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"ONTOLOGY, AUTHENTICITY, FREEDOM, AND TRUTH IN HEIDEGGER'S AND SARTRE'S PHILOSOPHY"

Abstract: Heidegger and Sartre developed the projects of their fundamental ontologies within the framework of the phenomenological approach. The traditional view of reality is based on dualistic oppositions of ideal and material, spirit and body, reality and possibility, and visibility and essence. It is phenomenology that enables elimination of the above-mentioned dualisms and restoration of the world's ontological unity on a reliable foundation. Though Sartre's existentialism was exposed to criticism both from right, and from the left intellectuals, and is not a "fashionable" current at present, and the fundamental ontology of Heidegger was estimated by Levinas as ontology of the power subject-centered line, nevertheless the author considers that attention which is paid in these concepts to such phenomena as the voice of conscience, care and freedom represents the most urgent philosophical value nowadays; the author in this regard points to insufficient validity of modern criticism of approaches of Heidegger and Sartre, in particular – reproaches in a subject-centered line from adherents of "ontology of the Other".

Keywords: being-in-the-world, ontology, Sartre, Heidegger, Truth, authenticity, Dasein, Nothingness, knowledge, phenomenology.

Ontology: Dasein and Being-in-the-World; Being and Nothingness

Although Husserl has a profound influence on both Heidegger and Sartre, who belong to the phenomenological philosophical tradition and adhere to the same method, there are major differences in their ontological projects: in their principles of the explanation of the Being structure, in the concept of human freedom and human relation to the Other, and in the understanding of language and the role of art.

Let us proceed to explicate being and existential relations, as they are represented in Heidegger's ontological project.

Heidegger terms the specific being that is peculiar to human reality as 'Dasein' (Germ. Da = here, there). This human reality is always present in the world, and forms a single and inseparable structure with the world; moreover, most importantly, this specific being is able to ask and asks about its own being.

Dasein exists (Germ. 'existiert'), which is its main difference from other worldly objects: A stone and a tree do not interrogate about their being and thus they do not exist; they have no possibility of being or not being themselves. For example Çüçen's interpretation of this in the following:

Being-in-the-world belongs to Dasein's ontological constitution. Nature, extant entities, can be without a Dasein existing because Dasein's world is not the natural world but rather a phenomenal world. The phenomenal world is more than the natural world, and Dasein cannot exist without phenomenal world because the phenomenal world belongs to Dasein's Being. Therefore, in a traditional sense, there are radical differences of ontological constitution between *res extensa and res cogitans* [1, 60].

Existence precedes essence: at first, this human reality only exists and then it determines itself; it is where 'existence means Dasein's possibility "to be itself or not itself"' [2, 33].

In the end, it constitutes full responsibility of the human reality for its behaviour: the ability to ask and determine itself in relation to being in the world and forming a single structure with the world.

For Heidegger, to ensure explication of the structure of relations between Dasein and Being, it is first necessary to raise the question of Being, which, he believes, has been forgotten by the Western metaphysical tradition. The development of the question about being starts from an analysis of that specific being that is able to ask about its own being; therefore, it has a non-explicit understanding of being – from the existential analysis of Dasein. The structure of authentic and non-authentic being of Dasein is revealed in existentials. A fundamental existential of Dasein is care; Being-in-the-world is essential for Dasein; the structure is unfolded in authentic (understanding or discourse) and non-authentic (ambiguity, curiosity, twaddle) moments.

As opposed to Heidegger, Sartre's ontological project emphasizes Nothingness. It is also a phenomenon of human reality from a somewhat different point of view than Heidegger's but principally not reduced to the dualism of the previous metaphysical notion. Sartre also develops his project within the framework of phenomenology. Let us clarify what it means. The basic characteristic of consciousness in phenomenology is intentionality – i.e., directedness towards an object. This object (noema), which is realized and to which cogitation (noesis) is directed, belongs to consciousness and also to the process of cogitation itself (noesis), according to Husserl's point of view. Sartre says with regard to this position that Nothingness can also possess being characteristics (an example of Pierre, whose absence in a cafe was not immediately noticed by the man who had arranged meeting with him in this café) [4, 9]. The Non-being in phenomenological ontology is as real as the being of a 'positive' thing.

There are two moments of being: being-for-itself or being of consciousness and being-in-itself or the totality of positive being. Being-for-itself is a particular way of being, which fulfils a series of negations of everything and in this way mark itself against the background of all other.

In case of cognition, being which is not I is an 'absolute completeness' of being-in-itself. Consequently, all that represents an object of cognition is the world – the world as a totality:

Yet it is not a purely subjective modification of the for-itself since it causes all subjectivity to be possible. But if the for itself is to be the nothingness whereby "there is" being, then being can exist originally only as totality. Thus knowledge is the world. To use Heidegger's expression, the world and outside of that – nothing. But this nothing is not originally that in which human reality emerges. This *nothing* is human reality itself as the radical negation by means of which the world is revealed [4, 181].

The 'proscenium' of totality of multiple groups of items is the space. Therefore, space is an instability of the world:

Space is not the world, but it is the instability of the world apprehended as totality, inasmuch as the world can always disintegrate into external multiplicity [4, 184].

Here Sartre indicates existential origins of space, which are concealed (forgotten, not correctly understood) in science; in geometry, for example, there happened a hypostatization of external indifference into a substance existing by itself.

With further respect to knowledge, Sartre interprets it as:

Knowledge is nothing other than the presence of being to the For-itself, and the For-itself is only the nothing which realizes that presence. Thus knowledge is by nature ekstatic being, and because of that fact it is confused with the ekstatic being of the For-itself. The For-itself does not exist in order subsequently to know; neither can we say that it exists only in so far as it knows or is known, for this would be

to make being vanish into an infinity regulated by particular bits of knowledge. Knowing is an absolute and primitive event; it is the absolute upsurge of the For-itself in the midst of being and beyond being, in terms of the being which it is not and as the negation of that being and a self nihilation [6, 216].

Therefore, for both Heidegger and Sartre, the being of the human reality is ecstatic and pre-reflexive, which means that it is not a reflexive Cogito of Descartes where being is a derivative of thinking. According to Heidegger, the being of human reality forms a single structure with the world, with the basic characteristic of disposedness in the world. According to Sartre, this single structure is a mobile quasi-totality in which there appear attraction points of 'being-for-itself' directed to 'being-in-itself', with "being-for-itself" transcending itself into 'consciousness of something' by means of an intentional act. The result of this transcending process, according to Sartre, is the world as an affirmed being. These points of view cannot be characterized as either idealism or realism, since the basis for competition for the existential superiority of a particular substance is eliminated.

Except being-in-the-world, the basic existentials include comport with the world and understanding of the world. Understanding of the world is rooted in the act of understanding rather than knowledge of things. We apprehend the world by means of our intuitive understanding of things. In this respect we can compare Heidegger's position with that of Sartre, with the latter saying that every cognition process could be only intuitive in the end:

[T]here is only intuitive knowledge. Deduction and discursive argument, incorrectly called examples of knowing, are only instruments which lead to intuition. [7, 182]

At the same time, the understanding of a thing is revealed in Heidegger's ontology, with it being ready-to-hand (zu handen)—e.g., Çüçen interprets:

Reality must be ontologically established in the Being of Dasein as an understanding of Being because reality is not something present-at-hand. Reality is something ready-to-hand and based on the understanding of Being [1, 55].

The dialectics of our freedom and being-in-the-world are revealed by our particular moods: grief, anxiety, and fear. Here, the common structure is 'disposedness' (Germ. Befindlichkeit). Existential moods are elements of this structure. This structure employs spontaneity – e.g., it happens when feelings seize us and assail us (Germ. überfallen). And it does not depend on us. These existential moods are not subjective (an example of alley in Wrathall's interpretation [9, 30]), and there are also social existential moods. However, these moods are not objective and originate from presence in the world:

So disposedness is an 'attunement', a way of being tuned in to things in the world, and tuned by the things of the world. This disposedness is something we can never fully master. But far from that being a detriment to our freedom, it is the condition that first makes it possible. [9, 34]

Attunement is what we cannot control. Sartre represents the grasping of being in the very basic universal form of immediate access, namely disgust, which is portrayed as total negation in his novel 'Nausea':

And then all of a sudden, there it was, clear as day: existence had suddenly unveiled itself. It had lost the harmless look of an abstract category: it was the very paste of things, this root was kneaded into existence. Or rather the root, the park gates, the bench, the sparse grass, all that had vanished: the diversity of things, their individuality, were only an appearance, a veneer. This veneer had melted, leaving soft, monstrous masses, all in disorder unnaked, in a frightful, obscene nakedness [6, 127].

Here we can find motives of thrownness into the world, attunement of everything to the absolute, single colour: suddenness and spontaneity of overwhelming existential grief in which being itself and the flesh of things are revealed.

The question of authenticity is one of the main questions of the human being in the philosophy of

Heidegger and Sartre. Investigation of the impersonal phenomenon of man, description of an understanding of the human conscience, bad faith, and sincerity – these are moments to which both philosophers pay close attention with regard to exploration of the human reality with the world: as being oneself.

The phenomenon of man (Germ. 'man'), analysed by Heidegger, is impersonal 'Others'. It is an impersonal but not voiceless phenomenon that can impose common understanding and action.

According to Heidegger, the man can hear the voice of conscience this voice serves as a call for remaining oneself, the human; this voice exists exclusively inside Dasein, prior to any action and any guilt. Public conscience is the 'voice of man'. Following this voice of 'man', Dasein loses its authenticity:

The voice does call back, but it calls back beyond the past deed onto thrown being-guilty, which is 'earlier' than any indebtedness [Verschuldung]. But the call back at the same time calls forth a being-guilty, as something to be seized upon in one's own existence, in such a way that authentic, existentiell being-guilty precisely comes after the call, and not the other way around. Basically, bad conscience is so far from reproving and pointing back that it rather points forward by calling back into thrownness [2, 179].

Thus, here Heidegger again highlights basic existential structures such as care (in thinking in advance about own indebtedness) and ecstatic being, as it is not an assessment of fulfilled events. Also, there is openness of responsibility and incompleteness of Dasein.

According to Sartre, the human can also be placed in a situation of rigorous alternative, the situation of choice, and lapse into a particular subordination, that is, lose his/her authenticity. However, in Sartre's explanation of this situation, there is no focus on 'public opinion' as well as on the voice of man and care, but rather on the phenomenon of 'sincere' self-deception – i.e., the phenomenon of 'bad faith', which means non-concurrency of for-itself and in-itself.

Bad faith of a person is a negation directed at the self: The human can subjectively deny something, but he/she in reality makes opposite things in the same unselfish and sincere manner. But this non-concurrency conceals the deception of bad faith. Another example of bad faith is when the human asserts or denies something, but the sense of what is being said neutralizes or depreciates his/her statement or denial. This means that a solution is hidden from itself in the situation of self-denial – it is bad faith.

Bad faith is a state. The opposite of bad faith is sincerity. But sincerity is not a state and rather a requirement to be who we are. It is not similar to the being-in-itself, for example, of a table or any other thing. The desire of always being sincere is the sense of being-for-itself stemming from the feeling of guilt, which is called existential guilt by Sartre.

Hence, the points of view of both philosophers coincide with regard to the explanation of the original existential guilt of the human, which is constituted by the desire to be authentic and the desire to be oneself, though they use different methods of explanation.

Solipsism, Transcendence, The Other

The most important philosophical problem investigated by Sartre, which significantly marks his ontological position from Heidegger's position, is a problem of the Other:

Others are the Other, that is the self which is not myself. Therefore, we grasp here a negation as the constitutive structure of the being-of-others [4, 230].

This view on the problem differs Sartre's position from ideas of both materialism and idealism. According to realism, bodies are located in the physical space; ontologically, the negation *I am not this* expresses the same as 'the table is not a chair'. Idealism separates two consciousnesses but in the same hypostatizing way – the difference from idealism is that the space in which two consciousnesses are separated is ideal. In materialistic and idealistic concepts, the Other is represented in consciousness as an external thing with regard to consciousness.

Sartre, on the contrary, adheres to the phenomenological approach; in my opinion, his position cannot be called materialistic, idealistic, or dualistic. The 'Substance' of being is not necessary in Sartre's ontology.

In part three in chapter one of 'Being and Nothingness' Sartre examines the concepts of three philosophers: Husserl, Hegel, and Heidegger. The concepts of these philosophers include an apprehension of the solipsism inevitability if a dualistic position is taken – i.e., two substances separated from each other in order to explicate relations of I and the Other; an attempt to unite two separated substances is a very unstable concept. But we can try to understand the relations between I and the Other within the framework of the phenomenological approach, as originated from intentional activities of consciousness itself. In this case, this consciousness is not Cogito, and, with no account of Cogito, we find the Other, and, vice versa, the existence of the Other makes Cogito possible at the moment of understanding ourselves as objects. For Sartre, rather the universal abstraction of the structure of the Other, the fact of being of the individual's claims is important:

– [I]f we are to refute solipsism, then my relation to the Other is first and fundamentally a relation of being to being, not of knowledge to knowledge [4, 244].

Heidegger also tried to find the way out of solipsism. Heidegger introduced new notions characterizing the human reality: 'being-in-the-world' where 'world', 'being-in', and 'being' are moments of integrity of one structure, and ways of being of the human reality with others are the moments of man (subordination), authenticity, Mit-sein (being together with others). Here 'I' does not meet the Other afterwards, as we speak of integral structure of Dasein. This being is not Cogito but Dasein 'which is mine'; and the relation with the Other is the moment of Dasein's structure.

The differences between Sartre's and Heidegger's opinions consist in connotational interpretations of the relations with the Other. While, according to Heidegger, it can be Mit-Sein (being together) or man (non-authentic being), Sartre understands the relations with the Other rather as a fatal 'conflict'.

For Heidegger, Dasein always represents its own possibility; it is oriented to the future in its authentic being. A very interesting question is 'what motivates a step from inauthenticity into a freedom', where Patkul, for example, interprets the transition into freedom as philosophizing:

– [W]hat motivates the transition from inauthenticity as initial mode of human Dasein, in which it "initially and for the most part" is, to the authenticity of its very being at all? Heidegger's answer is: anxiety (die Angst). … anxiety has the same function as philosophizing, namely that of bringing-back Dasein to its existentiality as its proper way of being [3, 136].

If we consider that human capacities are restricted by the world and by one's own nature, the relation of freedom with the world structure might be questioned and also it might be asked what serves as a push – a trigger to step into the authentic being – into freedom. And while, according to Heidegger, the voice of conscience can be such a motivation factor, Sartre believes that freedom must be distinguished as an ability to create projects and then be fulfilled. And freedom itself never exists outside 'the world maintaining resistance', where 'success is not important to freedom' [4, 483].

In Husserl's philosophy, the Other appears as the problem of the inter-subjective world constitution, not from the perspective of the individual I, but from the perspective of the inter-subjective horizon. Husserl's philosophy was a source of inspiration for Levinas. An intentional analysis showed the horizons that were forgotten by science.

Heidegger's philosophy comprises criticism of alienated mass being, which he calls *Das Man*, and traces its roots to technification, widescale industrialization and depersonalization. Heidegger's fundamental ontology is built from the Subject under a certain perspective – from Dasein; it is still philoso-

phy of the Subject, and therefore, there is a suppressive core at the heart of it. Here, everything is also drawn up from the I, though asking about its own being. According to Heidegger, the Other appears in Mit-Sein modus, being with others, where there are no asymmetrical relations of responsibility.

In Husserl's theory, we find responsibility as a responsibility for scientific truth, and in Heidegger's theory, as responsibility for the truth of Being, though I should notice and emphasize that Heidegger is not so abstract, and does not keep away from the issues of responsibility and conscience.

Sartre asserts that responsibility consists of an individual action; in concordance with Sartre's existentialism, there is no way out of our own subjectivity. Again, according to my opinion it should be noted that for Sartre [4, 182] cognition precedes action, and cognition is exclusively intuitive and deduction and discourse are the instruments of cognition, i.e. instruments of intuition, and surely, Sartre does not deny either discourse, or deduction, or intuition, and he also places emphasis on the description of particular relations with the Other, the issues of view of the Other, and conscience under the view angle of 'bad faith' (mauvais foi). The action itself is not an initial point for existentialism.

The differences, to my opinion, are just in the stresses that each of these authors lay on, while considering one or another sphere. For Levinas, it is the sphere of particular relations with the Other, where the Other acts as a Person, and the content of these relations comprises responsibility, conscience, and duty towards the Other; which, generally speaking, does not mean Levinas' hard opposition, at least, to Sartre. In my opinion, the ideas of both Sartre and Heidegger do not demonstrate a rough asymmetry, precisely with regard to the Face of the Other (In terms of guilt, Heidegger proposes that selfness rethinks itself as guilty [2, 179], as thrown into guilt; and according to Sartre, the human totality is simultaneously transcendental and immanent, and relations with

the Other are expressed in modus of shame, when the I is subordinate to the Other, and being-in-the-world-for-the-other (total submission) and and in modus of love.

To be, freedom does not need either Aristotle's 'matter' or the stoics' 'pneuma': with regard to 'being-in-itself', 'being-for-itself' just makes a negation. Sartre believes that 'situation and motivation are really one' [4, 487]. It is a paradox of freedom: freedom can be only in the context of the situation, but the situation is always associated only with freedom:

– [W]e are a freedom which chooses; but we do not choose being free: we are condemned to freedom, as we said earlier, thrown into freedom or, as Heidegger says, 'abandoned' [4, 484–485].

In his essay "Existentialism is Humanism", Sartre further asserts that if existence really precedes essence, the human is responsible for who he/she is and he/she *cannot pass beyond human subjectivity [5, 68]*–it is, according to Sartre, the deep sense of existentialism. There is no possibility to find any values, including in the noumenal world. We are, according to Sartre's expression, on a plain where no one is present, except people – with no excuses, no apologies.

The situation represents our position in the world and correlates with movement of the given towards the target goal: Everything which is given appears to be turned from the perspective of *incompleteness–'it is still not', and,* consequently, there are no and will not be situations, which could provide 'more freedom'

Hereafter, the thoughts of the two philosophers were developed by Heidegger under the sign of a 'linguistic turn', and by Sartre under the sign of his political activism and literature creativity. While analytical philosophy holds that we can understand intelligence by only analytically understanding the work of language, both Heidegger and Sartre are interested in their late works not in the logical work of language but in its nature as well as by the voiceless, still unspoken, word which is about to be in-

cluded in unconcealedness. The philosophical analysis is aimed at understanding the different ways of being-in-the-world, which are created by language, occupying all spheres of our presence in the world. Besides, for Heidegger, propositional truths were not the most fundamental; moreover, they did not express the original essence of being. According to Heidegger, it is more important to listen to the language itself, to what it says, to performative acts of language:

Instead of speaking of consciousness, he speaks of Erschlossenheit (openness) and of lumen naturale (light). He subordinates theoretical knowledge to a more original understanding from which it derives. This original understanding is indiscernible from existence as openness. To the extent that this openness entails a certain degree of comprehension, Heidegger identifies the human being with speech. This is not a representative kind of speech, but one that embraces the diverse modalities of consciousness. It is practical because it refers to being oriented; it is reflexive because it echoes in the subject and its capacities [8, 68].

Here we observe an obvious change of the subject of the analysis: a transition to understanding being as openness, which can be cognized not so much in an analysis of consciousness structures or the Dasein mundane, where understanding itself becomes fundamental and is revealed solely by language in which the pre-understanding of being is contained.

Sartre pays attention to the performative act of language and art, not reducing the propositional function of language to being:

Similarly, the signification of a melody if one can still speak of signification is nothing outside of the melody itself, unlike ideas, which can be adequately rendered in several ways. Call it joyous or sombre. It will always be over and above anything you can say about it [7, 10].

Therefore, we can cognize the living truth by means of great creation of art; it is where the word can become a part of openness.

To conclude comparing the points of view of the two philosophers, let us summarize: Both Heidegger and Sartre raise basic ontological questions in their works and use the same phenomenological method. Heidegger's main work 'Being and Time' focuses on the explanation of Dasein by analysing its existentials, with being-in-the-world and care being the basic ones. Sartre, in his turn, starts to develop his ontology, laying stress on Nothingness which is as real as the positive being, where the totality of being itself is divided into two moments: being-for-itself and being-in-itself. But both philosophers believe that the being of human reality is ecstatic: While Dasein is constituted by care and forms a united structure with the world, Sartre says that this single structure represents a mobile quasi-totality in which there appears attraction points of 'being-for-itself' directed to 'being-in-itself', and 'being-for-itself' transcends itself into the 'consciousness of something' by means of an intentional act.

In the phonomenological space we encounter freedom of the Other, who is as free as I am, and the sense of chain can appear as meaning and motivation to crush them, and sense of the slave's chains is represented as a goal which can be set by the particular man: to remain where he is or risk everything and break the chains.

In this situation, it means that, consequently, ontological sense of death is clarified in the abandoned being free: the human life and death are always unique, they are always "own", due to understanding of principal possibility of not being: for-itself is directed to being of its totality, in-itself, this quasi-totality is simultaneously immanent and transcendent and it forms a unite interrelated human reality.

The question of authenticity is one of the main issues of the human being in Heidegger's and Sartre's philosophy. According to Sartre, the human can also be placed in a situation of rigorous alternative and lapse into a particular subordination, which is akin to losing his authenticity. But unlike Heidegger, Sartre lays stress not on 'public opinion', the voice of 'man',

and care, but on the phenomenon of 'sincere' self-deception – i.e., the phenomenon of 'bad faith', which, in other words, is non-concurrency of for-itself and in-itself. However, in both cases, the authenticity phenomenon is closely related to the inner voice of conscience of the human existential guilt.

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