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## **Moritz Geiger's Postulate of Aesthetics as an Autonomous Science**

### Abstract

Moritz Geiger (1880–1937) in *Phänomenologische Ästhetik* paper postulates aesthetics to become an autonomous science. The new science is intended to analyze aesthetic values and to discover the rules of their regulations. It tends to be separated from aesthetics as the sub-discipline of philosophy (especially under the influence of metaphysics) and aesthetics as a field of applying other sciences (mainly psychology). It may be achieved by the usage of a phenomenological method.

### Keywords

Moritz Geiger, phenomenology, aesthetics' autonomy, aesthetic values, methodology

### Introduction

Moritz Geiger's philosophy has not received much interest in Poland. Geiger has been mentioned by Roman Ingarden (1970, 20–21; 1974, 13–34), and recently by Filip Borek (2016, 29–43), who has focused on the problem of empathy (*Einführung*). Moreover, one can find a translation of a short Diane Perpich's paper which is the only existing Polish text concerning Geiger's aesthetical views (1996, 201–208). It contains mostly a summary of Geiger's book *The Significance of Art: A Phenomenological Approach to Aesthetics*, that is posthumous preparation of his notes from aesthetic field, which he managed to set forth only in part (Perpich 1996, 201). We see therefore, that in our philosophical literature there cannot be found any paper written by the

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Polish author, which examines the aesthetics of this phenomenologist deeply enough. It can be treated as a sufficient reason for writing this paper. What is more, if we consider the influence of phenomenology on contemporary Polish aesthetics its necessity reveals itself as fully justified.

In Geiger's view, the aesthetics that uses phenomenological method is the best way of analyzing aesthetical objects. Hence it should be extracted from aesthetical reflection and established as an autonomous science. This is the exact meaning of the thesis of the author that I want to justify on the basis of Geiger's *Phänomenologische Ästhetik* (1928, 136–158).

The paper was published in the anthology of texts entitled *Zugänge zur Ästhetik* in 1928, when Geiger worked at the University of Göttingen (Spiegelberg 1965, 207) and contains manuscript of the lecture which was delivered at the Second Congress of Aesthetics and Art History (*Zweiter Kongress für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*), held in Berlin in 1924 (Dessoir 1925). As opposed to the afore mentioned *The Significance of Art...*, the materials to which were probably gathered after author's emigration to United States, ideas presented in this essay refer to his early European period.

Geiger provides an answer to the contemporary changes in the understanding of art. The ways of beauty and art have diverged. This situation demands appropriate research method, which would be as free as possible from its previous determinants. The solution proposed by Geiger works excellently. It focuses on the pure phenomenological aesthetic experience of givenness that is open to the new forms of artistic expression and innovative aesthetic values. After presenting the historical context and the outline of aesthetic views of the author, I will describe his argumentation in favour of the autonomous phenomenological aesthetics.

### **Moritz Geiger as a Phenomenologist**

It was around 1907 in Göttingen when a group of students started to gather around the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl. Among them one could find Roman Ingarden, Edith Stein, Dietrich von Hildebrand or Hedwig Conrad-Martius. In 1901 Geiger came to Göttingen from Munich, where he was Theodor Lipps' student. The members of this circle conducted their own researches often without Husserl's direct approval, because of their realistic approach to phenomenology, which presupposed objective existence of things and the possibility of reaching their essence, in contrast to Husserl's transcendental idealism, which focused on the analysis of consciousness (Spiegelberg 1965, 169–170).

Geiger was born in 1880 in Frankfurt on Main. He studied law, history of literature, and finally philosophy together with psychology in Munich (Gödel 2015, 16). His scientific interests were very broad, reaching from mathematics, through philosophy of existence and experimental psychology, up to aesthetics. The main topic of his works was the psychological function of art and, unlike in the case of other phenomenologists, scientific optimism, manifesting itself in the affirmation of natural sciences and treating them as ontological models. Husserl himself was changing his attitude to Geiger's philosophy. After the initial approval of his work (mainly thanks to Geiger's analysis of empathy) he claimed, that only a quarter of his philosophy was genuinely phenomenological. Geiger is also mentioned as the first phenomenologist, to have wider contact with American philosophy, which began due to his annual visit at Harvard in 1907, where he met Josiah Royce and William James. In the following years he frequently stayed in the United States, and from 1933 he settled there permanently, because of his dismissal from the University of Göttingen due to Nazi persecutions. He died in 1937 (Spiegelberg 1965, 206–207; Gödel 2015, 16). He wrote *Notes on the Elements of Feelings and their Relations* (Geiger 1905, 233–288) (Ph. D. dissertation under the supervision of Theodor Lipps), *Methodological and Experimental Contributions to the Theory of Quantity* (Geiger 1907, 325–522) (the habilitation thesis), *The Consciousness of Feelings* (Geiger 1911a, 125–162) and *On the Essence and Meaning of Empathy* (Geiger 1911b, 1–45).<sup>1</sup> His manuscripts are kept in Bayerische Staatsbibliothek in Munich (Crespo 2015, 375–376, 392).

Phenomenology is a domain of philosophy, that turns to immediate experience as the criterion of truth, bracketing irrelevant circumstances, in order to reach the essence of the analyzed being. As it has already been signaled, Geiger was a representative of Göttingen-Munich phenomenology, the main member of which was Max Scheler. They tried to be faithful to the first phase of Husserl's doctrine, which was characterized by the realistic approach. Geiger dedicated himself mostly to the phenomenology of objects (*Gegenstandsphänomenologie*) which deals with items in the sense of intentional objects. In the subsequent period of his work he also investigated the phenomenology of acts (*Aktphänomenologie*), analyzing, among other things, the relation between phenomenology and psychology or the acts of aesthetic pleasure (Spiegelberg 1965, 209). It is also worth mentioning that he introduced distinction between an act and an object within sensation (Fabiani

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<sup>1</sup> See also: Geiger 2015a, 19–31; 2015b, 75–86.

2010, 127). I am going to describe Geiger's general view on aesthetics, on the basis of which I will show his postulate of its autonomization by using the phenomenological method.

### **Moritz Geiger's Aesthetics**

In his research, Geiger represented the aesthetical antinaturalism, standing against the reduction of aesthetic reality to a physico-mental event. Moreover, in reference to aesthetics he claimed that it carried in itself an internal antinomy—it was a science which dealt with general assertions whose subject was simultaneously accessible only thanks to immediate experience. However, this antinomy was possible to overcome (Fabiani 2010). Echoes of this position can also be found in analyzed *Phänomenologische Ästhetik*.

With regard to aesthetic research, Ingarden describes the history of the dispute between two approaches; the objective (focused on a work of art) and the subjective (concerned with experience of the perceiving subject). He then presents Geiger's philosophy as oscillating between those two. In the introduction to *Zugänge zur Ästhetik* Geiger declares himself to be clearly in favour of the subjective approach, but in the paper discussed above he describes a work of art itself together with aesthetic values, which brings him closer to the objective approach (Ingarden 1970, 20–21). A similar point of view is presented by Algis Mickunas in his paper *Moritz Geiger and Aesthetics*: "Geiger was not too eager to rush toward the integration of aesthetics of enjoyment as aesthetics of affect, and aesthetics of appreciation as aesthetics of values" (1989, 43). Affects and values appear in this combination as two opposite areas, especially with respect to Scheler's understanding of the latter, namely as beings which exist independently of the subject. Geiger's interests concern particularly what was specified above as aesthetics of values. However, he does not include the problem of appreciation among psychological or metaphysical issues, but he postulates an independent science, that would deal exclusively with aesthetic values (Mickunas 1989, 43–44).

Aesthetic values should not be the object of metaphysical research, for such research demands an arbitrary right to determine what they are, depending on the dominating metaphysical paradigm of reality. Nowadays, because of the commonly favored scientific attitude, reality is reduced to for example light or sound waves. Such tendency extends the range of that, which presents itself as aesthetical, making it easier to name different objects as works of art. That is because, when focused on aesthetics, meta-

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physical theories postulate particular concept of the presence of truth in works of art. Aesthetic values are thus identified with truth, and aesthetic experience becomes in turn a form of knowledge. It results in specific, even if inaccurate, access of art to reality, depending on the current metaphysical theory e.g. in the Aristotelian view of art as the imitation of the reality, the value of art is at the same time its reference. In this way "the metaphysician becomes the guardian of aesthetic values" (Mickunas 1989, 45). Geiger rejects the metaphysical attitude that connects aesthetic values with the presence of truth because such operation creates problems which cannot be solved without destroying the autonomy of aesthetics. One of them is the exclusion of such art that does not correspond to the current metaphysical system determining aesthetic values. In consequence the function of a work of art is subsidiary to metaphysics, to which it must be adapted. Moreover because of relativism, it becomes difficult to distinguish between aesthetic and non-aesthetic values. We could therefore see that metaphysics should not include the research devoted to aesthetic values (Mickunas 1989, 44–46).

However it is also psychology that is not given the authority to analyze aesthetic values. It postulates their reductive interpretation. In this way, Geiger supports anti-psychologism relying on three arguments. Firstly, psychology treats aesthetic values as expressions of subconscious drives/impulses. In this way aesthetics was incorporated in a wide range of acts of human expressions, at the same time not considered superior to any of them. Secondly, in order to judge the value of a work of art, we are not supposed to reveal the impulses, that have driven the artist to create it. A work of art should be considered in itself, separated from the author's biographical context, though for example the use of offensive language by a given author does not prove, that he or she is also vulgar. The last reason for refuting the psychological interpretation of aesthetics is an argument from the impossibility of evaluating and comparing works of art treated only as expressions of a subject. This is, because every expression always accurately captures psyche and it is hard to say, whether one is better than the other. These three reasons for rejecting psychological interpretation of aesthetic values refer mainly to the artist. Geiger also mentions arguments that concern strictly the spectator of the work of art. They come down to the criticism of the Kantian understanding of the evaluation of the work of art, depending on how they awaken enjoyment in the spectator. The aesthetic value cannot be treated as the product of aesthetic enjoyment, but rather as its source.

I have shown that according to Geiger both metaphysics and psychology are not legitimate sources of the judgement of aesthetic values. The question still remains, which science could become such source? Apart from the negative approach, with which Geiger is not content, he postulates a new science focused on aesthetic values that I will describe in the fourth paragraph of this paper (Mickunas 1989, 48–51).

Geiger does not restrict himself only to the theoretical reflection; his aim is also to show the practical application of the method of phenomenological analysis. He opposes two extreme tendencies of this method, namely analyzing only logical-semantic sphere and resorting to intuition as the source of knowledge, to avoid necessity of correct justification, criticized by the neo-Kantists.

Geiger's starting point is the analysis of meaning of the concept of "aesthetics." It includes not only a specific scientific field, but is a common name for a set of diversified sciences which are specified as aesthetics because of their connection with aesthetic objects (Geiger 1928, 136–137). I admit that formulating such a definition of aesthetics amounts in a way to *petitio principii*, though let us assume that this is just a general presupposition—an aesthetic axiom. The author claims, that every kind of aesthetic discipline possesses a different relation to the phenomenological method, which implies a necessity of investigating how the method works in each of them (Geiger 1928, 137). Geiger singles out three sciences functioning under a common name of "aesthetics." These are:

- 1) Aesthetics as an autonomous academic discipline (*Einzelwissenschaft*),
- 2) Aesthetics as a philosophical discipline,
- 3) Aesthetics as a field of application of other sciences (Geiger 1928, 138).

Distinguishing aesthetics as an autonomous discipline is quite significant, because Geiger puts it on the same level with e.g. biology or physics. In the second point aesthetics is treated only as a sub-discipline of philosophy, exposed to many influences. We can recall here the aforementioned critics of metaphysics that often negatively influences aesthetics and usually conditions it. In the last point of Geiger's schema he suggests the refutation of psychology, as the instance overriding to aesthetics. We can therefore see, that Geiger preferred mostly the first solution, as it established a new aesthetic science, not conditioned by any prejudices.

## Aesthetics as an Autonomous Science

Aesthetics as a philosophical discipline for a long time did not see a possibility of becoming a single autonomous science or a field of application of other sciences. Geiger mentions F. W. J. Schelling, G. W. F. Hegel, A. Schopenhauer and K. R. E. von Hartmann as thinkers for whom philosophical nature of aesthetics did not pose any problem. Only after the decline of Hegel's philosophical system, beginning with Gustav Fechner the main role of aesthetic research was assigned to psychology, which contributed to the neglect of its autonomy (Geiger 1928). We see then that at the beginning, aesthetics was a sub-discipline of philosophy. The next stage of its development was defining its place among psychological area. At the moment when Geiger formed his views, aesthetics was generally a dependent discipline, the field of application of particular science—psychology. In such context one should appreciate the innovative postulate of this philosopher, who did not accept existing methodological status of sciences, but recognized that aesthetics needed to manifest itself as one of them.

Let us outline the characteristic of aesthetics as an autonomous science. Every autonomous discipline has a particular moment, thanks to which we could name it as such and not as any other science. For instance, in natural sciences this moment is the connection to the external nature, and in history a "historical happening" (*historische Geschehen*). Such is the function of aesthetic values. They separate aesthetics from other sciences and set its autonomy. Geiger gives an example of such values: beauty, ugly or trivial and objects that could be related to them: poems, musical pieces, paintings, people, buildings, landscapes, gardens or dances. I deliberately mention all categories of beings named by the author, to show the diversity of objects representing aesthetic values (Geiger 1928, 138–139). It is worth noticing, that among the objects of aesthetics as an autonomous science Geiger does not name beauty itself, or ugliness itself, but beautiful or ugly objects.

The issue of the knowledge of values raises certain metaphysical doubts. Does the phenomenological act of getting to know the object by the subject not reach immediately to values, but only to objects that constitute them? Does it mean, that ideas (universals) are not reached through that process and what we merely have are their exemplifications? However, we have to possess the idea of, for instance, beauty to be able to predicate it about an object that it is beautiful. The author himself describes the situation in the following way:

Aesthetic values and anti-values specific modification do not belong to items in such degree, as to be real objects, but only in such, in which they are given as phenomena. It attaches [value or anti-value] to appearing tones of symphony—tones as phenomena—and not through this, that they lay on the air vibrations. The statue possesses aesthetic meaning not as a stone block, but given to the spectator as the person's representation. For aestheticness the fact that actress playing Margaret's role is old and ugly and the glow of fresh youth owes only to characterization, lipstick and reflectors light is totally indifferent—she [aestheticness] reaches to the appearance, not to the reality. The noblest aim of aesthetics as the autonomous science is pointed to making aesthetic value or anti-value lie in the phenomenal state of object, and not in its real state. It [aesthetics] must first research aesthetic objects in respect to their phenomenological state (Geiger 1928, 139–140, trans. mine).

Hence, according to Geiger, aesthetic values and anti-values (*Unwert*) possess metaphysical status of phenomena. He points out that there does not occur a strong bond between aesthetic values and material fundament of the work of art, but they are shown as representations (*Darstellung*) given to the spectator (Geiger 1928, 139). Such an approach provokes another question concerning the ontological character of aesthetic values. It is difficult to ascribe to them only mental existence, since aesthetic phenomenon arises in contact with the object from which it originates. In some fashion, they must be connected with objects, for instance by being their properties. We therefore see here a certain metaphysical indeterminacy lying within Geiger's theory. In my opinion this was intended. He wants to avoid entanglement in metaphysical speculations that could in some way condition aesthetics, depriving it of its autonomy. However, in this way we stop merely at the level of phenomena. We do not investigate what stands behind them; a dimension which is apparently treated as not epistemologically attractive in the situation of experiencing a work of art. However, we do not need to interpret this postulate as a sign of resignation from metaphysics as such. While it could still study random beings, its goals lie behind the horizon of correct aesthetic analyses. What remains is a doubt whether Geiger's optimism in avoiding metaphysical questions in aesthetics is not too precocious.

Aesthetics as an autonomous science must begin investigating aesthetic objects in their phenomenal nature. In this context, Geiger defies to conception of characterizing aesthetic objects through category of shine, because it endows the phenomenon a reality which it does not possess. For instance, a painted landscape cannot be treated as some "reality" (*Wirkliches*), which then presents itself as unreal, but as one represented (*dargestellte*) landscape (as landscape, that is given as represented). Also through introducing illusions, contradictions and factual unreality the area of phenomena is abandoned (Geiger 1928, 140).



The author explains his theory on the basis of a painting. A significant amount of criticism is levelled against the psychological aesthetics that recognizes painting to be a conglomerate of mental impressions (a painting is not a material artefact, but something that overcrossing it.) The author claims, that this already reveals an attitude to phenomena. However, what is given are not actually impressions, but complete objects, constituting e.g. represented landscapes. Thus, he concludes that a work of art has got a character of phenomenon (Geiger 1928, 140–141).

Geiger signals that from an aesthetics as autonomous science one should exclude all methods, which narrow down the aesthetic questions only to experiences. As a result of defining aesthetical issues through the process of experiencing them, it is hard to indicate for example the location of the essence of tragedy. The author mentions a possible answer to the question about the essence of lightning, as the one which consists in evoking scream and fear; and according him is not correct (Geiger 1928, 141–142). In my opinion, it leads us to the reduction of an object to subjective consciousness and its experiences. In aesthetics considered as an autonomous science one must describe the objective reality, to which we possess access and not flee to psychologism. As an example of incorrect, that is psychological, definition of tragedy Geiger mentions Aristotle, while the correct one was to be found by William Shakespeare.<sup>2</sup>

In the analysis of problems belonging to aesthetics as an autonomous science the author prefers the phenomenological method. As long as empirical and experimental methods are used we are remaining within the area of aesthetics as the field of applying other sciences (in this case psychology.) This kind of aesthetics entails the problem of the work of art which occurs in the artist's and spectator's consciousness. We can see here the radical opposition mounted by the autonomous aesthetics and this, which is only a field of applying other sciences. The autonomous aesthetics, which could be also called phenomenological, analyzes objects and not consciousness. Thus, it is clearly objective (Geiger 1928, 142). In this way we see, that the author is on the way to expose phenomenological aesthetics and its characteristic as the best type of analyzing aesthetical objects.

Both the phenomenological aesthetics and the history of art (*Kunstwissenschaft*) have a common starting point which involves the statement of that, which is objective (a phenomenological object.) However, ways of phe-

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<sup>2</sup> I think, that Max Scheler also gives an appropriate (non-psychological) definition of tragedy, by placing it in the ontological construction of the world. See: Scheler 1981.

nomenological aesthetics and the history of art have diverged. Phenomenology always tries to reach the essence of an object in eidetic analysis. For this purpose, it does not focus so much as for example on Anton Bruckner's symphony or Sandro Botticelli's painting, but on the essence of the given painting or symphony, together with the way of founding aesthetic values in objects. In what way is it possible to overcome the plentitude of things and reach to the common structures and values (Geiger 1928, 143)?

Geiger suggests to reverse the direction assumed by the accepted paradigm of reflection upon art. According to him it follows "from above," which means that it is based on deduction from the general principle. The paradigm meant "imitation" in the case of works of art, and "unity in plurality" in the case of aesthetic values. Instead of that, one should reflect "from below." This enables to extract the essence from plurality of works of art, for example on the basis of tragedies by Sophocles or Shakespeare to capture the essence of "tragedy" itself (Geiger 1928, 143–144).

It turns out however, that such a solution is also not fully satisfying. To recognize tragedy in an object of art we must firstly dispose of the concept of "tragedy." Such an approach leads us directly to a vicious cycle. One should search for such a concept of aesthetics which enables to recognize aesthetic values in the object of art. According to Geiger the phenomenological method solves this problem because neither does it assume dogmatically the general principle or axiom that is later artificially found among objects, nor it induces from the accumulation of objects. The phenomenological method combines these two approaches, because it finds the general principle (the essence) in particular items. It tries to "be close" to phenomena, considering them not in their randomness and particular determination, but in their essential moment. The result is that the phenomenological method of aesthetical analysis does not use either deduction, or induction but intuition, to which one does not require contact with many similar objects, but only with one of them (Geiger 1928, 144–146).

The concept of intuition is nonetheless very problematic. It seems that there is nothing easier than instantaneously and directly experience the essence of a work of art presented to our consciousness, which replaces all research and evidence. The opponents of intuition in aesthetic knowledge propose usually two counter arguments. The first, is the difficulty in correct constitution (*Verfassung*) of experienced object, whereas the second is the problem of bringing together the whole object simultaneously analyzing its parts, which is required to define the essence (Geiger 1928, 146). Geiger claims that phenomenological method overcomes the second difficulty, but

correct phenomenological intuition requires much labor and effort of comparative analysis of different phenomena to grasp e.g. the essence of tragedy and that does not conform to the common understanding of intuition. The author also points out that there is a risk of ambiguity and change the meaning of linguistic expressions, which he shows on the example of the term "tragedy," pointing out that in different centuries it stood for different phenomena (Geiger 1928, 147). This is also the evidence for the fact that using the phenomenological method requires the effort to know the history of development of concepts. But is it not against the universality of phenomenological method, which always searches for timeless essences, without the necessity to know the multitude of examples (Geiger 1928, 148)?

We touch here upon an important problem of relation between phenomenology and history. The solution proposed by Geiger is analogical to the explanation, how a triangle that possesses some essence, could occur under different side lengths (Geiger 1928, 148). The author comes to conclusion that this is static understanding of essence which cannot be transposed to a development of e.g. the essence of a tragedy. Instead he postulates a dynamic approach that is characteristic of biological sciences in which in spite of some change like for example growing up of a human, we could ascribe to him or her the same essence. Commenting on this step, Geiger claims that it was softening of Plato's conception of ideas (invariable) by adding the Hegelian spirit (Geiger 1928, 150).

The author also recognizes the danger connected with the long time needed to learn how to use the phenomenological method, which follows from the lack of objective criteria of verification or falsification of achieved results. It is a highly relevant remark, which could be interpolated also to the other areas of phenomenological analysis. It shows, that it is hard to contest results of someone's researches. One should also not become influenced by stereotype imposed by natural sciences, which claim that results of knowledge should be accessible equally to everyone, independently of one's intellectual qualifications (Geiger 1928, 151).

Phenomenological method consists in the tension between the so called aesthetics "from below" (*von unten*) and "from above" (*von oben*). These names, as we have seen, are introduced by Geiger in his paper, on the one hand to signify the aesthetics focused on concrete occurrences of works of art, and on the other on formulating the general principles, like a paradigm of art as imitation. By doing this, just at the starting point, it places in unjustified way, specific system (Geiger 1928, 153–154). Phenomenological method starts with particular and singular beings, where it searches for valuable

moments. Then it recognizes accuracy in repetitiveness of occurrence of aesthetical principles, which create a specific shape. In this way it covers the whole area of aesthetics thanks to a few principles of forming values (*Wertprinzipien*). It stands for the end of possibilities of aesthetics as an autonomous science, because the interpretation of these principles is the work of aesthetics as a philosophical sub-discipline (Geiger 1928, 154–155).

Relations between the aesthetics as philosophical sub-discipline and aesthetics as an autonomous science are analogical to those between natural philosophy to natural sciences. The autonomous aesthetics considers aesthetic objects, values and the world of aesthetic given as phenomena. However, there is also the possibility of philosophical reflection on them as phenomena given to the subject, which is called the problem of constitution (Geiger 1928, 156–157).

### Summary

We can treat the whole Geiger's essay as the methodological defense or as the manifest of the aesthetics coming out as a conscious, autonomous science, disclaiming treating it as a field of application of other sciences or philosophical sub-discipline. It is realized by connecting it with the phenomenological method, which is opposed to traditional metaphysics and to psychological research. Aesthetic values and principles regulating them become the object of the aesthetics as an autonomous science. A work of art and aesthetic values possess the character of phenomenon, though Geiger as loyal to the realistic phenomenology and anti-psychological position places objects of aesthetic experience in an objective reality. We reach the aesthetic essence due to demanding preparations, methodologically regulated intuition, which develops from particular experiences of aesthetic values, discovers the structure and value of the aesthetic event (Fabiani 2010, 127). The reflection about these results should be left according Geiger to the philosophical aesthetics, which is the meta-level of an autonomous aesthetics.

At the base of Geiger's views, it can be observed presupposition of differences between phenomenology and philosophy, which he transposes on the field of the aesthetical reflection. Although aesthetics as an autonomous academic discipline demands the right to the most appropriate aesthetical reflection, it does not mean removal of other areas of aesthetics. The aesthetics as philosophical sub-discipline and a field of applying other sciences keep the power, however the range of their influence becomes radically separated.

Huge advantages of the individualizing of the aesthetics using phenomenological method can be revealed in relation to the issues of contemporary art, especially its new forms like minimal art, happening or performance. Phenomenology as a science concentrated on the experience, helps to find the essence of new forms of art. It researches them in a dynamic way, without stopping on certain schemes of aesthetic values. Hence it is opened for their new forms. Flexibility and openness of this method on new forms of experience helps to describe nowadays appearing, but not investigated, forms of an artistic expression and aesthetic values. It is allowed by the Geiger's belief, that the art is the special reality, which possesses profound meaning for the human existence (Fabiani 2010, 128).

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