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THE DIALECTICAL CONSTRUCTION OF A NOTION
OF TRUTH IN SOME 13TH-CENTURY MASTERS OF ARTS

Aristotle puts forward claims about truth in a number of places of his philosophical output, in works of logical, psychologico-epistemological and metaphysical character.¹ Among other places, he claims in the first chapter of the *De interpretatione* that truth occurs in relation with the composition and division of both intellectual and linguistic objects.² This affirmation echoes another one, in the third book of the *De anima*, where cognitive psychology is at stake.³ In the *Metaphysics*, in turn, Aristotle seems to identify truth and being, when he says that «each thing has as much truth as it has being»,⁴ only to tell us, in the sixth book of the same treatise, that «truth and falsity do not occur in relation to things [...] but in relation to thoughts».⁵ Truth, then, seems to be susceptible of attribution to thoughts, language, and things, but the modalities of these attributions remain unclear, as it is unclear whether these attributions are related to each other, and if so, how.

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1. For Aristotle's account of truth, see P. Crivelli, *Aristotle on Truth*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004.

2. Cf. *Int.*, I, 16a⁹⁻¹³: «Just as some thoughts in the soul are neither true nor false while some are necessarily one or the other, so also with spoken sounds. For falsity and truth have to do with combination and separation» (tr. J.L. Ackrill, in Aristotle, *Categories and De interpretatione*, Clarendon, Oxford 1963, 43). All translations from Greek and Latin are mine unless otherwise stated.

3. Cf. *De an.*, III, 6, 430a²⁶⁻²⁷. A claim to the same effect appears also in, e.g., *Metaph.*, Θ, 10, 1051b¹⁻³.

4. Cf. *Metaph.*, α, I, 993b³⁰⁻³¹.

5. Cf. *Metaph.*, E, 4, 1027b²⁵⁻²⁷.

In their exegeses of the Aristotelian corpus, 13th-century masters of Arts will move towards a unified notion of truth that can account for these metaphysical, psychologico-epistemological and logical attributions. The dialectical process whereby these masters devise such a unified notion surfaces in the analysis of a discussion that goes from the first half of the 13th-century until at least the dawn of the 14th-century. Such a process is typical of the development of philosophical discussions in 13th-century commentaries on the Aristotelian corpus produced in the Parisian Faculty of Arts, where masters clearly rely on earlier faculty commentaries⁶ in order to produce their own commentaries on an Aristotelian work, and read the Aristotelian corpus as a coherent whole.⁷ My aim in this article is to present the case of the notion of truth, by looking into 13th-century commentaries on the aforementioned Aristotelian passages. I begin with the rather short observations we find in Nicholas of Paris and Robert Kilwardby. Thereafter, I look at the state of the discussion in the commentaries on the *De interpretatione* by Martin of Dacia and Simon of Faversham and on the *De anima* by an anonymous master. I finish with the presentation of the unified notion we find in Radulphus Brito's philosophical works.

I. NICHOLAS OF PARIS AND ROBERT KILWARDBY

In Aristotle's *Categories*, the statement, which is sometimes true, sometimes false, is introduced as a counterexample to the

6. For the oral teaching of, and hence for the production of a commentary on, a text related to the trivium, masters of Arts rely on Boethius' translations and commentaries, on some late-medieval authoritative texts, e.g., Peter Helias' *Summa super Priscianum*, in the case of Priscian's *Institutiones*, and on earlier commentaries by their fellow masters, although it is not always possible to determine which specific text a master had under his eyes. Texts and discussions belonging to the faculty of Theology rarely play a part; see the conclusion of A.M. Mora-Márquez, *The Thirteenth-Century Notion of Signification. The Discussions and Their Origin and Development*, Brill, Leiden 2015.

7. For the parallel case of the notion of 'significatio', see Mora-Márquez, *The Thirteenth-Century Notion of Signification*. For the master's approach to the Aristotelian corpus as a coherent whole, see S. Ebbesen *et al.*, *History of Philosophy in Reverse. Reading Aristotle through the Lenses of the Middle-Ages*, Danish Royal Academy of Sciences and Letters, Copenhagen 2013.

claim that only the substance is susceptible of receiving contraries (cf. *Cat.*, 5, 4a¹⁰). In order to assess the force of this counterexample, Nicholas of Paris⁸ scrutinises the statement ‘Socrates is sitting’, which is true when Socrates is sitting and false when he is not sitting. Nicholas tells us that the statement does not receive the set of contraries truth/falsity as a property (*ut in subiecto*), but only insofar as the statement signifies an intellectual composition and division, which presumably is either true or false.⁹ But, he tells us, truth and falsity are in fact properties (*ut in subiecto*) of the thing.¹⁰ We are, thus, told without further explanation that truth relates to statements only insofar as they are signs of thoughts and that it relates to things as an attribute, its relation to thoughts remaining undetermined, as remains undetermined whether truth relates in the same sense or in different senses to statements and to things.

Hence, Robert Kilwardby¹¹ asks, in his commentary on the *De interpretatione*,¹² whether truth is indeed a property of things,

8. In his *Rationes super Praedicamenta Aristotelis* (= *In Cat.*), ms. Munich (= M), Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm. 14460, ff. 42-62. Unpublished edition by Heine Hansen, to whom I express my gratitude for allowing me to use his unpublished work in this article.

9. Cf. Nicholas of Paris, *In Cat.*, M 46^{va}: «Dico quod opinio et oratio non suscipiunt contraria, sed circa rem mutatio quaedam fit; eo enim quod res est vel non est dicitur oratio vera vel falsa. Unde oratio non suscipit contraria, sed res. Unde in oratione non est veritas vel falsitas tanquam in subiecto, sed tanquam in signo indicante». Continues in the following note.

10. Cf. *ibid.*: «est autem in re tanquam in subiecto sicut patet de urina, sed ipsa substantia secundum se suscipit contraria; suscipit enim languorem et sanitatem, quae contraria sunt».

11. For Kilwardby on truth, see A. Conti, *Semantics and Ontology in Robert Kilwardby's Commentaries on the Logica vetus*, in H. Lagerlund - P. Thom (cur.), *A Companion to the Philosophy of Robert Kilwardby*, Brill, Leiden 2012, 65-130. For Robert Kilwardby's psychology, see J.F. Pereira da Silva, *Robert Kilwardby on the Human Soul: Plurality of Forms and Censorship in the Thirteenth Century*, Brill, Leiden 2012. For his life and thought in general, see J.F. Pereira da Silva, *Robert Kilwardby*, in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/robert-kilwardby/>. I consider here the texts by Kilwardby which could have played a part in the process I am presenting, i.e., his commentaries on the *Logica vetus*. This does not mean that Kilwardby did not have a coherent and more developed understanding of the notion which can be found in, e.g., *De ortu scientiarum* and his theological production, but such texts certainly did not play a part in the dialectical process at stake here.

12. Robert Kilwardby, *Notule super librum Perihermeneias* (= *In Perih.*). I use Lewry's transcription and refer to the manuscript in Venice, Biblioteca Marciana, L.VI.66 (=V).

and starts his reply by claiming that the notion of truth is equivocal.¹³ As for Nicholas, for Kilwardby truth relates to the statement insofar as it signifies a compound thought and to the thing insofar as it is its attribute.¹⁴ But unlike Nicholas, Kilwardby gives us further information about the way in which truth applies to the intellectual realm. In relation to compound thoughts, he says, truth is the assimilation (*adaequatio*) of intellect and thing,¹⁵ so that:

Truth is in the thing as in a subject, in the statement as in a sign; and it is also in the thing as the effect in its cause, and in the intellect as in a faculty that composes and separates, i.e., as what is apprehended in what apprehends.¹⁶

Therefore, in its psychologico-epistemological dimension truth is defined as the agreement between the intellect, through its act of composition and division, and the thing.

Kilwardby's quick observations allow us to specify neither the conditions of that agreement nor the kind of attribute truth is in its relation to thoughts. However, he suggests the causal character of this agreement in his claim that truth is in the thing also as the effect in its cause. In other words, the thing's being is a subject of truth and a truth-maker. Moreover, Kilwardby makes it clear that this truth-maker is not a simple thing but a composition – a fact, as it were:

Understand that truth and falsity are in the statement because the thing is or is not; I don't mean the thing [under] the subject-term but rather

I express my gratitude to Alessandro Conti for giving me access to it. For parts of Kilwardby's text and an analysis of the manuscript tradition, see P.O. Lewry, *Robert Kilwardby's Writings on the Logica Vetus Studied with Regard to Their Teaching and Method*, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Oxford 1978.

13. Cf. Robert Kilwardby, *In Perih.*, v 12^v: «Intellige quod veritas dicitur equivoce».

14. Cf. *ibid.*: «propria habitudo veritatis ad enuntiationem est ut sit in ea tanquam in signo – est enim oratio enuntiativa significativa veri vel falsi – igitur non est in ea ut accidens in subiecto; set est in re tanquam in subiecto, et in oratione tanquam in signo». And: «sicut res se habet ad esse, sic ad veritatem: ergo in eo quod est esse in re, veritas est; non esse, falsitas».

15. Cf. *ibid.*: «et est veritas in complexis, et sic dicitur adequatio rei et intellectus».

16. *Ibid.*: «est in re tanquam in subiecto, et in oratione tanquam in signo, et est etiam in re tanquam effectus in sua causa, et in intellectu tanquam in virtute compositiva vel divisiva, tanquam scilicet apprehensum in apprehendente».

what is indicated by the statement, inasmuch as we say that the assertion 'Socrates runs' indicates the fact that Socrates runs.¹⁷

Therefore, Kilwardby suggests the idea, which we will find developed in later masters, that the attributions of truth to metaphysical, intellectual and linguistic compounds are closely related. Attributing truth to the metaphysical compound would at least partly amount to positing it as the cause of intellectual truth. The truth of the statement, in turn, would simply reflect the intellectual truth it communicates.

2. AN ANONYMOUS MASTER,
MARTIN OF DACIA AND SIMON OF FAVERSHAM

In the seventies, an anonymous master asks, in his commentary on Aristotle's *De anima*, whether truth is an attribute of the thing, and whether truth is an attribute of the intellect exclusively according to its second act,¹⁸ i.e., the act of composition and division. The latter question arises because of the possibility, considered by Aristotle himself, that truth can also be attributed to the intellect according to its first act, i.e., apprehension, or even to the sensitive soul (cf. *De an.*, III, 3, 428a¹¹⁻¹²). The master does not rule out the possibility to judge cognitive acts, such as vision and apprehension, as true, but he also stresses that this use of the notion of truth is improper, for in its proper sense the intellect is susceptible of truth and falsity only through its second act:

To the question I say that truth is twofold; for truth, properly speaking, is nothing more than the linking of concepts, in plural, in agreement to things, in plural; and such truth occurs only in relation to the intellect that

17. *Ibid.*: «Set intellige quod veritas et falsitas est in oratione eo quod res est vel non est; set non dico hoc rem subiecti termini sed magis illud quod significatur per orationem, secundum quod dicimus Sortem currere significari per hanc enuntiationem, 'Sortes currit'».

18. Edited by C.B. Bazán, in *Un commentaire anti-averroïste du traité De l'âme* (= An. Bazán, *In De an.*), in *Trois commentaires anonymes sur le Traité de l'âme d'Aristote*, Publications Universitaires, Louvain 1971, 358-514; q. 15: «Utrum circa intellectum componentem et dividendum consistant veritas et falsitas tantummodo»; q. 17: «Utrum verum et falsum sint in re».

composes and separates. Another truth is the apprehension of an object in agreement with a potency; for such truth occurs with respect to sensation and the simple thought; [...] sensation may well be true in an improper sense of 'truth'.¹⁹

Truth, in its proper sense, is the agreement (*conformitas*) between a composition of concepts and a composition of things. Indeed, a *comparatio conformis* involves the contraposition of pairs of things and hence the plural character of the concepts and the things at stake is essential to this definition of truth. Talking about agreement between simple items amounts simply to an improper use of the notion.²⁰ The master, then, sides with Kilwardby, who had already ruled out the possibility that only the content of the statement's subject be the cause of its truth. Consequently, truth is attributed to the intellect exclusively with respect to its act of composition and division.

Nonetheless, the master also discusses the attribution of truth to external things (q. 17) and rejects the attribution of truth as a property of things, which we found in Nicholas and Kilwardby. The master tells us that 'that which is true' (*verum*) is some knowledge whereby the intellect is in agreement with reality, just as 'that which is false' is some knowledge whereby the intellect is in disagreement with reality.²¹ Truth is, then, an attribute of the intellect that possesses some knowledge whereby it is in agreement with reality.

Even though the master acknowledges a metaphysical use of the notion of truth, against Nicholas and Kilwardby he rules out the possibility that truth relates to things as an inherent form (*ut in*

19. An. Bazán, *In De an.*, 498: «Ad quaestionem dico quod duplex est veritas. Quaedam enim est veritas proprie dicta, quae veritas nihil aliud est nisi comparatio conformis conceptuum in plurali ad res in plurali; et talis veritas tantum est circa intellectum componentem et dividentem. Alia est veritas quae est apprehensio conformis obiecti ad potentiam; talis enim veritas est in sensu et in intellectu simplici; [...] sensus bene est verus veritate improprie dicta».

20. Cf. An. Bazán, *In De an.*, 499: «sed veritas improprie dicta est conformitas conceptus et rei in singulari».

21. An. Bazán, *In De an.*, 502: «verum est quaedam cognitio in conformitate ad ipsam rem; [...] Ergo patet quod verum et falsum, in quantum convertuntur cum ente et non ente, sunt in re, sed in quantum verum est notitia in conformitate intellectus ad rem, et falsum est notitia in disconformitate intellectus ad rem, sunt sic in anima».

subiecto). Truth applies to things only insofar as they are the cause of intellectual truth, and not as a form or essence:

[Truth] is rather in the thing, it is true, rather in the thing than in the soul as an efficient cause (**effective**) and not formally and essentially.²²

Properly speaking truth is a psychological state of the intellect that knows in agreement with reality, and it applies to things only as truth-makers. However, the conditions of the agreement between intellect and reality – the conditions for truth – are left as undetermined as they were in Kilwardby's treatment of the question.

Martin of Dacia, also in the seventies, takes a step forward in the construction of a complete and unified notion of truth.²³ In **the** question thirteen of his commentary on the *De interpretatione*,²⁴ he asks to what truth is attributed as a property. Martin considers three possibilities: Truth is attributed as a property to i) things; ii) to the intellectual composition; or iii) to the statement. He states unequivocally that truth is a property of the intellect; for there is truth when two simple thoughts that are compatible are composed (or when two simple thoughts that are not compatible are separated); so, truth is a property of whatever composes or separates thoughts in this way, which is the intellect:

As it was said, truth consists in something being referred to something with which it fits, by composing, or in something being removed from that with which it does not fit, by separating. Therefore, that which is true will be as in a subject in that for which there is such reference to something. But only the intellect is as such. Therefore etc. To the question, I say that what is true and likewise what is false are in the intellect as in a subject.²⁵

22. An. Bazán, *In De an.*, 503: « est magis in re, verum est, effective magis est in re quam in anima, non tamen formaliter et essentialiter ».

23. For Martin of Dacia on truth, see also A.M. Mora-Márquez, *Martinus Dacus and Boethius Dacus on the Signification of Terms and the Truth-Value of Assertions*, « Vivarium », 52/1-2 (2014), 23-48.

24. Martin of Dacia, *Quaestiones super librum Perihemeneias (= In Perih.)*, in H. Roos (cur.), *Martini de Dacia opera*, GAD, Copenhagen 1961, 233-264; q. 13: « **Questio** est, in quo est veritas ut in subiecto ».

25. Martin of Dacia, *In Perih.*, 247: « Nam veritas in hoc consistit, sicut dictum est, quod aliquod referatur ad aliud, cum quo convenit, componendo, vel removeatur ab eo, cum quo non convenit, dividendo. Ergo verum erit in illo tamquam in sub-

Hence, truth is neither a property of things nor of statements, but of the intellect through its act of composition and division. Nonetheless, truth is related to things insofar as they are truth-makers and to statements insofar as they are the expression of compound thoughts,²⁶ so that the metaphysical and linguistic attributions of truth are derived from its psychologico-epistemological one.

Truth is the state (*dispositio*) in which the intellect finds itself when it is in possession of a compound knowledge that makes it similar to the way things are:

For truth is a disposition of the intellect whereby it is made similar to a thing.²⁷

Any other attribution of truth is related to its attribution to the intellect:

Therefore, since what is true is the good of the intellect, nothing will be true unless in relation to the intellect.²⁸

Specifically, truth applies to things in as much as they present themselves to the intellect as objects of knowledge and cause knowledge in it:

Since what is true is the good of the intellect, nothing will be true unless in relation to the intellect. Something is related to the intellect in three ways: in one way, as the sign to what is indicated, and thus the true sentence is related to the intellect, for the sentence, in as much as it is true, is a sign of the truth in the intellect. In another way, as the measure to what is measured, and thus are related to the intellect the things themselves, which imprint their cognition in the soul through their species.²⁹

iecto, cuius est unum sic referre ad aliud. Sed solus intellectus est huiusmodi. Ergo et cetera. Ad quaestionem dico quod verum et similiter falsum sunt in intellectu ut in subiecto. Cuius declaratio patet per rationem nunc dictam ».

26. Cf. Martin of Dacia, *In Perih.*, 247-248: « verum <et> falsum sunt in rebus sicut effectus in causa; in oratione autem sicut signatum in signo ».

27. Martin of Dacia, *In Perih.*, 248: « Nam veritas est dispositio intellectus, secundum quam assimilatur rei ».

28. Martin of Dacia, *In Perih.*, 248-249: « Cum ergo verum sit bonum intellectus, nihil erit verum nisi in comparatione ad intellectum ».

29. Martin of Dacia, *In Perih.*, 251: « Cum ergo verum sit bonum intellectus, nihil erit verum nisi in comparatione ad intellectum. Sed aliquid comparatur ad intellec-

The second way points, then, to truth in the thing amounting to causing knowledge in the intellect. Martin begins, thus, to elucidate the nature of the agreement between intellect and things that must come about for truth to occur: the elements of the compound thought – simple thoughts – represent things by virtue of the knowledge that arises when things imprint their forms in the intellect. The agreement between intellect and things is, then, of a representational nature, in the sense that such an agreement is made possible by the causal relation between the elements of the intellectual compound and those of the metaphysical compound.

Furthermore, Martin attempts to determine the nature of the metaphysical compound in question by asking whether the things that make true the intellectual compound must exist effectively outside the soul.³⁰ In fact, the texts by Nicholas of Paris, Kilwardby and the anonymous master do not take a clear stand with respect to the ontological status things must have in order to be truth-makers. Martin, to the contrary, explicitly states that effective existence is not a necessary condition for the compound thought to be made true; for it can also be made true by things that have only mental existence:

For there are some things that have being, even if there were no intellect, and some external and real composition corresponds to the composition made by the intellect about such things. For such composition is an assimilation of things and thoughts. But there are some other things which only have being through the conception and apprehension of the soul, such as the goat-stag [and] the chimera; and to the composition made by the intellect about these things must not correspond a real and external composition, but the sole apprehension is sufficient, as long as it is not contrary to the intellect.³¹

tum tripliciter: uno modo sic<u> signum ad signatum, et sic oratio vera comparatur ad intellectum. Nam oratio, in eo quod vera, signum est veritatis in intellectu. Alio modo sicut mensura ad mensuratum, et sic res ipsae <quae> imprimunt per suam speciem suam cognitionem in animam, comparantur ad intellectum ».

30. Q. 16: « Quæstio est, utrum cuilibet compositioni intellectus respondeat aliqua compositio in re extra ».

31. Martin of Dacia, *In Perih.*, 253: « Nam quaedam res sunt, quae habent esse, etiam etsi intellectus non sit, et compositioni factae ab intellectu de talibus rebus respondet aliqua compositio extra in rebus. Nam talis compositio est adaequatio

Mental existence is sufficient, not only in the case the truth-makers are fictional entities, as the chimera, but also in the case they are logical entities, as the genus, the species and other logical notions – i.e. in the case the truth-makers are things whose being depends on their being known.³² Effective existence, in turn, is only necessary when the truth-makers are things whose objective being is independent from their being known.

We find Martin's position further developed in Simon of Faversham's philosophical output. As for Martin, for Simon truth is a property of the cognitive agent who is in possession of true knowledge.³³ He also endorses the characterisation of a true thought as the one that is in agreement with things:

For truth is nothing else than the agreement between intellect and thing. For a thought is true when it is in agreement with the thing, which is outside.³⁴

Although unlike Martin and the anonymous master, Simon maintains that this agreement concerns the second operation of the intellect – composition and division – as well as the first one simple apprehension: Since the intellectual apprehension of a

rerum et intellectuum. Quaedam autem aliae sunt res, quae non habent esse nisi per conceptionem et apprehensionem animae ut hircocervus, chimaera; et compositioni factae ab intellectu de istis rebus non oportet, quod respondeat compositio in rebus extra, sed sufficit sola apprehensio, dummodo non sit repugnans intellectui».

32. Cf. Martin of Dacia, *In Perih.*, 252: «Et arguitur quod non. Nam hic est compositio, quam facit intellectus: thunnus est chimaera, cervus est hircocervus et homo est universale, et tamen eis non respondet aliqua compositio extra in rebus». There are many passages in Martin's commentary on the *Isagoge* to the effect that logical entities have only mental being; see, e.g., *In Isag.*, 129: «intentio universalis non componitur ex re naturae et rationis, sed est rationis tantum [...] ergo universale tantummodo est ens rationale sive intellectuale».

33. Simon of Faversham, *Quaestiones super libro Perihermeneias* (= *In Perih.*), in P. Mazarella (cur.), *Magistri Simoni Anglici sive de Faverisham opera omnia*, CEDAM, Padova 1957, 149-170; q. 6: «Consequenter quaeritur utrum circa compositionem et divisionem consistat veritas et falsitas». For another analysis of Simon's question, see L. Cesalli, *Le réalisme propositionnel. Sémantique et ontologie des propositions chez Jean Duns Scot, Gauthier Burley, Richard Brinkley et Jean Wyclif*, Vrin, Paris 2007, 62-64.

34. Simon of Faversham, *In Perih.*, 156: «Veritas enim non est aliud quam conformitas intellectus ad rem. Tunc enim intellectus est verus, quando conformatur rei, quae est extra».

thing is naturally in agreement with that thing, this apprehension is also susceptible of being true.³⁵

Regarding the question whether effective existence is a necessary condition for truth, Simon's position is along Martin's lines. In his commentary on Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*, Simon asks whether the truth of the proposition requires the entity (*entitas*) of the terms.³⁶ In the development of the question, he turns specifically to the sophismatic assertion 'man is an animal (*homo est animal*)' and discusses whether it is true, whether a man exists or not. In his reply Simon develops a remarkable account of truth determination.

An essential predication such as 'man is an animal' is true when the things expressed by the subject and the predicate exist as understood and as signified.³⁷ They must be understood because 'man is an animal' expresses the mental composition of man and animal, which evidently requires man and animal to be understood.³⁸ And they must be signified because otherwise the assertion 'man is an animal' would have no content at all.³⁹ However, 'man' and 'animal' need not refer to or signify anything real in the external world.

In general, assertions of the form 'S is P' are about the relevant mode of being of the significate of the predicate. In assertions where real accidents are predicated, the relevant mode of being of

35. Cf. Simon of Faversham, *In Perih.*, 156-157: «Si veritas est conformitas intellectus ad rem, ibi est veritas, ubi conformitas rei ad intellectum reperitur; sed in intellectu apprehendente invenitur conformitas intellectus ad rem quam apprehenditur; ideo etc.».

36. Simon of Faversham, *Quaestiones super Analytica Priora* (= *In An. pr.*), q. I, 56: «Utrum ad veritatem propositionis requiratur entitas extremorum», in S. Ebbesen (cur.), *Talking about what is no more. Texts by Peter of Cornwall (?), Richard of Clive, Simon of Faversham, and Radulphus Brito*, «Cah. Inst. M.Ā. gr. lat.», 55 (1987), 135-168.

37. Simon of Faversham, *In An. pr.*, 159: «Cum ergo quaeritur utrum ad veritatem compositionis requiratur entitas extremorum, dico quod ad veritatem propositionis requiritur entitas secundum esse significatum, iterum et secundum esse intellectum».

38. Simon of Faversham, *In An. pr.*, 159: «Secundum esse intellectum quia nihil componitur cum alio in oratione nisi quod intellectus prius simplici intellectu apprehendit; sed illud quod intellectus prius simplici intellectu apprehendit, esse intellectum habet, ut sit; ideo etc.».

39. Simon of Faversham, *In An. pr.*, 159: «Iterum et secundum esse significatum, quia omnis propositio est significativa veri vel falsi; ergo ad veritatem propositionis requiritur quod extrema aliquid significant».

the significate of the predicate is actual existence; therefore, their truth-makers must be real things in the external world:

When this verb 'is' is predicated as a third adjacent, I introduce a distinction, because then it predicates the being relevant to what is added. What is added either must have being in an effect or not. If what is added must have being in an effect, then the existence outside the soul of the extremes is required; those things that must have being in an effect are all the accidents, such as 'white', 'to run', etc. (for accidents have being in a subject existing in actuality); and hence for the propositions 'man is white' and 'man runs' to be true the existence outside the soul of the extremes is required.⁴⁰

By analogy, we can say that in assertions where logical intentions are predicated, the relevant mode of being of the significate of the predicate is mental existence; therefore, their truth-makers must be logical notions.⁴¹ But in essential predication, the relevant mode of being is neither actual nor mental existence, because essences are notionally independent of any sort of existence:

But if [what is added] must not have being in an effect, but by nature is indifferently related to being in an effect and to not being [in an effect], then the truth of such propositions does not require the existence outside the soul of the extremes. Such things that by nature must not have being or not being are, e.g., man, animal, and the second substances in general [...]. Those [substances] must not be in an effect or not be in an effect, and hence the truth of such propositions does not require the existence in an effect of the extremes, and hence 'man is an animal' is true when no man exists.⁴²

40. Cf. Simon of Faversham, *In An. pr.*, 160: « Quando autem hoc verbum 'est' praedicatur tertium adiacens, distingo, quia tunc praedicat esse quod competit illi addito; illud autem additum aut determinat se ad esse in effectu aut non. Si illud additum determinet se ad esse in effectu, tunc ad veritatem compositionis requiritur entitas extremorum extra animam; talia autem quae determinant se ad esse in effectu sunt omnia accidentia, ut 'album', 'currere' et similia (accidentia enim habent esse in subiecto ente actu); et ideo ad hoc quod tales propositiones sint verae 'homo est albus' 'homo est currens' requiritur entitas extremorum extra animam ».

41. Cf. Simon of Faversham, *In An. pr.*, 159: « Esse intellectum habent illa quae in suo esse ab intellectu dependent, quae non essent si intellectus non esset, et huiusmodi sunt intentiones secundae de quibus considerat logicus, cuiusmodi sunt syllogismus, genus, species ».

42. Cf. Simon of Faversham, *In An. pr.*, 160: « Sed si non determinet se ad esse in effectu sed indifferenter quantum est de natura sua se habet ad esse in effectu et ad non esse, tunc ad veritatem talium propositionum non requiritur entitas extre-

The truth-makers of such propositions are simply the essences understood and thereafter signified by the subject and predicate. Therefore, 'man is an animal' is true when no man exists, simply because being an animal is part of the definition of man.

As we shall see, the final stage of the discussion will take issue with the idea that mental entities can be truth-makers, as it is evident in Radulphus Brito's own contribution.

3. RADULPHUS BRITO

Brito takes up some of Martin's and Simon's central ideas but introduces substantial changes.

Just as Martin, Brito grants the thing's essence the natural capacity to cause its knowledge, so that it is in this sense that truth relates to the thing. In an epistemological sense, truth is knowledge that is in agreement with reality,⁴³ and as such truth is a property of the intellect that possesses such knowledge.⁴⁴ In fact, through true knowledge a relation between intellect and thing is

morum extra animam. Talia autem quae non determinant se ex natura sua ad esse nec ad non esse sunt ut homo et animal et substantiae secundae universaliter [...]. Huiusmodi ergo non determinant se ad esse in effectu vel non esse in effectu, et ideo ad veritatem talium propositionum non requiritur entitas in effectu extremorum, et ideo nullo homo existente haec est vera 'homo est animal' ».

43. Cf. *Radulphi Britonis quaestiones in Aristotelis librum tertium De anima* (= *In De an.*, III), in W. Fauser (cur.), *Der Kommentar des Radulphus Brito zu Buch III De anima. Kritische Edition und Philosophisch-Historische Einleitung*, Aschendorff, Münster 1973, 264: « Ideo aliter est dicendum quod veritas dupliciter accipitur: Vel prout est vera rei entitas quae non est aliud quam quidditas rei, ut nata est de se facere veram existimationem apud intellectum. Et sic veritas est in rebus, quia non est aliud quam rei quidditas. Et talis est in rebus. Ideo etc. Alio modo dicitur veritas notitia existens in conformitate intellectus ad rem ».

44. Cf. Radulphus Brito, *In De an.*, III, 264: « Et talis est in intellectu sicut in subiecto. Quia de ratione formae relativae est esse in subiecto illo quod magis dependet ad alterum. Modo intellectus ex sua notitia quae conformis est rebus, dependet ad rem per se et non res ad intellectum, sicut habetur v. *Metaphysicae*. Ideo ista veritas est in intellectu sicut in subiecto ». Note that, given the relational nature of truth, it will be a property (*ut in subiecto*) of the subject that is more dependent on the other with respect to the relation. Hence, truth is in the intellect as in a subject because intellects cannot have true knowledge without things, but things can continue to exist without intellects. Recall that Martin supports his attribution of truth to the intellect as in a subject on moral grounds: Truth is the good of the intellect.

established where the thing's being is objective and independent from its being known. A given piece of knowledge, in turn, is true (or the intellect is eventually in a state of truth) because of the agreement with the thing that is represented by the knowledge's parts. Finally, the conditions for the agreement are given by the fact that the thing has caused the simple representations that constitute that knowledge.

However, Brito departs from Martin and Simon in that for him the truth-maker of an affirmative compound thought must have extra-mental existence. Several places in Brito's philosophical output allow us to reconstruct the main tenets of his position regarding truth-conditions and verification. Notably, they allow us to determine the character of the causal relation between an intellectual compound involving logical notions and their truth-makers. As we just saw, for Martin and Simon some compound thoughts – e.g., those involving logical notions – can be made true by something the existence of which is only mental. For Brito, to the contrary, the extra-mental thing is what makes true the compound thought:

the common term indicates some true extra-mental being, as a **man** (for we talk of such things and not of something that has only mental being); [...] but what doesn't have true external being is not **man** or animal.⁴⁵

Hence, the compound thought that **man** is a species (i.e., the one expressed by the statement '**man** is a species') would be false in the case there were no **man**, as only external things are represented by the subject of such a thought. Furthermore, against his predecessors, Brito maintains that the cause of the compound thought's truth or falsity is *one* thing where different ways of being concur:

the cause of the truth of some proposition is not some second intention [...] the truth in specific propositions is caused by the identity of the thing.⁴⁶

45. Radulphus Brito, *Quaestiones super Topica Aristotelis*, q. II, 6, ms. Paris, BnF, lat. 1132, ff. 12-52 : 31^{ra}: «terminus communis significat aliquod ens verum extra animam, sicut homo (de tali enim loquitur et non de eo quod solum habet esse in anima); [...] illud autem quod non habet verum esse extra non est homo vel animal».

46. Radulphus Brito, *Quaestiones super Priscianum minorem* (ed. J. Pinborg, Friedrich Frommann Verlag, Stuttgart 1980, 129-130): «causa veritatis alicuius propo-

Thus, the compound thought that **man** is an animal is true because there is at least one individual thing, which is both **man** and animal, as it effectuates operations that are both essential to **manhood** (i.e., to reason) and essential to being an animal (i.e., to have sensation). In fact, Brito allows the species to be preserved in only one individual:

I say that the species can be preserved in a single individual, because the species is preserved in that in which its whole essence is preserved, and its whole understanding, because as regards the species there are only these things (i.e., essence and understanding); but its whole essence and its whole understanding are preserved in a single individual; therefore etc. The major is self-evident. The minor is shown taking the example of **man**: Whatever **man** involves is preserved in Socrates, because [**man**] involves the compound of matter and form that concerns the species; but Socrates includes all these things; [...] and likewise in the case of any other individual with respect to its species. [...] I say that what is apt to be one in many must be capable of being in several particular instances, but it must not be actually [in them]; to the contrary, it can be preserved in a single individual.⁴⁷

One individual, which presents itself to the knowing agent through the different operations that correspond to its different ways of being, makes true the compound thought.

One individual through its different ways of being causes the truth of compound thoughts involving real accidents (e.g., that Socrates is sitting), of those involving logical notions (e.g., that **man** is a species), and those involving essential predicates (e.g., that

sitionis non est aliqua secunda intentio [...] veritas in propositionibus specialibus causatur ex parte identitatis rei ».

47. Radulphus Brito, *Quaestiones super arte veteri* (= *S.a.v.*), Venezia 1499, im. 41: « dico quod species potest salvari in unico individuo, quia in illo salvatur species in quo salvatur eius tota essentia et totus eius intellectus, quia non sunt plura in specie quam ista; modo tota eius essentia et totus eius intellectus salvatur unico individuo; ergo etc. Maior de se patet. Minor declaratur accipiendo exemplum in homine, quod quicquid importat homo salvatur in Sorte, quia importat aggregatum ex materia et forma pertinente ad speciem; modo ista omnia includit Sortes; [...] et sic est de quolibet alio individuo respectu suae speciei. [...] Dico quod illud quod est unum in multis aptum requirit multa supposita aptitudinaliter et non oportet quod actualiter; immo potest salvari in unico individuo ». The incunabulum does not have page numbers. I refer to the image number as it appears here: <http://diglib.hab.de/wdb.php?dir=inkunabeln/3-8-log-r&image=00005>.

man is an animal). External things are such that their essences have different presentations – *apparentia* – through which they make true different judgements about them:

in one nature and the same essence, e.g., in the human nature, several presentations appear to us, and consequently this same nature is understood through different concepts. First, it appears to us that it is self-subsistent [...] and thus it is conveyed by the name ‘subject’ or ‘substance’. Also, it appears to us that this nature is subject of dimensions, and thus it is understood through the name ‘body’, which belongs to the category of substance. Also, it appears to us that it has sensation and that it moves itself, and thus [...] it is understood through the name ‘animal’. Also, it appears to us that it reasons, and thus [...] it is understood through the name ‘rational’. Also, it appears to us that it has sensation, and that it reasons, and thus it is understood through the name ‘**man**’.⁴⁸

The thing through these different operations, which correspond to its different ways of being, causes, then, the different simple thoughts that represent it.

In the case of compound thoughts involving logical notions, e.g., that **man** is a species, Brito posits that they are made true by the thing that has the presentation or mode of being – the *apparens* – from which the logical notion in question arises:⁴⁹

48. Radulphus Brito, *Rationale est animal*, in S. Ebbesen, *The Sophisma “Rationale est animal” by Radulphus Brito*, «Cah. Inst. M.Â. gr. lat.», 24 (1987), 85-120, 101: «in una natura et eadem essentia, sicut in natura humana, apparent nobis plura apparentia, et per consequens ista eadem natura sub diversis conceptibus intellegitur. De ista natura primo apparet nobis, quod sit per se subsistens [...] et sic importatur sub hoc nomine, quod est ‘subiectum’ vel ‘substantia’. Item apparet nobis quod ista natura est subiectum dimensionum, et sic intellegitur sub hoc nomine quod est ‘corpus’, quod est in praedicamento substantiae. Item apparet nobis quod sentit et movetur, et sic [...] intellegitur sub hoc nomine quod est ‘animal’. Item apparet nobis quod ratiocinatur, et sic [...] intellegitur sub hoc nomine, quod est ‘rationale’. Item apparet nobis, quod sentit et ratiocinatur, et sic intellegitur sub hoc nomine, quod est ‘homo’». For *apparentia* in Brito, see S. Donati, *Apparentia and modi essendi in Radulphus Brito’s Doctrine of the Concepts: The Concept of Being*, in J. Fink et al. (cur.), *Logic and Language in the Middle Ages*, Brill, Leiden 2013, 337-355; S. Ebbesen, *Radulphus Brito on the Metaphysics*, in J.A. Aertsen et al. (cur.), *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277: Philosophie und Theologie and der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts*, De Gruyter, Berlin 2001, 456-492.

49. Brito’s grounding of logical notions in the external world is discussed in: Cesalli, *Le réalisme propositionnel*, 56-61; A.M. Mora-Márquez, *Radulphus Brito on*

I say that 'man is a species', and similar propositions, are true [...] because the concrete species is verified of anything where the mode of being from which such intention is taken is preserved; but the presentation from which the intention of the species is taken is preserved in a man and in an ass; [intention] which is attributed to a thing which can be found, essentially and by itself, in several things numerically different. But man is found by itself in several things numerically different, e.g., in Socrates, Plato and other individuals, because the concrete intention is nothing else than the thing as understood in several things numerically different; therefore 'man is a species' is true.⁵⁰

Consequently, compound thoughts, and the statements that express them, including those that involve logical notions, as the species and the genus, are made true by one external individual where different presentations concur.

4. CONCLUSION

The notion of truth that underlies Brito's philosophical output achieves the intention – which we could perceive as early as in Robert Kilwardby – of devising a unified notion that can explain the different attributions of truth in Aristotle's works. The notion that results is clearly of psychologico-epistemological character (truth is the property of a knowing agent), but its application is extended to the thing that causes true knowledge and to the statement that expresses it. The main tenets of Brito's notion of truth can be summarised as follows: i) Truth is the agreement of knowl-

Common Names, Concepts and Things, in Fink et al. (cur.), *Logic and Language in the Middle Ages*, 357-372; J. Pinborg, *Radulphus Brito on Universals*, «Cah. Inst. M.Â. gr. lat.», 35 (1980), 56-142; M. Sirridge, *The Universal Thing is Either Nothing or Posterior*, in P.J.J.M. Bakker et al. (cur.), *Mind, Cognition and Representation: The Commentary Tradition of Aristotle's 'De anima'*, Ashgate, Aldershot 2008, 45-68.

50. Radulphus Brito, *S.a.v.*, im. 46: «dico quod haec est vera 'homo est species' et consimiles propositiones [...] quia species in concreto verificatur de omni illo in quo salvatur modus essendi a quo sumitur talis intentio; modo in homine et asino salvatur apprensus ex quo sumitur intentio speciei quae attribuitur rei quae est reperibilis in pluribus differentibus numero essentialiter et per se; modo homo reperitur in pluribus differentibus numero et per se sicut in Sorte et Platone et in aliis individuis, quia intentio in concreto non est aliud quam res intellecta in pluribus differentibus numero; ergo illa est vera 'homo est species'».

edge with reality, and as such it is a property of the human intellect (i.e., the human intellect is the truth-bearer, properly speaking); ii) the conditions of such an agreement are given by the fact that some actual thing causes – through the different presentations (ways of being) of its metaphysical constitution – different representations of itself in the human intellect; hence, iii) compound thoughts, and subsequently the statements expressing them, are made true only by individual things with actual existence where different presentations concur.

In the dialectical process of construction of this notion, Brito departs from his predecessors in these respects: i) following in Martin's footsteps, Brito departs from Kilwardby and Nicholas of Paris in that he does not consider truth to be a property of things, i.e., to be in things as in a subject. To be true, Brito admits that in a sense 'truth' is used to refer to the quiddity of a thing, but truth is in the intellect as in a subject; so, strictly speaking truth is a property of the intellect that is in possession of true knowledge; ii) unlike Martin, and perhaps also Simon, Brito is not ready to accept that mental being alone can make true compound thoughts and their corresponding statements. To this end, Brito comes up with a sophisticated metaphysical apparatus, which gives real ground to every piece of **true** knowledge.

Consequently, also in the case of truth, it is manifest that the elaborated philosophical notions we find in masters of Arts from the end of the 13th-century – such as Radulphus Brito – result from complex dialectical processes, which typically begin in the first half of the century with the masters' intention to reconcile apparently contradictory claims in the authoritative **literature**.