

gnomic poetry, correspondence, and to Eckermann. There are a few references to *Werther*, and several to *Faust*, of course, but to the few parts of *Faust* that interested Jung: Mephistopheles as a principle of evil, Gretchen as the object of tragedy, the Mothers, bits of the classical Walpurgisnight, and bits of act five. Strikingly absent is *Die Wahlverwandtschaften*—today, surely, Goethe's psychological novel par excellence, but perhaps more Freudian than Jungian. The approach also seems characteristically Jungian with its survey of the psychotherapeutic discourse, forays into mythological and anthropological terrain, and special interest in images. Thus the connections between Goethe and Jung, both at the beginning of Chapter 3 and throughout, are consistently conceptual. They are also often so general and so typically romantic that they do not seem specifically Goethean, even though Bishop does not want to call Goethe a romantic. Nevertheless, the accumulation of documented textual parallels confirms Goethe's pervasive presence in Jung's thinking and Bishop emphasizes, correctly, the importance of imagination for both Goethe and Jung.

Goethe and Jung function here as partners in conversation more than as one figure influencing the other. For example, we are told that #1255 of *Maximen und Reflexionen* is "clearly compatible with Jung's principle that, 'both theoretically and practically, polarity is inherent in all living things,' a principle that in *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* [Jung's memoir] . . . is traced back to Heraclitus" (123). The framework of the book confines it to the gravitational field defined by its two luminaries and prevents Bishop from locating his material in a larger historical narrative that tries to emerge from the text's subconscious but cannot quite get a word in edgewise: Jung, like most of his important intellectual contemporaries—Freud, Cassirer, Bertrand Russell (the figures to whom Bishop points and to whom I would add Heidegger, Arendt, Elias)—grew up in the age of the Goethe cult. Vast ranges of European intellectual life at the turn of the twentieth century were profoundly influenced by Goethe. Bishop has done the necessary detailed spadework with regard to Jung with admirable thoroughness, but I would like to hear more about how that claim for Goethe's legacy impacted the often competitive relations among the towering intellectuals of Jung's generation. It is hard to imagine a scholar better positioned to pursue this question, and I look forward to Bishop's further work.

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Charlton Payne and Lucas Thorpe, eds., *Kant and the Concept of Community*. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2011. 321 pp.

*Kant and the Concept of Community*, edited by Charlton Payne and Lucas Thorpe, gathers together some of the best-known figures in contemporary Kant scholarship. This fine collection traces Kant's concept of community from its precritical roots to its role in *The Critique of Pure Reason*, before going on to investigate the subsequent transformations it would undergo in Kant's later works on ethics, religion, history, politics, and aesthetics. With very few exceptions, all of the essays in this collection are interesting and informative, with signature pieces by Béatrice Longuenesse, Paul Guyer, Allen Wood, Onora O'Neill, and Susan Shell. This is a highly recommended collection suitable for advanced undergraduates, graduate students, and professionals.

The starting point for this collection lies in the table of categories provided by Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781, 1787, 2nd ed.). Here, in the so-

called first Critique, Kant had described twelve categories that he took to be lying at the heart of the processes making up mental cognition. Under the title "Relation," were three of the twelve categories listed: substance and accident, cause and effect, and community (*Gemeinschaft*). Kant's understanding of community in this case was connected to its logical basis as a disjunctive judgment, where disjunction was taken to be a mental act of dynamic reciprocity. When faced with an either/or decision, in other words, the nonchosen object remained an active participant in the logical judgment, according to Kant, insofar as its negation was necessary for the chosen object to be simultaneously determined as the reciprocally positive choice. This formed the background for Kant's added description of community as "reciprocity (*Wechselwirkung*) between agent and patient" (A80/B106). Assuming this part of Kant's argument was clear enough, however, things became decidedly murky once Kant took on the task of explaining how the category of community worked when applied to judgments of experience. For it certainly was not clear to many of his commentators, for example, why our perceptual judgments regarding simultaneously existing objects should rely necessarily on our judging those objects to be related in a state of reciprocal determination: I could see the moon, for example, and shifting my gaze I could see the field below it, but why was there a necessary reciprocity between the perceived moon-object and the perceived field-object in that event? With these and other complaints in the air, Kant's discussion of community languished in the pile of other arguments deemed wanting in comparison to the best moments of the first Critique. Adding to this dismissal, moreover, was a general awareness of the many places where Kant separately discussed religious, moral, and political communities—not to mention the important role played by the *sensus communis* in his work on aesthetics, the *Critique of Judgment* (1790)—without any obvious attempt on his part to connect these discussions to the original account of community as something logically identifiable with reciprocal determination. It comes as no surprise, therefore, to see that there has been little interest among scholars in investigating possible threads of continuity between the original account and the rest of Kant's work. This, however, is precisely what the editors of *Kant and the Concept of Community* attempt to redress with the essays in their collection.

Given the aims set forth by Payne and Thorpe, it is clear that the first task will be some sort of attempt at rehabilitation with respect to Kant's original discussion of community in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The first two pieces, by Longuenesse and Watkins, take up this challenge, with Longuenesse essentially elaborating a line of argumentation first developed by her in *Kant and the Capacity to Judge* (Princeton UP, 1998). Longuenesse admits that her interest in the concept of community lies in the fact that it is the most difficult of Kant's arguments to defend, before going on to attempt this defense by showing how Kant relied on the other categories of relation when establishing his proof. Watkins's strategy is to move beyond the first Critique to Kant's *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* (1786), where Kant sought to apply the categories to specific cases in physics. This discussion is particularly helpful, demonstrating the concrete role played by Kant's category of community (understood as both *Gemeinschaft* and *Wechselwirkung*) for understanding the filling of space by matter and the communication of motion.

With the foundation provided by Longuenesse and Watkins in place, the remainder of this collection takes up the effort to describe points of continuity

across Kant's critical writings, an effort Payne and Thorpe defend in light of Kant's well-known commitment to the centrality of the categories of experience for the system of reason as a whole. The editors argue for a distinction between what they consider to be "core" concepts of community for Kant—concepts, in other words, whose lineage is more easily traceable to their logical underpinnings—and the more remote versions of community, including under this heading the three essays devoted to Kant's account of a *sensus communis*. Apart from the opening two essays and the final three, therefore, the bulk of the collection looks at Kant's practical philosophy, emphasizing in most cases the reciprocal responsibility entailed by life in a moral community. Among these essays, Paul Guyer's piece can be especially appreciated for its sustained effort to disentangle conflicting texts and interpretations surrounding the relationship between what Kant described as a "kingdom (*Reich*) of ends," and the "highest good." Allen Wood provides an equally helpful discussion of the connection between Kant's views on religion and the formation of an ethical community, and the pieces by Onora O'Neill on the distinction between public and private uses of reason, Jeffrey Edwards on Kant's theory of property, and Susan Shell's discussion of Kant's political ideals regarding citizenship provide illuminating discussions that are well worth reading. Coming away from this collection, one might not be convinced in the end that Kant was quite as systematic as the editors believe he was regarding the concept of community, however one will be no less enlightened and informed as a result.

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Marcus Twellmann, "Ueber die Eide": Zucht und Kritik im Preussen der Aufklärung. Munich: Konstanz University Press, 2010. 334 pp.

With a nod to Friedrich Nietzsche's famous claim that cultural practices such as making a promise and the administering of punishment consist of ever-changing interpretations and legitimations, Marcus Twellmann embarks on his investigation of the vicissitudes to which the oath was subject in Prussia during the Enlightenment. The oath emerges in the course of Twellmann's lucid argument, which is related in refreshingly crisp and precise prose, as a point of intersection between state administration, religious practice, and philosophical critique. Because the taking of an oath traditionally involved the invocation of the divine, its study allows Twellmann to treat the Enlightenment as an age as characterized as much by continuity as by rupture. Twellmann's leading surmise is that the emergence of the modern state as a pastoral force, as interested in the spiritual salvation of its citizens as much as in the preservation of peace, preserved, albeit under shifting terms, the religious significance of oath taking. Tracing a breathtaking arc from public ordinances at the turn of the eighteenth century to the seminal philosophical reflections on oaths by Moses Mendelssohn and Immanuel Kant, and then closing with a poignant reflection on the fashionably controversial Carl Schmitt, Twellmann shows that the oath was a procedure by means of which the emerging state order compelled its subjects to speak the truth. The culminating moment in Twellmann's march toward modernity is, undoubtedly, the treatment of oaths in the philosophy of Kant. For this Prussian philosopher, above all others, spearheaded a conception of the oath as a relationship between a human being and his or her conscience, thereby jettisoning the traditional role of God as guarantor of truth.