Evidential Problems of Evil

You are about to enter a country that you have never entered before. You are told that the country is ruled by a very powerful, very wise, and very good—benevolent, merciful, just, etc.—sovereign who is fully in control of the country. Moreover, you are told that the country is more than amply resourced, and not subject to external threats: it is not at war, subject to famine, devastated by natural disasters, or the like. When you first view the country, as you approach the border from the surrounding hills, you are struck by the richness of its agriculture, the abundance of its water supply, the magnificence of its cities, and so forth. From this initial vantage point, it seems pretty clear that it is true that the country is both amply resourced and not subject to external threats.

However, when you cross the border and enter the country, you discover—to your horror—that there are grotesquely violated corpses hanging from lamp-posts along the road that you travel, including corpses of babies and young children. In the light of this discovery, it seems that you have reason to reassess the information that you were initially given. If it is so that the country is amply resourced and not subject to external threats, then surely it is not the case that the country is fully under the control of a very powerful, very wise, and very good—benevolent, merciful, just, etc.—sovereign. A very good sovereign who was in full control of the country would not authorise, or even permit, the murder of babies, young children, or, indeed, of any of the citizens of the country. That is, given that evidence, the plausible view to form is that either the sovereign is powerless to prevent the murder of babies and young children, or the sovereign somehow doesn't know about the murder of babies and young children, or the sovereign is much less than morally virtuous (indifferent to suffering, lacking mercy, malicious, or the like).

Some theists say that our universe is under the superintendence of, or has been designed by, or has been created by, an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good being. However, in light of the kinds of horrendous suffering that is to be found in our universe—e.g. the rape, torture and murder of babies and young children, the excruciating suffering and deaths of animals in bushfires and other natural disasters, and so forth—many atheists suppose that there is very good reason to judge that, if there is a being that has sovereignty over our universe, then that being is either unable to prevent horrendous suffering (and hence certainly not omnipotent), or else uninformed about the horrendous suffering that there is in our world (and hence certainly not omniscient), or else falls far short of moral perfection (because indifferent to the horrendous suffering, or delighting in the horrendous suffering, or whatever).

There are at least two important questions that can be raised in connection with these considerations about horrendous suffering. On the one hand, there are questions about the range of reasonable judgments that can be made concerning the bearing of horrendous suffering on the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good ruler of our universe; and, on the other hand, there are questions about the prospects for the formulation of successful arguments against the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient

and perfectly good ruler of our universe on the basis of considerations about the nature and extent of horrendous suffering in our universe.

A number of authors have developed evidential arguments from evil in the past thirty years. Perhaps the best known evidential arguments from evil are those presented in Rowe (1979) and Draper (1989). We shall spend most of the rest of this chapter examining these two arguments. (Other very well-known presentations of evidential arguments from evil include Schellenberg (1993) and Drange (1998). A good critical discussion of evidential arguments from evil is contained in Howard-Snyder (1996).)

Rowe's Evidential Argument from Evil

Recent interest in evidential arguments from evil almost all stems from Rowe (1979). Rowe has changed his mind about various aspects of his argument in subsequent publications, often in response to criticisms which have been launched against him. Here, however, we shall just consider the argument as it appears in his initial paper.

The central argument of the paper may be presented as follows:

1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. (Premise)
2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. (Premise)
3. (Therefore) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being. (From 1, 2)

Since, as Rowe says, the argument is plainly valid, the only questions which are raised by this argument concern its premises. Each is controversial.

Rowe *claims* that Premise 2 is pretty uncontroversial. However, one might think that there could be circumstances in which an omniscient, wholly good being would not prevent the occurrence of some intense suffering which it could prevent, even though it could do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. Here's how. Suppose that there is an infinite sequence of worlds $W_1, ..., W_n, ...$ Each world contains a very great good G whose obtaining in that world depends upon the obtaining of an infinite sequence of evils (where this infinite sequence is the "tail" of the sequence $E_1, ..., E_n, ...$). If all—or all but finitely many—of the evils E_i are prevented from occurring, then the very great good G cannot obtain. Suppose, further—for reasons which we need not go into—that the best world that a perfect being can make is one of these W_i. And suppose that the W_i may be described in the following way: W_1 contains the evils $E_1, ...E_n, ...$; W_2 contains the evils $E_2, ..., E_n, ...$; W_3 contains the evils $E_3, ..., E_n, ...$; ...; W_k contains the evils $E_k, ..., E_n, ...$; and so on. Then, if the perfect being is to make one of the best worlds that it can make, then it will have to choose one of the E_i. But, no matter which one it chooses, it will be true that there is an evil (E_{i+1}) which is

such that the perfect being can prevent it without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. So, unless one rejects the assumption that there could be worlds like the W_i, it seems that one should accept that Premise 2 is not obviously true. (Perhaps it is enough if one can argue that the possibility which is being here entertained is very remote. However, we shall not attempt to pursue this matter further. Nor shall we worry about other reasons that one might have for finding Premise 2 controversial, e.g., the suspicion that it *requires* a non-deontological conception of morality.)

Most of the debate about Rowe's argument has focussed on Premise 1 and, in particular, on the supporting argument which Rowe gives in attempting to motivate acceptance of Premise 1. Here is how Rowe argues:

1. There exist instances of intense suffering for which *we have found* no greater goods which would be lost or evils equally as bad or worse which would be permitted if a perfect being were to prevent those instances of suffering. (Premise)
2. (Hence) There exist instances of intense suffering for which *there are* no greater goods that would be lost or evils equally as bad or worse that would be permitted if a perfect being were to prevent those instances of suffering. (From 1)

Examples of the instances of intense suffering that Rowe has in mind could include the suffering of a fawn trapped in a forest fire or the suffering of a small child who is assaulted and then murdered.

Plainly enough, the argument here is not logically valid: it is—as Rowe acknowledges—possible for the premise to be true and the conclusion false. However, Rowe insists that the premise does nonetheless support the conclusion, in that it provides 'rational grounds' for its acceptance. There are various ways in which this claim can be further developed: for instance, in some later publications, Rowe develops the idea in the language of the theory of probability: the point is that our failure to find goods and evils of the kinds in question *greatly raises the likelihood* that there are no such goods and evils. (The likelihood of a hypothesis H, given evidence E, is Pr (E/H); the likelihood of a hypothesis H, given evidence E and background knowledge k, is Pr (E/H&k). Likelihood should be carefully distinguished from posterior probability: Pr (H/E) or Pr (H/E&k).) It will probably be enough for our purposes to work with a fairly undeveloped notion of "rational grounds".

Consider the family of arguments of the form: 'We have found no X's, so it is likely that there are no X's'. Some arguments of this form are strong; some are very weak. One of the features upon which the strength of these arguments depend is the likelihood that we would find Xs if they were there to be found. If it is very unlikely that we should find Xs even if they were there to be found, then our failure to find Xs is not very strong support for the claim that there are no Xs. My failure to spot any methane molecules as I scan my room is not very strong evidence that there are no methane molecules in my room; for, even if there are methane molecules in my room, they will be too small for me to see. So, in the case of Rowe's argument, it is clearly important to ask whether we should think

that it is likely that, if there are goods or evils which justify a perfect being in not preventing certain instances of intense suffering, then we will find those good or evils if we look for them.

Some theists, e.g. Wykstra (1984), claim that it is most unlikely that, if there are goods or evils that justify a perfect being in not preventing certain instances of intense suffering, then we will find those good or evils if we look for them. Clearly, if there is an omniscient being, it will have cognitive powers which are unimaginable to us. But, if that's right, then don't we have good reason to think that it is highly likely that there are hitherto undetected goods or evils that justify a perfect being in not preventing certain instances of intense suffering? Other theists, e.g. Bergmann (2001), claim that we are in no position to assign any likelihood to the claim that, if there are goods or evils which justify a perfect being in not preventing certain instances of intense suffering, then we will find those good or evils if we look for them. On this—"skeptical theist"—view, Rowe's supporting argument for Premise 1 fails, and so we have not been provided with good grounds for supposing that Premise 1 is true.

If we suppose that we have good (independent) reason for thinking that there is an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good being, and if we suppose that Premise 2 is true, then we can *infer* that there are hitherto undetected goods or evils that justify a perfect being in not preventing certain instances of intense suffering. That is, the theist can offer the following counter-argument to Rowe's argument in support of Premise 1:

1. There is an omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good being.
2. An omniscient wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
3. There exist instances of intense suffering for which *we have found* no greater goods that would be lost or evils equally as bad or worse that would be permitted if a perfect being were to prevent those instances of suffering.
4. (Therefore) There are hitherto undetected goods or evils that justify a perfect being in not preventing certain instances of intense suffering.

This argument appears to be valid; and Premises 2 and 3 are just the premises which appear in Rowe's original argument and his argument in support of Premise 1 of his original argument. Indeed, we can state Rowe's argument in the following more extended way:

1. There exist instances of intense suffering for which *we have found* no greater goods that would be lost or evils equally as bad or worse that would be permitted if a perfect being were to prevent those instances of suffering.
2. There are no hitherto undetected goods or evils that justify a perfect being in not preventing those instances of intense suffering.
3. An omniscient wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.

4. (Therefore) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good being

So, it might be thought, the "debate" between Rowe and his theistic opponent just comes down to the question of whether to accept the claim that there is an omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good being, or whether to accept the claim that there are no hitherto undetected goods or evils that justify a perfect being in not preventing certain instances of intense suffering.

While the above discussion more or less conforms to Rowe's claims about "the G. E. Moore shift"—i.e. the production of the related argument for the conclusion that there are hitherto undetected goods or evils that justify a perfect being in not preventing certain instances of intense suffering—it is not clear to me that this is the best way in which to make the point which Rowe wants to make. What seems right is that how one ought to respond to our failure to find greater goods that would be lost or evils equally as bad or worse that would be permitted if a perfect being were to prevent certain instances of suffering depends upon what else one is entitled to believe. If one has independent entitlement to the belief that there is an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being, then one may have good reason for thinking that there are undetected goods or evils that justify a perfect being in not preventing certain instances of intense suffering. On the other hand, if one has independent reasons for thinking that there are no hitherto undetected goods or evils that justify a perfect being in not preventing certain instances of intense suffering, then one may have good reason for thinking that there is no omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being. (Of course, one might have *other* good reasons for thinking that there is no omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being. But that's another story.) Whether either of the above arguments is, in any sense, a good argument seems to me to be a quite separate question—and one which should be answered in the negative, at least if the immediately prior remarks about what theists and atheists may have good reason to believe are well-taken.

One of the most interesting parts of Rowe's article is his distinction between "friendly atheism", "indifferent atheism", and "unfriendly atheism", and his subsequent defence of "friendly atheism". We may distinguish between these views as follows. The unfriendly atheist claims that no one is rationally justified in believing that there is a perfect being. The indifferent atheist has no opinion about whether one can be rationally justified in believing that there is a perfect being. And the friendly atheist holds that some theists are—or, at any rate, may be—rationally justified in believing that there is a perfect being. Rowe distinguishes various versions of friendly atheism. One version of the view holds that there was some time—perhaps long ago—when there were people who were rationally justified in believing that there is a perfect being. Another version of the view holds that, even now, there are people who are rationally justified in believing that there is a perfect being (but only because they are not acquainted with the grounds for disbelief). Yet another version of the view holds that even now, there are people who are rationally justified in believing that there is a perfect being (but only because they are mistaken about what they take to be the grounds of that belief). Finally—though this is not a view which Rowe endorses—there is the view that, even now, there are people who

are rationally justified in believing that there is a perfect being, and who are as rational, reflective, and well-informed as reasonable believers can reasonably be required to be. I think that even the strongest version of friendly atheism (and the correlative position of friendly theism) can be defended. Of course, if you are an atheist, you must think that theists have false beliefs. But I do not see that you have to think that rational, reflective and well-informed theists must suffer under some deficit of rationality with respect to their theistic beliefs. Even if this is disputed, it certainly seems to me to be right to say that atheists needn't think that there are arguments which ought, on pain of conviction of irrationality, to convince theists to give up their theism.

Draper's Evidential Argument from Evil

Draper's argument has a forbidding appearance, but it is actually quite straightforward. What Draper aims to establish is that there are certain facts—concerning observations of sentient beings experiencing pleasure and pain—which are much better explained by what Draper calls "The Hypothesis of Indifference" than they are by the hypothesis that there is an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect person who made the universe. ("The Hypothesis of Indifference" says: neither the nature nor the condition of sentient beings on earth is the result of benevolent or malevolent actions performed by nonhuman persons.)

More exactly, what Draper claims can be explained in the following way. Let O be a statement reporting both (i) the observations that one has made of humans and animals experiencing pain and pleasure, and (ii) the testimony one has encountered concerning the observations others have made of sentient beings experiencing pain and pleasure. Let HI be the hypothesis of indifference, and let T be the theistic hypotheses. Then, according to Draper, the antecedent likelihood of O given HI is much greater than the antecedent likelihood of O given T. (The *antecedent* likelihood of evidence x given hypothesis y is the probability of x, independent of the observations and testimony that x reports, on the assumption that y is true.)

Draper argues for this last contention in the following way. Let O1, O2 and O3 be mutually exclusive statements which together report the facts which O reports, in the following way:

> O1 reports facts about moral agents experiencing pain and pleasure that we know to be biologically useful
> O2 reports facts about sentient beings that are not moral agents experiencing pain and pleasure that we know to be biologically useful
> O3 reports facts about sentient beings experiencing pain and pleasure that we do not know to be biologically useful

Draper notes, first, that Pr (O / h) = Pr ([O1 & O2 & O3] / h). He then goes on to observe that Pr ([O1 & O2 & O3] / h) = Pr (O1 / h).Pr (O2 / [h & O1]).Pr (O3 / [h & O1 & O2]). Given this, the claim which he wants to establish—viz. that Pr (O / HI) is much greater than Pr (O / T) —will be true just in case Pr (O1 / HI).Pr (O2 / [HI& O1]).Pr (O3 / [HI&

O1 & O2]) is much greater than Pr (O1 / T).Pr (O2 / [T& O1]).Pr (O3 / [T& O1 & O2]). So, if we can argue that Pr (O1 / HI) is greater than Pr (O1 / T), that Pr (O2 / [HI& O1]) is greater than Pr (O2 / [T& O1]), that Pr (O3 / [HI& O1 & O2]) is greater than Pr (O3 / [T& O1 & O2]), and that in at least one of these cases, the difference in the values is substantial, then we shall have shown what Draper aims to show.

It might be worth noting that Draper insists that the probabilities which he is talking about are *epistemic* probabilities, and not *statistical*, *physical*, or *logical* probabilities. While Draper says that there is no adequate philosophical theory of epistemic probability, he does 'explain' this notion of epistemic probability in the following way: relative to epistemic situation K, the proposition that p is epistemically more probable than the proposition that q just in case any fully rational person in K would have a higher degree of belief in the proposition that p than in the proposition that q. I'm not sure that this 'explanation' is much help: the notion of 'epistemic' probability is rather obscure, though perhaps well enough understood for the purposes of Draper's argument.

We turn now to the argument from cases.

The first claim to be defended is that Pr (O1 / HI) is much greater than Pr (O1 / T). O1 reports facts about human beings experiencing pain and pleasure which is known to be biologically useful. So the claim which Draper wants to defend is that it is much more likely that there should be human beings who experience biologically useful pain and pleasure (in the way in which these experiences are actually distributed) if HI is true than that there should be human beings who experience biologically useful pain and pleasure (in the way in which these experiences are actually distributed) if T is true. (Roughly speaking, "biologically useful pain and pleasure" is pain and pleasure which makes a causal contribution to survival and reproduction.) Draper's defense of this claim begins with the observation that pain and pleasure have intrinsic moral value: pain is intrinsically bad, and pleasure is intrinsically good. Draper claims that, while this observation makes no difference to Pr (O1 / HI), it has a substantial impact on Pr (O1 / T). On the one hand, "a biological explanation of pain and pleasure is just the sort of explanation that one would expect on HI". On the other hand, "theism entails both that God does not need biologically useful pain and pleasure to produce human goal-directed organic systems and that, if human pain and pleasure exist, then God had good reason for producing them, reasons that, for all we know antecedently, might very well be inconsistent with pain and pleasure systematically contributing to the biological goals of human organisms".

The second claim to be defended is that Pr (O2 / O1 & HI) is greater than Pr (O2 / O1 & T): O2 reports facts about sentient beings that are not moral agents—i.e. young human children and non-human animals—experiencing pain and pleasure which is known to be biologically useful. Draper's claim is that it is more likely that there should be animals and children who experience biologically useful pain and pleasure (in the way in which these experiences are actually distributed) if O1 & HI is true than that there should be animals and children who experience biologically useful pain and pleasure (in the way in which these experiences are actually distributed) if O1 & T is true. Draper's defense of this claim turns on the point that, while the pain referred to in O1 might be justified on

the grounds that it serves some moral purpose for the subject of that pain, it cannot be that the pain referred to in O2 is justified on these grounds (since the subjects in question are not moral agents). While this point makes no difference to our assessment of the likelihood of HI, it should lead us to revise down (just a little) our assessment of the likelihood of T. ("The good moral reasons God has for permitting moral agents to experience pain do not apply to animals that are not moral agents ... [and hence we have] some reason to believe that God will not permit such beings to experience pain.")

The third claim to be defended is that Pr (O3 / O2 & O1 & HI) is much greater than Pr (O3 / O2 & O1 & T): O3 reports facts about sentient beings experiencing pain and pleasure that we do not know to be biologically useful. (Some of this pain and pleasure is known to be biologically gratuitous; some has an uncertain status.) Draper's claim is that it is much more likely that there should be sentient beings which experience pain and pleasure not known to be biologically useful (in the way in which these experiences are actually distributed) if O2 & O1 & HI is true than that there should be sentient beings which experience pain and pleasure not known to be biologically useful (in the way in which these experiences are actually distributed) if O2 & O1 & T is true. Draper's defense of this claim has two parts. First, Draper argues that we have much more reason to expect sentient beings to be happy on O2 & O1 & T than we do on O2 & O1 & HI. But, when O3 is taken into account "we find that many humans and animals experience prolonged and intense suffering and a much greater number are far from happy". Moreover, we have much more reason to expect to discover a close connection between certain moral goods and biologically gratuitous pains and pleasures on T than on HI; but we find no such close connection. Second, Draper argues that we have much more reason to believe that the "fundamental role" of pain and pleasure in our world is biological on O2 & O1 & HI than we do on O2 & O1 & T. And when O3 is added to O1 and O2, it appears that the fundamental role of pain and pleasure is biological. For much of the pain and pleasure reported in O3 is either pathological—i.e. results from the failure of some organic system to function properly—or else is biologically appropriate--i.e. occurs in a situation which is such that it is biologically useful that pain or pleasure is felt in situations of this sort. According to Draper, both of these sub-arguments support the main conclusion.

At this point, one might think that—if we grant the case-by-case arguments—we are now in a position to draw the conclusion that Pr (O / HI) is much greater than Pr (O /T). But, as Draper observes, in addition to their biological roles, pain and pleasure also have moral roles in our world. It might be that appeal to these moral roles can increase Pr (O / T) relative to Pr (O / HI), in such a way as to defeat Draper's arguments.

Draper develops this idea in the following way. Suppose that theism (T) is "expanded" by the addition of a theodicy Tn (where we assume that Tn entails T). Then, by another formula of the probability calculus, we have that Pr (O / T) = Pr (Tn / T) . Pr (O / Tn) + Pr (~Tn / T) . Pr (O/ T & ~Tn). What Draper argued in the previous part of his paper is only that Pr (O / T) is much less than Pr (O / HI) *prior to considering the effect of theodicies on Pr (O/T)*. Hence, he claims that, in order to complete his argument, he needs to show that Pr (O / Tn) is not significantly greater than Pr (O / T & ~Tn).

In order to show that Pr (O / Tn) is not significantly greater than Pr (O / T & ~Tn), Draper considers three possibilities for Tn, two of which draw upon considerations about freedom of will, and one of which draws upon considerations concerning our limited understanding of omniscient deliberation. While Draper claims that he cannot think of any other plausible candidates, it is worth noting that there are many other theodicies which have been seriously defended. (I omit further discussion of the way in which Draper completes his argument for the claim that Pr (O/T) is much less than Pr (O/H1) even after considering the effect of theodicies on Pr (O/T).)

Granting Draper everything that he has argued to this point, some may be inclined to object that the difficulty that his argument raises for theism is not particularly disconcerting. In particular, even if it is granted that Pr (O / HI) is much greater than Pr (O / T), it does not follow that Pr (HI / total evidence) is much greater than Pr (T / total evidence). But, of course, when one is comparing T with its competitors—including HI—one must do so taking all of the relevant available evidence into account. So, one might be tempted to say, we haven't really been given much of a reason to think that pain and pleasure presents a serious evidential problem for theism.

Draper concludes his paper with four sets of comments which are meant to indicate how hard it is for a theist to find other evidence that "balances out" the evidence that arises from reports about pain and pleasure. First, Draper contends that HI is not *ad hoc*, and that it is not the case that theism is intrinsically more probable than HI. Second, Draper contends that arguments for theism are "far from compelling". Third, Draper contends that, in the case of many arguments for theism, even if those arguments are compelling, they fail to establish that there is a morally perfect being. Finally, Draper contends that the evidence of "religious experience" is, at best, ambiguous evidence for the moral attributes of the creator.

The status of these comments varies. I think that there are few "compelling" arguments in philosophy, and hence that there is some substance to the second and third claims. However, I also think that one can be rational in one's believing even though one cannot offer "compelling" arguments in support of one's beliefs. More generally, I think that there is a presumption that the beliefs of thoughtful, rational, and reflective people should be judged to be reasonable unless there are really good reasons to think otherwise. In the case of contested beliefs—e.g. beliefs about the existence of a perfect being—I think that there is a presumption that it can be reasonable to take any of the views which are taken by thoughtful, rational and reflective people. So—regardless of the strength of the arguments which are produced on either side—I think that there is a presumption that it can be reasonable to be a theist, and it can be reasonable to be an atheist. However, when we think about how Draper's claims look from the standpoint of one who believes that there is a perfect being, the first and the fourth points which he makes seem highly contestable. Theism doubtless does appear "intrinsically more probable" than HI from the standpoint of theists; and the "evidence of religious experience" doubtless does appear to yield unambiguous evidence of the moral attributes of the creator from the standpoint of theists.

Thus, even if there is nothing to dispute in the details of Draper's argument, I find it very hard to believe that it is a successful argument against belief in a perfect being: his argument does not show that, by their own lights, reasonable, reflective and well-informed theists have good reason to give up their theistic beliefs. Moreover—though I shall not go on to explore these matters further—there are doubts which can be raised about various points of detail in Draper's argument.

Concluding Remarks

As I noted initially, there is now a vast literature on evidential arguments from evil. We have looked at two papers which develop evidential arguments from evil; we have barely scratched the surface of discussion even of these two papers. However, even our brief discussion shows, I think, that one cannot give an adequate discussion of evidential arguments from evil unless one is prepared to think seriously about the range of reasonable judgments that can be made concerning the bearing of horrendous suffering on the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good ruler of our universe. But, in my view at least, this latter topic is one that, in recent discussions of evidential arguments from evil, has not been given the prominence that it is deserves.

Bibliography

Bergmann, M. (2001) "Sceptical Theism and Rowe's New Evidential Argument from Evil" Noûs 35, 278-96

Drange, T. (1998) Non-Belief and Evil: Two Arguments for the Non-Existence of God New York: Prometheus Books

Draper, P. (1989) "Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists" Noûs 23, 331-50

Howard-Snyder, D. (ed.) (1996) The Evidential Argument from Evil Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press

Plantinga, A. (1979) "The Probabilistic Argument from Evil" Philosophical Studies 35, 1-53

Rowe, W. (1979) "The Problem of Evil and some Varieties of Atheism" American Philosophical Quarterly 16, 335-41

Schellenberg, J. (1993) Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press

Wykstra, S. (1984) "The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering: On Avoiding the Evils of 'Appearance'" International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16, 73-93