

Writing this article in mind for
it is not entirely clear what this
can. Is a mind distinct from
what inside it? Am I a different
is there any interesting sense in
in my brain and all its sensorial
arguably, these questions made
es. In fact, the very word
k of as inextricably connected to
exist in anything like the modern
Philosophers before Descartes
problem because they followed
fact of being a living entity meant

Aristotelian and medieval
living matter is just matter,
eries of scientific reductionism
ments and methodological
have the philosophical fortitude
ndful of the fate of his contem-
ed not include the mind in his
as a machine. In Descartes'
te diagrams of how vision works,
y modern idea that memory is
ain. But he stopped short at
ions, which he took almost
onfined to an immaterial soul.
ized his dualism created one of
n philosophy of mind: if the
distinct, how do the two interact,
er for a human being to be

marked by a gradual but steady rep
has taken full form only during the
century and is still being elaborated
provided by several schools of thou
dealt by skeptic philosopher David
Hume was still a dualist, and defen
basis of what is known as the *proper*
phenomena lack spatial extension a
must be non-material. But what is
Hume famously rejected any idea of
Descartes) affirming that introspect
discover anything but our own perc
myself at any time without a percep
anything but the perception", which
concept of mental activity as a 'bund
dissolved Descartes' unitary concep
of 'things', but had not solved the p
immaterial objects can possibly inte

The next step was taken by Tho
often known as 'Darwin's bulldog'
evolutionary ideas. Huxley was con
evidence strongly suggested that D
treating animals as machines (which
selection), but – probably also beca
– he could not conceive that anima
This brought him to the verge of r
two roads are open: either animals
(though to a lesser degree than hu
automata, including Homo Sapiens
a desperate compromise: both we a
consciousness, but this is complete
epiphenomenon of the brain's activity
phenomena of the senses) are corn

mechanisms causing the observable
and most of what's interesting about
author attempt at a fresh start with
that new approach is now known
Feigl, U.T. Place and J.J.C.
tempted to go beyond behavioristic
or all identify the mind with the
maintained, the trick is in which
word 'is' one is using while saying
In English, we can use 'is' in three
tion, or attribution of character-
"vore"); in a definition, or stating a
is a geometric figure with three
n, or stating of a contingent
charge of electricity"). Clearly,
"the brain" is of the third kind and
mental states are identical with
a (not because they logically have
happens in this corner of the
re, besides the obvious empirical
identity works, is that there are
identity seems rather unsatis-
relationship between brain states
one-to-one mapping, so that
tomorrow is Monday is in the
is hardly reasonable and contra-
plasticity and more in general of
which raises serious problems for
extreme positions (such as Patricia
that mental phenomena such as
simply do not exist and we should
begin to talk only about neuronal

problems. For example, John Searle's
"mind = brain" equations is based
about somebody sitting in a room
in the wall, cards with Chinese char-
He looks them up in a big book of
pushes other cards out through the
observer it seems like the room is
questions in Chinese, but to say that
Chinese goes against all our intuition.
produced a thought experiment, the
scientist called Mary who grows up
black, white and grey objects. She
the theory of color, but when she
enclosure and actually *sees* a color
our intuition is that she learns something
which she is not prepared. While
provocative, thought experiments
questionable assumption that our
unfamiliar situations are reliable.
speculative scenarios our intuition
or at most point us only to the philosophical
problem of the biases that we have
thinking about the mental.

All of this notwithstanding, what
the turn of the 21st century? It seems
more and more entwined with neuro-
theory, perhaps confirming once again
philosophy is to mull over problems
insoluble and then clear the way for
problem if the latter becomes possible.
current excitement in this field could
are open to the findings of biology
who are willing to embrace the biological
philosophy and go beyond the spe-

ity corresponding to, for example, ing and even praying and rging picture is that distinct kinds carry out different tasks, rejecting the brain as a general purpose seems to be made of diffuse and rly shaped by natural selection to such as identifying objects by their ive secondary qualities a result of guish between food and focs in the

relatively sophisticated brain ion, identification of objects, and orks of neuron-like elements is valuable alternative to old ce while in the process raising a ts own (e.g. we can simulate self-improving neural net, but understanding how actually the net

y of the mind has to come to terms alth of empirical information study of the mental out of the fog d into some as yet dimly t't know exactly what it means for write this article, but both ave a fresh new century to look es in this ultimate quest for self-

Professor of Ecology & Evolutionary nessee. In his spare time, he is a at the same University. His



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