A computer simulation (or the Matrix or whatever) of our universe—of any kind—would require a monstrous amount of energy—as defined in both within our universe and in the reality of the simulators. But the simulators, if they could simulate our universe, would basically have achieved their own technological singularity. Thus, they could make themselves almost arbitrary smart (or anything else) in an almost arbitrarily small amount of time. Thus they would lose interest/motivation in simulating our universe almost immediately. I conclude there is a vanishingly small chance we are in a simulation.

That is the reality of the situation (so to speak). But here is an interesting question. Suppose simulator x simulates person y. Suppose also that person y is a simulator and simulates person x. The question is, would either of them have free will (whatever your preferred definition of 'free will' is)? I would speculate that either *both* of them do or *neither* of them do.

Best,

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