Abstract
In his recent book, Bernecker (Memory, 2010) has attacked the following prominent view: (RK) S remembers that p only if S knows that p. An attack on RK is also an attack on Timothy Williamson’s view that knowledge is the most general factive stative attitude. In this paper, I defend RK against Bernecker’s attacks and also advance new arguments in favor of it. In Sect. 2, I provide some background on memory. In Sect 3, I respond to Bernecker’s attacks on RK and develop a new argument for RK. In Sects. 4 and 5, I develop two more new arguments for RK.
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Moon, A. Remembering entails knowing. Synthese 190, 2717–2729 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0065-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0065-3