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## BETWEEN HEIDELBERG AND MARBURG: THE *AUFBAU*'S NEO-KANTIAN ORIGINS AND THE AP/CP-DIVIDE..

Thomas Mormann

### I. Introduction.

The divide between analytic philosophy (AP) and continental philosophy (CP) has been one of the characteristic features of 20<sup>th</sup> century philosophy. Today, most philosophers consider this opposition as obsolete. According to them, it should be overcome in order to free the philosophy of the new century from parochial quarrels, boundaries and restrictions that duly belong to the past. Some authors even claim that they have already succeeded in the endeavor of overcoming the AP/CP-divide. For instance, Habermas considers

[...] hermeneutic and analytic philosophy not so much as rival but as complementary philosophical positions.

[...]

There may be still some physiognomic differences between the two traditions in that traditional analytic philosophy of language lacks sensibility and tools to deal with problems of diagnosing the fundamental question of our time ("zeitdiagnostische Fragen"), which, therefore, have remained the domain of the so-called "continental philosophy". In this respect, the opposition between analytic and continental currents still has a certain sense. (Habermas 1999, 76, 99).

Habermas's assessment is shared by many of his fellow philosophers, e.g. Apel, Rorty, Brandom, Margolis and others. In a slogan, then, rapprochement and reconciliation is on the agenda of the philosophy of early 21<sup>st</sup> century.

The reconciliatory project is often described as a synthesis, preferably between "Wittgenstein" and "Heidegger". What precisely this means, is less than clear, but most partisans of reconciliation don't care

much about details. Rather, they are interested in "building bridges", "overcoming obsolete boundaries" or "restarting disrupted debates", endeavors for which precision does not seem to be overly important. To be sure not everybody has joined the camp of the reconciliators. Some have remained skeptical. Instead of longing for reconciliation one may


[...]consider the conflict between the [analytic and the continental] traditions as both inevitable and desirable. Not a state of mutual ignorance is good; one certainly hopes for energetic interchanges across the lines of division. But that is not the same as expecting or wanting a reconciliation and even less wanting a reconciliation on the basis of some kind of Kantian schema. (Sluga 2001, 610).

Whatever stance one takes in this issue, it would be useful to have a clearer idea of what is at stake in this conciliatory project. In this respect, the contributions of Michael Friedman have been helpful. In *A Parting of the Ways* (Friedman 2000, henceforth (POW)) he set the debate on the AP/CP-divide on a more solid historico-philosophical base. According to Friedman, the opposition between these currents should be seen as the result of opposite attempts to overcome the shortcomings of the neo-Kantian heritage. The protagonists of these endeavors were Carnap and Heidegger, respectively.

Friedman's elegant proposal is to understand the continental/analytic split as a rehearsal of the split within the two main neo-Kantian currents in early 20<sup>th</sup> century, namely the Marburg School and the Heidelberg School. According to him, Kant's philosophy that conceived the systematic unity of all forms of thought – theoretical, practical, aesthetic, and religious – broke into pieces in the hands of the various neo-Kantian traditions, among which the most important ones were the Marburg School (Cohen, Natorp, Cassirer) and the Heidelberg or Southwest German School of value-oriented Neo-Kantianism (Windelband, Rickert, Lask, Bauch). More precisely, Friedman's proposal to conceive the contemporary AP/CP-divide as the outcome of the bifurcation between the neo-Kantian schools of Heidelberg and Marburg



may be diagrammatically presented by a bifurcation of the following kind:



According to this schematic map the early Carnap can be characterized as the executor of the Marburg School by applying the new logic created by Frege to resolve its philosophical ambitions, while Heidegger has the merit to resolve the outstanding problems of the Southwest School using the new phenomenological method due to Husserl cf. (POW, p. 149). These two distinct ways of overcoming of the Neo-Kantian orthodoxies then lead into the two main currents that marked 20<sup>th</sup> century philosophy, to wit, analytic philosophy on the one hand, and continental philosophy, on the other.

This is a neat bifurcation indeed.<sup>1</sup> The question is, whether it withstands further scrutiny. The aim of this paper is to undermine the plausibility of Friedman's beautiful bifurcation model in an essential aspect, namely in the role of Carnap as the one who overcame the

<sup>1</sup> It goes without saying that this picture is incomplete insofar as the role of British and American philosophers for the development of analytic philosophy is neglected. Moreover, the "new logic" and "the new phenomenology" serve as *dei ex machina* who are not properly localized in the landscape of the philosophy of 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century. After all, Frege the "creator of the new logic" had strong philosophical ties with the *Wertphilosophie* of Southwest neo-Kantians. Finally, the role of Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms that according to Friedman may be taken as a possible starting point for overcoming the shortcomings of the one-sided and radical positions of Carnap and Heidegger is not properly represented in this diagram. These deficiencies are ignored in the following.

Marburg Neokantian philosophy of the exact sciences with the help of modern logic. As I want to show, Carnap was much closer to the Southwest German neo-Kantian tradition than is usually recognized. Thus the presentation of Carnap and Heidegger as the respective heirs of the rival neo-Kantian traditions is misleading. According to Friedman's pedigree, the importance of the Southwest German tradition for the development of the analytic tradition is nil. I'd like to show that this contention is untenable. More precisely, I'll argue that the architectonic and the implicit "ideology" of Carnap's *Aufbau* was profoundly influenced by Rickert's *System der Philosophie* (Rickert 1921) that may be considered as the (incomplete) *summa* of his philosophical efforts. I propose to describe Carnap's philosophical endeavor in the *Aufbau* as an attempt to modernize the neo-Kantian approach of the Southwest German School with the help of modern relational logic. Carnap was well aware that the Marburg School was more advanced in matters logical than the Heidelberg School. This hold in particular for Cassirer, to a lesser extent also for Natorp. Thus in the *Aufbau* he came to apply Cassirer's theory of relational or functional concepts to overcome the logical deficiencies of Rickert's account. Although he endorsed the achievements of the "logical idealism" of the Marburg School in the end the influence of the original technical account of Whitehead and Russell prevailed. Thus, at the end of the day, Frege, Russell and other "professional" logicians became more important for him than Cassirer. Carnap attempted to improve Rickert's system not only by relational logic, but tried to enhance it also with the help of ingredients from various other philosophical currents, among them Husserl's phenomenology and Dilthey's *Lebensphilosophie*. In (POW) Friedman construes Heidegger's overcoming of Southwest German neo-Kantianism as a shift from Rickert to a sort of Husserlian phenomenology radicalized by some ingredients of Dilthey's *Lebensphilosophie*. Thus we see Heidegger and Carnap engaged in quite similar endeavors to modernize Rickert's *System der Philosophie*. In other words, in their philosophical beginnings both stood on the ground of the Southwest German neo-Kantianism. This is not to deny that the Marburg School had a strong influence on Carnap, but one should not overlook that the Heidelberg School defined the original philosophical setting.



What I propose, then, is to shift the point of gravity to the side of Southwest German neo-Kantianism acknowledging the pivotal role of Rickertian *Wertphilosophie* for Heidegger and Carnap. More precisely, I'd like to show that the *Aufbau* had a strong Southwest German flavor. This entails that Carnap cannot be lined up so easily with the Marburg school as Friedman assumes. This is not to deny that Cassirer influenced Carnap, the point is rather to determine more precisely the specific character of Cassirer's contribution to Carnap's rapidly developing philosophy. In section 2 I'd like to show that Carnap conceived Cassirer's functional theory of scientific concepts mainly as a technical tool to come to terms with logical problems posed by modern cultural and natural sciences. Thus the basic architectonic and agenda of the *Aufbau* was marked by the neo-Kantian school of Heidelberg (and Jena) school and not by that of Marburg.

Rickert's influence on Carnap has been virtually ignored up to now. This may have several reasons. On the one hand, in his later life Carnap himself was not fond of acknowledging Rickert's role. For instance, he did not mention him in his *Intellectual Autobiography* (Carnap 1963), although he was in more or less close contact with Rickert's philosophy from 1910 to 1925. Another reason is that the value-oriented Neokantianism of the Southwest German school remained an affair of German philosophy. It hardly became fashionable outside Germany, and certainly not in the Anglo-Saxon world. This means, in particular, that only a small amount of Rickert's work has been translated into English. Moreover, many of the leading representants of the Southwest German school, among them Bauch and Rickert fell into disrepute due to their role under the Nazi regime, which certainly did not render their philosophy more attractive (cf. Sluga 1994, Schlotter 2004). Nevertheless it is an undeniable fact that Carnap spent his philosophical youth under the auspices of the Southwest German Neokantianism, to wit, Bauch, Rickert, Frege, Nohl and others before he became a protagonist of logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle. The main thesis of this paper is that the Southwest neo-kantianism had a deep impact on the *Aufbau*. This entails that the story Friedman tells in POW about the Neokantian bifurcation of Heidelberg and Marburg

as the origin of the AP/CP-divide in 20<sup>th</sup> century philosophy is a bit too neat to be true.

The outline of this paper is as follows. To set the stage, in the next section we study in some detail Friedman's bifurcation thesis as presented in POW. In particular, we pay attention to the way of how Friedman located Carnap in the neighborhood of the Marburg approach, downplaying his relations to the Southwest German School. In section 3 it is pointed out that Rickert's and Carnap's philosophical systems as realized in *System der Philosophie* (Rickert 1921) and in the *Aufbau* (Carnap 1928) shared some fundamental similarities with respect to their basic intentions and assumptions. In particular, both intended to give a rational reconstruction of how systematic scientific knowledge emerges out of "chaos", thereby responding to a problematic inherited ultimately from Nietzsche's *Lebensphilosophie*. In section 4 a Southwest German interpretation of the *Aufbau* is sketched in which its affinities with the neo-Kantianism of the Heidelberg School with respect to its architectonic as well as its methodology become visible. Section 5 deals with Carnap's notorious article *Overcoming Metaphysics by Logical Analysis of Language* (Carnap 1932). I argue that it should be interpreted not only as a frontal assault on Heidegger's "Philosophy of the Nothing" but also as an announcement of Carnap's own break with the value-theoretical Neo-kantianism of the Southwest German school. We conclude with some tentative remarks on the more general problem what consequences have to be drawn from the fact that the *Aufbau's* position relative to Heidelberg and the Marburg is not as easily determined as one might have thought.

## 2. A Neat Bifurcation.

Let us now have a closer look on how Friedman in (POW) construes the basic bifurcation between the Marburg and the Heidelberg school of neo-Kantianism. This bifurcation is, as he points out, not only interesting as an event of our philosophical past, but is of concern to the philosophy of the new century as well as it prefigured the AP/CP-divide that marked the entire 20<sup>th</sup> century philosophy. The protagonists of the drama are



Carnap and Heidegger. Both aimed to overcome the inherent imperfections of their respective philosophical origins:

Just as Carnap begins his philosophical career by attempting to realize the philosophical ambitions of the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism using the new mathematical logic created by Frege, Heidegger begins his career by attempting to resolve the outstanding problems of the South-west School using the new phenomenological method due to Husserl. (149).

These attempts to overcome the shortcomings of the Neokantian orthodoxies led to disaster and rendered Carnap and Heidegger a kind of tragical heroes. The new conceptual tools enthusiastically employed by these young philosophers led to the destruction of the traditional Neo-Kantian frameworks, and confronted them (and us) with a dilemma:

We can either, with Carnap, hold fast to formal logic as the ideal of universal validity and confine ourselves, accordingly, to the philosophy of the mathematical exact science, or we can, with Heidegger, cut ourselves off from logic and "exact thinking" generally, with the result that we ultimately renounce the ideal of truly universal validity itself.

[...]

[I]t is precisely this dilemma that lies at the heart of the twentieth-century opposition between "analytic" and "continental" philosophical traditions, which thus rests, from a purely philosophical point of view, on the systematic cracks which had meanwhile appeared in the original Kantian architectonic. (156)

If one sought a story of a well-plotted philosophical drama, this would be a promising candidate. The question is whether the story told is sufficiently close to what really happened. In this paper I'll concentrate on the role of Carnap, leaving Heidegger largely out of consideration. I'll argue that Friedman's characterization of Carnap as the liquidator of the Marburg logical idealism is in need of qualification. The world that Carnap intended to build up in the *Aufbau* was not the world of "mathematical exact science" as Friedman wants to make us believe.

This means that Cassirer's *Substance and Function* (Cassirer 1910) and the *Aufbau* can hardly be considered as being of the same ilk, even if both shared a positive orientation towards the new logic. After all, *Substance and Function* was a theory of the formation of scientific concepts, strictly separated from common sense concepts. According to (SF) scientific concepts are functional or relational concepts while common sense concepts are substance concepts guided by an outdated Aristotelian syllogistic logic. Hence, compared with the *Aufbau*, the agenda of (SF) was much more restricted. While Cassirer aimed at a functional theory of concept formation in the exact sciences the *Aufbau* was engaged in a comprehensive constitution of the world in its totality, beginning with the constitution of modest qualities up to the highest cultural objects. Cassirer aimed at such a comprehensive generality only later in his *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* (PSF), which had no influence on Carnap's philosophy anymore. Taken with a grain of salt one may therefore contend that the *Aufbau* was the analogue of (PSF) rather than (SF). This assertion has to be hedged, of course, with incisive qualifications. Compared with the extremally rich and fascinating material on which Cassirer's argumentation in (PSF) was based the *Aufbau*'s presentation was poor, pedantic and not very stimulating. This difference, however, is not important in the present context. What counts, is the general intention of the work, and from this point of view the overall spirit of the *Aufbau* was quite similar to the systematic endeavors of the neo-Kantians of the Southwest school such as Rickert and Bauch who pursued the agenda of *Kulturphilosophie* before this topic became fashionable through Cassirer's brilliant contributions (cf. Schlotter 2004).

The affinity between Rickert's *System* and Carnap's *Aufbau* is evidenced in a particularly striking way by the fact that for both the world was a world of facts and values. To put it in a nutshell one may say that the Carnap of the *Aufbau* should be characterized as a logically enlightened partisan of the Heidelberg school rather than a faithful follower of the Marburg School.<sup>2</sup> Put it differently, Carnap began his

<sup>2</sup> Recently, Gabriel has proposed to conceive Carnap's early philosophy as the result of a specific philosophical constellation flourishing in Jena in the first decades of the last century (cf. Gabriel 2003, 2004). I think Gabriel is essentially



philosophical career by attempting to realize the philosophical ambitions of the Heidelberg school of neo-Kantianism using the new mathematical logic created by Russell and Frege. Of course, he was aware of the logical achievements of the Marburg School, in particular that of Cassirer and Natorp. But he used them as tools for solving the problems put on the agenda by the Southwest German approach (see section 4). Thus Friedman's characterization of the early Heidegger's first steps in philosophy may well be considered to yield a fair characterization of Carnap's early philosophical efforts as well:

Heidegger's early investigations revolve around the central distinctions between psychological act and logical content, between real thought process and ideal atemporal "sense", between being (*Sein*) and validity (*Geltung*)" (*POW*, 39)

The point I want to make is that this characterization applies to a large extent to early Carnap's early investigations as well. As will be explained in more detail in section 4 Carnap took upon himself to argue that the quasi-analytical constitutional method of the *Aufbau* could be understood as being based on the fundamental distinction between Being (*Sein*) and Holding (*Gelten*). As he pointed out, the objects constituted by quasi-analysis were "unreal" objects that had no being but "hold" for the elements by which they were constituted. In full agreement with the anti-psychologist convictions of the Southwest school he insisted that the constitution of the world from autopsychological experiences must not be misunderstood as a reduction to psychology. One had to distinguish strictly between the psychological act and its content. This meant, in particular, that values and other "unreal" objects were to be distinguished from value experiences in an analogous way as physical objects were to be distinguished from perceptual experiences. Thereby philosophy and the sciences were led to acknowledge a multitude of autonomous ontological realms of objects that could not be reduced to a single fundamental one. Among them one finds the realms of logical objects, mathematical objects, spatial forms, colors, etc. (cf. *Aufbau* §

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right, but in order not to complicate matters too much I identify the Jena constellation with that of Heidelberg.

162). The acknowledgment of an irreducible plurality of domains of scientific objects was a characteristic trait of Carnap's philosophy that survived even after he had cut all links with Southwest Neo-kantianism around 1930.

Now let us have a closer look on the relation of the *Aufbau* with Cassirer's (SF). Actually Cassirer is mentioned in the *Aufbau* only three or four times, namely in §§ 5, 12, 64, and 75. To convince the reader that our interpretation is not unduly biased let us comment on all of these paragraphs:

- (i) §5 rather cryptically states that the „identification of the object and the concept“ on which the *Aufbau* is based, „does not amount to a reification of the concept, but, on the contrary, is a „functionalization“ of the object.“ This may be understood as a general allusion to (SF) but it is not very clear what is the precise meaning of it.
- (ii) §12 claims that Cassirer's theory of relational concepts may be a useful tool to develop a "logic of individuality" required for the cultural sciences in the sense of Dilthey, Windelband, and Rickert. A fuller interpretation of this claim is given in section 4.
- (iii) §64 criticizes Cassirer, Rickert, Russell, Mach and a bunch of other philosophers for not adopting an autopsychological base. For the purposes of the present paper this is not relevant.
- (iv) §75 is the most important single source for elucidating the relation between the *Aufbau* and Cassirer. It has been quoted quite often by many authors, e.g., Friedman (1999), Richardson (1998), POW, and elsewhere. In order to keep this text as self-contained as possible, it may nevertheless be legitimate to quote it in full once again:

Cassirer ([Substanzbegr.] 292ff), has shown that a science having the goal of determining the individual through contexts of laws [*Gesetzeszusammenhänge*] without its individuality being lost must apply, not class ("species") concepts, but rather *relational concepts*; for the latter can lead to the formation of series and thereby to the establishing of order-systems. I hereby also results that relations are necessary as first posits, since one can in fact



easily make the transition from relations to classes, whereas the contrary procedure is only possible in a very limited measure. The merit of having discovered the necessary basis of the constitutional system thereby belongs to two entirely different, and often mutually hostile, philosophical tendencies. *Positivism* has stressed that the sole *material* for cognition lies in the undigested [*unverarbeitet*] experiential *given*, here is to be sought the *basic elements* of the constitutional system. *Transcendental idealism*, however, especially the neo-Kantian tendency (Rickert, Cassirer, Bauch), has rightly emphasized that these elements do not suffice; *order-positives* [*Ordnungssetzungen*] must be added, our "basic relations". (*Aufbau*, § 75)

The first thing to note is that §75 rehearses the very same issue that was already dealt with in §12, namely, the possibility of applying relational logic, or, more specifically, Cassirer's relational theory of concepts as a means to set up a logic of individual concepts. This would help to bring the concepts of the *Geisteswissenschaften* or *Kulturwissenschaften* in the ken of the new relational logic. Put it differently, the new logic, of which Cassirer was one of the most eager philosophical partisans, would turn out to be a useful tool for the solution of urgent problems on the agenda by the Southwest German philosophy of science, namely to formulate a theory of the formation of concepts for all sciences, included the *Kulturwissenschaften* or *Geisteswissenschaften*.

In POW Friedman claims that the influence of (SF) "extends far beyond the emphasis on the significance of the modern logical theory of relations" (cf. POW, p. 72). He argues that both Cassirer and Carnap represented empirical knowledge by a serial or stepwise methodological sequence. Thereby Friedman proposes to align the *Aufbau's* strata of the autopsychological, the physical, and the heteropsychological with Cassirer's approximative relations between theories, e.g. astronomical theories such as the Copernican, the Ptolemaic, the Newtonian etc. (cf. SF, p. 302). I think that this alleged parallelism is rather implausible, since for Carnap the various strata were allogeneous spheres of objects while Cassirer's astronomical systems belong to one and the same realm that was "continuously unfolded" in the progress of science. Moreover

Friedman explicitly claims that according to Carnap "the cultural realities belong to the heteropsychological realm" (POW, p. 73). This is certainly not true. At various occasions Carnap is at pains to point out that the sphere of cultural objects should not be identified or said to be reducible to any other realm, in particular not to the psychological one (cf. § 152). Summarizing I contend that the parallelism that Friedman construes between *Aufbau* and *Substance and Function* is not convincing, in particular for the fact that it underestimates the role of the Southwest German current. This is not to argue for the opposite extreme, namely to seize Carnap completely for the Heidelberg School. My point is simply that things were more complicated as though they could be cast in an overly simplistic bifurcational scheme.

Rather, the *Aufbau* is to be read as a contribution to a comprehensive philosophy of science in the sense of Rickert's *System*. Such an approach intended to be a philosophical frame for *Geisteswissenschaften* and *Naturwissenschaften*. This is not to deny that Rickert's understanding of the natural sciences was not at the height of his time as Cassirer and Carnap very well knew. Thus, instead of straightforwardly aligning Carnap with the Marburg school, both Carnap and Heidegger can be interpreted as fighting to overcome Southwest German Neokantianism, although with different allies and with different intentions.

### 3. Rickert and Carnap on Chaos and System.

Although Carnap did not mention Rickert in his *Intellectual Autobiography* (Carnap 1963) he was concerned with Rickert's philosophy for quite a long time. After he had begun in 1910 to study philosophy in Jena under Rickert's former student Bauch, in 1911-1912 he went to Freiburg and attended Rickert's lectures. From his letters transpires that he was particularly impressed by Rickert's interpretation of Kant (cf. RC-025-71-01). Before the outbreak of the war he returned to Jena to continue his studies under Bauch whose value-theoretical approach was rather close to Rickert's. After the war he obtained a PhD in philosophy with the dissertation *Der Raum. Ein*



*Beitrag zur Wissenschaftslehre* (Carnap 1922) written under the direction of Bauch. For thematical reasons *Der Raum* has not much to do with Southwest German Neokantianism contrary to the *Aufbau*, as I want to show now in detail.

Let us start with some bibliographical observations. In the bibliography of the *Aufbau*, whose first version was probably finished in 1924/25 before Carnap moved to Vienna, he mentioned Rickert's most recent book *System der Philosophie* (Rickert 1921) and the most recent editions of his earlier works. The *Aufbau's* relations to Rickert's philosophy, however, are much closer than is revealed by Carnap's direct references to him. It may well be the case that in the final version of the *Aufbau* Carnap attempted to play down Rickert's influence since Rickert was certainly *persona non grata* for the empiricists of the Vienna circle. My main thesis is that the constitution theory of the *Aufbau* can be conceived as a modernized and formalized version of Rickert's constitution theory as presented in the latter's *System der Philosophie* (Rickert 1921).

First evidence for the close relation between the constitution theory of the *Aufbau* and Rickert's *System der Philosophie* can be found in Carnap's unpublished manuscript *Vom Chaos zur Wirklichkeit* (Carnap 1921/22) that he considered as the "germ of the constitution theory of the *Aufbau* (RC-081-05-01). In *Chaos* he described the starting point and the basic intention of the constitution theory of *Aufbau* as follows:

"Reality" is not given to us as something fixed, but undergoes permanent corrections. The epistemologist asserts: it has been built up on behalf of an accomplishment from an original chaos according to certain order principles that for the time being are instinctive[...]

[...]

The will to a new order is responsible for the epistemological considerations that deal with the fictions of chaos as starting point and the principles of order that guide the constitution."

This will to order, which intends to overcome the inconsistencies of reality by rebuilding it in a new way, is the irrational starting point of our theory. (RC-081-05-01)

Before we go on it may be expedient to point out that the "will to order" is nothing but a reformulation of Nietzsche's "will to power". In Rickert's *System* we find a quite similar description of how to build a "system":

What we experience immediately, is [...] after we have subtracted all conceptualizations a chaotic "turmoil" of impressions that are continuously changing. For the scientifically minded human being the world conceived in a totally disordered way is a [...] chaos. Most people, however, do not recognize this, since we all grow into a solid world order.

(*System*, S. 6/7)

[...]

Thus the will to the philosophical study of the world is necessarily connected with the "will to the system". (ibidem, S. 10)

[...]

Philosophy has to think the world in such a way that from the chaos of experiences emerges a cosmos ordered and articulated by principles. (ibidem, S. 50)

Carnap had no intention to publish *Chaos*. Hence the text does not contain a bibliography or references to other authors. The similarities with Rickert's *System*, however, are thus striking that an accidental coincidence appears rather improbable. Thus, even one cannot show with absolute certainty that *Chaos* was influenced by Rickert's *System* the factual similarity between *Aufbau* and *System* cannot be denied.

Both *System* and *Aufbau* start with a fundamental layer of minimally structured basic elements, Rickert with *Erlebnisse* (experiences) and Carnap with *Elementarerlebnisse* (elementary experiences). These elements do not correspond to perceived or cognized objects or states of affairs, rather they are fragments from which reasonable objects are constituted by certain formations (*Formungen*). Rickert had not much to say about these *Formungen*, Carnap was much more explicit. According to him, *Formungen* are to be conceived as quasi-analytic constitutions. Both Rickert and Carnap are primarily interested in a logical reconstruction of (scientific) knowledge, not in its psychological



or historical origins. Both consider psychological, historical, or sociological arguments as strictly speaking irrelevant for philosophy of science. In the same vein as Rickert, in the *Aufbau* Carnap considered all sciences as relevant for a scientific philosophy. The *System* as well as the *Aufbau* aimed at a comprehensive philosophy of science that took into account cultural and natural sciences.

According to Rickert science as an endeavor aiming at true knowledge is possible only in so far it recognizes certain values. More precisely, science is to be characterized as the activity guided by the value of "truth" (cf. Rickert (1911, pp. 154, 1921, pp. 344, or 1932, pp. 244). This orientation towards truth may be spelt out in more detail as follows: in every judgment there is a valuating moment of affirmation or negation. Theoretical reflection as well as practical action is based on values. Due to the value orientation of knowledge, any copy theory of knowledge according to which knowledge aims at giving us a faithful copy of reality is strictly rejected; in this respect he agrees with the Marburg school and logical empiricism. Summarizing let us list the following essential ingredients of Rickert's philosophy that played an important role for the general architectonic of the *Aufbau*:

- (i) *Being and Holding (Sein und Gelten)*. The quasi-analytical method of constitution is conceived as an iterated generalization of the value-theoretical concept of validation (Geltung): quasi-analytically constituted objects hold for the elements by which they are constituted, while the constituting elements are for the constituted objects. In the chain of constitutional levels every constituted object may therefore be considered as existing (seiend) as well as holding (geltend) depending on the perspective from which it is perceived (cf. *Aufbau* §42).
- (ii) *Natural Sciences and Cultural Sciences*. The *Aufbau* intends to do justice the cultural as well as the natural sciences in that it deals with the constitution of both types of concepts. The general constitutional method of quasi-analysis allows the constitution of individual concepts of cultural sciences as well as the general concepts of natural sciences (*Aufbau* §§ 12, 152, 158). Only by the

constitution of values the construction of the world in its proper sense is completed (*Aufbau* §152).

- (iii) *Plurality*. The *Aufbau* intends to give a general theory of constitution systems. Hence it does not aim to single out the one and only "true" constitution system. Rather, it aims at the classification and assessment of all possible systems. This generality corresponds to Rickert's aim to conceive philosophy in a new way as a theory of possible *Weltanschauungen*. In contrast to Rickert's *System*, however, the *Aufbau* concentrates on a theory of epistemic systems. (*Aufbau*, §106).

The characteristics (i) – (iii) sketch a frame for a Southwest German interpretation of the *Aufbau*. I do not contend that such a reading would be the only possible one. It clearly ignores many a philosophical or scientific current that influenced Carnap at that time and that left its mark on the *Aufbau*. Moreover, the Southwest German interpretation of the *Aufbau* with its emphasis on the epistemology and knowledge of the *Geisteswissenschaften* or *Kulturwissenschaften* was a project that never bore fruit. Not only that the constitutions of cultural objects presented in the *Aufbau* were sketchy, soon after its publication Carnap's philosophical orientation drastically changed which resulted in a virtual abandonment of the philosophy of *Kulturwissenschaften*. Carnap's excursion into this territory remained an episode soon given up in favor of a thorough logical empiricism.

#### 4. The *Aufbau* from a Southwest German Perspective.

The concept of "constitution" is a notoriously vague philosophical concept. In the *Aufbau* constitution means constitution by quasi-analysis (*Aufbau* §69, 71). For the following it is expedient to recall in outline the method of quasi-analysis as follows. Every constitutional system starts from a given base of fundamental elements and fundamental relations. For the system primarily considered in the *Aufbau* the basic elements are *Elementarerlebnisse*, the only basic relation is a binary relation of resemblance. The next layer to be quasi-analytically constituted



from this basic level is the level of so called quasi-qualities. Extensionally, a quasi-quality *Q* is given by a class of elementary experiences, which are characterized by the fact that they are more similar to each other than to every element that does not belong to *Q*. Carnap insisted, however that the constituted quality *Q* is essentially different from the elements that constitute it. This means, in particular, that *Q* must not be equated with its extension. The ontological category of *Q* is different from that to which its elements belong: while the elements of *Q* "exist" (sind), the quasi-quality *Q* is a structural value that does not exist (along with its elements) but that "hold" for the elements that constitute it. In this sense, the elements of *Q* belong to the sphere of being, while *Q* belongs to the different sphere of holding. Thereby Carnap gives a type-theoretical difference between sets and their elements a value-theoretical twist. Constitution is to be understood as a kind of structural valuation:

Following an occasionally used terminology, one could speak of the different "modes of being" of the objects of different object spheres. This expression is particularly apt to make clear that allogeneous objects are completely dissimilar and cannot be compared. Fundamentally, the difference between being and holding, of which so much has been made in recent philosophy, goes back to the difference between object spheres, more precisely, to the difference between proper objects and quasi objects. For, if a quasi object is constructed on the basis of certain elements, then it "holds" for these elements; thus it is distinguished as something that holds from the elements which have being. (*Aufbau*, §42)

The "recent philosophy", in which the difference between being and holding plays such an important role is, of course, the value-theoretical neo-Kantianism of the Southwest German school (cf. Rickert 1921, Lask 1911). The central claim of Rickert's value-theoretical approach was that the world comprises more than just the sphere of empirical being but other "non-real" spheres, for instance, the sphere of mathematical objects. However, among the spheres of non-real objects, the sphere of values played a prominent role. "Values have no being,

values hold" was the slogan he coined for succinctly characterizing his approach. The *Aufbau* went beyond this distinction between being and holding by reconceptualizing this relation in a relative way:

Constitution theory goes beyond the customary conception of being and holding by claiming that this contrast does not arise only once, that there is only one boundary between being and holding, but that this relationship, constantly repeated, leads from level to level: what holds for objects of the first level has a second mode of being, and can in turn become the object of something that holds of it (on a third level) etc. So as construction theory is concerned, this is the logically strict form of the dialectic of the conceptual process. Hence the concepts of being and holding are relative and express the relation between each constructional level and the succeeding one. (*Aufbau* §42)

Since all scientific objects are quasi-analytically constituted objects (cf. § *Aufbau* 160), with the exception of elementary experiences all scientific objects are "non-real" from the perspective of constitution theory, or, better, they have a double character: they hold for the objects that constitute them, and they have being for the objects constituted by them. Outside a constitutional system the question whether an object has being or not, does not make sense. This value-theoretically motivated relativization of the concept of being may be considered as an early forerunner of Carnap's later enduring refusal of a strict distinction between reality and non-reality, which in its mature form he put forward in *Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology* (Carnap 1950).

Another evidence that the *Aufbau's* overall intention was to employ modern logic for a thorough modernization of the Southwest German neo-Kantianism is provided by Carnap's proposal that the new relational logic of Whitehead and Russell may be useful not only for the elucidation of "general" concepts as they are used in the natural sciences but also as a tool for establishing a "logic of individuality":

Recently (in connection with ideas of Dilthey, Windelband, Rickert), a "logic of individuality" has repeatedly been demanded; what is desired here is a method which allows a conceptual



comprehension of, and does justice to, the peculiarity of individual entities, and which does not attempt to grasp this peculiarity through inclusion in narrower and narrower classes. Such a method would be of great importance for individual psychology and for all cultural sciences, especially history. [...] I merely wish to mention in passing that the concept of structure as it occurs in the theory of relations would form a suitable basis for such a method. (*Aufbau*, §12)

This remark shows that at that time Carnap's relation to Rickert was rather constructive one. He essentially accepted the agenda of Rickert's systematic philosophy and intended to update Rickert's outdated conception of logic. Rickert, misled by an obsolete conception of logic marked by Aristotelian syllogistics had contended that standard logic was not able to explicate adequately the individual character of the concepts of the cultural sciences. Carnap, in line with Cassirer (cf. Cassirer (1910, chapter IV, 9) was convinced that the new relational logic was very well prepared to cope with individual and general concepts, since both could be characterized as a functional concepts (cf. also Richardson 1998, 371f). This technical alliance with Cassirer, however, did not disturb profound agreement with Rickert's overall approach. In particular he agreed with him that cultural objects belong to an autonomous sphere of being and could not be subsumed under the values that constituted them in the same way as elements under the extension of the class to which they belonged (cf. Rickert 1929, p. 739, 749ff, *Aufbau* § 37).<sup>3</sup> While for Rickert this fact conclusively showed the principal limitations of the logic of the natural sciences, for Carnap it evidenced that modern logic could overcome the traditional demarcation between cultural and natural sciences.

In order to lie the ground for a discussion of the constitutional sketches of values and other cultural objects that Carnap presented in

<sup>3</sup> Richardson interprets this episode differently. He takes it as evidence that Carnap took side with Cassirer against Rickert (cf. Richardson 1998, p. 38f). In my opinion he thereby overlooks the important fact that Rickert's approach continued to set the agenda for Carnap. The role of Cassirer was mainly that of an expert in matters logical.

the *Aufbau* let us succinctly recall the overall structure of the constitution system that served as the main example of that work. This constitution system has four main layers: (i) autopsychological objects, (ii) physical objects, (iii) heteropsychological objects, and (iv) cultural objects. Values belonged to the layer of cultural objects. For the constitution of this stratum it was presupposed that autopsychological, physical, and heteropsychological objects were already constituted. In realist language this meant that the objects of these spheres had a being ("sind") while cultural objects as belonging to the last stratum were to hold ("gelten") for the objects of the lower strata. The constitution of these cultural objects, in particular of values, was to be carried out by the method of quasi-analysis, which in this case, however, took the special forms of manifestation and documentation (*Aufbau* §§ 54ff).

Fully in line with the later "continental" tradition Carnap pointed out that 19<sup>th</sup> century philosophy had paid only insufficient attention to the autonomy of cultural objects. According to him, the reason for this deficit had been that philosophy stood under the spell of the rising natural sciences and confined its attention mainly to physics. Dilthey was the first who substantially improved the situation by working out a methodology for the historical and cultural sciences (cf. *Aufbau* §24), which paid tribute to the autonomy and independence of the emerging cultural sciences from the already established natural science. Thereby the peculiar ontological status of cultural objects was recognized. Although cultural objects are subject bound they do not depend on any specific subject as their carriers:

A state or a custom can persist even though the bearing subjects perish and others take their place. Moreover, the cultural objects are not composed of psychological (much less physical) objects. They are of a completely different object type; the cultural objects belong to other object spheres [...] than the physical and the psychological objects. (*Aufbau*, §23)

Cultural objects are not composed of objects of the lower levels; they manifest themselves through them or are documented by them. For instance, a custom or a habit, as objects of ethnology or anthropology, manifest themselves through certain actions, cultural objects such as



theories or art works are documented by certain perduring physical objects such as books, documents or paintings (cf. also Bauch 1923, Freyer 1928):

[K]nowledge of cultural objects, and thus their constitution, depends entirely upon the relations of "manifestation" and "documentation". [...] It is the task of the cultural sciences to deal with the correlation problems of the manifestation and documentation relation. These sciences have to ascertain in which acts (in the physical and the psychological sense) the individual cultural objects become overt and manifest themselves. In so doing they form, as it were, definitions for all the names of cultural objects. (*Aufbau* § 24)

Thereby all cultural objects are reduced directly or indirectly to their manifestations or documentations, and thereby they become constituted by the latter (cf. *Aufbau* §42). Manifestations and documentations have the role of indicators; more precisely, they have the role of objects that mediate recognition, and from their characteristics alone science is able to ascertain the characteristics of the cultural objects themselves (cf. § 56). This leads to a "modest" reduction of statements about cultural objects to statements about psychological objects in that the former can be translated in logically equivalent statements about the latter, even if the "meaning" may get lost in this translation.<sup>4</sup>

Values as special cultural objects are constituted by special manifestations and documentations the investigation of which is task of a "value science". More precisely, values manifest themselves in certain value experiences, by which one evaluates an experience or an action as pleasant, repugnant, coward, courageous etc. Analogously as for the constitution of physical objects from perceptual experiences values are constituted from value experiences. In the same line as Rickert, Bauch, and other Neo-Kantian antipsychologists Carnap insists that

<sup>4</sup> A quite similar description of the constitution of the objects of history, art, and mathematics, which emphasized their „irreality“, can be found in Bauch (1923, pp. 12ff). Similar remarks on the variety of domains of „unreal objects“ can be found in virtually every text of Rickert.

the constitution from value experiences does not imply that a value is something psychological:

The constitution of values from certain experiences, namely, value experiences, is in many ways analogous to the constitution of physical things from "perceptual experiences[...]. For the constitution of ethical values, for example, we must consider (among others) experiences of conscience, experiences of duty or of responsibility, etc. [...] On the basis of those constructions, we can then form the constitution of the various value types. This should not be considered a psychologizing of values, just as the constitution of physical objects from sense qualities does not amount to a psychologizing of the physical. [...] Values themselves are not experiential or psychological, but exist independently of being experienced. (*Aufbau* §152)

The "perception" of values in the *Aufbau* had its parallel in Rickert who claimed, "values are discovered like stars in the sky" (Rickert 1910, p. 151). Also the strict anti-psychologistic distinction between act and content can be found in Rickert, Husserl, and already Lotze. It enabled Carnap to establish a plurality of domains of being or object types:

In science, even today, there is already a considerable number of object types which have the same independence and thus the same claim to be considered essential aspects of the world. [...] Cultural objects, biological objects, and values have been recognized as independent, even though the equality of their status with that of the physical and the psychological objects at the moment is still debated. (§162)

In the *Aufbau* Carnap was so eager to ensure the scientific dignity of values that he pointed out that values could be constituted in all kinds of constitution systems, not only in those with an autopsychological base. Referring to Ostwald's *Die Philosophie der Werte* (Ostwald 1913) he offered a second way of constituting values:

It could seem an open question whether in a constitution system with physical basis there is room for the domain of values. This



doubt, however, has been removed by Ostwald with his derivation of values of several types upon a basis of energetics (based upon the second principle of energetics with the aid of the concept of dissipation). (*Aufbau*, § 59)

This twofold way of constituting values pointed to the fact that values were thus important for Carnap that he was eager to ensure that they could be constituted in every kind of constitution system regardless whether it was physicalist or not.

Summarizing one may assert that, although the constitutions of values and other cultural objects in the *Aufbau* remain rather sketchy they evidence that the *Aufbau*'s original program went far beyond the realm of the empirical sciences. Originally, it was designed to cover natural and cultural sciences alike following rather closely the program that Rickert had proposed for his version of Neo-Kantian philosophy of science. Thus it seems justified to conceive the *Aufbau*'s original program as an attempt to modernize the Southwest German version of *Wertphilosophie*. This program, however, never came to fruition and was given up soon after its inception.

## 5. Overcoming Metaphysics as the Elimination of Value Philosophy..

Shortly after the *Aufbau* had been published in 1928, Carnap cut short the relation with the value-theory of the Southwest German Neo-Kantianism. This break-off is well documented in *Overcoming of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language* (Carnap 1932) where *Wertphilosophie* is disqualified as philosophical nonsense:<sup>5</sup>

The development of *modern logic* has made it possible to give a new and sharper answer to the question of the validity and justification of metaphysics. [...] In the domain of *metaphysics*,

including all philosophy of value and normative theory, logical analysis yields the negative result that *that the alleged statements in this domain are entirely meaningless*. Therewith a radical elimination of metaphysics is attained, which was not yet possible from the earlier metaphysical standpoints. (Carnap 1932, p. 60/61).

It does not seem too far-fetched to contend that the implacable rejection of metaphysics put forward in *Overcoming* was meant not only as a frontal attack against Heidegger but also as a more implicit confession of a former partisan of metaphysical value philosophy. *Overcoming* can be read as a manifesto that documented Carnap's own overcoming of his earlier value-philosophical orientation, which had marked the architectonic of the *Aufbau* to such a large extent. After all, the world of the *Aufbau* had been a world of facts and values. Indeed, *Wertphilosophie* was the only comprehensive current of philosophy that in *Overcoming* was blamed to be metaphysical nonsense, not taking into account the fragment of Heidegger's "philosophy of the nothing" that can hardly be considered as an established philosophical discipline in its own right.

The expulsion of values out of the constitutional paradise meant to give up an essential part of the original program of the *Aufbau*. Values ceased to be scientifically respectable objects. The value-theoretical interpretation of quasi-analysis became not only "optional", but also obsolete (cf. § 42). More or less at the same time Carnap's antipode Heidegger arrived at a similar verdict concerning the Southwest German *Wertphilosophie* (cf. Heidegger 1935, p. 151). Thus, in the liquidation of *Wertphilosophie* Carnap and Heidegger were comrades in arms fighting against the same adversary, to wit, the Neo-kantianism of the Heidelberg School.

This means that around 1930 ("after the *Aufbau*") Carnap's philosophical outlook underwent a dramatic change, which up to now has been rather ignored. While in the *Aufbau* he had opted for a "comprehensive scientific philosophy" according to which not only empirical facts but also values and other cultural objects belonged to the ken of scientific philosophy. Consequently, the world of the *Aufbau*

<sup>5</sup> Although the article *The Old and the New Logic* (Carnap (1930) already had a section *The Elimination of Metaphysics*, value philosophy was not explicitly mentioned there as metaphysical.



was a world of facts and values. About 1930 Carnap came to the conclusion that the program of comprehensive scientific philosophy was not feasible. Instead, he favored a "restrictive scientific philosophy" according to which values dropped out of the realm of reason and were no longer considered as respectable objects of study for scientific philosophy. Instead, they were relegated to the realm of poetry, music and other nonrational endeavors through which one might express one's *Lebensgefühl*. This restriction of the realm of scientific philosophy was accompanied by raising the standards of scientificity such that only the purely formal aspects of science were admitted as genuine topics of philosophy of science. From that time onwards, scientific philosophy was restricted to philosophy of science in a narrow sense. The world of scientific knowledge became a world of facts without values.<sup>6</sup> Thereby he became representative for one horn of the dilemma that according to Friedman characterizes 20<sup>th</sup> century philosophy, namely the radical analytical current that holds "fast to formal logic as the ideal of universal validity and confines itself to the philosophy of the mathematical exact sciences." (POW, p. 156). A closer look on Carnap's philosophical development reveals that this was not the only stance he adopted throughout his early philosophical career. This means, Friedman's bifurcational scheme misrepresents Carnap's early philosophy to some extent.

## 6. Concluding Remarks.

The aim of this paper was to show that, contrary to common wisdom, the value-oriented neo-Kantianism of the Southwest School exerted a strong influence on Carnap's early philosophy, particularly on the *Aufbau*. Up to now, this connection has been virtually ignored despite the fact that the constitutional sketches of values and other cultural objects clearly evidence the influence of the Heidelberg School. As the early manuscript *Vom Chaos zur Wirklichkeit* reveals the constitutional programs of Rickert and Carnap shared important similarities. Both

conceptualized the constitution of the world as the construction of an ordered system ("cosmos") out of an "irrational" chaos of experiences (*Erlebnisse*). Both took the grounding of their systems in the "chaos of experiences" literally as grounding in the chaos of life, interpreting "*Erlebnisse*" quite literally as chunks of *Leben* (life). This points to an interesting connection with the currents of *Lebensphilosophie* à la Nietzsche and Dilthey. In the case of Carnap this connection has rarely been taken into account up to now. The first exceptions seem to be the investigations of Gabriel (cf. Gabriel (2003, 2004)).

The influence of the Southwest German school on Carnap's thought reached its peak in the early 20s. When he moved to Vienna to become a logical empiricist in a proper sense, the neo-Kantian features faded away. Hence it is not surprising that Carnap himself attempted to play it down after he had joined the Vienna Circle. The same is true for the other members of the Circle. As far as I know, the constitution of values was never a topic in the Circle's discussions of this work (cf. Neurath 1928, Mormann 2007).

Friedman concludes POW with an emphatic call that "those seeking to move beyond the analytic/continental divide can profitably begin by re-examining Cassirer's now unfortunately forgotten efforts at reconciliation and synthesis" (Friedman 2000, 159). According to him

Cassirer [...] alone attempts to do justice, once again, to both sides of Kant's original philosophical synthesis. And he alone is thus in a position to mediate the increasing intellectual tension between the now notorious "two cultures"- between the *naturwissenschaftliche* und *geisteswissenschaftliche* intellectual orientations. (ibidem, 152)

If the Southwest German interpretation of the *Aufbau* is not totally mistaken actually Cassirer was not the only one in aiming at such a synthesis of *geisteswissenschaftliche* and *naturwissenschaftliche* orientations. In a less brilliant but more logical way Carnap's *Aufbau* may be conceived of as being engaged in the same task as Cassirer, namely to overcome the growing gap between the "two cultures" of *Geisteswissenschaften* and *Naturwissenschaften* that threatened to bring

<sup>6</sup> For the reasons of this conversion, see Mormann (2007).



about a truly comprehensive scientific culture. This endeavor was couched in terms of the Southwest German neo-Kantianism of the Heidelberg school; although Cassirer's relational theory of concept formation exerted an important technical influence. Today, Carnap's reasons for abandoning this project of a comprehensive scientific philosophy may be assessed as not fully convincing. This may be considered as evidence that the dismissal of the Southwestern current as totally irrelevant for contemporary philosophy may have been too hasty. In any case, taking notice of the Southwestern heritage could help to mitigate the Kantian bias in the reconciliatory project of overcoming the AP/CP-divide, as the interpretation of the Southwest German *Wertphilosophie* as a (neo-) Kantian current may well rest on a profound misunderstanding that ignores its essentially Hegelian background (cf. Wagner 1987. p.11). In sum, coming to terms with the problem of how to locate the *Aufbau* in the landscape of early 20<sup>th</sup> century philosophy may be more difficult than Friedman's neat bifurcational scheme suggests. Consequently, a comprehensive understanding of the AP/CP-divide may turn out to be harder than most partisans of the various reconciliatory projects imagine.

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## HERMENÉUTICA DEL LENGUAJE..

Caleb Olvera

*Todo lo que hay que presuponer  
en la hermenéutica es únicamente  
lenguaje.*

F. Schleiermacher

*El arte nos permite hacer hospitalario el mundo,  
crearlo de manera menos predatoria*

Una vez que se ha establecido la búsqueda de la verdad por más de dos mil años sin resultado positivo, comienza la sospecha de que se persigue un fantasma o que el método empleado no es el adecuado. Con una idea como ésta en mente, se instaura el mito de *El dorado*. Un mito que condenó a los conquistadores a una búsqueda frenética que desembocó en tragedia. Parece ser que el hombre está arrojado a este mundo y condenado a un peregrinar de mitos, se le ha vendido la falsa idea de un lugar privilegiado llamado *El dorado* o para nuestro caso *Verdad*. La filosofía del siglo xx presenta una particularidad que se generalizó a casi todo su hacer, esta particularidad fue la reflexión sobre el lenguaje, conocida como el giro lingüístico. Dicha reflexión supone la sospecha de que algo no anda bien, y que quizá sea el objeto amado (pues éste es el significado primario del término filosofía) o el método empleado. Bajo la sospecha de que el objeto no aparece o que la verdad no aparece por ningún lado, los ojos de los filósofos se voltean hacia la búsqueda misma, hacia el método empleado y en particular hacia el medio utilizado para acceder a ella, en este caso el lenguaje. El proyecto hermenéutico siempre se ha desarrollado a la par de este pensar el lenguaje, de hecho las recientemente nombradas neurociencias, han surgido de una relación lingüística particular y apoyan la tesis de que el pensamiento es lenguaje.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Tesis que es posible rastrear mucho tiempo antes, se puede consultar D. P. Gorski, *Pensamiento y lenguaje*, Ed. Grijalbo, México, 1991.