CLASSIFICATION OF DISJUNCTIVISM ABOUT THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF VISUAL EXPERIENCE

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ABSTRACT: This paper proposes a classificatory framework for disjunctivism about the phenomenology of visual perceptual experience. Disjunctivism of this sort is typically divided into positive and negative disjunctivism. This distinction successfully reflects the disagreement amongst disjunctivists regarding the explanatory status of the introspective indiscriminability of veridical perception and hallucination. However, it is unsatisfactory in two respects. First, it cannot accommodate eliminativism about the phenomenology of hallucination. Second, the class of positive disjunctivism is too coarse-grained to provide an informative overview of the current dialectical landscape. Given this, I propose a classificatory framework which preserves the positive-negative distinction, but which also includes the distinction between eliminativism and non-eliminativism, as well as a distinction between two subclasses of positive disjunctivism. In describing each class in detail, I specify who takes up each position in the existing literature, and demonstrate that this classificatory framework can disambiguate some existing disjunctivist views.

KEYWORDS: disjunctivism, perceptual experience, naive realism, hallucination

I. INTRODUCTION: NAÏVE REALISM AND DISJUNCTIVISM

IN recent years, there has been a renewal of interest in naïve realism with regard to visual perceptual experience. What I refer to as 'naïve realism' is a view about the phenomenal aspect of veridical visual perceptual experience, according to which the phenomenology of veridical visual perceptual experience is (at least partially) constituted by environmental objects to which the subject stands in a perceptual relation.[1] Since this paper concerns disjunctivism in relation to naïve realism, I focus exclusively on *visual perceptions* and *visual hallucinations.*[2]

In order to see the motivations for naïve realism, it will be helpful to clarify what conception of visual perceptual phenomenology naïve realists typically endorse. Naïve realists usually accept the *presentation-based* characterization of visual perceptual phenomenology, according to which visual perceptual phenomenology is characterized in terms of the *visual presentational relation* (Martin 2002: 402; Fish 2009; Conduct

2012a; Kennedy 2013).[3] The visual presentational relation has both phenomeno-
logical and semantic-epistemic import. On the one hand, the visual presentational
relation *explains* what Millar (2014a) calls "phenomenological directness," i.e.,
the phenomenological feature of perceptual experience that "something distinct
from your consciousness is immediately present to your consciousness" (Millar
2014a: 241). The visual presentation relation is posited as the relationship a subject
bears to an entity distinct from their consciousness, by virtue of which that entity
becomes immediately present to their consciousness when they undergo a visual
perceptual experience. On the other hand, the visual presentational relation also
has semantic and epistemic import; that is to say, a subject becomes able to demon-
stratively think and know about an entity by standing in the visual presentational
relation to the entity.

Given this presentation-based characterization of visual perceptual phenom-
enology, the thesis of naïve realism involves the following two claims: (1) in
having a veridical perceptual experience, the subject is visually presented with
environmental objects;[4] (2) the visual presentational relation is grounded in the
subject's standing in a perceptual relation to the environmental objects.[5] In light of
this, we can see the motivations for naïve realism. First, naïve realism can capture
the *phenomenological intuition* that in having a veridical visual experience, what
is present to the subject's consciousness are environmental objects to which the
subject is perceptually related (Kennedy 2009, 2013). Furthermore, naïve realism
can explain how a veridical perceptual experience enables its subject to demon-
stratively think and know about environmental objects (Campbell 2002; Raleigh
2011; Johnston 2006, 2011; Logue 2012b).

Although the thesis of naïve realism does not, itself, say anything about hallu-
cinations, its account of the phenomenology of veridical perceptual experience has
implications for the naïve realist's stance on hallucinations. The phenomenology of
a hallucination, as of an apple, cannot be constituted by an actual apple to which the
subject is perceptually related, because the hallucination is, by definition, a mental
state in which the subject is *not* perceptually related to an actual apple. Naïve realists
are thus committed to *disjunctivism about the phenomenology of visual perceptual
experience* (hereafter DP), according to which while the phenomenology of *veridi-
cal* visual experience is explained in terms of the subject's standing in a perceptual
relation to environmental objects, the (apparent)[6] phenomenology of *hallucinatory*
experience is not explained in that manner.[7]

Note that the disjunct in the hallucinatory case is characterized negatively; that
is to say, DP claims that the (apparent) phenomenology of hallucinatory experi-
ence is *not* explained in terms of the subject's standing in a perceptual relation to
environmental objects. This negative claim does not itself entail any *substantial*
account of hallucinatory experiences. The word 'substantial,' as it is being used
here, means that the account must specify what the (apparent) phenomenology of
hallucinatory experiences *is* (or *consists in*), rather than what it *is not* (or *does not
consist in*).[8] As I will discuss later, the tenability of naïve realism is *not* indepen-
dent of the account the naïve realist provides of the (apparent) phenomenology of
hallucinatory experience. In defending naïve realism, a proponent of DP must thus

decide which substantial account of the (apparent) phenomenology of hallucinatory experience to adopt.[9]

Among the various sorts of hallucinations, proponents of DP typically focus on *total* and *perfect* hallucinations. There are two reasons for this. First, a total and perfect hallucination seems the most difficult for DP to explain. Second, it presents a challenge to the viability of DP; a challenge DP must overcome if it is to constitute a plausible position. I will briefly explain these points in the following three paragraphs.

A *total* hallucination is such that the subject is not seeing any environmental object, yet still has a visual experience. An example of non-total hallucination is a case in which a subject is visually experiencing a small hallucinatory pink elephant on an actual table that is veridically perceived. In this case, we can think that the resultant visual experience partially consists in the perceptual relation to the table. Accordingly, proponents of DP can explain the phenomenology of this experience in terms of the perceptual relation to the table *plus* cognitive penetration by something psychological, for instance, the subject's imaginative state concerning a pink elephant. This sort of integrative explanation does not hold for total hallucinations, because in these cases the subject is not seeing any actual environmental object whatsoever. For this reason, it is more difficult for proponents of DP to explain total hallucinations than partial hallucinations.

A *perfect* hallucination is such that there could be a veridically perceiving subject whose internal states were identical to those of the hallucinating subject. We can safely assume that if a hallucination is perfect, then the hallucination is introspectively indiscriminable from a corresponding veridical perception. It is natural to ask why a hallucinatory experience which does not consist in the perceptual relation, can be introspectively indiscriminable from a veridical perception which does consist in the perceptual relation. Therefore, with regard to the case of *total and perfect* hallucinations, opponents of DP would require its proponents to explain the introspective indiscriminability in question. This looks like a difficult explanatory task to achieve.[10]

Most importantly, it seems plausible to think that the phenomenology of *total* hallucination supervenes solely on the subject's internal states/activities, because it seems that no environmental object constitutively contributes to the phenomenology of hallucinatory experience. If this local supervenience thesis holds for a *perfect* hallucination, then it seems to follow that a corresponding *perceiving* subject also undergoes an experience with the same phenomenology. As I will discuss in detail in Section III, this consequence will be a problem facing DP.

Hereafter, by "hallucination" and "hallucinatory experience" I mean a total and perfect hallucination and its accompanying hallucinatory experience, respectively. As we will see in the following sections, there are many distinct views of the (apparent) phenomenology of hallucinatory experience that naïve realists have explicitly adopted or have been implicitly committed to. In order to see the advantages and disadvantages of each view efficiently, it would be helpful to have a framework in which such different views of the (apparent) phenomenology of hallucinations can be classified systematically. Since DP can be classified based on what view to

take of the (apparent) phenomenology of hallucinations, the framework provides a way of classifying DP.

This paper has two aims. The first is to show that the existing classification of DP is unsatisfactory. The other is to propose a more useful classificatory framework for DP. Section II argues that the existing classification of DP cannot accommodate all of the views of DP and that it cannot capture a fundamental disagreement amongst them. In Section III, I offer a classificatory framework that can accommodate distinct accounts of the (apparent) phenomenology of hallucinations comprehensively. In section IV, I will demonstrate that this classificatory framework is useful for identifying unrecognized ambiguities of some views of DP.

II. POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE DISJUNCTIVISM

Is there an existing classificatory framework for DP? The only existing classification is based on the distinction between positive and negative disjunctivism.[11] According to Fish, positive disjunctivism insists that "there is a positive story to tell about the phenomenal character of the hallucinatory state" (2010: 98), whereas negative disjunctivism states that "the phenomenal character of hallucination [. . .] is its property of being indiscriminable from a veridical perception of a certain kind" (2010: 100). While positive disjunctivism characterizes the phenomenology of hallucinations independently of veridical perceptions, negative disjunctivism characterizes the phenomenology of hallucinations with reference to veridical perceptions.

This distinction between positive and negative disjunctivism does indeed capture a significant difference amongst disjunctivists; a difference in the *explanatory order* they advocate. Let us consider a hallucinatory experience that is introspectively indiscriminable from a veridical perceptual experience. It is natural to think that the introspective indiscriminability is explained in terms of the phenomenology of the hallucinatory experience. Positive disjunctivists can accept this natural explanatory order, characterizing the phenomenology of hallucinations in such a way that the introspective indiscriminability in question can be explained in terms of the phenomenology. In contrast, negative disjunctivism reverses this explanatory order, stating that the phenomenology of hallucination should be explained in terms of the introspective indiscriminability from veridical perception. On this view, the introspective indiscriminability in question is explanatorily more basic than the phenomenology of hallucination; it may even be primitive in the sense that there is no psychological explanation as to why a hallucination is introspectively indiscriminable from a veridical perception.

Although the distinction between positive and negative disjunctivism adequately captures disagreements about explanatory order, it falls short of an exhaustive classification of DP. The classificatory framework based only on the positive-negative distinction cannot accommodate *eliminativism* about the phenomenology of hallucinations (hereafter eliminativism), according to which hallucinations do not have any distinctive phenomenology. Since both positive and negative disjunctivism presuppose that hallucinations have distinctive phenomenology, eliminativism cannot belong to either kind of disjunctivism. Nevertheless, a naive realist adopting eliminativism should be counted as an advocate of DP. To reiterate, the key claim

of eliminativism is that hallucinations do not have any distinctive phenomenology. If they do not have any distinctive phenomenology, then they do not have the phenomenology they appear to have, and thus that apparent phenomenology will not be explained in terms of a perceptual relation to environmental objects (since the hallucinating subject is not perceptually related to any environmental object). Furthermore, eliminativism has distinctive theoretical advantages and disadvantages (see III.B). Thus, the classificatory framework for DP should be able to accommodate eliminativism as an independent category.

The second problem with a classification of DP based only on the positive-negative distinction is that the class of positive disjunctivism is too coarse-grained, and hence fails to capture a more fine-grained but fundamental disagreement. Some positive disjunctivists claim that veridical perceptions and hallucinations belong to the same *phenomenological kind*. In other words, veridical perceptions and hallucinations have visual *perceptual* phenomenology in common. In contrast, other positive disjunctivists claim that veridical perceptions are different in phenomenological kind from hallucinations, holding that hallucinations have some distinctive phenomenology, such as visual *imaginative* phenomenology. Since this difference is significant for theories of the phenomenology of hallucinations, the classificatory framework for DP should be fine-grained enough to distinguish between these two camps.

The moral to be drawn from the above consideration is that a classificatory framework for DP should be able to capture the distinction between three different ways of accounting for the (apparent) phenomenology of hallucination; it should be able to: (1) identify it with visual perceptual phenomenology; (2) identify it with some other distinctive phenomenology, such as visual imaginative phenomenology; or (3) claim that there is actually no distinctive phenomenology of hallucination, despite its appearance. In Section III, I will propose a classificatory framework for DP that reflects this threefold distinction.

III. CLASSIFICATION OF DISJUNCTIVISM ABOUT PHENOMENOLOGY

In addition to the distinction between positive and negative disjunctivism, the classificatory framework for DP should distinguish between the following three ways of accounting for the (apparent) phenomenology of hallucination. The first is to identify it with visual perceptual phenomenology; the second is to identify it with some distinctive phenomenology other than visual perceptual phenomenology; and the third is to say that there is actually no distinctive phenomenology of hallucination, despite its appearance. I call them, respectively, 'presentation disjunctivism,' 'phenomenological kind disjunctivism' and eliminativism.' Presentation disjunctivism and phenomenological kind disjunctivism can be regarded as the subclasses of positive disjunctivism. We can distinguish between positive and negative sorts of *eliminativism*. Figure 1 demonstrates the classification that I propose.

In what follows, I will describe each kind of disjunctivism in detail and highlight the respective challenges directed at them. In doing so, I will also specify who takes up each position in the existing literature.

Figure 1. Classification of Disjunctivism

Before moving on, I make some remarks on the scope of this paper. I do not discuss negative disjunctivism, since it has already been much discussed.[12] In discussing eliminativism, likewise, I will put more focus on positive eliminativism than negative eliminativism, since negative eliminativism has already been discussed. I first discuss presentation disjunctivism, then eliminativism, and finally phenomenological kind disjunctivism.

III.A. PRESENTATION DISJUNCTIVISM

Presentation disjunctivism is a sub-category of positive disjunctivism that argues that veridical visual perceptions and hallucinations have the *same kind* of visual perceptual phenomenology, namely *presentational* phenomenology.

Since presentation disjunctivists accept that hallucinations also have visual perceptual phenomenology, they must characterize the phenomenology of hallucination in terms of the visual presentational relation as well. However, in the case of hallucination, the visual presentational relation cannot be grounded in the perceptual relation. Presentation disjunctivists thus maintain that the visual presentational relation should be analyzed disjunctively: the visual presentational relation is grounded in *either* the perceptual relation to an environmental object (in the case of veridical perception) *or* something different (in the case of hallucination). One motivation for presentation disjunctivism is that it can preserve the intuition that the phenomenology of hallucination, like veridical perception, has phenomenological directness and semantic-epistemic import.

In order to give an adequate account of the phenomenology of hallucination, presentation disjunctivists need to answer the following two questions: (1) what sort of entity is a subject presented with in having a hallucinatory experience? (2)

What grounds the visual presentational relation between the subject and the entity, in the case of hallucination, where the perceptual relation is unavailable?

There seem to be various options. Presentation disjunctivists may state that the visual presentational relation consists of the hallucinating subject's *sensing* relation to sense-data, that is, mental entities presented in its visual field. Alternatively, presentation disjunctivists may claim that the visual presentational relation consists of the hallucinating subject (or the hallucinatory experience) *representing an environmental object as being before the subject*, such that what is presented in the hallucinating subject's visual field is the environmental object that is represented as being before the subject.[13]

THE SCREENING OFF ARGUMENT

There is, however, a famous challenge to presentation disjunctivism, i.e., what is sometimes called the 'screening off' argument (Martin 2004: 46, 58–63). The screening off argument can be articulated as follows. Let us assume that a hallucinating subject is visually presented with an entity *E* by virtue of having a certain property *P*. This means that the presentational phenomenology of the hallucinatory experience is explained in terms of the subject's having P. Since the external cause of hallucination does not constitutively contribute to its phenomenology (a hallucination can in principle occur even without any external cause, i.e., purely by the brain's spontaneous activities), *P* supervenes solely on the internal states of the hallucinating subject. Since *P* supervenes solely on the internal states of the hallucinating subject, the corresponding *perceiving* subject also has *P*. Since having *P* is sufficient for the visual presentational relation to hold between the subject and *E*, the presentational phenomenology of the veridical visual experience is also explained in terms of the subject's having *P*. This suggests that the subject's standing in a perceptual relation to environmental objects is 'screened off' from the explanation of the phenomenology of the veridical visual experience. If the perceptual relation is screened off in this way, then naïve realism collapses.

There are at least two strategies for presentation disjunctivists to avoid the screening off argument. The first strategy is to admit the *explanatory overdetermination* of the phenomenology of veridical visual experience (Pautz 2010: 298–299). It may be admissible that the phenomenology of veridical visual experience is *doubly* explained in terms of the subject's having P *and* the subject's standing in a perceptual relation to environmental objects. Now, since this explanatory overdetermination would hold for any kind of veridical visual experience—namely the explanatory overdetermination is global—it would be costly to admit it compared with adopting other simpler theories of visual perceptual phenomenology, which are not committed to such global explanatory overdetermination. Nevertheless, if there is no principled problem with this global explanatory overdetermination, then the screening off argument does not decisively show that presentation disjunctivism is untenable. It can, at best, show that presentation disjunctivism has a theoretical cost.

One important challenge to this strategy is as follows. Suppose that the presentational phenomenology of a veridical visual experience is doubly explained in terms of the subject's having *P* and the subject's standing in a perceptual relation to an environmental object. It follows from this that the perceiving subject is presented

with *both E and* the environmental object. The question to be asked is: *how is this possible?* Assuming that *P* is *sensing* and thus that *E* is *sense-data*, the question is formulated as: how it is possible that the perceiving subject is presented with both sense-data and the environmental object? When I have a veridical visual experience of an apple, I am presented with something like an apple. It makes perfect sense to say that I am presented with an actual apple; it may also make sense to say that I am actually presented with sense-data like an apple. However, does it make sense to say that I am *doubly* presented with an actual apple and sense-data like an apple? Since it is metaphysically impossible that an actual apple is identical to sense-data, it is implausible that the something that I am presented with is *both* an actual apple *and* apple-like-sense-data. Furthermore, it does not seem from the phenomenological perspective that I am simultaneously presented with the two distinct entities, namely an actual apple and apple-like-sense-data. The phenomenological reflection strongly suggests that I am presented with only one item, either an actual apple or apple-like-sense-data. These metaphysical and phenomenological considerations seem to show that it is implausible that I am presented with both an actual apple and apple-like-sense-data.

This argument does not show that every sort of presentation disjunctivism is implausible; what it may directly show is only that *the sense-data sort* of presentation disjunctivism is implausible. However, this argument pushes the burden of proof onto those who admit the explanatory overdetermination of the phenomenology of veridical perceptual experience. They would be required to answer the question of how it is possible that the presentational phenomenology of a single veridical perceptual experience is doubly constituted by *E* and an environmental object.[14]

One way to answer this question is to maintain that *E* can be a *component* of an environmental object. Johnston (2004) and Conduct (2012a) adopt this strategy. They claim that a veridically perceiving subject is presented with an environmental object with visible properties that the subject is seeing, while stating that a hallucinating subject is presented with *uninstantiated visible properties*. A visible property can be a component of an environmental object in the sense that the former can be instantiated in the latter. Hence, the fact that one is presented with a visible property does not rule out the possibility that an environmental object is also presented in the subject's visual field in a way instantiating the visible property in question.

The apparent problem with this view is that it seems unclear how an uninstantiated visible property can be presented in our visual field as having *a specific location*. It is not intuitive to think that something can be presented in our visual field without an apparent location property; everything that is presented in our visual field appears to occupy a specific location. However, uninstantiated universals do not seem to have any specific location property *in themselves*. For instance, an uninstantiated redness itself does not seem to be located anywhere in this physical world. In order to justify the Johnston-Conduct view, therefore, one must specify a metaphysical relation by virtue of which the visual presentational relation holds between a subject and an uninstantiated visible property, where the metaphysical relation can account for why the uninstantiated visible property has an apparent specific location. Neither Johnston (2004) nor Conduct (2012a) gives a satisfying specification of the metaphysical relation required. Johnston (2004: sec. 7) only

states that in the case of hallucination, the visual presentational relation holds by virtue of the subject's visual system firing without appropriate causal connection with an environmental object; Conduct (2012a) seems to follow Johnston in this respect. Neither explains *how* the subject's visual system misfiring enables us to become aware of an uninstantiated universal as having a specific location property.[15]

The second strategy to avoid the screening off problem is to deny the local supervenience thesis that the phenomenology of hallucination supervenes solely on the subject's internal states/activities (Pautz 2010: 298–299). If the local supervenience thesis does not hold, the screening off argument does not get off the ground in the first place. Given the apparent plausibility of the local supervenience thesis, however, those who adopt this strategy must provide a convincing account as to how the supervenience base of the phenomenology of hallucination might extend beyond the subject's internal states.[16]

Adopting this second strategy, Raleigh (2014) develops an externalist view of hallucination, according to which the phenomenology of hallucination is constituted by certain *appearance properties* of the external cause of hallucination. Unlike standard cases of perception, the hallucinating subject does not feel like she is presented with the external cause of the experience. For example, one might feel like seeing a lemon, while the experience is actually caused by a supercomputer. How can the workings of the supercomputer constitute the phenomenology of the hallucinatory experience of seeing a lemon? Raleigh claims:

> there will be some internal feature or aspect of the machine, a 'standing structure', that must have been designed by the hypothetical brain-scientists precisely so as to appear just like a lemon when it is experienced from a very particular 'viewpoint'—i.e. in the very specific manner and circumstances of awareness that obtains when the subject is hooked up to the machine in just the right way. (Raleigh 2014: 100–101)

According to Raleigh, a hallucinating subject stands in this "hooked up" relation to the external cause of hallucination; it is by virtue of this external relation that the hallucinating subject is presented with certain appearance properties. This external relation would not be identified with the perceptual relation, since a hallucinating subject whose brain is hooked up to a supercomputer does not perceive the supercomputer in a standard sense. Based on this externalist view of hallucination, Raleigh can reasonably deny the local supervenience thesis, claiming that the phenomenology of hallucination consists in the external relation to the cause of hallucination. The problem with this externalist view is, as Raleigh noticed, that it cannot handle the case in which a subject has a hallucinatory experience without any external cause, e.g., the brain's abnormal spontaneous activities (Raleigh 2014: sec. 6).

Let us summarize this subsection. There are two strategies for proponents of presentation disjunctivism to avoid the screening off problem. The first is to admit the explanatory overdetermination of the phenomenology of veridical visual experience. A challenge to this strategy is to explain how the presentational phenomenology of veridical visual experience can be doubly constituted by an environmental object and an entity that can also be presented in a hallucinatory

experience. The second strategy is to deny the local supervenience thesis. A challenge to this strategy is to provide a plausible account as to how the phenomenology of hallucination might have an extended supervenience base. Presentation disjunctivists must adopt either of the two options and address the corresponding challenges to establish their position.

III.B. ELIMINATIVISM

The distinction between non-eliminativism and eliminativism consists in whether to accept that hallucinations have distinctive phenomenology. Eliminativists claim that hallucinations lack distinctive phenomenology. Fish (2008, 2009, chap. 4) and Logue (2012a) take this view. One motivation for eliminativism is that it has an ontological advantage over non-eliminativism, in that it does not have to posit any phenomenal entity to explain the phenomenology of hallucinations. Then again, eliminativism is less intuitive than non-eliminativism, since our intuition tells us that hallucination is a phenomenal state.

Proponents of eliminativism are not required to explain what the phenomenology of hallucination consists in, because they deny that any such phenomenology exists. Instead, they need to explain what a hallucination is without (directly) referring to any phenomenal feature. Logue takes hallucination to be a non-phenomenal perceptual-representational state, claiming that "total hallucinations fundamentally consist in the subject perceptually representing her environment as being a certain way, but they lack phenomenal character" (2012a: 183). Her view can be counted as *positive eliminativism*, since she positively characterizes what hallucination is without reference to veridical perceptions. Logue can explain why a hallucination is introspectively indiscriminable from a veridical perception by appealing to the representational content of hallucination.

In contrast, Fish (2009: chap. 4) characterizes hallucination as a non-phenomenal mental state which produces *the same cognitive effects as those of veridical perception*. His view can be counted as *negative eliminativism*, since his account of hallucination refers to veridical perceptions.[17] Furthermore, Fish defines the introspective indiscriminability of hallucination from veridical perception as follows: "a hallucination will be indiscriminable from a veridical perception of a certain kind if and only if it produces the same beliefs and judgments that a veridical perception of that kind would have produced" (2009: 94). Since beliefs and judgments are included in the cognitive effects, Fish's account of hallucination analytically involves the introspective indiscriminability from veridical perception. Thus, the introspective indiscriminability in question is not the explicandum but the explicans; that is to say, it explains what hallucination is.

So far, I have briefly described positive and negative eliminativism. As mentioned at the beginning of Section III, Fish's negative eliminativism is typically discussed in connection with negative disjunctivism, and it has attracted more attention than positive eliminativism.[18] I will thus focus on a challenge to positive eliminativism in the remainder of this section.

THE HIGHER-ORDER SCREENING OFF ARGUMENT

It seems that hallucinations have various cognitive and rational features. When hallucinating an apple, a subject is inclined to judge that there is an apple before her (perceptual judgment), and that she herself has an experience with visual apple-phenomenology (introspective judgment). This seems to show that hallucinations have certain cognitive features that provide the subject with the inclinations to form perceptual and introspective judgments. Assuming that the subject follows the inclinations and forms these judgments, the subject can rationally explain why she forms these judgements *by appealing to the hallucinatory state*. This suggests that hallucinations possess a certain rational feature; a feature which the subject can appeal to in order to rationally explain why she forms those judgments. Positive eliminativism can accept that hallucinations have the cognitive and rational features in question and can give an account of them. For instance, Logue (2012a) explains these cognitive and rational features in terms of the (non-phenomenal) perceptual representational content of hallucination.

However, positive eliminativism faces a problem *by successfully explaining* these cognitive and rational features of hallucination. Suppose that a positive eliminativist successfully explains the cognitive and rational features of a hallucination, as of an apple, in terms of a non-phenomenal feature F, such as non-phenomenal perceptual representational content, which supervenes solely on the subject's internal states/activities.[19] (As we have seen in examining the screening off problem in Section III, this local supervenience thesis is apparently plausible.) Given this supposition, let us consider a *veridical* case in which an internal twin of the hallucinating subject is veridically seeing an apple. The perceiving subject is also inclined to form a perceptual judgment that there is an apple and an introspective judgment that she has an experience with visual apple-phenomenology. Likewise, if the perceiving subject actually forms these judgments, then she can rationally explain why she formed these judgments by appealing to the veridical experience. Since F supervenes solely on a subject's internal states, the perceiving subject also has F. It thus seems that the aforementioned judgment-forming inclinations can also be fully explained in terms of F. It also seems that the rational potential of veridical experience can be fully explained in terms of F. This suggests that the phenomenology of the veridical experience is explanatorily redundant; that is to say, visual perceptual phenomenology *does not play any role* in explaining the judgment-forming inclinations and the rational potential in question.

This is intuitively implausible. More importantly, this consequence may deprive naïve realism of its motivation, since naïve realism is typically promoted by considering the explanatory role of the presentational phenomenology of veridical perceptions (see Section I). This objection to positive eliminativism shares the structure of the screening off argument, but it concerns the role of *visual perceptual phenomenology* in explaining cognitive and rational features of veridical perceptions, rather than the role of the perceptual relation in explaining visual perceptual phenomenology. Considering this, I call this argument the 'higher-order screening off argument.'

There are four strategies to avoid the higher-order screening off problem. The first strategy is to claim that the explanatory power of *F*, which explains the cognitive and rational features of hallucination, is derived from the explanatory power of visual perceptual phenomenology, which explains the cognitive and rational features of veridical perception. If the explanatory power of *F* depends on the explanatory power of visual perceptual phenomenology, *F* does not make visual perceptual phenomenology explanatorily redundant. Logue (2012a: 186–187) takes this strategy with respect to the inclination to form an introspective judgment, claiming that the explanatory power of the non-phenomenal perceptual representational state is in part derived from the explanatory power of visual perceptual phenomenology.[20]

The second strategy is to deny the local supervenience thesis, which states that *F* supervenes solely on the subject's internal states/activities. If a positive eliminativist takes this second strategy, she needs to specify *F* in a way that (1) plausibly denies the local supervenience thesis and (2) implies that F cannot be instantiated by the corresponding perceiving subject.

The third strategy is to admit that the explanation of the cognitive and rational features of veridical perceptions is *overdetermined*; that is, the cognitive and rational features are explained *both* by visual perceptual phenomenology *and* by *F* (Pautz 2010: 298–299). This response seems ad hoc, however. Furthermore, this overdetermination is global in the sense that the cognitive and rational features of veridical perceptions are *always* overdetermined in the above manner. Arguably, overdetermination of this global sort is a theoretical burden.

The fourth strategy—perhaps the last resort—is to bite the bullet; that is, to accept that visual perceptual phenomenology does not play any role in explaining the cognitive and rational features of veridical perceptions. Logue (2012a: 181–182) seems to take this strategy with respect to the inclination to form a perceptual judgment and the rational potential. This response is not incoherent, but it conflicts with our naïve intuition that when we are perceiving an environmental object, we are inclined to form a perceptual judgment about it *because* we are presented with the environmental object. The similar intuition would hold for the rational potential of veridical perceptions. Considering this, this fourth strategy may undercut a theoretical virtue of naïve realism, i.e., the fit with our naïve intuition.

Summarizing this subsection, positive eliminativism faces the higher-order screening off problem. There are four strategies to avoid it. Proponents of positive eliminativism thus need to take one of these strategies and to address potential challenges.

III.C. PHENOMENOLOGICAL KIND DISJUNCTIVISM

So far, I have discussed presentation disjunctivism and eliminativism. This subsection discusses phenomenological kind disjunctivism. Phenomenological kind disjunctivism claims that hallucinations have a certain distinctive phenomenology that is different *in kind* from visual perceptual phenomenology, wherein visual perceptual phenomenology is characterized as being presentational. Phenomenological kind disjunctivism is less intuitive than presentation disjunctivism, but is

more intuitive than eliminativism in that it preserves our intuition that a hallucination is a phenomenal state.

Phenomenological kind disjunctivists need to positively specify the phenomenological kind to which hallucinations belong. There are two distinct ways of doing this. The first is to directly identify the phenomenological kind to which hallucinations belong. The second is to specify the metaphysical property (relation) in which the phenomenology of hallucinations consists and thereby indirectly pick out the phenomenological kind in question. Let us consider these two ways in turn.

Dokic and Martin (2012: 541) endorse a metacognitive view of hallucination, according to which "hallucinations are mere metacognitive projections, or phenomenal ghosts generated by 'confused' monitoring processes" . On this view, hallucinations lack sensory phenomenology but possess a feeling of reality. Given that a feeling of reality is a sort of affective feeling, this view implies that the phenomenological kind to which hallucinations belong is *affective*. Allen (2014) argues for the imagination view of hallucination, according to which hallucinations are involuntary sensory imaginations. This view implies that the phenomenological kind to which hallucinations belong is visual *imaginative* phenomenology as opposed to visual *perceptual* phenomenology. These views directly identify the phenomenological kind to which hallucinations belong.

In contrast, Kennedy (2013) opts for the second way of specifying the phenomenological kind to which hallucinations belong. Kennedy endorses a naïve realist view of veridical perceptions, while adopting a general intentionalist view of hallucination. For Kennedy, "hallucinating subjects are related in a certain way to general propositions, and . . . the structure of hallucinatory experience is exhausted by this relation and its relata" (2013: 248). On this view, the phenomenology of hallucination consists in the representational relation to general propositions. As Kennedy emphasizes, this general intentionalism "holds that hallucinating subjects are not visually aware of anything or visually acquainted with anything. These subjects are merely related in a certain way to general propositions" (Kennedy 2013: 248). This means that the visual presentational relation does not hold in the case of hallucination; hence this view denies that hallucinations have visual perceptual phenomenology.[21] Kennedy is thus committed to the view that the phenomenology of hallucination has a certain distinctive phenomenology other than visual perceptual phenomenology, which consists in the representational relation to general propositions of certain kinds.[22]

THE DOUBLE PHENOMENOLOGY PROBLEM

Phenomenological kind disjunctivism does not face the screening off problem. Even if a hallucination, possessing some distinctive phenomenology other than visual perceptual phenomenology, is grounded in a property *P* which supervenes solely on the subject's internal states/activities, there is no reason to think that the *visual perceptual phenomenology* of veridical perceptions can also be explained in terms of *P*. That said, phenomenological kind disjunctivism seems to run into *the double phenomenology problem*. Logue (2012a) describes this problem in relation to the imagination view of hallucination:

> It [the imagination view of hallucination] entails that veridical experiences have too many phenomenal characters—the phenomenal character associated with sensory imagination in addition to perceptual phenomenal character. The claim is in tension with the deliverances of introspection of veridical experience. (Logue 2012a: 182)

This argument can be articulated as follows. If a hallucination has a certain sort of phenomenology, it supervenes solely on the internal states/activities of the subject. From this, it follows that the corresponding perceiving subject also undergoes an experience with the same sort of phenomenology. However, this seems phenomenologically implausible. Reflecting on my veridical visual experience, it does not seem that the experience has double phenomenology, i.e., visual perceptual phenomenology and some other distinctive phenomenology. The only thing I am undergoing in the veridical case is visual perceptual phenomenology. Hence, any view from which it follows that a veridical visual perceptual experience has certain distinctive phenomenology in addition to visual perceptual phenomenology is implausible.

There are at least three possible ways to avoid the double phenomenology problem. The first is to deny the local supervenience thesis that the phenomenology of hallucination supervenes solely on the subject's internal states/activities. Allen (2014: 300) follows this strategy, arguing that there is an additional condition necessary for the occurrence of hallucinatory experience, that is, "the absence of the appropriate object." Going by this view, a hallucinatory experience as of an apple can occur only in the case where there is no apple to which the subject is perceptually related. The problem with this view is that it is unclear why an imaginative state with visual imaginative apple-phenomenology, which Allen identifies with a hallucinatory experience as of an apple, does not occur in a case where the subject is seeing an actual apple. It seems that we can visually imagine an apple even when we are seeing an actual apple.

The second strategy is to pick out a distinctive phenomenal feature such that (1) it can account for the phenomenology of hallucination and (2) our introspection tells us that veridical visual experiences also have it. Arguably, Dokic and Martin (2012) take this approach, stating that a feeling of reality is also instantiated in a veridical visual perceptual experience.[23] This second strategy has a theoretical weakness relative to the first strategy. If a phenomenological kind disjunctivist can plausibly argue that a certain distinctive phenomenology other than visual perceptual phenomenology is instantiated in both veridical perceptions and hallucinations, then she runs into the *higher-order* screening off problem. If we can explain the cognitive and rational features of hallucination by appealing to some distinctive phenomenology which is shared with veridical perception, it seems that we can also explain the cognitive and rational features of veridical perceptions by appealing to the kind of phenomenology rather than visual perceptual phenomenology. Thus, the higher-order screening off problem arises, and must be addressed by those who adopt this second strategy for avoiding the double phenomenology problem.

The third strategy is to bite the bullet; that is, to simply admit that veridical perceptions have double phenomenology. Kennedy (2013), who does not seem worried by the double phenomenology problem, can be considered to take this approach. This strategy is not as hopeless as it may look. Kennedy might plausibly

dispute a subject's ability to introspectively discriminate between two kinds of phenomenology that differ only in their metaphysical ground. In other words, Kennedy may argue that when a subject has two distinct kinds of phenomenology which are nonetheless sufficiently similar, the subject is unable to introspectively detect the phenomenological distinction, and therefore makes the false judgment that there is only one kind of phenomenology. This possibility should not be ruled out without an argument. Nevertheless, those who take this third strategy also need to address the higher-order screening off problem.

Let us summarize this subsection. Phenomenological kind disjunctivism faces the double phenomenology problem. There are three strategies to handle this problem: (1) denying the local supervenience thesis, (2) picking out a kind of phenomenology which counts as the phenomenology of hallucination and is also a component of visual perceptual phenomenology, (3) simply accepting that distinct kinds of phenomenology can sometimes be introspectively indistinguishable. Proponents of phenomenological kind disjunctivism need to adopt one of these strategies and address potential challenges to it.

IV. THE USEFULNESS OF THE
CLASSIFICATORY FRAMEWORK FOR DP

I have described each category of DP, and have clarified the problems faced by each position. Presentation disjunctivism faces the screening off problem, positive eliminativism faces the higher-order screening off problem and phenomenological kind disjunctivism faces the double phenomenology problem (and perhaps the higher-order screening off problem, as well). If we formulate a view of DP within the classificatory framework for DP presented in this paper, we can clarify the challenges it must overcome. This is a merit of using this framework.

In addition to this, the classificatory framework is useful for identifying theoretical ambiguities of some views of DP. In this section, I will demonstrate this usefulness by focusing on Fish's view (2009) and Kennedy's view (2013).

Fish claims that "hallucinations have *a felt reality*," even though his definition of hallucination also insists that the hallucination itself lacks perceptual phenomenal character (2009: 99, emphasis added). The obvious question to ask is: what is felt reality? If it is not some sort of perceptual phenomenal character, what can it be? Fish (2009: 98) attempts to clarify what he means by saying that the 'felt reality' of hallucination is generated by the belief that the subject is seeing something. However, this only accounts for the genesis of felt reality; it does not make it clear *what felt reality is* as such.

This point becomes manifest in his exchange with Mike Martin. In commenting on Fish's view of hallucination, Martin asks whether "felt reality is a feature of the [hallucinatory] experience itself, [. . .] or whether it is an aspect of the upshot of the experience" (2013: 44). In response to this, Fish states that "'felt reality' was intended to express how things are for the subject—how things are from the subject's point of view" (2013: 63) and that a felt reality of hallucination is "determined by the kind of veridical perception one mistakenly takes oneself to be enjoying" (2013: 64). However, this response does not seem to answer the

question that Martin raised, since it does not specify the ontological status of felt reality. Fish's way of describing the felt reality of hallucination is ambiguous about its *ontological status*.

This ambiguity is problematic in assessing Fish's view of hallucination. Importantly, what class of DP Fish's view of hallucination belongs to depends on his view of the felt reality of hallucination. If felt reality is a non-perceptual phenomenal feature that is attributed to *hallucination itself*, Fish should be regarded as belonging to phenomenological kind disjunctivism rather than negative eliminativism. In this case, his view of hallucination would face the double phenomenology problem (and perhaps the higher order screening off problem as well). In contrast, if felt reality is a phenomenal feature of *the cognitive effects of hallucination*, such as beliefs or judgments, it is not attributed to the hallucination itself. In this case, Fish's view of hallucination should be regarded as belonging to negative eliminativism, combined with the claim that the cognitive effects of hallucinations have *cognitive phenomenology*, which contains felt reality as a phenomenal component. (Since I have adopted this second interpretation, I have classified Fish's view into negative eliminativism.)

If the current classificatory framework for DP, which explicitly includes the distinction between phenomenological kind disjunctivism and negative eliminativism, were already in place, it would have been easier for Fish to notice the importance of clarifying the ontological status of the felt reality of hallucination in developing his account. This suggests that the classificatory framework for DP may also turn out to be useful for other authors interested in developing their thoughts on the topic.

Let us turn to Kennedy's view (2013). As we have seen in III.C, he claims that "hallucinating subjects are related in a certain way to general propositions, and that the structure of hallucinatory experience is exhausted by this relation and its relata" (2013: 248). It is clear from this that, on his view, hallucinations consist in a representational relation to general propositions. However, it is unclear whether the view belongs to positive eliminativism *or* phenomenological kind disjunctivism. Although Kennedy does not claim that hallucinations do not have phenomenology, neither does he state that hallucinations are phenomenal. Given that the focus of his paper is on the first-personal aspect of perceptual experiences, it is natural to interpret his view as claiming that *the phenomenology of hallucination* consists of a representational relation to general propositions. However, it is also possible to interpret his view as claiming that *hallucination is a non-phenomenal state* that consists of a representational relation to general propositions. If his view is interpreted in this way, it faces the higher order screening off problem rather than the double phenomenology problem. Again, if the classificatory framework for DP, which explicitly includes the distinction between phenomenological kind disjunctivism and positive eliminativism, were already in place, it might have helped Kennedy better clarify his view in developing his position.

These two examples demonstrate that the classificatory framework serves to disambiguate some existing views of DP and that it enables us to clarify what problems they must overcome. Furthermore, these examples suggest that the classificatory framework can be helpful in clarifying views on DP. We can thus conclude that the classificatory framework is useful for developing a view of DP.

To sum up, the existing distinction between positive and negative disjunctivism concerns the explanatory status of the introspective indiscriminability of veridical perception and hallucination. In addition to this positive-negative distinction, the classificatory framework for DP that I have proposed introduces two other distinctions: (1) eliminativism or non-eliminativism; (2) presentation disjunctivism or phenomenological kind disjunctivism. The former distinction concerns whether to think that hallucination is a phenomenal state. The latter distinction concerns whether to think that hallucinations have visual perceptual phenomenology. In discussing the nature of hallucination, there is no doubt that these two diverging points are of importance.

The classificatory framework for DP that I have proposed enables us to organize and clarify the dispute over DP. For any philosopher who wants to defend naïve realism and hence DP, it is worth recognizing the category one's preferred view belongs to, so as to identify the general benefits and drawbacks of positions within that category.[24]

ENDNOTES

1.   The following figures can be regarded as naïve realists: Brewer (2011, 2017), Campbell (2002), French (2014), Fish (2009), Kennedy (2009, 2013), Logue (2012b), and Martin (2004, 2006). It is natural, though controversial, to interpret Johnston (2004, 2006) as a naïve realist. For a comprehensive review of naïve realism, see Genone (2016).

2.   Naïve realism may also be applied to illusory experiences (Brewer 2011: 132: 101–108; Kalderon 2011). I will set aside this issue here, since this paper does not discuss illusory experiences. I thank an anonymous referee for this point.

3.   Although it might be possible for a naïve realist to take the view that the phenomenology of veridical visual experience is *not* presentational, I do not know of any naïve realist who has explicitly adopted this view. Arguably, this is because the presentation-based characterization of visual perceptual phenomenology is one of the primary motivations for naïve realism.

4.   There is a sense of 'awareness' in which the claim that a subject is presented with an object is equivalent to the claim that a subject becomes aware of an object (Fish 2010: 17). The visual awareness relation in this sense is equivalent to the visual presentational relation. In this light, we can regard Brewer (2011), Johnston (2004, 2006) and Genone (2016), who use the term 'awareness' to characterize visual perceptual phenomenology, as accepting the presentation-based characterization of visual perceptual phenomenology.

5.   For a relevant kind of conjunctive characterization of naïve realism, see Fish (2009: chap. 1).

6.   The sense of 'apparent' is that a hallucinatory experience may not have phenomenology of the sort that it appears to have.

7.   One may want to characterize disjunctivism as "the view that there is no kind of mental state or event common to" veridical perceptions and hallucinations (Byrne and Logue 2008: 68). However, this 'no common mental kind' characterization of disjunctivism has been criticized as being "too strong to accommodate the views of the majority of those who

regard themselves as disjunctivists" (Soteriou 2016: 204; see also Logue 2015: 210). For this reason, I will not adopt the 'no common mental kind' characterization of disjunctivism.

8. This is not to say that proponents of DP must provide a *positive* account of the (apparent) phenomenology of hallucinatory experience. Even if an advocate of DP explains the phenomenology of hallucinatory experience in terms of its introspective indiscriminability from veridical visual experience, the explanation is substantial in the sense that it claims that the phenomenology of hallucinatory experience is grounded in its introspective indiscriminability from veridical visual experience.

9. One may want to ask how DP is related to other sorts of disjunctivism, such as epistemological disjunctivism and disjunctivism about content of visual perceptual experience. Given that disjunctivists of these sorts are concerned with the epistemological and intentional aspects of hallucination and that these aspects of hallucination are related to its phenomenal aspect, they would also be concerned with what substantial account we should provide of the (apparent) phenomenology of hallucinatory experience. For information regarding these sorts of disjunctivism, see Fish (2010: chap. 6), Soteriou (2014: sec. 2; 2016: chap. 5) and Logue (2015: secs. 3–4).

10. Proponents of DP may deny this explanatory duty, stating that the introspective indiscriminability in question is explanatorily primitive in the sense that there is no further psychological explanation of it. But in this case, they would be required to cash out the notion of primitive indiscriminability and to account for why it cannot be given any psychological explanation. I thank an anonymous referee for this point.

11. The label of 'positive' and 'negative' disjunctivism has explicitly been introduced by Byrne and Logue (2008: 69) though they are concerned with disjunctivism about metaphysical kind of visual perceptual experience rather than disjunctivism about the *phenomenology of visual perceptual experience*. For a detailed classification of DP on the basis of this positive-negative distinction, see Pautz (2010: 264).

12. The proponents of negative disjunctivism include Brewer (2011), Martin (2004, 2006) and Nudds (2013). For the objections to negative disjunctivism, see Conduct (2011), Hawthorne and Kovakovich (2006), Logue (2010, 2012a), Robinson (2013: sec. 3), Siegel (2008), Smith (2008) and Zimmerman (2012). For an overview of this debate, see Nudds (2009) and Soteriou (2016: chap. 6).

13. Pautz (2010: 263–64), Millar (2014b: 639) and Hellie (2013: 152–153) explicitly point to these two options available to presentation disjunctivists. It is to be noted that proponents of DP can take a representationalist view about the phenomenology of hallucination without commitment to presentation disjunctivism. I will discuss this sort of view in III.C.

14. The same challenge is directed to Hellie's solution to the screening off argument (2013). Hellie claims that if naïve realists deny the assumption that the phenomenology of hallucinations belongs to a single metaphysical kind and admit that it is explained in terms of distinct properties (depending on some conditions), such as sensing sense-data and representing an external scene, then the screening off problem does not arise. However, even though the phenomenology of some hallucinations is explained in terms of the subject's sensing sense-data and the phenomenology of other hallucinations is explained in terms of the subject's representing an external scene (as Hellie suggests), naive realists would be required to answer the question of how (in what sense) the presentational phenomenology of a corresponding veridical experience can be *doubly* constituted by an environmental object and each entity, namely sense-data or representational content. Hellie does not deal with this issue.

15. For the debate over the Johnston-Conduct view, see Hilbert (2004), Montague (2012) and Conduct (2012b).

16. Pautz (2010: 288–89) mentions that one possible option for this strategy is to say that the phenomenology of hallucination in part supervenes on the negative condition that it is not a veridical case. However, he does not give any account as to how this can be so. In III.C, I discuss a more substantial version of this kind of approach.

17. On Fish, see section IV.

18. For the objections to Fish's negative eliminativism, see Siegel (2008), Logue (2012a), Dokic and Martin (2012), Martin (2013) and Pautz (2013). Fish (2013) responds to some of these objections. For a dialectical move from negative disjunctivism to negative eliminativism, see Sturgeon (2008).

19. If you think that the perceptual representational content of hallucination depends on the subject's past interaction with her surrounding environment, then you can add it onto the supervenience basis. The higher-order screening off argument can be modified accordingly by appealing to a case in which the corresponding perceiving subject shares the relevant developmental history with the hallucinating subject. I thank an anonymous referee for this point.

20. For an objection to this strategy, see Niikawa (2017).

21. Opponents of naïve realism may reject the presentation-based characterization of visual perceptual phenomenology (Pautz 2007). For instance, one may contend that visual perceptual phenomenology is characterized in terms of a non-presentational conscious relation and may further claim that the conscious relation is grounded in (or identical to) a representational relation to general propositions of certain kind. On this view, the phenomenology that consists in the representational relation to general propositions is counted as visual *perceptual* phenomenology. I set aside this possible option, for this paper concerns disjunctivism of the sort adopted by naïve realists.

22. On Kennedy, see section IV.

23. Dokic and Martin (2017) provide a detailed discussion of how a feeling of reality is integrated into veridical visual perceptual experience.

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