TIMELINESS OF ANALOGY

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Dialogical Collection
TIMELINESS OF ANALOGY

Contents

Introduction

We are very happy to present the next volume of *Dialogical Collection* – an international and interdisciplinary initiative that embraces various languages, different cultures, philosophy, art and sciences. We want to create a space for dialogic encounters. Our logo, i.e. "&℘", represents two participants in dialogue, the joy of meeting and mutual attention, since like Buber wrote *All actual life is encounter* and these books are the fruits of dialogical meetings. The collection mainly consists in e-books with an open access, because an encounter is a grace, in other words a free gift.

This volume of our collection, entitled "Timeliness of Analogy", is representing the fundamental role of analogy in dialogue. The title comes from the workshop organized by Katarzyna Gan-Krzywoszyńska and Piotr Leśniewski during the 7ᵗʰ World Congress and School on Universal Logic UNILOG 2022 that took place in Kolymbari, Greece, in the Orthodox Academy of Crete, 1-11 April 2022. The Keynote speaker was Juan Manuel Campos Benítez. The volume consists of lectures presented at this event and texts inspired by the topic. During UNILOG 2022 Katarzyna Gan-Krzywoszyńska and Piotr Leśniewski presented also the tutorial on analogy.

The event is a continuation of our World Congresses on Analogy and our third publication on the topic. Please visit www.analogycongress.com, Special Issue of *Methodological Studies* on Analogy http://studiametodologiczne. amu.edu.pl/en/ and *Philosophies on Analogy* https://www.mdpi.com/journal/ philosophies/special_issues/Philosophies_Analogy

After the first volume in Spanish, this time texts are in English and French. As in the case of the World Congresses of Analogy we are interested in theories, history and applications of analogy in philosophy, sciences and arts. Therefore, the first three texts, i.e. *Medieval Analogy and Contemporary Metaphor* by Juan Manuel Campos Benítez*, Analogy and Metaphor in Aristotle's "Pros Hen" Understanding of Psychical Activity* by John Robert Bagby, and *The concept of analogy in the works of Władysław Biegański* by Zofia Hałęza, concern theories and the history of analogy.

The next group of texts consists of papers that present analogy in art and artistic expression. These are: *Analogy-making as an art: Prolegomena to the culture of smile* by Katarzyna Gan-Krzywoszyńska and Piotr Leśniewski, *Relations analogiques au sujet de l'acte créatif et la séquence imaginative en Chine et en Occident* by Caroline PIRES TING (丁小雨)*, Analogy and Creativity. Ready made and quantum physics, the analogy of two historical paradigms* by Sylvie Herrouet and Alain Lioret, and *On analogies between the Haitian past and the present. Current crisis through the lens of the spiralist novel "Dézafi"* by Katherine Cheung García.

The last set of texts regards analogy from social and political perspective. Three papers are presented here, namely: *What Protest Can Teach Us About Regulating Online Misinformation: An Argument From Analogy* by Geoffrey D. Callaghan, *Some remarks on the analogical model of referendum* by Przemysław Krzywoszyński, and *Analogies within Honorifics Systems in English, Korean and Polish* by Zofia Wójciak.

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By the way, we would like to inform you that we are planning The Third World Congress on Analogy at the beginning of November 2023.

* * *

Acknowledgements

Medieval Analogy and Contemporary Metaphor
Juan Manuel CAMPOS BENÍTEZ

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Abstract: This work tries to show two important conceptions about analogy and metaphor. Analogy is studied from medieval and scholastic philosophy; metaphor from two contemporary thinkers. Although analogy and metaphor are approached independently, a rapprochement between them is possible. A dialogue between metaphor and analogy could help us to a better understanding their similarities and differences.

Key words: analogy, metaphor, scholastic and contemporary scholars

1. Introduction

Analogy suggests several things: similarities, proportions, attributions, even identity and difference. There are hexagons of opposition to express the relationships among these components. Metaphor is more difficult to characterize, although it is relatively easy to detect a metaphor when we pay attention to the language of everyday life and language in other areas, especially in fiction and poetry. Metaphor has been characterized as a trope, a shift in the meaning of an expression, it is considered one among several figures of speech, such as synecdoche or metonymy. Many times we use the same word to signify different things due to a certain similarity that we find in the named things. That is why we

can speak of the foot of the bed or the foot of the mountain, and utter metaphorical sentences with these types of expressions; in this sense, metaphor is related to analogy. Similarities can be taken for granted, as in the sayings or proverbs, which try to draw a moral.

George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, in their work *Metaphors we live by*, claim that metaphor consists in understanding one thing in terms of another thing, and that that it is not just a matter of rhetorical issue, but that thought itself is a metaphorical process. In fact, metaphor encompasses at once three dimensions: language, thought, and action. In this paper, I will pay attention to this book's view of metaphor trying to understand its links to analogy.

2. Some division of terms

I will begin by noticing some aspects of analogy and metaphor in scholastic thinkers, such as they were settled in logical texts. We may find analogy especially but not exclusively in a chapter or book on the classification of terms, usually at the beginning of a given book. Terms could be taken as parts of the sentence, such as subject, copula and predicate. In the following Subject-copula-Predicate scheme we will have three cases of subject terms:

Scheme 1

Subject-copula-Predicate

1. Peter	is	arguing.
2. A tall man	is	arguing.
3. "Peter is arguing"	is	a true sentence.

We will consider the first case, where 'Peter' names or refers to a singular man, though there are complex 'names' which also refer to a singular thing, as we shall see. The predicate term, by the way, can be also complex, "Peter is a singular masculine noun" for instance.

2.1. Singular and common terms

Terms are divided according to several criteria, like reference to things, whether singular or plural. Terms may refer to one single thing, to an individual human being, like the terms 'Socrates', 'Peter' and so on. We have proper names like those already mentioned, but we may have another kind of expressions a

little bit more complex referring also to individuals, expressions like "The son of Sofroniscus", "The present king of England", or "This human being" (pointing out at Socrates). Common terms refer to many things, like 'human being', 'animal' and so on; common terms admit quantification while singular terms do not.

2.2.   Categorematic and syncategorematic terms

According to the function terms do play in a sentence, they can be classified into categorematic terms and syncategorematic terms. Categorematic terms are those which may play the role of subject and/or predicate in a sentence. They have a meaning so to speak, while the syncategorematic terms do not, but they have an important role in the sentences. They are what we may call 'logical constants', i.e. truth-functional connectives and quantifiers. For instance, in this sentence "Every man is white", the terms 'man' and 'white' are categorematic terms, but 'every' and 'is' are syncategorematic terms. Taking terms out of the sentence the categorematic term gives us some meaning to our understanding, but the syncategorematic provokes no meaning. If I say 'every' your reaction is to ask Every *what*? We feel there is something incomplete in the expression, and that feeling does not occur when we listen that word as a part of the speech, as a part of the whole sentence. We can understand Ockham's remark when he writes "And just as the name 'every' determinately and fixedly signifies nothing [whatever]… so [too] for all syncategoremata and for conjunctions and prepositions generally." (translation by Spade 1995:13-14)

2.3.   Univocal and equivocal terms

Terms can be divided into univocal and equivocal terms. We should notice that 'terms' here refer to nouns, to words, whether written or spoken, not to concepts though they are related to concepts. The distinction between univocal and equivocal terms relates to the fact that words may have different meanings or senses and that the same meaning or sense could be expressed by different words; to put it briefly, it is related to polysemy and synonymy. Furthermore, we use the same word to talk about quite different things, which may not be related to each other but in a very tiny way. Metaphysical and theological notions are of this kind. Metaphysicians use the same word or expression for substances and accidents (for instance "There are substances and there are accidents") and theologians do the same when talking about God's attributes and human being's

attributes, like goodness or being just (for instance "Socrates is just and God is just").

We have univocal terms when a word refers to a specific sense and we have equivocal terms when one word refers to different senses, like in this scheme:

<div align="center">Scheme 2</div>

UNIVOCAL TERM   One word-------------------One concept

EQUIVOCAL TERM   One word---<   Concept 1
                                                              Concept 2
                                                              Concept 3

Ockhams states equivocity as follows "That is, the concepts or intentions of the soul (such as descriptions and definitions and even simple concepts) are different, but the utterance is one" (Spade 1995:33).

Equivocal terms are of two kinds. The first kind, the equivocal by chance, *aequivocum a casu,* corresponds to terms applied to different things unrelated to each other. Ockham puts proper names as an example of equivocal terms, since there are men which happens, by chance, to bear the same name. 'Socrates' could name different individuals and so be a equivocal term, but 'this man' pointing out to Socrates is a univocal term; the demonstrative pronouns plus a common term are very close to Russell's logically proper names. A term is imposed to mean one thing and, later on, it is imposed to mean a different thing unrelated to the former. Another example is *canis*, applied to a dog, to a constellation, and applied to a mammal in the sea too, the seal or *canis marinus*.

The second kind, equivocal term by custom or deliberate equivocal, *aequivocum a consilio*, refers to terms imposed to one thing, say 'man' designating to a rational animal and further on we observe a similarity between a man and the picture or portrait of a man, the image of a man. Eventually we imposed the word 'man' also to his image. "Do you know who that man in the portrait is?" This second kind of equivocal terms accepts some relationship between things named by the same word, even when the word points out to an animated thing and to a non-animated one. We should notice that there is a prior sense, and later on a posterior one; there is a huge difference and a little similarity. We will find analogy in this second kind of equivocal terms. Notice this scheme, where terms are divided into univocal and equivocal terms:

Scheme 3

```
                  ┌─ Univocal
                  │
        Terms ◄───┤                   ┌─ by chance
                  │                   │
                  └─ Equivocal ◄──────┤
                                      │
                                      └─ by custom or deliberate
```

2.4.   Analogy as the intermediate between equivocal and univocal terms

Another classification of terms is almost like Ockham's except by the names of the equivocal terms, which allows us to consider analogy as an intermediate between univocity and equivocity. I take it from Tomas de Mercado, a New Spain logician. This is Mercado´s scheme:

Scheme 4

```
                  ┌─ Univocal
                  │
        Terms ◄───┤                   ┌─ Absolute equivocal
                  │                   │
                  └─ Equivocal ◄──────┤
                                      │
                                      └─ Analogous
```

Univocal terms and absolute equivocal terms are completely opposed; they only share a name but not the notions or natures o intensions of the soul. The analogous "does not fully participate in the nature of the equivocation, but remains as an intermediate between the univocal and the equivocal" (Mercado 1571:8).

Univocity means the same nature expressed by one name or voice, the reference may be to one individual (as it happens to singular terms) or to many (as it happens to common terms). There is a unity between name and notion; one nature, one voice. For instance, the name 'man' refers to many things by the same notion or reason. By the way, Mercado says this about 'reason': "Consider that we call reason here that which conveniently answers the question "Why this is that?" (Mercado 1571:7). We can see this in a clear way when we ask Why

Peter is a man"? And the answer is "Because he is a rational animal", and "Why Socrates is a man? Because he is a rational animal", and so on for everyone. Equivocity consists in unity in the name and a complete diversity of reasons. We obtain analogy "when the term suits many, but not equally, so that to some extent in the name itself they do not coincide or agree and in the reason of imported things they do not completely disagree, then this middle is analogy" (Mercado 1571:8).

Mercado offers this example. Consider the term 'man' applied to a certain man, and to his corpse; we can say 'a dead man', instead of 'corpse'. Now, the corpse is a body and the body is an essential part of a man. The voice 'man' applies univocally to a man and analogically to his corpse. Another example, 'Nero' refers firstly to a cruel Roman emperor and secondarily may refer to a today cruel person because there is some property shared by the two men, some similarity though they are different persons, one is dead while the other is not. Analogy then is in the middle, since it shares the same name and some part of the 'reason' or the concept though a tiny way.

This is a scheme of analogy:

Scheme 5

UNIVOCAL -----------------------	ANALOGY --------------------	EQUIVOCAL
Same voice	Same voice	Same voice
Same reason or concept	different reason	completely different
Complete similarity	but not completely	reason
	Some similarity	No similarity

3. The place of analogy

We have just said that analogy is located between univocity and equivocity, but 'between' can indicate many possibilities, for example these three:

Scheme 6

Univocal---Analogous---Equivocal
Univocal----------------------Analogous------------------------------Equivocal
Univocal--Analogous----Equivocal

Where exactly should we place analogy? If it should be in the middle, it would be at the same distance from the equivocal and the univocal, which is not the case. On the other hand a strong similarity would bring the analogy closer to univocity and a very weak one would bring it closer to equivocality. I wonder if it could be placed in all three different places, this could not be possible unless there were different kinds of analogy. The question is if there are different kinds of analogy.

Jennifer Asworth and Domenic D'Ettore (2021:1) talk about *semantic analogy* and they report three kinds of analogy. The first one is the oldest, the Greek sense of analogy, a comparison of two proportions or relations. Apart from arithmetical proportions, they give us this example, the noun 'principle', applied to the first point of a line and to the spring from which a river starts, so we have this comparison: the point is to the line as the spring is to the river. See this scheme where A: point, B: a line, C: a spring and D: a river

<div align="center">

Scheme 7

A   B   A:B::C:D

. ———————→

C   D

</div>

the term "principle" can be applied analogically to A and C. This analogy is called *analogy of proportionality*.

The second one is the so called *analogy of attribution* which occurs when we apply a name to different but related things and in a primary way to one and in a secondary way to another (*per prius* and *per posterius*). For instance the word 'healthy' when we say that a dog is healthy (*per prius*) and also that his food is so (*per posterius*). We have already talked about this. The third kind of analogy is *analogy of participation*, which relates terms used to talk about God and creatures in a way that they do not signify the same although something can truly be said about two quite different things. For instance, "Socrates is good" and "God is good", but the goodness of God is not the same as the goodness of Socrates. We can say that Socrates is good because he participates in the goodness of God, which is goodness itself.

We can place these analogies like this:

Scheme 8

Univocal-------*Attribution*--Equivocal
Univocal------------------------*Proportionality*------------------------Equivocal
Univocal--*Participation*------ Equivocal

The analogical terms share some similarity with the univocal term and some dissimilarity or difference with the equivocal term, but in each case with different degrees.

3.1.   Analogy and Oppositions: the hexagon

In a very general way, taking into account the main aspects of analogy, such as similarity and difference, we could express it in a hexagon of opposition. The extremes to place in the Square, using the traditional letters, are A: univocal, E: Equivocal (I apologize for using an adjective, the other choice is to use the words 'univocation' and equivocation'; in both cases there is a loss of language naturalness), I: Similarity, O: Difference. The compounded extremes are Y: Analogy and U: Non-Analogy. 'Compounded' since they are a combination of their closest neighbors. Y is the conjunction of I and O while U is the disjunction of A and E.

Scheme 9

Notice that this figure does not convey the difference among the different kinds of analogy; nevertheless, it captures the essentials. We said that analogy is in the middle, being in the middle could be regarded as equal amount, so to speak, of similarity and difference. Closer to univocity could be regarded as too much similarity, and closer to equivocity as too much difference. Of course, this is a kind of quantification; an analogical one could be said. Notice also that analogy is a compound notion since it is formed by the conjunction of subcontraries.

4. Do medieval logicians care for metaphor?

Yes, they do. Logical texts have a chapter on supposition, which is a study on the different ways names refer and what kind of things they refer to. There is one kind of supposition called 'improper' which can be found in the last chapter of Part I of Ockham´s *Summa logicae*. Improper supposition refers to the metaphorical or translational use of terms in propositions; it is related to rhetorics. Ockham does not mention there the word "metaphor" but he lists three figures of speech related to metaphor, namely, antonomasia, metonymy and synecdoche. Alonso de la Veracruz, another New Spain logician, says that improper supposition occurs when a term is taken metaphorically or 'translative'; he adds three more figures of speech: metaphor, catachresis and metalepsis (Veracruz 1573; ch.19). His example of metaphor is very brief; he says that there is a metaphor when we use the word lion to refer to a cruel person. However, metaphor should be looked for in the medieval studies of Aristotle, beyond his logical works; for a nice and complex view of this see (Ashworth 2007). I am interested in analogy in scholastic thinkers and metaphor in two contemporary scholars. After showing some contemporary ideas on this topic, I will say a few words to link, if possible, analogy and metaphor.

5. Lakoff and Johnson on metaphor

Lakoff and Johnson published their book *Metaphors We Live By* in 1980; from the acknowledgments, we realize their debts to several important disciplines that helped shape their thinking. Psychology, analytic philosophy, cultural anthropology, linguistics, gestalt, politics, fuzzy logic, even mathematicians contributed to build their theory about metaphors. I think the best thinkers from most humanistic disciplines of the 20th century are present in one way or another but conversely, those disciplines have also been influenced back by this book.

5.1.   The essence of metaphor

We shall begin with his notion of metaphor: "The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another." (Lakoff and Johnson 2003:5). Metaphor is not only related to language, nor its main function is to embellish speech. It is related to language, thought and action, including our everyday relationships with other people. Let me put it briefly: understanding A in terms of B, that is metaphor. We express metaphors in everyday life, and many times, we don't even realize that they are metaphors. Lakoff and Johnson use examples from ordinary language. Let us put some.

<u>Understanding   A   in terms of   B</u>
a.	*An argument*	*is*	*a war*
b.	*Time*	*is*	*money*
c.	*Ideas*	*are*	*objects*

"The fact that we in part conceptualize…[A]…in terms of … [B]… systematically influences the shape…[A]…take and the way we talk about what we do in…[A]" (Lakoff and Johnson 2003:7).

Metaphors appear clearly in these expressions:

a.   "His criticisms were right on target."
b.   "I don't have the time to give you."
c.   "She gave me that idea."

Let me call A *the target* and B *the source*. We understand the target in terms of the source, the source gives us something for a better understanding of the target.

Scheme 10

Inside B we will have a subset of terms that apply to a certain thing (say to a war), and among those terms there will be several that can also apply to an argument and highlight our understanding of it.

5.2. Metaphor hides something and illuminates something

Now, how big can the grey circle above grow? Certainly, it will have a limit, because otherwise, we would have a kind of synonymy, and we would not have a metaphor. In other words, we have a process that hides some of the meaning of war that does not apply to an argument and highlights what does and illuminates our understanding of it.

Metaphor hides those elements of the source that might be inconsistent with the target, and that is why the grey circle cannot grow too much. By the way, when the authors talk about metaphors, they also talk about metaphorical concepts. Metaphorical concepts give us partial understanding, and it will always be partial. If it were total, one concept would be another; A would be B, there would be total synonymy. This is the reason why a part of B cannot be adjusted to A.

5.3. Metaphors form a system

Now, metaphors reinforce each other, they almost form a system to improve our understanding of something. Metaphors support each other from different angles. Let´s take this metaphor, where the source gives a better understanding of love:

Target		Source
Love	*is*	*a journey.*

And consider these expressions from the everyday life:

> "We're at a crossroad."
> "It´s been a long, bumpy road."
> "This relationship is a dead-end street."
> "Our marriage is on the rocks."
> "This relationships is foundering.".

So this is how we experience and understand love in terms of a journey. This journey can be by sea, on the roads, even through the city. This can be seen in the various metaphors above. All they are instances of the "Love is a journey." metaphor.

Before asking about analogy, let me finish this part with a quotation that summarizes their view:

"In short, metaphor is a natural phenomenon. Conceptual metaphor is a natural part of human thought, and linguistic metaphor a natural part of human language." (Lakoff and Johnson 2003: 247).

6. Do Lakoff and Johnson care for analogy?

I do not recall having seen the word 'analogy' in Lakoff and Johnson's book, and I was surprised about this. They have said "our claims strike at the heart of centuries-old assumptions about the nature of meaning, thought, and language." (Lakoff and Johnson 2003: 273). In fact, they devote 17 chapters to expounding their theory in depth, and in chapter 18, they test it by contrasting it with another view. The following chapters are dedicated to demolish myths such as objectivism and subjectivism. They have a chapter to explain similarity in terms of our conceptual system and some natural kind of experience, "both of which may be metaphorical". They seem to claim their theory is good enough to explain away some philosophical problems such as the problem of meaning and related ones.

Before finding an answer to our initial question let us go the chapter 18, where they "need to look at two major strategies [*abstraction* and *homonymy*] that linguists and logicians have used to handle, without any reference to metaphor, what we have called metaphorical concepts." (Lakoff and Johnson 2003: 106).

6.1.   Before founding an answer let us see a problem

Take these sentences:

> "He buttressed the wall."

and

> "He buttressed his argument with more facts."

Lakoff and Johnson have a way of explaining how we use the metaphorical expression and why we easily understand it. However, there are 'strategies' which also look for a way to explain how we understand those sentences. The strategies are called "abstraction" and "homonymy"

The abstraction view maintains that there is an abstract concept of *buttress* and our sentences are special cases of it. The homonymy view maintains that there are two independent concepts of 'buttress'. namely b_1 and b_2

 The strong view takes them to be unrelated since one talks about a physical object and the other about to an abstract one. The use of the same word is an accident. The weak homonymy view "allows that their meanings may be similar in some respects…" but it is still an abstract similarity.

Scheme 11

```
                 ┌Abstract: same abstract concept
                 │
                 │              ┌ Strong:  b₁ and b₂ have nothing to do with each other
  buttress ◄─────┤              │
                 │              │
                 └Homonymy ◄────┤
                                │
                                └ Weak:    b₁ and b₂ their meanings may be similar in some
                                           respects, but there is still an abstract similarity
```

Does this sound familiar to the reader?

6.2.   An affirmative answer to our question and one last question

We should notice that Scheme 11 fits perfectly with the medieval classification (at least one of them) of the univocal and equivocal terms, as it shown in Scheme 4. The 'abstract' sense of the term 'buttress' corresponds to the univocal sense. The strong sense of homonymy corresponds to the equivocal sense and the weak sense corresponds to analogy. I guess the authors try to relate analogy to univocity when they insist in saying that weak homonymy preserves an abstract similarity. Perhaps they are talking metaphorically about analogy, but why they do not even mention the word 'analogy'? Perhaps analogy is one of the centuries-old assumptions they want to strike at.

Let us combine schemes:

Scheme 12

```
  ┌ Univocal terms: same concept / **abstraction**
  │
  │                              ┌ by accident, pure equivocals / **strong homonymy**
◄─┤                              │
  │                              │
  └ Equivocal terms/ **Homonymy** ◄─┤
                                 │
                                 └ deliberate equivocals / **weak homonymy**
```

We may ask them this question: What does make possible to understand one thing in terms of another thing? The first answer coming to my mind is: similarities, relationships of some sort make it possible. So we understand A, the target by means of B, the source and I think the source B is, in some sense, *prius* over the target A. A is *posterious* with respect to B. This way of looking at their scheme get us closer to analogy, since analogy depends and rests on

similarities. But notice that similarities depend on our conceptual frame and this is metaphorical, according to our authors. From Lakoff and Johnson's point of view analogy (if analogy is veiled referred to in their account of abstraction and homonymy) is not enough to explain certain thought and linguistic processes since analogy is based on similarities and these are most of the cases metaphorical processes. On the other hand, analogy seems to be basic when using words to point at different aspects of reality which happens to share something.

So it seems we are at a dead end. It seems that way, although I believe that we are at the beginning of a dialogue between apparently opposed conceptions. We need to find out more deeply what the scholastics think about metaphor, and what our authors can say about analogy. I believe that this dialogue can be fruitful.

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Analogy and Metaphor in Aristotle's "Pros Hen" Understanding of Psychical Activity

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Abstract: Analogy played a foundational role in Aristotle's philosophy connecting both to his understanding of causality and psychical activity. I discuss Aristotle's views on analogy and metaphor and show that his special use of the word *energeia* has metaphorical and analogical components. His views are not only subtle and insightful, but provide valuable insights for contemporary philosophy.

Key words: soul, activity, movement, philosophy of mind, phenomenology

It is well known that analogy played an essential role in the work of Plato and Aristotle. Generally, it has been considered from an epistemological perspective, as a means of knowing something indirectly by extrapolating from something different but similar. Plato famously had Socrates give a series of analogies in books 6 and 7 of the *Republic* which describe "the good" in relation to the soul's activity of striving for knowledge, which culminates in the allegory of the cave. These famous analogies describe the moment of true insight. Aristotle seems to have gone even further by systematically applying analogy in every philosophical and scientific pursuit. For both, analogy involves the striving of the mind as a psychical activity. The key is that we do not understand this

activity (analogical reasoning) on the basis of something else (analogically) but instead we understand the activity and causality of other things on the basis of it. By comparing metaphor and analogy I uncover phenomenologically distinct features of each as psychical activities and highlight their epistemic value in Aristotle's philosophy. Drawing on the interpretations of Ravaisson, Ricœur, Aubenque, Rodrigo, and Schumacher, I focus on the psychological aspects and processes involved in analogy and metaphor. I claim that analogy is both epistemological and phenomenological, but show that the latter aspects provide special insight into the workings of the mind. I begin by comparing analogy with experience [ἐμπειρία] and focalization [πρός ἕν], in order to show that analogy plays a fundamental role in *all* cognitive activity. I then go on to examine the role of analogical metaphor in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. With this analysis, it becomes clear that *psychical activity* is the basis on which the mind conceives activities of other varieties, and of causality in general and is the fundamental phenomena named by his term *energeia*.

  Analogy is an activity in which the mind gathers and understands the relations between a multiplicity of details that participate in a single form. The mind enacts it all together as a unity while preserving the differences, called a *pros hen* unity or focalization. We understand a convergence of causal factors in general by an analogy (matter to form, prior conditions to results, potency to activity, etc.). In the same way, the soul, as the "activity of the body," unifies the potentialities of the organs and directs their movements. The relation of mind to itself is the paradigmatic occurrence of analogy for Aristotle, as it is in no way a metaphor, nor indirect – the minds understanding of itself is as an act of understanding. For Aristotle, both metaphor and analogy can give us indirect access to something that we cannot grasp immediately through something we already know. Analogy is related directly with understanding form, metaphor to imagination and transformation. The distinction between motion and activity is a famously difficult question (Burnyeat 2008). Even with this distinction, Aristotle conflates them and even relied on metaphor as a means for getting at the nature of the mind and its processes of understanding. He famously likens the activity of the mind to light (as illuminating) as well as to touch (as an immediate contact). Even the word activity [ἐνέργεια] is metaphorical in that it is a "work" or "operation" [ἔργον]. While Aristotle insisted that motion and activity are different, and that metaphor and analogy have correspondingly different epistemic values, he still employed them both, and in combination, with didactic and heuristic intents. Aristotle's use of analogy ends up being very modern and has insights that are still relevant to contemporary philosophical investigations of mind, causality, and phenomenology.

Analogy, Experience, and Focalization

Analogy is a multifaceted term for Aristotle, with the most general meaning relating to proportion. In this sense it designates what today we call isomorphism; an intelligible relation which is a noticeable similarity between two different relations a:b :: c:d.[1] This ability of the mind to not only notice similarities (e.g. a goat is similar to a horse) but to notice similarities of relations (e.g. a tool is similar to a hand, since both are *useful* for the soul), points us to a deeper psychological aspect of analogy. Analogy opens up a comparative function of intellectual activity which discloses the most fundamental kinds of relationality, not merely numerical but also, and more importantly, qualitative. The relation between unity and multiplicity, especially in relation to causality, is the most fundamental analogy. Analogy itself is a gathering of multiplicity that discovers something that is more than the sum of the parts, by grasping them in a way that pertains to the whole as a *sui generis* unity. This way of understanding things as unities of a convergences of a multiplicity of factors is essential to both Aristotle's views on causality as well as the more cryptic views on *pros hen* unity (Cf. Yu 1999).

Pros hen unity is closely related to Aristotle's famous phrase that some terms are "said in many ways" such as in *Metaphysics* 4.1 and in each chapter of book 5 (Cf. Brentano 1975). Some things that are said in many ways are arbitrary, while others trace underlying connections (NE 1129a30). Justice is *said in many ways*, but also has a focal meaning. One important sense of justice (called distributive justice) is as a proportion [*analogon*] (NE 5.5, 1131a30-b13). Aristotle's emphases on the soul as the focal meaning of justice is revealing because it implies that justice not only manifests in many different ways, but that the central sense of it is known only by *one who is just and sees what is just and unjust in very different situations of life* (1138b23-35). Justice emerges in a person's gradual development, involving other virtues like courage and temperance (NE 1130a7). The virtue of justice depends on the emergence of these virtues and habits as preconditions. This idea is remarkably similar to the way justice is treated in the *Republic*, since it is about *cultivating* virtues and knowledge in the soul in order to become just. Aristotle and Plato's view is that, yes, it is extremely difficult to define justice and to communicate what it is in a sort of legal way, but the reason for this difficulty is not due to the fact that it manifests in many diverse

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[1]   The meaning of proportion can also extend beyond simple quantity. It is, in fact, an almost *qualitative* aspect of numerical relations rather than being a totality or sum. It is a way of relating numbers or magnitudes rather than a number or magnitude itself. This becomes even more qualitatively expressive with the ratios in musical harmony.

situations, but because you need to be just in order to know what justice is. This is why they are both so concerned with how people can become just not simply how to formulate a definition.

The relation between focalization and analogy has been explored with great clarity by Eric Schumacher. Schumacher (2018) argued against G. E. L. Owen (Cf. Aubenque 1984: 19-23), that focal meaning is coextensive with analogy, and does so by first of all extending the significance of analogy beyond its mathematical formulation as numerical proportionality. By connecting the two key passages (*Met.* 4.2 and 12.4) that Owen used to differentiate analogy and focal meaning, Schumacher shows how Aristotle's conception of focal meaning and analogy are not identical, but are *inverse perspectives* on the same double movement and therefore that each is implied by the other. Analogy emerges in the course of Schumacher's work as more than a mere epistemological devise and is revealed to be a general ability of the soul to gather memories, images, perceptions, and thoughts together into a simple whole or unity which both *relates* and *differentiates* what has been gathered together. Ana-logy is an ability to make the past relevant by gathering-again, that is, to think of something on the basis of something else, or to perceive *this* based on *those* memories (Baracchi 2007: 28-42).[2] We can approach this double movement of gathering and differentiating in a way that emphasizes one or the other of these aspects, that is, focalization or analogy.

Owen (1989) used these two aspects to try to prove the difference between analogy and focal meaning, referring to the former as an "outward" comparison and the latter as an "inward" one. Thus, analogy is said to take up a certain relationship (e.g. matter, form, privation). It *goes out* to things and *applies* the same relation to varying phenomena. Focal meaning, on the other hand, will draw in many irreducibly different things by connecting back to a fundamental meaning or definition. Causes are "focalized" by funneling plurality into a multifaceted unity, as in the example of health. But unlike Owen's account, for Aristotle, health is focalized by the actual, concrete, dynamic living thing that unifies all the diverse phenomena. Aristotle said that analogy is responsible for how we *think* of the causes of diversity among natural individuals (*Phy.* 1). We think of two different animals with unique features or behaviors, but with a similarity in their manor of converging several causal ingredients into an integral whole. Health is the concrete, ongoing process of making causes converge in a way that maintains vital functions. Based on an analogy at this level, we can

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2   Remember also that for Socrates, in the *Phaedo*, that recollection is most fundamental activity in the soul, and is responsible for both associations and differentiation (73a-76b).

say "healthy horse" and "healthy human." We do not mean the *exact same thing* in each case, as human health does not involve the same things as horse health; they integrate different causes and their maladies are diagnosed through different signs. Nevertheless, they are both understood through a convergence of causes that have an analogous relationship to the condition of the enduring individual.

Thus, some degree of the "outward movement" of analogy is already implied by the convergence of focalization, as it is only by a convergence of causes that there is any analogy between different individuals. Furthermore, every focalization is always already (potentially) an analogical mode of relating causal ingredients. *To think of health as focalized in one thing is already to think analogically of causes*. The very fact that health, justice, and being are approached as focal unities shows that *pros hen* unity is always already an example of analogical reasoning, and the most fundamental model of analogy. Schumacher provides an admirable alternative formulation to the problem by showing that analogy, taken as a mere structure of proportions, is secondary, derivative, and insufficient to "capture the primary dynamism of the term" (Schumacher 2018: 29). He also shows that Owen's interpretation of focal meaning was overly reductive and eliminated the hidden *dynamism*. The approach of Owen's interpretation was to understand a focalization of the *definition*: e.g. health as a central term used in *defining* heathy food. Schumacher shifts the meaning of focalization away from concepts and definitions to a more concrete sense. It is not a single definition being distributed to other concepts, but a way of thinking the relevance of a diverse set of interrelated, but differently significant, ingredients of a unified reality.

This interpretation emphasizes the relationship between unity and diversity. Rather than the abstract relationship that generalizes by subsuming a particular (unity) under a universal (multiplicity), the unity of focalization is instead a unity of real *generation* wherein multiplicity is subsumed by unity. The presence of healthy food is enough for the entire reality of health to show itself, but not by merely linking it back to a concept. It is not merely an association based on our hunger since the lived process of maintaining health is what makes such an association relevant in the first place. The association cannot be the cause of the idea, but is rather a relevant association to make only because of the general relevance that anything whatsoever in experience, thought, or imagination, can have with respect to the active condition of life that we call healthy (or sick). This is exactly how Aristotle thought of the activity of health and is why he used it as his example of focalization. Health is an active state or *hexis* (Rodrigo 2011), and is connected directly to the vital principle (*psyche*) as focused on living and preserving life. It is the tendency by which we spontaneously strive to

maintain life. The most fundamental senses of both health and the *pros hen* are thus teleological. We think of health as a "good" and as "choice worthy". Health shows up in our awareness on the basis of its preferability; things are relevant in relation to it and it is the central axis of relevance by which we perceive things as painful or pleasurable, averse or desirable, adverse or beneficial. The entire sense of life, including strivings of different sorts – striving for justice, the philosophical life that strives for the uncovering of *being* (stretching out toward the truth, *Met*. 980a21) – are animated by the focalizing tendency of the soul which puts the multiplicity of causal ingredients together in a way that maintains and optimizes its being. Far from a mere logical relation of concepts, focalization and analogy are lived processes involving feelings, actions, and the immediate apprehension of relevance. The fact that something appears as healthy, just, or true always already implies that we notice a common direction or orientation that unifies a multiplicity, and that this is what structures the relevance of the multiplicity to our concrete life. This dynamic sense of health as a *hexis* must be taken as essential to focalization.

Schumacher clarifies how intuition [νοῦς], by relating directly to the principle [ἀρχή], involves both analogy and a focalization. As Aristotle outlined, this very reliance on "principles" in our knowledge of nature and the soul is itself analogical (*Phy*. 1; *Met*. 9.6), Schumacher's identification of the faculty of intuition with analogy helps us understand how intellectual intuition factors into *all* human thought. *Nous* is not merely a "theological" hypothesis (thought thinking thought) or a postulate grounding metaphysical syllogisms, but is an indispensable ingredient in concrete human thought. The unity of the "material principles" of thought and the universals that the soul grasps by intellectual intuition are, more fundamentally, focalized unities. The grasp of principles is described by Aristotle as "indivisible," and is said to take place in an indivisible "now," but it is also, at the same time, an act of distinguishing the differences, as a point also divides a line in two (DA 3.4-6). *Nous* has a "fractured unity" according to Schumacher, which is both indivisible and duplicative, or double (Schumacher 2018: 45). This mode of being "fractured" implies that intuition is not only a simple unity, but is also involved in language, and is an ingredient in the gathering of *logos*. However, it is not reducible to language. He said that "*logos* makes vocal what *nous* unifies" (Schumacher 2018: 47). Thus, while language is closely related to *nous* and focalization, and depends on them, it also unfolds in multiplicity. The unity remains intact, its integrity is preserved in *nous*, while the multiplicity of differences emerge gradually by *logos* (analysis and discursive thought). *Nous* is a precondition for discourse in that the focalizing unity is the basis on which the

differences can unfold. Just as we have a sense of health that makes all particular senses relevant, so in syllogistic thought we have a focal sense of relevance by which the principle can be qualified though its relationship with a middle term. The thought that this activity (walking) is healthy, or that this animal is healthy, distinguishes or divides the indivisible principle by conceiving it under one of its causal ingredients. The analogical way of thinking about different natural compounds or living beings, as peculiar instantiations of *energeia*, is at work in all thought. The original and primary case from which analogy itself is defined, is a focal sense derived from thinking itself and later applied to the many. The focalization of thought itself in the active *being-at-work* of the soul (thinking) and by preserving its "first actuality" (knowledge), is the ground of all analogical thought (DA 412a-413a10). *Nous,* in a way, goes beyond *logos* (NE 1140b31-1141a8) and it is this aspect (indivisibility) that it can included infinite multiplicity and be delimited by a finite plurality of explanations. This appears to be what is at the heart of the very cryptic, but blisteringly insightful pages of DA 3.6.

Aristotle's characterization of the ambiguity of being as a *focal sense* known by analogy, is closely related to his claim that being is not a *genus*. This denial of the *generalization* or homogenization of focal meaning (and analogy) was of particular importance to Félix Ravaisson (1837) in his *Essai sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote*. The rejection of this ontological generality is clear, again, with the example of health: health is not a "general notion" of which healthy animal, healthy food, etc., are all specific, particular instantiations. Healthy food is not a *species* of health (one subsumed by the many), but is an unique aspect that is expressible through the same *activity* (many subsumed under the one). Similarly, being is like health in that, for example, the categorical modes of being are just one aspect, but act and power are other aspects irreducible to the categories, and we must include all aspects in the focal sense of the being as *this* individual (*tode ti*). Health is enacted in the convergence of healthy food, healthy actions, and doing things for the sake of health; the healthy individual itself weaves these together, not as an abstract juxtaposition, but as the integral act unifying the multiplicity of processes. Health is concrete, a tension holding the diverse parts together in the activity integrating its causes. It is also generative in that it produces and sustains itself by unfolding in multiplicity. We find in this portrayal of analogy and focalization, a sense of unity among qualitative multiplicity that hinges on the problem of abstract generality and concrete existence. As light is given as an analogy for intuition, we find these four key aspects for Aristotle to be indivisibly united: illumination, intuition, activity, focalization, and analogy.

In Pierre Aubenque's article, "Ravaisson interprète d'Aristote" (1984), a higher form of *analogy* is clearly delineated; it is not verbal, *logikos*, but deals with substances directly as individuals discovered in experience by a supra-logical intuition. Aubenque concludes, quite rightly, that Ravaisson leads us much closer to Aristotle's thought on this topic than any other in his interpretation. The kernel of insight rests on the distinction between two opposite directions in which thought can travel, namely, toward abstraction on the one hand and the concrete individual on the other (Ravaisson 1837: 537). The two corresponding forms of knowledge are: empty logical relations that apply to being by a "discrete analogy" in which the terms of relations are *identical*, and a "continuous analogy" that progresses, and as it does, new knowledge is produced in an irreversible direction of development. Aubenque (1984: 448) referrers to a crucial, illuminating footnote in which Ravaisson delineated the two directions using two strings of terms or "formulas:"

> on the one hand, «'Exoteric,' 'foreign,' 'common,' 'general,' 'logical,' (*logikon*, in the sense of 'verbal') and 'void,' and, on the other, what is 'own/ proper (propre),' 'Drawn from existing givens,' 'produced by the thing itself,' 'Exact,' 'natural' (*physikon*, in the sense of 'conforms to the nature of the thing'), 'analytical,' 'philosophical,' 'true'» (Aubenque 1984, *my translation*; Ravaisson 1837: 284, n. 1).

The second list of formulas delimits a domain of *concrete individuals*: a mixing of matter and form; focalizing activities and potentialities; the integral unity of imperfect forms that are always in the process of completing and maintaining themselves. Health is always this (*tode ti*) particular individual's current state with its concrete history. The relationship between a species and genus is direct, e.g. human and animal, but is also artificial and external. In the same way, quantity is directly linked to being. These abstract or logical relations are not on the side of truth (although they do contribute to the truth as matter does to form). Unlike the mathematical abstraction of *discrete* proportions, there is an analogy that uses *continuous* proportions, the parts of which form a "suite" or irreversible series in which the latter terms contain the former, which Ravaisson called subordination (Ravaisson 1837: 533, 536). This chain of continuous links is not a collection of species under a genus and not a direct link of logic or predication, but a real passage of movements gaining power over time by integrating multiplicity (Ravaisson 1837: 534; cf. Ricoeur 2003: 322). The "continuous proportion" refers to the focalization of the progression of growth involving many unequal parts. This is essential to the concrete process by which thought emerges in human life.

Sensation is to memory what memory is to experience, and again as experience is to knowledge. Each is an actual stage in the gradual emergence of knowledge. This continuity of powers and activities is a series of actual analogies describing the developmental process of all habituation and learning. Taking this continuous proportion as a paradigmatic of all life and thought, the continuous proportion, the good sense of analogy, is found to be at work in all experience and in the concrete intuition of principles (Aubenque 1984, 449). It explains developmental progress and is the cause of the actual emergence of such knowledge. Living activity integrates (*pros hen*) many different actions, habits, pleasures, and skills, by putting them to use in higher forms of intentionality.

While Aristotle leads us up to the summit of "pure activity", which necessarily goes beyond the human, to the point at which we find an unmoved mover, the intermediary compounds (moved movers) are what is of particular interest (Ravaisson 1837: 537) where individuals have an analogical way of being. They are what must be conceived dynamically and developmentally. Despite being launched by the study of nature into the stratosphere of *astral-theology*, we cannot simply reside at the summit, motionless, or in pure thought thinking itself. All we can do to stay in astral-theology is to remain in a circle of solar-metaphor (Ricoeur 2003: 341). But this always remains at a distance. We cannot, as passive intellects remain in a pure thought of motionless activity. How we move between these view of activity and motion (unmoved mover vs. moved mover) is of critical importance to preserving the dynamic view of life which Aristotle describes. An immediate descent from pure intellect will produce only abstract knowledge: a god that thinks the forms, and in that thought is contained the idea of a human. This "descent" says that the concrete human follows by necessity from the mind of god whose ideas of the form of living things is the truest cause. We will have walked ourselves into the sort of neo-Platonic emanation ontology (which Bergson accused Aristotle of doing; *Creative Evolution*). The reality of movement and the activity of life will be mere *diminutions* of the divine motor-power as it dissipates and decays by dint of the distance of its effects from their source. We can avoid this problematic view by taking an opposite approach by claiming that only the ascent has the ability to make an ontological claim, while the descent is merely abstract and logical, pertains to epistemology. The ontological, in this sense, arises from phenomenological investigations, while the epistemological arises from analysis. Only by remounting the chain of causes, by actually rising up with our soul into more intense movements and activities will the meaning of "moved mover" become dynamic and developmental. This approach preserves the concrete singularity of "growing" the powers of life and

soul in a series or "suite"[3], the true being of which consists of progress unfolding gradually, a continuity through developments (Cf. De Ribera-Martin 2017). The descent represents an inversion of reality, it smuggles along and conceals a falsehood that distorts our knowledge of reality. Being becomes nothing more than a coordination of species under a genus, a catalogue of abstract forms without reality (Ravaisson 1837: 537). The continuous analogy in the actual lived emergence of powers and activities in the soul is a movement that rises from multiplicity into higher unity: a convergence and growth of multiplicity by integration or focalization. The essence of psychical activity is not only grasped in its existence, but is tied to embodied life, habit, learning, and our individual life history. *Energeia* is concrete and the truth of its essence is disclosed to the soul in the event of its own activity.

Analogical Metaphors

In this section I will show that the meaning of *energeia,* as a term *coined by* Aristotle, is formed by what he called "analogical metaphor", and it describes the inner sense of psychical life. *Energeia,* first and foremost, names psychical activity. The term focalizes many diverse aspects of psychical activity: vividness, attention, vivacity, agential action, and intentionality. My key insight is that vividness [ἐναργής/ἐνάργεια] is a key component to his crafting of the word ἐνέργεια, and further, that activity, literally translates to both *being-at-work* and *manifesting-in-work*. Metaphor will be shown to have the power "to produce learning" (*Rhe.* 1410b13) in an easy and pleasurable way (1410b10), and furthermore, "produces *rapid* learning in us" (1410b21). By mixing metaphor and analogy, one can tap into a rhetorical power to bring their subject matter to life by giving it movement and vivacity. This ability arises from the speakers appeal to the lived activities of the soul, which are analogous to the activity they are metaphorically interposed with.

In *Rhetoric* 3.10-11, Aristotle examines elegance ἀστεῖα which is a way of rendering things vividly in speech. He explains this with his own metaphor of "setting things before the eyes"[4] which is the effect of "analogical metaphors" which, he says, signify *energeia,* activity (Cf. Ricoeur 2003: 30-38). Analogical

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    [3]   A musical suite is likely Ravaisson's metaphor, that is, a set of musical pieces played in succession.

    [4]   This phrase is found also in the poetics where he suggests that its best for writers, when constructing a plot, to "place things before the eyes", which makes the aesthetic effect "as vivid as possible [ἐναργέστατα]" (1462a23).

metaphor is differentiated from metaphor more generally. The former requires that the two things connected by the metaphor not merely share a quality or attribute, like completeness of a square and the quality of a just or upright person, but that they also involve activity (*Rhe*. 1411b23). For instance, according to Aristotle' examples, to say that a good man is "four-square" is a metaphor, since both are "complete", but the phrase does not express *activity*, which is essential to the analogical metaphor. Aristotle gives many examples of analogical metaphor,[5] many of which evoke an internal life and intentionality to inanimate things. Homer, he says, often speaks of inanimate things as if they were animate by making use of metaphor, giving them life and movement (1412a10). It is not only by placing activities before our eyes that his speech is elegant, in this sense, but because the activities in question are deep sentiments related to the inner life of the soul. Aristotle claimed that Homer's popularity is primarily due to his wittiness in bringing inanimate things to life, and gives the following example: "Downward again to the plain rolled the ruthless stone," (*Rhe*. 1411b22-33; *Od*. 11.598). Aristotle rewrites this metaphor as an analogy: "For as the stone it to Sisyphus, so is the shameless person to the one shamefully treated." (*Rhe*. 1412a5). Being ruthless and longing signify activities (*Rhe*. 1412a3) and we catch a glimpse of the inner life of things as moving and acting with intent. There are several important things to notice in the examples. First of all, in the (misquoted) Euripides line "Thereupon the Greeks darting forward with their feet," the Greeks are moving swiftly and so do things which are darting or shooting.[6] Both *do the same action* and enact the same intention. There is a further level of analysis which gives us insight into the phenomenological dimensions of analogical metaphor. The fact that *asteia* makes us learn *quickly* [μάθησιν ταχεῖαν] introduces a sort of *reflexivity* between the content of the particular example of analogical metaphor, and the darting action of all metaphorical language more generally. Elegance is, so to speak, an activity *manifesting-in-work,* placing activity before the eyes; it is the *being-at-work* of the soul making use of the activity of inner life to give a *quick* and easy insight into their subject matter. Not only does it make the content more lively, but it makes the soul of the listener more lively, mobile, and active! The second thing to note is that while *enarges*

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5   Too many to quote, but a few will be helpful to reproduce here: "of one having the prime of his life in full bloom" [Isocrates], "you, like a sacred animal roaming at will" [Phillippus], "The arrow flew" [Homer], "The arrow was eager to fly" [Homer], "The spear stuck in the ground [but remain quivering as with eagerness]" [Homer].

6   Like the shooting stars in *Republic* 10 (621b).

does not occur in the Rhetoric,[7] there are semantic intertwinements which tie *vividness* to the movement of placing activity before the eyes and producing quick learning. The word is based on *argos* which, in Homeric usage, can mean swiftness.[8] Argos also means "glancing" or "shimmering" which implies a quick flash of light as when Homer describes the brightness of Zeus's lightning bolts.[9] Aristotle describes poetic language itself as a sort of motion; he relates the word metaphor [μεταφορά] to ἐπίφορα transference (*Poet.* 1457b7; cf. Ricoeur 2003 8-25).

Metaphor is something used [χρῆσθαι] in different ways [τρόπῳ] (*Poet.* 1457b30). And usage involves two different, though related problems. First, it implies a concrete historical community of language involving common acceptable words and foreign words.[10] Next, it involves several different relations through which the transference of meaning can travel: (1) genus replaces species, (2) species replaces genus, (3) species replaces species, or (4) by analogy." (1457b7).[11]

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[7]   It is odd that Aristotle never used the term *enargeia* in *Rhe.* 3.11, a chapter whose explicit aim is to explain what "placing before the eyes" means, considering that in the *Poetics* he said that "placing before the eyes" produces vividness. Perhaps there have been some errors in manuscripts and the e and a are mistakenly swapped. But does Aristotle even need to use it in this passage? Has he not instead clearly indicating the very overlap between *enargeia* and *energeia*, and so this passage makes plainly clear the intended overlap in meaning. Translators have even tended to collapse the omission of *enarges*, rendering "before the eyes" simply as *vividness*. See W. Rhys Roberts, 158, who discusses the problem. For an example see the John Henry Freese translation of the *Rhetoric* in the Loeb edition, 1411b5. It hardly matters if Aristotle had put *enargeia* in some places where we today mistakenly find energeia, since we already have overwhelming evidence of their intimate connection. *Enargeia* overlaps clear δῆλον, manifest φανερά, as too *energeia* overlaps with usage [χρῆσθαι], and movement. In all cases, similarities do not erase the differences, but merely focalizes them.

[8]   Used in the *Od.* an epithet describing swiftness of 2.11, 17.62, and 20.145: "for along with him two swift hounds followed" [ἅμα τῷ γε δύω κύνες ἀργοὶ ἕποντο.].

[9]   *Od.* 5.128 and 131.

[10]   Something can cease to function as a metaphor if the intended connotation is no longer known to the audience.

[11]   He provides the following examples for each: (1) "my ship stands here" mooring is a species of standing (2) "a thousand noble works has Odysseus accomplished" a thousand [μυρίον] has been used [κέχρηται] instead of multiplicity [πολύ] (3) "drawing off life with bronze" and "cutting with slender-edge bronze [bowl]" drawing off is used in place cutting and *vice versa* (4) "when B is to A as D is to C, then instead of B the poet will say D and B instead of D" thus the phrase "sowing [σπείρων] its divinely-nourishing flame [φλόγα]" so that seed is to sowing as the sun is to its powers of warming, and so the word sowing is substituted for a word that would be the equivalent of the sun's insemination, imparting activity to the world (1457b7-29). In the first case, we substitute something specific with the general, in the second, the general is replaced by something specific. In the third we move between two specifics (a bowl draws off liquid a sword cuts and they are substitutable one for the other). It should also be noted that

Metaphor by analogy works by drawing a comparison between two different activities.

What analogy adds to metaphor is the possibility of getting at something which has no name. We lack a word for the life-giving activity of the sun and so we substitute our conception of sowing and fertility from human life. The poet evokes an inner life and intentionality which is transfered it to the action of the sun. Evocation invites us to install ourselves immediately in the *manifesting-in-work* itself as if we were living it. This rhetorical device, employed in philosophy, joins the content of the metaphor with its mode of production, i.e. invention. The flash of illumination of these lightning bolts of wit bring to life the very *vivacity* and *vividness* of the metaphorical act itself. The power of this vividness depends on the appeal made to the listeners own sensibility, it *evokes* and *instills* a sense of vitality. Evocative language does not succeed by demonstrations requiring logical deductions, rather they are successful if they attract us to make the convergence for ourselves.

Homer evokes the interiority of the movement which is characteristic of *energeia* as a living activity "he makes everything into something that moves and lives, and activity is movement." (1412a10). While the genius of Homer is often the way he brings the inanimate to life, (blurring a category difference which is used by Aristotle in DA 2.1) the purely imaginative transference of metaphor is not the only way it can be used. The analogous metaphor reveals the common feeling of life as an interiority guiding movement: κυβερνητικός (Rep. 488d-e). Despite the apparent attempt to separate the animate and inanimate, there are times that Aristotle turns to metaphorical transference of an interiority of the soul (*energeia*) to nature, like when he refers to a "desire" which directs the simple bodies, or refers to the heaven as participating in life (*Hea*. 292b1); a striving of matter towards form (*Met*. 1034a15); or when he says that if an axe had a soul, it would be the activity of cutting (DA 412b13). No doubt Aristotle transferred psychological characteristic of *energeia* to the dynamics of nature and while rejecting a *hylozooic* ontology, retained an *organic* cosmology: the whole cosmos is a living being and the simple bodies imitate life. *The dynamism of nature is understood by analogy to the activity of the soul, and metaphor can help us to learn about the inner principles at work in natural processes* (Cf. GC 380a17). Rhetoric is not a remote discipline, separated from philosophy and metaphysics. It is an integral part of Attic philosophical process of coming to first principles, rooting them in a mytho-poetic as much as a mathematical paradigm.

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in these two examples that Aristotle gives bronze acts as a common underlying matter for the actions of bowl and sword.

The Evidence and Vividness of Principles

The central importance of *enargeia* in Aristotle's coining of *energeia* is made all the more obvious by considering its role in science, which proceeds by way of induction [ἀπαγωγή] as described in *Prior Analytics* 23. Induction, involves a *vivid* awareness, by means of experience. Through it we discover the principles at work in the phenomena of nature. Induction achieves intuitions by bringing facts "before our eyes" or, by another metaphor, arrests and drags suspects into court to testify to a magistrate. Empirical knowledge begins only when phenomena bear witness to underlying causes. Induction is ἐναργέστερος, *more-vivid* than demonstration (*Pri.* 68b37) and the deductive knowledge of science depends on it.[12]

The principles "come to rest" in the soul like soldiers in battle who one by one retake their position (another metaphor) – the *evidence* which *clearly displays* the underlying nature suddenly is noticed (*Post. An.* 2.19). This could happen in the observation of the drying up of sap (*Post. An.* 98b35), in the physiological changes which accompany emotions, or in the acts of the soul itself (*Prob.* 916b-917b3). What is evident is not what appears immediately, but what only appears over time, by careful observation, when memory collects many unique moments together and we find the hidden thread connecting the changes. Experience brings us to the evidence of principles but we must open up to them in the right way in order to gain insight. The human body for instance appears to be healing and growing itself, it evidently acts according to principles, but the evidence of this inner-principle of life, *manifesting-in-work*, is not yet understood in terms of its component causes (the three principles, matter-form-privation, or the four causes matter-form-motion-end). Discursive thought considers the entity in relation to causes explained through demonstrative knowledge, but this knowledge is necessarily dependent on the sensible intuition of *evidence*. Evidence (*enarges*) arises in experience and the principles, discovered in the particulars, come to stand (epi-*steme*) in the soul as a universal, or according to the whole (kat-*holon*).

The most fundamental principles – *energeia* and *entelecheia* – come to rest or to take a stand in the soul by both analogy and metaphor. In *Metaphysics* 9.6 Aristotle gives a "synoptic analogy" [τὸ ἀνάλογον συνορᾶν] (1048a35-b8) which proceeds by induction. This is meant to make clear δῆλον (*delon*) the priority of *energeia* (with respect to ways of being) in immediate intuition. Through it, we can catch a glimpse of the establishment of this principle in action. Aristotle draws this analogy by assembling witnesses from a heterogeneous assortment of natural relations involving activity. The differences should not be collapsed, as

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12   We find a similar treatment of the inductive process in Hippocrates' *Precepts* section 1.

he says, "things are said to be actively, not in the same ways but analogously." (1048b5) Indeed we find a great deal of difference between the examples given:

> "what is building in relation what is capable of building, and what is awake in relation to what is asleep, and what is seeing in relation to what has its eyes closed but has sight, and what has been shaped out of matter is in relation to the matter, and what has been completely worked out is related to the something left unworked." *Metaphysics* 1048a36-b4 *my translation*.

The relation is both the same and different in each case. Builders do not innately have their art, it must be acquired, while all animals have alternating periods of sleeping and waking. Seeing and having eyes shut is not the same as sleep, although the eyes are closed in sleep. One does not stop or start having the ability to see by closing the eyes, though it does stop being used. So, these are not the same; they each imply different temporal relations. Nevertheless, these three encompass the sensible intuition, how it is *dunamei*, *energeia*, and *entelecheia*. A builder feels their *ability* to build as really existing; the open eye which is seeing is really *manifesting-in-work*; sleep (and knowledge; DA 2.1) is a preserving of the soul "*being-at-work-staying-itself*" or *holding-itself-together-completely*. These three temporal phases exist evidently in the immediate givens of our sensible and inner intuition. The difference is stretched even further by relating matter to the finished product of an operation of informing, determining, or distinguishing. Here we have an aspect of aesthetic intuition arising again; now, matter appears as whatever is available to be worked into another form by intentional processes (*techne*), and it is either something fully-worked-out, or it is something left idle, unworked. The unworked is able to be worked, it has power, and it is matter. Thus, we see that the dynamic and energetic, senses of being, temporalize reality in a variety of different ways. To think existence as dynamic, to think of the soul as active, and to think of thought as a fundamental principle, we must gather and distinguish all these senses of being. Analogy presents being in a way that is irreducible to presence to consciousness or concepts. Furthermore, the analogy is not a way of *reducing* many differences to one model, but of *collecting* the differences and perceiving them all as a whole ensemble.

We are presented with another set of opposing terms describing the dynamic sense of being in *Met*. 5.7:

> «we say both of what potentially sees and of what actually sees that it is 'a seeing' and, in the same way, both of what is able to use its scientific knowledge and of what is using it that is 'a scientific knowing', and both of what has already begun to rest and what is capable of resting that it rests.

> Similarly too in the case of substances. For we say that Hermes '*is* in the stone,' and that half the line '*is* in the line,' and of what is not yet ripe that 'it is grain.'» *Met.* 1017b1-8.

In each case we have a pair of terms that mutually displace one another, that cannot be coexisting together "in the same part in the same way" as Aristotle says of all principles (*Met.* 4.4; cf. Baracchi 2007: 221-238). The value of the relata and the ways of relating are not the same in each case. Some "matter" that can be made into a statue is not the same as having closed eyes. They have different temporal and developmental implication, they are ingredients in a convergence of causal ingredients in different ways. In each case what we have is a dynamic relationship which entails certain consequences. The analogy brings together differences and the convergence of it all in an intuition discloses an irreducible temporal depth of dynamic being which operates by inner principles of convergence and manifests in physical phenomena of motion.

An intellectual intuition, such as of a mathematical truth, also works by collecting (*syllogesthai*), and gathering multiplicity, and involves an activity of the mind. Aristotle tells us that geometrical "schema are devised [εὑρίσκεται] actively" (*Met.* 1051a23) and this activity consists of "distinguishing [διαιροῦντες]" that is indispensable to the event of insight. Aristotle emphasizes this by noting that, if the schema had already been *distinguished*, then it would have already been evident [φανερὰ] how the conclusion follows necessarily (1051a24). But this insight doesn't become evident until the diagrams have actually been drawn and actively distinguished, and thus for one who has already acted in this way – distinguishing – will it be "immediately clear on seeing it." (1051a27). It is not immediately clear at the start, during the activity of constructing the schema, nor even while distinguishing its parts. An intellectual energy is required to initiate the work of actually distinguishing each part, and this is continuous with the prior stages, but the insight arises after having distinguished them when we finally grasp them all as a whole. The whole is not merely a juxtaposition of the parts, it must be an integration of the parts as interpenetrating and reciprocally dependent. It is the cooperation of the parts, and the qualitative relation of them all to each other as a whole. The focalization and convergence of phenomena shows itself and makes evident the principle orienting the operations and ordering the multiplicity.

Aristotle analyzes this event of insight with the example of how we *come to know* the essence of a triangle (that the interior angles equal to two right angles).

The insight is not the process, it is what the process discloses, i.e. the unity of the parts all working together. We must go and construct the diagram for ourselves and distinguish the parts and let the relations emerge together so that we see how its inner angles *necessarily* equal two right angles in principle. We see this necessity "because the angles around one point are equal to two right angles. If the line had already been drawn upward parallel to the side, why this is so would be immediately clear on seeing it." (1051a27). The proof which he is referring to can be found in Euclid's *Elements* 1.32. By actively drawing the parallel line which make visible the proportionate angles, we see clearly how the angles will always be able to be recombined on a line to equal two right angles.

The student in geometry will need to draw several different triangles in order to see how it applies in every case. But they need not see *every* triangle, of which there are an infinite number. The operative principle is discovered by being actively employed in distinguishing the different parts of each scheme. It is not just that we know it must be true because of the demonstration, its not simply that we become exhausted by performing the operation and eventually abandon the skepticism motivating our activity. The real insight emerges as immediately evident in the particular case once the principle is discovered. After having constructed the whole diagram, the mind must actively distinguishing the parts and hold it all together in one continuous thought. The "complete picture" is more than a diagram, it involves a whole series of operations by which thought moves within the idea and focalizes the multiplicity into an integral whole. Having not only traced the lines, but also underlined them with the insight into the relations they hold together as a whole, the "why" will be "clearly [δῆλον] seen [ἰδόντι] by the one who beholds [εἰδότι]." (NE 1051a28) This is because the principle has come to stand in the soul, the essence of the triangle is manifest in existence. Stated as analogical metaphors: devising schema is the *work* of the mind, and this activity is what "kindles the understanding as a light in the soul" (*Rhe*. 1411b13). Given the fact that *enarges* refers to the visible or palpable manifestation of a divinity – theophany[13] – *we should not fail to notice the connotations of divine manifestation that is imparted on the principles and our apprehension of them* (NE 1177b30). *Sophia* is the virtue of the soul and intellect which is semi-divine (NE 6.7, 10.6-8), as it denotes the communion with the most fundamental realities: the ἀρχαί.

What this examination of the process of thinking reveals is a developmental way that thought is gradually constructed by a "subordinate series" of actualizations in which the powers of earlier moments are preserved and put to work in later

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[13]   *Phanes* Φάνης, is the Orphic god of creation, illumination, and new life.

stages: *a continuous proportion*. To put it bluntly and in metaphorical terms of fabrication; the schematizing activity brings about a "matter" or potentiality, which is then ready at hand to be *put to work* in thought, or activated. This is a theme Aristotle returns to again and again, that some prior knowledge is required which will play the role of matter for new thoughts to be produced. Once the diagrams have been drawn (by psychical activity), produced by the activity of *noesis*, the potential emerged from the activity, and new activities from that potentiality. The power to immediately understand an infinite number of different particular figures is discovered or invented [εὑρίσκεται] by enacting them. Thus, the soul holds the powers which it acquires, each of which is indeterminate insofar as it can apply in a plurality of cases. The thought which grasps not only the parts (points, lines, angles) nor merely the assemblage of them as a totality of relations given in a particular figure, nor again is it the image in which the parallel line is drawn, but rather this thought includes, in a way, all possible triangles. It is not a thought that is divided, distinguished, actualized in any figure. It is not a generality but rather a directing idea which engenders and orients the activity of thinking. The thought produced will be greater than the sum of its parts, as the focalization of them. This focal unity of enactive thinking is the analogical basis of dynamic causal thought in general. The *work* of the soul is an operation of informing multiplicity, and although it is an intellectual activity, it also involves imagination and an image (DA 431a16, 432a7). Analogy is based on the focalizing, be it the many senses of being the diversity of causes or the indeterminacy of preexisting knowledge into a formal, integrated unity of concrete principles and individuals. *Energeia*, after having been brought to light in the detailed observation of many different peculiar cases, thereupon shines brightly in the intellect, and illuminates the many ways that dynamic unities emerge from multiplicity by the work of psychical activity. When the soul of an "experienced" philosopher turns inward, the entirety of what is potentially thinkable, all memories in their heterogeneous details, seem to lie there as matter, ready to be collected into syllogisms, or at least into chains of recollected association. The soul is a great storehouse, harboring potentialities that develop in a continuous proportion, in a "suite" of increasing intensity in the course of an individual's singular history. It is this work (*energeia*) of the soul that is the *most evident* (*enargeia*) principle on which all others are based.

Conclusion

While metaphor is different from analogy, Aristotle shows how they are intertwined. In the very same way, movement and activity intertwine, *manifesting-in-work* and *being-at-work*: it is both enacting and enacted. The acquisition of

knowledge involves the institution of an ability and a new sense (as both meaning and the orientation and direction of motion) which endures and is maintained: to have learned means to possess what was acquired in a continuous proportion or analogy. The mind is both agent and patient as well as capacity, activity, and actuality. The agent mind acts by dividing, distinguishing, separating, choosing. Thinking involves both agent and patient and, looked at from one side, will involve movements, woven into a continuous thread by the unity of thinking itself. This duplicity of being internal to *acting* and also externalized as *resulting in movements*, is paralleled in the word *ergon* as making and made. This duplicity is implicit in *energeia*, which I have tried to underline with my translation "*manifesting-in-work*". *Energeia* draws together the infinite variations of concrete movement and the unity of intention of the soul focalizing multiplicity. Aristotle uses metaphor to get us to an immediate grasp of what the word *energeia* only points to. Aristotle's metaphorical description of the desire of simple bodies explains his tangential remark, in *De Anima*, that study of the soul proves to be helpful in the study of nature (DA 402a3-5). The soul is the principle of living things, and we know this reality by striving and being aware of our existence in the very activity of striving. Furthermore, to speak of the activity of the mind as a "work" is already a metaphor, as well as the "improvement" [θεραπεύων] of the mind (NE 1179a23), or its grasping e.g. *labein* (NE 1142a33) *hupolambanei* (DA 429a23) and illuminating truth (DA 430a15). Think also of the metaphors at play in the words *pensé*, conceive, or reflect. All Aristotle's efforts to describe the "works" of the mind are metaphors meant to assist us in focalizing an immediate intuition of psychical activity which both transcends and grounds all language and even all analogy (which is evidently more fundamental than linguistic expression). Ultimately, the mind is not known to us by indirect metaphors, but is instead known immediately by being lived. When we reflect on the act of reasoning by analogy we find the mind at work unifying multiplicity and activating potentiality, and this fundamental operation is the most evident principle of all our experience and knowledge. It is on the basis of this real immediacy that we understand all other causality and dynamic relations. Talking about the soul and the mind is as difficult today as it was in ancient times. We can make use of metaphors to describe different aspects of our psychical activity and now it is common place to conceive the mind on the analogy of a computer or a machine. What I find to be so interesting in this aspect of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy is that the basis of understanding reality is first and foremost the soul, and it is on the basis of living and thinking that we understand, by analogy, the causal dynamics of nature. This puts things in the opposite order of much of modern and contemporary thought, especially mechanistic reductionism and logical positivism,

which come to a formulation of physical reality or of conceptual coherence and then apply that to mind in order to explain it away. But, as Alfred North Whitehead said, "hard-headed men want facts and not symbols" (Whitehead 1927: 60), and attempt to expel meaning and metaphor from reality with a pitchfork. "However you may endeavor to expel it, it ever returns." (Whitehead 1927: 61).

Paul Ricoeur's (2003) assertion that the "art of rhetoric" has more or less died in the last one hundred year, and especially in its close relation with philosophy, suggests that metaphor has lost traction as a philosophical devise. There are nevertheless many famous examples of philosophers who rely heavily on metaphorical use of language to convey their insights and thoughts. Henri Bergson, who Bertrand Russell (1912) described as a "strong visualizer", delivered the most important insights of his philosophy descriptively by means of metaphors. The method he prescribed for metaphysics requires a series of metaphors which converge on a single intuition of the reality unmediated (Bergson 1946; 159-200). Phenomenology is also indebted to metaphor in its creation of "phenomenological descriptions". Think here of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's (2012) highly expressive use of terms like style, modulation, field, norm, horizon, and flesh. Metaphor directs us to the structures of perception and habituation, it combines many phenomena in such a way as to make them cohere in a single *sense*. Something as simple as a gesture cannot be understood unless we take stock of its metaphorical *sense-making* expressivity and the focalization we must undergo in order to see the multitude of bodily movements as an indivisible whole. Not only does phenomenology need metaphor and focalization, but the same source of analogy, as described above, seems to be required by the method – i.e. an immediate apprehension of the essence of consciousness (Husserl 2014). If there really can be a focalization of metaphors, then the events of creative and insightful emergence are the basis on which we understand various phenomena analogically. Metaphor, focalization, and analogy: three interdependent, but irreducibly different, fundamental ingredients in the activity of philosophizing. The essence of the activity of consciousness is the silent thesis of all our thoughts, that thinking always already knows what it is and what it wants to accomplish and logic and rhetoric only help it achieve what it always already intended: clear and distant knowledge. Unlike Rene Descartes, who accepts only one type of clear and distinct ideas with varying degrees of perfection, Aristotle, I think it can be said without becoming too anachronistic, allowed for several modalities of knowledge production, each with its own standards, structures, and genesis. He even relies on integrations of several modalities in emergent, *sui generis* forms of knowledge, and these again have their own internal standards (e.g. *prohairesis* mixes thought and desire; NE 1139b5). Rhetoric (metaphor) and

first philosophy (analogical observations achieving an intuitive focalization) end up being much more intertwined and ultimately inseparable; just as a transcendental field (invisible) always remains within the concrete phenomena (visible) and in historical meanings.

Analogy is often attacked by post-structualists as a tool of the old guard; a pillar of Thomas Aquinas' hierarchical metaphysics; a relic of the project of subsequent logocentric system construction. Old worn out metaphors became the *a priori* concepts of modernity, vague and rough ideas that have come about by defacement, by being passed around like coins (Derrida 1974). *Energeia* has certainly fallen prey to a debasement this sort, and along with it, the more concrete and profound sense of analogy in Aristotle. Analogy, as the correlate of focalization, is not a reductive logical simplification, not the logic of an "either/or", but of "both/and". The meaning of a focalization is closer to Derrida's "*différance*" than it is to an "*aufhebung*" that gradually abstracts and erases complexity, detail, and ambiguity. It lets being be *said in many ways* without eliminating its concrete dynamism. *Energeia,* in this sense, functions very similar to Whitehead's (1978) word *concrescence*, which names a fundamental way of being that is almost too fundamental to talk about at all. Aristotle's dynamic "metaphor by analogy" sets psychical life before our eyes in a way that makes us see the concrete whole as greater than the sum of the parts; as a process of oriented, but dynamic, transformations irreducible to the rearrangement of static elements or information. Aristotle's views on metaphor and analogy still have a great deal to teach us today about the nature and origin of meaning. They invite us to begin again and put language to use in novel ways that can help us better understand the ambiguity of being.

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The Concept of Analogy in the Works of Władysław Biegański

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Abstract: Władysław Biegański is one of the members of the so-called Polish school of philosophy of medicine. He was, next to Ludwik Fleck, the best-known Polish scientist who contributed to the development of philosophy of medicine. Despite his active medical activity, he published over 130 scientific works about medicine, as well as philosophy, epistemology, logic and ethics. Being a doctor and a scientist allowed him to perceive philosophical problems in an innovative way. I would like to focus on Biegański's pioneering works on analogy. Biegański wanted to break with the mythical vision of a scientist who, thanks to his extraordinary mental actuity and some lucky events, makes a scientific discovery. Biegański analyzed the history of science through the concept of analogy, and thanks to this approach he reconstructed the development of medicine and biology. He wanted to formulate a method for modern medicine and thus foster its development in Poland. In my article, I will present his biography within the historical context and will outline characteristics of his theory of analogy.

Key words: analogical inference, theory of analogy, history of Polish philosophy, history of logic.

1. Introduction

At the 10th Congress of Polish Physicians and Naturalists on July 23rd in 1907, Wladyslaw Biegański delivered a paper in which, in addition to a general overview

of natural philosophy, he spoke about inductive inference and inference by analogy. He published an extended commentary as articles: *Analogia i jej znaczenie w badaniu naukowym* [Analogy and its importance for scientific inquiry] and *O wnioskowaniu indukcyjnym* [On inductive inference]. The problems that Biegański addressed in them were very well devised and, after that, many years of his studying logic began. As a result, today you can read works such as *O wnioskowaniu z analogii* [On Inference from Analogy] (1909) and *Traktat o poznaniu i prawdzie* [Treatise on Cognition and Truth] (1910). After more than a century, his contributions to the theory of analogy and its practical application for science can still be a pretty valuable lesson. In my article, I would like to introduce the reader to the theory of Biegański, who – working as a medical doctor – had an extraordinary opportunity to test his concepts in practice. I will refer to numerous works, all of them originally in Polish, including the aforementioned article "Analogy and its importance with scientific investigation", "The fourth form of inference from analogy" and the books "Inference from analogy" and "The theory of logic". The very fact that Biegański took up this subject indicates how brilliant his mind was, since at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries that issue was very rarely addressed by philosophers, the Polish ones included (Biela 1989:20). Biegański championed a new understanding of the term 'analogy', which from the point of view of the history of philosophy is worth noting. The analysis of the inference by analogy is an extensive research problem, since this kind of inference seems to be a commonly used form of thinking. As Kazimierz Trzęsicki wrote: "Much of everyday reasoning is inference by analogy" (Trzęsicki 2012:326). Therefore, the outcomes of such research can be of interest to many disciplines, such as cultural studies, social sciences, or pedagogy. Biegański's considerations on analogy also pose an interesting methodological problem. That is because two disciplines –logic and philosophy – meet there. The transition from epistemology to logic was almost seamless so as a historical event it is debatable (Janeczek 2003: 26-27). The way Biegański was constructing his philosophy urges us to refrain from reducing his study of analogy either to the science of cognition or to logic. I consider this an asset as for the historicist perspective it gives us opportunity to see clearly what kind of changes the very concept of analogy has undergone and how the development of logic, then distinguishing itself as a separate science, looked like. Woleński wrote of Biegański's reflections on analogy: "This is one of the most valuable chapters of his logical work" (Woleński 1998: 24).

Władysław Biegański was a Polish physician, philosopher and social activist. He was born in 1857, his father was a locksmith, mother – an avid lover of literature. He studied medicine at the Imperial University of Warsaw (today's

University of Warsaw) and later deepened his knowledge in Berlin and Prague. Interest in philosophy began in his youth, when, still a student, he read the works of the positivist philosophers. Biegański did not intend to choose between the two passions of his life. Until his death, he pursued both philosophy and medicine. We know this thanks to the memoirs written down by his wife, a teacher and feminist activist Mieczysława Biegańska, née Rozenfeld (Biegańska 1930). Biegański was able to inspire people with his love of science and philosophy. His daughters Halina and Ludomira also pursued scientific careers and were both awarded doctoral degrees, in philosophy and in chemistry respectively, at Jagiellonian University, considered to be a huge achievement for a woman at the time.

2. Theories of analogy

How one should conceive of reasoning by analogy? In the professional literature on logic, textbooks or tutorials, it is rare to find chapters devoted to this type of reasoning. In David Kelley's book "*The Art of Reasoning. An Introduction to Logic and Critical Thinking*" analogy is presented as a linguistic tool, used to make our language more engaging. Kelley presents the descriptive function of analogy; analogy helps in the creation of metaphors and explanation (Kelley 2014: 442-444). Another impressive work on analogy, in fact one of the most comprehensive ones, is Adam Biel's book "*Analogia w nauce*" [Analogy in Science]; it was conceived as an attempt to cover this issue, without focusing on its formal side. Biela gives a definition of inference by analogy: "Inference by analogy is a cognitive activity, type of reasoning, in which on the basis of asserting certain sentences, which are called premises, one asserts another sentence, called a conclusion. Concluding is based, in turn, on the existence of a specific relationship (called analogical relationship, proportion or relation of analogy) between the states of affairs adjudicated in the premise and in the conclusion" (Biela 1989: 9). The term 'analogy' itself, not to be confused with inference by analogy, is derived from Greek (ἀναλογία) and means suitability or similarity (Biela 1989: 12-13). According to Aristotle and thinkers of his time, that term included geometric or arithmetic relations or proportions. Aristotle called inference by analogy differently: inference by example or proof by example:

> We have an Example when the major extreme is shown to be applicable to the middle term by means of a term similar to the third. It must be known

> both that the middle applies to the third term and that the first applies to the term similar to the third. […] Thus it is evident that an example represents the relation, not of part to whole or of whole to part, but of one part to another, where both are subordinate to the same general term, and one of them is known. It differs from induction in that the latter […] shows from an examination of all the individual cases that the (major) extreme applies to the middle, and does not connect the conclusion with the (minor) extreme; whereas the example does connect it and does not use all the individual cases for its proof (II, XXIV, 69a) (Aristotle, ca. 350 B.C.E./1938: 25.

In mathematics and in logic, the notion of analogy was perpetuated by Euclid and became synonymous with mathematical proportion (VII.20). The understanding of analogy as a similarity of relations between elements of objects has been widely accepted in modern logic. Biela wrote: "It seems that the origins of such a meaning of 'analogy' could be found with success in the works of ancient or medieval logicians, but a new way of understanding this concept became fully established in modern logic" (Biela 1989: 12). This was granted by the break with the authority of Aristotle and scholastic philosophy. Early modern and later attempts to define analogy, for example those proposed by Francis Bacon and J.S. Mill, are criticized by Biegański. I will address his criticism later. To conclude with this introduction to the understanding of the question of analogy, it is worth giving some simple examples from contemporary philosophy. Here, let us refer to Kazimierz Trzęsicki, who points out that the occurrence of the same proportion between C and D and A and B is the basis of analogy. We can write it down as:

$$A:B = C:D$$

He also gives some examples coming from natural language, which he presents in the form of the following reasoning: "Since I had an experience of successful shopping at some store and I imagine my next purchases I intend to make at that store, I think that they will also be successful. We relate past experiences to the future" (Trzęsicki 2012: 326). This confirms the thesis that analogy is used on daily basis, in the simplest of reasonings. Therefore, its definition and its use in the sciences needs to be clarified. A common objection to any reasoning by analogy, for example, is that any argument based on an analogy can be refuted simply by presenting yet another analogy that is structured in the same way but leads to a different, or even opposite, conclusion. If we do not specify exact conditions under which we can call an inference analogical, the line between analogy and similarity (which is a

broader term than analogy and means the correspondence of certain features) becomes blurred. J. S. Mill, already mentioned above, wrote: "There is no word, however, which is used more loosely, or in a greater variety of senses, than Analogy" (Mill 1843/1974: 554). Biegański, who repeatedly complained about the incorrect use of the term, would subscribe to Mill's opinion. The consequence of misunderstandings surrounding analogy led to a slow demise of belief in the usefulness of this kind of inference. Now, we shall turn to the considerations made by Biegański who in fact does not agree with the idea that analogy could be reasonably reduced to resemblance, deduction or induction, and makes an attempt to put the understanding of analogy on the right track.

3. Biegański's theory of analogy

As I have already mentioned, Biegański, in his works on logic, devoted a lot of space to inference by analogy but made it explicitly clear that this part of logic should be given more attention. He stressed the need to combine theory and practice, which, after all, is evident in his biography – he was medical practitioner and passionate for philosophy (Tarnopolski 2000: 6). For analogy is a unique logical issue, as it gives rise to generalizations and laws, more often than other inferences, such as inductive (Biegański 1912: 575). It follows that: "among the paths along which our mind walks in order to discover new truths, one of the most important ones is inference based on analogy" (Biegański 1909: 1). However, we cannot rely on colloquial intuitions about analogy alone. According to Biegański, analogy can become an effective tool only if one explains properly the term 'analogy' and makes it clear what inference by analogy actually is. In colloquial speech, analogy is defined as any incomplete similarity, i.e. similarity of only some features (Biegański 1912: 575-576). In other contemporary works of logic analogy was also understood that way. Biegański gives here the examples of Mill or Sigwart (Biegański 1912: 576). That is, inference by analogy "means drawing a conclusion from incomplete similarity, i.e., from the similarity of two objects of thought in some respect and because of certain properties inferring their similarity in another respect, because of other properties" (Biegański 1913: 26). Biegański cannot agree to such a definition because analogy would equate then with similarity. Biegański openly admitted to being inspired by E. Mach in how to properly, and originally, define analogy. And by extension, Biegański believed that a clear distinction should be made between identity, similarity and analogy. As he wrote in "*Teoria logiki*": "Identity is the conformity of all

qualities, similarity consists in the conformity of some qualities only and analogy in the conformity of relations that exist between qualities. In my opinion, if logic should give the inference from analogy a strictly defined basis and defend its justification, it must use the term analogy in the latter, stricter sense" (Biegański 1912: 576). Biegański valued Mach's work because Mach was a naturalist and methodologist, and thus understood the role that analogy plays in science (Biegański 1913: 27). To sum up, if we consider the term analogy in detail, examples would show us that scientific analogies are based on similarity of relations, and not on similarity of directly perceived characteristics. To illustrate this fact, we can cite here an example offered by Biegański himself (Biegański 1913: 30) – namely, Herbert Spencer's analogy of organism and society which is still prevalent. The functional similarity between organs resembles that between individuals and institutions in society. And it is precisely this resemblance, which Biegański defines as the relationship between features, that in his opinion proves the accuracy of this analogy. Since we have this term more or less explained, we can now turn to the problem of inference by analogy.

As I wrote above, inference by analogy was already distinguished by Aristotle, who called it an "inference from example". Biegański criticizes the Stagirite both in "*Wnioskowanie z analogii*" and in "*Teoria logiki*". It is a mistake to explain this type of inference as inductive-deductive which can produce a general rule. As Biegański put it: "[...] we see that Aristotle's construction explains the inference from analogy in the following way: first, from some single instance – from an example – we derive a general rule, and then from this general rule we deduce another instance. Thus, we are dealing here with complex inference: inductive, deriving a general rule from a detail, and deductive, which derives another instance from a given rule" (Biegański 1912: 578). But analogy is in fact only one type of inductive inference. That is why Biegański saw analogy as a particularly useful tool for science. As Trzęsicki wrote: "In the natural sciences, social sciences and humanities, one goes beyond what is given in the premises [...] Thus, such inferences can be of significant cognitive value, when they provide more reasons for recognizing a conclusion than for denying it" (Trzęsicki 2012: 245). However, Aristotle only knew inductive inference as complete induction, Biegański explains, so he had to create a separate type of inference (inference from example, i.e., analogy) in order to define somehow the derivation of a general rule from a single instance (Biegański 1909: 7). Of course, it is not true that Aristotle knew only complete induction. He used the term induction also in the case of intuition, by which one can recognize some universal features in what is singular. He used it with regard to complete

induction, which Biegański wrote about. However, Aristotle also distinguished non-demonstrative inference, which is precisely incomplete induction, i.e. a transition from the known to the unknown. This type of inference was no longer called inductive by Aristotle, but he was aware of it, which Biegański did not mention. In the science of logic contemporary to Biegański, in addition to the complete induction, incomplete induction was distinguished, "when one derives a general conclusion not from all, but only from certain singular instances" (Biegański 1909: 7). It follows that the derivation of a plausible general rule from a certain singular instance is not a characteristic of inference by analogy, but only a common feature of any inductive inference. It is this general rule that is the bone of contention here, and beginning with it Biegański can show that inference from analogy is a separate type of inference. In his view, we can distinguish two types of inference from singular to singular:

1. inductive-deductive inference, in which we derive a conclusion by means of a general rule,
2. inference from analogy, in which we cannot derive a general rule due to the existence of contradictory facts. (Biegański 1912: 580-581).

Aristotle mistakenly treated the first of the above as analogy. Biegański makes it clear that in inference by analogy there is no intermediation of a general rule, since we refer directly to a principle, stated in one singular instance about another. To make clearer the differences between the aforementioned types of inference from singular to singular, Biegański gives the following examples: "If from the singular instances that Peter, Paul and others died, I infer that the presently living John will also die, I base my inference on the mediation of a general rule. From those singulars I infer first of all a rule that all people are mortal, and then from this rule I infer that the living John will die. This is a type of inductive-deductive inference. Now, if I infer from the singular instances that Peter, Paul and others, gambling at cards, lost property, I infer about John, who also gambles at cards, that he will ruin himself financially, then in this case there is no mediation of the general rule. For the general rule that *all gamblers end up bankrupt* is not true. Drawing a conclusion in regards to John, I have already known that another friend of mine Charles, also a long-time gambler, did not lose his property. This contradictory fact does not allow me to derive the above rule and conclude from it as to John's future. But since I know that John, from his character, disposition and way of playing cards, is more similar to Peter and Paul than to Charles, it is in this similarity between the known singular and the present singular instance that I find the reason for inferring that John will lose his fortune"

(Biegański 1912: 581). The example by Biegański cited above shows that one uses inference from analogy in case when the general rule we derive turns out to contradict a different descriptive sentence that is not a premise. Therefore, inference from analogy understood in accordance with Aristotle's considerations is in fact inductive-deductive inference, and can lead to a mistaken belief in the reliability of analogy.

However, Biegański does not stop at commenting on Aristotle and develops his own theory of analogy. The biggest problem, according to Biegański, is "the lack of strict limits for the scope of inference from analogy" (Biegański 1909: 13-14). This was, in his view, a common problem for many thinkers dealing with analogy. Similarly, the science of logic at that time – which tried to provide rigor in analogical thinking – understood it in a way that Biegański could not agree with. As he put it: "The view that in correct, i.e., presumptive inference from analogy we derive a conclusion from the sum of similarities between entities is now almost universally accepted in logic" (Biegański 1912: 588). When considering any correct inference from analogy, we can see that it is not just a matter of similarity between things themselves, but the belief that the similarities found in things are in some relation to the inferred similarity (Biegański 1912: 589), as I wrote earlier. To illustrate this, Biegański uses the following example. Well, we might suspect that life on Mars is possible not because of similarities between Mars and Earth inherent in these planets, but because, according to astronomical data, there are conditions on Mars that are considered necessary for life on Earth (Biegański 1912: 590). He further adds that: "a statement that the Moon is inhabited is considered today to be a false analogy because there is no air atmosphere on the Moon, which is a necessary condition for life" (Biegański 1912: 590). The mere similarity of two objects or phenomena is not a sufficient condition for an analogy. As Biegański notes, there are also many similarities between snow and wood sawdust (Biegański 1909: 35-36). But this similarity is not enough to see an analogy between snow and sawdust. In nature itself, there is not a single thing that does not have characteristics similar to other objects. The conclusion that we obtain by comparing two things that are different, presenting only a few similarities, will always be only somewhat plausible. If inference from analogy is to be given a logical character, it is necessary to define some principle of operation needed to justify it. Therefore, Biegański proposes a formulation that is based on the similarity of the relations that are contained in the premises.

That formulation consists of two premises and a conclusion. The first premise specifies that in a thing or event M properties *a*, *b*, *c* are in a relation *k* with a

property P^{14}. The second premise, just like the first, has a structure in which a thing or event N can be distinguished, along with the features a, b, c and P existing in it, and there is the relation k connecting them. However, according to Biegański (a, b, c), k, P can be unknown (but only one in a given type of inference). As a result, we can conclude that *either* the same or similar property P, *or* the same similar relation k, *or* properties a, b, c can be found in the event or thing N (Woleński 1998: 24). This construction may resemble a syllogism. However, Biegański gives the following reasons why the analogy cannot be reduced to syllogism. First, a form of inference such as analogy contains four terms: M, N, P, (a, b, c), while a syllogism contains only three. Second, in a syllogism, the first premise should state that P is always and in every case in a given relation to all characteristics a, b, c (Biegański 1912: 591). In the case of an analogy, we are not able to state this, and we do not even assume it. We only assume that this is the case in a given event M. This is precisely the essence of analogy. We infer from the singular about the singular. Since Biegański gives two premises, we infer from a rule but under a certain condition. In inference from analogy, this condition must be marked. The rule for the analogous conclusion is the relation that exists between the properties (a, b, c) and P. If the assertion or assumption of this relation did not take place, then we could not, in the conclusion, attribute the predicate P to the subject N. As Biegański concludes, "Only if in the event M the property or phenomenon P is found to be any relation of dependence to the properties a, b, c, we can justify the conclusion proclaiming that also in the event N, in which we also find a, b, c, the same relation of dependence may occur, and that P will also be discovered" (Biegański 1912: 592).

It should be particularly emphasized that what distinguishes the characteristics of a, b, c from P is their place in the structure of relation. This means, citing the words of Biegański, that the phenomena/properties a, b, c cause P. Thus, a, b, c are the cause for P and this cause-effect relations is, according to Biegański, the grounding for the logical result, where a, b, c are the reason and P is the

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[14] Biegański revised his theory of analogy, so one can find different notations in his works. The description I have presented here can be found in two of his books (Biegański 1909: 58-61; Biegański 1912: 591-592). Another way of wording in which Biegański makes several simplifications can be found in a later work (Biegański 1913: 30-31). The most important changes consist in the fact that only properties and not features *or* events *or* properties are mentioned anymore, and the emphasis on the fact that there is some set of features (a,b,c) is abandoned. The newer version of the notation is thus more unambiguous – for example, we have no doubt about how many of these properties there should be in order to speak of an analogy. It is enough that there are two properties. Later on, I present a simplified notation that takes advantage of these changes.

consequence. Thus, the relation *k* cannot be treated as a relation of inference in the sense given to the term in modern times, and especially it cannot be attributed the characteristic of symmetry.

In summary, the "formal" structure of this inference can be presented after Biegański as follows:

$$1. \quad M(a,b,c) \; k \; P \; \& \; N(a,b,c) \; k \; P_1$$
$$2. \quad M \; k \; P = N \; k \; P_1$$

Conclusion: $P = P_1$

This is a notation generalized by me on the basis of a proposal by Biegański taken from "*Wnioskowanie z analogii*" (Biegański 1909: 58-59). One can make an objection that it is not a correct formalization, if we assume the usual meanings of the symbols used. It is not clear, for example, what kind of relation is expressed by the equals sign '='. While presenting his idea of inference by analogy, Biegański does not go straight to its four forms, but begins by showing a generalized and abbreviated version of it. As we will see later, this is actually the first form of analogy, in which the unknown is the characteristic P_1.

The inference from an analogy can always be reduced to the form of two premises and a conclusion, as above. However, Biegański points out that it is also possible to shorten this form as well. Here he has in mind what he calls the analogical enthymeme. The analogical enthymeme, as Biegański wrote, "also consists in leaving out one premise, namely the second one, which is then implicitly included in the reasoning" (Biegański 1909: 58). This means that the inference consists of a premise, which expresses a rule, and a conclusion, i.e. the application of the rule to dissimilar event N. The condition assuming a partial similarity between M and N is treated as implicit. According to Biegański, we can write it down in the form of a mathematical formula:

$$M : P \text{ is similar } N : P_1 \text{ [15]}$$

According to Biegański, the difference between analogy and syllogism is also manifested in the case of enthymemes. In a syllogistic enthymeme, we can omit a minor or a major premise, while an analogical enthymeme can only be abbreviated by a second premise – a condition. "[...] The first premise must

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[15]   That form of analogy is to be found in mathematical proportion. (Biegański 1909: 59).

always be marked, otherwise the abbreviated inference would lose its proper, analogical character" (Biegański 1909: 59). The difference between syllogistic and analogical enthymemes is also manifested in natural language. Biegański notes that "in speech we also clearly distinguish between analogical and syllogistic entimemata, using for the former the conjunctions *as – then*, and for the latter *because – therefore*" (Biegański 1909: 59).

Biegański distinguishes four different types of inference from analogy (Biegański 1912: 594). The first three types, which are listed in "*Wnioskowanie z analogii*" and in "*Teoria logiki*", are distinguished on the basis of the elements of the second premise, namely: which of them is unknown. This results in the following three combinations:

1. the property P in the second premise is unknown; Based on the identity or similarity between the properties a, b, c in M and the properties a, b, c in N and the relation k in M in the first premise, and the relation k or similar to it k_1 in N in the second premise, I infer by analogy the presence of P or similar to it P_1 in N.

$$\begin{array}{l} M \ k \ P \\ \underline{N \ k \ x.} \\ \text{Conclusion: } N \ k \ P \ (\textit{or } P_1) \ \{x = P\} \end{array}$$

2. The ratio k in the second premise is unknown. Based on the identity or similarity between properties a, b, c in event M and properties a, b, c in N and the presence of property P in M and the presence of property P or similar to it P_1 in N, I infer by analogy the presence of relation k or similar to it k_1 in N.

$$\begin{array}{l} M \ k \ P \\ \underline{N \ x \ P.} \\ \text{Conclusion: } N \ k \ P, \ \{x = k\}. \end{array}$$

3. The properties a, b, c in the second premise are unknown. Based on the identity or similarity between relation k in event M and relation k in event N and the presence of property P in M and the presence of property P or similar to it P_1 in N, I infer by analogy the presence of properties a, b, c or similar to them a_1, b_1, c_1.

$$M \ k \ P$$
$$x \ k \ P_1.$$

Wniosek: $N \ (a, \ b, \ c) \ k \ P_1$; $\{x = N \ (a, \ b, \ c)\}$

Another, fourth type of inference from analogy was published by Biegański a little later, in 1913, in the article "*Czwarta postać wnioskowania z analogii*". I will talk about its unique character further on. For now, I will present – following Biegański – its definition.

4. The whole structure of inference is known, that is, the event M and the event N are known, the relations connecting the properties in each of these events are known, and the similarity between them has been established. In addition, the consequents p, q, r arising from the relation k in M are known. However, the consequents resulting from the relation k or k_1 in the N situation are unknown. On the basis of the similarity between M and N, I infer by analogy the existence of the consequents p, q, r or similar to them p_1, q_1, r_1 in N.

$$M \ k \ P; \ k^M \rightarrow p \wedge q \wedge r$$
$$N \ k \ P$$

Conclusion: $k^N \rightarrow (p \wedge q \wedge r) \vee (p_1 \wedge q_1 \wedge r_1)$.

In his article "*Czwarta postać wnioskowania z analogii*", Biegański changes the notation of all types of inference from analogy. Using this new notation, which I consider to be the most up-to-date and adequate (as indicated by the fact that this notation appeared in Biegański's last work on analogy and was the result of new considerations and of his reaction to critical remarks), I present below my slightly modified proposal for the formal notation:

Type I:

$$M{:}A \ k \ B$$
$$N{:} \ A_1 \ k_1 \ x$$
$$\overline{N{:} \ A_1 \ k_1 \ B_1}$$

$$A \sim A_1; k \sim k_1$$

Type II:

$$\frac{\begin{array}{l} M: A \; k \; B \\ N: A_1 \; x \; B_1 \end{array}}{N: A_1 \; k_1 \; B_1} \qquad A{\sim}A_1; B{\sim}B_1$$

Type III

$$\frac{\begin{array}{l} M: A \; k \; B \\ N: x \; k_1 \; B_1 \end{array}}{N: A_1 \; k_1 \; B_1} \qquad B{\sim}B_1; k{\sim}k_1$$

Type IV

$$\frac{\begin{array}{l} M: A \; k \; B; \; k^M {\Rightarrow} C \\ N: A_1 \; k_1 \; B_1 \end{array}}{k^N {\Rightarrow} C_1} \qquad A{\sim}A_1; B{\sim}B_1; k{\sim}k_1; C{\sim}C_1;$$

Notes:

$\sim$ means *identity or similarity*.
$\Rightarrow$ means *causal relation*.

*

As early as in the beginning of 17th century, Galileo, Bacon, or Gassendi dealt with the question of the unsuitability of logic for science (Kuderowicz 1989: 133). Specifically, they were unhappy with Aristotle's demonstrative syllogism used by the Scholastic philosophers (Janeczek 2003: 162). Medieval logicians and theologians used that method to derive new conclusions and create theories. This was mainly due to a centuries-long misunderstanding. The Scholastics overlooked the fact that scientific proof by means of syllogisms can be unreliable. The demonstrative syllogism they used serves the purpose of providing an orderly account of where a particular piece of previously known information came from – Aristotle knew that all too well (Gaurkoger 1993/2005: 160-161). From the end of the Middle Ages logic was expected to fulfil impossible expectations. That gave rise to the need for a practical view on logic. Biegański's work shows that

in the 20th century logic was still perceived as Aristotle's *organon*. The new way of doing science, the origins of which can be traced back to the Middle Ages, meant that logic had to change. The difference between syllogistic and analogical inference, which I described earlier, shows that for example, while conducting some preliminary studies of natural phenomena, it is easier to accept a premise that is more specific than general. After that, we can create a scientific hypothesis based on a specific premise that should be then verified. Inference from analogy simply turns out to be more useful at the initial stage, and as Biegański put it: "[...] I have come to the conviction [...] that one should strictly distinguish between rudimentary inference from singular about singular and analogical inference proper, as applied in science. Moreover, I believe that the logical construction, which considers every inference from analogy to be the derivation from the similarity of certain properties of two compared objects about the similarity of other properties, is worthless for limiting scientific analogies" (Biegański 1913: 30). It is worth considering how to identify an apt analogy. It is best if we refer to case studies, thus following in the footsteps of Biegański (Biegański 1912: 594-595). During his talk at the 10th Congress of Polish Physicians and Naturalists in Lviv, in 1907, Biegański tried to convince the audience of his reasons, giving correct applications of inference from analogy, which contributed to scientific discoveries (Biegański 1907: 483). Examples from the history of science must have been among his favorites, as he repeated them in subsequent works on analogy.

4. Analogy and science

In addition to the four types of inference from analogy I discussed earlier, we can find relevant examples for each of them in Biegański's works. However, not all of the examples he gave are completely accurate and convincingly composed. However, Biegański liked to emphasize that if it were not for analogy, the progress of science would be severely limited. Thanks to the use of analogical inferences interweaved by cautious empirical generalizations, we are able to formulate the laws of nature, as Newton, Kepler or Galileo did (Biegańska 1930: 200). I think that Biegański's most elaborate example is his illustration for the first type of inference by analogy. He recounts the discovery made by the 18th century French physicist Antoine Lavoisier. This reference is still inspiring as Roman Mierzecki's book on Lavoisier's life and work is subtitled "The Genius of Association" (Mierzycki 2008). As Biegański shows,

this ingenuity of association consisted in the apt use of analogy. Lavoisier disproved the phlogiston theory, and thus showed that the combustion process does not involve the release of the so-called matter of fire (i.e., phlogiston), but the chemical combination of carbon, coming from the substance being burned, with atmospheric oxygen (Mierzycki 2008: 66-67). The study of combustion led Lavoisier further and so he tried to explain the source of animal heat. Analysis of inhaled and exhaled air allowed him to establish the fact that there is more carbon dioxide and less oxygen in exhaled air. That allowed Lavoisier to hypothesize that during respiration, a chemical process takes place in the lungs where atmospheric oxygen and carbon combine. The result of this process is the formation of carbon dioxide. A similar phenomenon occurs during combustion, when carbon is oxidized. "Thus – Lavoisier states – the air passing through the lungs undergoes a transformation quite similar to that which occurs in the combustion of carbon; and since heat is released in the combustion of carbon, therefore heat must also be produced in the lungs during the time between inhalation and exhalation" (quoted in Biegański 1912: 595). It should be noted that Lavoisier's reasoning was based on the analogy between the transformation of air in the lungs and the combustion process. In his book on analogy Biela, who also refers the example given by Biegański, wrote: "After all, those processes belong to two different categories: combustion is a physicochemical process, the essence of which Lavoisier learned only in terms of inorganic compounds; while respiration is a typical physiological process occurring between organic compounds of animate matter" (Biela 1989: 19). It is also difficult to see "with your own eyes" the similarity between these processes. Initially, Lavoisier managed to reduce the similarity to a single feature, which was also a necessary condition – there has to be atmospheric oxygen. As we know from the previous paragraphs, the mere similarity of an isolated general property does not determine the existence of an analogy. Lavoisier needed something else. Lavoisier studied the composition of atmospheric air and the amount of individual components in the combustion process. As Biela wrote: "On the basis of these data, he made the conjecture that perhaps during the process of respiration atmospheric oxygen is in a similar relation to carbon dioxide as in the case of the already well-known relation of these substances in the process of combustion" (Biela 1989: 19). Lavoisier then sought to determine the ratio between carbon dioxide and oxygen in exhaled and inhaled air. The research brought him the answer: much more carbon dioxide is found in exhaled air than in inhaled air, and in proportion to this, the oxygen content decreases and increases, respectively. Such results are the basis for analogy between the process of respiration and combustion, since

it is no longer the similarity of an isolated property but the analogy of relations and properties. Also Biela: "We will refer to this kind of deeper similarity of processes based on perceiving the correspondence of relations between the properties of these processes as analogy" (Biela 1989: 20).

Of course, Biegański was not alone in his belief in the importance of analogy for the development of science. The middle of the 19th century saw a rapid development of specific sciences in parallel with philosophy (Miłosz, 1974: 515). Momentous discoveries were made, and completely new theories were created. One could mention physics (Skłodowska-Curie, Roentgen, Meyer, Maxwell or Faraday), chemistry (Mendeleev, Wohler), biology (Darwin, Mendel, Pasteur) or medicine (Koch, Behring) just to name a few of the most famous. Philosophy was not indifferent to this dynamic development. New philosophical problems appeared, the views on progress, life or the essence of matter were changing. However, the additional question arose – how is the development of science possible? And again, the philosophers were drawn to the problem of analogy. Biegański was also interested in that matters – he studied the history of science and checked whether a single method, based on logical inference and leading to precise hypotheses, was reproduced when great discoveries were made? It was the inference from analogy that Biegański considered: "[...] as one of the main paths along which the mind walks to acquire new truths" (Biegańska 1930: 200). Biegański was a true forerunner in Poland – and even in the world – when it came to drawing attention to inference by analogy. He was followed, for example, by Władysław Szumowski, who devoted an entire chapter in *Filozofia medycyny* [Philosophy of medicine] to prove that analogy is extremely useful for medicine. Szumowski gives numerous examples from history of medical sciences – such as the discovery made by Ignaz Semmelweis, who initiated the development of antiseptics when his discovered the etiology of puerperal fever. The conclusions that Szumowski draws are as follows: "[...] inference from analogy is of great heuristic importance. Geniuses have always been distinguished by the fact that they knew how to perceive and grasp some deep analogy among the hundreds of similarities and strange relationships that sometimes occurred; those analogies they then confirmed by experiment" (Szumowski 2007: 252). However, it is worth recalling once again that, according to Biegański's theory, analogy is something different from identity or similarity and is based not on similarity of features, but similarity of relations. And the strength of the hypothesis that arises as a result of inference by analogy depends on the validity of the similarity of relations.

5. Reception of Biegański's theory

Biegański's work on analogy has been well received. Particularly noteworthy here is a short review by Józefa Kodisowa, where she writes about *Wnioskowaniu z analogii*: "Modern works on science have repeatedly drawn attention to the great importance of analogy in scientific theories. Hence there was a natural interest in the logical construction of analogy – procedure of thinking that, until recently, has been playing in logic the role of Cinderella" (Kodisowa 1910: 347-348). Tadeusz Kotarbiński and Izydora Dąmbska also quoted Biegański's views on analogy in their works (Woleński 1998: 25). However, there were also several reviews that were more critical. I would like to draw particular attention to the criticism that Biegański received from the Lviv-Warsaw School. Three years after Biegański's death, in October 1920 to be exact, a review was published by Daniela Gromska (Gromska 1920-1921: 159-161), who was then editor of the "Ruch Filozoficzny". Her text was about "Podręcznika logiki i metodologii ogólnej dla szkół średnich i samouków" "Handbook of logic and general methodology for secondary schools and self-taught students"[16]. As Gromska herself noted, it fell to her the thankless role of criticizing an author who had recently died (Biegański had been dead for only three years). She wrote that her words represented the common position of the Lviv-Warsaw School. According to Gromska the accusations were aimed against the *apparent* renunciation of psychologism by Biegański; psychologism proclaimed that ideal logical constructs are in fact mental activities. I have already mentioned that Biegański highly valued the history of logic, which is why much of his textbook is an overview of positions in the science of logic. Gromska reproaches Biegański that he "[...] uncritically uses other people's views" (Gromska 1920-1921: 159), and it is impossible to understand where his original thought begins and other people's ideas end. In addition, he is not consistent in the terminology he uses. Gromska concludes that this textbook is basically a danger to young people, due to the profusion of errors, and should be kept out of the hands of students. This was an exceptionally strong attack

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[16] The textbook on logic by Biegański was published as many as 5 times. The first time was in 1907: *Handbook of General Logic and Methodology for Secondary Schools and Self-taught Students*, Warsaw-Lviv: Wende and Sp. Its final, third and revised version was published by Biegański in 1916. The handbook was later published twice after his death, but without any changes. Gromska's criticism refers to the revised version. Biegański considerably shortened the chapter on methodology (as a result of changes in the curriculum) and argues against psychologism, proclaiming the ideality of logical constructions, what distinguishes logic from psychology.

given that Biegański could no longer defend himself. He always responded to any polemics against his views, but as Mieczysława Biegańska noted, Gromska's blows were focused on Biegański, but aimed more broadly (Biegańska 1930: 194). In subsequent issues of the "Philosophical Movement" there were voices of opposition to such fierce criticism (Biegańska 1930: 193). However, it was of no use, as Polish logic was already heading in a different direction, and Biegański remained in the memory of many as a self-proclaimed logician who did not know what he was doing.

6. Conclusion

Certainly the image of Biegański as a logician was revindicated strongly by Jan Woleński's article, published in *Philosophy of Science* in 1998. Woleński explains that we can look at Biegański as a "philosophical logician". "There is no doubt that Biegański was a philosophical logician in the sense of distinction made by Łukasiewicz. And this is how I intend to consider his work, all without prejudice" (Woleński 1998: 20). Wolenski admits that Biegański was not a good logician when it comes to formal logic. His writing lacked consistency, he understood the same terms in different ways and did not provide uniform definitions. In fact, he was accused of this on many occasions. Given such strong opinions about his logical achievements, it may come as a surprise that Jagiellonian University offered him the chair of logic in 1914 (Biegańska 1930: 64-65)[17]. However, looking at the way in which Biegański dealt with logic, it should not surprise us that he was looked down upon by the Lviv-Warsaw School. Biegański grew out of the Kantian tradition, he was greatly inspired by the work of the German Neo-Kantians and their psychological view of logic (Miłosz, 1974: 511-512). Biegański also wanted to use logic as a methodological tool for practicing science. That is why he paid so much attention to analogy and argued for its usefulness, showing case studies found in the history of science. For this reason, I hope that with my presentation of Biegański's views as a continuation of certain ideas and in the context of his other interests, I can clear him of some of the charges.

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[17]   However, Bieganski had to turn down the offer from Kraków due to his deteriorating health.

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Analogy-Making as an Art.
Prolegomena to the Culture of Smile

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Smilet er den korteste afstand mellem to mennesker.
The smile is the shortest distance between two persons.
Victor Borge

Abstract: Analogy-making is treated by us as an art that is not only the basis of a dialogical meeting, but of any relationship in general. After Simone Weil it is assumed that there are only relations and this conjecture applies in particular to the entire psychological content of human consciousness. The analogy is described in this paper as a deliberate introduction of nuance. This characterization is a paraphrase of a some statement by Albert Maysles. We give examples of works by artists, which we propose to interpret as the use of analogy-making in their creative activities. Although profound and hidden similarities between human beings may indicate, on the one hand, a tendency to violence and harm, but on the other hand, to a desire for beauty, joy and love. Our attitude towards analogy-making can be described as non-Nietzschean, because his conviction that pain is a condition of the eternal joy of creating is rejected here. Following Antoni Kępiński, we believe that culture is love for the world. However, we refer at the same time to Arthur Koestler's concept that, contrary to traditional views, the opposite of love is not hate, but smile. Therefore we would like to treat our approach as a contribution to the culture of smile project.

Key words: analogy, dialogue, smile, nuance, joy, uniqueness.

1. Introduction

Simone Weil reminded us that Greek science begins with Thales' formulation of the concept of similarity between triangles. And she wrote that *here science would seem to be only a more attentive perception.* But science changes: following Simone Weil, Greek science was about numbers, figures and machines, whereas now science seems to consist only of pure relations (*Sur la science*). But we are interested exactly in this greater attentiveness, i.e. in actions of paying closer attention to something: from the ancient Greeks to Douglas Hofstadter's cognition-core hypothesis, and beyond. Constructing ever more accurate, ever subtler analogies is still a method of refining our knowledge. Hence, we propose an introduction to this approach to analogy and its applications, which encompasses its history but also new perspectives. We put a strong focus on their special and delightful flexibility: using analogies not only opens new areas and values within the metaphysical universe, but also teaches us attention in Simone Weil's sense, and humility in a dialogical meeting with the Other.

Culture according to Simone Weil is a formation of attention, therefore we propose to consider analogy as a way of shaping our attention. The aim of this paper is also to present an elucidation to the logo of our dialogical collection.

We are interested in the application of analogy in the humanities. The Polish psychiatrist Antoni Kępiński (1918-1972) juxtaposed the traditional pair "civilization" and "culture". He assumed that civilization is power over the world, while culture is love for the world. Since knowledge is power, we are inclined to consider such a concept of analogy which is part of culture (in Kępiński's sense). We closely associate the concept of analogy with Franz Rosenzweig's dialogical turn in philosophy and going beyond the three paradigms of philosophical research as defined by Herbert Schnädelbach, i.e. outside the ontological, mentalistic and linguistic paradigms. The constitution of a dialogical relationship (i.e. the relationship between *I* and *Thou*) requires the development of the ability to focus attention, at the same time, on *similarities* among differences and on *differences* among similarities. This is our formula for a creative approach to the dialogical relationship.

According to Martin Buber, relationships are created in three spheres: in our life with nature, with people, and with intelligible forms. Therefore, we are interested in all the testimonies and examples of the use of analogies: from ancient mythology, through all the history of literature and philosophy, to utopian thinking and visions of the future. Moreover, Simone Weil said that there are only relations (French: *rapports*).

> L'homme ne peut concevoir cette opération divine de la médiation, il peut seulement l'aimer. Mais son intelligence en conçoit d'une manière parfaitement claire une image dégradée, qui est le rapport. **Il n'y a jamais autre chose dans la pensée, humaine que des rapports**. Même, les objets sensibles, dès qu'on en analyse la perception d'une manière un peu rigoureuse, on reconnaît que l'on nomme de ce nom de **simples paquets de rapports** qui s'imposent à la pensée par l'intermédiaire des sens. Il en est de même pour les sentiments, pour les idées, pour tout le contenu psychologique de la conscience humaine.
> **Nous n'avons en nous et autour de nous que des rapports.** Dans les demi-ténèbres où nous sommes plongés, tout pour nous est rapport, comme dans la lumière de la réalité tout est en soi médiation divine (emphasis ours, Weil 1951: 166).

We present analogy as a foundation of dialogue, of dialogical relation and any connection in general. Therefore, we will emphasize the importance of nuance, and by consequence of uniqueness, in the art of analogy-making that should bring us joy, delight, but most importantly a genuine smile as remedy to hatred.

2. Analogy as the deliberate introduction of nuance

The great filmmaker, Albert Maysles, said famously *Tyranny is the deliberate removal of nuance.* We observe many dangerous dichotomies and polarizations that plague many contemporary societies and dialogue can be introduced only with a re-introductions of nuance and clarity into any discourse. The pervasiveness of the narration we/them, we/enemies, if you are not with us, then you are against us, you are (with) the enemy. We always see nefarious consequences of hatred that festered in any place at any given time.

This is why we believe that we would like to propose this paraphrase Maysles' words and described analogy as the deliberate introduction of nuance. In consequence, the analogical paradigm in the humanities would be based on values such as clarity, nuanced uniqueness, careful consideration and dialogue. This understanding of analogy would prevent us from falling into the tyranny of homogeneity, of forced unification (producing men-cogs in the sense of Ernesto Sabato) (Gan-Krzywoszyńska 2021: 88-89).

In the philosophy of dialogue we value true diversity, therefore the aim of an encounter cannot be uniformization of partners but better understanding of each other, seeing, perceiving similarities and distinctions, savoring nuances that can be truly beneficial in alleviating all kinds of conflicts. Paul Valéry said: *Les*

hommes se distinguent par ce qu'ils montrent et se ressemblent par ce qu'ils cachent (Valéry 1960). He emphasized the role of appearances that introduce divisions, and deep, profound reflection on ultimate things/issues connect us with each other on an incredible scale like it happens in the case of art and its universal, or even *pluriversal* language (in the sense of Enrique Dussel). This is why in this paper we are focusing on the dialogical aspects of some of the most original and world-renowned four artists who connected with generations of people.

The above mentioned quote from Paul Valéry can be interpreted in two ways, namely that distinction between people regard superficial aspects and appearances and deep down we are much more similar than we believe. Profound and hidden similarities between human beings may indicate, on the one hand, a tendency to violence and harm, but on the other hand, a desire for beauty, joy and love. Consequently, following classics like Thucydides and contemporary artist like Abakanowicz we agree that one must see both sides of life: horror and delight. However, this text constitutes a certain departure from the old categories of Eros and Thanatos. We can say that our considerations represents a non-Nietzschean approach. We agree with a Hasidic postulate of *concept of a life in fervor, of exalted joy* (Buber 1991: 2) and we want to study analogies within the positive side and to focus on joy, beauty and pleasures of dialogical encounter. Which also requires and effort and may pose many difficulties, however dialogical spaces are best depicted by gentle and very, very wide flight of stairs like in Isamu Noguchi playgrounds, especially in Moerenuma Park in Sapporo. This unique space is safe, welcoming and relaxing, one is free to explore and discover, yet inspired to stay creative and attentive since there are always some slight distinctions between objects. The essential role of such an image is in radical contrast to an abyss of dichotomy, division, exclusion and violence.

We would like to focus on *I-Thou* relations in the Buberian sense considering the third level (relations with cultural objects/artifacts) as the rapports with an art and work of arts and artists/creators. One of the striking similarities between these artists: Matisse, Rothko, Abakanowicz and Noguchi is that they are well known for a big, human scale of their works. Matisse's cut-out, Rothko's color field paintings, late sculptures of Abakanowicz all had deliberately human scale in order to facilitate close relation and intense interaction with a work of art. Moreover, they are fruits of diligent work, extreme attention to detail and primal understanding, sometimes described as child-like or even in certain sense religious experience. In any case, they are dialogical, fresh, clear and authentic. They transformed artist and generations of divers audiences.

3. The Art of Analogy-making

The very act of creating analogies is an art. Jean-Yves Béziau put it a perfectly fine:

> Analogy is a very famous and popular notion. Everybody likes to make some analogies. Roughly speaking making an analogy is to compare two *different* things, stressing one *similar* feature, which is *transposed* from one thing to another one, shedding a new light on it. Considering this transportation, we can consider that analogies are metaphors (cf. the etymology of "metaphor").
> **Making analogies is an art, the result can be a *chef d'oeuvre* or an ugly and ridiculous thing when the mayonnaise is not succeeded** (emphasis ours, Béziau 2018: 1).

We are taking into consideration four contemporary artists: Henri Matisse, Magdalena Abakanowicz, Mark Rothko and Isamu Noguchi, especially their very last works. All of them geniuses and world renowned very prolific masters with permanent creativity and all fascinated by still mysterious and enigmatic phenomenon of life and vitality.

We would like to focus on dialogical and analogical aspects of their art, in particular, Matisse's Cut-outs, Abakanowicz long-time motif of Fiber beings, Mark Rothko's last paintings and Isamu Noguchi last work Moerenuma Park in Sapporo.

The word *dialogical* means *connecting*. Dialogical connection starts with a smile, as a delicate, genuine proof of attention and a gift. For example, it may begin with Simone Weil's question: What are you going through?

On the other hand, the late comedian, Norm Macdonald, said in an interview that in fact humor is useless, when you have two people genuinely happy to see each other, to be together, they will smile, laugh anyway, of a pure joy and appreciation of a gift. Of feeling not only safe but cherished and nourished.

Our logo symbolizes encounter of two people who are relaxed and focused on each other. Art creates very profound dialogical communication, discovers nontrivial analogies and connections. Formation of attention to nuances, looks effortless yet requires a lot of effort. Many great artists aspired to become in a sense children again (for instance Picasso), and the lightness of their work hide enormous efforts. Dialogical encounters are always beneficial and pleasurable, however in order for this to happen requires a lot of preparation and hard work. Matisse put it felicitously: *I have always tried to hide my efforts and wished my works to have the light joyousness of springtime, which never lets anyone suspect the labors it has cost me...*

We are interested in dialogical relation with art that should build, support and develop a person. Let us consider two examples of great Polish artists: Bohdan Butenko and Wojciech Kilar. Bohdan Butenko (1931-2019) was a Polish cartoonist, illustrator and graphic artist. In 2017, an interview that Małgorzata Piwowar conducted with him was published. This interview ends with the following statement by Butenko In this interview, he said, among other things):

> Little children are great and they are the same everywhere. Their natural sensitivity is knocked out of their heads by their community, taking away their psychological independence, way of thinking, associations and fantasies. Until it get out of their heads in schools, they're great. But then it does start getting worse and worse. The younger the children, the more willingly I meet them. During one meeting no one will learn to draw, but you can encourage, open up and stimulate the imagination to follow your own paths. If, out of 30 people I meet, two or three open up to their own imaginations, that's a lot (Butenko 2017).

Wojciech Kilar (1932-2013) was a Polish composer. In a conversation with Katarzyna Bielas and Jacek Szczerba, he said: *Art should lead to good, it should build a person, not ruin.* He also spoke briefly about music and teaching composition as follows:

> And here we touch on the basic topic, what is music, what is practicing my profession. I do not know what it is. These are the sounds that have been given to me for guidance, and I do what I want with them. (...) I do not accept academism, what I learned at school. It is really a completely individual matter. (...) It will sound very banal, but all that is true in life is communicating with people. (...) I don't like the word creativity, you can call it differently. (...) In any case, this work is best when it is unconscious. Probably not me discovered it, probably out of a thousand people say it. But it's like asking a flower how it grows, right? It is also a cliché, but the composition cannot be learned. An excellent professor of composition was, for example, the great composer Bolesław Szabelski. He struck the piano: 'Well, yes, such a chord, yes, oh, a chord yes. Or maybe we can go drink, smoke something...' This is the best science (Kilar).

4. Admiration and Delight

Seeing analogies liberates, reconciliates and bring joy of understanding and clarity. In order to see profound analogies one must display dialogical attitude, most importantly humility. The fundamental role of analogy was highlighted

among others by Octavio Paz who said: *Analogía es el reino de la palabra como, ese puente verbal que, sin suprimirlas, reconcilia las diferencias y las oposiciones.* (*Analogy is the kingdom of the word as verbal bridge that, without suppressing differences and oppositions, reconciliates them*) (Paz 1985: 102).

Matisse believed that this clarity received from a job well done is crucial to one's wellbeing. When asked if he believed in God, he answered only while working. *Derive happiness in oneself from a good day's work, from illuminating the fog that surrounds us.*

His desire was to create a very comfortable and comforting art. And many people, including fellow artist (like Mark Rothko), found this in dialogical encounters with his art. Even Matisse's longtime friend and patron Sergei Shchukin after series of tragic events and losses the only consolation was being surrounded by Matisse's art.

> What I dream of is an art of balance, of purity and serenity, devoid of troubling or depressing subject matter, an art which could be for every mental worker, for the businessman as well as the man of letters, for example, a soothing, calming influence on the mind, something like a good armchair which provides relaxation from physical fatigue (Matisse 1973: 481).

Similarly, Jorge Luis Borges stated that the only/main purpose of literature is pleasure, as in a meeting with an old friend.

5. Uniqueness and connection

> *And as you confront the new changes that will take place,*
> *please try and keep your country unique.*
> *Don't change into something else. Keep it unique.*
> Frank Zappa

Analogy has a fundamental role in dialogue because without it we do not have empathy, just sympathy. Instead of trying to understand the other, we are looking just from our perspective. The same essential difference we observe between discovering and in fact covering (it is more visible in Spanish in opposition *descubrimiento/encubrimiento*), especially in the context of so-called "discovery of America".

Analogy is a basis of analectic method elaborated and used by Enrique Dussel and it is connected with the uniqueness of a person and/or a culture. He wrote:

> The merely natural substantivity of a person ... acquires here all its uniqueness, its proper indetermination, its essence of bearing a history, a culture; it is a being that freely and responsibly determines itself; it is person, face, mystery. The analectical refers to the real human fact by which every person, every group or people, is always situated 'beyond' (*ano-*) the horizon of totality (Dussel 1985: 158).
>
> Liberation ethics, on the other hand, takes its point of departure in an affirmation of the real, existent, historical *other*. I have designated this 'transontological' (metaphysical) *positive moment* of departure, this active point of the initiation of the negation of the negation, the '*analectical*' (Dussel 1988a: 243).

The analectic method is focused on the praxis (among others economic, pedagogical, political) on the real efforts in order to understand the Other, to hear and consider the critical voice of the Other. It is about awareness of ethical consciousness, about a presence with the Other with full commitment in struggle for liberation and justice of the Other. The alterity can manifest itself in many aspects: cultural, sociopolitical, familial, ethnic, generational, etc. Díaz wrote:

> Since practice is a relationship between people, the point of departure of the analectical method is the interpellation of the other, the negation of oppression and the affirmation of exteriority. **Its logical operative principle, being practical, is then the analogy that includes difference and innovation, with the quality of liberation. If practical methods are ignorant of exteriority, they are consequently transformed into damaging, inhuman ideologies because they mean the eclipse of the other** (emphasis ours, Díaz 2001: 309).

Obviously, the alterity in many instances translates into exclusion, therefore the approach of Dussel and philosophers of liberation descend from the purely academic or privileged context and enter the peripheral zones. The affirmation of exteriority, impossible – in the sense of eclipse – within oppressive systems, emerges from the principle of the unconditional freedom and uniqueness of the Other, which in fact empowers our own sense of freedom and uniqueness.

However, we should remember that this affirmation of exteriority does not come easy, it is a difficult process, and even Matisse wrote about his constant efforts to achieve genuine *freshness of vision* that requires vigilance and utmost attempts in order to clean one's view/perspective. Let us quote these two fundamental statements of Matisse: *There is nothing more difficult for a truly creative painter than to paint a rose, because before he can do so he has first to forget all the roses that were ever painted.* And also: *I would like to recapture that freshness of vision which is characteristic of extreme youth when all the world is new to it.*

When considering the uniqueness and connection we must come back to Abakanowicz basic analogy: *We are fibrous structures* this is the title of her last retrospective exposition in Poznań, celebrating naming Magdalena Abakanowicz University of the Arts in Poznań, Poland. Interestingly the word *analogy* is very rarely used in critical reflection on her art, however, as we may see below, it is directly implicit by the *principle of similarity and difference.*

> Each of Abakanowicz's spatial projects in itself and all of them combined bring us closer to understanding **her creative logic, based on two principles of similarity and difference**. While each of the works has its own unique features, numerous similarities can be discerned between particular projects. We may therefore safely claim that the artist was able to express creative diversity while maintaining consistency in her initial assumptions. Each of the forms made for public space can be considered independently, as site-specific, but can also be interpreted as a part of a larger whole, of a broader artistic concept with solid theoretical background (Bieczyński 2021: 198).

It may seem paradoxical to talk about Abakanowicz work in terms of uniqueness when her masterpieces are crowds of unrecognizable, countless and anonymous sculptures. However, the essential analogy consist in fact that we are all unique as everybody else was a persistent idea of her creative activity. She said:

> I feel overwhelmed by quantity where counting no longer makes sense. By unrepeatability within such quantity. A crowd of people or birds, insect or leaves, is a mysterious assemblage of variants of a certain prototype, **a riddle of nature abhorrent to exact repetition or inability to produce it**, **just as a human hand can not repeat its own gesture** (Abakanowicz, From Her website: *About the Artist*)).

Her crowds consist of figures that seem uniform from afar, however when we dare to encounter them and pay attention each of them is an individuality, with its own expression, organic shapes, with unique details of skin like wrinkles, unique natural surface like tree bark or fur. Following nature Abakanowicz never repeats herself, became master of nuance and smallest not obvious characteristics. The sublime lies not in the beauty of the eyes, her crowds are often flocks of headless figures, still individuals not cogs. She explained this idea best herself: *I immerse in the crowd, like a grain of sand in the friable sands. I am fading among the anonymity of glances, movements, smells, in the common absorption of air, in the common pulsation of juices under the skin...*

Hence, the attention is on relationship, in order to save individual from the crowd we have to focus on analogies, on subtle nuances, like Matisse explained: *I don't paint things. I only paint the difference between things.*

6. Faith-Based Analogy (*Analogia Fidei*) and a future of dialogue

Another aspect of analogical attitude in dialogue is the problem of trust. In the same way as in art, dialogue requires faith, hope and trust. It is never the case of certainty and perfection. We may contribute by learning the craft, again like artists, but there is no recipe for a genuine encounter. There is always a risk of misunderstanding and dialogue requires permanent attention. The term *analogia fidei* comes from Dussel and he emphasizes the need leap of faith at the beginning of communication with the Other. He wrote:

> At the origin of dialogue or of daily existential or personal communication, when those who are in dialogue do not yet know each other, when the Other expresses his or herself initially (the first epiphany) or revelation (or the word of the Other understood in terms of a communication grounded in intimacy that must express its mystery, its self-identity, what it is most intimately, and which is not frequently exposed for fear of its use against the person who reveals it), all of this cannot be fully deciphered.
> With all the passion typical of a work written in my youth, I argued then:
> If philosophy were merely a theory, a reflected understanding of being and an interpretation that had been thought through as to an entity, the word of the Other would be unfailingly reduced to what has been said and interpreted mistakenly from the perspective of the prevailing foundations of Totality [of my Totality...]. To take the word of the Other as univocal as to one's own is the kind of ethical evil which corresponds to the fanatic, an ethical fault which condemns the person who engages in it because it represents a capital error of the intelligence [...]. To consider the word of the Other within the similitude of my world, conserving its meta-physical distinction which is supported in the Other, **is to respect analogy as if it were revelation;** and is to fulfill the duty of committing oneself in humility as to the happiness of the Other (Dussel 2019).

Thus, we want to remind that the same belief and hope must accompany us as we are confronted with the challenge of meeting with the new Other. The only advice or principle that may guide us, according to Ryszard Kapuściński, is kindness. He said during his speech at the Jagiellonian University in 2005.

> We should seek dialogue and understanding with the new Other. The experience of spending years among remote Others has taught me that kindness toward another being is the only attitude that can strike a chord of humanity in the Other. Who will this new Other be? What will our encounter be like? What will we say? And in what language? Will we be able to listen to each other? To understand each other? Will we both want to appeal, as Joseph Conrad put it, to what "speaks to our capacity for delight

and wonder, to the sense of mystery surrounding our lives; to our sense of pity, and beauty, and pain; **to the latent feeling of fellowship with all creation** – and to the subtle but invincible conviction of solidarity that knits together the loneliness of innumerable hearts: to the solidarity in dreams, in joy, in sorrow, in aspirations, in illusions, in hope, in fear, which binds men to each other, which binds together all humanity – the dead to the living and the living to the unborn" (Kapuściński 2005: 16-17).

7. Conclusion. Smile as a remedy against hatred

We mentioned at the beginning that, according to Antoni Kępiński, culture is love for the world. Living in constant threat of violence, wars, and other acts of nonrational tyrants, diseases and epidemics, many people traditionally think that the opposite of love is hate. We, however, propose to consider Arthur Koestler's concept, briefly noted in his memoirs during the Second World War. Inspired by this note, we think it is worth working on a project of a culture of smile. So, we would like to quote a relevant excerpt from Koestler's book at the end:

> I marched most of the time with Père Darrault, the young Dominican. Rivulets of sweat were running down his forehead and cheeks; his tonsure was burnt dark red by the sun. I told him how I had watched the German tank column and about that lad standing in the turret, and that for the first time in my life I had felt a real urge to kill – to kill without hatred. 'C'est logique,' he said: 'the only alternative to killing is to preach.' 'Go and try it,' I said. 'Go and preach to those motorised Neanderthal men.' 'What else have you and your friends done during these last years but preach to them?' he said; 'only your preachings and teachings were a little dry. They sounded like the rustling of dry leaves.' He took a long gulp of red wine mixed with water from his field-flask. 'Your results with them were not much better either,' I said. 'Mon cher,' he answered with his Mario-smile, 'we can wait. We can wait and wait and wait. But you can't. That is the difference between us.' 'Concretely – what would you preach to those men in the turrets?' 'Always the same simple word which we have preached for the last two thousand years: Love.' 'That is your mistake,' I said. '**Love is no alternative to hatred. They can live perfectly well side by side in compartments of the same mind.' 'Not the love we mean. And what is your alternative?' I had waited for this, for I thought that I had made a discovery, and wanted to try it out on him. 'The remedy against hatred,' I said, 'is to teach them to laugh and to smile.' He began to chuckle. 'Bon Dieu,' he said. 'To make a Boche laugh – that is possible. But to teach him to smile – that is too much, even for a Dominican**' (emphasis ours, Koestler 1941: 200).

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Relations analogiques au sujet de l'acte créatif et la séquence imaginative en Chine et en Occident

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Abstract: This study explores the connections between time, travel, and creative acts such as painting and poetry, highlighting the similarities that unite these themes. It also focuses on the relationships between the East and the West in regards to these subjects, and posits that travel can be understood as an active form of meditation. The study argues that the meaning of wanderings can be found by learning to make them conscious, and that there has been a deep reflection on time, consciousness, and mobility since ancient times.

Key words: time, travel, creative acts, East-West, consciousness

1. Introduction

Cet essai vise à réfléchir sur le parcours du voyageur en insistant sur les multiples analogies qui président au temps, au voyage et à l'acte créatif, en particulier la peinture et la poésie. Cependant, si ces réflexions nous poussent

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(Image 1) Caroline Pires Ting, *Voyage à travers le temps et l'espace*, aquarelle sur papier Arches, 23x31 cm

vers une considération sur le temps et la durée, nous essayons ici de les conduire sur les liens entre l'Orient et l'Occident à cet égard.

Le déplacement peut devenir méditation active et nous pourrions retrouver le sens perdu de nos déambulations en apprenant à les rendre conscientes. Depuis l'Antiquité, en effet, il existe une vraie réflexion sur le temps, la conscience et la mobilité comme exercice de ressourcement. Comme dans la méditation immobile, l'attention aux processus respiratoires et aux mouvements mentaux s'avère essentielle pour maîtriser l'état de clarté intérieure qui nous amène à nous conjuguer avec la réalité extérieure. Il n'est nullement anodin que, en chinois, le caractère traduit par « pleine conscience », ou selon l'anglicisme le plus fréquemment employé « mindfulness », est un idéogramme formé par les radicaux 今 (jīn), signifiant « présent », au-dessus de 心 (xīn), « cœur-esprit ». Littéralement, l'idéogramme combiné (今 + 心) 念 (niàn) signifie l'acte de vivre le moment présent avec votre cœur ou votre esprit. La pleine conscience est donc la lucidité instantanée de ce qui se passe en nous et autour de nous. En étant présent et conscient du moment actuel, nous pouvons accepter ce qui est à ce moment-là tel qu'il est, permettant au changement de se produire naturellement.

Pourtant, l'une des activités du 心, « cœur-esprit », consiste à prendre sa source dans l'attention au présent, 今, ainsi que dans le souvenir, la mémoire[19], à faire des parcours dans l'espace et dans le temps du monde. Le flâneur parcoure des variations de paysages et d'horizons, comme une séquence imaginative. Il est ainsi possible de mettre en rapport la marche, le récit et le mythe : dans chacun de ces cas, l'imagination est fortement stimulée. Chacun d'entre eux est un moyen de cheminer selon des voies vers une Vérité supérieure. Le voyage est, pour l'individu, une quête à plusieurs dimensions : quête de connaissances sur le monde, sur soi-même ; quête de sa véritable identité ou quête d'une Vérité supérieure (comme dans le cas des pèlerinages) ; le mythe, la religion et l'écriture sont, de même, l'expression de cheminements vers telle ou telle Vérité. Le thème du déplacement nous offre donc l'occasion de porter un regard particulier sur l'esprit hétéroclite du voyageur, collectionneur d'objets, de traces, de mémoires. Mais aussi, au contraire, du sujet qui s'évide, comme chez les taoïstes.

2. Quelques analogies entre la pensée chinoise et la pensée européenne

A côté de différences abyssales, certains rapports apparaissent frappants. Par exemple, on voit le poète Xie Tiao (464-499) découvrir que la fenêtre – résume Florence Hu-Sterk – « impose un ordre ; elle découpe la nature infinie pour n'en retenir qu'un fragment qui vaut la totalité. En l'isolant de l'ensemble, le poète se l'approprie comme un tableau» (Hu-Sterk 2004 : 127). En 1435, Alberti n'avait rien fait d'autre quand, juste avant d'ouvrir sa fameuse fenêtre – qui ne donne pas sur le monde mais sur la composition mesurée de l'œuvre –, il avait évoqué Protagoras et sa célèbre formule : « l'homme est la mesure de toute chose » (Cf. Arasse 2009: 54).

Le paysage traverse le corps par la « fenêtre » de la vision. La perspective permet de fixer sur la toile un instant du monde. Elle immobilise le temps au profit d'un espace intellectuellement construit ; elle requiert corrélativement l'immobilité du peintre et du spectateur afin d'assimiler le contenu établi. C'est dans ce sens que nous pouvons comparer la peinture à un paysage et la contemplation à la prise de conscience. Contempler un paysage est vouloir s'y perdre dans le présent ; métaphoriquement, s'évanouir au milieu des choses.

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[19]   La pratique bouddhiste méditative trouve son origine dans le mot sanskrit smṛti स्मृति. Traduit par pleine conscience, il signifie à la lettre "ce dont on se souvient".

« L'esprit du paysage et mon esprit se sont concentrés et, par-là, transformés de sorte que le paysage est bien en moi », affirmait le peintre chinois 石濤 Shi Tao[20] (1641- vers 1719-20). Marcher vraiment dans le paysage, enfin, signifie s'y fondre, un peu comme – dit la légende – le peintre chinois Shi Tao a disparu dans ce qu'il venait de peindre sur un mur. Cette production d'images de la nature et du mouvement sur des parois se retrouve chez Léonard : « Si tu regardes des murs souillés de beaucoup de tâches ou faits de pierres multicolores, avec l'idée d'imaginer quelque scène, tu y trouveras l'analogie de paysages au décor de montagnes, rivières, rochers, arbres, plaines, larges vallées et collines de toutes sortes. Tu pourras y voir aussi des batailles et des figures aux gestes vifs et d'étranges visages et costumes et une infinité de choses [21] ».

3. Correspondances

On sait que les Chinois aiment à établir certaines correspondances entre les vertus des choses de la nature et les vertus des choses de l'humain. C'est ainsi par exemple, comme nous le rappelle l'écrivain et poète François Cheng, dans son *Essai sur le langage pictural chinois* : « aux deux pôles de l'univers correspondent les deux pôles de la sensibilité humaine» (Cheng 1977 : 93). Le savoir était herméneutique, et l'écriture appartenait aux 士 (shi), une élite intellectuelle qui avait le pouvoir de « décrypter » le monde (Vandermeerch 1974 : 42-43). « 来去, lái-qù » signifie « venir et aller », « muser » ; « se promener ». En chinois, le mot « 叉, chā » doit être rapproché de termes signifiant « franchir », « aller au-delà », et d'autres qui expriment le plaisir, l'agrément, le peu de profondeur. « 叉, chā » évoque l'image de deux fourchettes entrelacées, comme nous le voyons dans le caractère 彐, dans le premier dictionnaire chinois, le 說文解字 (Shuōwén Jiězì), compilé à l'époque de la dynastie Han (206 av. J.-C. à 220 apr. J.-C.) par 許慎 (Xǔ shèn; 58-147).

François Cheng nous apprend que l'ensemble, souvent traduit par « passer par-dessus (un obstacle) », en sautant, en grimpant, exprime une idée de légèreté, de mouvement et de dépassement à la fois, un envol libre « au-delà » (Tchouang tseu, Lie Tseu, Lao Tseu). Ces idées sont basées sur le sens que l'artiste s'est fait « déchiffreur » de la Nature et transcripteur de ses symboles. Celles-ci font songer, tantôt aux *Contemplations* de Victor Hugo, dont l'univers est un « hiéroglyphe

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[20] Nous avons trouvé cette citation *in* Tchouang tseu, Lie Tseu, Lao 1955.
[21] Citation de Danielle Sonnier, in Alberti 2007: 43.

énorme » , comparable à la « Bible » ou à un « livre écrit dans l'azur, sur l'onde et le chemin, avec la fleur, le vent, l'étoile […] » et où « la nature est un drame » (Hugo, 1973 : 277), tantôt aux « Correspondances » de Charles Baudelaire, qui désignent les analogies entre les mondes matériel et spirituel, les artistes étant dans ce cas les seuls déchiffreurs des rapports qui permettent de passer du monde des sensations à celui des représentations.

En parcourant un chemin (qui peut être un tableau), nous créons donc le paysage, puisque percevoir c'est créer une image à partir d'énergies qui changent sans cesse. Marcher, c'est dessiner le paysage. C'est peindre avec son souffle, avec son corps, à la façon du peintre chinois Shi Tao : « […] À présent que le Paysage est né de moi et moi du Paysage, celui-ci me charge de parler pour lui. J'ai cherché sans trêve à dessiner des cimes extraordinaires. L'esprit du paysage et mon esprit se sont rencontrés et par là transformés, en sorte que le paysage est bien en moi ». [22]

Dans son chapitre *Le Paysage Symbolique*, l'historien de l'art britannique Kenneth Clarck examine la fonction de la réintroduction du paysage depuis le Moyen Âge (Clarck 1994 : 7). Il l'emploie dans « un cycle d'intégration harmonieuse de l'esprit humain » au « monde extérieur ». Sans doute, cette géographie sacrée est-elle à rechercher dans l'ancienne géomancie du paysage appelée en Chine « Vent et Eau » (風水, Feng Shui).

Umberto Eco, dans son livre *Art et beauté dans l'esthétique médiévale*, traite de la propension allégorique du Moyen Âge, qui fait de toute chose le symbole d'une autre en associant l'expression métaphorique à la mentalité primitive dans son rapport entre les images et ses respectifs signifiés : « une façon d'agglomérer dans la notion d'une chose déterminée tout ce qui peut entretenir avec elle un quelconque rapport de similitude et appartenance. Néanmoins, plutôt que d'un primitivisme au sens étroit du mot, il s'agira d'une aptitude à prolonger l'activité mythico-poétique de l'époque classique, en produisant des nouvelles représentations» (Eco 1997).

Eco insiste sur la relation entretenue, à l'époque médiévale, de tous les champs du savoir fondée sur le rapport de similitude : chaque créature reflète le monde. Voir par exemple les reproductions de l' « homme astrologique » que l'on retrouve dans les Livres d'Heures du Moyen Âge, qui considéraient le corps humain comme l'image réduite mais fidèle de l'univers. Mais aussi Gaston Bachelard qui a réfléchi sur cette imagination dans *La Formation de l'esprit scientifique*, et écrit : « on sent bientôt l'idée vague se reformer derrière

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[22]   Shi Tao (1641 – ap. 1710, Ming). (Cheng 1955: 30).

les précisions intempestives. Cette idée vague et puissante, c'est celle de la Terre nourricière, de la Terre maternelle, premier et dernier refuge de l'homme abandonné» (Bachelard 1938 : 177).

4. L'écriture et l'image

En chinois, comme dans plusieurs langues orientales, l'un des principaux vocables utilisés pour désigner le paysage est 山水, *shanshui*, ce qui veut dire littéralement « montagne-eau », mais aussi le tableau représentant ces deux éléments. C'est pourquoi la peinture paysagiste se dit « Peinture de Montagne et d'Eau » (Cf. Cheng 1979, 1991 : 92-93)

On retrouve d'ailleurs ces deux motifs dans toute la peinture paysagère d'Extrême-Orient. Pour Augustin Berque,[23] le 山水, *shanshui,* implique une fusion cosmique de l'Homme avec l'Univers. Le peintre «reviendra sans cesse sur le thème de la montagne, celle qui est devenue « très tôt, dans l'imaginaire chinois, le visage même du Mystère ». « Il s'établit en Chine une véritable mystique de la montagne qu'exaltaient inlassablement poètes, peintres et maîtres spirituels. [24]»

Dans son ouvrage *Un univers vers l'autre,* Cheng nous raconte que, en Chine, « le voyage d'initiation faisait partie de la formation d'un lettré ». « Tout lettré digne de ce nom, avant de se présenter au degré supérieur de l'examen impérial, se devait de visiter différentes régions de la vaste Chine, de connaître les différentes traditions vivantes qui avaient enrichi la culture chinoise ». Ainsi, la peinture chinoise a introduit les notions de « La spatialisation de la poésie » et, réciproquement, « La temporalité de la peinture » (Hu-Sterk 2004 : 166-177). Cependant, à la différence de l'Europe, ce sont les poètes plutôt que les peintres qui, les premiers ont vu la nature comme un paysage.

Jacques Pimpaneau[25] souligne d'ailleurs les origines chamaniques de la peinture chinoise. Le poète chinois, qui cheminait beaucoup, essayait comme le chamane de sortir de lui-même pour pénétrer dans le monde extrahumain, dans la vie des arbres, des fleurs et des animaux », de se rendre indépendant du « moi » et de trouver sa place dans l'univers.

Ce mouvement va se manifester dans toutes les étapes de la création. Voir l'exemple célèbre de la technique du halo d'encre (*moyun*) ; elle « représente le

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[23]   Les paysans-ouvriers. *Encyclopédie permanente Japon,* décembre, 1-8.
[24]   Ibid, p. 87.
[25]   Jacques Pimpaneau, *Le courant chamanistique dans la poésie chinoise*, in *Chamin,* n°9.

(Image 2) Caroline Pires Ting, *Dialogue sur le Temps : Une Méditation sur l'Art à l'Ère de l'Intelligence Artificielle*, Peinture numérique créée à l'aide de Midjourney

critère ultime de l'appréciation d'une peinture monochrome » car « pour réussir un halo d'encre, il faut que le peintre soit "aidé par le divin" […]. Tout comme le 道, Dao (ou le Tao), l'encre se diffuse d'elle-même pour créer un halo et le peintre n'a plus prise sur elle. La main de l'homme laisse alors à la Nature, ou au divin, le soin d'achever son geste[26] ».

Dans la tradition philosophique de la théorie du cosmos, la totalité était réservée à la contemplation spirituelle. Mais avec l'observation de l'ensemble de la nature en tant que paysage on atteint une nouvelle forme de la théorie du cosmos. Le paysage est la nature qui est présente esthétiquement au regard pour

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[26] Ibid., p. 207.

un observateur. Le paysage n'apparaît qu'à partir du moment où l'être humain se penche sur la nature avec tous ses sens dans une contemplation (Jouty 1991 : 21-34), c'est-à-dire, pour reprendre l'expression chinoise : où il vit le moment présent avec son cœur-esprit : 念.

Pour illustrer cet article, nous avons créé cette œuvre (Image 2) à l'aide d'un logiciel d'intelligence artificielle, où le temps, le dialogue et le voyage sont des éléments essentiels pour raconter une histoire. Même s'il s'agit d'une peinture dont la thématique s'approche de celle de l'Extrême-Orient, l'encadrement est typique des tableaux occidentaux. Comme dans les natures-mortes qu'on appelle des vanités, la durée du temps est ici illustrée symboliquement. Depuis des siècles, et jusqu'à nos jours, les artistes inventent des stratégies visuelles pour représenter le temps dans leurs œuvres. Cette illustration nous invite à prendre conscience du temps nécessaire pour la contemplation.

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Analogy and Creativity. Ready Made and Quantum Physics, the Analogy of Two Historical Paradigms

(From the artistic artifact as an object of consciousness in multiple worlds)

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Abstract: There is an analogy between art and physics and how their paradigm was challenged in the 1930s. Quantum physics, like the conceptual art of Marcel Duchamp with his ready-mades, is an exploration of human thought. The concepts of randomness, ubiquity, invisibility, and vacuity emerge at the same time, with the same problem of measurement, conveying powerful metaphors with surprising and creative effects that are embodied in physical materials, while indefinitely questioning the concept of reality.

Key words : quantum physics, conceptual art, metaphor, creativity, reality

There is an analogy between art and physics, and the way their respective paradigms were questioned in the 1930s. Indeed, we can see that in an analogical way, Duchamp's conceptual art and quantum physics have for consequence a new vision of our world. Certain concepts, such as those of chance, ubiquity, plurality and subjectivity, are involved in these two fields. These new concepts have liberated art and physics from their materialistic norms, to the point of questioning the very concept of reality. Has this new vision of reality led the

work of art to become so dematerialized that new theories on the definition of art itself are emerging at the same time? What analogy is involved here?

By analogy we mean, in the broadest sense, the exercise of a thought that establishes or detects little apparent, if not occult, sometimes distant relations between distinct and distant domains of experience. Analogy is a shift of meaning from one signified (a concept, an idea) to another signified, which, like a model in the form of images, allows us to compare them. The comparison, the metaphor, are figures of the analogy; the metaphor is an image which illustrates, evokes, crosses the border between the real and the imaginary.

The «as if» of the metaphor has a fictional value that allows the displacement, the transfer of psychic material for strategic purposes. This displacement of thought has surprising effects, unexpected thus very creative, which are incarnated in physical materials, even technological. It is from these displacements that art emerges with its new proposals, but these displacements also concern the sciences with its new paradigms which arise from this astonishing creativity.

Surrealist poet Pierre Reverdy is a specialist of analogy, comparisons and metaphors. In his text "Image",[27] (picture) written in 1917, he speaks of analogy as an image that is born of a comparison, but also of the bringing together of two more or less distant realities. This image is a pure creation of the mind that brings together two realities and generates a creation. Although these two realities must be those of distant ideas, they cannot be contrary, but they must be right. The more distant and right the relations of the two realities brought together are, the stronger and more brutal the image will be. Reverdy then adds that "By making intervene means of direct observations, one destroys the whole by detonating".

In a general way, the analogy as means of creation is omnipresent in the fields of the art but also in that of the sciences. Indeed, in research papers, the metaphors constituting theories have a role to play in the construction of theoretical models, on the one hand, and in the naming of new objects, on the other: they underlie many scientific models with the invention of new terms and require a high level of abstraction. For example, the planetary model of the physicist Niels Bohr, developed in 1915, is a theoretical model based on the metaphor of the atom as a solar system around which planets gravitate by the force of attraction; the analogy underlying this metaphor is both visual and mathematical, with electrons gravitating around the nucleus like the planets around the sun. Let us take another example with Schrödinger's thought experiment in which he imagines a cat

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[27]   Pierre Reverdy, Literary Review North-South, N°13, March 1918.

locked in a box with a radioactive atom and a detection system that triggers the breaking of a light bulb containing a deadly gas in case of disintegration: as long as the box has not been opened, we do not know if the disintegration has taken place, there is the superposition of a state where the cat is dead and alive. Yet another example, with Dirac's fish metaphor, Jeff Tollaksen's pigeon metaphor, Gamov's fly and tiger, and Einstein's thought experiment that straddles a photon and whispers into the vacuum.

These metaphors have made it possible to elaborate imaginary narratives with regard to another possible world, to the point of leading these physicists to carry out experiments and to elaborate theories that bring about new paradigms, like quantum physics.

This means, as Paul Reverdy explains, that without the detour of the metaphor, observation would not allow us to perceive reality, or would even destroy it?

The problem of direct observation brings us back to the problem of measurement inherent to quantum physics, i.e. in the world of the infinitely small, where the phenomenon of observation is a problem in its own right: reality cannot be observed with the naked eye; it can only be represented, or simulated by devious means using a scanning tunneling microscope.

Why is the work of Marcel Duchamp representative of the analogical thought? Because his thought introduces the spring of the enigma, with a world which does not obey any more to a rational causal logic, but with a chaotic and often probabilistic determinism, like the one of quantum.

Marcel Duchamp's work, "3-Stoppages étalon"[28] (3 Standard Stoppages) is an experiment that arises in 1913 to imprison forms obtained by chance; the artist frees himself from the norms of the arts by dropping three lines of one meter each from a height of one meter.

From these three different lines, he obtains three drawings with which are realized three curved rules of one meter. These "templates of chance" question the normative character and the reality of the standard meter which is the basis of our metric system, officially defined in 1791. In Duchamp's thinking, there are no longer any absolute truths or certainties.

Through the works of Marcel Duchamp, the question of the fourth dimension is represented in "The Large Glass" (le Grand Verre) created from 1915 to 1923, where he takes up the theme of "The Bride Stripped Bare by Her

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[28]   Marcel Duchamp's first box, the Box of 1914, included the seminal note that led to one of the artist's most important works. Medium: Wood, glass and paint on canvas, 28 cm x 1,29 m x 23 cm.

Bachelors[29]" (La mariée mise à nu par ses célibataires même). In this Large Glass is projected a universe of non-Euclidean geometry with four non-visible dimensions, and in this impossible object, it is a mechanics that governs the relationship of the top and bottom, the right side of the reverse. The materiality of this transparent work questions the problematic of the material of the work, its very existence and its visibility according to the light and its thin limits with what is seizable.

Thierry Davila, in his book: "De l'inframince. Brève histoire de l'imperceptible, de Marcel Duchamp à nos jours",[30] writes in 2010 that this work gathers ten years of his life. The fourth dimension of the Duchamp sub-fineness answers conjectures that the scientists reserved, at the beginning of the XX century, to the pure mathematical abstraction.

When the stake is still in the sensitive field, Marcel Duchamp produces by subtraction : most often, it does not appear any more. There remain ideas, writings, and the work becomes almost imperceptible. It remains only a representation of the spirit.

Thus, by analogy, to the new paradigm of the conceptual art brought by Marcel Duchamp corresponds that of quantum physics, where the very notion of reality is put in question. This reality remains invisible: one does not see anything there, one does not see a quark, the acuity of our perception is limited by our perceptions and the real is not visible, making the object's status, and thus that of the artwork, waver.

What reality of the artwork is Marcel Duchamp talking about? How did he transform an ordinary object to a master piece in the 1930s? How can an utensil become an artistic artifact, or how does the new paradigm of conceptual art dethrone that of modern art?

Marcel Duchamp works on subtle gaps, minute differences, like the anecdote of Pliny[31] the Elder about the painters Apelles and Protogenes who competed

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[29]   Marcel Duchamp, annotated detail, *The Bride Stripped Bare by Her Bachelors, Even (The Large Glass)*, 1915-23, oil, varnish, lead foil, lead wire, dust, two glass panels, 277.5 × 177.8 × 8.6 cm (Philadelphia Museum of Art).

[30]   « De l'inframince. Brève histoire de l'imperceptible » means dissecting the imperceptible, on the borderlines of the perceptible.

[31]   Pliny the Elder Painting in book 35 of the Natural History. P 81-82.
The virtuosity of the profession is often the occasion of a rivalry, and sometimes even a duel between artists. Thus Appele, who came to Rhodes to see Protogenes, while the latter was absent, drew on a painting which was in the workshop "a line of an extreme smoothness, summae tenultatis". Protogenes, on his return, immediately recognized the skill of Apelles, and made a second line, even finer on the first. When Apelles returned, "blushing to see himself surpassed, he split the lines with a third color, leaving no room for a finer line" § 81-82.

for excellence by drawing lines that were thinner and thinner, less and less perceptible, in a single stroke without lifting the pencil in a curve without jumping, without discontinuity or fixed level, like a continuous signal, that is to say, "analog".

To the question: "What is art?" Pliny the Elder answers: "That which makes visible the invisible". From where the question which results from it: would exist an invisible materiality, with an object which would be well there but reduced to its limit?

At the very time when art is dematerializing, pushed to such a limit of perception, newtonian physics is supplanted in the 1930s by quantum physics, bringing a disconcerting vision of the world in that it questions the very nature of matter.

Like art, quantum physics is also an exploration of human thought, but in the image of an infinitely small world that is only within our reach thanks to new technologies. The problem of measurement and observation implies that of reality: the object we want to observe behaves differently before and after its measurement, to such an extent that a question arises: does reality exist? This problem of measurement and observation thus raises the question of reality, implying also that of time and space.

The basics learned at school have taught us that the world functions in an orderly and determined way, that reality is materialist and that there is matter, space and time. This is what our senses also tell us: the world is in our image with the belief that thanks to science, we have deciphered it.

But now we discover that, in the end, it doesn't work like that. A hundred years ago, the materialist view of the world was shaken by the quantum mechanics resulting from Young's double slit[32]. The resulting interference pattern does not allow the trajectories of the corpuscles to be interpreted with the laws of classical physics, because it is the photon that interferes with itself by passing through both slits at the same time. The interpretation of this experiment is based on the fact that an individual photon finds itself in a superimposed state following the crossing of slits close enough to each other; it has been demonstrated that a single photon can only pass through one slit but it still interferes with itself as if it had crossed through both slits; on the other hand, the output of this photon, which leaves a trace on the screen, is indeed that of a particle, but when these particles are projected one after the other, they are distributed like a wave on the

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[32]   Experiment carried out in 1801 by Thomas Young which makes it possible to understand the wave behavior and the nature at the same time wave corpuscle of the light which while passing by two slits shows zones of interferences.

screen, and it is this result which is disconcerting and which calls into question the classical physics for which the matter is corpuscular and the light undulatory.

If an electron goes in a straight line, it has a curve called «probability of presence» for a given time and place; the probability moves as time goes by, and the object cannot be described as a point object but rather as a wave that propagates, hence the wave-corpuscle duality.

The relationship between matter and vacuum is the basis of the understanding of these quantum phenomena; it was not known that the vacuum was the medium that disturbed the movement of light and matter and its change. The conception that matter and vacuum interact continuously during the fundamental process of each particle, and the destructive and constructive effect of this vacuum are a considerable reversal of point of view. Thus, disturbed by the measurement of its state, the electron is no longer superimposed, but reduced or projected to its measurement state.

Young's experiment makes it possible to highlight the problem of quantum measurement where there is no objective and rigorous definition of what is a «measurement». And we find there the work of Marcel Duchamp with the standard meters in the subjectivity of «3-Stoppages standard». While Marcel Duchamp questions the real, Max Born explains that independently of observation, particles exist as a probability wave function, which is a set of potentialities rather than real objects.

In spite of the confirmation that quantum physics is right, science still postulates determinism in 1980; but quantum physics is a definition of what we do not see, which discovers that the vacuum is made of a lot of information and that it interacts with matter, and that thanks to the phenomenon of entanglement, the particles remain connected to each other, whatever the time and their distance. If an atom appears in a place only if I observe it, does the world exist only if I observe it?

By analogy with the dematerialization of matter whose particles are both constructed and destroyed by interaction with the vacuum, and while Marcel Duchamp exhibits his ready-mades that summon the limit of reality, Walter Benjamin in 1935[33] speaks to us of the dematerialization of art with the techniques of photographic reproduction that modify the perception of the spectator. The photography which seems to give more accessibility to the art simultaneously

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[33]   Walter Benjamin in short history of photography of 1931. Philosopher, writer, art historian, literary critic, art critic and German translator, Walter Benjamin is attached to the Frankfurt School.

reveals its absence. Written in the first place with luminous rays thanks to an optical process and a chemical emulsion, the photography does not give more place to a contemplative approach of the work. Walter Benjamin concludes from this that the work loses its aura, its original character, its uniqueness. This upheaval in the reception of the artwork is in the measure of the crisis of the renewal of humanity.

Then the reality put in box by the physical device of the photography, whose surface was revealed chemically and is now replaced by photosensitive sensors, enters the digital era with the XXI century.

The analogical world which consists in a transfer of structure is a gradual world where the phenomena occur in continuous, as the song of the birds with continuous variations. To reason by analogy is representing a physical quantity by another when one noticed that they present a similarity of form, although they are of different nature. The world of physical quantities is replaced by the digital world, an artificial world invented by man with electronic signals digitized by a series of numbers, 0 or 1, or «all or nothing» logic, high or low level.

By this flow expressed in bit per second, coding and programming constitute computational, virtual, immaterial artifacts, and such as the artifacts of Duchamp, they put in question the definition of the work of art or rather the problem of its materiality, in the Thirties then the Nineties.

This hard passage of the materiality of the artistic artifact to its immateriality was then particularly incarnated in the technological materials. The digital art, with its artifacts that we can see but which are not things, summons a universe which escapes us. Artificial lives, neural networks or L-systems are examples of the «as if» of metaphor particularly creative and powerful. It is the fictional value of this new art practice that has allowed the transfer of psychic materials to technological purposes with surprising and unexpected effects.

Marcel Duchamp's art was premonitory: a precursor of an art that no longer relies on the tangible, his influence illustrates this ability to capture what always escapes with a work that does not allow itself to be grasped.

To the question «What is art?», Arthur Danto[34] defines works of art as meanings that make the objective world more conscious of itself. These meanings are given by the artists to the world around them but also by the observer trying to interpret the artist's intention embodied in the ever changing forms of works.

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[34]   Danto, in his work of 1981 "The transfiguration of the banal" challenges the paternity of the institutional theory of the art, (which is that of Dickie) because it is contrary to him. He wants to elaborate an essentialist theory of the art which integrates the historical perspective. He does not want to be confused with Dickie.

The gap between the «ordinary objects» and Duchamp's «ready-made» defeated this artistic production allowing to understand what was making the masterpiece. The medium seemed indistinguishable, whereas it was the gesture itself, the presentation of the urinal, that constituted the materiality of the work in which its meaning was incarnated.

Danto insists on the fact that the materiality and the medium of the work must be made forget so as not to make the illusion; the work of art is thought like a means of access to knowledge, like an object of conscience which externalizes another way of seeing the world.

In its poiesis, the artistic artifact is in the image of an object of thought, of consciousness, until it becomes a dynamic entity at the interface of multiple worlds, from reality to fiction. Like a recipe, the artifact makes visible the intricacies of complex elements of thought in its making : once constructed, these objects acquire a character of autonomous being and will sometimes continue their «life» independently of the person who made them.

In his definition of the work of art (Defining Art, Dickie 1969: 253), Georges Dickie maintains that all works have in common the fact that the *ready-made* or the works of the *found art*[35] are indeed artifacts, but he needs a theory of the artifactuality.

Indeed, every work of art is an artifact, but in addition, it «will be a property in the name of a certain social institution» (which he calls, using Danto's expression, «The art world», Dickie 1984). Faced with objections to the «legalism» of these formulas, Dickie abandons the term «status», defining the work of art as an artifact created to be presented to an art-world audience (without, however, excluding the possibility that it will never be presented). As for the work as artifact, Dickie adds: «(...) artifacts need not be physical objects, although many of them are: for example, a poem is not a physical object, but nevertheless an artifact. Going further, performances, for example, or improvised dances, are also among the things that are "man-made" and therefore count as artifacts».

From then on, it is by an approach that opposes a fetishistic consideration of the work that we can experience it, and the work of art does not possess intrinsic qualities but exists and is defined through those who observe it: the social, institutional and material factors. That the artifacts do not need to be physical objects brings us directly back to the metaphor of a world at the moment of its

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[35]   The found art and a found object, not worked, which has a status of work by the use that one makes of it

observation and to the quantum theory. It is not by chance that contemporary works of art and quantum metaphorize the invisible, at the very heart of matter, whether physical or psychic.

In both cases, the invisible quantum is indirectly perceived through its effects, with several levels of reality; There is a limpid metaphor between the description made of the indeterminate and omnipresent quantum object which crystallizes in the observation, and the art piece: these two objects underline the influence of the observer on the observed. To continue the search for metaphors and analogies between psychic and physical objects leads us to the heart of matter. Would the psychic object possess quantum properties? This would be a great disruption of our logic.

What analogy is there between contemporary art and quantum physics? The same concepts of invisibility, immateriality, ubiquity, indeterminacy and non-locality liberate from the norms of materialism and question the representation of reality with a new vision of the world.

Between the dematerialization of the work of art and the dematerialization of the real instituted by quantum physics, the metaphors generate the passages of the real to the imaginary and of the imaginary to the real by transports of sense. The transfiguration of the trivial into a work of genius entails a painful paradigm shift, like that of quantum physics, which is just as puzzling. Marcel Duchamp's enigmatic and surprising work is the image of a representation of the mind which, with a gesture, makes visible the invisible and the elusive.

Without existence of its own, the probability of an artifact becoming a work only appears after its observation, which disturbs its state and determines its "status" as an artwork. The metaphor which generated them makes them navigate in the particles ocean, modeled by those of the vacuum until crossing the borders of the real and the imaginary. This so powerful metaphorical image gives the illusion of reality, the matter does not exist without conscience.

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On Analogies between the Haitian Past and the Present. Current Crisis through the Lens of the Spiralist Novel "Dézafi"

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Abstract: This paper is interested in the acute sociopolitical crisis that has gripped the Caribbean nation of Haiti since 2018, with a particular focus on the country's pervasive levels of violence and how this reflects on the latest episode of mass unrest, turmoil and instability. I turn to Haiti's own humanist tradition and, in *spiralism* (a Haitian literary and philosophical phenomenon that emerged in the 60s amid the brutal repression of the Duvalier regime) I find an example of analogy to the country's current intractable and rapidly deteriorating political situation, more concretely, in the first first novel ever published in Haitian Krèyol *Dézafi* (1975) by Frankétienne. As an intersection between literature, politics, philosophy and history, my analysis concludes with a reflection over what I think is *Dézafi's* and spiralism's deeper message, something that speaks directly not only of the Haitian spirit but also of our common humanity: how in the face of seemingly unsurmountable and never-ending difficulties there always is resolve, resilience and strength.

Key words: Haitian literature, spiralism, Frankétienne, political instability, Haitian history, analogy.

1. Introduction

As the Americas' most fragile and underdeveloped country, poverty in the Caribbean island-nation of Haiti is massive and deep. For the past four years, it has struggled with growing instability from its already notorious abject state of precarity, inequality and violence. Energy-related street protests first sparked in 2017-2018 and mass civil unrest over the unpopular (and allegedly corrupt) late President Jovenel Moïse – climaxing with his assassination in 2021, have now evolved into a full-blown crisis (Dougé-Prosper and Mark, 2021). Today, according to the United Nations over 11 million Haitians are at the brink of a humanitarian catastrophe (Cursino, 2022). Sadly, it is episodes of sociopolitical turmoil like these (if not of epidemics and natural catastrophes) what precisely every couple of years propels Haiti into the spotlight, reminding us all that such a place does, in fact, exists. After momentarily capturing the attention of the international community, it then slowly sinks back into oblivion.

My aim is to move past this cycle of visibility or notoriety and indifference, beyond the news headlines and its portrayal by the media and ask: what can Haiti tell us about itself and its own experience? From its humanities, what sources can enhance our understanding of Haiti and its complexities? And what analogies can we find and parallels can we draw between them and Haiti's current intractable and rapidly deteriorating political situation?

2. Spiralism: Haiti's long-lost poetics of protest and deciphering its spiral-based aesthetic

Spiralism is at the very heart of Haiti's humanist tradition. Its main representatives: Frankétienne (1936), Jean-Claude Fignolé (1941-2017), and René Philoctète (1932-1995), a trio of Haitian authors who since the mid-60s wrote about their country and did so *from* Haiti. The significance of this fact cannot be overstated. In a sea of chronic and widespread illiteracy engulfing over 70% of its population (Salmi, 2000), their writings gave a voice to the Haitian experience while also redefining it, as it was said then that to be Haitian was to be in exile, being this the one theme that characterized Haitian literature (Glover, 2010) yet, all three remained in Haiti to write during its longest and bloodiest dictatorship under the Duvaliers (1958-1986).

Partly as a result of this dangerous political climate, and stemming from Krèyol's (Haiti's popular idiom and official language) own willfully indirect,

ambiguous and polysemic nature, spiralism emerged as a phenomenon, and not just a literary movement (Glover, 2010), that resisted being explicitly defined. Unlike Negritude, *antillanité*, *créolité*, or any other post-colonial Caribbean literary effort (Francophone or otherwise) also marked by complex tensions and significant contradictions, the spiralists did not had a geopolitical project in mind (Stofle, 2015) as, for them, writing was more an exploration or interrogation of reality than a vehicle for any predetermined message or a single coherent conclusive "truth" (Glover, 2010). Just as with its history, which makes Haiti extraordinary, incomparable and somewhat of an anomaly; either by (political) necessity or by (language) design, the literature of Frankétienne, Fignolé and Philoctète set Haiti apart from its neighbors and, arguably, from the rest of the world. Thus, spiralism is a truly distinct way of writing (both in content and form) about Haiti, and of the specificity of *being and creating* in Haiti (Glover 2010).

Not created in exile, nor Paris-based and, certainly not politically driven nor theory-centered, the spiralist endeavor is a humanist continuation of Haitian indigenism and, generally speaking, of the Caribbean oral tradition. As a faithful heir of these historically "silent" and silenced cultures (Glover, 2010), the spiralists' prose fiction reflect, first, all of Krèyol's common traits: neologisms, alliterations, assonances, unusual metaphors and, last but not least, *andaki*: a well-crafted polysemic and cryptic mode of communication to be solely understood by the person or group "for whom it is intended and not by other listeners" (Asselin, 2018:163). This way to 'speak in code' has West African roots and goes back to the nation's own painful past, to Saint-Domingue's colonial plantation system, until 1791 the most brutal slavery regime in all the America's (James, 2003). Secondly, echoing the region's custom of oral storytelling, the works of the spiralists do not develop in a purely narrative, horizontal or linear way. Instead, they unfold in a cumulative and cyclical manner, they are full of movement and chaos. Multidirectionality and unpredictability characterizes these open-ended texts, with its alternative and additional plot lines.

It is the spiral what inspired the prose fiction of all three Frankétienne, Fignolé and Philoctète, and they claimed the spiral's shape (and concept) as the best analogy to describe the way in which their narratives strive to render reality: spiralic wind whirls, disorienting and chaotic circles that are intrinsically infinite and incomplete. In the spiralist narrative, the turbulent overlapping and clashing of events is common, it is a tale of stasis and movement, of circularity and linearity that ascends and descends, "hence the repetitions and reiterations even as the story advances… as the plot moves forward and upwards towards

its climax" (Asselin, 2018: xviii). Furthermore, just as the spiral, it operates at different levels and binds the self with the Other (or the collective), the particular with the universal. Deeply influenced by Haitian animistic mythology, the spiralist universe is also one in which men interact with spirits who are themselves thought to be manifestations of nature.

3. Frankétienne's groundbreaking novel *Dézafi*, Haiti's Divine Comedy or Don Quixote

No other text is as significant for spiralism, and for Haitian literature in general, as Frankétienne's novel *Dézafi* (1975). As the first novel ever published in Krèyol, it went against the convention held by Haitian authors who wrote solely in French and, as a result, internalized of overly intellectualized French literary models stifled by excessive theorization (Glover, 2010) while trying to talk about Haiti. *Dézafi* recognized the historically marginalized and *ghettoized* Krèyol, a language thought to be literary inviable and aesthetically insufficient, simply incapable of sustaining narrative or expressing abstract ideas (Glover, 2010). As part of the movement's *ethos* of trying to close the gap between the written and the lived, the literary Krèyol of Frankétienne's *Dézafi* intended to mirror the *deep* and oral Krèyol of the Haitian (illiterate) masses and, in his efforts, he also incorporated elements of the nation's popular culture, like the myth of zombification in vodou and the custom of cockfighting: which actually translates as *dézafi* in Krèyol, with cockfighting itself being an analogy to life in Haiti.

The novel, as it is the case within the Krèyol language, is filled with symbolism, riddles, interrogatives, proverbs and songs. *Dézafi*'s images create in the reader a "visceral feelings of confusion, sensory overload and even anxiety" (Glover, 2010:198-99). The writings of Frankétienne – who only left Haiti after turning 51, do reflect the emotional and psychological stagnation of life in Port-au-Prince. As he could not leave, all the existential anguish of living confined under Duvalierism long nightmare exploded in his writing (Glover, 2010). Creating right under the regime's nose, the pages of Frankétienne's work are filled with ambiguities, riddles and with sensorially offensive and nauseating scenes, which is a direct analogy to an inescapable environment of extreme decay, exploitation and corruption (Glover, 2010). Essentially, it is a characterization of the many hardships Haitians had to endure during the authoritarian Duvalier years.

The novel is comprised by three main parts titled: (1) "The dézafi is in full swing. The band strikes up a tune. We're wondering on which foot should we dance", (2) "One hell of a dézafi. Words thrown to the wind. Andaki words" and (3) "Three handful of salt are dissolving in a pot of hot water". The writing itself is structured by Frankétienne's use and mix of three distinct typographic styles (italicized, bold and standard), with abundant blank spaces between them acting as pauses. Altogether, they reflect two parallel levels of discursive forms: one concrete and one more abstract or metaphysical (Glover, 2010). These are two symbolic universes within the novel: one describing a linear plot linked to the unfolding of the story itself and its characters (with a standard font) and, through philosophical poetry, a second one expressing emotions and enigmatic inner visions (with italicized and bold fonts).

Dézafi mixes myth, poetry, allegory and social realism, it is both a riddle and a philosophical quest. It has no more than fifteen characters and is set in the villages of Boaunèf and Ravin Sèch or Ravine-Sèche (Frankétienne's birthplace), and also in Haiti's capital of Port-au-Prince. Essentially, it tells the story of Sintil, a powerful *houngan* or male vodou priest who, with the help of his drunkard assistant Zofé and his daughter Siltana (with whom he has an incestual relationship), turns many of his own village inhabitants into docile zombies (*zonbi* in Krèyol) whom he then abuses and exploits as workers at his plantation. Of his regime of terror is said: "... you don't know how long Sintil's tentacles are. He's stolen land. He's stolen cattle. He's stolen water. He's stolen women. He's stolen souls... Country folks shake when they hear Sintil's voice" (Frankétienne, 2018:49). Moreover, "Dead people are scattered all over his farmland. Corpses lie in the four corners of his backyard... The rooms in his house are crowded with zonbis. Human intestines hang on this property's fence. So then, you tell me, what can we do?" (Frankétienne, 2018:49).

Sintil is an *aloufa*: a greedy and all-devouring person in Krèyol terminology and, his hatred for educated people makes him target young and bright Klodonis who, while vacationing in Boaunèf is snatched and turned into a *zonbi* by Sintil and Zofé, who is then told: "You said you were an intellectual. You went to school in Port-au-Prince City... I took your soul and turned you into a zonbi because of your impertinence, because of your pride... Speaking fluent French doesn't mean you're smart. I'm going to send you to grow rice in the swamps so you can show me what a big man you are." (Frankétienne, 2018:62) In a confusing and unexpected twist of events Siltana, Sintil's own daughter, immediately falls for Klodonis who, in his *zonbi* slumber does not reciprocate her secret affections nor respond to her plan of running away together. After Siltana rejects the sexual

advances the overseer Zofé makes while drunk on *tafia* (the cheapest white rum made of sugarcane juice), he threatens to reveal her secret love to her already suspicious father. Fearful of the consequences, Siltana goes against her father's constant reminders to not, under any circumstance, feed salt to the *zonbis*. She gives salt to Klodonis.

It turns out that, instead of "poison" as he obsessively warned her, "salt is soul... salt gives life" (Frankétienne, 2018:126), resulting in Klodonis' awakening once being fed salt by Siltana. After remembering everything he endured and "all the unfortunate events that have interrupted his life" (Frankétienne, 2018:152) Klodonis violently answers to Siltana's plan of escaping together by striking her, causing her to run away on her own. He then decides to feed salt to all the other *zonbis* at Sintil's plantation, transforming them into *bouanouvo*: literally meaning new wood in Krèyol. *Bouanouvo* refers to former *zonbi* who have now regained his/her full faculties of will and cognition after tasting salt. After murdering Zofé, who "lies scattered in bits and pieces in the high road's dust" (Frankétienne, 2018:155) and with his "guts hanging on a fence" (Frankétienne, 2018:158) this small army of *bouanouvos* is then joined by the villagers of Boaunèf and Ravin Sèch, long terrorized by Sintil. Soon, they start to loot and wreak havoc until they are stopped by Klodonis, who re-directs them to extract their revenge on Sintil, whom they find on the other side of the railroad tracks, hiding in the dézafi. The novel ends with Sintil's murder at the hands of this mob of *bouanouvos* and villagers, in an equally grisly way as with Zofé's.

4. Analysis

4.1. Unemployment, internal/external migration, illiteracy, child slavery, alcoholism and gambling as some of *Dézafi*'s themes

Frankétienne's novel touches many central themes of what has been (and likely still is) the grim reality for many in Haiti. Gambling, unemployment and internal migration are, for example, reflected in the parallel story of young Gaston who, "sick and tired of eating dirt in Boaunèf" (Frankétienne, 2018:47) decides to leave for Port-au-Prince after winning in a game of dice with money stolen from his caring aunt Louizina. After four years of "wasting his life in the city" (Frankétienne, 2018:127), he has become "a gaunt figure of misery. Life in Port-au-Prince has given him a real beating" (Frankétienne,

2018:159). After finally overcoming the shame of going back penniless, and realizing aunt Louizina died heartbroken and alone, Gaston manages with much effort to almost reach his village but, after seeing from afar the violent commotion described at the end of the novel, he exclaims instead: "I'd better go and hustle elsewhere" (Frankétienne, 2018:160), then, "He takes two halting steps. He turns around and starts walking in the direction of Port-au-Prince" (Frankétienne, 2018:160).

Illiteracy, domestic violence, alcoholism and external migration are all present in another parallel story, that of Rita and Jédéyon. Rita is the domestic child servant of her alcoholic and abusive uncle Jédéyon, in an arrangement that resembles the condition of *restavèk*, a "Krèyol word derived from a seemingly inoffensive French phrase, *rester avec*, to stay with" (Suárez, 2005: 29) whereby poor rural families sent their most responsible daughter or son (as young as three or four years old) to stay with "relatives" in the city, in exchange for promises of education and adequate food that are quickly broken.[36] As with most *restavèks,* Rita suffers beatings at the hands of her own blood and spends most of her days either "curl up in a corner" or in constant distress running errands for her uncle, most of which involve fetching food to satisfy Jédéyon's many cravings, while Rita herself remains severely underfed. Her uncle imposing two-story house in Port-au-Prince is Rita's prison and, just as with Sintil and Zofé, Jédéyon turns into the torment of his neighborhood and, unsurprisingly, is despised by all because of this.

Rita is illiterate and, when looking into letters (or *vèvè* symbols as they are called in the novel) she cannot comprehend her imagination runs free. In one of such instances, while looking at a wall poster in the street, her mind transports her to "some faraway country" where at the depths of the sea she encounters the castle of the Mistress of the Waters to whom, after begging to be let in, is told by the goddess: "The blind are not allowed into my palace... Learn how to draw *vèvè* on paper. Then I'll put you on my back and bring you into my palace" (Frankétienne, 2018: 30). As the novel progresses, it is also revealed that Rita's own oppressor is nothing but a sad and bitter old man, abandoned by his own wife and children who migrated abroad more than a decade ago. After verbally abusing the neighbors in one of his many drunken tirades, with tears

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[36]   *Restavèk* is defined as: "an abusive practice in Haiti in which children of impoverished families are sent away to become domestic workers in other households, whose members often badly mistreat the children… in many cases, the children feel so humiliated that they cannot see themselves as laborer, but rather identify with the concept of slavery" (Suárez 2005:29).

in his eyes and full of nostalgia, Jédéyon would admit how nobody asks about him nor writes to him, adding: "to think that I broke my back so for children and a woman!... And here I am today, all alone in an old crumbling two-story house" (Frankétienne, 2018: 41).

4.2.   Mass social unrest in *Dézafi*: the *zonbi* myth and the phenomenon of *déchoukaj*

Frankétienne's characters and their stories address many important elements of the *Haitian psychosocial experience* yet, my analysis would like to highlight the violent commotion towards the end of the novel, that is, *Dézafi*'s portrayal of the "wild-eyed mob" of Boaunèf and Ravin Sèch because of its social and political implications and due to it being a potential analogy with Haiti's current situation of instability and mass unrest. Let us start with the novel's *zonbi* theme. First, if there is one thing shared by all the stories brought to life by the spiralists is that they conflicted, fractured and multiplied. Spiralism's extreme or "strange characters" are nevertheless human in that they bear the mark of suffering, alienation and violence, hence, the figure of the zombie, the schizophrenic, or the traumatized, terrorized and tortured individual.

All of this becomes very visible in the second more abstract universe of the novel (expressed in italicized and bold fonts), with its continuous allusions to hunger, thirst, tiredness, and exhaustion, to confused minds and broken bodies that, nevertheless, also show resolve and a glimmer of hope (as we will later see). For instance, Frankétienne writes: "We haven't had anything to drink. We haven't had anything to eat. We haven't slept a wink… Our faces look gaunt. We've become as thin as dry twigs" (Frankétienne 2018: 134). Also: "Severed legs. Severed hand. Broken backs. Severed heads. A gang of sorcerers has surrounded our house… Our dreams are confusing labyrinths. Our thoughts are incoherent shreds" (Frankétienne 2018: 152) and, lastly: "Our bodies have been skinned raw by the sun's claw. Fires are lit. Fires are stoked. Ashes cover our skin. But our bodies are not hemmed in. Our thoughts have no limits" (Frankétienne 2018: 137).

In *Dézafi*, the *zombified* person is said to be in a "state resembling death… A zonbi has no memory. A zonbi has no life force. A zonbi is forbidden ever to taste salt, for he must always remain passive, without any desire to escape" (Frankétienne, 2018: 152). In this sense, I argue that, not only does the *zonbi* echoes the harsh existence of the enslaved individual in colonial Saint-Domingue as it has been pointed out elsewhere (Glover, 2010) but,

regrettably, it also references more recent experiences of bondage or slavery: the abuse and deplorable conditions Haitians have historically faced abroad as, for instance, seasonal sugar cane cutters in neighboring Dominican Republic and its *bateys*, or even within their own borders, as attested by the *restavèk*, the aforementioned Haitian practice of child servitude. Furthermore, in the context of contemporary Haiti I see how the *zonbi* figure (extremely vulnerable, forceable displaced, subjugated and exploited) can be parallel to, first, the issue of extreme poverty – when the infamous 7.0 earthquake struck Haiti in 2010 54% of its population was already living on less than US$ 1 per day (Lundahl, 2011) And second, to illiteracy, as over half of Haiti's population was still illiterate at the turn of the millennium and, compared to Mexico's 2.3% and the region's average of 6%, 34% of all Haitian youth could not read nor write (Salmi 2000). Let us not forget that, even in Frankétienne's novel innocent Rita was cruelly deemed to be "blind" by her imaginary sea goddess due to her illiteracy.

In a truly spiralist fashion, we witness how all the injustices and abuses, the collective pain and fear of those long traumatized, terrorized or tortured boils up in Frankétienne's novel until, eventually, it violently and unexpectedly bursts in a wild mayhem, a blinding rage for revenge and a collective cry to end impunity. Thus, *Dézafi* concludes in a *déchoukaj* or uprooting in Krèyol. *Déchoukaj*, described as the violent overthrown of an oppressive regime, is a well-known Haitian sociopolitical phenomenon explicitly referenced by Frankétienne when he describes the long coming "payback day" of Boaunèf and Ravin Sèch's inhabitants once the *zonbis* are no longer disoriented and docile after having salt. He writes: "Foolproof padlocks are broken. Strongboxes get smashed and their secrets exposed. Bridles and bits come off and mouth are freed. Words popping like corn kernels and salt exploding. It's a new day" (Frankétienne 2018: 152). Salt can then be, arguably, also analogous to being literate and to the acquisition of knowledge, analogous to, say, (re)gaining one's own voice. To ingest salt is to step away from the darkness (or blindness as in Rita's case) of servitude, submissiveness and fear, towards the light of consciousness and awareness. As *Dézafi* puts it: "... our stomach could grind iron or wood. When things really get tough, not even sour spoiled food repels us. In the end, what is it we're afraid of?" (Frankétienne 2018: 54).

Unfortunately, the history of Haiti is one of greedy *aloufas*. In other words, a never-ending tale of abuse by the powerful, of carnage and brutality (Glover, 2010). Thus, its history as a nation is filled with extremely violent and dramatic "down with the tyrant" episodes, the sort of scenarios that

serve as *Dézafi's* climax. For instance, the murder of Jean Vilbrun Guillaume Sam in 1915, which prompted a two-decades-long occupation of Haiti by the United States. The gruesome ending of who was Haiti's President for less than five months surely belongs to one of Frankétienne's novels, as Jean Vilbrun Guillaume Sam was dragged out of the French embassy where he was hiding by the inhabitants of Port-au-Prince who decided to take justice into their own hands. Thus, after beating him to death, they shred his body to pieces that were then paraded in the streets. Another of such episodes was the *déchoukaj* following the end of François Duvalier's *Tonton Macoutes* in 1986, a secret police-turned-militia that under the Duvaliers direct orders terrorized for decades the population of Haiti – these spontaneous and violent acts of reprisal on Duvalierists by the population (who became themselves instruments of terror) traumatized Haiti's far right and the Haitian elites for years to come (Sprague, 2012).

4.3.   Broken and antidialogical relations

The relationships and issues illustrated by the spiralists in the alternative realities built by them are analogous to real life in that they are raw, spontaneous, ambiguous, tumultuous, and often simply left unresolved. Relationships are essential for spiralism, a movement that defines life primarily at the level of (unmediated) relations and historical connections (Stofle, 2015) and that, following Haitian animistic mythology, it portrays the interaction of humans with spirits who are themselves manifestations of nature. However, I found that the spiralist view of the universe, as its often depicted in *Dézafi*, is one where, first, nature and its elements are too strong and uncooperative, they are disruptive and often destructive e.g., strong winds and storms, relentless sun, floods, and so forth. Second, nature is shown as barren or ravaged. In other words, as an environment that, after been exploited or abused is now devoid of any life and lays as a passive wasteland. For instance, the novel references bad soils and lost harvests, and also deploys an overwhelming imagery of carcasses and rotten remains surrounded by flies laid out in the open for all to see. Thirdly, if nature is not dying or already dead, then it is certainly locked in a fight to the death, as exemplified by the *dézafi* itself (a cockfight tournament). This aspect of "nature against nature", as a matter of fact, is alluded in what in my view are some of the most striking and powerful passages of the whole novel: "the struggle never ends… the *dézafi*" (Frankétienne 2018: 136) and "life bounces back… there's hope to win at the

dézafi, life is endless" (Frankétienne 2018: 143) and finally, "Life is but one huge *dézafi*" (Frankétienne 2018: 161).

Thus, it is my impression that the interwoven co-existence of the individual, the collective, nature and, finally, the universe or the *beyond* (a higher force or power) *is* acknowledged by spiralism but, it is as if this delicate balance has been irreversibly altered, as if these relationships *do* exist but in a now broken state, leaving no space for any lasting connection nor a genuine dialogue. And, in this sense, it has been said that the reason why the characters of the spiralists struggle with sustained solidarity is precisely because they have been so broken by violence (Glover 2010).[37]

4.4.   Accumulation, acceleration, tumult and repetition. The spiral analogy in a real-life situation unfolding in front of our eyes

By all indicators, before the Duvaliers rose to power in 1957 Haiti was the America's poorest nation and, this was still the case once their kleptocratic reign of terror finally ended in 1986. Three and a half decades since, Haiti is still considered to be the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. It has been estimated that by the time Jean-Claude Duvalier fled to France close to US$ 2 billion had been stolen from the nation's Public Treasury (Gros 2012). The very same amount that seem to have recently evaporated from the hands of the Haitian government in a corruption scandal involving late President Moïse himself (Ives 2022). The historic continuities are here, heartbreakingly so, very striking. Haiti seems to be locked in a self-reinforcing cycle.

Haiti has been conduced down a pathway where now the whole country is effectively paralyzed in an acute economic crisis and an intractable political deadlock. Since 2018 Haiti has not had a stable or secure supply of fuel or electricity and, for over one year now, nor does it has an acting President. With hundreds being killed by violent warfare among gangs who have taken over and effectively run most of it; Haiti is being held hostage by inner forces and coming apart at the seams. Following the UN's warning of an impending humanitarian catastrophe, the Haitian government explicitly requested in early October 2022 for international armed forces to step in. View from spiralism and its cyclicality,

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[37]   I have previously addressed this issue in an article I wrote in Spanish, see: Cheung, Katarzyna Gan-Krzywoszyńska, Juan Manuel Campos Benítez and Piotr Leśniewski (eds), Poznań: Poznań Kontekst, pp. 81-94.
[37]   I have previously addressed this issue in an article I wrote in Spanish, see: Cheung, Katherine. 2022, "Violencia intragrupal como manifestación de la conciencia oprimida: Carpentier y de Jesús a la luz de la filosofía de Paulo Freire" in *Rebelión positiva ¿Para qué rebelarse?*, Katarzyna Gan-Krzywoszyńska, Juan Manuel Campos Benítez and Piotr Leśniewski (eds), Poznań: Poznań Kontekst, pp. 81-94.

this announcement immediately brought back memories of foreign actors' previous intervention or presence on Haitian soil, the most recent of which was the UN's peacekeeping troops, whose troubled mission ended five years ago after eleven years in the country (Thomas 2022).

I set to better grasp Haiti's current "downward spiral" and, for this, I resorted to the spiralist movement, an understudied and underappreciated yet, in my view, a fascinating and seemingly essential part of *Haitianity*. Its own philosophical commitment prevents spiralism from being explicitly defined, so it remains purposefully ambiguous and, just like the spiral, unpredictable, open-ended, repetitive, non-linear, and fragmented both in time and space. Admittedly, this makes the study of spiralism a challenge, and further contributes with its undeserved obscurity (Glover, 2010). Nevertheless, as a uniquely subversive form of self-expression, genuinely indigenous to Haiti, spiralism is, indeed, a true intersection between psychology and society. It was born as a metaphorical escape for those writers that endured the crushing repression of the Duvalier years, its brutal arbitrary violence and utter lack of accountability (Glover 2010). In other words, this literary and philosophical movement is a child of over thirty years of dramatic insularity and confinement (and this feeling of being forgotten by a world who moved on), restlessness, fragmentation, violence and, above all, of the absurdity (and injustices) of life.

The spiralists always insisted on the importance of "creative inventiveness", of developing one's own voice. Their aesthetics is based precisely on this conviction: every narrative must have (or create) its own form in order to accurately portray the ever-changing (external) world (Glover, 2010). Albeit original and groundbreaking – it is said that *Dézafi* is for Haiti and Krèyol what Dante's work is for Italian and *Don Quixote* for Spanish (Glover, 2010); the reality is that both in shape i.e., language, and in content, the spiralist tale is an overwhelmingly tragic, unsettling and chaotic one. Thus, spiralism provides no rest or comfort, nor any conclusive or coherent single truths, partly because Haiti itself serves as a reference to the world insofar as a "magnified image of global unease" (Marty in Glover, 2010: 26). Staying truthful to Haiti and to what greatly has been the Haitian experience means that spiralism cannot be (artificially) embellished just to please an audience, thus, as described by Frankétienne's own concept of *schizophonia*, it basically remains as the representation of a reality either too absurd or traumatic to narrate (Frankétienne in Glover 2010: 183).

5. Concluding remarks

The future is surely full of uncertainties yet, the deeper question here, and one that still remains, is whether Haitians are to be the inevitable eternal victims of their own (seemingly cyclical) history? To this I have no answers but, certainly, to understand the present, one must first go, not only to the past, but also to other sources and perspectives. I attempted to see Haiti's current crisis (more concretely, the country's pervasive levels of violence and history of institutional vandalism) through the eyes of its own humanist tradition, and through spiralism's literary and philosophical prism I have come to realize what I believe is one of the movement's deeper messages: life is analogous to a *dézafi* simply because it is a struggle and yet, somehow, there is always resolution. Take, for instance, the following extract of *Dézafi* laid out by Frankétienne in italics: "We've been trudging through brush, so our clothes have become mere rags. Our bodies are ripped apart by thorns. Still we keep walking, even though we're bleeding, even though we're limping, even though we're fainting from hunger, even though we're twisting from pain" (Frankétienne 2018:38).

This is an important reflection, a powerful realization. Even in the face of seemingly unsurmountable never-ending odds, like those filling the pages of the spiralists' fiction, or the ones the people of Haiti face today (and have endured countless of times throughout history), there is resolve, there is always strength. I hold that, the recognition (and not mere passive resignation) of life's struggle-like nature and the resilience shown in the face of all this, is something that, not only does it speaks directly *to* the Haitian (unbreakable) spirit, but it also *of* our common humanity.

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What Protest Can Teach Us about Regulating Online Misinformation: An Argument from Analogy

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Abstract: The argument I put forward in this chapter is relatively uncontroversial. I merely join a long list of scholars who believe that regulating online content for its epistemic quality is a highly problematic path for democratic states to follow. What is more controversial is the way I arrive at that conclusion. My claim is that if one believes that online expression should be regulated in the service of upholding certain core democratic values, then they ought to believe that in-person protest should be regulated *for exactly the same reasons*. The upshot of course is that any discomfort we may feel committing ourselves to the latter conclusion should arise as well when we contemplate the former.

Key words: false protest, inauthentic protest, misinformation, online expression.

The rise of the internet has in many ways been a boon for democracy. Not only do citizens have a greater capacity to send and receive information to and from their governments, they also enjoy more efficient means to hold their governments to account. All of this is possible due to the ease at which individuals can now access information, from virtually anywhere in the world, with a mere click of a button.

But the internet has also exposed a number of vulnerabilities inherent to the democratic enterprise, and this has given some theorists pause concerning the overall democratic value that should be attributed to it. The problem concerns the aggregate nature of democratic decision-making and the incentives that follow. In a nutshell, the problem is this. If the aim of democratic decision-making is to aggregate the participatory input of all eligible citizens, then for any one citizen to increase their influence over the entire scheme they must first convince others that the decision they wish to see implemented is the best or most preferred one. But because individuals make decisions on the basis of reasons, and because reasons are formulated on the information people have available to them, the incentive for those who wish to increase their influence over a given decision shifts from a concern for the *accuracy* of the information they present to the potential for that information to attract the required *support*. In this respect, the very design of a democratic society *encourages* the dissemination of information that may be deliberately misleading or false. In other words, it encourages individuals to *use information as a weapon*. This exposes vulnerabilities to the democratic enterprise at a number of levels, but for the purposes of this chapter I would like to hone in on three in particular.

The first vulnerability relates to the substantive nature of the outcomes produced by democratic decision-making. Assuming that, on balance, decisions made on the basis of false or misleading information will in the long run be worse than those made on the basis of complete and truthful information, low-cost accessibility to false information stands to produce suboptimal decisions over extended periods of time (see Landemore 2012). While a select few will naturally come out better off in situations like this, the collective as such will not, and this undermines the health of the broader democratic enterprise.

A second and related vulnerability is the adverse impact that the spread of false or misleading information could have over social cohesion. It is well understood that a vital quality of democratic states is that its citizens observe a general duty of civility, meaning that even in the event that certain individuals come out on the losing side of some decision, they remain committed to the mechanisms by which that decision was produced. The familiar reasoning here is that because democratic decision-making is *periodic*, those who have lost out on a given decision will have opportunities in the future to win support for the position they prefer, at which time they will expect others to abide by the decision just as they are expected to abide by it now. False and misleading information erodes this duty of civilly and the value of reciprocity upon which it rests.

A final vulnerability relates to the democratic commitment to the autonomous choice-making of individuals. To the extent that individuals spread false or misleading information explicitly as a way to bring about a self-directed end, they treat those who are exposed to that information as a means to achieving that end rather than having a regard for the particular ends those others may have come to formulate themselves. This is especially true in today's world, where the intentional manipulation of pre-cognitive biases through data-mining and other analytic techniques is increasingly being viewed as a virtue of corporate governance.

In light of these vulnerabilities, democratic theorists have been forced into a bind. While the vulnerabilities provide a *prima facie* case in favour of regulating information that is transmitted via the Internet, such regulation comes at the expense of encroaching on the robust democratic commitment to freedom of expression. The question becomes one of balance: to what extent may a government or corporation regulate information *in the service of democracy* before it unjustifiably violates one of democracy's core values? While some contend that regulation of any sort would represent an unjustifiable violation (Samples 2019; Brown and Peters 2018), others have been more receptive to the idea, recognizing that the impact that false and misleading information has over the democratic enterprise is urgent enough to warrant a regulatory response (Cruft and Ashton 2022; Sunstein 2018).

My interest in this chapter engages this debate from a novel perspective. My contention is that the democratic rationales that support regulating online environments apply in all the relevant respects to another area where political information is disseminated: popular protest. Since both online expression and in-person protest are subject to false and misleading messaging, both stand to threaten the democratic enterprise in precisely the same ways. If this much can be established, then arguments in support of regulating online environments should apply *mutatis mutandis* to in-person protest movements. The slippery slope this conclusion portends should give us pause on how committed we are to regulating information in any environment – online or otherwise.

1. Preliminary Considerations

The argument I have just outlined clearly relies on analogical reasoning – a type of reasoning that some consider to be especially weak. The difficulty arises from the fact that just because two things are *similar* in a given respect, it does not

follow that any value judgments attributable to one can or should be transmuted to the other. Indeed, all one can say generally about the two objects under review is that they are similar *in the limited respect that has been identified*. This has led some to argue for a radically context-based approach to analogical reasoning, where any inference drawn is only warranted in reference to the specific facts that bear on the comparison in question (Norton 2010). This is more or less the approach I will adopt in this chapter. I take for granted that my argument is what philosophers of science call 'ampliative' since any conclusions I submit should be judged exclusively on how well the relevant details of the analogy I present are explained. I will address a number of possible disanalogies between the two objects of my analysis in Part IV, explaining why they do not upset the comparison I wish to draw in any determinative way. Nevertheless, I fully concede that applicable disanalogies may exist and that if they do my argument becomes so much the weaker because of them. Ultimately, this is a task I leave to my reader. The task I have set for myself is to offer the most convincing analogy possible between the objects of my analysis so that the conclusion I defend is placed in the strongest possible light.

One further point should be clarified before I turn to the argument directly. It is sometimes thought that content-based restrictions on any form of expression are offensive to the principles of liberal democracy. This is neither true in theory nor in practice. While governments that impose content-based restrictions on expression are often compelled to pass a more onerous test than what is required to impose content-neutral restrictions, the former are acceptable so long as they are themselves grounded in the principles of liberal democracy. Take, for example, US Code 2283, which declares that "[w]hoever incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof…shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both." This restriction is clearly directed at the content of expression, but in a way that few would challenge on democratic grounds. Since the restriction is explicitly based on the supremacy of the rule of law, it is better cast as a limit that supports liberal democratic governance rather than one that undermines it.

A more controversial example are provisions that resemble section 319(2) of the *Criminal Code of Canada*, which provides that "every one who, by communicating statements, other than in private conversation, wilfully promotes hatred against any identifiable group is guilty of (a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or (b) an offence punishable on summary conviction." Again here, the criminal sanction is

clearly directed at the content of expression (hate speech), but in a way that arguably aims to support rather than undermine the democratic enterprise. As the Supreme Court of Canada reasoned in *R v Keegstra* (1991), where it found for the provision's constitutionality:

> The message of the expressive activity covered by section 319(2) is that members of identifiable groups are not to be given equal standing in society, and are not human beings equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration. The harms caused by this message run directly counter to the values of a free and democracy society...

Following the general rationale of these exceptions, an argument could be made that regulating false or misleading information is justified precisely because such content poses a risk to many of the core values observed in democratic states. Spelled out more concretely, some may claim that in exactly the same way that regulating hate speech is justifiable in a democracy, so too is regulating false or misleading information. My goal in the chapter is to challenge this intuition. While I believe there are good reasons to extend *already established* content-based restrictions on expression to online environments – particularly those that aim to prevent direct or indirect harm being suffered by discrete persons or groups – a line can and should be drawn at the epistemic value that is attributed to information. In other words, my intention is only to demonstrate that the regulation of online content that is *directed specifically at the threat that misinformation poses to the democratic enterprise* is a dangerous precedent to set.

2. Misleading Grounds for Protest

I begin by assuming that if a given type of expressive activity falls within the range of justifiable regulation, the same type of assembly-based activity will fall within that range as well. This is not an idle assumption. Although strictly speaking individuals would be able to exercise their expressive rights without concomitant protections on their choices of association and assembly, the ability to fulfill most of the goals related to that exercise would be severely limited in the absence of these protections. One of the core principles underlying the right to peaceful assembly is that citizens *as a group* have access to platforms from which they may raise awareness on issues that concern them (see Butler 2016). In this respect, it is a right that is inextricably linked to the right to free expression

and, one can surmise, subject to the same general rationales that support the democratic urgency surrounding expressive rights.

The first task before me then is to determine which kinds of assembly-based activities bear a relevant likeness to the spread of false or misleading information online such that arguments in support of regulating the latter can be said to apply to the former. To my mind, two forms of protest fit this description and they roughly align with a distinction often made in the literature between *mis-* and *dis*information.

Whereas the term 'misinformation' applies to situations where subjects *un-knowingly* share false or misleading information, 'disinformation' is a term reserved for the *intentional* dissemination and/or promotion of false or misleading information (Obelitz Søe 2021). In what follows, I will call protest movements that resemble the spread of online misinformation 'false protest' while those that resemble the spread of online disinformation will be called 'inauthentic protest'.

False Protest

A protest movement can be described as false or misleading when the information upon which it is based is false or misleading. Here, although participants will often join a protest movement for *genuine* reasons, the reasons themselves do not stand up to ordinary standards of verifiability. In this respect, what is false about what I will call 'false protest' is the *message* that the protest promotes rather than the motivation of the protesting agent(s). Some examples will help to clarify the distinction.

> *January 6 Protests*: On January 6, 2021 a crowd gathered near the White House in Washington, D.C. to witness outgoing President Donald Trump speak and to protest what many believed was an illegitimate electoral win for Democratic Party candidate, Joe Biden. The protest (and eventual insurrection) was the culmination of a months-long 'Stop the Steal' movement, the aim of which was to put pressure on state and federal officials to overturn the results of the 2020 presidential election. Dozens of lawsuits, recounts, forensic audits and partisan reviews carried out after the election was over confirmed that it was administered effectively and impartially. In this respect, and contrary to the genuine belief of its participants, the movement was entirely based on false or misleading information.
>
> *Freedom Convoy*: The Freedom Convoy originated as a loosely organized group of Canadian truck drivers who, on January 22, 2022, descended on Ottawa in protest of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's decision to forgo the exemption they had enjoyed throughout much of the COVID-19 pandemic over vaccination requirements for international travel. Upon learning

that the United States had similarly lifted the exemption, and that the Canadian Prime Minister's decision was in this sense redundant, Convoy spokespersons shifted their target, declaring instead that they were fighting to bring about an 'end to mandates of any kind'. The declaration revealed a lack of understanding of the specific details of Canada's federal system of governance. Since the vast majority of the protest's demands fell under provincial jurisdiction, directing the protest aims at the leader of the federal government (Justin Trudeau) was constitutionally misguided.

Inauthentic Protest

A second form of protest that is based on false or misleading information is when a protest movement is carried out for *inauthentic reasons*. I call this 'inauthentic protest'. Unlike false protest, the agent's motivational base does play an integral role in the harm that such movements might have over the democratic enterprise.

A number of things stand to complicate the characterization as I have described it. One might wonder, for example, whether movements comprised of individuals who cite *expressive* reasons for their participation (van Troost, van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013) should be deemed inauthentic. Is it fair to criticize a movement simply because (some of) its members have decided to join as a way to merely 'blow off steam'? Perhaps not. But for my purposes, this complication can be put to the side. I will proceed on the assumption that if enough of a movement's participants have joined *exclusively* for reasons external to the stated or unstated communicative aims of the movement itself (where this can be tested by removing that reason), then, and only then, should that movement be considered inauthentic. Once again here, some examples will help to clarify.

> *Meng Wanzhou:* On January 20, 2020 a group of young people appeared with signs supporting Meng Wanzhou outside a British Columbia (Canada) Supreme Court, where the Huawei CFO was facing an extradition hearing related to fraud charges that were pending in the United States. The group were cast by a Central China Television news report as "protesters asking for Meng's freedom," but reporting on the ground returned a much different perspective. Many of the 'protestors' had little to no knowledge of why they were there, or even who Meng Wanzhou was. What is more, two members of the group alleged to being paid to be in attendance, assuming when they took the money they would be extras in a film shoot. Neither could articulate where the money transfer they received came from. Huawei and the Chinese Consulate General in Vancouver later denied having any involvement in the staged protest (Larsen 2020).

George Soros: In the wake of George Floyd's murder by police officer Derek Chauvin, a number of media personalities began drawing a link between protests that had erupted across the country against police brutality and 90-year-old Hungarian-American philanthropist George Soros. As one guest on Fox News declared on June 1, 2020: "Follow the money and I suspect you're going to find Open Society Foundation and George Soros' fingerprints." The claim originated in the fact that Soros' charitable organizations had donated money to grassroots groups and activists who participated in the protests, but who vehemently denied that Soros himself, or any of his representatives, had a role in facilitating them (Tamkin 2020).

Crowds on Demand: Crowds on Demand is a California-based PR firm that provides clients with "protests, rallies, flash-mobs, paparazzi events and other inventive PR stunts." Their website boasts that they "provide everything including the people, the materials and even the ideas" to those who wish to employ their services. Among other events linked to the company, Crowds on Demand hired actors to lobby the New Orleans City Council on behalf of a power plant operator and to protest a Masons convention taking place in San Francisco in 2018. Importantly, the company is not unique in its concept. As Edward Walker confirms in his book *Grassroots for Hire*: "There are hundreds of lobbying firms and public affairs firms that do this work, though not all in the same way. Some only do a little bit of this grassroots-for-hire, but things adjacent to [what Crowds on Demand are doing] are not uncommon today" (Koren 2021).

3. Protest and Online Expression: The Analogy Explained

Earlier I described three ways that the spread of false or misleading information can harm the democratic enterprise. Recall those ways. Not only does the spread of false or misleading information (1) impair the capacity for citizens to make informed political choices; it also (2) undermines social cohesion, and (3) subverts the autonomy of democratic citizens. How do these potential harms manifest in the context of false and/or inauthentic protest? This is the question I turn to now.

Informed Political Choices

Consider first the capacity for citizens to make informed political choices. The basic assumption motivating this concern is that some decisions are substantively superior to others and that information that depicts the world or a state of affairs inaccurately is liable to deliver inferior decisions to information that depicts the world or a state of affairs accurately. In this respect, the presence

of misinformation compromises optimal decision-making among an electorate due to the contaminating influence it has over the ideas which would lead to optimal outcomes.

The question of course is how any of this relates to protest. Although the reasons that individuals choose to organize or join a protest movement vary across contexts (see Walgrave et al), one common motivation for doing so in a democracy is to raise awareness around an injustice so that it may be converted into a ballot issue. The hope, in other words, is that the high-cost political activity of protest will have a material impact on the way the wider citizenry chooses to vote. And importantly, evidence confirms that this motivation is more than merely aspirational (Bremer, Hunter and Kriesi 2020; Aytac and Stokes 2019; Gillion and Soule 2018). To the extent then that one of the aims of protest is both to *inform* the wider citizenry of a matter of political importance and to *influence* them toward supporting it at the ballot box, movements which are either false or inauthentic stand to influence others on the basis of false or misleading information which, true to the broader democratic harm we are examining, is liable to have a negative impact over the optimality of the outcome in question.

A simple example suffices to make the point. Consider *Freedom Convoy.* Although it is difficult to parse the exact messaging of any widespread protest movement, the grievances expressed by at least some of those who aligned themselves with the Freedom Convoy turned on the perceived rights-violating measures enforced by Canada's federal government during the COVID-19 pandemic. While in the context of a substantive debate about rights and their limits these grievances would arguably have been healthy for democracy, given that the grievances were based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the way rights operate in Canada, the contribution to democracy was questionable. Statements by the movement's leaders often suggested that the rights and liberties protected under the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* were absolute (see Meyers, Dishart and Morgan 2022) – a claim that is neither true in a formal sense,[38] nor in an juridical sense.[39] By erroneously suggesting that the rights enshrined in the *Charter* are absolute, the Freedom Convoy encouraged others to adopt a political

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[38]   Section 1 of the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* "guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."

[39]   The rights that, on their face, support the nature of the grievances expressed by the Freedom Convoy – for example, the section 7 protection on life, liberty and security of person, and the section 6 protection on mobility – have all received intricate attention and development by the courts, where the scope and limits of those rights have been made clear in the contexts of various legislative agendas.

position that failed to match the extant legal and political realities in which those others exist.

Social Cohesion

Consider next the tendency for false or misleading information to sow distrust among a citizenry. The presence of *some* inauthentic protest movements erodes trust in the authenticity of *any* protest movement. This is clearly evinced by the interplay between the three anecdotes I introduced earlier. *Meng Wanzhou* and *Crowds on Demand* arouse justifiable suspicion concerning *George Soros* despite the fact that the basis for that suspicion has largely been discredited. Here we come up against the defining characteristic of the post-truth era, where because the sources of knowledge are subject to hyperbolic doubt, each token example of a given type can be co-opted to undermine the type itself. This is an especially acute problem in the context of protest due to its non-trivial connection to public trust. As Phillipp Aerni explains:

> Public trust is the political resource the protest organization has acquired by exposing unfair or harmful practices committed by institutions that seek to gain money or power, the traditional political resources. Public trust, mostly ignored as a political resource in public choice, proves to be a very valuable asset in a world that is characterized by uncertainty and complexity and it can be assumed that those who lack public trust would be willing to exchange it for money or power. Yet, if a protest organization wants to continue to exist and eventually expand, it cannot agree to any deal with stakeholders that represent money and power, because the public would likely feel betrayed, withdraw its trust immediately and thus deprive it of public legitimacy (Aerni 2003: 22).

Protest movements depend on authenticity precisely *because* the political currency they trade in is public trust. And due to the pervasive skepticism that in many ways defines the era in which we are living, if the authenticity of *any* protest movement is called into question, the authenticity of *all* protest movements are called into question in turn.

The nature of the problem just described is equivalent to the democratic harm that follows from an erosion of social trust through the spread of false or misleading information on online environments. Online misinformation erodes trust precisely because it casts doubt over the reliability of *any* source of information, setting up a state of affairs where the default attitude is skepticism. Research confirms (Quattrociocchi, Scala and Sunstein 2016) that once a person adopts this attitude, they are far more likely to accept sources of information

that confirm their pre-reflective biases and reject those that challenge them. The result is a pervasive echo chamber phenomenon, where pre-reflective biases are perpetually reinforced and emboldened.

The very same phenomenon occurs in the context of protest. The messages promoted by a given protest movement will be accepted *to the extent that* they confirm one's pre-reflective biases. If they do not confirm those biases, the likelihood is that they will be rejected as inauthentic and any currency the movement might have had as a political act is vitiated.

Autonomous Choice-Making

Consider lastly the tendency for false and misleading information to impair the autonomous choice-making of individuals. By deliberately posting false or misleading information to online platforms – especially high traffic platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube – the disseminating agent treats its users as a means-to-an-end rather than as an end-in-themselves. The user in effect becomes a mere instrument in the posting agent's project, which undermines their worth as individuals capable of formulating projects of their own.

Inauthentic protest exhibits this dynamic to the letter. The inauthentic protester deliberately deceives others in order to achieve an end that is unrelated to the message that is broadcast by the protest itself. This in turn reduces others to a mere means in the achievement of inauthentic protestor's end. The paradigm here is *Crowds On Demand*. Crowds on Demand leverages public trust by selling a message for a price, with little regard for the content of the message itself. This treats those who would be deceived by the message's authenticity as a means to satisfying the financial end that the company has set for itself rather than having a regard for the interests of its recipients. In this respect, the entire business plan of Crowds on Demand *depends* on violating other's autonomy.

When it comes to false protest, things are different. Since those who engage in false protest genuinely believe that the message they are communicating is true, the choice to broadcast that message neither disrespects the agency of others nor their autonomy to formulate an independent response to it. Although both forms of protest are based on misleading information, only the inauthentic protester seeks to *manipulate* others through their action.

Importantly, however, the fact that the concern around autonomous choice-making only applies to inauthentic protest does not upset the broader analogy I wish to draw. As I explained earlier, false protest aligns with the phenomenon of *mis*information which, you will recall, is reserved for the *unintentional* spread of false or misleading messages. In this respect, and equivalent to the case of false

protest, the agent who spreads misinformation online cannot be said to subsume others within their project *for an end that is external to the project itself.* While the end they have set for themselves is based on inaccurate information, that end is genuine, and so any appeal that others share in that end upholds their value as autonomous agents capable of arriving at their own judgments on the basis of (what is believed to be) relevant information. In this way, although the concern around autonomous choice-making does not apply to false protest, neither does it apply to the spread of online misinformation. The analogy remains perfectly in tact.

4. Possible Disanalogies

I have just explained how the vulnerabilities suffered by the democratic enterprise from the spread of false or misleading information online arise as well in the context of false and inauthentic protest. But this only covers the positive side of the argument. If a relevant distinction can be found between the two objects of the analogy I have drawn, it will be enough to discredit the more general point I wish to make – which, once more, is that the way the two cases are *treated* by democratic bodies should likewise be equivalent.

In this section, I will respond to three possible disanalogies between the spread of false or misleading information online and false and inauthentic protest. The first turns on the public/private distinction. Whereas false and inauthentic protest is protected to the extent that it is carried out in public environments, the spread of false or misleading information online occurs largely on social media platforms which are owned and operated as private companies. The public/private distinction may provide a reason to treat each differently. Next, it can be argued that the broader scope and sharper intensity that the spread of false or misleading information online has in relation to false and inauthentic protest makes the former a relevant candidate for regulation when compared to the latter. Finally, if the spread of false or misleading information online can be shown to be a *cause* of false and inauthentic protest, then an argument can be made that by regulating online environments alone a society may indirectly mitigate the prevalence of false and inauthentic protest.

The Public/Private Distinction
While most online exchanges occur on platforms that are owned and operated by private companies, protest movements are constitutionally protected to the extent that they occur in public spaces. The distinction appears relevant to the question of whether and the extent to which liberal democracies should adopt

a regulatory response to each. The argument runs as follows. Since constitutional guarantees are limited to the relationship between citizen and state, it would be wrong for individuals to expect the same non-invasive dealing in the private sphere that they enjoy in the public sphere. In the former, but not in the latter, the proverbial 'exit option' is always in play, and this supports the claim that private actors should be at liberty to regulate the services they provide in a manner they deem most appropriate (at least within reason).

The clean-cut nature of this argument is also its undoing. Legal systems have long recognized that the distinction between the public and private sphere is anything but precise,[40] and this serves to complicate the distinction as traditionally understood. Concerning the current disanalogy, the question is how different web platforms, and the internet more generally, fit into this schema.

Let's begin with the internet generally. Although it is tempting to classify the internet as an updated form of traditional media, as Jean Camp and YT Chien explain in their work on the subject, the "classification hardly works well" (Camp and Chien 2000: 13). The internet resembles physical space in a way that traditional media does not, and this fundamentally alters the way in which consumers relate to it. As a venue in which expressive activities are carried out, "the internet is more like physical spaces in that the same generic technology defines things, which are very different – different spaces, locales, media, or forums" (Camp and Chien 2000: 14). Put more simply, no one 'owns' the internet – it is merely a space in which human activity takes place.

But the public nature of the internet is rather beside the point of the objection raised by the disanalogy we are examining. Calls for regulating online content are almost never directed at the internet itself but at particular social media sites like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube – all of which are explicitly owned and operated as private corporations. These are the platforms where the spread of false or misleading information is most dangerous to the democratic enterprise due both to their content-sharing model and to the magnitude of their user bases. The question is whether this ownership model introduces a relevant distinction between the online environment and in-person protest that justifies regulating the former but not the latter.

There is reason to think that it does not. Not only are content-sharing platforms like the ones mentioned above *treated* as public spaces by their users (see Burkell et al 2014), what is infinitely more important, the law is increasingly

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[40] Airports and military installations, for example, are often owned by governments but restricted to select entrants; shopping malls, on the other hand, are often owned by nongovernment entities but are legally required to be accessible to all.

coming to recognize that such treatment is *appropriate*. As the Supreme Court of the United States recently declared in *Packingham v North Carolina*: "[W]hile in the past there may have been difficulty in identifying the most important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of views, today the answer is clear. It is cyberspace – the vast democratic forums of the Internet in general, and social media in particular." Due to this evolution in human interaction, the Court held that "to foreclose access to social media altogether is to prevent the user from engaging in the legitimate exercise of First Amendment rights." Although platforms like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube are owned and operated as private entities, they explicitly *function* to provide environments where people can meet, express their views, gather news, and debate matters of importance to them. Given that these are the very same activities traditionally reserved for the public square, a good argument can be made that any regulation directed at one of the environments should *mutatis mutandis* be directed at both.

Scope and Intensity Distinction

I have argued that social media platforms, which represent the central target for regulating false or misleading information shared online, bear all the relevant features of a public space. In this respect, the apparent public/private distinction does not undermine the analogy I am attempting to draw between online expression and public assembly rights. But that online expression is transmitted in a space analogous to the areas in which in-person protest is carried out does not mean that the impact each will have over the values central to democracy will similarly be analogous. It is undeniable that online expression is a more pervasive phenomenon than in-person protest, and one can extrapolate that the detrimental effects of communicating false or misleading information online will therefore be far more severe than engaging in false or inauthentic protest. This could serve as a distinction that justifies implementing a different regulatory response to each.

The argument can be put another way. Much of the decision-making in a democracy requires that a balance be struck among competing values and interests, and this often results in one or more of the values central to democracy giving way so that others may be satisfied. The present objection can be understood along these lines. Since the harm to democracy caused by the spread of false or misleading information resulting from in-person protest is relatively benign, it follows that violating the core democratic right to freedom of assembly is unjustified. The exact opposite is the case when we consider online environments. Here, the harm to democracy is acute, and this in itself justifies regulatory intervention.

The objection as it stands is compelling. But there are a few considerations that complicate its conclusion. First, as with all threshold assessments the line between appropriate and inappropriate regulatory intervention is imprecise. This invites concerns that regulatory bodies may tailor the threshold to suit a political agenda rather than applying it evenly across cases. Concerns like this have arisen in the context of regulatory measures that have been imposed on select Facebook and/or Twitter accounts, where users allege that they were targeted for expressing a particular political view rather than because they violated the platform's 'terms of agreement' (see Hasson 2020).

More importantly, however, the shifting threshold concern leads to an even stronger issue with the present objection. Are we comfortable with the idea of regulating a case of false or inauthentic protest, even if it passed a certain threshold of harm, *exclusively* on the basis that it is false and/or inauthentic? In other words, are we comfortable with an authoritative body applying a threshold distinction to a protest movement *regardless of its rationale*?

I think the answer depends on the kind of protest we have in mind. When it comes to inauthentic protest a *prima facie* case can be made for answering the question in the affirmative. Since the declared intent of inauthentic protest is to deceive, an argument could be made that the benefit of upholding the rights of individuals to engage in deliberately misleading actions is outweighed by the harm those actions may have over other values central to democracy. But even here there are complicating factors to consider. For one, a distinction may be drawn between the *organizers* of an inauthentic protest movement and its *participants*. We may, for instance, be comfortable holding the entity *Crowds on Demand* culpable for the misinformation their business model introduces into the public sphere, but I suspect we would not be as comfortable holding the participants of a rally organized by *Crowds on Demand* culpable. Indeed, for all the slippery slope concerns it would provoke, I suspect we would not even approve of authorities breaking up a protest movement that was known to be inauthentic.

When we turn to false protest the concerns become even more pronounced. Suppose, for example, that media attention directed toward the *Freedom Convoy* led to thousands of others joining the movement explicitly on the basis of the false information conveyed in its reporting. Would we be comfortable if authorities were to intervene in the movement *exclusively because it was based on false information*? If the answer is 'no', then the premise of the current objection is essentially misguided. To the extent that it would be illegitimate to intervene in a protest movement based on false information *regardless of how successful*

that movement was in disseminating its message, any disanalogy between online expression and public assembly rights that turns on a threshold distinction must be rejected.

Direction of Causation

The final objection to the analogy I have drawn between online environments and in-person protest turns on the causal relationship that exists between the two. If an argument can be made that *but for* the existence of false or misleading information online, false and inauthentic protest would not be an issue, then by regulating the former, any concerns that arise in the context of the latter would be resolved. This gives us reason to apply a different regulatory response to each.

Before responding to the objection directly, I should note that inauthentic protest does not appear to be impacted by this particular objection at all. Consider in this regard *Meng Wanzhou*. While it is entirely possible that online disinformation campaigns could have accompanied the fact pattern outlined in *Meng Wanzhou* – indeed, it would be strange if the organizers of a high-cost activity like inauthentic protest did not simultaneously engage in the relatively low-cost option of disseminating disinformation online – there is scant evidence to support, and very little reason to believe, that a *casual* connection holds between the two. The objection is therefore dependent on the claim that false or misleading information online leads to what I have called false protest. Is there evidence to support this relationship?

Let me begin with the obvious. If a group of people did not have access to information of a particular sort, they would not be able to formulate the required intent to organize a collective movement on the basis of that information. In this respect, the message conveyed by a protest movement is contingent on the information that is accessible to the people who comprise it. Interestingly, however, the self-evident nature of this simple observation already raises flags concerning the basic assumption upon which the current objection rests. To the extent that an authoritative body can control the kind of information people have access to, they control as well the political responses that people may formulate on the basis of that information. So while it is true that regulating the information people have access to online will shape the nature of their political responses, this is hardly a democratic argument in *support* of online regulation. Indeed, what I have just described appears to be a rather succinct description of the strategy authoritarian regimes invoke to maintain control over a populace.

But let us step back for a moment and evaluate the objection on its own merits rather than on the basis of its antidemocratic implications. While some

have expressed doubt that social media is a necessary and/or sufficient cause of protest (Lynch 2011; Gladwell 2010; Adey et al 2010), evidence suggests that by regulating the spread of false or misleading information online, false protest would naturally be reined in. Jost el al, for example, have argued that "social media may affect the decision to participate [in a protest movement] by increasing or otherwise altering knowledge about the ratio of costs to benefits" (Jost el al 2018: 88-89). The authors further explain that "information that is vital to the coordination of protest activities... spreads quickly and efficiently through social media channels," and that "social media platforms also transmit emotional and motivational messages both in support of and in opposition to protest activity" (Jost el al 2018: 111). In theory then, there is reason to believe that the nature of the information people have access to on online forums will impact their willingness to engage in a particular type of protest action. Is this enough to further establish that by minimizing the spread of false or misleading information online, we would be able to curb false protest as well? Not necessarily. Causation is notoriously difficult to establish, and in settings as variegated as the ones we are examining it is virtually impossible to control for the confounding factors that could have an impact on any findings. It is certainly possible that the spread of false or misleading information online is connected to false protest merely in a contiguous way – that both occur at roughly the same time and by the same set of people for reasons entirely independent of one another. Indeed, as I referenced above, it strains credulity to think that those who engage in the high-cost activity of protest would not at the same time pursue low-cost options in support of their cause, including of course disseminating their message across social media platforms.

But more to the point, as McGarty et al contend in their study on the relationship between social media posts and protest, social media may contribute merely to "an acceleration of [activist] processes that normally occur much more slowly" (McGarty et al 2013:). In other words, it is not that these processes would not occur *but for* the messages broadcast on online forums, but that they would merely occur at a slower pace. This weakens the claim that by regulating online environments a democratic polity could simultaneously dispense of any analogous problems that might arise on the basis of false protest.

Lastly, there is some indication that the degree to which social media stands to have an impact on the formation of attendant protest movements is heavily dependent on the kind of society in which the relationship occurs. Research by both Diamond and Plattner (2012) and Shirky (2011) suggest that the impact will be much stronger in closed or authoritarian societies given the relatively narrow

points of access that citizens have available to express their grievances. An implication of these findings is that the reverse will also be true: in democratic societies, where civil rights are relatively well secured, the impact of social media on in-person protest will be far weaker than in countries under authoritarian rule. This relates to something I mentioned earlier. There is a strange tension that occurs when a democratic society contemplates regulating a particular forum for expression (online environments) while officially remaining committed to upholding all the other traditional civil liberties assigned to citizens. For usually when a regime controls the kind of information its citizens have access to *specifically out of a desire to control the political responses that are formed on the basis of that information* it will also seek to control other parts of their lives – their association and assembly rights, for example. The reasoning here is clear: in order to control the range of political responses available to citizens, it is not enough that an authoritative body regulate *one* way that information is transmitted but must simultaneously regulate *all* potential ways for transmission. The fear is that unless a regime is prepared to monitor all forms of information spread – which includes of course meetings among citizens and popular protest movements – then information will tend to get out somehow. This is more or less the baseline characteristic of authoritarian regimes, and its lesson lends weight to the slippery slope concern I am trying to highlight in this paper. Regulating online discourse may preserve a range of cherished democratic values, but the cost at which they are secured is likely far too high.

Conclusion

The argument I have made in this chapter is uncontroversial. I have merely joined a long list of scholars who believe that regulating online content for its epistemic quality is a highly dubious path for democratic states to follow. What is more controversial is the way I have arrived at that conclusion. My claim is that if one believes that online expression should be regulated in the service of upholding certain core democratic values, then in the spirit of consistency they ought to believe that in-person protest should be regulated *for exactly the same reasons*. The upshot is that any discomfort we may feel committing ourselves to the latter conclusion should arise asa well when we contemplate the former.

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Some Remarks on the Analogical Model of Referendum

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Abstract: An approach referring to the concept of analogy within the theory of referendum provides tools for discussion of the role, status and future of the referendum as a basic democratic institution. The presented analogous model of the referendum allows us to comprehend the fundamental similarities and distinctions between various positions both on a theoretical and practical level. In my paper I analyze conditions concerning among others initiative and form of questions and answers for a referendum to be a form of dialogue between the authorities and the general public, and at the same time prevent a transformation of democratic institutions into systems of domination.

Key words: referendum, plebiscite, referendum question, threshold, NOTA

1. Introduction

The article concerns application of analogy in referendum theory in order to clarify uses and abuses of this institution within both democratic and non-democratic systems. I use the term analogy (similarity and distinction) as opposed to two radical approaches, i.e. univocity and equivocity. This methodological proposition can be considered a "golden mean" designating a research direction between the extremes represented by two above radical approaches (Dussel 1996).

Democracy based on social dialogue requires referendum as a tool for communication and consultation. I propose an analogical model of referendum to show important distinctions that enables us to protect democracy from manipulations, abuses and totalitarian/tyrannical tendencies.

Among many critics of anti-democratic uses of referendum I would like to mention Roussillon, Sartori, Kis and Applebaum. Their main concerns are: polarization of society, over reductive treatment of complex problems, forced consensus, lack of responsibility (especially when breaking institutional guaranties) (Roussillon 1996: 184-192 ; Sartori 1987: 112-116; Kiss 2003: 135; Applebaum 2017: 56-58).

Controversial use of direct democracy or its avoidance showed that we still need the new form of referendum, especially a profound reflection on referendum questions and detailed analysis of answers.

In general the dialogical approach to referendum should secure both sides an equal status, they should be partners. It should enable a transparent/clear and precise exchange of information and save the space for multiple, at least more than one answer.

In an analogical model people are referendum initiators, therefore we have a bottom-up initiative. I would like to refer to Francis Hamon's view. He distinguishes two main categories, namely: top-down and bottom-up referenda. In the first one the initiator is not always the author of a referendum question. When it comes to the initiative of the people, i.e. a bottom-up referendum, one can also distinguish obligatory bottom-up voting or optional bottom-up voting. (due to the necessity to vote). We speak of a mandatory bottom-up referendum when it is necessary to conduct a vote (order a referendum by an authority body) at the request of the sovereign. Hamon proposes to treat them as a variant of compulsory voting. According to him only the compulsory referendum is an authentic form of top-down referendum (Hamon 1995: 22-29).

The next problem is who should vote. It seems obvious that in democracy everybody should be able to vote. However, let me recall an idea from the famous anti-war manifesto by Gen. Smedley Butler:

> Another step necessary in this fight to smash the war racket is the limited plebiscite to determine whether a war should be declared. A plebiscite not of all the voters but merely of those who would be called upon to do the fighting and dying. There wouldn't be very much sense in having a 76-year-old president of a munitions factory or the flat-footed head of an international banking firm or the cross-eyed manager of a uniform manufacturing plant – all of whom see visions of tremendous profits in the

> event of war – voting on whether the nation should go to war or not. They never would be called upon to shoulder arms – to sleep in a trench and to be shot. Only those who would be called upon to risk their lives for their country should have the privilege of voting to determine whether the nation should go to war (Butler, 1935: 10).

His text was published in very tense period before the World War II. It was also the time of The Versailles Order and some politicians believes that plebiscites resolves problem of conflicts, such as after World War I. The idea of the right to self-determination of peoples/ nations became very popular in that time. Many border conflicts were dissolved (but also inflamed) by the application of direct democracy. Determining the voting entity turned out to be a serious problem. The idea of new international order based of plebiscites was criticized by Emile Joseph Dillon (Wilson's secretary) who in 1919 warned of a new conflict in the next 20 years (Krzywoszyński 2011: 35).

Chesterton said: *We shall have real Democracy when the problem depends upon the people. The ordinary man will decide not only how he will vote, but what he is going to vote about* (Chesterton 2008: 34).

Generally we believe that referendum questions are simply yes-no questions, however even with this too reductive approach some serious problems remains, especially concerning the interpretation of the negative answer.

Negative answer is usually insufficient, and (as we have seen in the case of Brexit) may even cause a chaos. The problem of negative answer also shows that referendum questions are rarely simple yes-no questions. Let us look at the following example from Polish referendum (2015). The question seems to have the form of a yes-no question:

> (Q) *Are you in favour of maintaining the current method of financing of political parties from the national budget?*

The positive answer to this question do not cause any misunderstandings, contrary to the interpretation of negative answers, that seem to cover the whole spectrum of possible opinions from A_1 to A_4:

> (A_1) *No, I am against of the current method of financing of political parties from the national budget, I want to stop it.*
>
> (A_2) *No, I prefer to give less money (50 %).*
>
> (A_3) *No, I am against the current method of financing of political parties from the national budget, I want to give more money.*

(A_4) *No, I prefer to give 95% less.*

And of course, there are more possible answers (Krzywoszyński 2017: 102).

Another issue constitutes the situation when voters do not know what some of the indicated (desired) answer even mean in reality, as it is the case with Brexit. It turned out among so many other things, that nobody could tell what in fact negative answer means and what are the consequences.

2. Simple referendum question without threshold

Usually we think there is not much to analyze since the referendum questions seem to fall into the category of yes-no question. It is in fact much more complicated. Let me first present simple referendum questions. Following the general form of question:

$$(*) \; ?\{A_1, ..., A_n\},$$

where there are two erotetic constants: "?" [question mark] and "{}" [brackets]. So the question is characterized by the set of possible answers. Therefore, the yes-no question has the following form:

$$(**) \; ?\{A, \neg A\}.$$

Only referendum without threshold have this form.

The example is the question from constitutional referendum in Poland in 1997:

> *Do you approve the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, passed by the National Assembly on April 2, 1997?*

Similar example of simple referendum question was the sentence put in Brexit in Great Britain 2016:

> *Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?* (Krzywoszyński 2017: 82-85)

3. Complex referendum question without threshold

The Complex referendum question would be the one (still without threshold) will be a question with more than two answers), for example:

$$(***) \quad ? \{A_1, A_2, A_3\}.$$

Complex referendum questions can have also a conditional form that consists of two questions. The second question depends from answer to the first one. In Greenland in 1978 it was held referendum on alcohol banning or rationing. The first question was about total banning of alcohol. In case of negative answer it was second, question about rationing. It was put, because of negative answer the first:

1. *Are you for a total ban on alcoholic beverages?*
$?\{A, \neg A\}$

2. *If there is not a total ban, you draw rationing into consideration?*

The scheme is:
$?\{\neg A \wedge B, \neg A \wedge \neg B\}$
The ultimate form of referendum question:
$?\{A, \neg A \wedge B, \neg A \wedge \neg B\}$

So this case can be regard as three possibilities:

$?\{A_1, A_2, A_3\}$

Where:

A_1 is A (Support for total ban. In that case there is no necessity to put next question)
A_2 is $\neg A \wedge B$ (No support, but rationing)
A_3 is $\neg A \wedge \neg B$ (No support, no rationing) (Krzywoszyński 2017: 94-95).

4. Referendum question with threshold

The problem of referendum questions and answers gets more complicated if there is a referendum threshold, that makes it valid. I would like to propose this scheme for representing the extensions of all three kind of possible answers to referendum question. So at the center of the scheme there are *indicated (desired) answers* – i.e. those that are fully formulated on the voting card. Then, *acceptable (permissible) answers* would be all previous ones plus NOTA vote, and finally *Interpretable answers* include also resign from voting as an answer.

In most of constitutional systems there are referenda with threshold. Then we have four possible answers, even to what it seems to be simple yes-no questions. The final score depends on voting and participation (Krzywoszyński 2017).

A general scheme has for question with a referendum threshold the following form where:

$?\{A_1, ..., A_n, \square, \blacksquare\}$ represents the set of answers present on the voting card, while symbol $\square$ represent the NOTA answer (none of the above) and symbol $\blacksquare$ represents resigning from voting.

Simple referendum question with a referendum threshold has then the following form:

$?\{A, \neg A, \square, \blacksquare\}$.

An example of simple referendum question can be Polish access referendum in 2003, the threshold to valid voting was 50%:

> *Czy wyraża Pani/Pan zgodę na przystąpienie Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej do Unii Europejskiej?*
> *Do you approve of the Republic of Poland's accession to the European Union?*

It worth noting that the simple referendum question with threshold is the most popular form used in referenda.

Examples of complex referendum question with threshold has the following schema:

(i) $?\{A_1, A_2, A_3, \square, \blacksquare\}$.

(ii) complex conditional referendum question with threshold

$?\{A, \neg A, \square, \blacksquare\}$.

If not A, then:

$?\{\neg A \wedge B, \neg A \wedge \neg B, \square, \blacksquare\}$
$?\{A, \neg A \wedge B, \neg A \wedge \neg B, \square, \blacksquare\}$ (Krzywoszyński 2017: 95-97).

I propose the use of analogy as a heuristic tool and a solid and sufficiently general foundation for the development of various forms of rational social dialogue. Moreover, it is worth considering, especially in an era witnessing a resurgence in extreme positions and radicalization, the analogical paradigm – designed to avoid extremism and to include different perspectives in theoretical reflection.

An analogical (and at the same time dialogical) model referendum supports democracy, for it helps to control authorities, obstructs monopoly of power and enables practice of accountability. In particular institutions like recall, ratification referendum (which control decision of authorities) and bottom-up initiative make dialogue possible.

It this context it is worth mentioning one historical example of limitation of power that comes from Polish noble democracy. The idea of balance which was called *misgovernment* (originally in Polish *nierząd*) but not in the sense of lawlessness. Łukasz Opaliński wrote: *not only Poland, but also every state of such high freedom is a misgovernment* (...) *we must be sad for all the laws that their horse curb adopts. And that is why Poland prefers misgovernment, as long as it is free, that is why we do not want novitates.* (Opaliński 1959: 70-71, my translation).

Such an organization of political power and administration (where almost all officials were elected) was at the time considered a balance of power and an example of a perfect political system. Therefore, unlike in European monarchies, the Polish nobility had real influence on governance, and the king had to share power with the nobles. The nobles' democratic principles established self-government as the most popular and desired form of political life (Krzywoszyński 2021: 37-38).

Rousseau believed that the Polish noblemen's democracy constituted an example of a synthesis between direct democracy and the sejm (the lower house of the parliament) as an organ of representation. In *Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne et sur sa réformation projetée* (1770-1771) he described two pillars of the modern constitutional system, i.e. ratification referenda and parliamentary representation. In his conception, members of parliament were bound by their electors and could be removed by them from office, and therefore, we propose to consider this an early example of the institution of *recall* and at the same time as the first realization of the idea of semi-direct democracy (Denquin

1976 : 22-23; Capitant 1972: 25-28; Krzywoszyński 2014: 55, 61; Michalski 2015: 104-115). Furthermore it was the system that created line of dialogue between king and noble subjects. Every nobleman as well as the entire noble community respected class solidarity, the privileges that constituted the 'golden freedom', including the famous *liberum veto* ("I oppose!"). *Liberum veto* was an example of the protection of individual freedom (Krzywoszyński 2012: 111; 2021: 38, 42).

In time of modern democracy this kind of institution can be replace by obligatory bottom-up referendum. Serge Zogg distinguishes an ordinary optional referendum on the initiative of the people (French *le référendum facultatif d'ordinaire*) and an extraordinary optional referendum (French *le référendum facultatif d'extraordinaire*) taken on the initiative of the head of state or other authorities. It also draws attention to the fact that if the referendum is initiated only by the authorities, it should not be included in the institution of direct democracy, but should be treated only as a procedure for legitimizing the authority of the state (Zogg 1996: 21-22).

This conception allows us to formulate the following characteristics of the referendum according to the analogical approach. (1) The referendum questions should have the form of a complex conditional question that takes into consideration the analogical character of the negative response in order to prevent dichotomous divisions within the given community. (2) The return to the optimal system of direct democracy, in other words, to better the realization of people's rule, is possible by a citizen-initiative obligatory referendum. The referendum initiative should belong to the people as sovereign, both in the subject of the referendum, the formulation of referendum question(s), and the precise definition of the procedures and methods for introducing legally binding effects. (3) There should be a protected system of representation control, for example, by an appropriate form for referendums, namely the veto-referendum. (4) In addition, especially in a crisis situation, the procedures should also take into consideration potential objections and voices of disapproval expressed in the form of the NOTA or by abstention from participation in the referendum.

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Analogies within Honorifics Systems in English, Korean and Polish

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Abstract: This paper deals with Enrique Dussel's concept of analogy and its application to philosophy of dialogue. Within Dusselian approach analogy allows dialogue because analogy is an intellectual tool to understand other people, cultures and other world perspectives. Using various examples such as the understanding of the Korean "we" and the impact the concept of "we" has on community, this study focuses on an application of analogy in understanding linguistic politeness and honorifics systems and their dialogical implications within the sphere of three different languages – English, Korean, and Polish. Said languages vary in the complexity of linguistic politeness, its social and cultural meanings and the philosophical approach it implies. In this paper I will analyze social and cultural dispositions created by language, the role of dialogical principles in communication and the possibility of achieving sound mutual understanding by means of analogy both between people from the same linguistic sphere and between people of distinct linguistic and cultural descend.

Key words: analogy, philosophy of dialogue, honorifics system, linguistic politeness

1. Introduction

As per the 2009 "Ethnologue" publication published by SIL International, we can distinguish 6909 different languages used all around the world, with

only 230 of them spoken in Europe and 2197 languages spoken in Asia alone. The differences between languages vary and can be found in their lexicon, grammar, syntax and such. On top of that, with the linguistic diversity also comes the diversity in cultures shaped according to and within distinct language spheres as one shall remember "the influential arguments of Bakhtin that the significance of any linguistic utterance is determined not merely by the words used in that utterance but by its entire social context" (Booker 1990: 80).

Given the amount of languages in use and the various levels of distinction between them, it is inevitable that speakers of different languages coming from different cultures may experience difficulties while attempting communication with users of languages other than their own. It happens even when they attempt to communicate while using a language understood and spoken by all parties. Obviously, the differences in cultural backgrounds coming naturally with our first language and the way we think in our first language may pose as a problem when we encounter speakers of other languages.

Taking into account only three languages – English, Polish and Korean – the distinctions between them, namely the distinctions between their honorific systems and language politeness, may seem striking. Politeness is important to communication and in many cultures it's expressions play a vital role in social life. The comparison of the three aforementioned languages and their expressions of politeness shows a significant difference between them and the cultures they shape.

In this paper I use the definition of honorifics coined by Kyoko Hijirida and Homin Sohn, according to whom honorifics are not "any forms used to convey the speaker's politeness to the addressee but narrowly those explicit expressions which have structurally or lexically encoded the speaker's socioculturally appropriate regard toward the addressee or the referent" (Hijirida & Sohn 1986: 366).

2. Language politeness and honorifics system in English language

In English language, the honorifics system is not especially abundant. The most commonly used English honorifics are "Mr", "Mrs" and "Ms" and specific honorifics referring to one's position such as captain or professor. They are often used in every day communication and outside of formal settings and referred to as simply address-reference terms (Hijirida & Sohn 1986) rather than honorifics.

Furthermore, in the English language honorifics do not form any grammatical system that can be distinguished from the common grammatical structures of the language.

In English, there is no special second-person singular pronoun used to express politeness; the English "you" is used both in formal and informal communication with no regard for the social status of the addressee and the sentence structure does not change grammatically depending on the status of the speaker nor the addressee. According to Saeko Fukushima and Yuko Iwata, native English speakers usually achieve certain levels of language politeness by hedging – the softening of the statement, being indirect, avoiding referring to "I" or "you" directly, seeking agreement (for example adding "okay?" at the end of the sentence), avoiding disagreement, reasoning with, attending to the addressee. There are no special pronouns nor grammatical constructions that explicitly express politeness and the social status of the speakers. English is considered a non-honorific language and its linguistic politeness may be considered simple in comparison to other Indo-European languages.

3. Language politeness and honorifics system in Polish language

In Polish language, the honorifics system is more rich and used more strictly than in the English language. Honorific terms such as "pan", "pani" (the equivalent of English Mr, Mrs, respectively) and specific honorifics referring to one's position like "profesor", "doktor" or "dyrektor" are used commonly to refer to people of a certain status or in certain social situations. The omission of honorific terms is generally viewed as impolite and in many situations may put the speaker in a difficult position (for example, when they refuse to call their professors by their full titles – "panie profesorze", "pani profesor").

In Polish language honorifics form a grammatical system that can be distinguished from the common grammatical structures of the language. Native Polish speakers do not use the second-person singular pronoun, the English "you", while striving to achieve linguistic politeness. Instead, they use the third-person singular or plural grammar structure while referring to the addressee as "pan", "pani" or in the plural form "państwo" and often add the specific honorific term according to the status of the addressee. This linguistic phenomenon is seen in both spoken and written language, in formal situations and everyday life. The Polish norms of politeness are viewed as culturally obligatory, quite strict and specific in most of social situations.

4. Language politeness and honorifics system in Korean language

The Korean honorifics system is the most expanded and complicated system from those described in this paper. According to Sangseok Yoon, in Korean language "honorifics are not mere politeness markers or linguistic forms that speakers use passively, following social conventions. Rather, they are social indexes that can be used to construct one's identity or change footing in a given social context" (Yoon 2015: 97).

While striving to be accordingly polite in a social situation, native Korean speakers use appropriate terms while addressing the addressee, such as "선생님" ("teacher"), adding the honorific suffix "-씨" or "님" to the addressee's name. Instead of the plain English "you", Koreans use honorific first-person plural pronouns "우리" and "저희".

They also use honorific verbs and nouns instead of regular ones used in everyday communication, such as "댁" ("house") instead of „집", "드리다" ("to give") instead of "주다" and so on. Other verbs are transformed into honorific ones by adding the suffix "~(으)시". The formal speech level ending, "~습니다" is too used.

Furthermore, the intricate language politeness system is not only used in a formal social setting and while addressing those of a higher social status, but also in an informal setting while addressing one's family elders, especially grandparents. Older siblings and friends are also addressed through the use of appropriate terms such as "형", "누나", "언니" and "오빠". The Korean language politeness system is very strict and seen as crucial to social interactions and communication.

5. The Korean understanding of "we"

The phenomenon of the Korean first-person plural pronouns seems especially vital as recognizing oneself as I and recognizing the other in another person can be the basis for establishing a dialogical relationship between people. The understanding of "I", "you", "she"/"he"/"it" differs, often significantly, between successive philosophical concepts; another separate problem opens up before us in terms of understanding the concept of "we", "they"/"one", "others". The issue of interpreting the ideas behind "we"/"our" poses a number of questions about dialogical processes, the forming of relationships, belonging and community. The problem of "we"/"our" Western philosophy used to present in the light of

the sets of subjects "I"/"mine" as the necessary basis for creating the existence of "we"/"us". In this approach, "we" is only the plural form of "I", without which it does not exist objectively in the world.

In the article "A Phenomenological Approach to the Korean 'We': A Study in Social Intentionality", Hye Young Kim argues about the possibility of existence of "we" without the primary existence of "I"/"you" or "I"/"other" and understanding "We" which is not a multitude of "I" but an extension of "I".

Kim, a native Korean speaker, presents the idea of Korean "we" – "우리" (*uri*) – as the basis of her concept. Uri, next to "저희" (*dzŏhyi*) is one of the two forms of expressing the words "we"/"our" in Korean. While *dzŏhyi* is used less frequently and in most cases in an honorific form to the recipient of the message, *uri* is the most common form of expressing "we"/"us" in everyday communication. Korean speakers are also comfortable using *uri* to express "me"/"mine". In communication, *uri* very often replaces the Korean words " 나" (*na*) and "저" (*dzŏ*), or "I"/"mine", which usually only express a specific, individual property.

The Korean "we" is unique because it is not a plurality of "I"; it is an integral subject that cannot be broken down into parts ("I" and "I"). Moreover, the recipient of the message does not even have to belong to the same group as the sender in order for him to address him in the form of "we"/"our", because, as Kim explains, "our someone" as a whole is rather a subject of the community than the combined form of individual entities. The members of our group are not required to identify or participate in the group in order to be in "we". Even in the case of Buber's I-You relationship, when we include *uri* in the message, both I, You and the third person or persons affected by the message belong to the group "we" not as subjects, but the overall "we", which cannot be separated into units that exist as one extended entity.

A similar phenomenon also exists where there is no personal relationship between the recipient of the third party message and that third party; when the sender of the message uses the word *uri*, the addressee also belongs to the group "we" establishing the coexistence in the world of all participants of the communication. This is an expression of the Korean understanding of the subject, which in Korean is not expressed by personal pronouns, but proper names or honorific phrases corresponding to relations between persons in a communicative situation.

According to Kim's example, in Korean, "my father and a random man whom I ran into on the street can never be the same *he*, even if both of them are a third-person, masculine singular" (Kim 2017: 624). This creates a unique type of

communication where the same personal pronouns never correspond to the same pronouns and where the relational realm is the basis of communication. "We" becomes the pre-subject "we", which does not presuppose the original existence of any "I", "you", "other" and the Martin Buber's eternal You, but establishes the common pre-existence in the world of all participants of communication which funds the existence of every one of them.

"This pre-subjective *we* is possible not through overlapped or proactively shared memories or histories, but through space where, they *are* together, which is to say by literally *being there*" (Kim 2017: 625), writes Kim, opening up new possibilities for understanding the concept of "we" through the means of Korean language and culture.

6. Lost in translation

Many of the aforementioned honorific expressions are essentially impossible to be translated into other language. Although expressions like "누나" may be translated as a Polish "starsza siostra", English "older sister", these translations do not hold the meaning that the Korean language and culture associate with the word and they cannot express the bond that the interlocutors share.

Similarly, the complex grammatical structures of the Polish language are difficult to translate into Korean and English as the English question "would you be so kind to help me?" does not express the same level of politeness as the Polish "czy byłaby pani na tyle uprzejma, by mi pomóc?" where the word "pani" (English "Mrs") is used in the place of the English "you". The cultural meanings get lost in translation and so often do our intentions when we are not communicating in our mother language.

Apart from the purely linguistic and cultural side of honorifics systems, there are also their various dialogical consequences. One may find that the nature of honorifics systems can be twofold. Languages and cultures that do not form a rich honorifics system could be seen as conducive for the formation of horizontal relationships which promote equality, mutual respect and understanding.

At the same time, the lack of expressive linguistic politeness may be interpreted as an absence of respect and a sign of weak social structures and bonds between people. On the other hand, languages and cultures rich in honorifics systems may be seen as very strict, rigid, forming vertical relationships built on oppressive power structures. But the very same relationships can be understood

as truly nurturing and caring, embracing the principles of respect and courtesy, strengthening social bonds.

These significant differences may become the source of conflict and misunderstanding among the users of the three aforementioned languages. The distinctions between their various attitudes towards linguistic politeness and social roles as the tangible expression of honorifics systems stall the process of communication and can prevent people of different cultures from achieving a true understanding of others. This is where the concept of analogy formed by Enrique Dussel presents itself applicable as a way to allow dialogue and a real mutual understanding between people of different linguistic and cultural spheres.

7. Enrique Dussel's concept of analogy

According to Dussel, dialogue cannot be achieved without analogy. He highlights three model attitudes towards polysemy. The first one is univocity which is only possible the meaning of words remains abstract and loses its quality as the horizon of sense spreads among distinct senses. Univocity assumes the division of identity and difference, focusing on dichotomies; it is dangerous as it creates conflict and violence. He also describes the equivocal approach, radical in its relativism that results in a lack of clear definitions and communication and incomprehension leading to isolation. In between these attitudes there is the analogical approach, as Dussel argues for the possibility of "communication through similarity, but which is not identical, of the same word in each of the worlds of the interlocutors involved, since the expression of one can have, in the world of the other a meaning which is distinct but similar, and thus approximately comprehensible" (Dussel 2019: 1).

It seems vital to both the meaningful communication between people of the same linguistic sphere and to the prospect of intercultural dialogue as it refuses the means of univocal communication, which is simply not possible especially in the case of different mother languages and different mindsets that come with them, while simultaneously pointing out the danger of incomprehension posed by the absolutely equivocal communication. The analogical approach with its concept of similarity and distinction presents us with a broad variety of options, with no inherently correct nor wrong ones and allows us to be open and creative, while still respecting the options and opinions of others in a true dialogical approach.

Analogy allows us to find ourselves focusing not on the complicated attempts of translating the linguistic and cultural meanings of different honorifics systems to our own mother language and culture, but on the similarities and distinctions between us. It does not leave place for isolation among one's primary language and culture nor forces us to abandon our cultural identity for the sake of intercultural communication.

It is important to bear in mind the distinctions between various expressions of linguistic politeness and honorifics systems, while simultaneously finding oneself in a process of looking for similarities of structures and experiences. This process depends on our own decision and the actions that are its consequences. This process cannot be forced as it should not focus on strengthening identities and approaching different cultures with set expectations that align with our own cultural experiences.

After all, analogy argues for creativity and openness to different styles. As Yuko Abe suggests, although for example the clear translation of Korean honorifics and their cultural meanings into English or Polish is impossible, with an analogical approach one can still "transfer experience of that which is particular (individual experience derived from immersion in one particular culture) to the context of other particular, individual experiences" (Abe 2019: 2).

While the Korean terms such as "누나" ("older sister") or "형" ("older brother") cannot be properly translated into English nor Polish, the experience of having an older sibling or a sibling-like figure in one's life may allow us a better understanding of the way Korean speakers use these terms and of the social bonds connected with such terms.

Although English and Polish speakers rarely use the first person plural pronouns like the Korean "우리", we also tend to refer to people, things and places as "our" especially while talking with people who know of or also share a bond with the topic of the conversation; Polish speakers say "nasza matka" ("our mother"), "w naszej szkole" ("in our school"), "nasz pies" ("our dog") and so do the English speakers.

Of course, the Korean "우리" extends from the structure of language alone and into the social and cultural sphere, too. But it is not impossible for Polish or English speakers to understand the phenomenon of the Korean "we". Although Polish philosopher Józef Tischner put great emphasis on the place of individual "I" in "we", the means of analogy allow us to notice vital similarities and distinctions between Kim Hye Young's understanding of "we" with the particular sense of community it creates and Józef Tischner's concept

of "we" deriving from the Polish social, cultural and historical contexts of his time.

Tischner argued that when we are saying "we", "we are inside a particular world. Said world embraces us but does not annihilate us. After all, there would be no We if there was not I. I preserves itself in We and even affirms itself"[41] (Tischner 1993: 19). Although Tischner's We forms a community, it consists of many individual I's which do not lose their particular identity in We, while the concept of Korean "we" presented Kim provides us with the possibility of "we" existing without any preexisting "I", "you" nor "other". The two ideas may seem completely contradictory at first. But Tischner also states that community cannot exist without mutual appreciation – "our We emerges from the appreciation we feel for each other. This appreciation also gives back ourselves to us. One does not opposes the other, one affirms the other" (Tischner 1993: 16), writes Tischner. Through analogy, one may find Tischner's concept of mutual appreciation within a community similar to the emphasis that Korean language and culture put on the matter of respect, community and bonds within people as *uri* is commonly used to display respect even when there is no personal relationship between the recipient message and the speaker which establishes their shared coexistence in the world of all participants of the communication.

With the help of analogy people can find similarities between them and their own experience of power structures, social roles and relationships instead of deeming the distinct system univocally different or equivocally incomprehensive.

In a world where thanks to technology and the process of globalization intercultural communication becomes the new normal, Enrique Dussel's concept of analogy and its application to philosophy of dialogue seem especially vital. The analogical approach offers us the possibility of achieving deep mutual understanding and experiencing meaningful dialogical relations among not only people of different linguistic spheres but also within our own cultural spheres. It is an important topic which calls for further analyses that will hopefully one day allow us to better understand both ourselves and other people, no matter the linguistic and cultural spheres.

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[41] All the translations from Polish sources are mine, ZW.

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was the best thing in the universal history.

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