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Phenomenal Conservatism and Bergmann’s Dilemma

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Abstract

In this paper we argue that Michael Huemer’s (PC) phenomenal conservatism—the internalist view according to which our beliefs are prima facie justified if based on how things seems or appears to us to be—doesn’t fall afoul of Michael Bergmann’s dilemma for epistemological internalism. We start by showing that the thought experiment that Bergmann adduces to conclude that (PC) is vulnerable to his dilemma misses its target. After that, we distinguish between two ways in which a mental state can contribute to the justification of a belief: the direct way and the indirect way. We identify a straightforward reason for claiming that the justification contributed indirectly is subject to Bergmann’s dilemma. Then we show that the same reason doesn’t extend to the claim that the justification contributed directly is subject to Bergmann’s dilemma. As (PC) is the view that seemings or appearances contribute justification directly, we infer that Bergmann’s contention that his dilemma applies to (PC) is unmotivated. In the final part, we suggest that our line of response to Bergmann can be used to shield other types of internalist justification from Bergmann’s objection. We also propose that seeming-grounded justification can be combined with justification of one of these types to form the basis of a promising version of internalist foundationalism.

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Notes

  1. Phenomenal conservatism is most commonly associated with Huemer’s work. Other epistemologists––such as Jim Pryor (2000) and John Pollock (1986)––have proposed similar views, though less general than phenomenal conservatism. For a list of philosophers who have defended phenomenal conservatism or a similar view see Moretti (2015: §1).

  2. The superscript ‘P’ in ‘(PCP)’ indicates that this principle concerns propositional justification. Huemer (2001) defends a stronger version of (PCP) according to which, for any proposition P, if it seems to S that P, S has prima facie justification for fully believing P.

  3. S has propositional justification for a proposition P just in case P is epistemically worthy of being believed by S, because S has a reason for doing so, whether or not she actually believes P for that reason or at all. On the other hand, S has doxastic justification for P just in case S has propositional justification for P and S bases her actual belief that P on the reason she has for believing P.

  4. Huemer has also articulated a few arguments in defence (PCP). For a critical overview see Moretti (2015: §3).

  5. For reference to relevant literature see Moretti (2015: §1).

  6. The superscript ‘D’ in ‘(PCD)’ indicates that this principle concerns doxastic justification. Note that (PCD) is true if and only if it is true that if it seems to S that P, in absence of defeaters S has some degree of justification for believing that P, whether or not S actually believes P on the basis of her seeming that P or at all. This is the same as saying that (PCD) is true if and only if (PCP) is true. Huemer (2013: §1c) appears to endorse––at least implicitly––this biconditional.

  7. Bergmann (2013: 154, n4) claims that some passages in Huemer’s papers can be interpreted as suggesting that Huemer himself would endorse (PCD*). However, it is rather unclear how, for instance, inferential justification could turn out to be seeming-based justification. Huemer (2013: 1c) himself emphasizes that it is controversial even among supporters of phenomenal conservatism whether or not a variation of phenomenal conservatism could account for inferential justification.

  8. The expression ‘X is relevant to the justification of truth of B’ is used by Bergmann––and we follow him in this use––as a generic way to refer to epistemic relevance. This expression could thus be replaced by others such as ‘X is evidence for B’ or ‘X is a truth-indicator for B’ and so on. (Cf. Bergmann 2006: 15, n23).

  9. At least if S is a cognitively limited subject as we are. The reader should be careful not to confuse this infinite regress with the infinite regress constituting one of the options of Agrippa’s trilemma, considered in the previous section.

  10. Note that the (SPO) was first explicitly formulated by Bonjour (1985: 41–43) but directed against externalist notions of justification.

  11. Let be (NA) the claim that the truth of S’s belief B is not accidental from S’s point of view. It is somewhat unclear how (NA) should be intended. Bergmann (2013: 168) explicitly addresses this question, and considers five different conditions each of which would count, if accepted, as necessary and sufficient for the truth of (NA). Precisely: (I) S is aware of X and X in fact indicates B’s truth; (II) S is aware of X and S epistemically should believe that X indicates B’s truth; (III) S doesn’t believe that B is formed in an unreliable way (so that it’s unlikely to be true); (IV) It’s false that S epistemically should believe that B is formed in an unreliable way (so that it’s unlikely to be true); (V) S is aware of X and S believes that X indicates B’s truth (or at least conceives of X as being relevant to B’s truth or justification). Bergmann argues––convincingly in our view––that the internalist cannot interpret (NA) in ways (I)–(IV). Bergmann also contends that the internalist should accept (V) as a condition both necessary and sufficient for the truth of (NA). We find it reasonable that the internalist should accept (V) as a condition only sufficient for the truth of (NA). In this paper we indicate two additional and different ways in which something of which S is aware can prevent the accidental truth of S’s belief B from S’s perspective.

  12. Rogers and Matheson (2011) and Crisp (2009) deny that this regress is vicious. See Bergmann (2013: 165)’s response. We do not take position on this dispute in this paper.

  13. Bergmann could try to meet this objection by retreating to the claim that S’s weak awareness of her seeming that P cannot prevent the proposition that P from being accidentally true from S’s own perspective. Bergmann’s thought experiment, however, is irrelevant for this different conclusion. In this example, S bases her belief that P on no reason; so what is clear about S is just that it is an accident, on her part, that she comes to believe a truth while forming the belief that P. The example, in other words, leaves unsettled the question about whether S’s epistemic situation is such that the truth of the proposition that P is also an accident from her point of view.

  14. (IJ) should probably be refined. For the introspective belief of S about X that provides the basis for S’s belief that P can plausibly be, not just the belief that X occurs in S’s mind, but a different introspective belief about X whose content entails the content of the first belief. For instance, one could say that S’s pain indirectly contributes to the justification of S’s belief that (P) the effect of the anesthetic is quickly fading away if, in absence of defeaters, S is doxastically justified (at least to some degree) in believing P on the basis of S’s introspective belief that (Q) S ’s pain is quickly increasing. Clearly, Q entails the proposition that pain occurs in S’s mind. For ease of presentation and because the refinement wouldn’t substantially change our arguments (the reader can easily verify it), we prefer to leave (IJ) unaltered.

  15. In this case, S’s introspective belief that she feels pain contributes directly to the justification of S’s belief that the effect of the anesthetic is over. Furthermore, S’s pain contributes directly to the justification of S’s introspective belief that she feels pain.

  16. There are exceptions. Take for instance the disjunctive proposition (D) that [P or S has the belief that P]. If based on S’s justified belief that P, S’s belief that D is justified. Thus S’s belief that P can directly contribute to the justification of S’s belief that D. Yet S’s belief that D is obviously justified also if it is based on S’s justified introspective belief that S has the belief that P. Thus S’s belief that P can also indirectly contribute to the justification of S’s belief that D.

  17. (INF) bears an interesting similarity to Richard Fumerton’s Inferential Internalism (II), which is the principle saying that “in order to be justified in believing P on the basis of E, one must have justification for believing, not only E, but also the proposition that E makes P probable. (Fumerton 2006: 39). (INF) and (II), in particular, are arguably equivalent if we make the assumption that S’s belief is justified in the sense of (II) if and only if its truth is not accidental from S’s perspective. For a recent discussion of Fumerton’s principle (II), and of alternative principles of inferential justification, see Tucker (2012). Tucker contends that S’s higher-level awareness of the link between E and P needs to be neither justified nor doxastic in order for S to have inferential justification for believing P on the basis of S’s belief that E.

  18. As we have seen, when X is one of S’s mental states, and X directly contributes to the justification of S’s belief that P, X is normally unable, on S’s ordinary background information, to contribute also indirectly to the justification of the same belief that P. S’s background information may however depart from the ordinary one, and X can be at the same time a direct and an indirect contributor to the justification of S’s belief that P. When X directly and indirectly contributes to the justification of S’s belief that P, it is false that S just bases her belief that P on her belief that O and not (also) on her belief that she has the belief that O. For since X contributes also indirectly to the justification of S’s belief that P, S also bases her belief that P on her belief that she has the belief that O. In order to keep either contribution of X to the justification of S’s belief that P distinct, in this case we say that to the extent to which X contributes directly to the justification of S’s belief that P, S just bases her belief that P on her belief that O and not (also) on her belief that she has the belief that O.

  19. Suppose, instead, S’s based her belief that P on her belief that (E) she has the belief that O. In this case–along with the explanation given in the previous section––(INF) would impose that S should be strongly aware of her belief that O in order for S’s belief that P to be non-accidental from S’s perspective.

  20. Philosophers sympathetic to Bergmann’s views may grant this but still insist that when X is a mental state of S, and X directly contributes to the justification of S’s belief that P, S must be strongly aware of X if her belief that P is not to be accidentally true from her own perspective. The apparently most straightforward line of argument for these philosophers is to appeal to a principle like the following:

    (BAS) When S’s belief that P is based on S ’s mental state X, the truth of S’s belief that P is non-accidental from S’s point of view only if S justifiedly conceives of (or is at least able to justifiedly conceive of) X as relevant by itself to the justification or truth of her belief that P.

    Suppose in fact X contributes directly to the justification of S’s belief that P. In this case (INF) cannot motivate the requirement that S should be strongly aware of X in the specific sense that entails that S conceives of the truth of the proposition describing the occurrence of X as relevant to the justification or truth of her belief that P. Yet, in this very case, (BAS) seems to motivate the requirement that S should be strongly aware of X in the different sense entailing that S conceives of X itself as relevant to the justification or truth of her belief that P.

    We don’t think this strategy will succeed. For it seems to us that the claim that S’s mental state X is relevant by itself to the justification or the truth of S’s belief that P––as contrasted with the claim that the truth of the proposition describing the occurrence of X is relevant to the justification or the truth of S’s belief that P––cannot be interpreted in such a way that (BAS) turns out true. Suppose S directly contributes to the justification of S’s belief that P. In this case, there is a clear sense in which X can be described as being relevant to the justification or truth of S’s belief that P, for X is the mental state upon which S bases her justified belief that P. However, if to conceive of X as relevant to the justification or truth of S’s belief that P means to conceive of X as the basis of S ’s justified belief that P, (BAS) is unmotivated. For it is far from clear why S should––in addition to just having X, and basing upon X her belief that P––also conceive of X as the basis of her justified belief that P in order to prevent this belief from being accidentally true from her point of view. There might be alternative interpretations of the claim that X is relevant to the justification or truth of S’s belief that P capable of producing a more plausible reading of (BAS). Until further notice, however, we feel entitled to dismiss the strategy at issue as unsuccessful.

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Acknowledgments

We are grateful for very useful comments and criticism on drafts of this paper to Michael Bergmann, Chris Tucker, a referee of this Journal and audience at the conference Philosophy, Analysis and Public Engagement, University of L’Aquila, 3–5 September 2014. The final draft of this paper was written at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP). The authors thank the MCMP for hosting them and for providing a stimulating atmosphere to conduct this research.

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Moretti, L., Piazza, T. Phenomenal Conservatism and Bergmann’s Dilemma. Erkenn 80, 1271–1290 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-015-9724-3

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