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**EUROPEAN REVIEW
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Philosophy of Mind

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The papers presented here were originally written for the European Yearbook of Philosophy. They were all received by the present Editors by the end of 1990. Our original publisher unfortunately had to drop the project. We thus had to look for another publisher. Also, we decided to change the name of the Publication. This will not, at least not in the short term, change its character as a yearly publication.

We would like to apologize for the delay in the publication and to thank all Authors for their understanding, trust and patience. We would also like to thank Dennis J. Hall, the Departments of Philosophy of the Universities of Geneva and Neuchâtel for administrative support; Johanna Spindler for help with the typesetting; and Dikran Karagueuzian for his support in the final realization of this project. —The Editors

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Part I



Philosophy of Mind

(1) and (3) pair off Tim and Tim's RAM that Hesperus is a star. But if (3) is used in a context in which, for instance Tim takes 'est une étoile' to mean what 'is a satellite' means in actual English, then under this contextual restriction, (3) and (1) can differ in truth value because Tim doesn't possess the RAM determined by "Hesperus is a star," i.e., this RAM doesn't belong to Tim's RS.

Having sketched out Richard's theory, I would like to end by saying that Richard's interesting and challenging theory can deal in a satisfactory way with the Frege-inspired puzzles. This is another reason which makes the reading of this book both stimulating and fruitful.

Eros Corazza
University of Geneva

☞ MARK SAINSBURY, *Paradoxes*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

Is Achilles, the skilled warrior, incapable of catching up to a tortoise? Is it true what the Liar says? Do two grains of sand form a heap? "Yes," we have to answer. There are convincing arguments which lead to those conclusions. But as we are still unwilling to answer affirmatively to the above questions, we search for a flaw in the arguments.

There is no way out: We have to uncover and reject one of the allegedly innocent premises, find a hidden mistake in the reasoning or else accept the unwanted conclusion. Either decision demands a justification. This leads from the nice stories to serious philosophical issues in which some of our most central beliefs are challenged.

Sainsbury guides the reader through complex arguments on a number of paradoxes which concern various fields of philosophy. He does not offer an overall theory to cover all paradoxes. Instead, he elaborates the relevant premises, concepts, forms of reasoning, etc. to clarify the arguments, in order to develop strategies towards a deeper understanding of the problem involved. It is here that the merit and interest of the book lie, not in the presentation of sweeping 'solutions'.

Of Zeno's paradoxes on space, time and motion, Achilles' race against the tortoise is most famous: The tortoise is given a head start, so Achilles first has to catch up to the point where the tortoise started. By this time,

however, the tortoise has advanced a little bit further. So, Achilles has to get to that new place of the tortoise. Meanwhile, though, the tortoise will have advanced to a new place ahead. However small the gap becomes, Achilles will never catch the tortoise as long as it keeps moving. The problem is essentially the same as in the paradox of the Racetrack: Apparently, Achilles has to travel an infinity of spaces in order to win the race. Sainsbury investigates into the notions of time, space and infinity involved. Eventually, he suggests that we need an elaboration of our spatial concepts, so that they can be coherently described by mathematical means.

The classical paradox of the heap ('sorites' in Ancient Greek) begs many questions on the nature of vagueness. It seems clear that a heap of sand is still a heap if one takes away a single grain. So, if one takes away a grain from the resulting heap, its result is in turn a heap, and so on. Consequently, two grains are a heap. The same paradox can be generated for other predicates like 'child', 'tall', 'red', etc., due to their essential vagueness. Sainsbury discusses the merits of sharpening the predicates, of agreeing that there are degrees of truth ('half true that this is a heap') and of admitting vagueness of objects—though none of the suggestions alone appears to be convincing.

The Liar admits: "What I am now saying is not true." If it is indeed false, if what he says is true, then it is not true. But if it is not true, it is just what is said: true. So it can be neither true nor false. But it says that it is not true (which would be the case if it was neither true nor false). So if it was neither true nor false, it would be true. In this paradox of the Strengthened Liar, all three ascriptions ('true', 'false', 'neither true nor false') lead to contradiction.

The problem seems to lie in the sentences' saying something about its own truth or non-truth. As one can hardly ban self-reference on the whole, the solutions are being sought in the self-ascription of a truth-value. The idea is that there is in fact more than one predicate 'true' (and 'false'), that there are levels of such predicates. This would not permit that a sentence ascribes truth to a sentence of its own level, or even to itself. The development and justification of those and other accounts is discussed by Sainsbury, which shows the relevance of the paradox for a theory of truth.

In his attempt to give an insight and overview of the more relevant paradoxes, the author presents more than the paradoxes sketched above. He equally deals with Russell's Paradox, with Newcomb's Paradox and the Prisoner's Dilemma on rational behaviour, and with the paradoxes of rational belief: the Ravens, Goodman's 'grue' and the Unexpected Examination. Finally, he makes a brief attempt to show that no contradictions are accept-

able, i.e., that dialethism is false. An appendix contains a collection of some more paradoxes.

The book requires only little philosophical background and serves introductory purposes very well—though, occasionally, less precision and more intuitive argumentation would have widened its accessibility. The reader is guided in the development of his own thoughts on the matter and continuously challenged by intriguing queries and footnotes. The selective bibliography and the bibliographical notes allow to track down the recent literature. They might well prove useful even for the professional philosopher who did not manage to keep up with the recent discussion in the journals. The book is not just the only one of its kind but also highly recommended for its pedagogical value and concise argumentation.

Vincent C. Müller
Hamburg



RICHARD SCHANTZ, *Der sinnliche Gehalt der Wahrnehmung*, München; Hamden; Wien: Philosophia Verlag, 1990.

The book, originally a Heidelberg PhD dissertation (1985), constitutes a well-articulated, clearly-written introduction to some major topics of contemporary philosophy of perception. The title, somewhat deceptively, lets the reader expect a work on the topic of perceptual content. A chapter (VII) is indeed devoted to the analysis of the Armstrong-Pitcher theory which treats perception as belief acquiring. But the most conspicuous part of the book deals with the representative theory of perception (I–III) and its competitors (IV–X). An adverbial theory of perception is explicitly defended (X); its relations to causal accounts and to the problem of secondary qualities are investigated (XI).

I have nothing to object to the more expository chapters. Some imprecise points surfacing in the other are nevertheless matters for complaint. I shall briefly spell out these imprecisions, which are to be found mainly in chapters X and XI. In the former, the author offers an account of the adverbialist theory of perception and defends it against criticisms, addressed (most prominently) by Frank Jackson, summed up in the so-called ‘many-property problem.’ The answers provided by the author are largely insufficient. The problem of which semantics is appropriate for adverbs, a problem that could

be crucial in framing the very shape of an adverbial theory of any entity (waltzes as well as perceptual states), seems to deserve no special mention; nor is there a clear statement of the endorsed ontology. On p. 189 we read for instance that “Die adverbiale Analyse erweist sich also für Schmerzen als äusserst plausibel, denn in ihr tritt deutlich zutage, dass Schmerzen anders als Personen, die sie empfinden, keine Individuen der Ontologie, sondern vielmehr ontologische Parasiten sind.” This is at best confused, for being an ‘ontological parasite’, whatever this means, does not imply not being an individual (witness the very issue of sense-data, mind-dependent phenomenal individuals). One can assume that events are ontologically parasitic on substances without giving up the firm conviction that events are individuals in one’s ontology. The author makes his point after a discussion of the putative ontological advantages one can gain from assigning the grammatical category of adverb to ‘a waltz’ in ‘Peter dances a waltz’. This assignment is largely undisputed, but it in no way implies that there are not two entities, a waltz and a man, which are in some way related. Of course the relation is not the one expressed by the predicate ‘dances’, but this is only because the entire expression composed of predicate (‘dances’) + apparent object (that is, adverbial phrase: ‘a waltz’) picks out, in standard accounts, an event: a waltz. On p. 186 we read that the “verbale Ausdruck ‘empfindet schmerzlich’ steht zu dem noch unmodifizierten Ausdruck ‘empfindet’ in der Beziehung von Spezies zu Genus”; this is an obvious mistake, for it is the referents of these expressions, and not the expressions themselves, which stand in such a relation.

It is difficult to evaluate the defence of the adverbial theory against the many-property objection, given on the pp. 193–211. Little or no attention is paid to the secondary literature; a discussion of Tye’s defense of adverbial paraphrases, of Casullo’s criticisms, of Gram’s study of direct realism are to be found neither in this chapter nor elsewhere in the book. The many-property objection, first advanced by Jackson, claims that when construed adverbially a perceptual report of the form ‘A sees an x which is F and G and a y which is H and I’ could apply to a case in which A saw an x which is F and H and a y which is G and I, with dramatic loss of discriminatory power. Alternatively, an adverbially construed report which could preserve the discriminatory power of the original report would not allow an inference of ‘A perceives an x which is F’ from ‘A perceives an x which is F and G’. The only thing the author seems to have to offer in reply to the many-property objection is that the Sellarsian version of adverbial predication, ‘A sees an-F-G-ly’ would eschew criticism, because the hyphenated predicate would not stand