



BRILL



brill.com/jocc

Civilizing Humans with Shame: How Early Confucians Altered Inherited Evolutionary Norms through Cultural Programming to Increase Social Harmony

Ryan Nichols

Department of Philosophy, California State University, Fullerton, CA, USA
Centre for Human Evolution, Cognition, and Culture, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada

rnichols@fullerton.edu

Abstract

To say Early Confucians advocated the possession of a sense of shame as a means to moral virtue underestimates the tact and forethought they used successfully to mold natural dispositions to experience shame into a system of self, familial, and social governance. Shame represents an adaptive system of emotion, cognition, perception, and behavior in social primates for measurement of social rank. Early Confucians understood the utility of the shame system for promotion of cooperation, and they build and deploy cultural modules – e.g., rituals, titles, punishments – with this in mind. These policies result in subtle alterations to components of the evolved shame system that are detectable in data from contemporary cross-cultural psychology that show that populations in the Confucian diaspora have a unique shame profile compared to Western and non-Western populations. The status of Confucian diaspora populations as outliers in the context of shame is partially explained by appeal to the cultural transmission and historical endurance of relevant Early Confucian cultural modules.

Keywords

China – co-evolution – Confucianism – cultural transmission – morality – shame – social organisation

1 Introduction

The *Zuozhuan*, or *Chronicle of Zuo* (c. 389 BCE), lists 540 interstate wars and 130 major civil wars in the North China plain during 259 years, and this list is not complete (Lewis, 1989, p. 36). When attempting to reduce the proportion of interactions that include violent and aggressive behavior and increase the proportion that generate peace and harmony, would-be cultural leaders of Warring States China had few means available to them. Most obvious, law and punishment cannot be used in the absence of a strong central state. Confucius dismisses the role of punishment and violence in social governance: “The Master said, “If the people be led by laws, and uniformity sought to be given them by punishments, they will try to avoid the punishment, but have no sense of shame [chi 恥]. If they be led by virtue [de 德], and uniformity sought to be given them by the rules of propriety [li 禮], they will have the sense of shame, and moreover will become good” (*Analects*, 2.11; quotations from *Analects* drawn from Slingerland, 2003, unless noted). Supernatural punishment, which regulates behavior (Johnson and Kruger, 2004; Johnson and Bering, 2006), cannot be used in the absence of widely embedded ‘high gods’ concepts, which Ancient China is thought to lack (Granet, 1985).

The original Confucian authors, editors, redactors and masters sought to control and organize behavior of people of early China in ways that yielded efficiencies in cooperation and reduced between-group and between-person violence endemic to the Warring States period (475–221 BCE). But they had a long-term vision for cultural influence. Confucius, his students, followers and editors focused on shaping peoples’ emotions, cognitions and behaviors through the promulgation of an all-inclusive ideology or ‘memplex’. The means through which early Confucians employed shame (typically *chi* 恥 or *xiu* 羞) to influence society through individuals is analyzed here. The paper describes the functions of shame and ‘proto-shame’ in their evolutionary contexts; discusses Early Chinese historical, intellectual and ecological features relevant for understanding the function of shame; analyzes Early Confucian shaping of shame emotions, shame behaviors and the sense of shame; and lastly positions Early Confucian construction of shame experience in relation to hypotheses about the cross-cultural representation of shame in the contemporary Confucian diaspora as opposed to its representation elsewhere in the world. The primary aims of the paper are to provide a naturalistic, genealogical explanation of the cultural extrapolation of evolved propensities for shame made in Early Confucian texts, and to demonstrate the social utility of these propensities as cultivated through Confucianism in light of data drawn from contemporary cross-cultural psychology.

In a society in which rank is determined by physical aggression and force, bravery and physical prowess become prized virtues (Latin ‘vir’ = man; manly). In a society in which rank is determined by social attention-holding power, social influence and empathy are prized virtues. The thesis of this paper is that Early Confucian texts aimed to increase social harmony and decrease violence by promulgating a networked ideology with specific emotional, behavioral and cognitive content. Early Confucians sought this goal in two ways. Confucians in Warring States China inherited a social rank system dominated by physical dominance. First they recalibrated the sense of shame to function in and to facilitate the development of a social environment in which dominance is achieved by prestige, not physical force. Second they altered shame experience, the sense of shame, and additional features of our bioprogram, so that embodiment of a suite of quasi-moral traits of character was necessary for achievement of high social status in their prestige-based system of social rank. Prestige, as social rank, in Henrich and Gil-White’s (2001) sense of the term, was intended to be acquired in the cultural context of ancient China through morally praiseworthy behavior.

To understand the cultural influence of Early Confucianism on shame in changing our bioprogram – our set of evolutionarily adaptive behaviors and emotions – we first must understand what shame is.

2 Shame as a Behavioral, Emotional and Cognitive Adaptive System

What is shame? A true and complete answer to this question necessitates multi-disciplinary research involving evolutionary and social psychology, cultural history and philosophy. Making a start on such an answer is the purpose of this section. In Section 2.2 the paper examines what shame experience is (rather than what the English word ‘shame’ means) through consultation of relevant studies in evolutionary and social psychology. Shame is a ‘social-rank based emotion’. Given those supporting data, Section 2.2 examines why shame is thought to be an adaptation not only across cultures and species-wide but across the entire superfamily of *hominoidea*.

2.1 *What is Shame?*

Shame is an ‘affect’ and for some a basic emotion (Gilbert, 1997). Unlike other emotions, affects are considered to be cross-cultural natural kinds (Griffiths, 1997: 4), following what Ekman (1992) says about ‘basic emotions’. Benefiting from the wide interdisciplinary literature on shame and guilt requires resolving conceptual confusions regarding the senses and referents of those two terms. The title Jeff Elison gives to his outstanding paper on this issue aptly

signals the problem: “Shame and guilt: A hundred years of apples and oranges” (Elison, 2003). Work clarifying the categories involved reveals an insight constraining the present project: conceptions of shame in the currency of Western psychology and philosophy are far too complex either to be representative of experimental data about shame or to correspond to the evolutionary ancestry of shame affect (Elison, 2003: 6).

Although not universally classified as a basic emotion, studies document correlations between shame and the basic emotion of fear, especially as found in collectivist societies such as those constituting the Confucian diaspora, which includes China, Taiwan, Japan, Korea and Singapore. Data drawn from an fMRI study reveal similar activations in the anterior cingulate cortex during physical pain and during social exclusion (Eisenberger et al., 2003). Shame’s capacity to change behavior proceeds through fear or the cognizance of fear, coupled with social intelligence. If one imagines oneself committing an immoral action in full public view, one might shudder at the resulting social devaluation. The frequency with which shame is experienced with fear varies across cultures: if shameful action A would cause one to be socially ostracized in culture 1 and not culture 2, then *ceteris paribus* one would have more fear regarding committing shameful actions of that type in culture 1.

Whether shame is or is not a basic emotion, expert researchers on emotion concur: shame is primitive and requires no cognitive resources for its experience in contrast to guilt. Fessler describes shame as having “evolved from a rank-related emotion,” which explains why it can be found “motivating prestige competition, cooperation, and conformity” (Fessler, 2004: 207). Gilbert writes, “The evolutionary root of shame is in a self-focused, social threat system related to competitive behavior and the need to prove oneself acceptable/desirable to others,” which contrasts with guilt’s origins as a care-giving and “an ‘avoiding doing harm to others’ system” (Gilbert, 2003: 1205). Gilbert concludes that it is the “inner experience of self as an unattractive social agent, under pressure to limit possible damage to self via escape or appeasement, that captures shame most closely. . . . Shame is an involuntary response to an awareness that one has lost status and is devalued” (Gilbert, 1988: 22). Shame experience monitors social rank and detects social threats from conspecifics. Decoding the social communication as disapproval enables the shamed animal to submit. Sometimes this decoding is fully conscious and sometimes, even among humans, the shame system activates unawares, as in blushing. You might experience shame and then blush without being aware you are blushing, enabling trained others to know you have been shamed when you do not.

The capacity for shame evolved in hominins and non-hominins due to its utility in enabling those who have it to negotiate dangerous social hierarchies (Gilbert and McGuire, 1998). Shame is elicited by one’s perception of one’s

social devaluation by another (Frijda, 1993; Gilbert, 1997). Thus shame experience represents a “recalibrational emotional program”, in this respect like guilt, grief, depression and gratitude. The primary function of recalibrational emotions is not short-term changes to behavior (Tooby and Cosmides, 1990). This point appears to confuse some researchers: since shame appears to have adverse consequences in the short term – anger, anxiety, ostracism – some infer that its experience is maladaptive. But this is short-sighted not only because in ancestral and in present-day populations those short-term reactions are often adaptive, but because long-term effects of shame that involve recomputation of one’s social rank can be especially adaptive in making future behavior more fitness-enhancing.

In cultures without enforced laws (like Early China, among thousands of others) and in non-human contexts, shame or ‘protoshame’ is one of few non-violent means by which the group can regulate behavior (Fessler, 1999). Shame is found in non-human primates to take forms such as averted gaze, reduced posture, and submissive gait, which are stereotypic features of appeasement. Fessler remarks that such displays “signal to dominant individuals that the actor accepts a subordinate position in the dominance hierarchy”. These gestures aim to “dissuade the dominant from aggressing” (Fessler, 2004: 239; see also Fessler, 1999; Keltner and Harker, 1998). Fessler (2007) adds that the “panprimate substrate” on which human shame is built consisted of communication within a system of hierarchical social relationships. This, he argues, changed in human beings because the reliance on culture and cooperation favored the evolution of a new motivational system oriented towards prospective cooperative partners (Fessler, 2007: 174). Another research team led by Keltner argues that shame’s role in catalyzing appeasement displays is a homology shared between present-day humans and hominin ancestors for the reason that humans unable to appease dominant individuals after violations of group norms risk being targeted by collective action. Keltner and colleagues find that displays of shame enhance reconciliation and social reincorporation (Keltner et al., 1997; Keltner and Harker, 1998), which anticipates current work in ‘restorative shame theory’ (much of which draws explicitly on Confucianism).

Displays of shame experience include appeasement behaviors but one can possess a ‘sense’ of shame without ever demonstrating those behaviors. The English term ‘shame’ can connote, given varied contexts, this sense of shame, feelings of shame, shame behavior, and the state of being ashamed. Possessing a keen sense of shame issues in conformist behavior. Conformity is motivated by a desire to avoid being ashamed and embarrassed, the aversive emotions attending negative social appraisal (see Fessler, 2004, for review). Embarrassment, the emotion often elicited by violations of norms governing

comportment and presentation of self, is accompanied by display behaviors that inform onlookers that the violation was unintentional.

Communicating that the actor knows and values the local standards mitigates the damage the violation causes to the actor's social position (Keltner and Buswell, 1997; Keltner et al., 1997).

Shame experience shapes many behaviors and cultural patterns. In collectivist cultures individuals show greater awareness of what others are thinking, including what others are thinking about them. This awareness couples with the desire to avoid social devaluation prominent in collectivist cultures (see below). Effects of shame become magnified in collectivist cultures since shame is the paradigmatic social emotion regulating status, but effects of shame also get magnified in highly stratified societies. In highly stratified societies, your social status is placed at greater risk due to your possible interactions with individuals far above you in the hierarchy. Warring States China is both collectivist and highly stratified.

2.2 *Why Is a Sense of Shame Thought to Be an Adaptation in Social Primates?*

Distinguish two distinct strategies in gaining and maintaining rank: aggression and prestige. In an environment in which social leaders use physical aggression to enforce rank and harmonize behavior, such leaders would be coercive, threatening and authoritarian. Adaptive displays of shame in that environment would include submission, retreat and fear. Those displays would be accompanied by overt physical behaviors known to correlate with shame experience – averting the eyes, reducing one's physical stature, and other gestures of appeasement directed at reducing or forestalling aggression (Keltner and Harker, 1998). Aggressors want to be feared and obeyed in order to maintain social power. Instead, where prestige is the currency through which social leaders enforce rank and harmonize behavior, such leaders would emphasize the desirability of talent, competence and affiliation. Leaders of prestige-based social groups, 'attractors', lead not by instilling fear and obedience but by being valued and popular. Gilbert and McGuire (1998) refer to this as 'social attention-holding power'. Aggressors aim to instill negative affect in those of lower social rank whereas attractors aim to instill positive affect in them. Violations of social norms in this context would lead to deference and a return to conformity. But if prestige is the currency of social rank then the physical correlates of shame behaviors will change by becoming less severe and pronounced while retaining the structure imposed on them by the utility of shame displays throughout our species' biological evolution (another corollary hypothesis).

Cooperation, a key component in human ultrasociality, enabled ancestral humans to reduce chance-based variance in finding food and to increase productivity by enabling reciprocal divisions of labor, for examples. But cooperation, supported by reciprocal altruism, is insufficient to support human ultrasociality. Cooperation at the large group level requires a complicated distribution of labor and resources like food, territory, and mating opportunities. The social hierarchy provides for this distribution (de Waal, 1986, 1988; Keltner et al., 2003). Social hierarchies function efficiently when greased by submission and dominance including experiences of pride, contempt and shame. Shame experience functions to appease dominant individuals and signal submissiveness (Keltner and Buswell, 1997). In ultrasocial humans, shame displays were redirected in cultural forms from aggression-avoidance to the maintenance of prestige. This vastly expanded the applicable range of behavioral contexts in which shame became appropriate (Gilbert, 2003: 1209). Prestige is a proxy for possession of access to resources. Decreases in prestige are maladaptive. Shame displays limit or halt such decreases.

Distinct currencies of social rank emerged in different cultures due to a variety of factors. Currencies might include hunting skills, social networks, wealth, mating opportunities, or numbers of kin in the group. Depending on the primary currency in use, systems of rank based on prestige lead to variance in embodied shame between humans and non-humans, and across human cultures. When in the presence of others of much higher social rank, one experiences admiration – not the negative affect familiar from shame experience. Admiration is an emotion of a piece with affiliation displays. Prestigious people are models of social success and influence, which causes lower ranking individuals to concern themselves with and to imitate prestigious people (Henrich and Gil-White, 2001). Fessler remarks about changes to the bioprogram: “Natural selection therefore modified a fundamentally competitive emotion so that it could also motivate simple conformity – in addition to striving not to be bested by their rivals, individuals now also worked not to fall out of line with the majority” (Fessler, 2004: 250). Conformity to group standards not only signals group membership, which increases access to resources, but also enables individuals to “more readily predict one another’s actions. Increased predictability is valuable because it facilitates coordination across individuals” (Fessler, 2004: 245).

A sense of shame is hypothesized to be an adaptation in ancestral populations because a shame system with a finely attuned theory of mind allows for precise judgments about the changing allocations of prestige. This information is fitness-enhancing because it enables accurate impression management. ‘Impression management theory’ refers to a set of confirmed hypotheses

descriptive of conscious and non-conscious attempts by humans to influence the perceptions of others by regulating or controlling social information. Efforts at impression management focus on self-presentation, and those efforts can either be merely expressive or instrumental. Expressive forms of self-presentation allow individuals to reconfirm beliefs about their own personal identity and image. Instrumental forms of self-presentation fall into several categories, including efforts at intimidation, ingratiation and supplication. Shame provides for efficient impression management via the latter two forms of instrumental self-presentation. This arises in four evolutionary roles: sexual behavior (unattractiveness, sexual deviance), conformity (breaking rules or traditions), resource competition (lacking abilities to compete) and prosocial behavior (failing to meet one's obligations to others). In male groups shame may be experienced following a display of fear; in a caste society shame may be experienced following a class violation (Greenwald and Harder, 1998).

A sense of shame was naturally selected for because shame modulates social status and rank. Status and rank are correlated with adaptive reproductive benefits (Fournier et al., 2002). Signaling submission to an authority, a group or a parent is highly adaptive (Gilbert and McGuire, 1998). Signaling shame appeases authorities. Stereotypical voluntary or semi-voluntary signals include making oneself appear non-threatening, surrendering, and physically lowering oneself. Participants across cultures successfully identify shame behavior as such, closing a gap that would lead to misunderstanding if left open. In many of the social primates shame assists in the management of the hierarchy without the negative consequences for the group that physical aggression causes (Keltner and Harker, 1998). This implies that the prevalence of a sense of shame in group members enhances group cohesion and cooperation in ways that the resort to violence sabotages. Submissive signaling represents one's recognition of social devaluation by others and represents a warning signal to one's self of one's social devaluation (Gilbert and McGuire, 1998). Data on the phenomenal components of shame across cultures shows that it consists of feeling weak, lower and small (Barrett, 1995). Causing people to feel inferior in these and other ways can be of use for leaders since these feelings are embodied and can easily be converted into behaviors.

As Parker puts it, shame and other self-conscious emotions "were favored because they increased the ability of parents, kin, peers, and others to socially manipulate their offspring, kin, peers, and others. Self-regulation functions of [the self-conscious emotions] were favored because they allowed parents and others to inculcate and enforce values and behavioral codes in others that increased their own inclusive fitness" (Parker, 1998: 115). This 'social manipulation' can be studied through the lens of the mechanisms that facilitate the

transmission of cultural information from one generation to the next. Various groups increase the group's net reproductive fitness relative to other groups through conformist transmission because high rates of conformity minimize differences within the group and aid cooperation while widening differences between groups (Boyd and Richerson, 1988).

Conformist transmission will be most effective in physical and social ecologies that are stable and will be least effective in environments that are unstable (Henrich and Boyd, 1998: 220, 226). If physical environments change, then conformist rules inherited from a generation who lived in a different environment would likely be less adaptive than would be using new rules of behavior. The same is true of social environments, thus cultures effectively using shame would be more likely than cultures that do not to have a stable set of interaction rituals. For numerous reasons (agriculture at c. 7500 BCE, landforms limiting contact with non-Han peoples, etc.), the ecology of Early China was a remarkable incubator for conformist transmission. Confucianism systematizes our natural propensity for shame through a complex system of cultural practices and rules in order to civilize human beings, manage the social hierarchy and craft a uniquely Chinese moral system.

3 Shame in Early Confucianism

Section 3.1 begins with a brief description of the violence and social disarray in Warring States China, Section 3.2 presents evidence of Early Confucians' preoccupation with social rank, and Section 3.3 a report about Early Confucianism's use of this – a preoccupation not to be ashamed – to increase morally praiseworthy behavior and cooperation.

3.1 *Social Disarray and Violence in the Warring States*

Due to a few historical and ecological features of China and the North China Plain, populations experienced high rates violence and low rates of cooperation. The two most important of these features include the early development of agriculture and the history of metallurgy. The advent of agriculture changes population dynamics and social organization, and prompts the development of hierarchies in historical societies. Behavioral ecologists and social historians document the importance of agriculture in the transition to societies with highly stratified organization, due principally to the ability to accumulate and store wealth over time in the form of grain (Sanderson, 1995). Early China's early adoption of agriculture (in the 7th millennium BCE) speeded and amplified its social stratification. As agriculture allows societies to gain increasing

rates of organization, conflicts of interest between individuals are settled by the powerful exploiting the weak to maximize fitness at others' expense. Laura Betzig finds significant correlation between group size and hierarchical complexity, asymmetry in the resolution of conflict, and degree of polygyny attained by those at the top of the hierarchy (Betzig, 1982; see Betzig, 1995).

The second major incubator for social violence in Early China is the onset of metallurgy. The importation of metallurgical skills furthered Early China's stratification (Higham, 1988). Kyle Summers (2005) summarizes unique features of the Early Chinese context leading to its "extreme hierarchies": In China, extreme hierarchies developed in the Shang Dynasty, coincident with the sudden blossoming of bronze metallurgy after its importation from western Asia (Watson, 1967). During this period, towns came under the control of a ruling class that monopolized control of bronze weaponry and armor. Peasants did not have access to metal tools; instead, they had to use stone tools for agricultural work (Watson, 1967). In the early Chinese Iron Age (475–221 BCE), which is just the Warring States period, the government had a monopoly on iron production, and there was an edict preventing export of iron weapons or tools. High-quality iron weapons were likely restricted to the noble elites of the military (Taylor and Shell, 1988), and stratification remained high (Andreski, 1968; Summers, 2005: 124).

Agriculture allows for the accumulation of wealth, which in turn separates levels of society. Access to metal implements for farming and metal weapons correlates with further separation between levels of society since the highest levels, with access to metal implements and weapons, will vastly outcompete those levels without access.

These facts play directly into the story of shame in Early China and Confucianism for two reasons. First, societies that are highly stratified by wealth fall victim to more social unrest and violence than societies with more egalitarian forms of resource distribution, as work on the Gini coefficient has shown. Second extensively hierarchical cultures (need to) make more use of shame and deference than do less hierarchically organized cultures (Kitayama et al., 2000). "In more interdependent and hierarchically structured societies there is often a hypercognized emotion, combining elements of what we call shame, embarrassment, shyness, and modesty, which is highly valued when displayed by the lower-status person in an interaction" (Keltner et al., 2006: 131; see Menon and Shweder, 1994).

The Warring States period (*zhanguo shidai*, 戰國時代) earned the name. Historians, sociologists and anthropologists of Early China studying the periods after the fall of the Western Zhou Dynasty in 771 BCE to Qin Unification in 221 BCE emphasize the extreme rates of interpersonal and inter-group violent

conflict. In *Religion in Human Evolution* Robert Bellah argues China's "axial transition" occurred "when a society ruled by warriors was being transformed into a society ruled by imperial bureaucrats" (Bellah, 2011: 400). He writes, "The ensuing Chunqiu (Spring and Autumn) period, named after a chronicle that spans the years 722 to 481 BCE, saw a gradual descent into incessant warfare, leading into the Warring States period (450–211 BCE) when a series of new developments changed the nature of Chinese culture and society and led to the elimination of the warrior aristocracy that still dominated in the Spring and Autumn period" (Bellah, 2011: 401). The central cultural development Bellah goes on to describe is the advent of Confucianism and its subsequent influence in Imperial China.

Many historians of Pre-Imperial China echo a similar belief that Early Confucianism was instrumental in an all-important shift in the regulation of Chinese culture. Pines, writes, "the Chunqiu was the age of disintegration. The continuous usurpation of superiors' prerogatives by their underlings resulted in incessant strife among the states, among the major lineages within each state, and often within the lineages. The history of Chunqiu political thought may be summarized as the statesmen's painstaking effort to put an end to the disintegration, prevent anarchy, and restore hierarchical order" (Pines, 2002: 89). During the transition from the Chunqiu to the Warring States period, Confucius is born and lives, marking the beginning of a broad culture change. The Chunqiu, or Spring and Autumn, period from 771/722 to 481/403 BCE, during which Early Confucianism formed, contained a remarkable amount of violence. Scholars argue that a considerable portion of total warfare in the period traces to shame through dishonor. As mentioned, the *Zuozhuan* lists 540 interstate wars and 130 major civil wars in the North China plain during 259 years (Lewis, 1989: 36). The warrior aristocracy lived in near constant war. Warfare represented the defense of the clan's lineage and honor so it became a part of the ancestral cult, institutionalized as a religious duty.

But concern for the peaceful ordering of Chinese society while maintaining the social hierarchy informs some of the earliest layers of Confucius' *Analecets* and some of the earliest dialogues recorded in *Mencius* (c. 300 BCE) between Mengzi and King Xuan and King Xiang. *Mencius* Book 1A.6 reports the death of King Xuan and the ascension to the throne of his son Xiang, then describes Mengzi's first meeting with the newly appointed sovereign. The king asks, "How can the world be pacified?" The dialogue continues: I responded, "It can be pacified by being unified". The king asked, "Who can unify it?" I replied, "One who does not have a taste for killing people can unify it. . . . If there were one who did not have a taste for killing people, the people of the world would

crane their necks to look for him". (*Mencius*, 1A6; quotations from *Mencius* are from Van Norden, 2008, unless noted)

This occurs in the opening section of the second most important text in the Confucian tradition, carrying immense cultural and historical influence through subsequent generations. *Mencius* is cited here rather than the earlier *Analects* in part because advocacy of peace and social harmony in *Mencius* explicitly repeats Kongzi's (Confucius') own authoritative positions on these matters, exhibiting effective vertical cultural transmission already within the Warring States period. At *Mencius* 4A.14 we read, "Kongzi rejected those who enrich the rulers who do not put into effect benevolent government. How much more would he reject those who encourage war. To wage war to fight for land is to kill people till they fill the fields. To wage war to fight for cities is to kill people till they fill the cities. This is what is meant by 'leading the land to eat the flesh of the people'. This is a crime even death cannot atone for". Early Confucianism offers no harsher condemnation than this: leaders who promulgate war and violence are the worst of the worst.

3.2 *Achieving Social Status: the Goal of a Good Confucian*

According to the foregoing argument, Early Confucianism bases prestige not on physical power and capacity for violence but on quasi-moral character. This implies that Early Confucians aim to achieve social status. (Keep in mind sharply contrasting forms of moral leadership such as Jesus' and Gandhi's.) Do they?

Early Confucian texts reveal an extreme concern for achieving social status, often through public display of virtue. Confucius affirms the publicity of virtue explicitly: "Virtue is never solitary; it always has neighbors" (*Analects*, 4.25). Confucianism is able to use shame to enforce or encode behaviors of would-be scholar officials (*shi*, 士), the target audience of Early Confucian texts, because the moral code to which these readers aspired correlated socially desirable behavior with moral behavior.

Consider first *ren* (仁), benevolence, thought to be the highest virtue. The subtle opening statements in the earliest layer of *Analects* exhibit a means-end concern with virtue and goodness while combining an interest in status. *Analects* 4.1 and 4.2 read as follows: "The Master said, "To live in the neighborhood of *ren* is fine. If one does not choose to dwell among those who are *ren*, how will one get to be known?" "The Master said, "Without *ren*, one cannot remain constant in adversity and cannot enjoy enduring happiness. Those who are *ren* feel at home in *ren*, whereas those who are clever follow *ren* because they feel that they will benefit (*li*) from it".

Ren is a means, though not a mere means, to other things of more importance: getting to be known, overcoming adversity, being happy. But even if *ren* is a means to benefits, it ought not be sought for its benefits. In the earliest recorded passages identified with Confucianism *ren* and virtue in general are social, in contrast to some virtues in non-Confucian traditions.

Consider the *junzi* (君子). Though typically translated ‘gentleman’ or ‘superior man’, the term originally referred to a man of high social rank, meaning ‘prince’. Strictly speaking Early Confucianism’s moral ideal, the *junzi*, was itself defined in terms of preeminent social status. Since the *junzi* is characterized as someone of high social rank, Early Confucianism leverages his public persona to motivate moral behavior. The *junzi*’s errors “are like an eclipse of the sun and moon in that when he errs the whole world sees him doing so” (*Analects*, 19.2). The goals of the intended readership of works of Early Confucianism include acquisition of abundant social power through career success. The *junzi* is revolted (*ji*, 疾) at the thought that his name might not be celebrated after his death (*Analects*, 15.20). *Daxue* (*The Great Learning*, 大學) says *junzi* ought to be wary of being alone and not in public (Chan, 1963: 89–90), as does *Zhongyong* (*The Golden Mean*, 中庸; Muller, 1991 [2011]: 1), presumably since in a shame-based moral system being unsupervised undermines the primary form of moral motivation at work.

Historian Ping-Ti Ho remarks that Early Confucians transformed their concern with increasing their social status in a highly stratified society into moral distinctions between kinds of men. This led Early Confucians to alter the meaning of *junzi*, which under their usage went from referring to the noble born and high of status to referring to a “people of superior knowledge and moral quality” (Ho, 2008: 5). These authors and editors sought to maintain social hierarchy but shift its principle of organization away from power and toward moral character. Ho remarks, “by attempting to perpetuate the feudal system, Confucius and his followers actually heralded the arrival of a new social order, based not on hereditary status but on individual merit. While upholding a hierarchical society, they concerned themselves with the means to tackle its inherent injustice and bring about social equity mainly through education” (Ho, 2008: 6).

Early Confucian cultural leaders used rank-based emotions as a tool for a sweeping set of social policies that would overcome endemic violence in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods. Seeding a sense of shame in the population of scholar officials and, through them, in their students, employees and subjects, and through them, in their sisters, brothers, sons and daughters, had greater potential to peacefully achieve social harmony than just about any other methods of social engineering available.

3.3 *Early Confucian Texts Use Shame to Promote Non-Violence and Cooperation*

Ames and Rosemont say shame is “a hugely important factor in Confucian moral philosophy” since it enabled transformation of “the people through their own willing participation in a self-regulating communal order [which] is fundamental to Confucianism” (Ames and Rosemont, 2009: 58, 73). This section briefly describes a series of tools or techniques identified in Early Confucian texts for promoting cooperation and harmony through mechanisms that involve shame.

3.3.1 Face-Reading and Mind-Reading: Learn to Identify Shame Experience in Others

Fingarette says about shame (*chi*, 耻) that it “looks ‘outward,’ not ‘inward’ . . . The Confucian concept of shame . . . is oriented to morality as centering in *li*, traditionally ceremonially defined social comportment, rather than to an inner core of one’s being, ‘the self’” (Fingarette, 1972: 30). The outward focus of Confucian shame is possible because Early Confucians appeal to embodied signals of shame and shame-like feeling as a means of success in theory of mind tasks. In *Analects* 2.8 Zixia asks about filial piety and the master replies, “It all lies in showing the proper countenance” (Ames and Rosemont, 2009: 78) or more literally “What is difficult is one’s facial coloration” (Csikszentmihalyi, 2004: 135, translating *senan*, 色難). In *Mencius* 3B7 Zilu describes how one gains valuable information about the feelings of one who may utter what he does not believe: “observe the reddening of their facial coloration” (Csikszentmihalyi, 2004: 135). Blushing and sweating signal inauthentic behavior, knowledge which the disciple of Confucianism is to use to his advantage. Savvy Confucians expertly perceive when people reduce their social rank, and train in advanced techniques of impression management.

3.3.2 Encode Proper Social Behavior: Avoid Shame and Social Devaluing by Cultivating Other Emotions

By virtue of its status as a basic or quasi-basic emotion, repeatedly making feelings of shame relevant to one’s readership offers an evolutionarily effective means of influence. But certain other emotions can keep shame at bay, and these emotions also get considerable play in Early Confucian texts. For example, texts recommend *gong* (恭), translated as ‘reverence’ or ‘respect’, in this connection. *Analects* 1:13 reads “Reverence comes close to ritual propriety, in that it allows you to keep shame and public disgrace at a distance”. Etymologically, this character means ‘hearts together’; to experience reverence requires action and emotion. Shame avoidance requires managing one’s

relative place in the social hierarchy. Elsewhere the authors use *gong* in such a way, for example, writing that reverence is a character trait one embodies when properly serving one's superior (*Analects*, 15.1). Savvy Confucians will avoid shame by cultivating respect and deference.

3.3.3 Public Use of Words: Ensure Your Words Match Your Deeds to Gain Respect

The perception of untrustworthiness harms one's ability to secure cooperation. A principal means of gaining a reputation for untrustworthiness is to act in ways inconsistent with one's words. Many examples of shame in *Analects* revolve around concerns that one's words and one's deeds will not be in harmony. Confucius advises readers to monitor the relationship between others' words and others' deeds to insure trustworthy speech in order to distinguish cooperators from cheaters (*Analects*, 5.10). One must also monitor the relationship between one's own words and deeds. "A gentleman is ashamed of his word out-stripping his deed" (*Analects*, 2.13; see *Analects*, 14.29; *Mencius*, 4B.18). Shamelessness becomes a cause that affects the inability to enact one's words: "If you are shameless in what you propose you may then find it difficult to put your words into action". Savvy Confucians gain status and avoid shame by matching their words to their deeds, and gain advantage when identifying when others fail to do so.

3.3.4 Proper Names and Titles (Zhenming, 正名): Govern a Population with Forms of Address That Promote Hierarchical Thinking and Non-Violent Interactions

To Early Confucians *zhengming*, "rectification of names", is "the starting point of sociopolitical order" (Hall and Ames, 1987, p. 270), "the indispensable condition for all government" (Hsiao, 1979, p. 98). The doctrine of *zhengming* functions as a central means of establishing conformity to social roles by educating the citizenry about the conditions under which they will be devalued by others, namely when citizens behave in ways that do not comport with stereotypical role-based behavior. Confucius' first edict, were he hypothetically called into service by the Duke of Wei, would be to *zhengming*: "Zilu said, "Suppose the ruler of Wei makes you administrator, what will you do first?" Confucius said, "Necessarily, rectify names" (*Analects*, 13.3). Rectifying names stabilizes social roles and ranks, creates conformity, and represents a turning away from violence as a motivation for social conformity. Chad Hansen writes, "Our potential for conventional social intercourse depends on our having a sense of shame – the inclination to conformity . . . The final outcome of letting this feeling have its sway is that we will become moral people *in a conventional*

sense” (Hansen, 1992: 64, 165). Savvy Confucians create conformity in societies they govern by conditioning the populace with social roles born of the proper use of titles.

3.3.5 Propriety Produces Cooperation: Use Rituals to Bring People Together Peacefully

Early Confucianism converts the complex of emotions, behaviors and cognitions surrounding role-based shame into actual physical behavior by prescribing a set of preferred ritual interactions, and representing negative consequences of violations of those prescriptions. Ritual propriety (*li*, 禮) efficiently encodes a sense of shame, and the benefits are obvious: following *li*, you would know better than to greet a visiting guest in hunting attire, or fail to serve him turtle soup. These are, after all, both acts for which noblemen were murdered in Warring States China (Lewis, 1989: 40). “Being respectful brings one close to ritual propriety, and keeps one away from shame and humiliation” (*Analects*, 1.13; see Hagen, 2010: 10), especially when interacting with other strata in the social hierarchy. The kowtow (*ketou*, 磕頭) involves three kneelings and nine prostrations. This and other Confucian rituals mimic shame behavior described above as being observed in non-human social primates – exposing one’s neck, lowering one’s stature, making oneself vulnerable to attack. Savvy Confucians use rituals that signal deference as a means of social governance at all strata of a well-ordered society.

3.3.6 When One Must Actively Govern, Govern Without Force: Shame, Rather than Physical Punishment, Is the Preferred Means of Social Control

Consistent with *Analects* 2.11 and *Mencius* 2A3.2, Pre-Qin and Imperial Chinese states used forms of non-violent punishment (in addition to other forms) that relied on shame and ostracism, including tattoos and public humiliations (Ch’ü, 1961: 246–247). The Qin Dynasty – not as influenced by Confucians as by Legalists – contained a legal canon providing conditions for appropriate tattooing (McLeod and Yates, 1981, p. 147). Prominent facial tattoos, one of the “Five Punishments,” including tattoos describing the crime, leveraged fear and social conformity to enforce norms. Since the body was inherited from one’s ancestors, its disfigurement through amputatory punishment caused family and euhemerized ancestors to feel ashamed (Ames and Rosemont, 2009: 12). Qin and Han law provide for “mutual implication” (*lian zuo*), according to which punishment for some major crimes not only focused on the violator but “extended to family, neighbors, and, in the case of an official, to superiors, subordinates, or the man who had recommended him for office” (Lewis, 2007:

233). No wonder Confucius says, “When governance and teaching are not successfully implemented, punishments and penalties will be insufficient to cause shame, and noble ranks will be insufficient to motivate” (*Zi Yi*, 13; see Cook, 2004: 407). Consequently costs of third-party punishment and policing get reduced dramatically. Savvy Confucians create social harmony with minimal physical punishments for offenders by deft use of shame’s social utility.

4 Early Confucianism’s Influence Present in Unique Shame Profile in the Present-Day Confucian Diaspora

If the Confucian cultural tradition has the content this argument says it does, and if it has been as influential and well-transmitted as this argument presumes it is, then we would expect that people in the present-day Confucian diaspora will show evidence of heightened shame behavior, shame emotion and shame cognition in relation to control groups not subject to the ideology of Early Confucianism. Section 4.1 provides evidence that members of the Confucian diaspora show heightened shame experience compared with WEIRD and non-WEIRD countries. Section 4.2 provides evidence of ways shame is uniquely encoded in pedagogy and in parent-child interaction in East Asia. Section 4.3 describes ways civil and political authorities in the Confucian diaspora have employed the social utility of shame. Section 4.4 describes the diffused sense of self found in studies of East Asians and its connection to shame and aptitudes in Theory of Mind.

4.1 *Confucian Diaspora Populations Have a Unique Shame Profile*

When a culture modifies evolutionary norms having to do with shaming and being shamed, its social communities are led to endorse some behaviors and condemn others. A study of cross-cultural modifications of evolutionary norms of shame can reveal the means by which cultures moralize behavior and so change. Cross-cultural psychological studies indicate that East Asians feel more shame, in more contexts, and do so more frequently, than others.

Triandis et al. (1988: 324) remark that persons in individualist cultures have many more in-groups – coworkers, clubs, teams, family – than do persons in collectivist cultures. When an in-group becomes too demanding, including one’s nuclear family, a person in an individualist culture leaves it and finds another one much more often than a person in a collectivist culture. Furthermore individuals in collectivist cultures tend to arrange their in-group memberships in delineated orders of importance and commitment since for them social hierarchies are more important. “In collectivist cultures the most important

relationships are vertical (e.g., parent-child), whereas in individualist cultures the most important relationships are horizontal (e.g., spouse-spouse, friend-friend)" (Triandis et al., 1988: 325). Bond (1986) summarizes findings about the psychology of collectivism in China saying that Chinese have higher needs for socially oriented achievement, abasement, change, endurance, and order, and low levels of individually oriented achievement, affiliation, aggression, exhibition, and power. Explicit studies of cultural representations in the Confucian diaspora also confirm many of Bond's generalizations, for example, a study of Chinese children's stories rank ordered the frequency of portrayed behaviors as follows: socially oriented achievement, then altruism, then social and personal responsibility (Blumenthal, 1977, cited in Stipek, 1998: 619).

Since social systems in East Asia place more importance on vertical rather than horizontal relationships, there are fewer opportunities to form new relationships. An adaptationist theory of shame predicts that individuals in societies with low relational mobility will be more prone to shame amongst non-strangers than will individuals in societies where relational mobility is high. Though they used only East Asian and WEIRD populations, this is what Sznycer et al. (2012) found in a study in which they showed that Japanese experienced significantly more proneness to shame than participants from the USA and the UK.

Surveys of cultural values based on self-report measures provide a snapshot of the variance of values across cultures. The value 'Having a Sense of Shame' ranked ninth of 40 different values in the Chinese Values Cultural Survey (reported by Garrott, 1995: 219). Studying Chinese shame concepts, Li et al. (2004) find robust relations between fear and avoidance of shameful experiences. The extent of these relations shows China is an outlier even among collectivist cultures. Studies of emotion categorization show that China's emphasis on honor, respect, and face leads to highly articulated scripts for expression of and reaction to shame (Li et al., 2004; see Goetz and Keltner, 2007: 163). Shame emerges as an emotion family in China, but not in other collectivistic cultures such as Indonesia or Italy (Shaver et al., 1992). Shaver, Wu and Schwartz use participants in the United States, Indonesia, Italy and China, which assuages some concern that the uniqueness of the shame profile of persons in the Confucian diaspora is the result of their comparison only to WEIRD populations (Henrich et al., 2010; see also Shaver et al., 2001, about Indonesia emotion, including shame).

Cultural attunement to shame experiences enable individuals to improve the accuracy of their expectations for interaction rituals since knowledge of one's social role enhances social harmony by alerting individuals about the rules that govern a wide range of distinct interactions. One can experience

shame because of one's own direct social devaluation, or that of a family member or friend. Cross-cultural differences in the latter type of shame experience shed light on variance between collectivist and individualist cultures. In interdependent or collectivist cultures family members and friends and deceased ancestors are experienced as extensions of the self (Markus and Kitayama, 1991). Supporting data come from Stipek (1998) who found that Chinese students were more likely than American students to feel guilt or shame in response to a relative's wrongdoing as well as pride for the praiseworthy accomplishments of a relative. Stipek also asked Chinese and American participants to rate the degree of shame they would feel if they were caught cheating and the degree of shame they would feel if their brother were caught cheating. Chinese reported they would feel significantly more shame than Americans would in the event that their brother was caught cheating. Chinese participants in another study experienced more social anxiety than Western participants (Zhong et al., 2008). In general, East Asians experience 'socially engaged' emotions more intensely than do Westerners (Kitayama et al., 1997, 2006).

Residents in the Confucian diaspora share with the historical audience of Early Confucian texts a cross-culturally unique shame profile as compared with populations from outside the Confucian diaspora, especially Westerners. This profile consists of analogs of emotional, cognitive and behavioral features revealed in Early Confucian texts including greater shame sensitivity, greater linkage of shame with social fears and social anxieties, and greater identification with one's role, title, and group.

4.2 *Shame Used for Social Governance and Political Order in East Asia*

Once a sense of shame is internalized and once one knows the requirements for maintaining good standing in the community, group action gains efficiencies. Shame reduces a group's resource allocation for third-party justice by governmental bodies including police, courts, and jails, and shame facilitates increased rates of within-group communication and cooperation. However, this comes with a proviso: people must care what others think of their behavior, and people must pay attention to others' behavior. As Bedford and Hwang write, "shame is a more effective means of social control in a system where maintaining harmony in relationships is valued over maintaining behavior according to an objectively defined right and wrong" (Bedford and Hwang, 2003; 133).

Historians of and philosophers of Chinese law document cross-cultural differences along these lines regarding the roles of shame between East and West. Since Anglo-American legal tradition emphasizes personal liberty, objective rights, property, and Mill's 'harm principle', shaming is regarded as an ineffec-

tive means of behavioral control. But historians argue that the Early Confucian emphasis on shame has been a formative force in the development of contemporary East Asian legal systems. In the *Tradition of the law and law of the tradition* Xin Ren (1997) writes, “Social conformity in the Chinese vocabulary is not limited to behavioral conformity with the rule of law but always moralistically identifies with the officially endorsed beliefs of social standards and behavioral norms. . . . [T]he Chinese tradition of so-called “greatest unity” has always attempted to achieve ultimate uniformity of both mind and act within Chinese society” (Ren, 1997; 6). This provides a philosophical or historical background to data surrounding the rule of law in China. Before-the-fact socialization, rather than after-the-fact arrest, primarily explains the low rates of social crime in China (Schurmann, 1968). ‘Social crime’ refers to crime affecting a victim visible to the assailant, like assault, as opposed to non-social crimes, like violation of property rights through internet piracy. Reflective of Confucius’ dictum of *Analectics* 2.11 about the social inefficiencies of law the Chinese legal theorist Xiaoming Chen writes, “Law has traditionally been regarded as, at best, irrelevant and, at worst, disruptive of harmony. Neither written codes nor legal institutions and practices have traditionally been seen as very important by the Chinese themselves” (Chen, 2002: 51; van der Sprenkel, 1966).

Primary responsibility for keeping the peace in China falls on community norms. The community plays a significant role in solving crimes and even apprehending criminals in China (Zhang et al., 2006). Perhaps the most fascinating example of social enforcement of law and morality lies in contemporary Chinese netizens’ use of what is called 人肉搜索 (*renrou sousuo*; lit. ‘human meat search engine’). The community vigilance and social application of shame at work in *renrou sousuo* has longstanding precedent in Chinese history. The most formal of these precedents dates from the Song Dynasty and its organized community-policing system of Baojia (保甲).

Shame in East Asia is not merely of use reducing crime; it is applied in rehabilitative efforts, which are discussed in work on ‘reintegrative shaming’ (Braithwaite, 1989: 101–102). Not enough shame fails to achieve the behavioral reform intended, but too much risks pushing offenders into criminal subcultures in which they would have no social status left to lose. Rituals or “ceremonies to reintegrate the offender” (Braithwaite and Mugford, 1994: 4) find use in rehabilitative shaming. Chinese legal theorists discuss applications of Braithwaite’s theory of reintegrative shaming to contemporary Chinese jurisprudence, and draw on Confucian social engineering and Confucian ritual as they do so (Chen, 2002).

This is no stretch since the founder of ‘reintegrative shaming’ practices draws explicit inspiration from Confucius, “the most influential thinker about

restorative justice the world has known” (Braithwaite, 2002: 20). Whether or not that is true, moral reeducation through shame and group influence has Chinese roots and shoots (Greer and Lim, 1998: 85; Zhang, 2004: 23), and has been used up through present times. Sociologists and criminologists working in the context of China emphasize the prominence of ‘gan hua’ (感化), meaning “helping people to change through [moral] persuasion” or “setting an example by which to transform people and help them to change” (Dutton and Xu, 1998: 299). Through *gan hua* sessions prisoners admit their moral failures and publicly reckon with their wrongdoings. Theoretically, the process and its resulting emotions and social devaluation generate empathy for victims and a change of heart. Outside the prison environment mainland communist authorities have employed a related forum for the reintegration of offenders to the community through shame and restoration, ‘bang jiao’ (邦交; Lu, 1999). One experiment revealed both practices were quite effective (Zhang et al., 1996). Contrast these with British and early American colonial forms of punishment that emphasized solitary confinement. This was thought to allow one time alone with God for guilt-infused reflection on one’s misdeeds.

East Asian, especially Chinese, societies appear to have been shaped significantly through the cultural manufacture of cooperation and obedience through practices involving shame experience originally.

4.3 *East Asian Parents and Pedagogies Promote Cultural Learning of Confucian Shame*

Early Confucians faced an operational problem in instituting desired social changes: cultural change through texts is difficult with high rates of illiteracy. For children and commoners, non-rational means of behavioral influence are not optional but essential (*Analects* 8.9). When examining the use of shame in the influence of children in contemporary cultures, we find that the role of shame in instruction or conditioning varies significantly. Research shows that shame is used frequently in China for the moral instruction of children (Fung, 1999). According to one cross-cultural study appraising the role of shame to shape behavior, contemporary China uses shame more often than the other societies – East Asian or Western – studied (Mauro, 1992: 313).

In an exploratory factor-analysis of beliefs about and practices of child-rearing in China, Leiber and colleagues found significant correlation between the shame subscale and the training subscale. “That Shame is significantly related only to Training suggests a dynamic unique within Chinese parenting beliefs and consistent with the socialization of traditional filial values. ‘Training’ embodies Chinese parents’ sense of responsibility to foster the development of pro-social behavioural characteristics and this effort is accompanied by ‘shame’ practices

intended to heighten children's sensitivity to the emotional and behavioural cues in Chinese social contexts" (Leiber, 2006: 145). When to feel shame, how to feel shame and when to apply shame to others is subject to unique amounts of social training, despite the presence of evolved capacities for shame experience. Historical China's longstanding hierarchical social structure, its collectivism and its emphasis on social roles have contributed to the formation of a social environment in which one can feel more varieties of shame as a result of a greater number of causes than anywhere in the world. Such finely grained uses of the sense of shame must be produced through cultural learning.

Development of senses of shame within a culture begins by encoding behaviorally and emotionally conditioned responses in children. The encoding methods used in the Confucian diaspora have generated a distinctive shame profile for its children. When Western children report that the appropriate situational response is anger, for example, after being socially excluded, Chinese children report that the appropriate emotional response is shame. These two sets of responses are funneled through social conventions that govern the display of positive and negative emotions in children (Cole et al., 2002). Fung says that shame in Chinese children "originates in the child's fear of social expulsion and abandonment" and, "if there is no audience, either real or imaginary, one does not feel shame" (Fung, 1999: 182). The explicitly social conditioning of shame in Confucian populations is reflected in cultural tropes including Confucian culture's "emphasis on face, criticism, and evaluation in interpersonal relationships, and in its rich variety of lexical terms and labels for shame, humiliation, and embarrassment, face, and related notions" (Feng, 1999: 183).

Developing a sense of shame allows Chinese children to be sensitive to the perceptions of others and thereby avoid future behaviors that would bring shame or embarrassment to the family. Children learn that shame functions like a perceptual faculty that takes as its object social status vis-a-vis the group, which allows a culture's expression of shame experience to manage social roles (Jin, 2004: 769). Nelson infers that "Confucian philosophy is thought to help children regulate and enact their behavior in culturally appropriate, modest, tactful, restrained, respectful, and sensitive ways" (Nelson, 2006: 262). In studies of sets of Chinese and American mothers, observers recorded mothers talking about their child's misbehavior in the child's presence. Chinese and Chinese American mothers more often emphasized the shame inherent in misbehavior (Miller et al., 1990, 1996). Chinese parents readily endorse shaming as a strategy to educate and socialize their children about the proper ways to behave (Fung et al., 2003).

Confucian diaspora children receive cultural training in the use of the cognitive, behavioral and affective system of shame from parents more than those

elsewhere in the world. This is expected given the content and transmission of Early Confucianism.

4.4 *Residents in Confucian Diaspora Countries Have Merged Sense of Self*

The Confucian ideal implies individuals concern themselves with their place in the social order. Many philosophers put the point in stronger terms. Ames interprets the Confucian self with a “focus-field”, relational model that proposes selves are intrinsically related to one another such that “[w]hen all these specific roles we live – not ‘play’ – have been inventoried, and their interconnections made clear, then each of us has been uniquely specified as a person with precious little left over to piece together a bare, autonomous, individual self” (Rosemont and Ames, 2009: 32, 38).

Social psychologists confirm that these a priori philosophical extrapolations from Confucian texts hold uniquely true for people in the Confucian diaspora, where self is relational, able to accommodate to different situations, and able to know distinct obligations of various roles within the family and outside the family (Heine, 2001: 886). Bedford and Hwang (2003) write that the “Family is conceptualized as the “great self” (*da wo*, 大我). . . . Chinese identity is defined in terms of the system of relationships in which a person is involved”. They add that “Close personal relations are treated as parts of the self and selfness is confirmed through interpersonal relationships” (Bedford and Hwang, 2003: 130). This corresponds with data from cross-cultural experiments about family relations. Caucasian Americans react negatively when choices are made for them, whether one’s mother or a stranger make a choice, but among Asian-Americans, negative reactions ensued only when a stranger makes the choice (Iyengar et al., 1999). This data underscores the presence of filial piety obligations through family roles observed elsewhere in the Confucian diaspora (Nichols, 2013).

Findings about the nature of the East Asian self in relationships outside the family support hypotheses affirming collectivism and interdependence. Japanese were much more likely to experience interpersonally engaged emotions like respect or shame relative to experiences of interpersonally disengaged emotions like pride or anger than were Americans (Heine, 2001, p. 889). Heine and colleagues note East Asians place significantly more importance on in-group memberships, which are extensions of the self. North Americans evidence greater differentiation with both in-group and out-group than do East Asians (Heine, 2001: 895). Triandis et al. (1990) asked Chinese and Americans to complete 20 statements that began with “I am” and found Chinese participants were about three times more likely than Americans to give a collec-

tive response in which they construed their identity in terms of a group. Cohen and Gunz (2002) showed East Asians use third-person perspectives when recalling memories of themselves when they were at the center of attention much more often than Americans. In a paper entitled “Mirrors in the Head”, Heine and colleagues suggest that “A subjective perspective on the self would seem to be less desirable and of less utility when meeting the consensual standards of others is an important cultural goal . . . In effect, Japanese appear to have mirrors in their heads” (Heine et al., 2008: 885). This follows reporting of data showing that Americans were greatly affected by the presence of a mirror and increased their rates of self-criticism and decreased their rates of cheating when in that condition, whereas Japanese showed no significant increase on either scale in the presence of a mirror. East Asians habitually attend to others’ perspectives more than Westerners do (Cohen and Hoshino-Browne, 2005).

In turn these results coupled with information about the evolved function of shame provide compelling reason to hypothesize that cross-cultural variance in shame will show members of the Confucian diaspora much more sensitized to and motivated by shame. In East Asia, behavior is primarily evaluated according to how well it serves to enhance the interpersonal standards of society. “Group oriented behavior such as harmonious interaction of group members is highly valued instead of individuality or individual freedoms as in Western cultures” (Bedford and Hwang, 2003: 130–131). Rightness and wrongness are “socially defined” such that proper behavior varies with each circumstance depending upon the relationships of those involved (Bedford and Hwang, 2003: 133). Binding this together is shame, which is “linked to judgments about the self, and related to [a] sense of self and personal identity” (Bedford and Hwang, 2003: 128).

5 Conclusion

Confucianism was created by design as a complete cultural system containing behavioral scripts and rituals to guide interpersonal interaction, and emotional schemas that encode responses to social stimuli. At the cognitive level, Confucianism produced a set of texts not only faithfully read for thousands of years but memorized by hundreds of thousands of aspiring men whose reputations – and reproductive success – were de facto dependent on their success in that task via workings of the pre-Imperial and Imperial examination systems. Confucianism began its journey through time by moving an Early Chinese society prone to disarray and violence toward peace and stability. Many widely transmitted Confucian techniques for influence were deployed to

enhance our evolutionarily endowed shame system in positive (and negative) ways to contribute to a harmonious society. We know not only what techniques these were – rituals, proper use of titles, social forms of punishment, etc. – but we have evidence from cross-cultural psychology of their special influence in the Confucian diaspora. Reverse engineering a cultural subcomponent such as Confucian shame has much to teach those of us working in the multidisciplinary world of cultural transmission who remain discontent with a priori mathematical models and laboratory experiments.

Acknowledgements

Research for this project was provided through a postdoctoral fellowship with the SSHRC-funded Cultural Evolution of Religion Research Consortium (CERC) based at the Centre of Human Evolution, Cognition, and Culture, University of British Columbia, and by the Templeton World Charities Foundation, through a sub-award from The Chinese Challenge grant. These sources of funding are gratefully acknowledged as the sine qua non of the research for this paper and the larger project of which it is a part. Special thanks to Justin Lynn, Ted Slingerland, Amy Coplan, Joe Henrich, Tyler Noble, Casey Hall and Bryon Cunningham.

References

- Andreski, S. (1971). *Military organization and society*. University of California Press, Berkeley, CA.
- Andrews, B. (1998). *Shame: interpersonal behavior, psychopathology, and culture*. Oxford University Press, New York, NY.
- Barrett, K.C. (1995). A functionalist approach to shame and guilt. In Tracy, J.L., Robins, R.W. and Tangney, J.P. (Eds), *The self-conscious emotions: theory and research*, pp. 25-63. Guilford Press, New York, NY.
- Bedford, O.A. (2004). The individual experience of guilt and shame in Chinese culture. *Culture and Psychology* 10, 29-52.
- Bedford, O. and Hwang, K.-K. (2003). Guilt and shame in Chinese culture: a cross-cultural framework from the perspective of morality and identity. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour* 33, 127-144.
- Bellah, R.N. (2011). *Religion in human evolution: from the Paleolithic to the Axial Age*. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.

- Betzig, L.L. (1982). Despotism and differential reproduction: A cross-cultural correlation of conflict asymmetry, hierarchy, and degree of polygyny. *Ethology and Sociobiology* 3, 209-221.
- . (1995). Medieval monogamy. *Journal of Family History* 20, 181-216.
- Blumenthal, E. (1977). *Models in Chinese moral education: Perspective from children's books*. Dissertation Abstracts International. Retrieved from University Microfilms No. 77-7876.
- Bond, M.H. (1986). *The Psychology of the Chinese people*. Oxford University Press, Hong Kong.
- Boyd, R. (1988). *Culture and the evolutionary process*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.
- Braithwaite, J. (1989). *Crime, shame, and reintegration*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- . (2002). *Restorative justice and responsive regulation*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Braithwaite, J. and Mugford, S. (1994). Conditions of successful reintegration ceremonies: Dealing with juvenile offenders. *British Journal of Criminology* 34, 139-171.
- Chan, W. (1969). *A source book in Chinese philosophy*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
- Chen, X. (2002). Social control in China: applications of the labeling theory and the reintegrative shaming theory. *International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology* 46, 45-63.
- Cohen, D. and Gunz, A. (2002). As seen by the other . . . : perspectives on the self in the memories and emotional perceptions of Easterners and Westerners. *Psychological Science* 13, 55-59.
- Cohen, D. and Hoshino-Browne, E. (2005). Insider and outsider perspectives on the self and social world. In Sorrentino, R.M., Cohen, D., Olson, J.M. and Zanna, M.P. (Eds), *Culture and social behavior: The tenth Ontario symposium*, pp. 49-76. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ.
- Cole, P.M., Bruschi, C.J. and Tamang, B.L. (2002). Cultural differences in children's emotional reactions to difficult situations. *Child development*, 73(3), 983-996.
- Confucius. (2003). Slingerland, E., trans. *Confucius' Analects: with selections from traditional commentaries*. Hackett, Indianapolis, IN.
- Cook, S. (2004). The debate over coercive rulership and the "human way" in light of recently excavated warring states texts. *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 64, 399-440.
- Csikszentmihalyi, M. (2004). *Material virtue: ethics and the body in early China*. Brill, Leiden.
- Darwin, C. (2004). *The Descent of Man*. Penguin Classics, London.
- de Waal, F.B. (1986). The integration of dominance and social bonding in primates. *The Quarterly Review of Biology* 61, 459-479.

- . (1988). The reconciled hierarchy. In *Social fabrics of the mind*, pp. 105-136. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ.
- Dunton, M. and Xu, Z. (1998). Facing difference: relations, change and the prison sector in contemporary China. In Weiss, R.P. and South, N. (Eds), *Comparing prison systems: Toward a comparative and international penology*, pp. 289-336. Gordon and Breach, Amsterdam.
- Eisenberger, N., Lieberman, M. and Williams, K. (2003). Does rejection hurt? An fMRI study of social exclusion. *Science* 302, 290-292.
- Elison, J. (2005). Shame and guilt: a hundred years of apples and oranges. *New Ideas in Psychology* 23, 5-32.
- Fessler, D. (1999). Toward an understanding of the universality of second order emotions. In Hinton, A. (Ed.), *Beyond Nature or Nurture: Biocultural Approaches to the Emotions*, pp. 75-116. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY.
- . (2004). Shame in two cultures: implications for evolutionary approaches. *Journal of Cognition and Culture* 4, 207-262.
- . (2007). From Appeasement to Conformity: Evolutionary and Cultural Perspectives on Shame, Competition, and Cooperation. In Tracy, J.L., Robins, R.W. and Tangney, J.P. (Eds), *The self-conscious emotions: theory and research*, pp. 174-193. Guilford Press, New York, NY.
- Fingarette, H. (1998). *Confucius: the secular as sacred*. Waveland Press, Long Grove, IL.
- Fournier, M.A., Moskowitz, D.S. and Zuroff, D.C. (2002). Social rank strategies in hierarchical relationships. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 83, 425-433.
- Frijda, N.H. (1993). The place of appraisal in emotion. *Cognition and Emotion* 7, 357-387.
- Fung, H, Lieber, E. and Leung, P.W.L. (2003). Parental beliefs on shame and moral socialization in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States. In Yang, K.-S., Hwang, K.-K., Pedersen, P. and Daibo, I. (Eds), *Progress in Asian social psychology: Conceptual and empirical contributions*, pp. 83-109. Praeger, Westport, CT.
- Fung, H. (1999). Becoming a moral child: the socialization of shame among young Chinese children. *Ethos* 27, 180-209.
- Garrott, J.R. (1995). Chinese cultural values: new angles, added insights. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 19, 211-225.
- Gilbert, P. (1997). The evolution of social attractiveness and its role in shame, humiliation, guilt and therapy. *British Journal of Medical Psychology* 70, 113-147.
- . (1998). What is shame? Some core issues and controversies. In Gilbert, P. and Andrews, B. (Eds), *Shame: Interpersonal behaviour, psychopathology, and culture*, pp. 3-38. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- . (2003). Evolution, social roles, and the differences in shame and guilt. *Social Research* 70, 1205-1230.

- Gilbert, P. and McGuire, M. (1998). Shame, social roles and status: the psychobiological continuum from monkey to human. In Gilbert, P. and Andrews, B. (Eds), *Shame: Interpersonal behaviour, psychopathology, and culture*, pp. 99-125. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Goetz, J.L. and Keltner, D. (2007). Shifting meanings of self-conscious emotions across cultures: A social functional approach. In Tracy, J.L., Robins, R.W. and Tangney, J.P. (Eds), *The Self-conscious emotions: Theory and research*, pp. 153-173. Guilford Press, New York, NY.
- Granet, M. (1999). *La pensée chinoise*. A. Michel, Paris.
- Greenwald, D.F. and Harder, D.W. (1997). Fantasies, coping behavior, and psychopathology. *Journal of Clinical Psychology* 53, 91-97.
- Greer, S. and Lim, T.P. (1998). Confucianism: natural law Chinese style? *Ratio Juris* 11, 80-89.
- Griffiths, P. (1997). *What emotions really are: the problem of psychological categories*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.
- Hall, D.L. (1987). *Thinking through Confucius*. State University of New York Press. Albany, NY.
- Hansen, C. (2000). *A Daoist theory of Chinese thought a philosophical interpretation*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Heine, S.J. (2001). Self as cultural product: an examination of East Asian and North American selves. *Journal of Personality* 69, 881-906.
- Heine, S.J., Takemoto, T., Moskaleiko, S., Lasaleta, J. and Henrich, J. (2008). Mirrors in the head: cultural variation in objective self-awareness. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 34, 879-887.
- Henrich, J. and Boyd, R. (1998). The evolution of conformist transmission and the emergence of between-group differences. *Evolution and Human Behavior* 19, 215-241.
- Henrich, J. and Gil-White, F.J. (2001). The evolution of prestige: freely conferred deference as a mechanism for enhancing the benefits of cultural transmission. *Evolution and Human Behavior* 22, 165-196.
- Henrich, J., Heine, S.J. and Norenzayan, A. (2010). The weirdest people in the world? *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 33, 61-83.
- Higham, C. (1988). Prehistoric metallurgy in Southeast Asia: some new information from the excavation of Ban Na Di. In Maddin, R. (Ed.), *The beginning of the use of metals and alloys*, pp. 130-155. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
- Ho, P.-T. (2008). *Ladder of success in imperial china: aspects of social mobility, 1368-1911*. ACLS History E-Books, New York, NY.
- Hsiao, K. (1979). *A history of Chinese political thought*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
- Johnson, D. and Bering, J. (2006). Hand of God, mind of man: punishment and cognition in the evolution of cooperation. *Evolutionary Psychology* 4, 219-233.

- Johnson, D. and Kruger, O. (2004). The good of wrath: supernatural punishment and the evolution of cooperation. *Political Theology* 5, 159-176.
- Keltner, D. and Buswell, B. (1997). Embarrassment: Its distinct form and appeasement functions. *Psychological Bulletin* 122, 250-270.
- Keltner, D. and Harker, L.A. (1998). The forms and functions of the nonverbal signal of shame. In Gilbert, P. and Andrews, B. (Eds), *Shame: Interpersonal behaviour, psychopathology, and culture*, pp. 78-98. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Keltner, D., Haidt, J. and Shiota, M. (2006). Social functionalism and the evolution of the emotions. In Schaller, M., Simpson, J.A. and Kenrick, D.T. (Eds.), *Evolution and Social Psychology*, pp. 115-142. Psychology Press, London.
- Kitayama, S., Markus, H.R., Matsumoto, H. and Norasakkunkit, V. (1997). Individual and collective processes in the construction of the self: self-enhancement in the United States and self-criticism in Japan. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 72, 1245-1267.
- Kitayama, S., Markus, H.R. and Kurokawa, M. (2000). Culture, emotion, and well-being: good feelings in Japan and the United States. *Cognition and Emotion* 14, 93-124.
- Kitayama, S., Mesquita, B. and Karasawa, M. (2006). Cultural affordances and emotional experience: socially engaging and disengaging emotions in Japan and the United States. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 91, 890-903.
- Legge, J. (2001). *The Chinese classics*. Simon Publications, Harbor, FL.
- Lewis, M.E. (1990). *Sanctioned violence in early China*. State University of New York Press, Albany, NY.
- . (2010). *The early Chinese empires: Qin and Han.*: Belknap Press, Cambridge, MA.
- Li, J., Wang, L. and Fischer, K. (2004). The organisation of Chinese shame concepts. *Cognition and Emotion* 18, 767-797.
- Lieber, E., Fung, H. and Leung, P.W.-L. (2006). Chinese child-rearing beliefs: key dimensions and contributions to the development of culture-appropriate assessment. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology* 9, 140-147.
- Lu, H. (1999). Bang Jiao and reintegrative shaming in China's urban neighborhoods. *International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice* 23, 115-123.
- Markus, H. and Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation. *Psychological Review* 98, 224-253.
- Mauro, R., Sato, K. and Tucker, J. (1992). The role of appraisal in human emotions: A cross-cultural study. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 62, 301-317.
- Mencius. (2008). Van Norden, B., Trans. *Mengzi: with selections from traditional commentaries*. Hackett, Indianapolis, IN.
- Menon, U. and Shweder, R.A. (1994). Kali's tongue: cultural psychology, cultural consensus and the meaning of "shame" in Orissa, India. In Kitayama, S. and Markus,

- H.R. (Eds), *Emotion and culture: Empirical studies of mutual influence*, pp. 241-284. American Psychological Association, Washington, DC.
- Miller, P.J., Potts, R., Fung, H., Hoogstra, L. and Mintz, J. (1990). Narrative practices and the social construction of self in childhood. *American Ethnologist* 17, 292-311. Miller, P.J., Fung, H. and Mintz, J. (1996). Self-construction through narrative practices: a Chinese and American comparison of early socialization. *Ethos* 24, 237-280.
- Muller, A.C. (2011). The doctrine of the mean (Zhongyong) 中庸. Available online at <http://www.acmuller.net/con-dao/docofmean.html>.
- Nelson, L.J. (2006). Relations between Chinese mothers' parenting practices and social withdrawal in early childhood. *International Journal of Behavioral Development* 30, 261-271.
- Nichols, R. (2013). The origins and effects of filial piety (Xiao 孝): How culture solves an evolutionary problem for parents. *Journal of Cognition and Culture* 13, 201-230.
- Parker, S.T. (1998). A social selection model for the evolution and adaptive significance of self-conscious emotions. In Ferrari, M.D. and Sternberg, R.J. (Eds) *Self-awareness: Its nature and development*, pp. 108-134. Guilford Press, New York, NY.
- Pines, Y. (2002). *Foundations of Confucian thought: intellectual life in the Chunqiu period (722-453 BCE)*. University of Hawai'i Press, Honolulu, HI.
- Ren, X. (1997). *Tradition of the law and law of the tradition: law, state, and social control in China*. Greenwood Press, Westport, CT.
- Rosemont, H. (2009). *The Chinese classic of family reverence: a philosophical translation of the Xiaojing*. University of Hawai'i Press, Honolulu, HI.
- Sanderson, S.K. (1999). *Social transformations: a general theory of historical development* (expanded edn.). Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, MD.
- Schurmann, F. (1968). *Ideology and organization in communist China*. University of California Press, Berkeley, CA.
- Schwartz, S.H. (1990). Individualism-collectivism: critique and proposed refinements. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 21, 139-157.
- Shaver, P., Wu, S. and Schwartz, J. (1992). Cross-cultural similarities and differences in emotion and its representation: A prototype approach. *Review of Personality and Social Psychology* 13, 175-212.
- Shaver, P.R., Murdaya, U. and Fraley, R.C. (2001). Structure of the Indonesian Emotion Lexicon. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology* 4, 201-224.
- Stipek, D. (1998). Differences between Americans and Chinese in the circumstances evoking pride, shame, and guilt. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 29, 616-629.
- Summers, K. (2005). The evolutionary ecology of despotism. *Evolution and Human Behavior* 26, 106-135.

- Sznycer, D., Takemura, K., Delton, A.W., Sato, K., Robertson, T., Cosmides, L. and Tooby, J. (2012). Cross-cultural differences and similarities in proneness to shame: an adaptationist and ecological approach. *Evolutionary Psychology* 10, 352-370.
- Taylor, S.J. and Shell, C.A. (1988). Social and historical implications of early Chinese iron technology. In Maddin, R. (Ed.), *The beginning of the use of metals and alloys*, pp. 205-221. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
- Tracy, J., Robins, R. and Tangney, J.P. (2007). *The self-conscious emotions: theory and research*. (2007). Guilford Press, New York, NY.
- Tooby, J. and Cosmides, L. (2010). The evolutionary psychology of the emotions and their relationship to internal regulatory variables. In Lewis, M., Haviland-Jones, J.M. and Feldman Barrett, L. (Eds), *Handbook of the Emotions*, 3rd edn., pp. 114-137. Guilford Press, New York, NY.
- Triandis, H., Bontempo, R., Villareal, M., Asai, M. and Lucca, N. (1988). Individualism and collectivism: cross-cultural perspectives on self-ingroup relationships. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 54, 323-338.
- Triandis, H., McCusker, C. and Hui, H. (1900). Multimethod probes of individualism and collectivism. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 59, 1006-1020.
- van der Sprenkel, S. (2004). *Legal institutions in Manchu China: a sociological analysis*. Berg Publishers, Oxford.
- Watson, W. (1967). A cycle of Cathay China: the civilization of a single people. In Piggott, S. (Ed.), *The Dawn of Civilization*, pp. 253-276. McGraw-Hill, New York, NY.
- Zhang, L., Zhou, D., Messner, S.F., Liska, A.E., Krohn, M.D., Liu, J. and Lu, Z. (1996). Crime prevention in a communitarian society: *Bang-jiao* and *tiao-jie* in the People's Republic of China. *Justice Quarterly* 13, 199-222.
- Zhang, X. (2004). *A Restorative Justice Audit of the Chinese Criminal Justice System*. Ph.D. Thesis, London School of Economics, London.
- Zhong, J., Wang, A., Qian, M., Zhang, L., Gao, J., Yang, J. and Chen, P. (2008). Shame, personality, and social anxiety symptoms in Chinese and American nonclinical samples: a cross-cultural study. *Depression and Anxiety* 25, 449-460.