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There is an error in the proof of the main theorem on page 6 ("Rice's Theorem for Logic"). If  $\phi$  is undecidable in Q, the claim that Ax1 and Ax2 are tautologies is not valid, and this fact compromises the rest of the proof. Furthermore, the following decidable property is a counter-example to our result:

**Definition 1.** Let T be a theory. A theory  $T^+$  is an extension of T if  $Th(T) \subseteq Th(T^+)$ .

**Definition 2.** Sub(T) denotes the set  $\{Th(T^{-}): T \text{ is an extension of } T^{-}\}.$ 

**Proposition 1.** If T is a consistent decidable theory, then Sub(T) is a non-trivial decidable property.

*Proof.* By the consistency of T, Sub(T) is non-trivial. For each finite  $A \subseteq L_{\Sigma}$ , the following holds:

$$Th(A) \in Sub(T) \iff T$$
 is an extension of  $A \iff T \vdash \bigwedge_{\phi \in A} \phi$ .

Since T is decidable, there exists an algorithm which decides for given finite  $A \subseteq L_{\Sigma}$  whether  $T \vdash \bigwedge_{\phi \in A} \phi$  or not. That is, Sub(T) is decidable.

For instance,  $Sub(\{\forall_x \forall_y (x = y)\})$  is a counter-example to our result. This negative result, which is contrary to our initial intuition, led us to consider the existence of these "Ricean" undecidability results in a more general sense.

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**Definition 3.** Let T be a theory and  $\Gamma$  be a set of sentences.  $\Gamma$  is a property on T if the following holds for any sentences  $\phi$  and  $\psi$ :

$$T \vdash \phi \leftrightarrow \psi \Rightarrow [\phi \in \Gamma \Longleftrightarrow \psi \in \Gamma].$$

A property  $\Gamma$  is trivial if it is the empty set or the set of all sentences.

In particular, note that a property P in the sense of our paper corresponds to the property  $\{\bigwedge_{\phi \in A} \phi: Th(A) \in P \text{ and } A \text{ is finite}\}$  on  $\emptyset$ . If we consider sufficiently expressive theories such as Q (Robinson arithmetic), it is indeed possible to prove that they are undecidable in the sense of Rice's theorem.

**Theorem 1.** Every non-trivial property on Q is undecidable.

For instance, since Th(Q) is a property on Q, we derive as a particular case of this general result that Q is an undecidable theory. Theorem 1 is a consequence of the diagonal lemma, and the reader is referred to [1] for a general treatment of this elegant result and its consequences. A new interpretation of this result will appear in a forthcoming paper.

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## References

 C. Bernardi. On the Relation Provable Equivalence and on Partitions in Effectively inseparable sets. *Studia Logica* 40 (1981), 29–37.