

From indignation to norms against violence in Occupy Geneva: a case study for the problem of the emergence of norms

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Abstract

(English)

Why and how do norms emerge? Which norms do emerge and why these ones in particular? These questions belong to the “problem of the emergence of norms” that consists of an inquiry on the production of norms in social collectives. It is with the ethnographic study of the emergence of “norms against violence” in the political collective “Occupy Geneva” that I address this problem: first, empirically with the analysis of my field observations; and, second, theoretically by discussing my findings. In consequence of two episodes categorized as sexual assaults that occurred in their camp, the members of Occupy Geneva decided to tackle those issues in a general assembly. Their goal was to amend their first charter of good conduct, in order to reform its norms and complete it with norms aiming to regulate “facts” of “unjustified violence.” During a collective deliberation, new norms were devised, debated, and consensually adopted. The writing of the new charter took place in a second general assembly during which the wording of the written norms was collectively decided. I show that indignation against the sexual assaults was the main motive that led to the collective deliberation, and that the entire process of the making of these norms was characterized by different collective emotions. Indeed, indignation, contempt and fear played major roles in the emergence of norms

prohibiting violence, allowing punishing and excluding wrongdoers, and prescribing to intervene collectively against an aggressor to neutralize the threat that he represents. These findings make me hypothesized that social norms emerge from emotions thanks to the latter internal structure; and that emotions provide *causal* and *grounding* explanations of this emergence. Thus, emotions allow answering the questions “Why do norms emerge?” and “Why do they have their specific forms?”. In short, I argue that social norms have emotional foundations.

Keywords: emergence of social norms, emotions, indignation and punishment, contempt and social exclusion, fear and protection, emotion rules, causal explanation, grounding explanation, collective deliberation, social movements, Occupy movement

Abstract

(français)

Pourquoi et comment les normes émergent-elles ? Quelles sont les normes qui émergent et pourquoi celles-ci en particulier? Ces questions relèvent du « problème de l'émergence des normes » qui consistent en une enquête sur la production des normes dans les collectifs sociaux. C'est par l'étude ethnographique de l'émergence de « normes contre la violence » dans le collectif politique Occupy Geneva que j'aborde ce problème : d'abord empiriquement par l'analyse de mes observations de terrain, puis théoriquement dans la discussion des résultats de l'étude. En conséquence de deux événements, catégorisés comme des agressions sexuelles, qui se sont produites dans leur camp, les membres d'Occupy Geneva ont décidé d'aborder ces sujets dans une assemblée générale. Leur but était d'amender leur charte de bonne conduite, afin d'en réviser les règles et de les compléter par l'ajout de nouvelles normes visant à réguler les « faits »

de « violence injustifiée. » Au cours d'une délibération collective, de nouvelles normes ont été conçues, débattues et adoptées par consensus. La rédaction de la nouvelle charte a eu lieu dans une seconde assemblée générale durant laquelle les normes écrites ont été formulées collectivement. Je montre que l'indignation contre les agressions sexuelles était le motif principal à l'origine de la modification de la première charte et que l'entier du processus de conception de ces normes était caractérisé par des émotions collectives. En effet, l'indignation, le mépris et la peur ont joué un rôle majeur dans l'émergence de normes prohibant la violence, permettant de punir et d'exclure un agresseur et prescrivant d'intervenir collectivement contre lui afin de neutraliser le danger qu'il représente. Ces résultats me conduisent à faire l'hypothèse que les normes sociales émergent des émotions et que les émotions fournissent des explications *causales* et *fondationnelles* (*grounded*) de cette émergence. De la sorte, les émotions permettent de répondre aux questions « Pourquoi les normes émergent-elles ? » et « Pourquoi ont-elles leurs formes spécifiques ? ». En bref, j'avance que les normes sociales ont des fondations émotionnelles.

Mots-clefs : émergence des normes sociales, émotions, indignation et punition, mépris et exclusion sociale, peur et protection, normes émotionnelles, explication causale, explication ancrée, délibération collective, mouvements sociaux, mouvement Occupy

1. Introduction

Much of social theory takes social norms as given and is interested in explaining how individuals behave in relation to the norms of their social collective (Coleman, 1990: p. 241). But the problems of why and how norms emerge are central to social theory (Coleman, 1990; Hechter and Opp, 2001). Thus questions such as how norms are constituted in a social collective

and how they get their form are fundamental ones. My argument is that social norms emerge from emotions that also ground them: emotions explain why norms emerge and why they take their specific forms.

In this paper, I look at the emergence of norms against violence in the political collective Occupy Geneva (OGVA). The aim of this study is to illustrate how the internal emotional dynamics or “reciprocal emotions” between members of a political movement (Goodwin et al., 2000) helped to shape the institutions of their political association by introducing norms aimed at regulating their interactions. I show how indignation toward two incidents consensually categorized as sexual aggressions led to a collective deliberation during which the members of the collective elaborated norms meant to prevent and punish violence. Contempt felt toward the sexual aggressor also resulted in the adoption of a norm allowing for his social exclusion, and fear of taking action against him contributed to shaping the norms that eventually emerged.

The idea that social norms have emotional foundations can be traced back to the work of authors such as Durkheim (2007 [1893]) who understood punishment in penal law as a passionate reaction, Ranulf (1933-34) who believed that indignation and envy were at the origin of criminal laws, and more recently Barbalet (2001) who considers that resentment and vengefulness motivate political activists’ claims for basic rights. The additional claim of this paper is a generalization of this argument, by saying that types of norms correspond to types of emotions.

2. Emotions and “affective oughts”

In this section, I give a definition of emotions and expose how they relate to norms in my theory. The aim is to present analytical tools that will help me analyze the empirical material, and to give substance to the general discussion at the end of the paper.

2.1. *Working definition of emotions*

Emotions can be characterized in different ways, but for the purpose of this paper, I concentrate on the following components: physiological arousal, physiological expressions, subjective feelings, a pleasure-pain dimension, cognitive antecedents, core-relational theme, intentional object, action readiness change, concerns, and temporality (Frijda, 2007). I will not elaborate on each component, not because they are unimportant for sociologists, but simply because they are not central to my study.

Emotions possess intentionality in the sense of being about something (Frijda, 2007; Deonna and Teroni, 2012): Maria's fear is *about* the dangerous dog, Nina is indignant *at* corruption. They can be caused by beliefs, perceptions, memories, imagination, etc. (Frijda, 2007), and thus have cognitive antecedents; They are "felt bodily evaluative attitudes" (Deonna and Teroni, 2012) that apprehend (dis-)values occurring in the world (de Souza, 1987; Tappolet, 2000). As such, indignation results from the evaluation of a situation seen as wrong, contempt from the evaluation of a person seen as unworthy. In fact, every type of emotion is differentiated by an associated value that philosophers call a "formal object" (Tappolet, 2000; de Souza, 1987; Deonna and Teroni, 2012) and psychologists call a "core relational theme" (Lazarus, 1991). But for an emotion to arise, the evaluation of a situation as exemplifying a (dis-)value is not sufficient. Indeed, emotions arise in "responses to events that are important to the individual's concern" (Frijda, 2007: p. 7). Concerns consists of "personal attachments" to objects or values for which the individual cares (Roberts, 2003): they are "states of valuing" (Deonna and Teroni, 2012).¹ Thus anger resulting from an insult can only arise if the person values respect and fear of a dangerous dog can only arise if the individual values her life.

¹ Since they are states of valuing, concerns are not identical to values.

Emotions are also motive states or “states of readiness” that prepare the individual to accomplish actions (Frijda, 2007). A state of readiness motivates, persists over time, exerts control precedence over other motive states; it is bodily felt and affects the whole individual; it also leads to a filtering of information: keeping the relevant and neglecting what is incompatible with the emotion (Frijda, 2007). Many states of readiness consist of “action tendencies”; that is, an impulse for accomplishing types of action. For instance, indignation prepares to punish the culprit (Ranulf, 1933-34; Elster, 2007), contempt to exclude the unworthy person (Fisher and Roseman, 2007), and fear² to neutralize the danger (Deonna and Teroni, 2012). Action tendencies are not identical to actions but are states of readiness to act that do not necessarily actualize in concrete actions (Frijda, 2007). For instance, someone who is indignant at the wrongdoings of a culprit will not necessarily act in order to punish him. Thus, as Frijda (2007: p. 27) says, action readiness “refers to readiness for achieving a particular aim.” Emotional behavior is then intentional, since it is “oriented toward a future state” (Frijda, 2007: p. 27). This orientation can take the form of a “prior intention” that precedes the action or that of an “intention in action”³ that does not precede the action but is realized while performing it (Frijda, 2007: p. 46).⁴

But emotions do not only motivate motor actions; they also motivate cognitive processes and may induce “cognitive changes” (Frijda and Mesquita, 2000). Indeed, action readiness modulates attention, sets expectations and perceptual sensitivity, sets sensitivity for cognitive information gathering and also influences the estimation of the probability of events (Frijda, 2007). It can thus motivate deliberation, calculation, and evaluation concerning future consequences of actions; this means that emotions influence deliberation and choice. Emotions

² It is quite common to read that fear has three action tendencies: flee, freeze and fight. But they can be redescribed as sub-categories of the global tendency of neutralizing the danger.

³ The notions “prior intention” and “intention in actions” comes from Searle (1985). Frijda uses them, but whereas he explicitly talks of “intention in action”, he uses “prior aim” for “prior intention.”

⁴ Aranguren (this volume) gives an insightful clarification on the relation between intention and state of readiness in terms of “push” and “pull” factors.

can thus lead to belief changes (Elster, 2010; Frijda and Mesquita, 2000) such as value judgements (Deonna and Teroni, 2012; Prinz, 2006) and deontic judgements.

2.2. *Affective oughts and emotion rules*

Usually, sociologists who study emotions and social norms are interested in how social norms shape emotions. They are thus interested in how social norms contribute to the regulation of emotions by defining when an emotion is appropriate or inappropriate in a social context. More deeply, they are concerned with the internalization of norms and how they shape the sensitivity of the members of a collective. A leading figure of this approach is Hochschild (2003)⁵ for whom social norms, or “feeling rules,” define the *type of emotion* that one ought to feel (sadness during a funeral) or not to feel (envy toward a colleague). They define *who* should be emotionally aroused, *when, where, with whom, toward whom, for how long, because of what, with what intensity and quantity*. They set emotional rights and duties by defining obligation, interdiction, and permission governing emotional arousal, expression, and behavior. They set standards of comparison between what an individual *is* feeling and what he *ought* to feel in a given social context (marriage, funeral, workplace), and thus they help the public or the individual to evaluate the social (in-)appropriateness of the emotion felt. Emotion rules are thus *extrinsic* to the emotions they regulate and belong to the ordinary ethic of societies.

Here an important remark on terminology must be done. Indeed, Hochschild (2003: p. 254) considers that “feeling” and “emotion” are interchangeable terms. But as Mulligan and Scherer (2012) state, this synonymy is misleading: an “integrative component” of emotions is their “subjective feeling”, and there are feelings that are not components of emotions (feeling of hunger or of pain in the foot, for instance). Since “feeling” and “emotion” are not identical, they cannot be used as synonyms. Thus strictly speaking the expression “feeling rules” cannot be

⁵ Nevertheless many of Hochschild's claims were anticipated in the seminal work of Mauss (1968-69).

used to mean “rules regulating emotions.” I will then follow Aranguren (this volume) who recommends substituting “*emotions rules*” to “*feeling rules*.” As he says, since feeling is one of the components of emotions among others, there is no good reason to restrict focus on “inner feeling”, for social norms regulate “emotions at large”, not only feelings. As such, emotion rules may regulate the different components of emotions: outer expression, evaluation, action, etc. The terminology being fixed, I come back to the main argument of this section.

As said above, emotion rules are *extrinsic* to the emotion they regulate. But besides this *extrinsic normativity* or social appropriateness, emotions can also be assessed as (in-)appropriate according to norms that belong to their nature and internal structure. Being internal to emotions, such norms can be called *intrinsic norms*. In order to show the contrast between the *extrinsic* and the *intrinsic* interpretations of “affective ought,” it is useful to give an example. Consider the expression *what ought to be felt* and the example of Allison’s envy toward her rival who has won a first prize in literature.⁶ In the extrinsic sense, if envy is considered a vice in Allison’s society, her envy would be assessed as inappropriate for moral reasons: she ought not to be envious. But in the intrinsic sense, Allison’s envy can be assessed as appropriate because her rival has won the prize that she coveted and because her rival’s success means that she cannot win the prize. In this case, envy is appropriate because it correctly represents (or fits) its object as being enviable (D’Arms and Jacobson, 2000; Deonna and Teroni, 2012); that is, it is exemplifying the formal object of this emotion. This example shows that even if envy can be socially inappropriate for moral reasons, it can be correct if its object is accurately presented as enviable (D’Arms and Jacobson, 2000).⁷ As such, envy “ought to be felt” because

⁶ The two meanings of appropriateness (property vs correctness) and the example of envy come from D’Arms and Jacobson (2000). I add to this picture the idea of distinguishing between “extrinsic and intrinsic norms or “extrinsic appropriateness” and “intrinsic appropriateness”.

⁷ There might be cases when an emotion is both correct and socially appropriate: for instance, indignation toward a sexual aggression can be assessed as a correct emotional attitude since sexual aggression represents unjustified violence and as morally appropriate for the members of a society who can claim that it is a duty of being indignant toward sexual violence.

of the *intrinsic norms* of this emotion, but “ought not to be felt” because of *social norms* or *emotion rules*. For the sake of simplicity in distinguishing between both senses of appropriateness, I will use “*social appropriateness*” for the *extrinsic* meaning, and “*correctness*” for the *intrinsic* meaning.

3. The emergence of norms against violence in Occupy Geneva

3.1. *Introducing Occupy Geneva*

Occupy Geneva (OGVA) was born October 15, 2011 in Geneva, Switzerland, and disappeared around May-June 2012. It was a nonpartisan political collective that was spontaneously created by inhabitants of Geneva alongside a worldwide demonstration against stock exchange markets organized by the Occupy Movement (Occupy Wall Street, Occupy Madrid, etc.). The collective thus joined the Occupy movement, which occupied symbolic places in many cities and countries in the world from spring 2011 onwards in order to denounce “democracy deficiency” and “unfair” economic relationships⁸. The *Indignés* of Geneva “occupied” a park in the center of the city, *Le parc des Bastions*. They settled a camp made of individual and collective tents; the camp grew after a few weeks to reach approximately 40-50 tents. It is difficult to accurately estimate the number of members of the movement, but probably a maximum of 70 to 80 persons lived in the camp, and there were about 350 sympathizers. Nevertheless, the arrival of winter, permanent conflicts, and demotivation led rapidly to a decline in participation. When the camp was shut down, fewer than 10 people lived in two tents. Not all members taking part in the general assemblies or the work groups (such as those against economic injustices or for capitalism alternatives) lived in the camp or lived in it permanently.

⁸ For studies about different instances of the Occupy Movement see the special issue “From Indignation to Occupation: A New Wave of Global Mobilization” of *Current Sociology*, edited by Benski, Langman, Perugorria & Tejerina in 2013.

The general assemblies (GAs) took place during the week in a tent mounted in the middle of the camp, whereas the Saturday GA was held outside the camp in front of the Wall of the Reformers⁹ in order to open up the GA to passersby and people who were reluctant to enter the camp.

Various topics were discussed during the GAs, but mainly they could be divided into those that concerned the “community,” that is, the management of the camp (management of heating wood, guard turn, washing-up, reception of outsiders, etc.), and those concerning the “political association” (political actions, working group, strategy, negotiation with city authorities). After one week of existence, the *Indignés* decided to adopt a charter of good conduct in order to regulate their interactions and try to live together in harmony. Indeed, they encountered various “practical problems” in the camp and during the GA that resulted in conflicts, that the charter was supposed to help resolve. Examples of such “problems” were thefts, insults, fights, disregard of collective decisions, free-riding, noise during the night, lack of participation to the GA. One month later, as the same problems and new ones were encountered, they decided to revise the first version of the charter and adopt a second one. Finally, when they dismantled the camp, they elaborated a third version of the charter that was only concerned with the GA.

3.2. *Institutional organization*

A very interesting specificity of OGVA, which was shared with other collectives of the Occupy Movement, comes from the fact that the collective was organized by two types of social organization: the community (as exemplified by the common life in the camp) and the political association (as exemplified by the GA, working groups, action groups, etc.). But both collective

⁹ This wall celebrates the protestant Reform, and few major figures have their statues: Guillaume Farel, Jean Calvin, Théodore de Bèze and John Knox.

forms were organized according to the same two constitutive principles: participatory and deliberative democracy. The principle of participatory democracy “permits that everyone directly participate to a collective decision; [whereas] deliberative democracy demands to the citizens to participate in the elaboration of decisions, that is to the process that leads to them” (Livet, 2007: p. 111)¹⁰. Both principles were operative for the community, as anyone could join, camp, and take part in the collective decisions affecting the common life, and for the political association, as anyone could take part in the GA and express views during the decision-making process. Since I am interested in the emergence of norms, and the GA was invested with the power of a “central legislator”—it was there that the rules of the charters were discussed and adopted—a brief description of its functioning is necessary.

3.2.1. Functioning of the general assembly

The general assembly took place around 8:00 p.m. during the week and around 2:30 p.m. on Saturdays. It was formally constituted by those people,—members of OGVA or not (for instance, people who were curious to know what OGVA was)—, who decided to attend the GA. The assembly was regulated by one moderator, and it was sometimes supported by a second facilitator in charge of indicating when it was someone's turn to speak. At the beginning of the GA, the moderator invited members to set the agenda. Together, they decided the order of the topics, and finally the moderator opened up the discussion by asking who wanted to take the floor. People who wanted to express their views raised their hands, and the moderator (or the second facilitator when there was one) defined the order of the talks. Various signs were

¹⁰ It is important to note that both principles are distinct. Indeed, participatory democracy states that *everyone* has the right to participate: *everyone* is a member of the *demos*. By contrast, deliberative democracy concerns only the “citizens”, and thus is not incompatible with a society that distinguishes between those who are members of the *demos* and those who are not.

used in order to prevent people from interrupting the speaker so as to ensure the smooth unfolding of the debate. The deliberation process ended when people agreed on what to do about the issue raised. The decision was made by consensus: each single participant was expected to express that he or she agreed with the proposed decision. In case of disagreement, the deliberation continued until a consensus was reached. Generally, the consensual decision was proposed by the moderator, and it was him or her who claimed that the members of the GA had arrived at a common decision.

3.2.2. The charters of good conduct

As already stated, the *Indignés* felt the need to agree on and adopt rules for regulating their common life: they wrote charters of good conduct that served the purpose of maintaining their collective¹¹. As such, the first two charters posited rules that applied to both the camp and the GA, whereas the third one was dedicated to the GA. Their changes over time mirror different practical problems that the *Indignés* encountered in the camp or during the GAs. In this paper, I am interested in the modification of the first rule of charters one and two; that is the ones concerned with both camp life and the regulation of GAs. In the first charter, rule number 1 stated the following:

- *We will respect others*
- *We will avoid insults, judgments, discriminations*

In the second charter, the statement of the rule was thus amended:

¹¹ See Kaufmann (2010) for a discussion of the moment of maintenance contrasted with the moment of constitution of a social collective.

- *We will respect ourselves as we respect others.*
- *We will refuse any insult, judgment, or discrimination (based on race, gender, sexual orientation, etc.).*
- *We will combat all forms of violence, verbal or physical, in particular sexual and/or racial violence.*

In what follows, I will attempt to explain why the rule was modified, and more specifically, I will focus on the modification of the verbs and the added content. But let me first describe the context in which these norms emerged.

3.3. *Context of emergence*

The modification of the rule is based on two distinct episodes involving a man and two young women in their twenties that the *Indignés* categorized as episodes¹² exhibiting the same scenario: the man offered the women to take cocaine with him in a tent. Inside the tent, the man started to touch them. In reaction to the touching the women left the tent and shouted out loud. A few *Indignés* who were aware of both episodes categorized them as “*sexual aggressions*”, as it will be shown in the analysis of the collective deliberation, and decided to talk about them during the GA of November 10, 2011. Their aim, as it can be inferred from the analysis of the GA, was to amend the charter of good conduct so as to make explicit reference to those events. A collective deliberation followed, during which new rules were discussed and a consensus on the content of the new norms was reached. But the rules were not written during this GA. It was only on November 21st that the second charter was collectively written. As will become clear,

¹² See the interventions of Armand in the first empirical extract.

indignation toward those sexual aggressions was the major motive that led the *Indignés* to modify their rules. For this reason, it is useful to provide a working definition of indignation.

4. Indignation, a working definition

The central theme or formal object of indignation is a wrong, and its action tendencies are the punishment of the wrongdoer and the nullification of the wrong situation. While indignation is a painful emotion belonging to the anger family, it differs from anger, and resentment. Indeed, anger is a reaction to personal offenses (Descartes, 1996 [1649]), and resentment is a reaction to domination construed as personal humiliation (Nietzsche, 1971), whereas indignation reacts to unjustified harm or good (Descartes, 1996 [1649]) that affects something¹³ or someone—a wrong resulting from the intentional ill-willed behavior of a wrongdoer (Strawson, 2008 [1974]). In this sense, indignation can be felt for the bad that is done to others, since the wrong needs not to affect the person who is indignant at it (Descartes, 1996 [1649]). That is why indignation is typically, but not necessarily, felt by a third party who attends the wrong (Elster, 2009; Ranulf, 1933-34). Thus the resulting tendency to punish of indignation can be called a “disinterested tendency to punish” (Ranulf, 1933-34). Indeed, the spectator is ready to punish the wrongdoer without expecting any individual profit or even at his own expense (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Ranulf, 1933-34). An additional action tendency is the tendency to nullify the wrong: the spectator is ready to intervene in order to stop and to make disappear the wrong situation. But those two action tendencies are “subspecies” of the general goal of the emotion: (re-)establishing the right. Finally, the concern of indignation can be described as a concern for the right understood as an attachment to the respect of superior


¹³ The nation, the state, the traditional family, esthetic canons, a vandalized painting, etc.

common goods.¹⁴ In the OGVA case, the relevant “collectively shared concern” (Salmela, 2012) for the modification of the charter was the “respect for others”, as the charter shows it.

5. Explaining the emergence of norms against violence in

OGVA

In this section I present field observations so as to analyze the process of emergence of the new rules. My empirical materials consist of transcripts of the recorded dialogues that the *Indignés* held during their GAs. The elaboration of the norms can be described as a temporal sequence divided into three stages, as represented in the scheme below.



The first stage is the public denunciation, during the GA of November 10th, of the two episodes involving the man and the two women that had previously caused the indignation of a few *Indignés*. The second stage is the elaboration of a collective reaction against them during the same GA, where the rules were discussed and a consensus was reached by the members. The

¹⁴ Laurence Kaufmann (personal communication) qualifies indignation as being concerning around superior common goods. Examples of superior common goods are values such as human dignity, respect, justice, liberty, equality, sacred, beauty, sublime, health, wealth, peace, etc.

third stage concerns the GA of November 21st, where members revised the first charter of good conduct and wrote the second version, by taking into account the consensual decision of November 10th. This analytic division allows showing the successive stages of the elaboration of the norms and also provides the steps of the explanation.

5.1. *The General assembly of November 10, 2011*

The major instigator that led to the modification of the first norm of the charter of good conduct came from the sexual aggressions committed by a man against two young women in the camp. The man was not a member of the collective. Like others, he just came to the camp to “hang around” without joining OGVA’s activities. The *Indignés* did not know his name, but they knew his nationality, and thus they called him the “Brazilian.” Both episodes were denounced and discussed during the GA of November 10, 2011. This GA lasted about two hours, and the discussion about the aggressions lasted about one hour. Around 25 people took part in the GA. Interestingly, neither the victims nor the assailant were present during the GA, and not all members of the GA had heard about the aggressions prior to the GA. The discussion thus finds its roots in the testimony of few *Indignés* who were in the camp when the aggressions occurred. As a matter of fact, since the victims were not there when the deliberation took place, the latter was entirely composed of third-party spectators.

5.1.1. First stage: call for third-party regulation

The GA had begun one hour earlier. The *Indignés* had spoken about various problems occurring in the camp: lack of hygiene, thefts, insults, drugs, etc. Now it was the turn of Lukas, who

wanted to speak about a specific kind of problem he had noticed: gender violence. His talk was spontaneously followed by those of Armand, Milo, and Edis, who did not ask the moderator for permission to speak.

Lukas, *bright, sharp, very lively*: [...] By the way, there's something... In relation to the rules and all that. What's been really bothering me lately... for me, it's extremely important that violence is explicitly mentioned, the sort of violence that's – how shall I say? – verbal and, above all, about gender relations. I'm not sure if you follow me? (*Lydie* : "Yes, yes".) Certain forms of gender violence, sexual violence, but sexual in a very broad sense, that we absolutely don't tolerate! No, what I mean is that we don't tolerate anyone hassling a girl or a guy (*Armand*: "It happened last night") in a way that's linked to their sexuality.

Armand: "It happened last night and it's really not cool."

Someone agrees: "Yea, yea".

Milo: "But it wasn't only last night, it also happened... The same person as when we were there on the other side."

Armand: "OK. Well I got the same impression afterwards as well."

Edis: "Who are we actually talking about? Because we mustn't hesitate!"

Armand: "A Brazilian you never see anywhere, who never participates in anything. In any case, it's not Fabiano or his usual mates; it's a guy on coke." (*Milo*: "Right.") "Let's call a spade a spade – who attracts chicks with his coke and then takes them into his tent (*Someone whistles softly*) and they come out yelling "Leave me alone! Let me out! Fuck, you're nuts!" (*Someone whistles softly*) So I warned him: next time "Eu te mata" [*I'll kill you in Portuguese*]. That's it. It's clear. And I'll do it! So now he knows where it's at."

Lukas denounces behavior that manifests violence. He focuses mainly on violence that he calls sexual or gender violence. His denunciation has a purpose: he wants the charter of good conduct to be modified in order to have new rules that clearly stipulate that any kind of gender violence is forbidden. He says also that the notion of gender violence must be understood very widely, that means that the definition ought to cover physical as well as verbal violence, but also

violence against women as well as against men. In that specific case, he speaks of sexual orientation. Lukas does not make explicit reference to a particular event; he speaks in general. During an interview I asked him what he had in mind when he spoke. He explained to me that he had been particularly outraged by an *Indigné* who had said in a casual conversation that homosexuality was disgusting and that he did not approve of it. But Lukas also spoke of other men who indulged in sexist talk, as well as the sexual aggressions that occurred in the camp. Interestingly, we see that Lukas—who is heterosexual—reacted with indignation to gender violence, judging that such violence was bad and intolerable. Implicitly, this denunciation is also an act of accusation against those who were “guilty” of performing such violence. By the way, since both speech acts are made in front of the assembly, they also consist of a call to a third-party regulation by orienting the attention of the public to gender violence and by calling for a modification of the charter of good conduct. Remarkably, Lukas formulates a proscription under the form of a norm in which the pronoun “we” is used: “We don’t tolerate anyone hassling a girl or a guy in a way that is linked to their sexuality”: a potential “we” emerges that entails the evaluative judgments that violence is bad and intolerable, and the deontic judgements that such violence ought to be forbidden. This “we” at this specific time is only potential, because the collective deliberation by which other members of the community are called to give their approval to this “we” has just started: no consensus about the legitimacy of the norm that Lukas proposes has yet emerged.

After Lukas, Armand takes the floor and informs the public in vague terms that something falling under the category of gender violence “happened yesterday.” In saying “it’s really not cool,” he expresses disapproval and condemnation of the act he has in mind: the second sexual aggression. Someone expresses approval, saying “Yea, yea,” and Milo adds that another sexual aggression occurred. Armand says it seemed to him that this was the case. Edis reacts and asks who the assailant is: his name must be given without hesitation. These turns at talk involve

further denunciations of the sexual aggressions, but also an accusation of their perpetrator, whose identity is sought: indignation seeks a culprit.

In response, Armand, who was in the camp when the second aggression was perpetrated and who had heard about the first one, informs the assembly about the identity of the assailant. His description remains quite vague. The author is described as not taking part in the activity of the collective; he is “Brazilian” and a cocaine addict. Milo confirms this short description. Remarkably, the description means that this person is categorized as not being a member of the collective: he has no name and does not participate. Following the description, Armand tells what he heard and how he reacted when the second aggression occurred. But rather than speaking only about the second aggression, he aggregates both aggressions and produces a narrative that becomes the common structure of both events, therefore considered as two instances of the same type.

The “Brazilian” is presented as a seducer who offers cocaine to the young women (they were in their twenties) and makes them follow him under a tent in order to take the drug. Under the tent, the women endure sexual touching, a scene that is not explicitly described but only hinted at. Then the women go out of the tent screaming, “Leave me alone! Let me out! Fuck, you’re nuts!” The young women are thus presented as victims who have suffered from bad treatment. Indeed, the words that Armand puts in the mouth of both women give access to their suffering. But what Armand is really narrating is only the second aggression: when Christine was assaulted, she went out of the tent screaming and went straight to the tent where Armand and several Indignés were, including Milo, in order to seek help and protection. After hearing Christine’s screams and what she related, Armand, just like he says to the assembly, went straight to the “Brazilian” and threatened him with death: “*Eu te mata.*”

So what exactly is Armand doing with this narrative? As we see, he does not tell very accurately the “facts”; for instance, he does not use the names of the victims, Christine and Laya, which

he knows. Indeed, he makes a generalization and speaks of “girls.” As such, the concrete actions of the Brazilian’s aggressions against both Christine and Laya are modified: the surnames making reference to singular individuals or persons are substituted with the impersonal and general social category of women. This constitutes a first redescription of both events that will, during the collective deliberation, lead to an abstract typification implying social categories: men and women connected with actions typified as violent and wrong, where the men occupy the position of the “strong” who through sexual violence inflict unjustified harm to the “weak”, a position that is in the present case occupied by women. Thus, the situation of sexual violence is seen as a wrong that exhibits one of the basic appraisals of indignation: a strong inflicts unjustified harm to a weak (Descartes, 1996 [1649])¹⁵.

This “factual” relation is very important for the GA because it presents what happened in the camp to the members of the assembly. Armand’s speech works as an activator of collective indignation both for those who are already aware of those events and for those who are hearing from them for the first time. It is according to Armand’s speech that the theme of *unjustified wrong* enters into the collective discussion and triggers collective indignation.

Now, it appears that indignation is not the only emotion that the description can be said to involve. Indeed, the Brazilian is presented as a drug addict: a character that inspired contempt in Armand, as he showed on many occasions during the ethnography¹⁶. But contempt for the “vice” of “using drugs” is not the only one and maybe not the most important for the collective

¹⁵ This appraisal can be identified since a “sexual assault” is by definition a situation where the assailant “takes advantage” and “makes suffer” his victim by force and against her will.

¹⁶ Armand’s general contempt can be illustrated by two GAs (among others) where he evaluated people categorized as drug addicts negatively, expressed stereotypical judgments, the will to exclude them, and reported that he undertook actions in order to do so. In the first GA, a discussion about drug dealings took place. Armand qualified people he identified as “customers” coming into the camp to buy and take drugs as “guys who have the face of a dead fish”. He added to this remark that he “has to kick them off [the camp] regularly” (GA, November, 28th). In the second GA, when the issue of expelling drug addicts who had tents in the camp came into discussion, Armand backed up this measure. And when an *Indigné* made the remark that Armand categorized and negatively evaluated people as drug addicts without evidence, he explained that he was able to recognize drug addicts at first sight, because: “I was addicted to heroin for 30 years, so I can’t forget what it makes people look like: I see it, from 100 meters, I see it.” (GA, November, 30th).

deliberation. Actually, the fact of being a sexual assailant—a fortiori, a person evaluated as being bad—triggered strong contempt against the Brazilian, who was further categorized as a rapist, a term particularly infamous for the *Indignés*. But another emotion seems present: compassion for the women, considered in the narrative of Armand to have suffered. In the following pages I do not expound further on the theme of pity. Indeed, I am interested in the elaboration of norms that targeted the wrong situation and the culprit, and not in the elaboration of norms that, related to pity, targeted the victims and aimed at alleviating their suffering.

5.1.2. Second stage: how to react?

The rest of the GA does not revolve around the qualification of the events as unfair but rather around the matter of how to organize a collective answer against potential future sexual violence. It is then a matter discussion that, by anticipation, aims on the one hand to find means of preventing such events from happening again and on the other hand to determine the suitable individual or collective behavior that members ought to have if the aggressor comes back to the camp or if new aggressions occur.

Continuing Armand's speech, Edis asks for further information on the aggressor:

Edis: "Does this person have a tent here?"

Milo: "No."

Armand: "Yes, under the tree."

Milo: "No, that's not him. That's Bruno."

Armand: "Well then, he doesn't have a tent. He squats in I don't know whose tents. (Edis: "I suggest...") But he shouldn't be here."

Edis: "He shouldn't be here! (Armand: No.) Well that's it, that's what I wanted to say. If he had a tent, we'd have had to deal with that... Next time he's here, whoever has already seen him should alert people. (Armand: Black, shaved head.) If you want to do it by yourself, go ahead. But call the others, explain the situation and then go and tell him that he's not wanted here. (Armand: Black,

shaved head, a bit affected.) Because that's precisely the thing that there's no debate about." (General Assembly, 10 November 2011)

Edis asks if the "Brazilian" has a tent in the camp, but Milo answers that he does not. Armand confuses the Brazilian with someone else, Bruno, and Milo corrects him and says that Bruno is not the right guy. They rely on the intrinsic norms of contempt and indignation that ought to be directed toward the wrongdoer. Armand states vigorously that the aggressor has no reason to be in the camp. Edis agrees. This sentence can be understood as a deontic judgment that states that "the aggressor is not allowed in the camp." It is unclear what Edis means about reacting if the aggressor had a tent in the camp, but implicitly he seems to be asking whether this individual really belongs to OGVA. Since he does not have a tent, the reaction is straightforward: the next time he is in the camp, the *Indignés* have the obligation to expel him; any single person may do it alone, or additional people may be called for help. In order to expel him, they must explain the situation to him and make him leave. The means of expulsion are thus language but also the collective strength of being many against the aggressor. In short, Edis devises different rules. First, the aggressor has no reason to be in the camp, he ought to be excluded. In case he comes back, the *Indignés* ought to expel him. But the question of who ought to be the agent of the expulsion is also raised: one member or many of them? Both possibilities are allowed. Edis also states that the expulsion ought to be done by speech and not violent conduct: it is a matter of signifying to this man that he ought to leave. At the same time, Armand expresses contempt for this man in saying that he is pretentious.

The themes of the expulsion and exclusion that are apparent in this excerpt refer to the movement that goes from indignation at the wrong done to contempt at the wrongdoer, whose acts reveal the "badness" of his character (being a sexual predator). It can be inferred that the norms that Edis expresses are rooted in his contempt for the aggressor. This talk is important for the rest of the collective deliberation, as it is the first time that contempt and a rule that aims

to banish sexual predators are expressed. In the course of the collective discussion these themes are developed by Lydie, who intervenes just after Edis to confirm that this man ought to be expelled. Lukas says that she is right and that there is no possible tolerance with a sexual assailant.

After the publicization of indignation and contempt, the deliberators attempt to regulate their hostile action tendencies. Two opposite camps emerge: the first one wants to moderate or even suppress the hostility toward the aggressor, whereas the second one wants to maintain the hostility and amplify it against the attempts at moderation of the first camp. This discussion putting in play “emotion rules” but also “intrinsic norms”, as we will see, can be understood as a deliberation about the right sanctions and their proportionality. The sanctions have to fit the degrees of the wrong and the badness of the wrongdoer. Indeed, punishment can take various forms that vary in their degrees of severity—from blame to corporal punishment to execution—and expulsion involves degrees in the sense that it can be temporary or permanent, but also partial or complete. The sanctions are also discussed in order to respect moral norms.

Hostility moderation and suppression

After the talks of Lydie and Lukas, Viviane goes back to what Armand said: that he is ready to kill the Brazilian if he assaults a woman again:

Viviane: “There’s one thing that strikes me though. It’s the fact of saying ‘Heh, if I see you I’m going to kill you, I’m going to do you in, I’ll smash your face.’”

Armand: “But that’s all he understands!”

Viviane: “No! In any case I believe we’re here to act peacefully. Already last week when we weren’t properly organized yet, we had to deal with a knifing. (Armand: But there were 50 of us.) So we’re not about to start punching someone in the face. I reckon we’ve got other ways of dealing with this;

and I really don't want someone dead because someone else lost it, even if there's been a rape, even if... We don't need a death here."

She explains that she is struck by Armand's hostility who is ready to physically attack the aggressor and to kill him. She claims that they have to act peacefully. She does not want anyone to die in the camp. Even if there is a *rape*, the consequence should not be death. Armand contradicts her: the man understands only violent threats. Viviane seems to be outraged by the potential violence of Armand. She thus affirms an extrinsic norm—no one should be killed—in order to regulate the “extreme” punishment that Armand imagines. But when she says that even if a woman is raped, death is not the proper response, she seems to think that the death penalty might apply but is not a morally legitimate punishment. She then seems to recognize that the intrinsic norm “the wrongdoer ought to be punished for what he did” could lead to extreme violence. But it is incompatible with the norm “it is forbidden to kill.” Thus, she does not refute that the aggressor should be punished, but only that physical violence is not a legitimate means of punishment. One can act peacefully in order to regulate the problematic situation. In her speech she also makes reference to an incident that took place at the very beginning of OGVA: a member had threatened another member with a knife. She says that they were able to manage this dangerous situation. Armand reacts by saying that they were fifty. This “knife episode” was considered by the *Indignés* who made reference to it—just like Viviane—as an example of successful collective regulation in which people managed to oppose an aggressor and talk to him, but they could also regulate and moderate members who, under the sway of strong emotions, were prone to take bodily actions against the aggressor. In sum, Viviane formulates an obligation to act peacefully, a prohibition of physical violence, a prohibition of murder, and implicitly an obligation to act collectively in order to regulate anybody who manifests aggressive behavior, either the aggressor himself or an *Indigné* acting as a third-party regulator. And she further categorizes the events as “rape.”

After four quick speeches that are not directly relevant for the present analysis, Juan requests the floor. He speaks in Spanish and is translated by Edis and Irene. In order to understand Juan's speech it is important to note that he was a hippie living in a tepee in the camp. He was a supporter of universal peace and love and an adept of *Ho'oponopono*, a traditional Hawaiian technique that aims to produce harmony and peace among people by means of self-transformation and forgiveness. Importantly, his speech about *Ho'oponopono* is shared by two new members: Frank and Odile. For lack of space, I will not reproduce their speeches, since their content is in substance equivalent to Juan's speech, and the reactions of the *Indignés* who do not agree are also quite the same as those that Juan's speech produces.

Juan: Because of all the mistakes people make, rejection will only make things worse. Because of the mistakes someone makes, brutal rejection only worsens the situation [...] Our only hope to solve problems is love, gestation and love, it's our only hope in the world."

Armand: "Pfff... Yea... With a rapist? With a rapist that doesn't work."

Juan: What we think of someone who does something bad is very important because the person feels what we're thinking and it's registered in the energy field that connects us all. For me that's quite clear [...] If someone does something awful and you hate him because of it..."

Edis: "But Juan, we're not talking about that."

Juan: "I'll talk about whatever I feel like talking about. This is an assembly, isn't it?"

Edis: "Yes, but we're talking about what happened today. It's really serious that some girls have..."

Juan: "Hatred is something very serious in the world. Which is why I want to talk about it."

Armand: "Twice! Two girls! Laya and now little Christine there."

Edis: "Two girls have been harassed."

Juan: "Let me finish."

Armand: "Never two without a third!"

Juan: "What I want to say is very important. Just as important as the fact that this is a very bad person."

Irene: “It’s to learn how to defuse exactly this kind of conflict. In general.”

Juan: If you want to help a person who does bad things, the easiest way is to send him positive thoughts and love, even if he’s a murderer. It can be Hitler or anyone.

Edis (translating): “If you want to help someone who’s doing something bad, the best thing you can do is... Pfff... to love him in your mind.” (*He turns to the audience as he says this, looking disenchanted, and people laugh.*)

Juan: If someone does something bad and we send him negative thoughts it worsens the situation and won’t cure...

Edis (translating): “Negative thoughts make things worse.”

Armand: “I agree with that! I agree with that!”

Juan: “And that’s difficult. It’s hard to accept giving love to what’s bad, to what we don’t like.”

Edis (translating): “It’s difficult to accept sending love to people we don’t like.”

Armand: “Pouh!!!”

Juan attempts to regulate the hostility expressed by the *Indignés* who have already spoken. He explains that rejecting people who committed errors would have negative consequences and would worsen the situation. In his mind, the rejection takes the form of negative energy that is sent through magic thinking to the faulty and that negatively affects the mutual connection of human beings, who are connected by an energetic field. Later on he explains that negative thinking or hatred corresponds to black magic, whereas positive thinking or love corresponds to white magic. According to him, if the world is to become a better place, it needs love and not hatred. The underlying rationale is that bad people (even Adolf Hitler) need to be helped and cured: they are also suffering human beings, and as such are proper recipients of compassion and love, not hostility. Then Juan calls for cognitive work or “deep acting¹⁷” (Hochschild, 2003) in order to reappraise the situation and the assailant: the aim is to come to see the latter not as an offender who, as a proper object of indignation and contempt, deserves to be punished, but

¹⁷ Hochschild takes this expression from actor and theater director Stanislavski.

as a “victim” who suffers and, as a proper object of compassion, deserves to be helped and loved¹⁸. Thus, in his talk Juan formulates a prohibition of violence, because of “negative energetic feedback,” the obligation to love everybody since it has good consequences for the world as a whole, and the obligation of compassion toward the assailant, who ought to be seen as a suffering person and helped (cured) just like the intrinsic norms of compassion require.

Hostility maintenance and amplification

Juan’s talk raised several complaints and objections along two lines: the right evaluation of the situation and its agent, and the right actions that should be performed in order to deal with them. Interestingly, Juan’s formulation of a duty of compassion and love consists of an emotion rule that is extraneous to indignation and contempt; it targets both emotions in order to suppress them and replace them with love and compassion. The counterarguments pose emotion rules too, yet these rely this time on the intrinsic norms of indignation and contempt. The purpose of the objections is to reaffirm and amplify hostility against the attempts to moderate or suppress it. Indeed, when Armand says that Juan’s suggestion does not apply to someone categorized as a rapist and that the aggressor is a recidivist because he has committed two aggressions (on Laya and Christine) and may do so again in the future (“things come in threes”), he denies that this man has to be seen as someone suffering. He thus reaffirms that the Brazilian ought to be seen as a “*rapist*” because his acts show what kind of person he is: someone who does not deserve good treatment, but rather someone who is an appropriate target of hostility. Thus this man is considered not to be an appropriate object of compassion but to be an appropriate object of indignation and contempt. According to Armand these emotions are deemed “correct” because they “fit” the “facts”: “a rapist has committed sexual assaults.”

¹⁸ This view about “proper object” and “desert” are taken from Adam Smith’s view about how gratitude and resentment aptly fit their objects (Smith, 2002 [1790]).

In the same vein, Edis reaffirms that the two women were victims of aggressions and that the situation is serious. Interestingly, he tells Juan that his speech is irrelevant to the discussion on the right reaction to the aggressions. It seems that the indignation Edis felt led him to put aside the information that was not relevant to the wrong; that is, the attempt of Juan to modify the hostile feelings by a reappraisal of the aggressor so as to see him as an object of love and compassion. Indeed, Edis tried to modify Juan's view by reorienting his attention to the facts and the injustice done. It seems that his indignation has led him to say that indignation is the correct emotion for the wrong done, not compassion. Thus Edis implicitly resorts to an intrinsic norm of indignation: one ought to react with indignation when facing a wrong. But this norm, since it is expressed and targets Juan, is also to be understood as an extrinsic emotion rule that states what type of emotion must be felt and is socially appropriate. It is as if Edis said to Juan, "you ought to be indignant at the facts, not compassionate." It is interesting to remark that several persons in the assembly laugh sarcastically when Edis turns to them, thus manifesting disapproval of what Juan says. Nevertheless, he gets Armand's approval when he states that negative thinking may worsen the situation. But he gets Armand's disapproval again when he reasserts that even if it is difficult to give love to what is bad, it is an imperative.

As a continuation of the previous sequence, Lukas demands to talk and provides counterarguments to Juan's view.

Lukas (curtly): "So Juan, I agree 200% with what he said. Euh... For me love is something very beautiful. However, I think... (excitedly) 5000 years of sexual oppression of women... we're not going to resolve that by giving people a little bit of love. I think... For me, it's extremely important to indicate a clear line of what is unacceptable. You can do that with love, but you can also use other means. And I'm sorry, if someone uses methods that have nothing to do with loving someone who harasses women here, I'll be delighted!"

Lukas disapproves of Juan's speech. He formulates a limit between what is acceptable and what is not: sexual oppression is not tolerable. But he does not only indicate a limit; he also says that this limit counts for everyone. This may mean two things: first, everyone must respect the norm forbidding sexual violence, and second, the norm should be there in order to command the members to react to violence when they see it. Considering, like Armand and Edis, that hostility is an apt reaction to sexual aggression, Lukas states that he approves of violence against an aggressor. Thus Lukas takes a further step in the use of the intrinsic norms of indignation: indignation is not only the correct emotion in response to sexual wrongs, but the action tendency of punishing is legitimate against a rapist. In other words, the culprit is a correct object of punishment: he ought to be punished for and expiate his deeds. Of course, as previously said, this intrinsic norm *being exteriorized, becoming public*, and targeting Juan (and Viviane implicitly) also works as an extrinsic emotion rule. But in this case, it concerns the right treatment that the rapist deserves: physical violence for his wrong actions is correct since it fits the fact *and* it is socially appropriate because it is moral to be indignant at wrongdoings and to wish to punish the wrongdoer.

The speeches that I have reported represent the main antagonist positions of the *Indignés* during the GA. Indeed, on the one side, there were those who were against any kind of violence and supported collective actions of a pacifist nature against the aggressor. Among them, people like Juan, Irene, Odile, and Frank also argued for a strong regulation of the hostile action tendencies of indignation and contempt that had to be suppressed and replaced with nonhostile action tendencies (love, compassion). But they did not deny that sexual aggressions and being a rapist were bad and wrong. They simply thought that hostility would be ineffective and risky, and that it was possible to stand firm in front of an aggressor without being aggressive. They seemed to believe that expressing disapproval and blame in a calm way were sufficient degrees of punishment. On the other side, there were those who believed that sexual aggression and a rapist

deserved to be punished strongly and expelled from the collective, and that non-hostility was not the proper reaction, as Armand, Edis, and Lukas indicated. Thus two “we” corresponding to each group emerged: they were not yet unified in a higher “consensual” “we” that would represent the “general will” of the members of the assembly.

But another view about the right reaction of the third party was discussed after two other talks. It was expressed by a man I was unable to identify¹⁹:

A man: “I think you’d still better think about how you’re going to get rid of him. Because the problem with junkies, people like that, I mean people on coke, is that they might want to come back and take their revenge. So, if someone just fronts him on their own and tells him to get lost, he’ll most probably come back alone to get even. So best do something collective to make him understand... [...] Or do it in stages, I dunno. Give it some thought because if it’s a spontaneous thing, I can see that a guy who’s capable of doing that here, well... Maybe he’ll do it and maybe not, I really don’t know.”

Here the emphasis is put on the potential danger that a drug addict may pose to a third party who intervenes for expelling him out of the camp. This can be interpreted as a call to caution for fear of the third party. Indeed, this talk is about danger, which is the formal object of fear. Another aspect of the situation thus comes to light: if a third party who is contemptuous wants to expel the wrongdoer, she faces the risk of violent retaliation. Thus, in order to neutralize this risk as the action tendency of fear requires it, a strategy must be elaborated so as to realize the goal of contempt: social exclusion.

To continue this recommendation, Edis speaks one more time:

¹⁹ This person was not part of the collective but apparently was here because of his curiosity, just like others who did the same.

Edis: “I’d like to remind you [...]. So, the aim of having this discussion was to write clearly that we don’t tolerate this. And then, it’s clear, as we’ve said a thousand times, that we don’t react to violence with violence. But if someone is in the process of attacking someone, you’re not going to have a conversation with him. The first thing to do is to prevent the aggression and you can discuss things with him later [...].”

There the action tendency of preventing the wrong proper to indignation gives rise to a norm that we can roughly formulate in these terms: “we ought to nullify the wrong, and for this purpose violence is appropriate, and thus permitted.” Violence in this case is not proposed as a punishment, which is expiation for one’s misdeeds, but as a justified means to nullify the wrong. Edis adds that it is only when the aggression is stopped that the third party can start to discuss nonviolently with the aggressor. He seems thus to think that violence as a punishment is not desirable.

After several speeches of members who elaborate the various positions that I have exposed, Lukas asks for a consensus about the right reaction to sexual aggression. The focus is on the interpretation of “firmness”; that is, the right degree of hostility. On the one hand, “firmness” may mean to only use calm speech in order to blame the wrongdoer and command him to leave the camp; on the other hand, it may mean that violence for preventing the wrong and/or punishing and expelling the wrongdoer is appropriate.

Lukas: “[...] But for a consensus, would someone have a problem with me if I don’t signal love but firmness? Would someone personally have a problem with that? (*Frank: The one doesn’t exclude the other.*) Yea, exactly. But it could be a consensus. I don’t act in terms of love, not at all, in this kind of situation. Will someone have a problem if I do that?”

Frank: “Yes, yes.”

Viviane: “Just as long as there’s no extreme violence that could harm the camp, that’s all. Yep.”

Lukas: “No, you know me. I won’t be nice with the person, but I won’t beat him up.”

Viviane: “Yes, no, that’s clear.”

A woman: "I mean, there's been an aggression and it has to stop."

Lukas repeats his position that violence under its different forms (punishment, prevention) is appropriate against a sexual aggressor. Frank says that firmness and pacifism are not incompatible, and he disagrees with the hostility of Lukas. Viviane approves of Lukas saying that hostility is tolerated, as far as violence is not detrimental to the camp. Lukas answers that in such a case he will not physically assault the aggressor, but he will not be nice to him. Finally, a woman says that if there is an aggression "one ought to stop it," meaning that violence is a proper means to do so. The *Indignés* consider at this moment that a consensus is found. But it is only a "pseudo-consensus²⁰," since the notion of "firmness" stays ill-defined and admits different degrees: this notion is subject to interpretation. The *Indignés* in their attempt of making emerge the "consensual" "we" that would represent the "general will" of the members fail to do it in certain way. But one consensual result seems to be that extreme violence, like murder, is prohibited.

Several other discussions occur about the danger that a rapist represents for women who sleep alone under a tent in the camp, which I will not present because this would lead us to analyze the emergence of norms for the protection of victims, which is not the topic of this paper dedicated to indignation and contempt. Eventually, Lydie, the moderator, asks for a final decision or consensus:

Lydie: "OK, so I just wanted to...Can we conclude this GA? [...] I think we've just about gotten to a consensus on saying that these cases of aggression, whether linked to gender, race, sexual orientation or to ... (*Viviane: Violence in general*) Right. All kinds of violence, exactly. *Her tone sharpens.*
Violent acts in general are not tolerated in this camp! That's the line... It's a clear limit, OK? We've

²⁰ To call this consensus a "pseudo-consensus" is justified in the sense that the *Indignés* arrived at a genuine consensus on several occasion when everyone gave publicly their assent to a collective decision. For instance, about what types of political action perform. In our case, there is no consensus on the right meaning of "firmness", but the *Indignés* do as if they had all agreed.

got a consensus on that. No kind of violence is tolerated. Everyone is responsible, individually and collectively, we're all responsible, if we see something, to report it, to do something to counter it whether personally or, if one of us sees something happen and doesn't feel capable of handling it alone, to discuss it with others and intervene collectively. We agree that we don't want to be violent but that we'll be firm, uh... really very firm. [...] Can we conclude with that?"

This consensus proposal is collectively approved, and closes the GA. It is important to note that the consensus does not include all the norms that were discussed: it is poorer compared to the content of the deliberation. Indeed, the theme of violence and the tendency to stop the wrong are linked to indignation: the third-party must react against violence. But the tendency to punish is not clearly stated: it remains implicit in the notion of firmness whether this one is interpreted as justified violence or only as justified blame. Contempt for the assailant is absent. But the tendency to expel/exclude seems to be implicitly included in the norm considering the proper reaction of the third-party who ought to intervene against violence. Fear is also present: if the third-party who should intervene "doesn't feel capable of handling it alone", he should call for backup. Thus the tendency to neutralize the danger translates as a duty to search for help in order to face the aggressor.

5.2. *The general assembly of November 21, 2011*

It was only on November 21 2011 that the second charter of good conduct was written. All the rules of the first charter were discussed and modified in greater or lesser extent. As a reminder, in the first charter rule number 1 stated:

- *We will respect others*
- *We will avoid insults, judgments, discriminations*

This rule was thus modified in the second charter:

- *We will respect ourselves as we respect others*
- *We will refuse any insult, judgment, discrimination (based on race, gender, sexual orientation, etc.)*
- *We will combat all forms of violence, verbal or physical, in particular sexual and/or racial violence*

I am interested in the underlined modifications that correspond to the deliberation of November 10th. The addition of a duty of “self-respect” was not related to the sexual aggression but was added as a general precondition for the duty of respecting others. I will not elaborate on the latter point in the following pages.

As can be seen, the pronoun “we” is used, and there are no “negative forms” such as “it is forbidden to” or “we ought not to.” The rationale behind this was to “invite” everyone to act so as to respect the rules of the charter, rather than to give the impression of forcing people or imposing the rules upon them. The “we” is also used to highlight the fact that the rules were decided on collectively and concerned every *Indigné*. As such, these norms can be seen as deontic “we-attitudes”, that reflect the “general will” of the members. Nevertheless, there are several vocabulary changes between the two versions of the first rule. The verb “to refuse” replaces the verb “to avoid.” There are precise suggestions of what counts as disrespect: offenses in regard to race, gender, and sexual orientation. A new rule emerges that concerns the right reaction of a third party against disrespect that ought to be fought.

The written rules are poorer than the final consensus of the previous GA that was itself poorer than the collective deliberation. There are no clear mentions of duties of punishing, expelling,

or preventing wrongs by any means. But traces of them can be found. Indeed, the verbs “refuse” and “fight” can be seen as euphemisms for those duties. Additionally, a clear formulation of the duties of acting individually or collectively against an aggression and the aggressor is also missing. Nevertheless, the utilization of the “we,” which designates all members, implicitly encapsulates those duties. But why are the written rules poorer than the collective deliberation in the first place?

5.2.1. Third stage: writing the rules

There were 14 *Indignés* during this GA. The only members who were present at the previous GA were Edis, Lukas, Lydie, and Armand. The drafting of the first rules took nearly 20 minutes. When the revision of the first rules came into discussion, the *Indignés* took up the final consensus that was recorded in the minutes of the November 10th GA. It is important to stress that the sentences that figure in the minutes were normative conclusions of the “hot” collective deliberation that unfolded during the GA. The verbalized norms and value judgements to which the deliberation arrived can be used “coldly” by the members who drafted the rules: there is no indication that they felt indignant, contemptuous, or afraid when they did it. But if the elaboration of the rules can be made coldly, this does not mean that the *Indignés* did not feel those emotions when drafting the rules. Indeed, taking up the consensual conclusion might have reactivated by recall the corresponding emotions in a milder manner. These recalled, low-intensity emotions (at least as compared to those felt during the 10th November GA) might have helped to amend the charter.

The revision of the charter did not start with the first rule but with those regulating the consumption of drugs in the camp. During this discussion, the topic of sanctioning and expelling deviants came to the forefront. At this specific moment Lydie and Émilie stated clearly that the charter was not a penal code:

Lydie: “There’s no sanction, a charter doesn’t sanction people. What you’re suggesting is to specify what should be sanctioned and that’s... [...]”

Émilie: “Exactly what I was about to say. It’s a charter and not penal code.”

Thus they state that the charter must not include rules of sanction. This injunction, which found no opposition, constrained the rest of the GA and explains why punishment and exclusion do not overtly figure as duties in the charter. When the *Indignés* finish modifying the rules on drugs, Lydie, who is in charge of writing the draft of the charter, demands to revise the first rule.

Lydie: “For example, in the first point, it’s super important, ‘We respect others’. Perhaps it would be good to put that we prohibit violence of any kind, or something like that, like the consensus we’ve reached, so that it’s clear that that’s our first point.” [...]

Émilie (*replies to Lydie*): “But surely that’s part of respect for others, no?”

Lydie: “Uh... no. (*She laughs, joined by Émilie.*) In any case, I think that what’s obvious for us isn’t necessarily obvious for others. So, uh, well, I dunno...”

She asks for the proscription of any kind of violence, as was decided in the final consensus. Émilie intervenes and says that the interdiction of violence falls under the duty of respecting others. She seems to say that the specification of the different types of violence is superfluous. But interestingly, Lydie explains that what is evident for them might not be obvious for everyone. It seems then that specifying the various forms of disrespect has educational value: it brings to the common attention of the members behaviors that ought not to be performed because they exemplify disvalues (violence, sexism, racism, etc.). In a sense, this specification is also there to “teach” people the extensions of the notions of respect and disrespect; that is, what kinds of behaviors fall under these categories.

Lukas intervenes and asks to change the verb “to avoid” because it is not strong enough. He means that “avoid” makes the rule optional. He wants it to be a categorically imperative and reminds the others that the consensus states that violence is not acceptable.

Lukas: “But we used to have a consensus like, uh... OK, we’ll find it in the minutes, but something like... uh... what did we say? We... ‘prohibit’? Because it’s not only to avoid, ‘avoid’ is really not strong enough.”

Lydie: “Yea, but that’s it, that has to be changed.” [...]

Lukas: “OK. So there was something, when we were talking about all kinds of violence, there was something... Well, in any case, if we absolutely don’t want to put it into the negative, we can find something. Though it doesn’t make much difference if it’s ‘prohibit’ or ‘don’t accept’. But anyway.”

Laetitia: “‘Refuse’? We had something about not accepting any kind of violence whether physical or verbal and then something specific about no violence, uh... in particular no... (*Armand: ‘Sexual’*) sexual or racist violence.”

Armand: “Exactly, we should mention both.”

A man: “Yea, yea.”

Laetitia: “If we put ‘we refuse’?”

Lukas: “Yea.”

Laetitia: “All forms of violence.”

Laetitia suggests replacing “avoid” by “refuse”; that is an attitude expressing that the *Indignés* do not accept or tolerate violence. This proposal is accepted. “Refuse” is also used as a trick to avoid formulating the rule with a negation like “we do not tolerate violence.” Lukas reminds the others also that the precise types of disrespect have been chosen: sexual and racial violence. Armand agrees with this.

After having decided how to formulate the interdiction of violence and its condemnation, the *Indignés* move on to the right reaction to violence. Lukas proposes a new paragraph:

Lukas: "I've got a suggestion for point 3.1. Perhaps a bit radical: 'We will combat all forms of violence'."

Lydie: "Yea, yea, yea."

Armand: "Yea, with bowling balls."

Several people burst out laughing.

Armand: "No, but you see what I mean. It's an antimony!"

The laughter stops.

Lukas: "As far as I'm concerned, certain forms of violence should be combatted with all the necessary means."

Lydie: "OK."

Laetitia (*snickering*): "With all the necessary means."

This time the rule concerns not the type of attitude that the *Indignés* ought to have when facing violence but rather the right behavior to adopt in response to violence. Lukas, who argued in the previous GA that violence for punishing the aggressor and for stopping an ongoing aggression were legitimate, proposes to add a norm stating, "we will combat all forms of violence." When Armand notes that such a norm contradicts the general banning of all violence, Lukas answers that some kinds of violence (in the present case, sexual aggression) can be fought by any necessary means, even by violence itself. People in the GA laugh at this proposal and do not contest it. Thus the proposal is accepted. As such, the duties of punishing and preventing aggression are implicitly captured by the verb "combat," but they are not explicitly formulated. Interestingly, none of the strong pacifists (Juan, Frank, Odile, and Irene) of the previous GA are present during this GA. We can hypothesize that if they had been there and a longer discussion on this point had taken place, maybe the rule would have been formulated differently. It is also interesting to note that the statement that this charter is not a penal code is bypassed when it comes to the sexual aggressions: "combat" does not state overtly that punishment is a duty but allows it nonetheless.

Later on, Lydie, who is writing the rule, asks for help in order to synthesize the proposal.

Laetitia, Armand and Adrien inform her:

Lydie: “OK... Now just on this point, we have ‘we will avoid insults, judgements and discrimination’. Do we want to put an alternative to ‘avoid’?”

Laetitia: “I say ‘refuse’.”

Lydie: “‘We refuse’. OK, fine! So, we refuse insults, judgements, discrimination. And then there’s also ‘We will combat all verbal or physical violence’. And then there’s the suggestion to specify (*Émilie: sexual*) ‘racial and sexual violence’.”

Armand: “‘In particular’.”

Lydie (*continues rapidly*): “‘In particular’. OK.”

Armand: “That’s it!”

Lydie (*writing*): “‘Sexual and racial’. OK.”

Adrien: “For discrimination.”

Armand: “‘Sexual or racial’.”

Lydie writes the consensual formula on a sheet of paper. She is in charge of finishing the document and printing the new charter of good conduct. The revision of the first rule is now complete.

6. Discussion

6.1. *Empirical discussion*

The aim of this paper was to make the case for an affective view of the emergence of norms that may help to explain why norms emerge and why they take their specific form and, through a study on the emergence of social norms against violence in the context of OGVA. I have thus tried to show that those social norms were grounded in the intrinsic norms of indignation,

contempt, and fear. During the GAs, those intrinsic norms were discursively verbalized and became public objects to be discussed, approved, and collectively adopted by consensus. As such, indignation, contempt, and fear were collectively assessed as correct emotions that fitted their various objects, but also as socially appropriate emotions that were expected to be felt in the face of the events and their authors. Interestingly, the process of emergence was possible thanks to the institutional settings of OGVA. Indeed, the GA worked as a “central legislative organ” that gave its members the power to make and adopt rules for regulating their interactions, thanks to the principles of participatory and deliberative democracy and the procedural norms of the GA. But while the “legislative” power was centralized, the “executive” and the “judiciary” power remained diffuse and decentralized. Indeed, the “we formulation” of the rules commanded that all members, as third parties, had the responsibility to respect the rules and the right to punish, prevent, and exclude when the circumstances required it. Thus the collective “we attitudes” that emerged during the public deliberation designated for the joint attention of the members (Kaufmann, 2010) legitimate objects of indignation, contempt, and fear. But these collective attitudes also assigned duties to the members (Kaufmann, 2010): duties of condemning violence and of acting against them. Thus the collective elaboration of the norms against violence and their formulation in “we” can be seen as an attempt to bring forth a sensitive community whose members shared the same concern for the respect of others and should have been able to aptly identify disrespect and to adequately react against it thanks to the guidance of common rules. As such these rules, setting emotional duties, guiding attention, intentional detection, and emotional actions can be understood as *emotion rules* that emerged from the intrinsic norms of the occurrent emotions. Thus the modification of the charter of good conduct was an attempt not only to regulate sexual aggressors but also to generate sensitivity among members.

6.2. *Causal and grounding explanations*

The empirical study of the emergence of norms in OGVA brings us back to the starting questions of this paper: why and how do norms emerge? Why do they have their specific forms? The answer seems to be that social norms have emotional foundations in both the sense that norms emerge from emotions and that types of emotions correspond to types of “forms” (Simmel, 1999 [1908]). Just like the empirical study tried to show, norms of *punishment* for wrong, norms of *exclusion* for unworthiness, and norms of *protection* against danger were the result of *indignation*, *contempt*, and *fear* respectively. That is why I would like to suggest that social norms emerge from emotions that “cause” and “ground” them. In that sense, emotions provide a “*causal explanation*” and a “*grounding explanation*” of the emergence of norms²¹. Indeed, the emotions felt by the members of OGVA, in reaction to emotional events, led them to collectively adopt norms: the emotions *explain causally* the emergence of these norms as the result of collective actions. By contrast, the forms of the norms were dependent on the structure of the felt emotions. These provide a *grounding explanation*: emotions give to norms their forms in the sense that types of emotions (indignation, contempt, fear), thanks to their intrinsic norms, give to types of social norms (punishment, ban, expulsion, protection) their forms. This is a relation of “identity dependence”²² where the form of norms depends *non-causally* upon the identity of emotions. But this relation of identity dependence can also be said to obtain *in virtue* of the structure of emotions. The expression *in virtue* marks the fact that this dependence

²¹ Aranguren (this volume) develops the idea of emotional mechanism as factors of (re-)production of social order. The idea that emotions play a causal role in the emergence of social phenomena is already stressed by Elster (1999; 2011) who thinks that emotions are “causal mechanisms.” For an application of this idea to social movement studies, see Jasper (2014). In a similar way, Barbalet (2001) defends the restricted thesis that basic rights are causally and ontologically explained by resentment and vengeance.

²² “Identity-dependence” means that “the identity of *x* depends on the identity of *y*” (Tahko and Lowe, Spring 2015 Edition: p. 17)

can be understood as a grounding explanation where emotions ground the norms *non-causally* (Bliss and Trogdon, Winter 2014 Edition), and where emotions are ontologically *prior*²³ to the norms (Tahko and Lowe, Spring 2015 Edition), and thus more *fundamental* than the norms, since the norms ontologically depend upon the emotions (Tahko and Lowe, Spring 2015 Edition).²⁴

But are causal and grounding explanations compatible? I think so. The causal explanation explains *how* emotional events triggered emotional actions that resulted in the production of norms, and the grounding explanation explains *which* norms (and no others) obtained *in virtue* of their ontological dependency upon the structure of the obtaining emotions (and no others).

7. Conclusion

This paper was dedicated to the empirical study of the emergence of norms against violence in the political collective OGVA, and to the theorization of the emotional foundations of norms. I have tried to show that the norms that emerged from the group were the result of collective indignation, contempt and fear felt by third-parties in relation to two events that have occurred in OGVA camp, and that the activists categorized as sexual aggressions. Drawing on this empirical study, I have hypothesized that emotions provide causal and grounding explanations for the emergence of norms. The central argument dwelled on the thesis that emotions possess intrinsic norms (“affective oughts”) that give their forms to extrinsic norms (social norms), and in virtue of their action tendencies, emotions can give rise to actions that bring about types of

²³ Priority does not have a causal meaning where x is a causal antecedent of y . It expresses “priority between things” (Tahko and Lowe, Spring 2015 Edition): x is prior to y , since x is more fundamental than y on a grounding hierarchy.

²⁴ I use Bliss & Trogdon and Tahko & Lowe encyclopedic papers for they clearly synthesize and discuss the complex philosophical debates about ontological dependences and grounding explanations. For details about “priority” see Fine (2012), and for details about “fundamentality” see Schaffer (2009). The application of the “grounding concepts” to emotions and norms comes from me.

norms. Thus, types of norms seem to derive from types of emotions. Although I have observed and compared different forms of norms, a comparison between norms of the same type is still lacking, and further comparisons between different norms are necessary. Thus, comparative studies are needed in order to substantiate the thesis that norms have emotional causes and foundations. Nevertheless, the theoretical discussion may prove useful for further research on the emotional emergence of norms. This empirical study could also be a useful basis for further comparative research.

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