ACTION

Thinking *in* Action

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EDITORS

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PREFACE

This volume is the offspring of friendship, respect and commitment between two academic communities that admittedly have a lot in common, especially with regard to philosophy, and hopefully as many differences as needed in order to secure a long-lasting and fertile exchange of ideas; it is also the natural-born child of necessity: philosophy is about argumentation, debate and confrontation.

Thinking in Action inaugurates Hellenic-Serbian Philosophical Dialogue Series that entertains no hesitation in being as ambitious as any philosophical series could be: it seeks to establish a permanent, wide and rich channel of fruitful philosophical interaction between the two philosophical communities. The initial idea for this venture belongs to the staff members from both the Department of Philosophy of the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, and the Department of Philosophy of the University of Novi Sad that are mentioned as the General Editors of this Series; the aspiration, however, is to make this Series a meeting point for all Serbian and Greek philosophers and scholars.

Greece and Serbia have long and undisturbed friendly relations throughout their history, but the philosophical background on which we hope to fructify our meeting is best exemplified in the person of the Serbian thinker and pedagogue Dositej Obradović (1739-1811). Obradović from the early days of his career, already a monk, was interested in classical Greece and the Greek language. His many travels as a young man, in Greece also, helped him to learn Ancient as well as Modern Greek and twice he had been a student in Greek land, first in 1765 in Smyrna, where he studied theology, philosophy, Greek literature, rhetoric with Hierotheos Dendrinos and, later, while he worked in Corfu, where he studied with Andreas Petritsopoulos. Next, Obradović will travel to Europe and become familiar with the ideas of European Enlightenment. This paradigmatic figure summarizes all that is common in Greek and Serbian philosophy: Greek culture and philosophy, European modernism, and, last but not least, Orthodox spirituality.

By committing ourselves to a discussion that aspires to persist in time, we see an opportunity to engage the philosophical understanding of both Greek and Serbian students and academics towards a mutually beneficial chance for our philosophical communities to debate on central ideas and collaborate on projects.

Together with these broad introductive ideas, the volume at hand has a specific interest as the scope of the papers presented clearly demonstrates.

George Arabatzis is concerned with the problem and the intellectual legacy of the concept of Byzantinism and its relation to action on the limits of philosophical constructivism. George Arabatzis compares the concept and its fundamental ambiguity with some key notions of the Byzantine tradition

and aims to demonstrate the ways that it surpasses the strict medieval or pre-modern context in order to infiltrate not only our present state of ideas but also our normativities and our proper modernity in its method to deal with fields of immense cultural capital like post-Byzantine anthropology.

Nikos Erinakis is studying two of the most debated notions of the modern philosophical vocabulary, i.e. "authenticity" and "autonomy" that although often indeterminate they eventually come into conflict. Nikos Erinakis seeks to detach autonomy from authenticity, recusing the idea that the latter can or must be a condition of the former, and he acknowledges that not always the same people exemplify both categorizations, the crucial test for them two being the degree of independence or even rupture of one from the other, leaving aside the axiological or even the meta-axiological judgment.

Željko Kaluđerović is writing about the actually dominant trend of globalization and is trying to determinate the criteria by which one can define it. After a summary of some major contributions on the field, Željko Kaluđerović insists particularly on David Held's opinions on the matter, who in a sense makes a theory of the theory of globalization, classifying the tribes of the relevant specialists and proposing, by the same, a range of comprehensive approaches and a span of possible actions one should undertake to deal with this multi-faceted and complex reality and the various serious repercussions it has on the lives of all.

Milenko A. Perović provides a brief account of the Philosophy of Praxis, once a pride and honor of the Yugoslavian thought. The Praxis School, nourished by a greater liberalization in former Yugoslavia and inspired by the theories of Karl Marx to which it aspired to give a second souffle, became an expanding thought that contributed greatly to the critical dialogue of the radical West. For Milenko Perović, the discussion concerned in particular the then much debated question of humanism and its relation to Marxism that the Praxis School defended against other currents, like Althusser's, that plainly rejected it.

Una Popović gives us a detailed account of the progress of the study of aesthetics in Modern Serbia. Beyond the research on the fate of a discipline and of the institutions related to it, Una Popovic's paper outlines something more general, which is largely representative of the adventure of philosophy in Serbia and of a real politics of difference, first from the former communist regimes and later from what can be called the consumption society. Yet, this politics of difference in the practice of the Serbian study of aesthetics is not one but multiple, a clear proof of its energetic character and vitality.

Dragan Prole undertakes a meditation on difference where he puts the postmodernist rhetoric of difference on critical trial together with a real and deep concern about the destiny of critical thought amidst a heavily homogenized world. The problem lies deeper than in what is believed to be political correctness; for Dragan Prole the rhetoric of homogenized difference implies a precise orientation in what Aristotle would name theoretical sciences towards some very un-differentiated metropolitan expectations. Holding high the torch of the

critical flame is, like before, still the clear objective of the philosophical theorist.

Evangelos Protopapadakis discusses the moral standing of autonomy in the fields of Medical Ethics and Bioethics by means of a thought experiment that concerns administering placebo medication without letting the patient know on purpose of serving the patient's best interests. Evangelos Protopapadakis argues that the conflict between autonomy and utility in cases as such is due to the strict concept of autonomy usually employed in Bioethics and Medical Ethics; the upshot is according to Protopapadakis that a patient-doctor relationship is not an ordinary social one, therefore the role of autonomy should probably be reconsidered.

Kostas Theologou in his essay examines the rather complex relationship between the Orthodox Church, the Greek Society and the Hellenic State. To this purpose he investigates the various historical and political circumstances in Greece after the official establishment of the Modern Greek-State, taking also into account the post-byzantine Ottoman occupation. Kostas Theologou argues that the identity of modern Greeks is due to various cultural sources and deeply tradition based. Theologou concludes with the view that only longstanding processes towards supranational paradigms have the power to reform traditional value-established national identities.

Having high aspirations is one thing; meeting these aspirations as well as the expectations of the reader is a totally different one. We wish *Thinking in Action*, the first volume of the Hellenic-Serbian Philosophical Dialogue Series, apart from being the initial step of a long journey, will also be a fascinating one to the reader.

George Arabatzis and Evangelos Protopapadakis
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BYZANTINISM AND ACTION

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Abstract: *The paper examines the relations between Byzantinism and action on the limits of philosophical constructivism with a special emphasis on the normativities that were established in the Greek and European culture in the long term (longue durée). Byzantinism is thus seen as a recurring notion and bearing that was developed beyond the dominion of the Byzantine commonwealth; one can clearly perceive it as the expression of the ambiguity inherent to political concepts while its special dynamics surfaces in relation to the original Byzantine concepts of eusebeia (piety) and economia (the management of both the regularity and irregularity of social life) and in comparison to political realism. The complete understanding of the term cannot be achieved without a special care for the martial practices that it encompasses which are clearly visible in the implementation of acculturation techniques, destined to the locales where Byzantinism became originally noticeable.*

Keywords: *Byzantinism, Byzantium, philosophical constructivism, political realism, philosophy of history.*

What is Byzantinism?

What will follow is an introduction to the notion of Byzantinism; the reason for this interpretative effort lies in the idea of removing the notion from the realm of the history of ideas in order to place it amidst an archaeology of knowledge.[1] It follows that the notion of Byzantinism is seen both at the margins of the modern ethical/aesthetical/political vocabulary and at the center of the critical analysis of the phenomena related to it.

"Byzantinism" is part of the modern political and aesthetic vocabulary. This latter aspect of the notion can be seen in the French thinker and essayist Julien Benda who perceived the early 20th Century French literary modernism as a kind of Byzantinist way of thinking.[2] Antonio Gramsci also used the term to designate

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[1] See M. Foucault, *The Archaelogoy of Knowledge,* translated by A.M. Sheridan Smirth (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), esp. the chapters "The historical *a priori* and the archive", 126-131, and "Archaeology and the History of Ideas", 135-140.

[2] J. Benda, *La France byzantine ou le triomphe de la littérature pure. Mallarmé, Gide, Valéry, Alain, Giraudoux, Suarès, les Surréalistes. Essai d'une psychologie originelle du littérateur* (Paris: Gallimard, 1945). See G. Arabatzis, Βυζαντινή Φιλοσοφία και Εικονολογία (Athens: Kardamitsa, 2012), 36-41, and Idem, "Byzantine Thinking and Iconicity: Post-structural Optics", in *The Ways of Byzantine Philosophy*, ed. M. Knezevic (Alhambra Ca: Sebastian Press, 2015), 429-448, esp. 429-430.

the Jacobin politics that was seen by him as a Byzantinist trend.[3] One should not forget the close ties of the Russian imperial thought with Byzantinist politics which in a sense was transcended by Russian populism and although this last was hostile to Russian monarchy yet it was still seeing Russian people as a holy people.[4] In modern Greece, one cannot emphasize the cultural and intellectual echoes of the notion; Constantine Cavafy spoke of "our glorious Byzantinism"[5] and the Greek national historiography insisted on the importance of the byzantine moment for the continuity of the Greek nation.[6]

Byzantinism has, actually, a rather pejorative meaning. On the political level it signifies a political stand without normative legitimacy and even when norms exist, they lack applicability to particular contexts; the notion is reminiscent of the Byzantine Empire's form of government.[7] Yet, one should not think that Byzantinism suffers more than any other political concept. In fact, political language is characterized by the essential contestability of its concepts; Nietzsche famously said that "only something which has no history can be defined"[8]. But if the political concepts on the whole are contestable how one is to formulate a civic lexicon? For Hobbes, this effort lies beyond language. The idea of the general war of everybody against everybody can mean nothing else than that the individuals possess only the private language of their desires, untranslatable to the language of the others and only the subjugation to one higher authority can achieve general consent. In other terms, the political concepts are in need of translation that cannot be effective without either conversion or coercion. The political concept in itself is an act of solipsism; yet, there are forms of surpassing the conceptual *aporia* by understanding that the political concepts are always contextualized and in this way they produce the action that is characteristic to them. Reinhart Koselleck focused on the work of the interpretation of political concepts that should be accompanied by the search

[3] Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. and trans. Q. Hoare, and G. Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), the chapter "Against Byzantinism", 200-201.

[4] Fr.-X. Coquin, *Des pères du peuple au père des peuples. La Russie de 1825 à 1929* (Paris: SEDES, 1991), esp. 1-24 and 143-176.

[5] "I love the Church – its hexapteriga, / the silver of its sacred vessels, its candlesticks, / the lights, its icons, its pulpit. / When I enter a church of the Greeks, / with its fragrances of incense, / with its voices and liturgical choirs, / the stately presence of the priests / and the solemn rhythm of each of their movements - / most resplendent in the adornment of their vestments / my mind goes to the high honors of our race / to the glory of our Byzantine tradition", C. Cavafy, "In Church", *The Complete Poems of Cavafy*, trans. Rae Dalven, intr. W. H. Auden (New York: Harvest, 1976), 43. The translation of "Byzantinism" as "Byzantine Tradition" misses the ambiguity of the original term. See Dominique Grandmont, *La victoire des vaincus. Essai sur Constantin Cavafis* (Saint-Benoît-du-Sault: Tarabuste, 2015).

[6] The two most prominent historians are Spyridon Zampelios (1815-1881) and Constantine Paparrigopoulos (1815-1891); see Y. Koumbourlis, *Οι ιστοριογραφικές οφειλές των Σπ. Ζαμπέλιου και Κ. Παπαρρηγόπουλου* (1815-1891). *Η συμβολή Ελλήνων και ξένων στη διαμόρφωση του τρίσημου σχήματος του ελληνικού ιστορισμού (1782-1846)* (Athens: ΙΙΕ/ΕΙΕ, Τομέας Νεοελληνικών Ερευνών 128, 2012) and K. Th. Dimaras, *Κωνσταντίνος Παπαρρηγόπουλος. Η εποχή του, η ζωή του, το έργο του* (Athens: ΜΙΕΤ, 2006).

[7] See Dimiter Angelov, "Byzantinism: The Real and the Imaginary Influence of a Medieval Civilization on the Modern Balkans", *New Approaches to Balkan Studies*, eds. D. Keridis, E. Elias-Bursaq, and N. Yatromanolakis (Dulles, Brassey's, 2003), 2-23.

[8] Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, II, 13, ed. K. Ansell-Pearson, trans. C. Diethe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 53-54.

for the practical, politically effective, middle term.[9] Thus, every political concept is as much particular as it is precarious.

What is meant here by the term "action"? It does not refer to some theory of deliberation and movement. It rather belongs to philosophical constructivism and involves culture, language, discourse, knowledge. Action as construction is the formation and critique of normativities, quite distinct from any objectivist ontology and distinctively afar from phenomenological intentionality. Constructivist action cannot be put in the frame of either essentialism or empiricism and it comprises causality solely as power.[10]

Byzantinism and the production of concepts

How does all the above influence the understanding and use of the notion of Byzantinism? One should make here the distinction between political genealogies and political categories. The historicization of concepts does not make easier the task of producing their genealogy since this last cannot be integrated in a coherent, or coherently looking, history of ideas. Any history of ideas is a narrative that cannot deal with the totality of the factual empiricism of historical action. In other words, the political concepts as particular and precarious beings are dissociated from historicity or else they would be part of the logic of a predetermined action. There is here another remark to be made: many researchers believe that the contestability of concepts is the result of the clash between different and opposing worldviews. The reasoned concept of worldview originates in the hermeneutical philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey;[11] a worldview means the mode on the basis of which a precise cultural space-time represents the world that surrounds it, the human relations, the feelings, the artistic productions but also the world of action; action is thus always the action according to a certain worldview. In this way, Dilthey introduces a cultural relativism that is subject only to understanding and not to causal explanation. Hegel even though had himself produced a historicist account never concluded on a relativist view since in him the different worldviews are articulated inside an evolutionary picture that culminates in the Absolute Spirit.

Dilthey's relativism has certain consequences that remind us strongly of the postmodern moment in philosophy. Thus, since worldviews exist, no one is ever in direct contact with reality, but only in contact with the world-viewed reality. Reality can never be understood without the mediation of a network of concepts. In fact, anyone that partakes in a worldview lacks the words to describe what is evident

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[9] See Reinahrt Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts*, trans. Todd Samuel Presner (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002).

[10] See Dave Elder-Vass, *The Reality of Social Construction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), esp. 15-34.

[11] See Rudolf A. Makkreel, *Dilthey. Philosopher of the Human Studies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 345-355.

for another worldview. A second consequence is that the question of power becomes clearly prominent. The first and original power is that of translation that brings forth the question of the compatibility of worldviews. For example, as to distinct worldviews, can one translate Descartes's *Treatise of Passions* into SMS messages? Is the relativism of worldviews a radical one or can it be surpassed? The incompatibility of worldviews shows that translation always misses or, as the Italians say, "*traduttore traditore*". Yet, the description itself of the variety of worldviews demonstrates that the relativism here is not a radical one or, in other terms, the description of a given variety marks the limits of absolute relativism. Next, from questions of ontology, one passes to questions of common action: do we share the same worldview? Do we see the same world? Those are questions that become crucial with globalization, massive migration or even, simple tourism while emerges the need for new epistemic fields of cultural observation. There is still a major problem: the communication technologies can obscure or cover the differences in worldviews. The new media are the manifestation of the coexistence of relativism and communication, despite the informational noise and the bad faith that characterize them.[12]

Back to Byzantinism, the concept as any other may refer to a conflict of worldviews since this is a possible approach to the problem of the contestability of concepts. The cultural Byzantinism thus may refer to a primal symbolic incompatibility between Athens and Jerusalem as historians of ideas supported for a long time. Another probable idea is that a concept results from and stands for a void; in other terms, the contestability of a concept comes not from a lack of referential power but is in itself the origin of all political concepts; concepts are contestable and the concept of Byzantinism as well, because political concepts are semantically void. This is the position of Ernesto Laclau in his treatise on populist reason[13] and his views are in the same line with French theory for which concepts are *aporetic* and not part of formalistically articulated wholes. Politics in itself, or civic life, or culture, are precisely the products of the *aporetic* character of concepts. This does not prevent them from being operative, quite the contrary. Instead of perceiving the difficulty as to concepts in the difference between theory and action, one, as a good Kantian, must acknowledge here the real outcome of constitutive antinomies.

As to the genealogy of Byzantinism, the term has been seen as part of the worldviews that arise from the antithesis between traditionalism and modernism. The discourse of emancipation comprised the idea of freeing oneself from the Byzantinist tradition; this is a common view about the progress from retrograde

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[12] On "Weltanschauung" in relation to Byzantine thought, see G. Arabatzis, "Ο Ι.Ν. Θεοδωρακόπουλος απέναντι στη Βυζαντινή Φιλοσοφία. Οι πηγές της κριτικής του", *Εκκλησιαστικός Φάρος* ΟΘ΄ (2008): 49-62.

[13] Ernesto Laclau, *On Populist Reason* (London: Verso, 2005).

culture to progressive politics.[14] Rupture was the external context of this modernist passage or of this kind of response to the modernist appeal. The context is seen rather as a frame, as a stage for the abandonment of some ideas and the progression of others. Yet, one could also view the context as inherent to ideas and the contextualization as the proper of a constantly dilemmatic ethics and politics. For example, the view that the emancipation of Modern Greece was part of an age of democratic revolutions cannot be challenged, but the observation of the actual transformations can lead us to the conclusion that not all forms of political modernity oppose the tradition. For example, the Byzantinism of the national historiography is the result of a superimposition of both modernity and tradition. This is also evident in the narratives of the travelers who were journeying through the Balkans in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. The cultural superimposition is not only a kind of representation but also a type of action, one that clearly demonstrates how the opposition of delimited homogeneous wholes is erroneous and that one should rather speak of an *apophatic* modernism. The initial fallacy consists in turning a logical opposition into a historical one; this manifests how the concepts are twisted due to latent normative desires, which are responsible for the historical lapsus that cannot be solely attributed to the persistence of traditionalist surviving patterns. Thus, the context of concepts is shown to be the structure of their production.

The modernist progressive worldviews are considered to be the outcome of the Machiavellian project of a stable republic in spite of the abandonment of transcendental sources of authority and against the relapsing of modern politics into irrationality; Max Weber is also in this line of thought. To the image of historical decline embodied in Byzantium, as the historian Edward Gibbon[15] has supported, retorts the Machiavellian idea that corruption is part of a historical recurrence in human affairs.[16] In Gibbon, the critique of the regional political ontology of Byzantium is seen as part of a broader operation of legitimacy; it would be wiser to perceive of Byzantinism as part of a plurality of political languages. The search for legitimacy can be witnessed clearly in Gibbon's naïve realism about names as naming operators, for example in his aforementioned statement about the decline of Rome due to religion and barbarism. Only later, in Nietzsche for example, legitimacy came to be thought as corresponding to the will – the will of power in particular. The names instead of being operators of naming are in Nietzsche the

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[14] For a critique of naïve oppositions see André Guillou, "Le monde de Byzance dans la pensée historique de l'Europe: le siècle des Lumières", *Culture et société en Italie Byzantine - VIe-XIe s.* (London: Variorum Reprints, 1978), 27-39.

[15] Edward Gibbon, *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ed. D. Womersley (London: Lane/ Penguin, 1994, 1068).

[16] Of course, in Byzantine Orthodoxy, Machiavellianism would be intolerable; see John Climacus, *Scala Paradisi*, *PG* 88, 884, where complotting against another person is inacceptable since it contributes to a second fall, which is accompanied this time with pleasure. As we will see, the concept of economia may in extremis concern the actual shortcomings of a person's implication with power.

signs of impasses in reference; here irrationality or rather contingency is the proper foundation of the concepts.

One must not miss the fact that in many traditional commonwealths like the Byzantine one, the right to insurgency in some instances was a legitimate element of political action and only partially was contained by the instrumental use of intolerance.[17] This right was constantly introducing the element of contingency into the normativity of public life. The Machiavellian project, on the other hand, may be still seen as a Platonic political programme where the idea (the republic in Machiavelli's language) is opposed to the world of sensations (the political irrationality in his view); in Machiavellian terms, it is the opposition between the *virtù* and the *fortuna*. A *prima facie* civil right is the constitutive other of the law and its premise; it is not absolute and yet is always presupposed. The general illegitimacy of any concept is the sign of its radical contingent character. This is what can be described as the fallacy of the speculative leap from the empirical to the normative sphere.

One cannot understand the semantics of Byzantinism without the argumentative practices that support it. The concept is not the outcome of a definitional practice – of course, it can also be that – but what challenges definition. Byzantinism, maybe more than other political concepts, makes evident the above observation. The political-ethical refutation of Byzantinism coexists with its aesthetic persistence and relevance over time. The Byzantinism in its aesthetic relevance transcends the critique of ideology towards the understanding of what is and how does function a political archetype. The Byzantinism is the concept that properly corresponds to the context of the Byzantinist debate; in other terms, Byzantinism, as it happens with other political concepts, transcends the distinction between text and context.

Eusebeia as anti-Byzantinism

If Byzantinism is a form of alienation of the Byzantine spirit or mind one should ponder the definition of this latter. The main notion here from a value-neutral point of view is the idea of "*eusebeia*" (= piety).[18] In this notion are comprised the divine revelation, the tradition (especially the Patristic one), morals and the happiness proper to the Orthodox ethics.[19] The defense of these parts of *eusebeia* is the mission of Basileus and the clergy while their conservation is the task of the faith and the care that pertains to the Orthodox people. By definition, people exterior to the above system of convictions is dealt with skepticism and groups

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[17] See D. N. Karayannopoulos, *Η πολιτική θεωρία των Βυζαντινών* (Thessaloniki: Vanias, 1992), 35-37.
[18] On *eusebeia*, see André Guillou, "La vie quotidienne à la haute époque byzantine, Eusébeia: piété. Une réflexion lexicographique", *The 17th International Byzantine Congress, Major Papers* (New Rochelle-New York: Ar. D. Karatzas Publishers, 1986), 189-209 and Idem, "Piété filiale, piété impériale", *Collection de l'Institut des Sciences et Techniques de l'Antiquité* 367 (1988): 143-153, Mélanges P. Lévêque, I. Religion.
[19] In Isaiah, 33, 6, *eusebeia* has the aspect of a dynamic cognition.

not affiliated to it are named in such manner that the common perception of them remains unchanged for eternity.[20] The cultural conflict of the Byzantines with the Arabs and the Westerners, after the one between Christians and pagans, lead to the examination of the idea of cultural superiority and thus to the indecision about universal values. In particular, the encounter with the West created a new challenge and divided the Byzantine intellectuals. The Latinophile party of Constantinople proposed a form of Occidentalization while the opposants, i.e. the Anti-Latin party, promoted, in essence, the possibility to ignore the Western rise to prominence. This denial by the Anti-Latin party of the new power presented different levels of intensity while the central idea, maybe for the Latinophiles also, was the preservation of the greater part of Byzantine tradition. In this perspective, the tradition was characterized by immutability, contrary to the idea of the expansive science that was proper to the early Byzantine thought. Resistance as immutability could not escape the issue of the inferiority of Byzantine science as improper for the understanding of movement. The resistance thus to the Western intellectual acculturation was at the same time a dispute about intellectual progress. The fields affected in the first place by the encounter with the West were the realm of the Ego and the universality of meaning.[21]

Eusebeia has been without doubt an individual affair, the measure of a personal behavior. *Eusebeia* by itself presupposes a personalist view of the individual destiny. During the relative prime of the Byzantine state of mind, it possessed clear essentialist properties and subsequently became a first order quality of the Byzantine person as the treatise of Kekaumenos reveals.[22] In order to understand the realm proper to *eusebeia*, one must distinguish it from morals and religion; *eusebeia* is the quality of human existence after the fall that cannot ambition the comfort of the moral or religious universality. Actions are always actions-in-the-world and the liberation surpasses the immanent world. Birth has a completely defining meaning because it determines one's nature and the Ego cannot thus quite intent the status of a subject.

Beyond personal *eusebeia*, there is the communal one that possesses normative value and is common to all Byzantines, i.e. to all proper human beings. *Eusebeia* is a quality of humanity, a spiritual if not a transcendent universal. What makes its strength is the expansiveness and the power to comprehend the Other and

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[20] See Constantine Porphyrogenitus, *De Administrando Imperio*, Proem 15 Moravcsik. The notion of "Ἔθνη"/ Nations refer to the "gentiles", foreign to the chosen people, as in Ps. 2, 1 and Matth. 10, 5; the foreigners are either spiritually or politically alien or both; see Constantine Porphyrogenitus, *De Administrando Imperio. A Commentary*, ed. J. Romilly and H. Jenkins, commentary R. J. H. Jenkins (Washington DC: Dumbarton Oaks, 1962), 11.

[21] As to the distinction between Latinophiles and Anti-Latinophiles in Constantinople, see Stylianos Papadopoulos, *Ορθόδοξη και Σχολαστική θεολογία* (Athens: 1970). See, from a historical point of view, Steven Runciman, *The Great Church in Captivity: A Study of the Patriarchate of Constantinople from the Eve of the Turkish Conquest to the Greek War of Independence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), esp. the initial parts of the study.

[22] See Kekaumenos, *Στρατηγικόν*, ed. D. Tsougarakis (Athens: Agrostis, 1993), 245, § 77.

thus *eusebeia* acquires meta-religious characteristics as to comprehension and transcendence. It forms the supra-categorical monism of the Byzantine anthropology in face of God and human community. It is a monistic metaphysics that can be confused with mysticism but is not mystical in itself; it is only epistemologically warranted by mysticism. The motivation for it is the salvation and survival of the Byzantine Christian and so its monism is secondary and heterogeneous. The all-comprehensive idea of "everything-in-everything"[23] of the Greek philosophy is now considered as a consequence of the evangelic love, as an equivalent of the statement: You is I. As such, it is the foundation of what can be considered as Byzantine immanence, the vacillation between the universal and the communal as a kind of conceptual solidarity. Hence, in what degree the conservation of tradition is effectively accomplished, is a question that cannot escape the dialectical survey of the above subjective as well as objective statements. Yet, the same feature makes very difficult the ratiocinating approach to the Byzantine phenomenon.

Stillness

The famous Byzantinist Paul Lemerle[24] attempted an overview of Byzantine art, placing the concept of style in the center of his analysis. The notion of style allows for the abandonment of the aesthetic-metaphysical dualities that dictate aesthetic considerations, the most important being the one between form and content. The concept of style, precisely, allows the possibility to refer to elemental iconological units without involving aesthetic categories that are dually opposed, metaphysically polarizing the iconological material and, in effect, negating it. Lemerle emphasizes that the Byzantine art is a religious art and clarifies that, in more correct terms, Byzantine art is a theological art. The French Byzantinist points out that the Byzantine artist searches to avoid any personal interpretation, in addressing solely the spiritual element. The Byzantine artist, says Lemerle, does not aspire to any kind of personal work but rather tries to perform, as far as his forces allow, a sacred task, quite like the priest in church. His ambition is not the innovation but the humble reproduction of a type that has already been decreed to confer the divine spirit.[25]

The constant reference to faith and to the relationship between the created and the uncreated signifies the total overcome of the artistic ego by the supreme truths of creation. This description of Byzantine art requires, at least, an account of the experience that supports it, i.e. the religious experience; yet, such an effort would not be in position to exhaust the interpretative possibilities. The religious

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[23] Anaxagoras B 11 D-K.

[24] Paul Lemerle, *Le style byzantin* (Paris: Larousse, 1943). See G. Arabatzis, *Byzantine Philosophy and Iconology*, op. cit., 109-111.

[25] The question of innovation and originality is a debatable question in Byzantium; see André Guillou, *La civilisation byzantine* (Paris: Arthaud, 1990), the chapter "Originalités", 220-224.

experience is certainly present, but as Lemerle has already pointed out, art does not concern the "religious" but the "theological" sphere, which he even combined with the invocation of the concept of spirituality; art, therefore, refers to a spiritual-theological experience. However, this observation does not give way to further analysis, as one would expect from the description in Lemerle's work; instead, one sees here a significant regression to ideological language.

Thus, for Lemerle, Byzantine art is a theocratic one, i.e. subject to authority, alien to progress (what in fact does artistic progress mean?), transpiring an air of monotony, habit, and copying. The idea of copying is particularly relevant, Lemerle says, in the Byzantine iconology of sacred forms. This is not, he supports, a kind of artistic weakness, but the process of copying signifies the power of the archetype that has been miraculously revealed and which now requires utter faithfulness in reproduction. This attitude, however, he notes, serves high dogma as well as superstitious iconography, thereby forming an aesthetic duality; it is an art at the same time impersonal and paradoxical, though this latter description contradicts the spiritual tone which Lemerle himself had pointed out in the beginning of his analysis. Which art more in search of the novel, the original, the unusual, the *recherché*, the different would be, by logical consequence, more spiritual than the Byzantine art? It is obvious that Lemerle appears still a captive of the metaphysical dualities that he previously negated.

One should plainly distinguish between metaphysical immobility, one of the more prominent features of the Greek metaphysics about the Real Being, and Byzantine stillness. The work of Evagrios Pontikos may be of great help here. Evagrios is more or less contemporary to what it was historically initiated as the Eastern Roman Empire. A member of the ecclesiastical hierarchy in Constantinople, he allegedly gave in to temptation, he repented and chose to move to Jerusalem and follow the ascetic vocation. He subsequently promoted the practice of the ascetic stillness quite in opposition to the previous familiar to him sociability of the imperial court.[26] He promoted a series of practices, suitable to induce to calmness and silence the passions. The discourse of hesychia is in that way both a discursive practice to tame passions and the explanation of the ontological state of things, which, if one conforms to the first caution, is as good as the outcome of creation permits. Evagrios' *Treatise to Eulogios* is an account of the gnosis that is suitable for the above two objectives. The ascites' intentionality is turned not to the interested sociability with others but to a life of virtue that is only visible to God. Worldly esteem is a regression to the life of passions. The Ego thus must always be neutral as to the things of this world, giving neither to irascibility nor to pleasure. Irascibility can be turned solely against the demons while pleasure

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[26] Later in Michael Psellos, sociability becomes a main characteristic of political life; see Michel Psellos, *Chronographie*, II, 391 r, ed. Émile Renauld (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1967), 74-75; see also E. de Vries-van der Velden, "Les amitiés dangereuses: Psellos et Léon Paraspondylos", *Byzantinoslavica* 60 (1999): 315–350.

must always relate to Christian salvation, humility and charity. The search of pleasure is before anything else a regulation of one's interiority and the repulsion of vainglory. The worldly pleasure is constantly related to the world of forms and figuration and a Christian's intellect must make a great effort to resist them both. True understanding, in this sense, is an "understanding of thanksgiving" which "bears the way of the truth upon the tongue"; if we have truly acquired love, we have "extinguished the passions and have let our light shine into the heavens"[27]. Maximus the Confessor, commenting upon Dionysius Areopagite, underscores that God is the agent of love, the One who pushes love towards the exterior of the subject, i.e. the other created beings; God is the true mediator towards the authentic union in Spirit and the work of mediation is what provokes the union. This last, the Christian union in spirit, is the highest and superior to all other unions.[28] Already, for Leontius of Byzantium, division is essentially incompatible to the dogmatic concise condensation.[29] Yet, besides the dogmatic condensing effort there is the need for spiritual compensation which, according to Dorotheus of Gaza, is due to one's pious proximity to spirituality.[30]

Byzantinism and Understanding

This idea of the Byzantine practical state of mind may give way to some serious misunderstandings as to the ways of relating Good and Action. One can very schematically situate the incompatibility thus produced at the breach separating the Christian ethics of St Paul, who states about good actions that "I do not do the good I want to do, but the evil I do not want to do—this I keep on doing"[31] and the claim of Euripides' Medea: "I am overcome by evil, and I realize what evil I am about to do, but my passion controls my plans."[32] The possible or impossible compromise between these attitudes and the ways to differentiate them exemplify the emergence of Byzantinism. A clear presentation of Byzantinism is given by G.W.F. Hegel who writes in *The Philosophy of History on Byzantium*[33] (I am giving an extensive part of the text due to its importance):

"The history of the highly civilized Eastern Empire — where as we might suppose, the Spirit of Christianity could be taken up in its truth and purity — exhibits to us a millennial series of uninterrupted crimes, weaknesses, basenesses and want of principle; a most repulsive and consequently a most uninteresting picture. It is evident here, how Christianity may be abstract, and how as such it is

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[27] Evagrios Pontikos, *Eulogios*, in Robert E. Sinkewicz, *Evagrius of Pontus. The Greek Ascetic Corpus* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), the Greek text 331, 30 (1136 D).
[28] Maximus the Confessor, Sch. D.N. IV 14, PG 4, 265 D.
[29] Leontius of Byzantium, *PG*, 86/1, 1297 B.
[30] Dorotheus of Gaza, *Œuvres spirituelles*, rds. L. Régnault, and J. de Préville (Paris: Cerf, 1963), SC 92, 486; see A. Guillou, *La vie quotidienne*, op. cit., 203.
[31] Romans 7, 19.
[32] Euripides, *Medea*, 1078-79.
[33] G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, trans. J. Sibree (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2001), 355-358.

powerless, on account of its very purity and intrinsic spirituality. It may even be entirely separated from the World, as e.g. in Monasticism —which originated in Egypt. It is a common notion and saying, in reference to the power of Religion, abstractly considered, over the hearts of men, that if Christian love were universal, private and political life would both be perfect, and the state of mankind would be thoroughly righteous and moral. Such representations may be a pious wish, but do not possess truth; for religion is something internal, having to do with conscience alone. To it all the passions and desires are opposed, and in order that heart, will, intelligence may become true, they must be thoroughly educated; Right must become Custom — Habit; practical activity must be elevated to rational action; the State must have a rational organization, and then at length does the will of individuals become a truly righteous one. Light shining in darkness may perhaps give color, but not a picture animated by Spirit. The Byzantine Empire is a grand example of how the Christian religion may maintain an abstract character among a cultivated people, if the whole organization of the State and of the Laws is not reconstructed in harmony with its principle. At Byzantium Christianity had fallen into the hands of the dregs of the population — the lawless mob. Popular license on the one side and courtly baseness on the other side, take refuge under the sanction of religion, and degrade the latter to a disgusting object. In regard to religion, two interests obtained prominence: first, the settlement of doctrine; and secondly, the appointment to ecclesiastical offices. The settlement of doctrine pertained to the Councils and Church authorities; but the principle of Christianity is Freedom — subjective insight. These matters therefore, were special subjects of contention for the populace; violent civil wars arose, and everywhere might be witnessed scenes of murder, conflagration and pillage, perpetrated in the cause of Christian dogmas. (…) Especially notorious are the contentions about Images, in which it often happened, that the Emperor declared for the images and the Patriarch against, or conversely. Streams of blood flowed as the result. Gregory Nazianzen says somewhere: "This city (Constantinople) is full of handicraftsmen and slaves, who are all profound theologians, and preach in their workshops and in the streets. If you want a man to change a piece of silver, he instructs you in what consists the distinction between the Father and the Son: if you ask the price of a loaf of bread, you receive for answer — that the Son is inferior to the Father; and if you ask, whether the bread is ready, the rejoinder is that the genesis of the Son was from Nothing." The Idea of Spirit contained in this doctrine was thus treated in an utterly unspiritual manner. The appointment to the Patriarchate at Constantinople, Antioch and Alexandria, and the jealousy and ambition of the Patriarchs likewise occasioned many intestine struggles. To all these religious contentions was added the interest in the gladiators and their combats, and in the parties of the blue and green color, which likewise occasioned the bloodiest encounters; a sign of the most fearful degradation, as proving that all feeling for what is serious and elevated is lost, and that the delirium of religious passion is quite consistent with an appetite

for gross and barbarous spectacles.

"The chief points in the Christian religion were at last, by degrees, established by the Councils. The Christians of the Byzantine Empire remained sunk in the dream of superstition - persisting in blind obedience to the Patriarchs and the priesthood. Image-Worship, to which we alluded above, occasioned the most violent struggles and storms. The brave Emperor Leo the Isaurian in particular, persecuted images with the greatest obstinacy, and in the year 754, Image-Worship was declared by a Council to be an invention of the devil. Nevertheless, in the year 787 the Empress Irene had it restored under the authority of a Nicene Council, and the Empress Theodora definitively established it - proceeding against its enemies with energetic rigor. The iconoclastic Patriarch received two hundred blows, the bishops trembled, the monks exulted, and the memory of this orthodox proceeding was celebrated by an a nnual ecclesiastical festival. The West, on the contrary, repudiated Image-Worship as late as the year 794, in the Council held at Frankfort; and though retaining the images, blamed most severely the superstition of the Greeks. Not till the later Middle Ages did Image-Worship meet with universal adoption as the result of quiet and slow advances.

"The Byzantine Empire was thus distracted by passions of all kinds within, and pressed by the barbarians — to whom the Emperors could offer but feeble resistance — without. The realm was in a condition of perpetual insecurity. Its general aspect presents a disgusting picture of imbecility; wretched, nay, insane passions, stifle the growth of all that is noble in thoughts, deeds, and persons. Rebellion on the part of generals, depositions of the Emperors by their means or through the intrigues of the courtiers, assassination or poisoning of the Emperors by their own wives and sons, women surrendering themselves to lusts and abominations of all kinds — such are the scenes which History here brings before us; till at last — about the middle of the fifteenth century (A.D.1453) — the rotten edifice of the Eastern Empire crumbled in pieces before the might of the vigorousTurks."[34]

The end of history, eschatology, is one of the main constituents of the Judaeo-Christian culture that vows to the annihilation of the evil and spiritual emancipation. A new approach to the question is made by Alexandre Kojève's reading of the *Phenomenology of the Spirit*.[35] Eschatology makes the world history a necessary and mandatory science and, through the idea of world history, is further introduced the notion of the science of war or Polemology. Before a general, disastrous war, the idea of conservation appears as the real antithesis to eschatology. This line

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[34] On this text, see G. Arabatzis, "Ο Χέγκελ και το Βυζάντιο, κατά τις παραδόσεις του Γερμανού φιλοσόφου, Μαθήματα φιλοσοφίας της Ιστορίας" (Βερολίνο 1830-1831), *Κ΄ Πανελλήνιο Ιστορικό Συνέδριο 28-30 Μαΐου 1999* (Thessaloniki: Ελληνική Ιστορική Εταιρεία, 2000), 61-69; Idem, "Hegel and Byzantium (With a Notice on Alexandre Kojève and Scepticism)", *Philosophical Inquiry* 25, no. 1-2 (2003): 31-39; Idem, "Le Byzance de Hegel et la question du néoplatonisme hégélien", *Peitho* 1, no. 5 (2014): 337-350.
[35] Alexandre Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1969).

of thought is not difficult to follow in the history of the post-Westphalian state (after 1648) and in the philosophy of liberalism, i.e. in Thomas Hobbes. World history thus relates war to eschatology. The notion of cosmopolitanism in Kant is idealistic since it appears as the regulative idea of an a priori contradiction. The Machiavellian Prince can incarnate as an individual in a better way this coincidence of the opposites. Rousseau, for his part, identified decline with civilized society itself. Before the end of history, the balance of conflicting great powers was seen as a model of political management as early as the times of Byzantium. This realism of "check and balances" is manifest in Kojève (but also in Hobbes and Carl Schmitt) and it has a lot to do with competing against an exemplary enemy. The antithesis between friendship and hostility is once more presented as the latent cause of movement in world history and thus war is the only real reason for the creation of the state. By the same, neutrality must be placed out of history, i.e. as an exception. According to Schmitt, the essence of politics is the management of exception and here the relevant logic is that of the vicious circle.[36]

In any case, the above description is in many points telling as to the evolution from Byzantium to Europe and as to the creation of the modern state in the form of a synthesis of ideology and war (to which neither the Ancient cities nor the Roman Empire may conform completely). How, before such a ruthless logic, can the idea of the end of history be re-evoked? The formalization of conflict as the proper essence of politics underscores the permanence of the eschatological hope. Therefore is introduced the idea of a dual history, i.e. a political and an occult history and, subsequently, the idea of a multiple and alternative history. The idea of universal collaboration (peace), on the other hand, is principled in the manner of the eschatological view since it puts forward an indeterminate suspension of the politics of war. Everyone in this perspective is present in multiple worlds and we cannot avoid the idea of the apocalyptic disaster in one or more of them. The old humanity is fractured into what one can call different commonwealths.

The situation is not strange to the idea of the development of modern science, which must have initiated in an imperial or hegemonic logic according to the Hegelian analysis; science does not stand apart from war and power. At first, science does not appear to be related to any warlike sentiment. In Hobbes, the genealogical inheritance is of prime importance: the contractual science is born out of the refutation of the consequences of the generalized war. The Hobbesian contract is together with Kant's cosmopolitan ideal the two great horizons of world history. In other words, the regulative duality of the reflection over world history is made of the difference between Hobbes and Kant. Hobbes appears as a major realist

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[36] Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, trans. G. Schwab (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985), 5 ff. See the critique of Schmitt (and Heidegger) as national-socialist thinkers in Nikos Psarros, "Ο φιλοσοφικός εθνικοσοσιαλισμός στη σκέψη του Martin Heidegger και του Carl Schmitt", communication to the University of Ioannina.

in relation to Kant's epistemological idealism or, in more psychoanalytic terms, Hobbes demonstrates the priority of fetishist realism (i.e. the political contract). This realism has been part of the common vocabulary for so long that there is a discourse about it ignoring the fact that this is often nothing more than a fetishism of thought. The political realism is nothing else than the repulsion of ethics and justice as simple epiphenomena of the political interest. Yet, the eschatological hope is never eliminated and constitutes the other face of realism; eschatology in other words possesses here a latent normative value. Realism is in a way a form of eschatology that has temporarily ceased to exercise pressure on history. The virtuous intentionality or, else, the return of morals is never, in practice, alien to the exercise of the realist politics of nations. Hobbes' as well as Machiavelli's political philosophies are deficient as to the understanding of the politics of hope[37] while Kant appears as the true heir of the Machiavellian ambition for the autonomy of comprehending political action.[38] The foundationalism of the good is never fully abandoned just as the nominalist view on evil cannot be avoided. Max Weber's distinction between politics of conviction and politics of responsibility is at this point wanting.[39] Political action in other words neither abandons the movement of the commonsense nor cease to confront the determinism of bad faith.

Byzantinism and History

Some believe that the introduction of the concept of ideology can be illuminating at this point. The globalization of the message of Enlightenment is largely responsible for the broad diffusion of the concept of ideology. However, it is a concept that cannot always be proved useful for the understanding of Byzantium and only some neglect of the lessons of Byzantine history would preserve the concept of ideology in its totality.[40] On the other hand, as it is said, eschatology is still part of the modern employ of political power. The notion of ideology as a kind of fixation of the mental life is often responsible for the modernist perception

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[37] On the politics of hope, see Ernst Bloch, *The Principle of Hope*, trans. N. Plaice, St. Plaice, P. Knight (Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 1995).

[38] I am inspired here and in what follows by Pierre Manent's distinction between the 'Empire', the 'Church' and 'Monarchy', where this last is a form of transcending the incompatibility of the first two; in Manent's view Monarchy is the source of the consequent political philosophy of liberalism developed by Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, etc.; see P. Manent, *Histoire intellectuelle du libéralisme* (Paris: Hachette/Pluriel, 1987), esp. 17-30. For a different view, see Max Horkheimer, "The Begginings of the Bourgeois Philosophy of History", in *Between Philosophy and Social Science*, trans. G. Frederick Hunter, M. Kramer, and J. Torpey (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1995), 318-388.

[39] See M. Weber, "Politics as a Vocation", in *The Vocation Lectures*, trans. R. Livingstone, ed. D. Owen and T. B. Strong (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2004), 32-94; see also, G. Arabatzis, *Éthique du bonheur et orthodoxie à Byzance (IVe-XIIe s.)*, avec une préface de André Guillou (Paris: Éd. P. Belon/Diffusion De Boccard, 1998, coll. "Textes. Documents. Études" No. 4), 27-36.

[40] The limits of the relevant ideological reading can be seen in Hans-Georg Beck, *Das byzantinische Jahrtausend* (München: C. H. Beck, 1978), esp. the chapters II.8 and IV.4.

of science as a dialectic of power and war. The idea of cooperation is frequently a question about the type of ideology that can lead to an action for the good. Thus, cooperation appears now as a real and present eschatology, although incomplete as to the primal and authentic form of eschatology. Ethics, supposedly without political power, is the eschatology of realism, and thus it takes a normative form. This means that the mechanism of power appears to involve eschatological-ethical considerations. The fundamental Hobbesian principle of a primal general war can be abandoned in favor of an expanding virtue, as in the Byzantine thinker Plethon; his system of virtues must be interpreted beyond the context of ancient philosophical influences.[41]

A modern system of virtues can lead to a form of solidarity beyond tradition that requires multiculturalism, like the Greek and Christian elements in Byzantium, which would set goals far superior to those of simple political realism. The discourse about realism and the rational choices it implies is thus replaced by a multiplicity of values and at least a duality of cultural forms. In fact, however, there is no direct confrontation between the two cultures, except in the early Christian times[42], and the resultant pluralism may also aspire to some realism, that of the political project, as opposed to the realism of the appeal to authority that was the traditional Byzantine courtly behavior and persists as part of the politics of Byzantinism. World history is thus transformed into a pattern of cultural politics that, as in Plethon, renounces to Byzantinism for simultaneously a kind of proto-nationalism and cosmopolitanism. The spirituality of orthodoxy had already supported the universality of the Byzantine patriotism.[43] In fact, the Orthodox spirituality had, long ago, abandoned the naïve realism described above. The inclusion of new ethnicities in the Byzantine Commonwealth[44] was an important turning point in official knowledge, in the culture of communication, in the perception of space in terms of more "objective" criteria, for example those of diffusing the Byzantine model of agriculture.[45] This shift remodeled the traditional expanding geopolitics of the Byzantine court. The cultural influence cannot be reduced to the war of all against all, or to the idea that man is a wolf for man. The eschatology here joins rather the co-operation than the self-securing Hobbesian contract and the Orthodox spirituality had already, very early on, rejected the Roman morals of the

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[41] See G. Arabatzis, "Plethon's Philosophy of the Concept", in *Georgios Gemistos Plethon. The Byzantine and Latin Renaissance*, eds. J. Matula and R. Blum (Olomouc: Univerzita Palackeho v Olomouci, 2014), 73-111.

[42] See Dionysius Areopagita, "Letters to Sopatros and to Polycarpus", in Günther Heil, Adolf M. Ritter, *Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita. de Coelesti Hierarchia, de Ecclesiastica Hierarchia, de Mystica Theologia, Epistulae* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012), 164-170; see, in contrast, C. N. Sathas, *Έλληνες στρατιώται εν τη Δύσει* (Athens: Karavia, 1986).

[43] See H. A. Ahrweiler, *L'idéologie politique de l'empire byzantin* (Paris: PUF, 1975).

[44] See D. Obolensky, *The Byzantine Commonwealth: Eastern Europe, 500-1453* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971).

[45] See G. Arabatzis, *Éthique du bonheur et orthodoxie à Byzance* (IVe-XIIe s.), op. cit., 92-97 and 109-117.

[46] André Guillou, *La civilisation byzantine* (Paris: Arthaud, 1990), 374; see Constantin A. Bozinis, *Ο Ιωάννης ο Χρυσόστομος για το Imperium Romanum. Μελέτη πάνω στην πολιτική σκέψη της Αρχαίας Εκκλησίας* (Athens: Kardamitsa, 2003), esp. 105-107.

arena.[46] Byzantium as the empire of wisdom rejects the extortionist universality towards an idea of the Biblical *economia* as openness to the less fortunate, a form of social welfare and care for the needy[47], which in some degree contradicts any fixed representation about medievalism.

The violent introduction of the West into the Byzantine world could not but engender the same skepticism about the destiny of the divine kingdom as the Arabian invasion had already done at the beginning of the Byzantine dark centuries.[48] This meant, despite the widespread legend about Byzantine political formalism, a very real debate for the subjects of Byzantine rule. This concern about the limits of Byzantine rule was contemporary to an ontological topology that became particularly visible in the phenomenon of Byzantine *iconoclasm* [=the Byzantine war of the images] rather than in official lawmaking or political tactics. The Arabian factor has marked the iconicity of Byzantine rule and the rise of a renewed anxiety about the meaning of change while the Byzantine state was acquiring new potential in order to face the menace. Addressing the Western challenge required other processes at the level of governmentality[49] but at the end it only demonstrated the shortcomings of the Byzantine *economia* while the Ottoman aggressiveness became a new threat.

The above examples demonstrate that violence without cultural confrontation is not a real threat to an organized state-run community such as the Byzantine one that had successfully defeated the invasions of the "Barbarians". Thus, Gibbon's phrase about religion and barbarity as the cause of the decline of Roman supremacy is doubly lacking. Hegemony and science (*episteme*) constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions for a true resistance to enemy forces as this is evidenced by the Byzantine example, and both lead to a new image of political confrontation opposed to the realist's view about power. The hierarchy of power in this way is to be distinguished from society as simple mental construction and, in any case, what comes out triumphant is not political realism.

The conclusions drawn from the above image of Byzantine resistance are multiple: (1) the case of realism is simplistic or naïve; (2) the science of power is linked to the science of communal procedures; (3) realism essentially goes back to the question of action. The Byzantine *economia* thus emerges as the practice

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[47] See D. J. Constantellos, *Byzantine Philanthropy and Social Welfare* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1968), esp. 67–110.

[48] See Paul Lemerle, *Byzantine Humanism. the First Phase: Notes and Remarks on Education and Culture in Byzantium from Its Origins to the 10th Century* (Leiden: Brill, 1986).

[49] See M. Foucault, "Governmentality", in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, eds. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 87–104.

[50] See H. A. Ahrweiler, *L'idéologie politique de l'empire byzantin*, op. cit., 141-147, where the economia is seen as a progressive adaptation to new realities. C. Cupane sees the economia as a form of social compromise ("Appunti per uno studio dell'oikonomia ecclesiastica in Bizancio", JÖB 38 (1988): 53-73) while G. Dagron considers economia as a normalization of social conduct through moral principles and charisma ("La règle et l'exception. Analyse de la notion d'économie", *Religiöse Devianz, Untersuchungen zu sozialen, rechtlichen und theologischen Reaktionen auf religiöse Abweichung im westlichen und östlichen Mittelalter*, ed. D. Simon. Studien zur europäischen Rechtsgeschichte 48 (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1990), 1-18.

of creating the *topos* of universality.[50] The eschatological dialectics is more or less abandoned, and the natural law is maintained in practice, if not in theory.[51] The military factor is constantly praised, i.e. the military intervention, even within the limits of a sufficiently eschatological perspective.[52] Thus, by virtue of the conscious perception of the balance of power, Byzantine governmentality acquires a multiple status, defends the law of the Orthodox communities, does not abandon the right of intervention, is conservative and emancipatory if necessary. The Byzantine *economia* is thus an instrumental concept that can be considered realist, though not properly one[53], although the idea of a sole Christian nation, in the confrontation with the West, must be abandoned. The Byzantine relevant concepts become, following the emergence of Western supremacy, aural or thematic, and by no means imperial. Theory is distinguished from the instrumentality of political themes; the first is worldwide, while the second is economical. The abandonment of a general worldview takes place in the interest for rational choice or what can be considered as such. Byzantine governmentality is an image of political voluntarism in an expanded way; anthropology, solidarity, community, history are at its disposal. Political will does not differ from solidarity, which means the communal self-consciousness. This is the deepest reason for the alienation of the modern political sensitivity from the Byzantine government, i.e. the proper form of its adaptive structures. The rupture here, before being realistic, is rather paradigmatic. The peace of Byzantine governmentality is not normative, although it signifies the being together of people inside prolonged time spans. But this long duration of Byzantine rule cannot be reconciled with the modern ideas about the state and the people. The statement "nothing human is alien to me" (*nihil humanum a me alienum*) must give way to the institution of warfare, otherwise it would stand for a partial retreat of the Byzantine project. The Byzantine challenge is nothing less than the creation of a universal right opinion and of a common consciousness.

The question is that there actually can exist only relative and local *epistemae*, determined by epistemic limits, in this case those of the Byzantine studies field. The relevant ideas on Byzantine commonwealth life must be completely *ad hoc* and not refer to other governments or forms of rule. This is not a political point of view but a political science perspective in the sense of Hobbes, i.e. anti-Aristotelian, a kind of an a priori rupture with tradition following the breakthrough of modern

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[51] Basil the Great proposes in case of doubt the Patristic tradition as criterion, *PG*, 32, 669 B.
[52] The Bible though praises mildness and quietness of character; see Is., 68, 2-3.
[53] On the relation between *eusebeia* and *economia*, see Photius, *Bibliothèque*, IV, 227, ed. R. Henry (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1965), 112-113.
[54] See Paolo Rossi, *I filosofi e le machine, 1400-1700* (Milano: Feltrinelli, 2002); see also *The Dynamics of Aristotelian Natural Philosophy from Antiquity to the Seventeenth Century*, eds. C. Leijenhorst, Chr. Lüthy, Hans Thijssen (Leiden: Brill, 2002), esp. the article Edith Sylla, "Space and Spirit in the Transition from Aristotelian to Newtonian Science", ibid., 249-287. On Hobbes' dependence on the "resolutif-compositif" method of Paduan Aristotelianism, see François Rangeon, *Hobbes, état et droit*, préface de Victor Goldschmidt (Paris: Albin Michel, 1982), esp. 50-63.

mechanics[54] in the dawn of Modernism. Liberalism may criticize the social engineering, but not the idea of a rupture with the so-called traditional hegemony. The problem of European mechanization[55] is directly related to the evolution of law and history. The relationship between states, for example, is emerging as a matter of international mechanics and this can be seen as the sublimation of what the Hobbesian theory pushes down to the political unconscious. Mechanics is the other face of the traditional relationship of hegemony and violence as this latter is revealed to Hobbes (more scientifically than in Machiavelli) as well as to Max Weber's critique. This hegemony/violence balance is not situated far from Kantian cosmopolitan peace in the form of a direct critical project about peace and war. Thus, the critique of Byzantine formalism as political Byzantinism grows parallel to the development of modern epistemic fields.

However, the division of labor in *epistemae* does not dispute the question of the mentalities or behaviors in Aristotle's politics of tyranny[56], not completely unrelated to the Machiavellian project. The dangers of tyranny in Byzantium[57] initiated a reflection on political motivation and decision-making. The former was determined in a number of ways, including economical considerations, while the latter was not strange to the mundane behavior or, otherwise, the structure of imperial court. The rational choice should incorporate here the social pressures in play and the resulting states of mind and for that reason state theory in Byzantium took distances from the Neo-Platonic illumination model of the deployment of cosmos. This detachment signifies the awareness of the distance that separates the leadership behavior from the simple rational choice – if one considers Neo-Platonism as the then principal frame of rationality. Decision makers appeared to move away from the confusion of the psychological sphere with the cultural one and decision making was not totally subordinated to government or was not part of the constructivism that is considered peculiar to government and produces a unifying history (historicism). This extraordinary neutrality of decision making as dilemmatology seems to bring us back to the question of the philosophical-political *theoria*. The ensuing bad faith of rule makes it necessary for the political expert to behave as a secret counselor. One can thus return to a political realism that does not stand the test of historical duration - what was realistic before, is not realistic anymore because the time-span in which it was effective has just elapsed. Realism is thus extra-temporal inasmuch as it defines contemporaneity as its main dimension and may leave aside any attempt of conceptual valuation, maintaining only the ultimate criterion of political history, i.e. military power. Any other realistic concept

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[55] See Paolo Rossi, op. cit., esp. "Appendice terza. La nuova scienza e il simbolo di Prometeo", 177-188.
[56] *Politics*, V, xi, 1313 a 18 – 1315 b 10.
[57] See G. Arabatzis, "Nicephoros Blemmydes' Imperial Statue: Aristotelian Politics as Kingship Morality", *Mediaevistik* 27 (2014): 99-118.

is nothing but the fetishism of the military and military predominance is a fetish concept that itself departs from any other concept of government. However, the idea of governmentality[58] is not in position to upset the Realist.

If the idea of the ruler as decision maker fades away, the concept of state action, the balance of power, the legitimation of acts of power are equally dissolved. Here lies a real epistemological rupture: the confrontation (within the sublime of warfare) escapes the duality of the conflicting powers, the functionality of the cooperation is abandoned, while the regulating principle of hegemony and the eschatological idea re-emerge. The disappearance of the conceptual importance of war and cooperation leads in essence to the development of a theory of mediation and discontinuity and the philosophy of history dissolves in a vigilance about mediation. The other is not the warrior-enemy but its survival and strength as well as its weakness are simple regulatory ideas of *economical* government. The political thing is always the other's power and weakness, continuity and rupture. In this sense, the cultural policy of the Machiavellian ruler has no praxeological value. The ruler is the beneficiary of the hegemonic status in the midst of an unknown and forbidding territory. Strong hegemony in itself is the colonization of the other. This is the misery of the modernist rule, there is never a historical time while it is weakness that regulates the power failures[59] and the realistic logical coherence loses the ground under its feet; in structural terms, naïve realism cannot exceed the certainty of the signifier. Rational cooperation is not an alternative to power but what exceeds this last's struggle with error. Governmentality can now prevail over classical political science. The enemy/friend relation is constructivist and not realistic. The management of hostility renounces the policy of dialectical mastery in front of the impossible unification. The discovery of structured concepts, the reflection of the outside as attraction and oblivion[60], replaces the pervasive confrontation, while the war is excluded from this operation of replacement. The fundamental problem of Byzantium is the loss of its world, the departure from its stronghold position over the seas. The diplomatic relations with the West highlights the mutual interaction of profit and loss in status and the limits of European solidarity. With the Ottoman conquest, and with the loss of Byzantine statehood, a new cycle of hostility begins. Post-Byzantine Greece, later Modern Greece, are progressively inscribed in a modern adventure, that of liberation from the unjust yoke. Political realism is installed with the progressive loss of confidence to a savior West but with the need for a new idealism of emancipation. From the Byzantine

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[58] This implies that the notion is primarily a critical one since Foucault, in the first place, is primarily a constructivist; see M. Foucault, *Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings*, 1972-1977 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980) for an illustration of Foucauldian constructivism.

[59] See Nietzsche, who profoundly comprehended the reactional force of weakness, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, op. cit. I.13, III.9, 18.*Mediaevistik* 27 (2014): 99-118.

[60] See M. Foucault, "Maurice Blanchot: The Thought from Outside", in *Foucault/Blanchot* (New York: Zone Books, 1987), 7-58.

economia the subject of action moves toward the figures of the heroes of hegemony and science. Governmentality changes the political polarity and the new popular legitimacy requires new regulatory ideas. The fall of rule arrives through the post-political, the mobilization of new actors while hegemony now passes through the exercise of deviation, the successive failures before the not-yet ultimate success. The hegemonic exercise cannot be seen here otherwise than as a government of hegemonic deviation. There remains the state ratification of Greece that will take four centuries to prevail over the Ottoman rule.

Aftermath: Modernity's Eye of the Dragon

In the following lines, there will be a brief presentation of a symptomatic short story by the Greek author Yannis Kambysis that sums up the themes we have previously presented in relation to Byzantinism and modernity. Yannis Kambysis (1872-1901) was a writer of rupture that departed from Greek *ethographia*, i.e. the depiction of provincial morals and habitudes combined often with a patriotic or nostalgic flair. Kambysis was influenced first by socialism and then by Nietzscheism, and his writings carry the weight of cultural despair and perspectivism that Nietzsche inspired to many writers since the end of the 19*th* century. The short story that will be presented here is entitled "The eye of the dragon" and was first published in 1898.[61]

The story plot is as follows: in a small village of Peloponnesus, up on a mountain with a view to the sea that extends far to the Barbary Coast, two middle aged women married to two brothers are chatting in the tender night. They speak of a strange thing, pagan-demonic, occurring in a Christian setting: a fox after having killed some chicken and a rooster had sat on and brood the eggs. About to take their leave to sleep, one of the women notices faraway in the sea a light like a star that goes off slowly and beams again. The two women who witness the continuous on and off of the light are taken by terror like in front of a demonic power: the light was like the eye of the dragon of fairy tales. They wake their husbands who witness by themselves the event and soon the whole village observes the strange phenomenon with awe. A young man of the village, in love with the daughter of the priest, thinks of traveling to catch the dragon. A whole legend is formed in his mind about confined princesses and kings and he, like a savior knight, offering to liberate the noble daughter from the monstrous hold and if so, the king giving her to him as wife. The young man would ride the winter horse to take him to the glass tower where the princess is held captive. But as he is climbing down the mountain

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[61] Yannis Kambysis, "Το μάτι του δράκοντα", in *Διηγήματα* (Athens: Nefeli, 1989), 49-56. 1898 is precisely the year that Kambysis turned from socialism to Nietzscheanism; see Pantelis Voutouris, *Ιδέες της σκληρότητας και της καλοσύνης. Εθνικισμός, σοσιαλισμός, ρατσισμός (1897-1922)* (Athens: Kastaniotis, 2017), 167-169.

to his courageous mission, his mother, his aunt and other villagers find him and take him back to the village where the priest in front of the men and women is exorcising the distant dragon; in daylight, the beam of the eye of the dragon is gone. But the night, the light is still there and the next night and all the following ones and every night the villagers' fear diminishes and at the end, even the dreamy young man forgets about it. After a few months, a politician candidate passes by the village, sees the light and hears the story about the eye of the dragon. Soon enough he realizes that it is the lighthouse of Porto Longo, lately constructed. This explication makes no impression to the villagers since they are not concerned anymore and neither the lighthouse nor the eye of the dragon can trouble them, since the epoch of the dragon has completely evolved.

The short story summarizes the themes that we have discussed earlier, the pagan-Christian clash, the formation of the Christian conscience, the intrusion of modernism in the exemplifying person of the politician and its psephology as well as the persistence of an autonomous Christian orthodox time with its own rhythm that mollifies the returns of the pagan as well as the modernist intrusion.[62]

The modernist politics of intervention and acculturation in regions that have been locales of imagination - like Greece - has been captured intellectually by a multitude of different philosophies that perceive through a range of epistemic fields - geography, architecture, philology, morals and law - related to the genealogy of human sciences. The process of intervention signifies the simultaneous use of many jargons, especially as to the traditions of the localities where it takes place, as well as the relevant language of modernity. It is a narrative of the intervention itself but also the very real result of it, and perception here joins invention. The intervention generates or expands the cultural wars and the interventional iconology forms a "basic training" for this particular struggle. Thus, the iconography of intervention is a bio-power[63] that distributes and normalizes the martial art of intervention and also institutionalizes it. The interventional iconology illustrates the embrace of the priority of violent action. The iconology of intervention is, thus, an open window to the Polemology of intervention; it is the establishment of a cultural imaginary. "Just war" and "eternal enemy" are two dimensions of intervention, antithetical to the imperial ethics of responsibility. It is an imaginary ritual that dominates the formal as well as the extra-categorical features of this last.

The intervention generates anxiety and in this way is placed in a position of mental supervision by the use of abstract opponents like "modernity" and "tradition" and in likeness to virtual war games. Intervention uses abstract enemies to conceal the true enemy, which is none other than autonomy and its formal

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[62] The mention of a dragon is clearly a reference to foundational myths; see J. Trumpf, "Stadtgründung und Drachenkampf", *Hermes* 86 (1958): 129-157. Yet, here, in Kambysis's story, the disposition is clearly anti-foundationalist.
[63] See G. Arabatzis, "Φιλοξενία καὶ Εἰκονολογία", Ἕνεκεν 42 (2016): 258-272, thematic issue: «Η φιλοξενία».
[64] See supra, n. 5.

abstractions are assisted here by images. Byzantinism, then, in the Cavafyan sense[64], appears as the opposite to intervention, enforced by the romantic reminiscence of legendary battles. Like ancient wars, the new ones of the intervention are virtuous and fair. The intervention abolishes a kind of realism and creates a new one through the production of an idealizing picture of the conflict; it is nostalgic, and equally shaping for the native. Establishing a crucial distance here is a critical affair. The geopolitics of intervention *is* and *is not* at the same time, it is real *and* imaginary. Naming is equally a very critical process. The above-described structure persists even when the tensions produced because of it are forgotten and replaced by other ones. While the original similarity has been overcome by recent events, the overall structure of similarity remains and, in the form of psephology, evokes a commercial enterprise, part of a worldwide financial conduct (the politician candidate is touring the villages like a travelling salesman).

Similarity as structure produces also alterity, and more specifically, the iconographic one. Thus, the similarity of the intervention scenario is based on some imagist accuracy and narrative difference and this gives birth to a sense of uncanny. The whole narrative action is part of a cycle of intervention-production through some rather realistic representational entities, mainly "mythical hostile beings" of an essentialist texture, and thanks to the simulation that ultimately this is not a game of power and domination. Byzantium thus acquires a strange or, at least, uncanny aura. It is an entity, at the same time, abstract and viscerally alien. Sailing away from Byzantium generates feelings of relief as a form of disaffection from the uncanny and acquisition of control in a kind of modernist dream of grandeur.

Psephologists are defined as technocrats, but of what *tekhne*? One may guess that it is the art of affronting cultural counter-resistance.[65] The theory thus makes another shift towards the paradigm of war. The dominant strategy is to shape minds and hearts in order to achieve the confidence and cooperation of the people. It is a strategic populism in spite of all other dead ends in governmental rule. The reform of societies is achieved due to a theology of determination for social engineering. It is a form of expeditionary intelligence, a strategic development of civilization in two phases: (1) the cultural preparation of the relevant forces towards productive interaction with the natives; (2) the specialization in situations of crisis through a detailed knowledge of the theory of local societies and a mapping of them, a task of preparing for the hazardous, identifying key individuals and networks, using predictive methods for forecasting and computing, developing the sciences of the community and a calculating fantasy through relevant formulations. On the limits of *epistemae*, there is a preference for cultural knowledge and ethnographic

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[65] Byzantinism as counter-resistance can be diagnosed in C. Sokolis, *Αυτοκρατορία*, ed. G. Arabatzis (Athens: Roes, 1993).

understanding over philosophical anthropology. The religious, political, psychological studies, etc. are undesirable in a condition of travesty for any science with moral anxieties. The overall effort consists in the collection of anthropological information by non-specialists in philosophical anthropology. It is a modernist effort that pretends being un-interested in the production of the anthropological element of modernity, from the local up to the supranational level. The pertinent interest is focused on micro-anthropology, i.e. the gathering of basic information about the kinds and the characters of local groups; this is also Byzantinism.

The general idea is that domination over a region requires specialization in the localities. Concepts and traditions are not of interest to the cultural strategic designers who aim to improve the intercultural dynamics of intervention. Interventional anthropology goes beyond the limits of social or cultural anthropology as a science. The interventional groundwork replaces the oldest European travel literature. The science of research on the field is a science of modernity that links the analysis with the participation in decision-taking groups; modern science in this sense is a surface covering specialization. The content of this particular science is a martial anthropology evolving in the context of an academic-military *mathesis* (conquest of the field). The critical element is inversely proportional to the accounting capacities of this science, which is rather trans-scientific or rather an applied anthropology. Due to this, it is possible to normalize "acculturation" with an emphasis on ethnography. The knowledge of cultural mechanisms is always evolving on the limits of applied anthropology, like an analysis of dreams with utilitarian goals. The "anthropological field" is considered here in terms of normalization; the applied anthropology advances towards an integration of the cultural architecture of regional knowledge.

The normal interferes here with what is culturally important (values). The epistemic simulation of extra-normality avoids the real penetration into the anthropological field. The world of applied anthropology is an artificial world, a modernist artificial paradise. Normalization is achieved through the adoption of a "first person" perspective and the distribution of others in "places"; there is a steady obsession with classificatory methods of achieving normalization. The classificatory approach is a predictive, well-established culture and technology about human groups. The classificatory approach allows the creation of a second modeled world, a molding of others in classification tribes and the visualization of their future. From the geo-spatial coordinates we proceed to the mapping of the human groups from a martial power position.

The aesthetics of assimilation is a role-play, the identification of a set of actions in a particular geosphere through scenarios of visualized action. The prognosis of the future as applied anthropology produces social engineering and lessens empathy with others. This tendency is governed by a strong epistemology

of confidence in the ability to classify things; it is a hyper-positivism of the power techniques. The prognosis ultimately comes to exercise control and science meets magic inside a kind of positivist Machiavellianism.

It would be more appropriate to say that knowledge was the agent of activation of the power instances of the community, in order to protect itself from the possibility of change. If we take a closer look at this tradition of continued violent conflict with the concepts of different lifestyles and the establishment of different knowledge, we come to see that our contemporary understanding of the difference as an enriching feature is nothing but an attempt of amortization of the long-term tendency of the community to interpret otherness as a threat. The social reality of the culture of difference is per se a battleground.

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AUTENTICITY vs. AUTONOMY: AN AWKWARD RELATIONSHIP

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Abstract: *Most theories either identify autonomy and authenticity or else conceive the one as a core condition of the other. This paper concentrates towards a reconceptualization of authenticity aiming at a clearer distinction between it and autonomy. I argue that authenticity may be irrelevant or even conflicting to autonomy and each of these concepts needs to be understood in its own terms. I develop a novel conception of authenticity and in contrast to the vast majority of prominent thinkers, who base their conceptions of authenticity on rationality and reflection, I base mine on creativity. A contribution that I aim at making in the current debate is that I conceive autonomy and authenticity as wholly distinct moral concepts. I take autonomy to be part of the principle of the right, and authenticity to be part of the theory of the good. This distinction has not, to my knowledge, been previously recognized. I argue that authenticity is a descriptive concept, which ought to be promoted, whereas autonomy is a normative concept, which ought to be respected. I thus explore autonomy as a constraint in the pursuit of authenticity.*

Keywords: *authenticity, autonomy, creativity, Bioethics, rationality, reflection, creativity.*

Introduction

Most thinkers seem to conceive authenticity and autonomy as either more or less the same notion or at least as strongly interrelated. My aim, by contrast, is to pull them apart. I claim that authenticity should not be equated with autonomy and that the former should not operate as a core condition for the latter (as it often does in most theories). Autonomy and authenticity do occasionally come into conflict. One may restrict or constrain the other. Still, based on the conceptions developed here, one can autonomously choose to follow an inauthentic path and while we should respect one's autonomous decision, we should also often seek to promote the authentic one. This said, I consider autonomy to be part of the principle of right, whereas authenticity to be part of the theory of the good.

To understand the notion of autonomy we need to know both what an

autonomous choice is and what it is to respect an autonomous choice. Here I discuss autonomy as competence and I consider the main duty in order for persons to respect the autonomy of others to be the duty of non-paternalism. I then develop a novel conception of authenticity based on an original conception of creativity, in contrast with most prominent thinkers of authenticity who base their conceptions on rational and/or critical reflection.

Following from this, I discuss cases in which authenticity obtains without autonomy and vice versa. A central aim of my theory is to prove that it is possible for a person to be autonomous while inauthentic, as well as to be authentic while non-autonomous. Authenticity may be irrelevant or even in conflict with autonomy and each concept needs to be understood in its own terms. I conceive autonomy and authenticity as embedded in two different normative principles. Autonomy is a moral concept, which relates to what is morally right and is used for regulating permissible and impermissible actions, while authenticity is an ethical concept that picks out part of what is good. I explore autonomy as a constraint in the pursuit of authenticity, while considering some case studies in bioethics. My conclusion entail that in the majority of cases we should respect the autonomous decision even if it goes against the authentic one.

My account, however, also suggests how we should treat people who may not be competent for autonomy, but may be capable of authenticity. I examine, therefore, the notion of authenticity in cases of non-autonomous persons. Despite the fact that in terms of regulation we should mainly respect the autonomous over the authentic attitudes of a person, I am of the opinion that an ideal society would be one in which the autonomous attitudes would be identical to the authentic ones. Thus, we should aim at developing social structures that promote and cultivate authenticity; since for a human life to flourish, it needs to be to some extent authentic.

Autonomy-as-Competence and Authenticity-as-Creativity

By exploring prominent conceptions of authenticity and autonomy, and more precisely the relation that contemporary thinkers propose between the two, one may divide the dominant contemporary theories into three categories: firstly, conceptions that conceive authenticity as both necessary and sufficient for autonomy; secondly, conceptions that conceive authenticity as necessary but insufficient for autonomy; thirdly, conceptions that conceive authenticity as neither necessary nor sufficient for autonomy. I find that Harry Frankfurt's (1988, 1999) and John Christman's (2009) accounts belong to the first category, that Gerald Dworkin's (1988) and Alfred Mele's (1995) accounts belong to the second category,

and that James Stacie Taylor's (2009) account belongs to the third category. Given this, most scholars who construct autonomy conceptions seem to take for granted that authenticity is, if not autonomy itself, at least a core condition of autonomy. I claim that this is the main source of several critical misunderstandings in regard to these two notions. Furthermore, I am of the opinion that even though Frankfurt's and Dworkin's models are widely considered as nearly identical because of their shared hierarchical nature, they are importantly distinct in view of the different ways in which they relate authenticity to autonomy, and that even though Christman seems to distinguish authenticity from competence, he ultimately does not. I maintain that Frankfurt's and Christman's theories of autonomy are best understood simply as theories of autonomy and not of authenticity. Moreover, I treat the theories of Dworkin, Mele, and Taylor as theories of autonomy that misuse the nature and role of authenticity in regard to autonomy.

To begin with, what we need to know is on the one hand what an autonomous choice is and on the other hand, what it is to respect an autonomous choice. As regards the first of these, I construe autonomy as a kind of competence and I explore the competence conditions of several prominent accounts. As regards the second, I take that the main duty in order for persons to respect the autonomy of others is the duty of non-paternalism. The roots of non-paternalism lie in Kant's formula of the end in itself (FEI) (Kant, 1998 [1785]: 41 [4:429]) and Mill's harm principle (Mill, 1991 [1859]): 13-4), based on which I claim that autonomy is a moral concept, which should be used for regulating permissible and impermissible actions and should be respected. On the other hand, having Mill's ideas in regard to individuality as one of my starting points, I argue that authenticity is an ethical concept, which picks out part of the good that should be promoted.

The notion of autonomy-as-competence, that will be referred to here can be synopsised in the idea of a person having the capacity for rational self-reflection, while being free from any external or internal interference that may constrain or bypass this capacity. It should be noted that the capacity for rational self-reflection and the idea of non-interference is conceived in the traditional account of autonomy as rational self-control, which was first introduced by ancient Greek philosophers, re-approached and reinforced by Mill, and reflected, while enriched, in most contemporary conceptions. Thus, the conception of autonomy referred to here is negative, historical/developmental, externalist, individualist, intellectualist, procedural and content-neutral.

Following from this, the contemporary general principle for respecting autonomous choices and actions is negative and can be formulated, in the words of Beauchamp and Childress, as follows: "Autonomous actions are not to be subjected to controlling constraints by others." (Beauchamp and Childress, 1979:

72) However, especially in bioethics, the principle of respecting autonomy also entails a number of positive requirements. For instance, in regard to the relationship between a doctor and a patient, there exists an obligation of the doctor to disclose certain information, ensure clear understanding and foster voluntary decision-making, in order for the autonomy of the patient to be respected. Hence, part of respecting an agent's autonomy is letting the agent decide and act voluntarily.[1] Respecting autonomous attitudes and actions involves not subjecting them to controlling constraints and helping to ensure that they are outcomes of informed and voluntary decision-making based on clear understanding.

The interference with one's autonomy cannot be legitimate or permissible, unless the autonomy of others is at stake. It is my view that hard paternalism should not be allowed in any case. On the other hand, soft paternalism may be allowed in some cases—when the competency for autonomy does not exist—, but it always needs to be highly informed by considerations of authenticity as a component of the good—since the theory of the good includes not simply living a healthier and wealthier life, but also authenticity as one of the goods. When we exercise soft paternalism, we should also take into serious consideration authenticity by taking into account how one could be better or worse off with or without following one's authentic attitudes. Besides, it also depends on how much distress or joy each one may take from creative creation and authenticity. In the following section, I explore what it means for one to be competent for autonomy but not for authenticity and vice versa; and in which cases the principle of non-paternalism is valid in regard to persons who are competent for both, but the one comes into conflict with the other.

It is my view that in order for a person to be authentic in respect to an attitude not only rationality and good reasons but also activity, wholeheartedness, mere reflection and unreflective reasons cannot operate as either necessary or sufficient conditions. Harry Frankfurt's (1988, 1999) and Gerald Dworkin's (1988) theories experience critical flaws, since they do not take into account the personal history and development of the individual as well as there is no way of acknowledging and controlling the source of second order desires of the agent. Since manipulation in regard to higher-order desires may take place, one can meet any of the aforementioned conditions, while at the same time being inauthentic in respect to an attitude. Given this, it has been argued that those conditions may not be sufficient for authenticity but that they still are certainly necessary. In contrast to the majority of the prominent autonomy and authenticity scholars, I believe that

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[1] Voluntariness has often been equated with autonomy in the sense that many theorists, for instance Joel Feinberg (1986: 48), have referred to it as the presence of adequate knowledge, absence of psychological compulsion, and the absence of external constraints. Beauchamp and Childress, in order to avoid this equation, restrict voluntariness in claiming that: "a person acts voluntarily to the degree he or she wills the action without being under the control of another agent's influence" (Beauchamp and Childress, 1979: 107) and they also add that it can be affected by physical and psychological conditions, for instance compulsion and drug addiction.

they are not necessary either.

On the other hand, theories which incorporate the personal history of the agent, like the ones developed by Alfred Mele (1995), John Christman (2009) and Charles Taylor (1989, 1991), are restricted to conditions founded solely on rationality, rendering them weak, inadequate and unrealistic. Nevertheless, the historical aspect is required for an adequate conception of authenticity and it should be retained, but without the necessity of the rational or any other kind of reflection, since reflection in any form cannot guarantee authenticity.[2] This said, in short, the historical condition required for authenticity that I propose is based on a novel conception of creativity that I have developed and it is externalist, anti-intellectualist, not necessarily rationalist and content-neutral. In short, my account of creativity can by synopsized in the following conditions based on which a *creative process* is:

    i)   a conscious or unconscious process,
    ii)   which tends to result in novel ideas that are new in regard to both the person and the person's social environment, i.e. not an outcome of manipulative influence, and that manifest an exploration and/or transformation of a body of knowledge
    iii)   while the person is sensitive in regard to the value of its outcome.[3]

More precisely, the conception of authenticity that I propose entails one condition, which requires the non-bypassing of the creative processes of the person; based on the aforementioned definition of a creative process. Thus, when it comes to understanding authenticity as creativity the question of an attitude's authenticity is a question of that attitude's history. This condition is both necessary and sufficient for *authenticity* and it can be phrased as such:

A person is authentic in respect to an attitude if this attitude either arises from a creative process or arises directly from a prior authentic attitude of the person.

Following from this, an account of inauthenticity should be formulated too. I argue that:

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[2] Higher-order endorsement theories and externalist historical theories are based on our reflective thoughts in regard to our attitudes, they are ways through which we may come to know whether they are authentic or not. In my opinion, the way either to create or to acknowledge authenticity is through the experience of it and not through the reflection on it. Our authentic attitudes exist before our thoughts about them begin to exist. The authentic attitude is an attitude that, when we create it and we experience it, overwhelms, enchants or enraptures us; we know that it is there in the same way we know that we are not yet dead and not in the way we know that one plus one equals two.

[3] The limited length of this essay does not allow me to further elaborate on the necessary and sufficient conditions for a creative process to obtain, as I have done elsewhere.

A person is inauthentic in respect to an attitude if either one was caused to have an attitude by another person in a way that bypassed one's creative processes or this attitude aroused from a prior inauthentic attitude.

Attitudes may not only be either authentic or inauthentic, but they may also be non-authentic. Besides, it seems odd to refer to a person as being inauthentic while she is not even able yet to formulate authentic attitudes. For example, a child may not be considered authentic since she may have not yet created any authentic attitudes, but this does not mean that she is inauthentic. She is simply non-authentic. The same may stand for persons with severe mental illnesses, e.g. bipolar disorders. Not being authentic does not necessarily mean that they are inauthentic, but rather non-authentic, since no authentic attitudes may exist in them or they may not be able to further formulate any. Following from this, everything that is not authentic or inauthentic is non-authentic. In this sense, the distinction between an attitude being authentic and inauthentic depends on whether creativity is involved or not and the distinction between an attitude being inauthentic and non-authentic depends on whether it was caused by another person or caused by nature. The addition of the idea of non-authenticity seems crucial in the sense that previous conceptions of thinkers categorized certain persons or attitudes as inauthentic, whereas it is my view that in reality they were non-authentic.

Based on the conditions outlined, an attitude can be authentic either if it is an outcome of the person's creative processes or if it is an outcome of previous authentic attitudes of this person. Given the latter, not all attitudes need to be creative in order to be authentic. A number of attitudes can be authentic if they simply are by-products of other authentic attitudes, while however during their formulation the person's capacity for creativity is not bypassed in any way. Hence, creativity is sufficient, although not always necessary, for authenticity. But what exactly does it mean for an attitude to arise directly from a prior authentic attitude? Authentic love is unique and distinct, there exist so many authentic emotions of love as not only the persons that have created such emotions of love but also the number of times that each person has authentically fallen in love.[4] Depending on the distinctiveness and uniqueness there exists a certain spectrum of emotions from an imitative inauthentic emotion of love to a completely genuine and creative one. However, a desire that is a by-product of an authentic emotion of love may not be creative, but only a simple basic desire, e.g. to give a hug to the beloved one. This desire is still authentic, since it is a direct product of an authentic attitude, i.e. the love of this person for another person, and the capacity for creativity of this person is not bypassed.

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[4] Think of Anna Karenina's words in the homonym book by Tolstoy, "'I think,' said Anna, playing with the glove she had taken off, 'I think... if so many men, so many minds, certainly so many hearts, so many kinds of love.'" Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot, *Discours sur l'histoire universelle*, Œuvres II (Osnabrück: Otto Zeller, 1966), 628.

I have argued that the aspects of creativity that lead to authenticity are novelty and the non-bypassing of one's creative processes by other individuals or social structures. Given this, an attitude or creation may be creative and authentic of a person, even though it may not express this person. In other words, for an attitude or a creation to be creative and in extension authentic it is neither necessary nor sufficient to be an outcome of self-expression of the person. Consider the random composition of avant-garde music through mathematical formulas. Despite the fact of whether the composer expresses his or her self through it, if this musical outcome is directed and amended towards certain creative outcomes, e.g. a number of compositions by Karlheinz Stockhausen and Iannis Xenakis, it can be considered authentic.

Autonomy without Authenticity and vice versa

Let us now concentrate on cases in which autonomy exists without authenticity or in which autonomy restricts authenticity. It seems that most adult people, who in general are competent for autonomy but may be inauthentic, fit this category. We could think of a fashion victim who always follows other people's trends. One may autonomously, after rational deliberation and self-reflection, decide that one wants to blindly follow the dominant latest trends in fashion. This person may be autonomous, but she is not in any sense creative—a fact that renders her inauthentic. She is competent to sign legal papers and make crucial choices in regard to her life, and in terms of these her autonomy is respected, but in terms of owning and being authentic with respect to her attitudes and actions her life goes very badly.

Consider also another case in which a writer has the capacity for authenticity but autonomously decides to restrict it. This writer may have a truly creative idea, and in this sense one that is deeply authentic, to write a uniquely original novel. However, while she is writing it, she autonomously decides to avoid telling what she had intended to by giving all the details in the creative way she desired. She decides to change its form and content resulting in a diminution of her creativity because she does not want to hurt her family and friends to whom she refers throughout the novel. In this sense, the writer autonomously decides to repress her authenticity.

Let us now consider a case in which authenticity obtains without autonomy. Consider the case of Vincent van Gogh. Based on the autonomy conceptions discussed, he probably could not have been competent in terms of being able to give a valid consent to a legal paper. More generally, in many cases mental illness may bypass a person's capacity for reasoning and reflection. However, that does not mean that mental illness necessarily also bypasses the person's capacity for creativity. Hence, even though van Gogh life was going badly in various ways regarding his everyday moments, there was one way in which it went extremely well: he was able

to be highly creative and thus competent for authenticity.

Moreover, whereas a person's attitude may be externally generated and still be autonomous, it cannot be externally generated and still be authentic. In other words, a person after rational self-reflection may autonomously incorporate, adopt and then follow an externally generated attitude. Nevertheless, this person cannot be authentic with respect to this attitude since the condition for creativity is not met and this attitude is entirely externally generated, while also it cannot be a direct by-product of a previous authentic attitude of this person either. Whereas externally generated attitudes that have been endorsed by the agent and have been retained in their primary form may be autonomous, they can never be authentic.

Respect towards autonomy derives from our fundamental duty to not only not harm others—as philosophers from Mill (1991 [1859]) to Ross (1930: 21-22) have pointed out—, but also to not intervene in their lives. These two duties are basic moral requirements, which cannot be reduced to a more fundamental principle. What we morally ought to do is what is morally preferable and respecting the autonomy of a person is a duty. I consider, therefore, autonomy to be a fundamental right.[5] If authenticity, nevertheless, is part of what constitutes the good and autonomy is part of what constitutes the right, the crucial unavoidable question is which of the two are we to prioritize over the other?

I do not argue that autonomy is the only right, but that it is a very important duty among others; and I do not claim that authenticity is the only good, but that it is an important aspect of the good.Based on cases of everydayness and especially ones relevant to bioethics, while also following the liberal tradition, the duty to promote the good seems to come after the duty to avoid harm and interference, meaning that we should primarily respect the autonomy of persons. Beside this, however, what we should aim at in general is to autonomously [through following what is right] desire to be also authentic [aiming at what is good].

Nonetheless, what should happen when a person is not competent for autonomy but is capable of authenticity? Turning, for instance, to Bioethics, the answer is that the doctor should also take into serious consideration the person's authentic attitudes, insofar as they are knowable, despite the fact that the person may be non-autonomous. In this way, the account proposed here suggests how to help and to treat people who are not competent for autonomy. Based on the conceptions of autonomy and authenticity that I have proposed, irrational persons may not be competent for autonomy, but can nevertheless be authentic. As mentioned, authenticity is part of the good and thus one's best interests always

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[5] According to the deontological approach, an action is justified on the basis of a quality or characteristic of the act itself, regardless of its consequences. For instance, the core moral rule with respect to autonomy is the following: It is wrong to intervene manipulatively to the decision or an attitude of another person.

include an interest in authenticity. That is, following an authentic life is part of the good and it promotes by itself one's best interests. Besides, it is through authenticity that each of us can develop his or her full potentiality. Depriving irrational persons of the opportunity to lead their lives authentically equals with depriving them of the opportunity to develop their full potentiality. Doctors should respect what is better for their patients and aim at securing their best interests; they should, therefore, promote one's authentic attitudes. However, they should also aim at promoting their patients' best interests insofar as this is consistent with their patients' autonomy.

Authenticity may make aspects of one's life better or it may make it worse. Whichever way, the important fact is that the life that follows after an authentic choice is one's own creation and thus overall is good for one nevertheless. Whether the authentic choices of a person lead to a better condition or to a worse may be of a lower importance in comparison to the fact that these choices were one's own. The ability of one to follow the life plan one wants constitutes by itself a definition of well-being. In this sense, authenticity may operate as an ethical ideal[6], insofar as it provides the means to significantly improve the quality of one's life and provide meaning to it. In regard to persons that are not able to formulate autonomous decisions but are able to formulate authentic ones, the latter need to be cultivated and promoted, in accordance of course with their other interests, and as long as their own authenticity and the authenticity and/or autonomy of other persons are not diminished.

If, however, certain authentic attitudes seem to compromise the ability of the person to continue being authentic, i.e. the capacity for creativity, then the doctors should interfere with her authenticity. For instance, consider a mentally ill girl who creatively formulated an authentic desire to compose and play an extremely obscure and odd melody. The doctors constantly inform her and her family that playing and listening to this melody worsen her situation. However, this melody does not harm anybody else, contrariwise to some it may even be pleasurable. This girl is not competent to decide autonomously whether she wants to be restricted from playing

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[6] Authenticity's ethical reflection, which "focused on the relation between acting ethically and 'being oneself'" and was "inaugurated by Rousseau and enriched by the contributions of, among others, Herder, Schiller, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Heidegger, is the seed-bed where the contemporary normative notion of authenticity was shaped." (Ferrara, 1998: 8) Existentialist ethics was developed around the notions of disalienation and authenticity. Besides, Sartre's (1992 [1943]) concept of authenticity is often referred to as the sole existentialist "virtue", although it is criticized as expressing more a style than content, as his predecessor, Heidegger (1962 [1927]), is as well, meaning that their theories focus more on how one may live and not what one may do. For the existentialists, we live in a society of oppression, which is primary and personal, and exploitation, which is structural and impersonal; within an otherwise absurd universe, the acquisition of authenticity makes life meaningful. It is precisely this insistence on being authentic which involves the aspect of value in their thought. Taylor (1991) implies that existentialists were criticised unfairly as having an aesthetic approach on authenticity. Since for them it is authenticity that provides all the necessary means for one to significantly improve one's life, it cannot but be an ethical ideal.

this melody, but she is competent to formulate authentic attitudes. She authentically decides, as a by-product of her prior authentic attitude, to continue playing the melody no matter what. The pleasure and peace she finds in it help her, at least in her view, more than any other treatment. Doctors should also take into account her authenticity, since it is part of the good and thus one's best interests always include an interest in authenticity. They should thus consider the possibility of letting her play the melody, despite the fact that doing so might be against her other interests, since her authentic desire to do so may outweigh them. Besides, nothing ensures us that doctors have always the ability to know what the best interests and the good reasons of each person are in order to make a decision on behalf her. As Anderson writes, "Judges, doctors, and psychiatrists have neither privileged access to good reasons nor any guaranteed ability to recognize good reasons. The possibility that one is operating under conditions that are not actually those of procedural independence applies symmetrically to the person whose autonomy is in question and those who are trying to assess her autonomy." (Anderson, 2008: 21)

The conception proposed here does not suggest that some moral outlooks are superior to others, i.e. it is not concerned with either values or meta-values. Social approvals and conformities are irrelevant to its presence and essence. If, however, one's creativity is directed towards immoral attitudes and works creating a life awfully unethical, then we could evaluate it based on certain ethical grounds, but not on grounds of whether is authentic or not. If we are to deprive one of the opportunity to live one's own life created in the way one desires, then this can be done only on the basis of principles like the harm principle and its derivatives, and not on the widely accepted misconception that since one cannot be autonomous, one cannot be authentic either.

Conclusion

A principal aim of this paper has been to renew our understanding of authenticity and its relation to autonomy. As argued, most thinkers either identify authenticity with autonomy or else take the one to be a core condition of the other. My intention, by contrast, has been to distinguish the two notions in regard to their very essence, function and role in our political and moral thought. While liberating authenticity from the necessity of reflective rationality and of a substantial theory of the self, as well as illuminating its role as a crucial aspect of the theory of the good, I have proposed a novel conception of it based on *creativity*. If my arguments have succeeded, I hope that they have given us a better comprehension of the nature of creativity, authenticity, and autonomy, as well as their interrelation in our everyday life.

By recognizing the above, our self-understanding, hopefully, becomes more illuminated constituting us more aware of the weight each attitude and each decision about our attitudes has. Understanding that an attitude being authentic

is different from an attitude being autonomous allows us to acknowledge the difference between creating and developing our attitudes and works authentically, i.e. creatively, and doing so autonomously, i.e. rationally. Nevertheless, an ideal life in an ideal society would be one in which the autonomous attitudes were identified with the authentic ones. Therefore, while respecting autonomy, we should primarily aim at developing social structures that promote and cultivate authenticity, since a human life worth living is one that is at least to some extent authentic—e. e. cumming's following verses shed some light on the reasons why: "To be nobody-but-yourself — in a world which is doing its best, night and day, to make you everybody else — means to fight the hardest battle which any human being can fight; and never stop fighting…Does this sound dismal? It isn't. It's the most wonderful life on earth. Or so I feel" (e. e. cummings, 1958: 13).

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HELD'S CONCEPTUALIZATION OF GLOBALIZATION PROCESS

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Abstract: *Researching the interpretations of globalization is multi layered and therefore it is hard to cover all the areas of its application, as well as its manifestations. Multidimensional character of definition of globalization is also difficult because it is not a state but a process, so the difficulties of its conceptualization are associated with thematic and rational approach to this process. After analyzing the most common definitions of globalization, and with special attention given to Held's approach and classification, the author of this paper concludes that globalization is essentially connected with de-territorialisation and re-territorialisation of the socio-economic, political and cultural boundaries. Globalization, in other words, compresses time and space, which in turn increases interpersonal relationships and accelerates communication among people. Last but not least, globalization, the author asserts, is a complex, ambivalent and controversial process, which increases interdependence and deepens social relations between different factors in almost all aspects of the present-day life.*

Keywords: *globalization, understanding, de-territorialisation, re-territorialisation, space, time, Held, hyperglobalists, sceptics, transformationalists.*

Although the term globalization dates further back, it has been introduced into the wider use in the 1960s, while the onset of the true debate about it is marked in the late 1980s and early 1990s.[1] Despite the large body of literature about globalization that has been published over the course of the last two decades, there is still not a single convincing theory of globalization. Even more, there are no systematic analyses of its major characteristics present today. The hardship lies not only in the different approaches to one such analysis, but in the different classifications of those approaches. Also, relatively frequent, undifferentiated use of the term[2] is problematic since the "self-evidence" of a term does not suffice for its philosophical meaning. Moreover, globalization is in danger to become, if it has not already become, a handy phrase of our times - an omnipotent word that covers a wide span of activities from global market to internet[3], while offering a little insight into contemporary issues.

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[1] The term, according to Giddens, has come out of nowhere only to become a key topic in economic, cultural and political discussions today.

[2] It suffices to say that in July 2017 there were about 48 million web sites on globalization, only in English!

[3] Or, as Clark says, globalization is everything and anything from Internet to hamburgers. I. Clark, *Globalization and International Relations Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 35.

Due to a variety of criteria used to classify approaches to globalization and a multitude of questions that are thereby revealed, it is hard to provide even an incomplete record of definitions and standpoints on globalization. Even if such a task were possible, that certainly would not be the intent of this author to layout a list of definitions. Mere compiling of such information would be useless unless supported by a thorough analysis of its sources and the context of recorded uses. For a philosopher, in other words, it is far more important to focus on definitions and interpretations of globalization as classified according to an appropriate set of standards.

Further on, I will first note a few definitions given by well-known theorists of globalization, and then I will show some of its most relevant classifications. In order to keep the research undissolved into numerous elaborations of the globalization itself, most attention will be devoted to D. Held's classification. I will not debate whether or not the noted classifications are thorough and consistent, and where is the subtle, yet clear, line between theory of globalization and the (more or less) comprehensive standpoints about it, as well as theoretical generalizations.

Here are some leading definitions of the concept of globalization:

- *The inexorable integration of markets, nation-states, and technologies to a degree never witnessed before-in a way that is enabling individuals, corporations and nation-states to reach around the world farther, faster, deeper and cheaper than ever before ... the spread of free-market capitalism to virtually every country in the world.*[4]

- *The integration of the world economy.*[5]

- *Integration on the basis of a project pursuing market rule on a global scale.*[6]

- *Deterritorialization – or ... growth of supraterritorial relations between people.*[7]

- *It is nothing but "recolonization" in a new garb.*[8]

- *The compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole... concrete global interdependence and consciousness of the global whole in the twentieth century.*[9]

- *A social process in which the constraints of geography on social and cultural arrangements recede and in which people become increasingly aware that they are receding.*[10]

- *The intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa.*[11]

- *The historical transformation constituted by the sum of particular forms and instances of*

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[4] T. L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1999), 7-8.
[5] R. Gilpin, *Global Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 364.
[6] P. McMichael, *Development and Social Change* (Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press, 2000), xxiii, 149.
[7] A. J. Scholte, *Globalization: A Critical Introduction* (Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave, 2000), 46.
[8] J. Neeraj, *Globalisation or Recolonisation* (Pune: Elgar, 2001), 6-7.
[9] R. Robertson, *Globalization* (London: Sage, 1992), 8.
[10] M. Waters, *Globalization* (London: Routledge, 1995), 3.
[11] A. Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 64.

... [m]aking or being made global (i) by the active dissemination of practices, values, technology and other human products throughout the globe (ii) when global practices and so on exercise an increasing influence over people's lives (iii) when the globe serves as a focus for, or a premise in shaping, human activities.[12]

- A process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organisation of social relations and transactions, expressed in transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction and power.[13]

Many authors write about fervent theoretical and ideological discussions and debates of rivalling concepts about the globalization itself, its understanding and character. Some see the globalization as an embodiment of an ironclad historical inevitability, for others it is only a large myth. Some assert that globalization is an objective and spontaneous planetary process, while their opponents view it exclusively as scheme[14] for assuring Western domination - that is Americanization of the world. Further, there are authors who believe that the globalization is a new and unique phenomenon in the history of the human kind, and there are those who see it as a process that has come to an end in the 20th century as capitalism[15] spread around the whole planet. Some argue that globalization means the end of nation states, whereas others insist that in the increasingly integrated world the role of nation states will become even more important. On the one hand we hear that cultural homogenization is an inevitable outcome of globalization, on the other, that the interactions caused by the globalization will create a new cultural diversity. While for one line of thought it signifies the integration of the world, for others it inevitably causes fragmentation, deepening of the social gap between worlds and ultimately a clash of civilizations. If the winners in the globalization see exclusively a civilization progress and added benefits for the humanity, for losers it is but a destructive force.

When speaking about different elements of globalization, U. Beck[16] finds two major approaches to its analysis. One encompasses authors such as I. M. Wallernstain, J. N. Rosenau, R. Gilpin, Held, R. Robertson and A. Apadurai who insists that there is one central logic of globalization; another consists of authors that suggest and use a set of interdependent elements as necessary to explain

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[12] M. Albrow, *The Global Age* (Cambridge: Polity, 1996), 88.
[13] D. Held, A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt and J. Perraton, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture* (Stanford: Polity Press, 1999), 16.
[14] Even those who do agree that globalization is a project, disagree on other points. Some hold that globalization is just a myth – a form without a cognitive content – while others believe that it is an ideological project with a real content supported by a number of influential groups.
[15] Kellner, following Horkheimer, asserts that it is possible to say that whoever speaks of capitalism must speak of globalization, and that it is not possible to theorize globalization without talking about the re-structuring of capitalism. D. Kellner, "Theorizing Globalization", *Sociological Theory* 20, no. 3 (2002): 289. For more details see: Ž. Delić, Ž. Kaluđerović, A. Nuhanović, „Kritika globaliziranog (neo)liberalnog kapitalizma i njegovih finansijskih institucija", *Pregled* LV (2014): 1-15.
[16] This importance of the proper use of terms is well shown in Beck, who distinguishes between the terms "globalism" on the one side, and "globality" and "globalization" on the other. U. Beck, *Was ist Globalisierung?* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1998).

globalization. It would be difficult even to name all of these authors both due to constant changes in their positions and due to emphasizing particular elements of globalization.

In that respect Beck made himself well known by highlighting the idea of risk in the context of the ecological dimension of globalization. Further, Robertson is one of the first authors to emphasize cultural aspects of globalization. M. Shaw points out war as the cause of globalization. Held, Rozenau and Gilpin, each in their own way, focus on the political sphere, while S. Strange and K. Omae, inter alia, pointed out the technological aspect of globalization. Besides stressing the importance of communicational technology, Apadurai speaks mostly about the influence of migration on the process of globalization. L. Sklair underscores capitalism, while G. Soros emphasizes the role of financial markets. D. Harvey speaks of the geographical element, and S. Sassen of the urban one.[17]

One of the most significant authors who have contributed to a more comprehensive understanding of globalization is David Held, Master of University College, Durham and Professor of Politics and International Relations at Durham University.[18] I have already mentioned his definition of globalization and now I will add that globalization, according to Held, is characterized by four types of changes. Firstly, globalization encompasses the expansion of social, economic, and political activities beyond the boundaries of states, regions and continents. Secondly, it is characterized by the strengthening or increased significance of inter-connectedness and the flow of trade, goods, capital, as well as culture and people. Thirdly, globalization may correlate with the acceleration of global processes and interactions. Lastly, increased expanding, strengthening and accelerating of global interactions may correlate with their increasing influence upon fluidity of the boundaries between local and global events. To put it more simply, according to Held, globalization can be understood as extending, intensifying, accelerating and increasing the importance and influence of inter-connectedness among people around the world.[19]

Held's classification of the theorists on globalization as *hyperglobalists*, *sceptics* and *transformationalists* is certainly the most famous one, although it is just one of various concepts, theories or schools of thought. Since globalization is not a neutral term, each of these three schools of thought offers a different view of the globalization, i.e. it tries to understand and explain this phenomenon in a diversified manner. In addition to being different from each other, each of the afore

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[17] For more details see: V. Vuletić, „Rivalski pristupi u izučavanju globalizacije", in *Aspekti globalizacije*, eds. V. Pavićević, V. Petrović, I. Pantelić, M. Sitarski, G. Milovanović (Dosije – Beograd: BOŠ, 2003), 57.

[18] According to Held there are four types of globalization: thick globalization, diffused globalization, expansive globalization and thin globalization. D. Held, A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt and J. Perraton, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture* (Stanford: Polity Press, 1999), 211-222.

[19] For the opposing view see B. Michael, "Theorising the Politics of Globalisation: A Critique of Held et al.´s 'Transformationalism'", http://www.fatih.edu.tr/~jesr/Globalisation.pdf. Michael finds this classification to be "inadequate".

mentioned perspectives also reflects a set of general arguments on globalization that deal with its conceptualization, its *novum* role in history, its implications on the power and position of states, its potential for democratization, as well as its historical achievements and intentions.

According to hyperglobalists, globalization mostly means entering the new era characterized by global capitalism, global governance and global citizenship. The difference between the present and past is the existence of global economy which transcends and unites the biggest economic regions in the world.[20] Through various descriptions of "manic capitalism", "turbo capitalism" and "supra territorial capitalism", these (hyper)globalists intend to understand the qualitative change in the spatial organization and dynamics within the realm of this new global capitalism. They see strategic economic activities as immanently removed from boundaries of nation-states. Today, it is the capital in the hands of largest world's corporations and financial institutions that dictates the organization, location and distribution of economic power and goods - rather than the states.

Within the ranks of hyperglobalists there is significant normative disagreement between neoliberals who value the triumph of individualism and free market, and radical activists - neomarxists - for whom globalization represents the victory of cruel and exploitative global capitalism. Despite divergent ideological views, all hyperglobalists agree that the globalization is primarily an economic phenomenon, that world economy is more and more integrated, and that the need for global capital imposes appropriate economic discipline which, in turn, drives most of the governments to practice politics less as "the art of the possible", but rather as "appropriate economic governance".

Hyperglobalists, according to Held, admit that globalization continually deepens the gap between the losers[21] and winners in the new economy. However, according to the ambitious position of neoliberals, this does not necessarily mean that one side must lose a lot or even everything for the other side to gain as much. Some parts of states may lose in the game of globalization, but each of these states has competitive advantages which will come into the play sooner or later in the field of open and fair competition in the global market. It appears that neoliberals do not want to acknowledge that global capitalism not only creates, but even purposely works on strengthening the structural forms of inequality, both within and between nation-states. The Neoliberal idea of the demolition of the social state and the drastic narrowing of the economic power inevitably leads to malignant social consequences. M. Pečujlić adds: "Contrary to social capitalism, the project of "welfare state" which simultaneously increases the wealth and distributes the welfare to all wider social strata, neoliberal formula hastens the

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[20] K. Ohmae, *The End of the Nation State* (New York: Free Press, 1995).
[21] Some authors view terrorism as a manifestation of the dark side of globalization, or as a radical expression of the losers in globalization - so called globophobia.

accumulation of wealth for a few, while increasing social inequality and leads to globalization of poverty… If we compare two historic periods: from 1960-1980 and 1980-2000, corresponding to the rule of two different economic models, all indicators of economic progress point in the same direction - the last two decades are characterized with slow, or no progress. This increasing social discrepancy does not exist only between the First and the Third world, but the ripples of the 'new poverty' are felt within wealthy societies as well. 'Black holes of globalization', disenfranchised people and territories are found in every big city of the First world: ghettos in the U.S.' communities of Northern Africans in France, and Japanese Zoseba areas. In these areas we find millions of homeless people, great deal of prostitution, criminal and drugs, sick and illiterate (M. Castells, p. 168)".[22]

In economies without country borders the role of national governments is reduced to a little more than the transmission of global capital, or they just serve as intermediary institutions between increasingly powerful local, regional and global governance bodies. Globalization, according to hyperglobalists, means the end of nation-state, it has deprived it of its autonomy and sovereignty. This erosion of power and importance of nation-states and old structures is happening within the framework and control of capitalism and new technologies. Existing multilateral institutions which dominate world's economy, particularly G8, IMF, WB and WTO - mostly function by supporting the emerging "civilization of the global market".

It is certain that increased importance of the regional and global governance institutions will cause a decrease in sovereignty and autonomy of nation-states. On the other hand, it will make it easier for people from different countries to cooperate, alongside the increase in the global infrastructure of communication and firm awareness on numerous common interests, regardless of the place of origin. According to hyperglobalists this should witness that the process of development of the "global citizenship" has started.[23]

In the context of the social structure takes place the transformation of the overall social relations, which ultimately should result in the creation of a new global civilization. In the end, hyperglobalists agree that globalization, regardless of whether it is considered from a liberal or radical leftist perspective represents the embodiment of the fundamental transformation of the "order of human action".[24]

Information and media revolution[25], together with its cultural products, reach beyond geographical borders and impact local cultural environments. Local horizons widen, and food, entertainment and life-style preferences homogenize. Constant movement of images on TV screens (movies, TV series, shows, pop idols, so called celebrities, even daily news) cause spiritual deterritorization and create a culture rich

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[22] For more details see M. Pečujlić, „Globalizacija-dva lika sveta", in *Aspekti globalizacije*, eds. V. Pavićević, V. Petrović, I. Pantelić, M. Sitarski, G. Milovanović (Dosije – Beograd: BOŠ. 2003), 22-24.

[23] Economic and political power, according to hyperglobalists, goes beyond the borders of states and nations, to the point to which these are just "transitional forms of financial institutions". K. Ohmae, *The End of the Nation State* (New York: Free Press, 1995).

[24] M. Albrow, *The Impact of Globalization on Sociological Concepts: Community, Culture and Milieu* (New York-London: Routledge, 1996). According to many theoreticians Fukuyama's image of the world, i.e. its overly optimistic announcement of the end of history, also should be understood as a hyperglobalistic thesis.

[25] For more details see D. Donev, Ž. Kaluđerović, „Etičke dileme u novim medijima", *Media and Communication / Mediji i komunikacije* III, no. 5 (2016): 115-125.

with global information. Simultaneous to this global development of mass culture is the growth of cosmopolitan culture - the sense of openness towards the world and of being a citizen of the world - the feeling which transcends the local milieu.[26]

Sceptics, on the other hand, based on the data on the flow of goods, services, capital and people in the last hundred years, argue that the current level of economic interdependence in the world does not historically represent any precedent.[27] In their view we can talk less about globalization, because it necessarily implies a fully integrated global economy, and more about an increased level of internationalization and interaction between predominantly national economies.[28] While sceptics argue that globalization is a myth, they fully rely on the economic concept of globalization, identifying it primarily with a perfectly integrated global market. Arguing that the current level of integration does not meet this "ideal" of full integration, and that such integration is less distinctive than the one from the 19th century (so called era of the "golden standard", sceptics assert that the "accomplishments" of the present day "globalization" are completely overstated. They further find the hyperglobalists' views to be basically wrong and politically naïve in their underestimation of the power and endurance of national governments in their role as regulators of international economic activities. According to the sceptics, the intensity of internationalization is not only beyond national control, but it actually depends on the regulatory power of national government which enables and guarantees the continual economic liberation.

If any conclusion can be drawn from the current socio-political situation, it is, according to sceptics, the fact that the economic activity is subject to a kind of "regionalization"[29], because the world economy predominantly takes place between the three major financial and trade blocs: Europe, Pacific region and North America.[30]

Also, sceptics are hesitant to accept the idea of internationalization as a new world order in which national governments do not play a key role. They point to the increasing importance of national governments in regulating and active promoting of cross-border economic activities. Therefore, national governments are not

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[26] One thing that hyperglobalist do not acknowledge is that the process of "cultural deterioration" is not a balanced one. It impacts relatively small percentage of the world's population - the well-off class with high mobility - which testifies to the fact that this is indeed a process of westernizing the world. Most of the inhabitants of the Third World spend their time struggling to survive, rather than enjoying the luxuries of the consumerism, such as cell phones and broadband internet. They are destined to live and die on the same territory and are trapped in what Baumann calls the "local cage".

[27] Gordon (D. Gordon, "The Global Economy: New Edifice or Crumbling Foundations", *New Left Review* 168, 1988) and Weiss (L. Weiss, *The Myth of the Powerless State*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988) find that geographically speaking, when we compare present international economy with the one in the times of the great empires, we find the former to be significantly smaller than the latter.

[28] P. Hirst, G. Thompson, "Global Myths and National Policies", *Renewal* 4, no. 2 (1996).

[29] Sceptics see "globalization" and "regionalization" as contradictory concepts.

[30] This division is also called "triadization" and, according to sceptics, it is manifest in almost all aspects of international relationships. For example, in the realm of global communications, most of the expensive optic fiber cables are running the lines of the "informational super highways" between North America, Europe and East Asia. According to Linné approximately 80% of information exchange happens between the US, Europe and Japan. T. Linné, *Globalization: Winners and Losers*, as found on the web: http://www.iehei.org/bibliotheque/AnnaDIMITROVA.pdf.

victims of internationalization, but rather their leading force. Gilpin, for example, considers internalization to be a side-effect of an Americanized multilateral economic order which, as a result of the WWII, has since inspired liberalization of national economies. A. Callinicos[31] offers a different perspective when he interprets the current intensification of world trade and expansion of foreign investment as just another phase of Western imperialism, in which the national governments, being directly connected to monopoly capital, are deeply involved.

However, despite the differences in emphasizing of individual aspects, sceptics agree that no matter what drives internationalization, it does not decrease the gap between the rich North and the poor South. To the contrary, it causes greater economic marginalization of many countries which are euphemistically called "developing". Just as trade and investments between prosperous countries of the developed North grow, exclusion and marginalization of the majority of remaining countries in the world increases. Moreover, one can challenge the common belief that the new labour distribution pattern means deindustrialization of the North by means of multinational companies outsourcing their operations and thus industrializing the South. J. Allen and G. Thompson[32], for example, destroy the "global corporation myth" by emphasizing the fact that foreign investments circulate and are exchanged mostly between the most developed countries and that majority of multinational companies are primarily a product of their countries and regions. Similarly, sceptics argue against the view that internationalization causes fundamental or at least significant restructuring of global economic relations. In this respect, their position is based on deeply rooted forms of inequality and strict hierarchy in the world's economy which in terms of structure has not significantly changed in the past century.

According to many sceptics, deep inequality feeds various kinds of fundamentalism and volatile nationalism, rather than creating a global civilization. Moreover, it fragments the world into civilizational blocs and cultural and ethnic enclaves. S. Huntington[33] pointed to the terrors of this new age: international and civil wars, strengthening of terrorism and various forms of organized crime. All of these contribute to the general sense of uncertainty of life. All of this he embraced in the well-known phrase on "clash of civilizations", while B. Barber[34], similarly, speaks of the age of the "lesser evil" in which one must choose between two evils that he symbolically called the McWorld and Jihad. Hereby, he contrasts the homogenous and commercial tendencies of global economy and culture with traditional cultures which often resist globalization processes. T. L. Friedman[35]

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[31] A. Callinicos et al., *Marxism and the New Imperialism* (London: Bookmarks, 1994).
[32] J. Allen, G. Thompson, "Think global, then think again - economic globalization in context", *Area* 29, no. 3 (1997).
[33] S. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).
[34] B. Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld, How Globalism and Tribalism Are Reshaping the World* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1995).
[35] T. L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1999).

uses the seemingly more benevolent distinction between Lexus and olive tree. Lexus is a car manufactured by the famous Japanese car manufacturer Toyota that symbolizes modernization, wealth, luxury and the consumer mentality of the West, while the olive tree stands for tradition and stable communities. Deepening of global inequality, true politics of international relations and "clash of civilizations" point to the deceiving nature of "global governance" to such an extent that the governing of the world order predominately remains, as it has been for the past hundred years, in the hands of Western countries. With that in mind, sceptics understand "global governance" and economic internationalization as mostly Western projects whose main purpose is to maintain the domination of the West in the world business. The deciding factor of the international order, therefore, is not interdependence, but dependence.[36] In the sceptics' footsteps, one may say that "international order" and "international solidarity"[37] will remain the catchphrases of those who see themselves powerful enough to impose these onto others.

The concepts of cultural homogenization and global culture are also solely advanced and masked myths which are easily destroyed by the sceptics' arguments. In reality, one can easily detect the Western drive for cultural hegemony, for creating a monoculture, absolute uniformity and standardization of life styles and for the destruction of all other versions and ways of life. It is more precise to speak of Americanization - Mecdonaldization and Cocacol(oni)zation of culture – rather than Westernization. According to sceptics, we should say that, just as much as deeply inaccurate and counterproductive is the thesis of hyperglobalists about the death of a nation state and sovereignty in the political sphere, equally untrue and harmful is their prediction of the death of national, local cultures, as incurably parochial and conservative, i.e. as archaic remnants of the distant past.

Finally, offering a specific solution to these somewhat opposing and different views, are the authors who see globalization as a real process, but also a complex phenomenon full of contradictions. These, we may say, are today's mainstream. Transformationalists hold that globalization is the moving force behind social, political and economic changes that affect modern societies and the entire global order. The current process of globalization, according to them, is new to the human kind and it is up to communities and governments worldwide to find ways to adapt to the new reality characterized by vague boundaries between international and national, i.e. foreign and internal affairs. According to Rosenau[38], increase in "inter-domestic" affairs sets "new boundaries", expansion of political, economic and social space in which destiny of communities and societies is being shaped.

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[36] The solution for this authoritarian outlook on globalization is not isolation, or anti-globalizational fundamentalism. The future doesn't consist of self-sustainable national economies, super-technology should not be viewed as a priori evil, and national culture shouldn't not be fully preserved. It is not true that the progress is possible only if we radically part from the emerging global order.

[37] The relative character of "international solidarity" is well shown in the seemingly surprising fact that the help for the "developing countries" has been declining for the past few decades to the point of being four time lesser than ever before.

[38] J. N. Rosenau, *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

The globalization, therefore, is a powerful force aimed towards the transformation of the world and is responsible for massive and radical reorganization of societies, economies, governing institutions, as well as the world order.

Nevertheless, the direction of this reorganization is not pre-determined since globalization is understood as an intrinsically unpredictable process. In other words, globalization is an open and dynamic concept without a clear direction and with no established techniques for transformation of the world. Unlike hyperglobalists and sceptics, the transformationalists demand no particular course of globalization and do not judge existing trends according to a particular fixed ideal of globalized world. They rather see globalization as a long term historical process marked with contradictions and dependent on a plurality of factors.

The caution of the transformationalists about the very future of globalization is due to the belief that modern modalities of global economic, political, cultural, technological, military, ecological and migratory flows are hardly predictable and cannot be compared with any other period in human history. Deep connectedness of the world into one entity is not seen by them as proof of convergence or of forthcoming emergence of a single, unified global society. To the contrary, transformationalists see the globalization as related to new forms of global stratification within which some countries, societies or communities are becoming more interlaced and connected to form a single global order, whereas others are more and more marginalized. To speak of the North-South split, or the division between the First and the Third world, means to overlook the ways in which globalization transforms traditional modes of establishing and disestablishing relationships between countries while creating a new hierarchy of power in the whole world. Transformationalists think that we should not speak of the social structure pyramid any more - with the elite on the top, and bigger and more numerous classes as we go down the line to the bottom - but rather about a three-layered format that resembles the image of concentric circles. Each circle in this scheme surpasses national boundaries as the first one represents elite, the next the so called "content" and the third one the marginalized population.[39]

The transformation of the forms of global stratification is closely connected with the growing deterioration of economic activities, among others, just as production and financial transactions are becoming more and more global and transnational. The transformationalists hold that national economies are being transformed through the process of economic globalization in the degree that national economic space simply does not coincide with national and state boundaries. In such a globalized economy these systems of production that transcend the boundaries of states, trade and financial transactions are even more tightly connected than some traditional values which connect communities and

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[39] A. Hoogvelt, *Globalisation and the Postcolonial World: The New Political Economy of Development* (London: Macmillan Press, 1997).

people on different continents.

Contemporary globalization, according to transformationalists, reconstructs or "redesigns" the power, function and authority of national governments. Although they do not question governments' right to effectively control what is happening on its territory, the transformationalists believe that the competence of international institutions, as well as obligations arising from the norms of international law can, to a certain extent, correspond to the usual understanding of sovereignty and integrity. This is obvious in many transnational organizations like ASEAN, NAFTA, OPEC, OECD, WTO and EU. In the European Union, for example, there is a coexistence and simultaneous functioning of national governments, regional and local assemblies, as well as decisions and norms passed in the center of the organization. Delegation of responsibilities and their supplementation enable for many European citizens to have a second capital city (Brussels) in addition to their own and that is not merely symbolically. In these new circumstances the concept of nation-state as an independent, autonomous and self-sufficient unit is more and more just an echo of the past, and less an image of reality in any of modern states. Globalization is, according to transformationalists, connected with reconceptualization, transformation or differentiation of the relationship between sovereignty, territorial integrity and power of a country.[40]

Claiming that globalization transforms or reconstitutes the power and authority of national governments, the transformationalists reject the hyperglobalists' thesis of the cessation of the sovereignty of national states, as well as the sceptics' view of the absence of any significant changes in the last decades. Instead of these, often to the extreme polarized viewpoints, the transformationalists simply think that the new model of sovereignty only suppresses the traditional concept of the state as an absolute, indivisible, territorially exclusive and complete form of public power. The contemporary concept of sovereignty according to them, should be understood "less as a territorially bounded space, and more as a political source of negotiation characterized by complex transnational networks"[41].

This, of course, does not mean that state borders no longer have any political, military or symbolic function or significance, but the recognition that their consideration as the primary spatial points of reference of modern life signifies that they can be relativized in an era of ever more intensifying globalization. Transformationalists believe that globalization has to do not only with new modes of sovereignty, but also with the emergence of powerful non-territorial forms of economic and political organizing at a global level, such as multinational corporations, transnational social movements, international regulatory agencies,

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[40] Of course, there are countries – the most powerful ones – which did not change their idea of sovereignty. They most often simply ignore newly established rules and institutions.

[41] R. O. Keohane, "Hobbes's Dilemma and Institutional Change in World Politics: Sovereignty in International Society", in *Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War*, eds. H.-H. Holm and G. Sorensen (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 165-86.

etc. The world can no longer be considered exclusively as state-centric or as the one in which countries dominate, because today the authority diffuses between public and private agencies at the local, national, regional and global level.

What this new order needs is to adjust forms and roles of states, just as governance needs a coherent strategy for matching all the elements of the globalized world. The relevant strategies range from neoliberal models with minimal roles of states, developing models of states in which government promotes economic expansion, and catalytic state in which government enables and facilitates joint operation. According to transformationalists, globalization does not mean the "death" of state, but rather encourages an entire range of adaptive strategies and to a certain point enables a more effective one. Therefore, the power of national governments is not necessarily weakened by the process of globalization, but it is reconstructed and restructured to meet the needs of the complex governance structures in the increasingly interconnected world.

A specific indirect transformationalists' view is obvious in the new terms which were created in order to describe the content of present globalization. The antithesis of globalization-localization is synthesized in the term glocalization that stands mostly for interlacing the local content with global influences (Robertson). A resolution for the dispute regarding the crucial factors which are active in the modern world, in which some emphasize nation states and others advocate transnational organizations, is sought by the so called post- international era of politics. When it comes to culture, the homeganization-heteroginazation dichotomy is surmounted by the term hybridization of culture.[42]

The adjustment of local societies to the new state of affairs is a number one item on the agenda for 21st century which can be hardly ignored. Adjustment is a must, not only due to strong pressure from without, but also as a true need of each society, a manner of overtaking and qualitatively treating of the superior civilization heritage such as: modern technology, more efficient market economy, democratic forms of political life, human rights and the broadening of local cultural horizon.

The need for democratization of the global order - transnational and supranational institutions, forms of government - is the other side of the same challenge: to create a decent "global society". There are many groups and social movements, cultural, scientific, philosophical and political elites that are driven by the dark side and risks of the authoritarian form of globalization to search for corrections and alternatives – "for different form of mondialisation". In economic and social sphere, instead of the globalization of poverty, poverty alleviation, the reduction of gaps between societies, the write-off of debts to poor countries, the taxation of speculative financial capital and the introduction of basic, minimum income for all citizens are required. Politically, we see the emergence of projects of cosmopolitan democracy anywhere from the local participation of citizens,

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[42] The views of Held and other like-minded thinkers which were elaborated in this paper may be also found in their books and at Global Transformations Website: http://www.polity.co.uk/global/.

the regional collective decision making ("collective", "shared sovereignty") to the reformation of the UN and the adoption of democratic global legislation. The tendency to change from one sided to multisided global community is strong. Projects of cultural pluralism, mutual enrichment and interlacing of civilizations will replace the destruction of national culture as well as the clash of civilizations.

The epoch of the emergence of "global society" - global order - should not be reduced to the pro-contra dispute for globalization. The true conflict is about the social nature and the historical form of globalization. What will be the form of globalization? Will it be the one more humane and more socially responsible, or less human and "more profitable" one? Democratic or authoritarian? Therefore, it is of utmost importance that philosophers - given that their views are often seen as value judgments across the humanities - do not go under the established ethical standards of the civilized world and should analyse globalization carefully and be aware of the dilemmas that they may encounter in their professional work. Adequate interdisciplinary approach as well as awareness of responsibility should increase philosophers' sense of responsibility towards the possibilities of philosophy and the significance of its effects.[43] After all, the resolution of the conflict about the dominant form of globalization will essentially decide the destiny of billions of people in the world.

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[43] For more details see Ž. Kaluđerović, „Bioetičko razmatranje dostignuća savremenih nauka, posebno genetike", *Godišnjak Filozofskog fakulteta u Novom Sadu* XXXV, no. 1 (2010): 307-318.

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PRAXIS SCHOOL

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Abstract: *This text provides the basic information about the Yugoslav Marxist philosophical school of humanistic orientation Praxis which existed during the 1960's and 1970's. The author claims that the Praxis school was one of the major currents within the Marxist humanism.*

Keywords: *Praxis School, humanism, practice, marxism, truth.*

The Praxis School (Praxis Philosophy or Praxis Group) is a philosophical school of humanistic orientation active in Yugoslavia in the 1960s and 1970s. It cherished humanistic and non-dogmatic orientation in Marxism and was named so because of the central position which the notion of practice (Greek *praxis*) held in it. The Praxis School was engaged in the search for the philosophical solution of the basic ambivalence of the Marxist theory in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. Marx viewed his own theory as a tool of radical criticism of social practice of the capitalist societies, as well as an anticipation of a possible socialist, that is communist society. However, his philosophy acquired the unusual role of representing a confirmation of social practice in the Soviet Union and the countries in which after World War II the socialist social system was established. This implied that the critical intention was to be excluded from the Marxist theory. Thus the theory was reduced to adogmatized doctrine functioning as an apology of the existing social system. It became the official "Marxist-Leninist" interpretation of Marxism in the versions of Stalinism, "real socialism"as well as "'the self-management socialism".

Relative political liberalization in Yugoslavia in the 1960s encouraged one young philosophical generation from the University of Zagreb (Croatia) to oppose strongly such an official interpretation of Marxism. Its outstanding protagonists postulated a philosophical program of the renewal of the critical potential of Marxism by returning to the heuristic strength of Marx's theory and by discarding dogmatized Marxism. Certain philosophers from Belgrade (Serbia) joined them soon. Together they formed the Praxis School. Its most outstanding representatives were the philosophers Gajo Petrović and Milan Kangrga from Zagreb and Mihailo Marković from Belgrade. The School did not have a unique philosophical and sociological theory. Its representatives were connected by their joint intention to

discuss critically the significant problems of the contemporary world, problems of theory and practice of socialism, as well as the search for the path to humanize life and to structure a more humane modern society, in the spirit of Marx's philosophy, German idealistic philosophy, as well as contemporary philosophical tendencies in the West. They were united in their belief that it was possible to develop a new humanist version of Marxism by the reconstruction of Marx's original thought. Under the auspices of the Croatian Philosophical Society, the representatives of the School published the journal *Praxis* in Zagreb (from 1964 to 1974). It was one of the more significant international philosophical journals of Marxist orientation. In the same period, they organized The Summer Philosophical School in the island of Korčula. The journal *Praxis International*, published in Oxford from 1981 to 1994, was the successor of the *Praxis* journal. Even though the protagonists of the Praxis School did not have an anti-socialist inclination, their radical critical attitude provoked the reaction of the authorities. Due to the denial of financial support, the publication of the journal *Praxis* was discontinued, and the "Korčula Summer School" stopped functioning. Eight lecturers from the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade lost their jobs. Although the influence of the Praxis School was marginalized, particularly after the so-called "fall of communism", its philosophical-critical spirit still lives in some cultural centers in the region of the Former Yugoslavia (Zagreb, Novi Sad).

The Praxis School represents one of the most significant trends within Marxist humanism which developed after World War II. The representatives of the Marxist humanism (Herbert Marcuse, Ernst Bloch, Erich Fromm and others) discovered the grounds in Marx's early works to interpret his theory primarily as humanistic and to confront it with the dominant understanding of Marxism and communism. They discarded the reduction of Marxism to the theory of economic and historical determinism. They also rejected the standpoint that authentic Marxism could present a theoretical basis for Stalinism and the bureaucratized "socialist" systems in Eastern Europe. A significant impetus to the creation of the Praxis School was thus given by the Marxist humanists. The publication of the selection from Marx's and Engels's works of the early period of their activity (1843-1845) in Zagreb in 1953 exercised also a great direct effect. Marx's *Economic-philosophical Manuscripts* from 1844 (*Ökonomisch-philosophischen Manuskripte aus dem Jahre 1844*) held a special position in that selection because they had not been published during Marx's life. Preserved in fragments, they were discovered in the late 1920s and first appeared in the edition of Marx' early works in 1932. The manuscripts represent a testimony of Marx's complex critical attitude to Hegel's philosophy. However, they also present his entire philosophical theory, as well as the outline of the criticism of "national economy" (i.e. capitalist system). The essential notions of his philosophical theory were labour and capital, practice, alienation, reification, man's "generic being", goods and ownership, profit, wage, as well as the hired, manifested and alienated

labour.

In the conditions of its concrete application in the social processes in Yugoslavia, familiarization with the philosophy of young Marx encouraged the protagonists of the Praxis School to try to develop and creatively apply the humanistic cognitive and active potential of Marx's theory – contrary to the orthodox, dogmatic and sterile understanding of Marxism. Their theoretical program had several basic points: first, they interpreted Marx's theory by relating it to the philosophical tradition (primarily with the philosophy of German idealism and Hegel's philosophy); second, in line with Marx's standpoint about "the critique of everything existing", they exposed to radical criticism the existing bureaucratic-statist concept of socialism; third, they discussed the philosophical, sociological, economic and cultural problems of socialism; fourth, they theoretically postulated socialism as a social model of self-liberation of man and society from all forms of alienation; fifth, they critically discussed significant problems of contemporary world (inequality among people, wars, repression, threat of self-destruction, consequences of technology etc.).

From the standpoint of the theory of de-alienation, they had a critical attitude to the capitalist system and bourgeois way of life. As a whole, the Praxis School was a school of non-dogmatic, creative Marxism. Its central notion is practice (Greek *praxis*). In philosophy since Aristotle *praxis* has denoted one of three basic forms of human activity, in addition to *theoria* (insight, thinking) and *poiesis* (creating). Praxis in traditional sense meant the action which starts from man's relation to his own humanness and to other people. Praxis includes the moral, political, economic and legal acting[1]. The protagonists of the Praxis School attached a new meaning to the notion praxis. They made a synthesis of the meanings of traditional notions praxis and poiesis (Latin *actus et operatio*) so that praxis acquires the value of the highest anthropological determination of man's essence as "free creative activity". According to G. Petrović's stipulation, *praxis* is an ontological notion which denotes "a free, universal, creative and self-creative activity by which man creates (does, produces) and changes (shapes) his historical world and himself". *Praxis* is an activity "inherent to man, by which he essentially differs from all other beings"[2]. It is his self-creating activity that creates everything. Man produces his own history as "his *praxis* in the broadest sense of the word". *Praxis* is also a gnoseological notion. It represents a criterion of truth in the sense in which Marx understood it, too: "The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth — i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice"[3]. Theory

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[1] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1178 b 20-22; 1139 a 15-30; 1139 b-1141 b; 1095 b 15-20.
[2] Gajo Petrović, "Why Praxis?", *Praxis* (1964), https://www.marxists.org/subject/praxis/issue-01/why-praxis.htm.
[3] Karl Marx, "Theses On Feuerbach", in *Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Selected Works in III Volumes*, vol. I, 13-15 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969).

is an elaborated form of practice. As a practical being, man is in the original sense a free being. He produces himself and his historical and social world of life. What man is and what he can be is his own deed. Primary temporal dimension of human individual and social life is not past or present, but future.

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AESTHETICS IN SERBIAN PHILOSOPHY

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Abstract: *This essay is going to discuss the character and development of aesthetics in Serbian philosophy. Apart from presenting the main philosophers and problems, I will address the main question of Serbian aesthetics, namely the question of methodology. Research is orientated towards comparing the work of several main Serbian aesthetitians, as well as towards the histories of Serbian aeshtetics, which serve as a meta-position of research. Such analysis confirms the thesis that the very distinctive feature of Serbian aesthetics is its orientation to the question of aesthetics as such, that is to the question of its methodological character. In consequence, such result allows for a coherent analysis of various theories within Serbian aesthetics, as well as for the understanding of its development during the 20th century.*

Keywords: *aesthetics, Serbian philosophy, methodology, normative character, hermeneutic analysis.*

As a branch of philosophy, aesthetics is one of the most developed and most infulential domains of philosophical research in Serbia. Aesthetics earned such a prominent status during the second half of the 20th century, under most interesting circumstances. The period of its ascent is of some importance, while it could be said that philosophy in Serbia in general gained its impetus only after the Second World War. Although aesthetics was not seen as one of the major areas of philosophy at the very start of this period, nevertheless it reached such position slowly, but in continuous development. Today, we see that aesthetic research is represented by many influential philosophers in Serbia, and that such research is often highly valued in terms of recognition and various prizes given to philosophical autors. Therefore, it is easy to conclude that aesthetics is a good representative of contemporary philosophy in Serbia in general.

The main issue I will adress in this paper is the position and character of aesthetics in Serbian philosophy. The main goal of the research is the presentation of Serbian philosophy in some of its most interesting features; in this context aesthetics is chosen as an especially convinient example.

Aesthetics in the History of Philosophy in Serbia

Philosophy in Serbia, as it was previously mentioned, was mainly developed during the second half of 20th century. Although prominent figures and ideas in philosophy can be traced back even to the period of Middle Ages, before the founding of the first Serbian university – the University of Belgrade was founded in 1808 – we could hardly speak of a consolidated academic endeavour. Apart from the founding of the University, the most important event regarding the development of philosophy in Serbia was the establishing of the Serbian Philosophical Society in 1898, which is the first society of philosophers ever to be set up in the Balkans.[1] In terms of these two important events, philosophy in Serbia finaly gained its institutional background; however, the consequences of these events reached their peak only after the Second World War. The flourishing of philosophy in the era of former Yugoslavia was partly an outcome of marxist and socialist politics of the state, which also meant significant financial and institutional support.

In this context, aesthetics was largely neglected. Namely, during the 19th century, up until the beginning of the Second World War, the philosophical education in Serbia was mostly situated in high schools, and subjected to the secondary education goals and role in society: it was mainly orientated towards logics, psychology and ethics, and mixed with religious teachings. In this context, the aesthetical problems, such as beauty, were seen as ethical: as we can read in documents from that period, the *aesthetical education* was supposed to enhance the pupils' understaning of their religious and moral duties to themselves[2]. On the other side, at the University itself, aesthetics was not, at first, given any import: first lectures in aesthetics were held in 1852 by Aleksa Vukomanović, but this did not mean that such lectures were held regularly nor did they become a fixed part of the curriculum. Aesthetics became a subject of specific and separate course of lectures only in 1906[3], but it was not untill the second half of the 20th century that it was fully accepted as an important discipline of philosophy.[4]

However, after the Second World War, aesthetics slowly but steadily became one of the most developed fields of philosophical research in Serbia. In the past three decades, Serbian aesthetitians showed specific interest in this development, an interest which resulted in several studies that investigate the history and character of aesthetics in Serbia. It should be noted that such studies, up until recently, were not to be found in cases of other disciplines of philosophy, such as ethics and logics, but only – and rarely – in the case of the history of philosophy in Serbia in

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[1] http://www.srpskofilozofskodrustvo.org.rs/index.php?page=istorijat (25.09.2017).
[2] *Privremeni nastavni plan i programi za više razrede realnih gimnazija u Kraljevini SHS* (Beograd: Državna štamparija Kraljevine SHS, 1927), 7.
[3] И. Марић, *Философија на Великој школи* (Београд: Плато, 2003), 126, 133; С. Жуњић, *Историја српске философије* (Београд: Плато, 2009), 208.
[4] М. Ранковић, *Историја српске естетике* (Београд: Завод за уџбенике и наставна средства, 1998), 58.

general.[5]

The first study, dedicated to the history of aesthetics, was written by Dragan Jeremić, former professor of aesthetics at the Department of Philosophy at the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade. Entitled *Aesthetics among the Serbs* (*Estetika kod Srba*) and published in 1989[6], the book covers a wide period from the Middle Ages to the end of the 19th century, more precisely, to the period of Svetozar Marković, one of the most important philosophical and political figures in Serbia of that time. The second important study dedicated to the history of aesthetics was written by Milan Ranković, professor of aesthetics at the University of Arts in Belgrade and former Serbian minister of culture. Published in 1998 under the title *History of Serbian Aesthetics* (*Istorija srpske estetike*)[7], the book covers every aspect of aesthetics in Serbian philosophy, including its development in the 20th century; on the other hand, it is not as voluminous as the one written by Jeremić.

As an influential figure in aesthetical circles in Serbia, Ranković also initiated a conference dedicated to the development of aesthetics in Serbia in the 20th century. The conference was held in Belgrade in 1999 and 2000, and it was organised by the Aesthetical Society of Serbia. The proceedings of the conference, edited as *Serbian Aesthetics in the 20th century* (*Srpska estetika u XX veku*) and published in 2000[8], present us with various problems and philosophies of Serbian aesthetics. Although these proceedings are not an integral study of the 20th century Serbian aesthetics, they give an account of many previously neglected aestheticians and their work, and therefore are very valuable to the research of this topic. It is even more important to notice that this conference, together with the proceedings, made a significant impact on researchers: from then onwards, the problems of the history of Serbian aesthetics are constantly in the focus of researchers, so that today we are in position not only to strive towards shere mapping of names and facts, but also to evaluate the character of Serbian aesthetics as such.

Such interest, evoked by the mentioned conference, happily coincided with another similar interest of philosophers in Serbia that can be noticed in the past ten years. Namely, in the past decade, there is a significant focus in Serbian philosophy on investigating its own history, partly stimulated by the government, i.e. by the guidelines defined for the scientific projects financed by the Serbian Ministry of Science and Education. Resulting in numerous articles and studies dedicated to the problems and themes arising from the history of Serbian philosophy, ranging from its presence in secondary education to the systematic expositions of works of the most important philosophers, such efforts gave way to the investigation of Serbian aesthetics as well.

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[5] In 2012 Slobodan Žunjić published a voluminous study about the history of logics in Serbian philosophy. See
С. Жуњић, *Прирок и суштаство: историја појмовне логике код Срба I-IV* (Београд: Службени гласник, 2013).
[6] Д. М. Јеремић, *Естетика код Срба. Од средњег века до Светозара Марковића* (Београд: САНУ, 1989).
[7] М. Ранковић, *Историја српске естетике* (Београд: Завод за уџбенике и наставна средства, 1998).
[8] M. Zurovac (ed.), *Srpska estetika u XX veku* (Beograd: EDS, 2000).

The most important novelty of the contemporary research about the history of Serbian aesthetics, in my view, is the peviously mentioned fact that such research is now furthermore focused on the specific character of Serbian aesthetics. That is to say that the main problem now is the question: is there some specific feature that marks aesthetical research in Serbia, common to all aestheticians and their enedavours? Is there a distinctive problem to which most of them are trying to find solutions? Is there a peculiar methodology which they all embrace in their dealings with the aesthetical problems? In a word, is there a common ground which can be found and investigated?

Although these questions are not formulated as some kind of plan for research, they can nevertheless be traced in almost all contemporary studies and articles dedicated to the history of Serbian aesthetics. A stellar example of such research is the recent study by Nebojša Grubor, professor of aesthetics at the Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade. Published in 2015 and entitled *From Aesthetical Exactness to the Meta-aesthetical Scepticism: Studies in Contemporary Serbian Aesthetics* (*Od estetičke egzaktnosti do metaestetičkog skepticizma. Studije o savremenoj srpskoj estetici*)[9], the book presents five separate investigations dedicated to the five more important Serbian aestheticians – Milan Damnjanović, Mirko Zurovac, Sreten Petrović, Milan Ranković and Anica Savić-Rebac. However, these five investigations are all governed by the same idea - namely, the search for the methodology in the aesthetics of these philosophers.

Therefore, Grubor presents us with a carefully developed study of the methodological background of otherwise very different aesthetical projects, implying that the perspective of methodology should be the one leading the historians of Serbian aesthetics in their research. Moreover, such implication is not restricted to the mere question of how should one investigate the history of Serbian aesthetics, but for Grubor it represents the very common ground of all these aesthetical perspectives as such. That is to say that, in Grubor's view, the main question of aesthetics in Serbia is the question of a proper methodology of aesthetical research, the question of a proper way of thinking within aesthetics as a branch of philosophy. This aggregate further implies that the main question of Serbian aesthetics is, in fact, the question of aesthetics as such – the question about the very possibility of the philosophical and argumentative analysis of the aesthetical domain.

The aim of the study is, in Grubor's own words, to resolve „the question of how did our prominent aestheticians understand the concept of aesthetics and the nature of aesthetical research, both in the perspective of its methodology and its subject."[10] Its results, as we have seen, imply that all analyzed philosophers share

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[9] N. Grubor, *Od estetičke egzaktnosti do metaestetičkog skepticizma. Studije o savremenoj srpskoj estetici* (Beograd: Institut za filozofiju Filozofskog fakulteta Univerziteta u Beogradu, 2015).

[10] Grubor, *Od estetičke*, 7 (English translation by Una Popović).

the same conviction, namely that aesthetics should once more be questioned and defined in terms of its scientific and/or philosophical character. This question of aesthetical methodology is, as Grubor rightly observes, the one that preoccupied Milan Damnjanović. Therefore it could be said that it was he who made it popular within the research of the other three philosophers - Zurovac, Petrović and Ranković, who were all in some respect his followers and under his infulence.

However, if this was the sole result of Grubor's study, it would merely be a matter of an interesting observation concerning only few philosophers. Namely, these four aesthetitians are all very prominent and influential: they practicly defined the development and character of Serbian aesthetics from the seventies onwards. Nevertheless, in their approach to aesthetics they are very different. For example, Mirko Zurovac – Grubor's predecessor and the sucessor of Jeremić on the position of professor of aesthetics at the Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade - is mainly interested in the systemathic understanding of aesthetics as a branch of philosophy: he is an advocate of beauty as the main concept and problem of aesthetics. On the other hand, Sreten Petrović – retired professor of aesthetics at the Faculty of Philology in Belgrade – has chosen art as the main problem of his research. However, apart from these differences, which are surely great, Grubor has found the common ground of these philosophers in terms of the above discussed question of the methodology of aesthetics.

But, Grubor's claim that the question of methodology is the very question of Serbian aesthetics is by no means restricted to the influence of Damnjanović. The fifth philosophical figure he analyzes, Anica Savić-Rebac (1892-1953), lived and died much before Damnjanović turned this question of methodology into the object of his philosophy; therefore she could not possibly be under his influence. Given such perspective, Grubor's claim now gains a more substantial meaning: in fact, he claims that the question of methodology, as a question of aesthetics as such, is the main question of Serbian aesthetics in general. In this respect, the philosophy of Anica Savić-Rebac is „an overture and antitipation of the aesthetical research of our prominent philosophers."[11]

As we can see, aesthetics in Serbian philosophy is mainly developed during the 20th century. If we accept Grubor's findings, we can also claim that its main focus was not some specific aesthetical problem – such as beauty or art, but its own character, the very aesthetics as such. Bearing this in mind, we can now proceed to a more precise analysis of the reasons for this feature in the development of aesthetics in Serbia, that is, to the presentation of its most prominent philosophers and their work.

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[11] Grubor, 8 (English translation by Una Popović).

Serbian Aesthetics in the 20ᵗʰ Century

As we have already seen, the aesthetics in Serbia developed mostly in the period after the end of the Second World War. In that period it was shaped by various influences, which were mostly accepted from abroad: Serbian aesthetics, as it was often stated, walked hand in hand with the development of aesthetics in general. However, the specific local circumstances also defined its development, and made marxism and phenomenology the key perspectives for the Serbian aesthetics in the 20ᵗʰ century.

Namely, Serbian aesthetics was mainly under the influence of these two philosophical schools: although it was the aesthetics of Benedetto Croce that mostly marked its development before the Second World War, the second half of the 20ᵗʰ century was, without a doubt, the phase of (western) marxism and phenomenology. Aesthetics originating from english speaking philosophers is also to be found amidst the influences, but to a lesser degree. Of great significance in this context was the philosophy of Susan Langer, and also the 18ᵗʰ century British aesthetics of Hume, Shaftesbury and others; it was Leon Kojen and Iva Draškić Vićanović who introduced these aesthetics to the Serbian philosophy to a large extent. Iva Draškić Vićanović, profesor of aesthetics at the Faculty of Philology in Belgrade, published the first and so far the only study in Serbian aesthetics dedicated to the 17ᵗʰ and 18ᵗʰ century British aesthetics.[12] During the past decade there was also an increase of interest in analytic aesthetics, mostly due to the work of researchers from the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade. Postmodernist approaches to aestehtics are also present in Serbian philosophy, but not as its leading trend, although it could be said that in the past two decades they are more present than ever. The leading philosopher of postmodernism in Serbia is Miško Šuvaković.[13]

It sholud also be noted that the development of Serbian aesthetics during the 20ᵗʰ century culminated in 1978, with the founding of the Aesthetic Society of Serbia (Estetičko društvo Srbije, EDS). The Aesthetic Society of Serbia was for many years, apart from the Serbian Philosophical Society, the only society for philosophy in Serbia, and it was the first such society that was exclusively focused on the development of a specific branch of philosophy. From the 1978 onwards, ASS (EDS) acted as the true *spiritus movens* of aesthetics in Serbia[14]; its most recognisable activity are the regular annual conferences, usually held in December. These conferences and related proceedings – up until now no less than thirty-six volumes of them – cover a wide range of aesthetical problems and perspectives, continuously enhancing both the public and the philosophical understanding of

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[12] I. Draškić Vićanović, *Estetsko čulo: studija o pojmu ukusa u britanskoj filozofiji 17. i 18. veka* (Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva, 2002).

[13] М. Шуваковић, *Постмодерна* (Београд: Народна књига, 1995); M. Šuvaković, *Pojmovnik suvremene umjetnosti* (Zagreb: Horetzky, 2005).

[14] M. Vidaković, „EDS - spiritus movens razvoja estetike u nas", in *Estetika, umetnost, moral*, ed. B. Milijić (Beograd: EDS, 2002), 183.

aesthetics in Serbia.

The circumstances of the founding of ASS are also indicative for the understanding of the development of aesthetics in Serbia during the 20th century. Namely, ASS was founded as an institutional backing for the organisation of the *IXth International Conference for Aesthetics*, which was held in 1980 in Dubrovnik (today in Croatia)[15]; the main theme of the conference was *The Problem of Creativity.*[16] Many philosophers, but also many artists and theoreticians were present at the occasion of its founding: in that same spirit, ASS continued its activity during the first decade of its activity – predominantly philosophical, it remained open to interdisciplinary research. This was changed during the nineties, when ASS turned more to the field of philosophy in the strict sense, only to open its activities for interdisciplinary research once again at the beggining of the 21st century.[17] The first president of ASS was already mentioned, Milan Damnjanović, and he was succeeded by Mirko Zurovac; the current president of ASS is Divna Vuksanović.

However, the fact that Milan Damnjanović was the first president of ASS is of notice, since it was he who „introduced in our aesthetics the philosophy of the second and third generation of phenomenologists, which was already known in Europe.“[18] That is to say, Damnjanović acted as a promoter of phenomenological aesthetics, and that he is responsible for the imense influence of this school of philosophy on the development of Serbian aesthetics. The fact that he shaped the profile of ASS ment that phenomenology was largely recieved as a new trend in aesthetics.

Damnjanović was followed by many. For example, Mirko Zurovac was, in his early years, also a proponent of phenomenology; in the third generation of Serbian aesthetitians its main proponent is Nebojša Grubor. The PhD thesis of Zurovac was dedicated to J.-P. Sartre; during the first two decades of his work, Zurovac published also studies on Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty.[19] Grubor's main interest is Heidegger, although he also published on Plato and Kant. Another example of the influence of phenomenology in Serbian aesthetics is presented with Milan Uzelac, one of the most important philosophers from the generation of Zurovac.

However, the fact that phenomenology was introduced in the Serbian aesthetics, as such a great influence is very unusual. Namely, at the time marxism

[15] USA and USSR gave the largest number of participants: there were 69 of them from the USA, and 61 from the USSR. Italy was represented with 41 participants, France with 26, Greece with 23 and Romania with 21. Other participants came from Hungary, Germany, Spain, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Belgium, Japan and Netherlands; also from England, Canada, Switzerland, Austria, Israel, Brazil, Norway, Egypt, Turkey, Zaire, Netherlands and Argentina. See Vidaković, „EDS - *spiritus movens*", 185.

[16] J. Aler, M. Damnjanović, eds., *The Problem of Creativity* (Beograd: EDS, 1983).

[17] У. Поповић, „Естетичко друштво Србије: улога у развоју естетике у српској филозофији", in *Историја српске филозофије I*, ed. И. Деретић (Београд: Evro-Giunti, 2011), 599-604.

[18] B. Milijić, „Prisutnost fenomenološke misli u srpskoj estetici", in *Srpska estetika u XX veku*, ed. M. Zurovac (Beograd: EDS, 2000), 51.

[19] M. Zurovac, *Umjetnost i egzistencija: vrijednost i granice Sartrove estetike* (Beograd: Mladost, 1978); M. Zurovac, *Umjetnost kao istina i laž bića. Jaspers, Hajdeger, Sartr, Merlo-Ponti* (Novi Sad: Matica Srpska, 1986); M. Zurovac, *Djetinjstvo i zrelost umjetnost* (Novi Sad: Književna zajednica Novog Sada, 1994).

marked philosophy and aesthetics in Serbia and Yugoslavia. Due to various, mostly political and social circumstances, it was seen as the sole and proper paradigm of philosophy. The divergence from such a model of thinking is, surely, a political act in itself: a testament of this is given by Branislava Milijić, one of the most devoted students of Damnjanović and a very important figure in the early years of the ASS. She wrote that „the presence of phenomenology for us has the meaning of the begining of the plurality of thought, which in our circumstances and in that time meant a detour from ideological dogmatism and more freedom to be allowed to different other views.“[20]

With this note we are left with a new perspective on Serbian aesthetics – the one of its political significance. This should not be overrated; the previously mentioned marxist paradigm by definition implied such a position for philosophy in general, and also for aesthetics. However, in the case of aesthetics this had peculiar implications: namely, during the first decades of former Yugoslavia, it was usual for philosophers to be engaged in public debates with artists, and to shed light on their work from the perspecitve of its desired or non-desired ideological implications. Perhaps this was mostly the case with Dragan Jeremić, who was engaged in a debate concerning one of the most important works in the Yugoslavian literature of the time – *A Tomb for Boris Davidovič* (*Grobnica za Borisa Davidoviča*), authored by Danilo Kiš in 1976.[21]

However, the political significance of phenomenology as a new perspective for Serbian aesthetics meant more the possibility of departure from such political engagement than a new political paradigm. In other words, it meant the possibility for the development of aesthetics apart from any political struggle, aside from the demanded necessity of its ideological implications. This is evident in the activities of the phenomenologically orientated aestheticians: they had almost never engaged themselves in political disputes concerning questions of art. For example, in the past two decades, Zurovac sometimes acted as a political figure, but he never mixed this with his work in aesthetics. On the contrary, it could be said that Zurovac, as the main figure of aesthetics at the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade, made a sharp differentiation between the aesthetics and its possible political (mis)use. From early on, he made clear in his lectures that aesthetics should be investigated and thought of in strict philosophical terms, with respect to the history of philosophy, metaphysics and epistemology – and nothing else. Given that professor Zurovac forged almost all of the third generation of Serbian aestheticians, as well as some of the fourth generation, one can clearly see his influence in the consequence of proliferation of highly academic aesthetic endeavours.

In terms of influence on Serbian aesthetics, the most significant

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[20] Milijić, „Prisutnost fenomenološke", 51 (English translation by Una Popović).
[21] Ранковић, *Историја српске естетике*, 85-86; D. Jeremić, *Narcis bez lica* (Beograd: Nolit, 1981).

phenomenologically orientated philosophers were Nicolai Hartmann, Jean-Paul Sartre, Roman Ingarden, Martin Heidegger and Mikel Dufrenne. Hartmann's *Aesthetics* could be considered as almost the canonic book for Serbian aesthetics: it is still a necessary part of almost any curriculum on aesthetics. J.-P. Sartre and R. Ingarden were more popular up until the end of the 20th century, while Heidegger's thought on art is continuously of interest since the seventies. Although one could ask if Sartre, Hartmann or Heidegger were phenomenologists at all, nevertheless they are accepted as such in the horizon of Serbian aesthetics. Hartmann, however, is a special case in this respect: for example, Zurovac claims that his aesthetics results from the application of the phenomenological method to aesthetical problems and that it is essentialy phenomenologic, while Damnjanović – and, following him, Grubor – consider Hartmann's aesthetics as ontological.[22] Damnjanović claims that even the method of Hartmann's aesthetics is ontological.[23]

On the other hand, the most influential marxist philosophers, apart from Marx himself and Engels, are surely Theodor W. Adorno, Herbert Marcuse and Georg Lukacs. Marcuse and Lukacs were more influential during the first few decades after the Second World War, while the interest in Adorno's philosophy is increasing from the eighties onwards. This is very stimulating because Adorno's and Horkheimer's understanding of popular culture and culture industry during the years became a ground for contemporary Serbian philosophy of media, which is best represented by the work of Divna Vuksanović, professor of aesthetics at the Faculty of Dramatic Arts in Belgrade.[24] Bearing the stamp of aesthetics, this research in contemporary mass media is also under the influence of Walter Benjamin.

It is important to notice that the aesthetics of Kant, Hegel and Schelling also have a prominent place in the context of Serbian aesthetics. Interestingly enough, such prominent place for this aesthethics is a consequence of the wide acceptance of Classical German Idealisam in the Yugoslavian philosophy in general, on the basis of the influence of Hegel's philosophy on Marx. Nevertheless, attention that was given to Kant, Hegel and Schelling is noted both among marxist and phenomenologist aestheticians, and is still much present in Serbian aesthetics. While almost every prominent aesthetician in Serbia published on Kant and Hegel,

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[22] М. Зуровац, „Естетика Николаја Хартмана", in *Ка филозофији уметности: у спомен Милану Дамњановићу*, ed. Б. Милијић (Београд: Универзитет уметности у Београду/ЕДС, 1996), 214; M. Damnjanović, *Strujanja u savremenoj estetici* (Beograd: Fond za izdavačku delatnost Univerziteta umetnosti, 1984), 70; N. Grubor, „Lepo kao odnos pojavljivanja. Osnovna ideja Hartmanove estetike", *Theoria* 52, no. 3 (2009): 63-64.

[23] Damnjanović, *Strujanja*, 70.

[24] D. Vuksanović, *Filozofija medija I: ontologija, estetika, kritika* (Beograd: Fakultet dramskih umetnosti/Institut za pozorište, film, radio i televiziju, 2008); D. Vuksanović, *Filozofija medija II: ontologija, estetika, kritika* (Beograd: Fakultet dramskih umetnosti/Institut za pozorište, film, radio i televiziju, 2011); D. Vuksanović, *Filozofija medija III: ontologija, estetika, kritika* (Beograd: Fakultet dramskih umetnosti/Institut za pozorište, film, radio i televiziju, 2017).

[25] S. Petrović, *Negativna estetika: Schellingovo mesto u estetici nemačkog idealizma* (Niš: Gradina, 1972); S. Petrović, *Šeling protiv Hegela: Šelingova temeljna misao i 'meke forme'* (Beograd: Albatros plus, 2015).

it is Sreten Petrović who published more on Schelling.[25]

Sreten Petrović was also one of the main proponents of marxist aesthetics, at least in his early works, such as *Aesthetics and Ideology: Introduction to Meta-aesthetics* (*Estetika i ideologija: Uvod u metaestetiku*), *Marxist Aesthetics: Critique of the Aesthetic Mind* (*Marksistička estetika: kritika estetičkog uma*) and *Marxist Critique of Aesthetics: Contribution to Marx's ontology of creation* (*Marksistička kritika estetike: prilog Marksovoj ontologiji stvaranja*).[26] Recently, he is more interested in problems of contemporary art and new practices within its development, as well as in the question of the position and meaning that aesthetics should have within the horizon of new artforms.

Another author that was of marxistic orientation was Milan Ranković. As with Petrović, marxism marked his early works, such as *The Marxist Investigation of Art* (*Marksističko proučavanje umetnosti*), *Art and Marxism* (*Umetnost i marksizam*) and *Culture in Question: Current Problems of the Yugoslavian Culture* (*Kultura u pitanju: aktuelni problemi jugoslovenske kulture*).[27] Both of these prolific authors also contributed largely to the development of sociology of art in Serbia.[28] Together with Zurovac, they defined Serbian aesthetics after Damnjanović, but in opposition to him they were both especially interested in problems of art and culture. Ranković published a number of novels, while Petrović is more interested in painting and sculpture, often forging his philosophy through direct contact and comunication with the most famous Serbian artists.

As we can see, during the second half of the 20th century Serbian aesthetics gained both academic and institutional ground and position in the shaping of public views on art and culture. Although it was mainly developed under the influence of the most important tendencies in aesthetics in general, mostly the ones from Germany and France, gradually it reached the status of autonomous endeavour that only partly relies on great names in aesthetics and that present us with original accomplishments. Aesthetics gained such status in Serbia mostly through the work of the above commented Damnjanović, Zurovac, Petrović, Ranković and Uzelac. However, once gained, such status allowed for younger researchers, such as Grubor, Vuksanović and Draškić Vićanović, to extand their own investigations toward new fields and problems of aesthetics.

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[26] S. Petrović, *Estetika i ideologija: Uvod u metaestetiku* (Beograd: Vuk Karadžić, 1972); S. Petrović, *Marksistička estetika: kritika estetičkog uma* (Beograd: BIGZ, 1979); S. Petrović, *Marksistička kritika estetike: prilog Marksovoj ontologiji stvaranja* (Beograd: Prosveta, 1982).

[27] M. Ranković, *Marksističko proučavanje umetnosti* (Beograd: Prosvetni pregled, 1975); M. Ranković, *Umetnost i marksizam* (Beograd: Radnička štampa, 1975); M. Ranković, *Kultura u pitanju: aktuelni problemi jugoslovenske kulture* (Nikšić: Univerzitetska riječ, 1988).

[28] S. Petrović, *Estetika i sociologija: uvod u savremenu sociologiju umetnosti* (Beograd: Predsedništvo Konferencije SSOJ, 1975); S. Petrović, *Savremena sociologija umetnosti: estetika i sociologija* (Beograd: Privredni pregled, 1979); M. Ranković, *Sociologija umetnosti* (Beograd: Umetnička akademija, 1967); M. Ranković, *Opšta sociologija umetnosti* (Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva, 1996).

Concluding remarks

The above mentioned specific character of the 20th century Serbian aesthetics could now, after the presentation of its main philosophers and influences, be analyzed in a more precise manner. Namely, following Grubor, we claimed that the main problem of Serbian aesthetics is not any of its traditional issues – beauty, art or aesthetic experience, but the problem of the methodology of aesthetics. That is to say that the original endeavour of Serbian aesthetitians, if one should talk of it in such broad terms, is to be considered in terms of this crucial question. The development and the importance of this philosophical discipline in Serbia should also, at least in part, be seen as a consequence of dealings with this precise problem.

If we are to understand the development of Serbian aesthetics in the 20th century, we should take notice that both marxism and phenomenology, as the most important influences, were here accepted more as specific ways of thinking within aesthetics than as some given and finished positions, not to be subjected to further development or criticism. That is to say, in both cases these philosophies were not understood as something to be imitated or simply advocated, but as a specific background, the horizon in the realm of which the researcher could develop his own methodology and conceptual matrix. In terms of our most important question about aesthetics, the question of its methodology seems to be consistent: marxism and phenomenology served as possible orientations for the understanding of what is aesthetics and what should it be, and not as already defined and given answers on that qusetion.

This can be seen in the above mentioned example of the political engagement once expected from the aestheticians in Serbia. This recquired not just the simple qualification of some work of art in terms of its ideological value, but also some kind of projection of what art should be and how should it relate to the theory of art. Also, it pressuposed a sort of hermeneutic analysis, given that accepted values and standards are to be applied to ever new artworks. Therefore, the researschers that were orientated towards marxism understood their task as the task of making sense and non-sense within the field of aesthetics and art, not simply as a task of judging the works of art. In the case of phenomenology, it is clear that the very method of phenomenology is the main influence here: relying on that method, developed aesthetics could in advance be transparent and non-judgemental.

Finally, the question of methodology as the main question of Serbian aesthetics should, as we already suggested, be understood as a question of aesthetics as such – especially in terms of its immanent philosophical character. That is to say that Serbian aesthetitians were, more or less, aware of the peculiar status of their discipline in the context of Serbian philosophy in general, and that they felt the need to show that aesthetics is philosophical in character. Moreover, they felt the need to accentuate this philosophical character of aesthetics in terms of the precise account of its methodology and importance, making it possible for aesthetics to

become one of the most important domains of philosophical research in Serbia.

Such commitment is also to be seen in present Serbian aesthetics. On the one side, there is an interesting, almost traditional problem that marks the variety of research positions – namely, the question of the possible normative character of aesthetics, opposed to the idea that aesthetics should merely follow the development of art and give its description. On the other side, there is an increase of interest in new artistic practices and new media; as we can see, these two sides coincide in part. In the past few years ASS recognized such tendencies, which resulted in several annual conferences dedicated to these problems: for example, one that took place in 2013 examined the question of the *Crisis of Art and New Artforms*,[29] and the one that took place in 2014 was dedicated to the problem of *Actuality and the Future of Aesthetics*.[30] Therefore, we can conclude that the present Serbian aesthetics, as well as its future development, are clearly under the influence of its 20th century problems: in years to come we will probably witness new transformations of the problem of methodology in this discipline.

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[29] И. Драшкић Вићановић, Н. Грубор, У. Поповић, М. Новаковић, eds., *Криза уметности и нове уметничке праксе* (Београд: ЕДС, 2014).
[30] И. Драшкић Вићановић, Н. Грубор, У. Поповић, М. Новаковић, eds., *Актуелност и будућност естетике* (Београд: ЕДС, 2015).

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RESISTANCE TO OTHERNESS

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Abstract: *The author discloses European long-term tendency to interpret otherness as a threat. One presumes that social reality of the culture of difference is always a sort of a combat zone. The endless Christian confidence and routine approach towards cultural difference was uncovered as a result of self-justification by means of own absolute righteousness in the battle against evil. That field of operations coined the key mechanism which established the history of Christianity as a history of exclusion of the heterodox. The Rennaisance emphasis on the general and common was interpreted as a major civilizational leap forward, due to its creation of the preconditions for the acknowledgment and cultural appropriation of the cognitive praxis which were not even conceived, nor created in the wider framework of the European religion or civilization. Enlightenment activates image of the cultural differences as a means of the creation of an assumption for transcending our own cultural backwardness. The contemporary exchange of knowledge between cultures is dictated by market success or failure, because the knowledge which no one want to by becomes utterly irrelevant. In order to sell the difference, one creates the ideal "representatives" of it, following the strategy which combines ideological values of metropolis and exoticized image of foreignness. The author concludes that ideal representative of the difference does not show us a foreign world.*

Keywords: *difference, otherness, culture of knowledge, ideal representative.*

The classical Greek experience of the culture of difference was at the same time both encouraging and dramatic. It shows us that knowledge can be perceived as anything but power. It would be more appropriate to say that knowledge was the agent of activation of the power instances of the community, in order to protect itself from the possibility of change. If we take a closer look at this tradition of continued violent conflict with the concepts of different lifestyles and the establishment of different knowledge, we come to see that our contemporary understanding of the difference as an enriching feature is nothing but an attempt of amortization of the long-term tendency of the community to interpret otherness as a threat. The social reality of the culture of difference is per se a battleground.

Perhaps the historical development of Christian monotheism provides us with the most credible testament of the institutionalized practice of disablement

and neutralization of otherness. The eradication of the classical age culture of
knowledge presented the first condition of establishing a belief as the authentic
medium of establishing humanity. The function of Tertullian's rhetorical question
"What do the Academia and Golgotha have in common?" was to create, once and
for all, an unbridgeable gap, an annulment of knowledge as a possible opponent
– or rival – to belief. After science was practically exiled and the Academy closed,
the forms of otherness had nothing left but to manifest themselves through belief.
However, *heterodoxia* did not mean a neutral term for different forms of belief,
but hid in itself a dangerous potential to connect *heresy* and *choice*. Even though we
no longer see any type of connection between the two, the ancient Greek word
hairesis referred at first to the personal aspect of choice, which left a lasting mark
in the word *heresy* as well. To have a *different* belief was to have the *wrong belief*. At
the heart of a wrong belief was not an omission in theory, but a potentially fatal
wrong choice. Its crucial source is ethical, not cognitive. In the belief framework,
heresy was not reducible to otherness of convictions, but implied an utterly awful
and problematic personality without which the wrong choice would never have
been made. The correction of belief, therefore, becomes possible as a correction
of a person that makes a choice, and in line with that choice, makes decisions.
With that, the otherness of belief becomes a latent object of violence which styled
itself in an unblemished form of humanization. The steps to correct the wrong
choices have historically multiplied in various forms of coercion, ostracism and
elimination. Their endless confidence and routine self-legitimization was justified,
by default, by the absolute righteousness in the battle against evil. The origin of
evil was also well known. Beyond the metaphysical speculation, the seeds of evil
pointed to corruption, straying away and wickedness, features easily found in all
those subjects whose choices smelled of heterodoxy.

The archetype of purity, whose function Plato reserved for the practice of
philosophizing as an individual duty, necessary for *the purification of one's soul*, with
St. Paul achieves its form in plural and becomes reserved for a special quality
"of our" belief. Given that the attribute of impurity implied sickness, decay and
death for centuries, the separation from the impure, and their ostracism from the
community was an understandable act of preservation of the healthy, veracious
and "normal". Pointing out "For we are not as many, which corrupt the word
of God"[1], this evangelist of love opened a wide front in the war of the righteous
against the heretics. Above all, he noted the conflict with every form of different
understanding, with all forms of believing thought or action for which the *heteron*
is determined when compared to the official church dogma. The appearance of
otherness in the understanding of the Teaching is automatically branded as *an offence
against the Teaching*. Promising accursedness to all who confess "a gospel contrary to

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[1] St. Paul, *To the Corinthians* II, 2, 17.

what you received" (Gal, 1. 9.), St. Paul prophesized death to many. It initially hit all those different-thinking within the one faith, and then moved to the countless "pagans", beyond the Christian world. The key mechanism which established the history of Christianity as a history of exclusion of the heterodox was noted by Jan Assmann in the formation of the irrational belief as the essential specificity of the community: "Jewish criteria of affiliation, the abiding of the law, was replaced by Christians with 'belief' in Jesus as the Christ, in the salvation through Jesus. You do not 'believe' in the law, you abide by it […] the belief in Jesus as the Christ liberated the Christians from the Jewish law […] opening the door for different forms of political and theological re-paganization"[2].

Renaissance: The culture of translating the difference

If there is something to signify the renaissance as the rebirth of the spirit of classical antiquity, then it was the restoration of a more trustworthy relationship towards the knowledges and traditions which were created beyond the Christian cultural sphere. Greek polytheism was able to easily identify gods of other religions, and to name a Greek equivalent based on a most recognizable trait. The readiness to acknowledge the properties and qualities from other cultures is an essential trait of the renaissance way of thinking. It shows us how knowledge can become power only if we allow it to be what it is. The insight that knowledge was able to find its own place, during the most intensive "purifications" by the Inquisition, is most admirable. Perhaps its power indeed had to be witnessed through the sacrifices of those who held it. As if the introduction of the other and different knowledge is in direct correlation with the establishment of the chthonic, the underground, the most ancient. A specific ritual of the transition from one culture of knowledge into another is linked to the making of a sacrifice, with the execution of the bringer of news of the discovery of a different cognitive horizon. Because of that, the death of Socrates does not portend the death of Julius Caesar or Jesus, as was once suggested by Hegel, but the burning of Giordano Bruno. Sadistic capital punishment: to be burned at the stake for believing in knowledge. However, may we still claim the eternal validity of the rule according to which "when the purpose is achieved, they fall apart, the empty shells with no core"[3]?

Unlike Hegel that the dynamic of *diachrony* always leads to the ruin of historical individuals, the spirit of the renaissance emphasized above all the synchrony, thanks to which it seeks in all knowledges for the confirmations of the unique core. The renaissance humanism functioned with syncretism, a belief that one truth is articulated in different ways in religious teachings and mythological legends. If we consider that Giovanni Pico della Mirandola by default took into account

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[2] Jan Assmann, *Politische Theologie zwischen Ägypten und Israel* (München: Siemens Stiftung, 2006), 123-124.
[3] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1961), 76.

different cultural, religious and linguistic traditions to find the confirmation of
single-mindedness and harmony – "the dignity of the liberal arts, which I am about
to discuss, and their value to us is attested not only by the Mosaic and Christian
mysteries but also by the theologies of the most ancient times […]"[4] – then from
his perspective, the interpreters of the highest and the hardly attainable truths had
to be very competent translators. Based on the idea that the *inventio* is the greatest
achievement of the spirit of man, man is no longer convicted of the burdensome
mimicking of the eternal role models. He may now open the doors into the area
in which he will mostly face himself. The encounter of the Renaissance man with
himself liberated the perception of other cultures, and spurred the idea that all
creations of the spirit are mutually convertible. Even though we could see such
a model as productive and useful for the modern unification and levelling of the
ever-present differences, it should be pointed out that the renaissance translation
of the symbols from one religion or culture into another religion or culture was
founded on the premise that reality functionally never changes. Naiveté, which has
significantly devalued the results of the renaissance translational enthusiasm, came
from a completely ahistorical view that reality is the same everywhere, which in
turn meant that the differences are not all that different. It is clear that such a view
was the consequence of the intention to lessen the centuries-long Christian cultural
exclusivism, but we should also note that the "openness" of the Renaissance for
different knowledges from other religions and cultures was empowered thanks to
the neutralization of the diplomatic power of the difference. Focused on the unity
of the human spirit in its different iterations, the renaissance thinkers neglected the
power of the difference to present something unequal, which defied synthesis, to
be something "which can negate itself and change"[5].

On the other hand, if reality is the same everywhere, then it cannot be
changed even by the liveliest possible exchange of knowledge, which means that
is in essence immune to any type of translation. The emphasis on the general and
common in the case of the renaissance meant a major civilizational leap forward, as
it created the preconditions for the acknowledgment and appropriation cognitive
achievements which were not even conceived, nor created in the wider framework
of the European religion or civilization. However, the same emphasis had as a result
the differences becoming indifferent, as they could neither negate nor question
anything. There, where they were mutually indifferent, the differences lost their
specificity and stopped being valid. Therefore, one of the important lessons of the
renaissance experience is that an overtly aggressive emphasis on the general and the
common can hardly avoid the levelling, and in the final stage, the disappearance of
the different as such. And there, where nothing is considered different anymore,

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[4] Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, *Oration on the Dignity of Man*, trans. A. R. Caponigri (Chicago: H. Regnery
  Company, 1956), 25.
[5] Georg Wilchelm Friedrich Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik I*, Werke Band V (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,
  1969), 127.

nothing can be the same either. If the ancient lesson noted that the distance towards the other necessarily leads to self-execution, then the lesson we can obtain from the experience of the renaissance is that too much sensitivity towards the similarity in difference in the end has to be paid in the cancellation of identity, or the specific representation of the world in which – together with the disappearance of the difference between objects – the connection also fades. Starting with the renaissance, the human spirit reflects on itself. It no longer represents a speculum of a higher order but the confrontation with its own capacitates and deficits, with its own virtues and limitations. In that we can find the renaissance affirmation of the "philosophy of freedom"[6]. With its support, the road was pawed towards the century of enlightenment, or its core idea of the progress of humanity.

Enlightening the difference

Enlightenment changes the direction of the difference, as it no longer reflects on the difference between cultures, nor is its focus on the difference between its subjects. On the contrary, the difference is now displayed in the immanence of the subject. Because of this Diderot can say that his protagonist, Rameau, is more different from himself then from others. Enlightenment requires the individual to change – the change that requires us to ascend above immaturity or corruption. Because of this, the dynamic of the inner difference is crucial for enlightenment, and the instance that it induces must not remain irrelevant. The only way to recover from corruption is to establish firm and permanent communication channels with the incorrupt. The enlightenment thinkers do not tie the incorrupt with the privileged sphere of the *sacred* but with the representatives of those human characters that would have been considered outsiders. Overcoming one's immanent affections can be induced through the contact with the wild, childish and foreign. It thus became possible to use the construction of the cultural difference as a corrective against pathologies which are considered normal for the sole purpose of becoming the comprehensible, everyday part of our own culture. Montesquieu's image of the Parisian life from the perspective of Persians, activates the cultural differences as a means of recognition, caricature, or the creation of an assumption for transcending our own cultural backwardness. The Enlightenment's individuation of the difference goes hand in hand with the creation of the greatest possible generality. *Le Genre humain*, the human kind, represents a loan from biology, which, though the historization of knowledge became the basis of the optimistic view, was founded on the idea that tomorrow will be better, and more ingenious.

Truth be told, the promoters of the idea of the human kind did not plan on promoting the vertical anthropological hierarchy. Inspired by egalitarian ideas,

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[6] Jean Delumeau, *La civilisation de la renaissance* (Paris: Arthaud, 2005), 358.

Turgot points out that "The human kind, always the same in its turns, like seawater in a storm, always moves to its perfection"[7]. However, the liberal orientation did not stop the French philosopher of history to also note that "unequal progress" necessarily fades, because in the long-term temporal perspective the tempo of progress becomes levelled. With that, the sole problem can be seen in the knowing that "the world is not eternal", which means the mutual economical oncoming of nations with a drastically different level of development will have to wait. Until such time, we can only state that the model of progress under the auspices of the entire human kind has given an amazing opportunity for one side to consider itself superior to the other.

Even though, thanks to the Enlightenment's emancipation of the difference, for the first time we see the opportunity to have the specificities of a foreign cultures become useful as incentives for encouraging home-grown practices, the imperative of progress will take lead in the intercultural communication. The status of the progressive, leading and "modern" will, until this day, preserve its aura, in whose background we will see the practice of casting aside or ignoring the insufficiently progressive, backwards, "non-modern". Through that, the same epoch of Enlightenment can be presented as the period of the emancipation of the difference, but also as the foundation of the long-lasting manifestation of the difference between cultures. It is not by accident that the Enlightenment's emancipatory principle emanated in the individual plane, while the idea of universal progress of the entire human kind is rightfully accused as the key stronghold of imperialism, colonialism, assimilation: "Civilization by itself becomes the criteria of value: the judgment is passed in the name of civilization […] it was allowed even to ask for the greatest sacrifice in the name of civilization, which means that in the service or defence of civilization, if need be, it is justifiable to use violence. The uncivilized and the savage must be stopped from bringing harm if they cannot be educated or converted"[8]. The 18th century discovery of the subjectivity of national language and national spirit is proof enough that enlightenment did not focus solely on the individual and the general, as even today, the imprint it made on the specific is still valid. The occupant of Plato's cave, who desperately tries to leave the kingdom of shadows, and to converse with the characters of the true reality, through Enlightenment takes the form of the *collective subject* and becomes the *national spirit*, for which the creative work on language is the base feature. Exaltation becomes possible as a collective act, enabled through the mutual action of all actors within a language community. It is mostly intersubjective, a social achievement, and not an individual feat.

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[7] Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot, *Discours sur l'histoire universelle*, Œuvres II (Osnabrück: Otto Zeller, 1966), 628.
[8] Žan Starobinski, *Od boljke i lek. Kritika i opravdanje pritvornosti u veki prosvećenosti*, trans. T. Đurin (Sremski Karlovci/Novi Sad: IKZS, 2014), 36.

From colonialism to market historicism

The variations of the Enlightenment's instrumentalisation of difference and the appropriation of otherness found their place in the strategies of the colonial powers: "The initial phase of the wise adjustment and improvisation is joined by the second phase of assimilation - the adaptations of the foreigners to us"[9]. From there, most of the protest against the European tradition, whose addressants had the respect outside of the European cultural roots in common, could be read as a means of resistance against the *second phase of assimilation*, whose consequence is the denigration of the entire "oriental thought", or in European terms, being accused of nurturing the shameful "logical Balkans"[10].

Following the criticism of orientalism, the official rhetoric of all the participants in the cultural knowledge exchange shows that it no longer wishes to be associated in any way with the colonial concepts of otherness. Instead of the former logic of unequal development and imperial "uplifting" of otherness, the lead role has now been taken by the *market shaped historicism*. The ideology of historicism primarily states that there are no qualitative differences between cultures. Every culture should be regarded as an individual with its own tempo, but also as something beyond any comparison, a specific self, something distinct, that cannot be attributed to any other individual. Through that, the statement that every culture has something important to deliver is created. However, the crucial question here relates to the position from which we deduce what is actually important.

The actual exchange of knowledge between cultures is dictated by two conditions. The first relates to the market opportunities. Knowledge that no one will buy becomes irrelevant and doomed to failure. Considering that the market is not prone to ideological censorship, it will strongly promote even the most rigid criticism of current western ideology, provided it sells well. It is pointless to accuse the market for non-democratic action. On the contrary, it will, even with the spiritual sciences, incite ideological colours of the entire spectrum, like the Benetton Company, as long as they contribute to better sales and increased profits. Market opportunities in the exchange of the culture of knowledge get a significant help from the other condition which implies a representational demonstration of the difference. Why does the market follow the logic of the marketing industry and, instead of true quality, always support the stereotypical idea of "true representatives"?

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[9] Hinrich Fink-Eitel, *Die Philosophie und die Wilden. Über die Bedeutung des Fremden für die europäische Geistesgeschichte* (Hamburg: Junius, 1994), 105.

[10] The term "logical Balkans" dates back in 1879, and we owe it to a Hegelian – Friedrich Theodor Vischer. His expressed "colonial", or pejorative interpretation of the term comes from labeling utter confusion, which is not even at the level of opposites anymore, but at the level of pure chaos, as "Balkan". Friedrich Theodor Vischer, "Mode und Zynismus", in *Die Listen der Mode*, ed. S. Bovenschen (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986), 62.

Emphasizing the moment of representation in correlation with the immanent scientific criteria is necessary because of the modern *crisis of the difference*. Regardless of whether its origin is tied to the "democratization of the foreign"[11] in the post-industrial societies, in which the empirical basis of the former homogenic identity has been lost, or whether it's the saturation with the everyday media presence of foreigners in the global village, there is no doubt that the modern claim for foreignness cannot be even remotely compared with the rich supply. By its own, the difference in modern societies has lost its former exclusivity: "The Other, by losing all of his fullness, is no longer hostile or confrontational, but *indifferent*."[12] Keeping in mind the loss of interest for the difference, the initially fragile market opportunities get strengthened by the additional argument that we are not dealing with just any difference, but an exclusive difference, because it represents in an exclusive manner, the midst from which it originates.

The postcolonial logic rightfully insists on self-representation. Unlike the colonial approach which denies the voice of the foreign in advance and speaks for it, the modern stance lets it present itself and speak freely on its own behalf. However, after a decennial practice of postcolonial thinking, we would expect the flourishing of translational activities, thanks to which Indian, Chinese, Brazilian or African intellectuals and novelists would be represented in our libraries and book stores more than ever. If the distinguished representatives of certain countries or regions finally have a chance to present themselves in a manner they think they should be understood, then it is to be expected that our knowledge of those countries and regions is significantly more serious than that of the generations before us. So why do such expectations always have a disappointing outcome?

According to Vladimir Tasic, a Novi Sad mathematician and novelist who has been teaching for over two decades at the New Brunswick University in Canada, the flourishing of the exchange within the global culture of knowledge never happened because the dominant cultures consistently uphold to the strict terms of acceptability. Unlike the *hard sciences* in which cultural differences play an insignificant role, as the exchange is broken down to instrumentalisation[13] of knowledge accumulated by others, with no interest for the cultural foundations such knowledge creates, in the things related to the cultural exchange, the lead is still carried by the inherited oppositions – metropole vs. periphery, or prestige vs. anonymity.

This means that there is no direct communication with the countries and languages in which the noted authors live and work. On the contrary, the first condition of acceptability is reduced to the *place of production* of the exclusive

[11] Ulrich Bielefeld, "Exklusive Gesellschaft und inklusive Demokratie", in *Faszination und Schrecken des Fremden*, ed. R.-P. Janz (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2001), 41.
[12] Gilles Lipovetsky, *L'ère du vide. Essais sur l'individualisme contemporain* (Paris: Gallimard, 1983), 78.
[13] Shingo Shimada, *Grenzgänge-Fremdgänge. Japan und Europa im Kulturvergleich* (Frankfurt am Main-New York: Campus, 1994), 227.

representation of the difference. This place can only be the metropole, not the periphery. Tasic, who writes natively in Serbian, convincingly points out that Khaled Hosseini, Azar Nafisi, Moshin Hamid, Jhumpa Lahiri, Ha Jin, M. G. Vassanji, all come from different countries (Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, India, China, Kenya), but the biographical similarities between them are far more striking that the differences: all graduated from elite Western universities, all write in English and are one way or the other, thematically tied to their country of origin. Such a policy of representation practically means that the metropole does not dare directly import cultural goods. It also implies the ancient tendency to buy raw material from the "third world", and then sell it back to them, meanwhile refined. Of course, in this situation, the raw materials are gifted young men and women, and their refinement is the education in elite Western universities. The triumph of the entire process is ensured if it so happens that those authors become authoritative, esteemed voices in their countries of origin, backed up by the "international success" and the recognition of elite western institutions.

Instead of translating the most significant works written in the country of origin, the metropole rather favours the intermediate way, in which the representatives of the periphery are conditioned on a long-term plan to become exclusive representatives of their own countries. That conditioning is not so much related to adopting certain contents, but to adopting the formatting, which is to serve as a sort of lens through which the difference should be displayed. Adopting the perspective of the metropole in a personal representation of the periphery becomes more convincing, mostly thanks to a more or less painful emigrants' experience. As if the only "true" contact between the cultures and knowledge can happen only if it's attested by a person who is "neither here, nor there"? That sort of double allegiance is especially seductive, because it implies the absence of a stable reference framework, whose "hybrid" productivity lies on the free movement between the peripheral world of origin and the reality of the metropole. However, according to Tasic, there are few indicators that attribute to Said's strategy of immanent subversion of the metropole' hegemony. The market with its official theoretical support, for now, presents an unbridgeable obstacle for its plementation. Unlike the hope in the subversive action of emigrants in the heart of the metropole, Tasic points out that their work perfectly reflects the modern imperative of neoexoticism: "Neoexotic must fit into the system of expectations and symbolic exchange, it must be recognizable. It must be tamed, but not as before, with the help of theoretical subduing or colonial violence: it must tame itself and show that it wants to be tamed"[14].

Unlike the old, naïve exoticism which bragged about the things that it was not familiar with, neoexoticism is a far more complex phenomenon. The difference

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[14] Vladimir Tasić, *Udaranje televizora. Kolebanje postkulture* (Novi Sad: Adresa, 2009), 84-85.

is no longer displayed form the position of complete protection and is self-explanatory superior to what is being displayed. On the contrary, it is revealed by an "authentic" representative, who lives and works in the metropole, and also writes in its language. No matter how well situated he may be in the metropole, the authentic representative has interiorised the moment of non-domestication and sense of not belonging. Should we ask ourselves, why the drama of personal existential foreignness is so highly appreciated, the above noted *horizon of expectations* will help us with that dilemma.

The superficial, mediated discussion about the difference is not as convincing if it's not presented by a strong subjectivity, one completely domesticated and happy in the metropole. The presentation of the difference must not appear to be condescending, coming from a well situated and confident subject: that way, it would resemble the colonial presentations of foreignness. A subject whose bond to his homeland proves to be especially firm and solid is also unacceptable. Such a subject would be immune to the perspective of the metropole, and thus out of the question, as he/she could not be differentiated from the natives from his/her country of origin. What is left is the position of a vulnerable, meek subject who experienced certain advantages and charms of his/her country of origin, but the outside power (politics, ideology) prevented him/her from enjoying those. That fragile subject is aware of the advantages of the metropole, but at the same time does not lose sight of the unfeasible desire to belong to it, to merge with it completely.

His/her position floats and wavers between two impossibilities: the complete affiliation which is externally disrupted and the chronically incomplete assimilation. The existential framework from which he/she speaks is marked by the essential discomfort in the present. That discomfort enhances his/her vigilance and further sharpens his/her perception of the world. On the other hand, the experience of undomestication and not belonging gifts him/her with a strong sense of freedom, which is followed by an even greater degree of independence and a more relaxed attitude towards reality.

Because of this, we consider the modern representative of the difference to be strategically manufactured in the metropole as an *ideotypical image of our age*. Like a conjointment of vigilance and relaxation, it is the embodiment of the neoliberal spirit, in which not belonging and vigilance are necessary because of the desirable mobility on the labour market, and also for gaining elasticity which will come in very handy after losing a job, difficult working conditions or an absent security in life. On the other hand, the relaxed attitude will enable him/her to successfully cope with these troubles. Unlike the domesticated subject whose tensions surfaces with every disruption of the pre-set balance, the conjointment of vigilance and relaxation will help our subject recover no matter how bad thing get. The ideal representative of the difference thus does not just show us a foreign world. What he/she does on the narrative plain can be considered secondary when compared to the sophisticated optics thanks to which, like a common thread, it pulls through an

ideology of a desirable life attitude in our own contemporaneity.

Reinhard Koselek has taught us that the discord between the real situation and the horizon of expectations creates a crisis. However, we do consider that *the origin of the crisis of the modern social sciences is intricately tied to the overly met horizon of expectations of the metropole.* In fact, the problem with the production of the difference via its ideal representatives is that it neutralizes and wipes out the foreignness of that difference. Being respectful of the perspective of the metropole, they display the difference in accordance with the expectations, strictly minding that they do not step out of the hermeneutical frameworks they have adopted during their education and life in the metropole. With that they willingly "tame" the difference, erasing from all their products the different models of memory, disloyal understanding of history (disloyal to the metropole), censoring the heterogenic values and moral criteria. All of this is removed from the display by the representatives, as an unwanted "wilderness", incomprehensibility and foreignness. Instead of a productive dialog with the difference, they actually perpetuate the same, already seen and explored. Hence, the perspective of the metropole brings nothing new. If so, we could note that the burden of responsibility falls on the countries that are not in the centre of cultural production and the elite educational system. It indeed seems reasonable to reprimand the periphery that it needs to try harder to become visible in the metropole. It is highly probable that because of such remarks, for decades there have been state funds created specifically to help the translation of indigenous, domestic authors, mostly into English. Regardless of the fact that fiction is the sole beneficiary here, that works from the fields of social sciences have almost zero chance of getting state support, we do consider that the situation would remain the same, even if the countries quadrupled their funds for translations, and translate into English the entirety of their production in the field of social sciences.

When making attempts to face the criteria of the metropole, such attempts have no chance as they do not meet the above mentioned horizon of expectations. What the metropole needs, it can produce on its own, while the foreign contents seem like a principle of endangering whose criteria are made from beyond the system. Such a constellation is responsible for the drastic reduction in quality of production in the periphery. In fact, being frustrated with the near certain failure if it disobeys the criteria of the metropole, the periphery takes on the same matrix, and creates its own products *as if they were* the products of the metropole. In that manner, it mostly neutralizes what it has to offer, and that is a different, dissimilar view. Seeing things in a different manner implies seeing different things. Refusing that, in mimicking the metropole, the periphery adopts its horizon of expectations. Through that, it enables a voluntary colonization. In the alleged tendency to escape provincialization, it becomes even more provincialized. Its products by default become the pale shadows of the metropole. The alternative to the voluntary colonization is argued by Vladimir Tasic by calling the authors of the periphery to remain true to their mother tongue: "The resistance is what the theoretical branch

of the hegemony presents as a futile nonsense: emancipated writing, ambitious and courageous writing, learning from the best and creating a hybrid literature in the best sense of the word, but one that is created in its own language, which lives in that language and does not enviously glance at the media success in the metropole"[15].

However, even if somewhere the audacity and freshness are preserved, the results in the metropole will be equally weak. The breakthrough of the foreign contents into the heart of the metropole is destined to fail in advance as the metropole mechanisms of choice of the "ideal representatives" do not allow that. Speaking of the cognitive achievements of other cultures, it actually speaks about itself and affirms itself as the unmatched and irreplaceable standard of cognitive policy. With that in mind, it is clearer why the "critical discourse, as it currently functions in the West proves to be surprisingly homogenous […] that homogeneity is greatly attributed to the fact that the critical discourse in the West primary circulates as goods on the media market"[16].

The homogeneity of the critical discourse is perhaps the most solid signal that the culture of difference, which we have pointed out as the source and foundation of Western civilization, is at an all-time low. The plea for the *reconstitution of the culture of difference* would have been a worthy response to the phenomenon named by Bernhard Valdenfels as *disassociation of modernity*. Being that it is constituted in thanks to the radical asymmetry, modernity must by default deviate as: "the instance which excludes the foreign at the same time rejects all that it itself means to the foreign. The Exclusion of the foreign takes on the shape of self-exclusion […] the foreign expands inward"[17]. The productivity of the meeting with the knowledge of other cultures is based on the premise that the relation with the foreign cannot be reduced to the relation of the subject and object. On the contrary, it inevitably includes a certain relationship of the singularity with itself. However, that feedback loop of the relationship with the foreign is never revealed in the form of a triumphant acclamation of selfness after a successful showdown with the foreign. The defeat of the foreign does not imply the strengthening of the singularity. The settling of accounts with the foreign does not benefit but hinders the singularity. On the other hand, during the meeting with the foreign which does not lean toward exclusion, we have an opportunity to see the limits of our insights from within. With that we actually work towards a dynamic of our own scientific culture.

We doubt in the usefulness of the exchange which implies in advance acclamation and agreement. Instead of a programed harmony between the singularity and the foreign we endorse the capacities of the foreign to bring in additional dynamics into the scientific area. Because of that, it is necessary to go

[15] Tasić, *Udaranje televizora*, 110.
[16] Boris Groys, *Das kommunistische Postskriptum* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2006), 69.
[17] Bernhard Waldenfels, *Der Stachel des Fremden* (Frankfurt am/M.: Suhrkamp, 1990), 33.
[18] Johannes Feichtinger, *Wissenschaft als reflexives Projekt* (Bielefeld: Transit, 2010), 535.

back to translation work and cultural exchange which will come from all directions, and to understand that their starting points and lines of movement must not necessarily cross. Only then can we provide a proper resistance to the asymmetrical exchange and conduct "the politics of anti-politics"[18].

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PLACEBO: DECEPTION AND THE NOTION OF AUTONOMY

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Abstract: *In this short essay I intent to discuss the moral standing of autonomy in the field of Medical Ethics and the way it affects individual decision making as well as health care policies. To this purpose I will employ a real life scenario, namely administering placebo medication to a patient without letting him know, by means of which I will challenge not only the effectiveness and the feasibility of autonomy in the Kantian sense, but also its desirability. I will argue that the Kantian notion of autonomy when it comes to Medical Ethics is in some cases self-defeating and, therefore, confusing and misleading. I will conclude with the view that, at least as Medical Ethics is concerned, we should rethink and, maybe, revise the meaning we usually assign to autonomy, so as to take into account the particular nature of the doctor-patient relationship.*

Keywords: *autonomy, disclosure, Kantian ethics, Medical Ethics, placebo, deception, doctor-patient relationship.*

Introduction

Major philosophical traditions do not just perish; they always leave something behind and continue to cast their shadow on the way we think, perceive the world, make our decisions and interact with other people. This is *a fortiori* the case with major traditions in ethics, since ethical theories are by definition purposed to have as much impact as they can afford on everyday life. When it comes to Medical Ethics, this couldn't be truer than with regard to the Kantian tradition, still the most influential ethical system in western medicine, since its core element and cornerstone, the principle of autonomy of the moral agent, has become the most central value in health-care ethics. In this short essay I intent to discuss the moral standing of autonomy in the field of Medical Ethics and the way it affects individual decision making as well as health care policies. To this purpose I will employ a real life scenario, namely administering placebo medication to a patient without letting him know, by means of which I will challenge not only the effectiveness and the feasibility of autonomy in the Kantian sense, but also its desirability. I will argue that the Kantian notion of autonomy when it comes to Medical Ethics is in some cases self-defeating and, therefore,

confusing and misleading. I will conclude with the view that, at least as Medical Ethics is concerned, we should rethink and, maybe, revise the way we understand autonomy, so as to take into account the particular nature of the doctor-patient relationship.

The notion of autonomy

Autonomy in general, everybody can tell, is not an easy goal to pursue; by this I mean not only that it is hard to achieve, but also that an autonomous life is not a convenient fashion to live after. In medical practice, in particular, most of the times autonomy comes at the expense of effectiveness and utility; nevertheless, no matter what each time the stake is, almost all codes of medical ethics or professional conduct clearly mandate that autonomy should be sought, preserved and safeguarded by all means. This is due to the fact that on the one hand the autonomy of the patient is usually quite vulnerable, and on the other because it is precious – in the words of Kant the property of autonomy is the ground of dignity of the human and of every rational nature, as well as the sole principle of morality. To cast more light on this view I will provide a brief outline of the way Kant perceives autonomy.

According to Kant,

"The will is a species of causality of living beings, insofar as they are rational, and freedom would be that quality of this causality by which it can be effective independently of alien causes determining it; just as natural necessity is the quality of the causality of all beings lacking reason, of being determined to activity through the influence of alien causes."[1]

In that sense freedom and free will appear to be either interwoven, bound up, or even identical to autonomy[2], the latter defined by Kant as "the property of the will through which it is a law to itself."[3] But why is autonomy the ground of dignity? In order to fully grasp this we have to move back to Seneca and his pivotal

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[1] Immanuel Kant, *The Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, edited and translated by Allen Wood (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002), 63 [Ak 4:446].

[2] Ibid., 63 [Ak 4:447]: "[…] what else, then, could the freedom of the will be, except autonomy, i.e., the quality of the will of being a law to itself? […] thus a free will and a will under moral laws are the same". Cf. 66, [Ak 4:449]: "It therefore appears as if in the idea of freedom we really only presupposed the moral law, namely the principle of the autonomy of the will itself, and could not prove its reality and objective necessity for itself"; also 66 [Ak 4:450]: "One must freely admit it that a kind of circle shows itself here, from which, it seems, there is no way out. In the order of efficient causes we assume ourselves to be free in order to think of ourselves as under moral laws in the order of ends, and then afterward we think of ourselves as subject to these laws because we have attributed freedom of the will to ourselves, for freedom and the will giving its own laws are both autonomy,hence reciprocal concepts, of which, however, just for this reason, one cannot be used to define the other and provide the ground for it, but at most only with a logical intent to bring various apparent representations of the same object to a single concept (as different fractions with the same value are brought to the lowest common denominator)"; finally 69 [Ak 4:452]: "Now with the idea of freedom the concept of autonomy is inseparably bound up".

[3] Ibid.,58 [Ak 4:440].

distinction between *pretium* and *dignitas*. "Bodily goods are", Seneca claims, "good for the body; but they are not absolutely good. There will indeed be some value in them; but they will possess no genuine merit, for they will differ greatly; some will be less, others greater."[4] Tagging along with Seneca Kant claims that,

> "In the realm of ends everything has either a price or a dignity. What has a price is such that something else can also be put in its place as its equivalent; by contrast, that which is elevated above all price, and admits of no equivalent, has dignity. That which refers to universal human inclinations and needs has a market price; that which, even without presupposing any need, is in accord with a certain taste, i.e., a satisfaction in the mere purposeless play of the powers of our mind, an affective price; but that which constitutes the condition under which alone something can be an end in itself does not have merely a relative worth, i.e., a price, but rather an inner worth, i.e., dignity. Now morality is the condition under which alone a rational being can be an end in itself, because only through morality is it possible to be a legislative member in the realm of ends. Thus morality and humanity, insofar as it is capable of morality, is that alone which has dignity."[5]

And since being capable of morality requires free agency, to wit agency "as a special kind of causality, namely a causality that acts under normative principles, hence a capacity to choose between alternatives according to one's judgment about which alternative is permitted or required by a norm"[6], autonomy is "the ground of the dignity of the human and of every rational nature."[7] To make a long story short: the property of rationality extracts mankind from the realm of natural heteronomy and facilitates free agency, in other words autonomy. Autonomy is a *conditio sine qua non* for morality[8], and morality in turn is thus the ground of dignity for human beings.[9]

Autonomy and real-life scenarios

Let's move to the way Kant's account of autonomy affects real life issues

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[4] Seneca, *Ad Lucilium epistulae morales*, translated by Richard Gummere (London: William Hainemann, 1970), vol. II, LXXI 33-34: "Corporumautem bona corporibusquidem bona sunt, sed in totum non sunt bona. His pretium quidem erit aliquod, ceterum dignitas non erit; magnis inter se intervalis distabunt; alia minora, alia maiora erunt". "Genuine merit" (dignitas) is often also translated as "true worth": see Seneca, *Letters On Ethics to Lucilius*, translated with intro and commentary by Margret Graver and A. A. Long (University of Chicago Press 2015), p. 221.

[5] Kant, *The Groundwork*, 52-53 [Ak 4:434-5].

[6] Allen W. Wood, "What Is Kantian Ethics?", in Immanuel Kant, *The Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, edited and translated by Allen Wood,157-181 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002), 175.

[7] Kant, *The Groundwork*, 54 [Ak 4:436].

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

now. Pursuant to the view I just outlined, almost all codes of medical ethics and professional conduct incorporate strict provisions forbidding the doctor or the medical staff not to tell the truth or not to disclose all crucial and relevant information to the patient.[10] The reason for this is that if the doctor was allowed the freedom to do otherwise, the autonomy of the patient would be severely compromised, and he – the patient – instead of being treated "always at the same time as an end in itself"[11], would be reduced to just a mere means to an end; and, as shown before, compromising one's autonomy is unacceptable regardless of the stake: should it be the convenience of the doctor or the medical staff, or the effective allocation of resources, or even the patient's own best interests, all these have to be cast aside if they are to come through lying, concealing the truth or withholding information, since all such options would be violating the patient's autonomy. To rephrase Ronald Dworkin's famous aphorism, autonomy tramps utility[12], and this admits of no circumstantial exceptions.

Doesn't it? Well, in a Kantian universe this would definitely be the case. But our universe, the only one we will ever know, is not such stuff as Kantian principles or imperatives are made on – at least *not only* such stuff. In real life autonomy may have to be sometimes balanced with utility, at least inasmuch as the patient himself looks up to the doctor not as a champion of autonomy, but just as a healer or a life giver.

To make this clear, let us consider a case in which a patient could have either his autonomy respected and preserved, or his health condition successfully treated. What should prevail then? Let the situation be like this: John is 40 years old and he is married to Jane 5 years already. John two years ago had to go through some extremely difficult situations that emerged all together at the same time, exactly as difficult situations usually tend to do in the life of humans: first he had to deal with his mother passing away, to whom he was strongly attached; a few months later he lost his job, so there was only Jane's salary for both of them to live on. The combination of these two personal calamities drove him into a plight which probably triggered some inherent – up to then inert – genetic tendency, and soon John was diagnosed with major depression disorder. This, of course, became a huge impediment to his personal as well as social life, so John had to ask for an expert's help. Luckily enough in John's case MDD could be successfully controlled, but only by means of a carefully designed and complex therapy. John's doctor, however, is rather reluctant to proceed with such a therapy. He has been made aware of John's and Jane's fervent wish to acquire offspring, and he knows that they both now are at their peak years of fertility. John's therapy, highly effective as it may

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[10] T. Goffin, Herman Nys, Pascal Borry and Kris Dietrickx, "Patient Rights in the EU - Greece", *European Ethical-Legal Papers* 6, Leuven, 2007.
[11] Kant, *The Groundwork*, 55 [Ak 4:437].
[12] Ronald Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1978), 190-192.

be, as a side effect largely reduces – if not totally eliminates – sexual desire. Since the therapy is going to last for as long as John lives, John and his wife are unlikely to ever have any children without resorting to assisted reproduction services – but it doesn't seem likely they will ever be able to afford such services given their poor financial condition. This puzzle would be impossible, but actually there seems to be a way out: placebo[13] treatments have been tested to be almost as effective in the case of major depression disorder as conventional ones. As a matter of fact clinical trials show that depression is a highly placebo-responsive condition: mean placebo response rises up to 46%, while mean standard medication response is as high as 59%[14]; this 13% superiority gap on behalf of conventional medication may easily be compensated by the total absence of side effects when placebo medication is administered. In short, if the doctor decides to administer sugar pills to John, John would have almost equally good chances to maintain his condition under control and he will definitely acquire offspring. There is only a minor setback: John shouldn't be aware of the fact that he is receiving sugar pills; he should have to be deceived into believing that he still receives conventional medication, otherwise responsive rates would fall at as low as 18%. But deciding for a placebo prescription is not even an option for John's doctor, since if the doctor would decide to withhold the truth he would compromise John's autonomy and, hence, he would severely damage his morality and dignity, not to mention that this would be against the law and would leave the doctor vulnerable to law suits. The fact that he would be doing so in order only to benefit John would be morally irrelevant, since, as I previously said, *autonomy trumps* utility in any case and irrespective of any anticipated benefit.

Autonomy as a safety-valve: A utilitarian account

As I previously implied, utility issues should be considered irrelevant in the case of John and John's doctor. Contemporary Bioethics seems to assume some kind of threshold after which all concerns regarding the utility of any choice of ours become totally transparent, although just before it they are as tangible as it

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[13] Placebo is "a preparation containing no medicine (or no medicine related to the complaint) and administered to cause the patient to believe that he is receiving treatment." Pedro Luis Dago and Frederic M. Quitkin, "Role of the Placebo in Depressive Disorders", *CNS Drugs* 4 (1995): 335-340; according to Shapiro the term placebo applies to "any therapy or component of therapy that is deliberately used for its nonspecific, psychological, or psychophysiological effects, or that is used for its presumed specific effect, but is without specific activity for the condition being treated." See Arthur K. Shapiro, "A Historic and Heuristic Definition of the Placebo", *Psychiatry* 27 (1964): 52-58. Brody defines placebo as "a form of medical therapy, or an intervention designed to simulate medical therapy, that at the time of use is believed not to be a specific therapy for the condition for which it is offered and that is used either for its psychological effect or to eliminate observer bias in an experimental setting; [or is] a form of medical therapy now believed to be inefficacious, though believed efficacious at the time." See Howard Brody, "Placebo Effect", in Leonard White, Bernard Tursky and Gary E. Schwartz (eds.), *Placebo: Theory Research and Mechanisms*, 39–49 (New York Guilford Press: New York, 1985).

[14] Jeffrey A. Bridge, Boris Birmaher, Satish Iyengar, Rémy P. Barbe & David A. Brent, "Placebo Response in Randomized Controlled Trials of Antidepressants for Pediatric Major Depressive Disorder", *American Journal of Psychiatry* 166 (2009): 42-49. See also Bret R. Rutherford and Steven P. Roose, "A Model of Placebo Response in Antidepressant Clinical Trials", *American Journal of Psychiatry* 170 (2013): 723-733.

gets; the threshold, of course, is the potentially effect on autonomy of the moral agent, a capacity that should be preserved by all means. Strangely enough, the assumption of such a threshold seems equally plausible and justifiable to Kantian as well as to utilitarian ethicists – when it comes to the latter, especially to *rule utilitarian* ones. You see, unshakable respect for moral agents' autonomy, apart from being an utter mandate that emanates straight from pure reason and the moral law as Kantian bioethicist would put it, is also a perfectly functional safety valve in the eyes of those who entertain a fervent concern for utility issues.

An *act utilitarian* would definitely find repulsive or, at best, awkward the assumption that in the case of John blind respect towards an abstract notion such as autonomy should prevail instead of the best interests of the patient. But act utilitarians should consider themselves a rare breed, as Richard Mervyn Hare has argued.[15] In order to be able to successfully determine whether the autonomy of any patient should be respected or overridden, a doctor should be able to judge according to a kind of information that is usually inaccessible to humans: he should be fully aware of his patient's priorities, beliefs and preferences, not to mention the medical particularities of his individual case; at the same time, he should be perfectly sure that the best outcome – not only as far as his patient is concerned, but also from the point of view of the universe[16] – would result from disregarding the patient's autonomy in the face of the anticipated benefits. This, however, calls for accessibility to data and intellectual powers (probably including the power of divination, also) that only seers may possess, but not ordinary people. Since, however, act utilitarians are not Hare's Archangels, but ordinary individuals as all other ethicists, they are entirely justified to entertain strong doubts concerning their aptness to be flexible when it comes to autonomy issues, mostly because "the axiom of universal benevolence that tells us to maximize the good, impartially"[17] is not safe-guarded when respect for autonomy is left upon individual and circumstantial assessment.

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[15] See R. M. Hare, *Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method and Point* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), especially chapter "The Archangel and the Prole", 44-64.

[16] When it comes to balancing benefits against potential risks or harms, the real issue is the point of view those are to be assessed from. See Henry Sidgwick's unique suggestion in his *Methods of Ethics* (London: McMillan, 1907), 382: "So far we have only been considering the 'Good on the Whole' of a single individual: but just as this notion is constructed by comparison and integration of the different 'goods' that succeed one another in the series of our conscious states, so we have formed the notion of Universal Good by comparison and integration of the goods of all individual human or sentient existences. And here again, just as in the former case, by considering the relation of the integrant parts to the whole and to each other, I obtain the self-evident principle that the good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view (if I may say so) of the Universe, than the good of any other; unless, that is, there are special grounds for believing that more good is likely to be realised in the one case than in the other. And it is evident to me that as a rational being I am bound to aim at good generally, so far as it is attainable by my efforts, not merely at a particular part of it". For a thorough analysis of Sidgwick's views see Katarzyna De Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer, *The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and Contemporary Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

[17] De Lazari-Radek, *The Point of View*, xii.

In other words, although a patient's best interests would be definitely better served if his doctor disregarded autonomy-related concerns and focused exclusively on the potential benefits for his condition, it is quite doubtful whether this would impartially maximize *the good* from the point of view of the universe: such an attitude might also well result – if generalized, and under circumstances that are not at all rare in the history of mankind – in maximizing overall harm and reducing overall good. Absolute respect for autonomy – in any case and irrespective of the anticipated outcome – is the best tool available to prevent the dreadful possibility of a new Holocaust, or just to avoid be left pray to the caprices of fate and individual moral tendencies or dispositions.

The upshot is that autonomy-related issues in Medical Ethics and Bioethics seem to be more adequately addressed by rule-utilitarianism approaches, and this is probably no less obvious to moral agents – or ethicists – who have a soft spot for act-utilitarianism. After all, in Hare's view, there are only a few situations one can justifiably boast for Archangel-like powers, and only then may one opt for act-utilitarian judgment; autonomy-related issues, however, do not seem to be suitable for such ventures. Therefore, it would call for something more than utility-based objections to challenge the dominant role of autonomy in Medical Ethics and Bioethics.

Autonomy revisited

Anyway, utility-based arguments against autonomy (and vice versa: autonomy-based arguments against utility) probably provide the perfect definition of a poor philosophical debate: they can only convince those who have already been convinced, or those who are about to be; to anybody else, however, they are as good as thin air. In other words, utility concerns may have effect only on utilitarian or utility-concerned ethicists, but by no means on those who pursue such issues form within the Kantian tradition – the latter are anyway steadily fixed on rightfulness. In general, to be rightfully challenged a moral view should be shown inherently defective and inconsistent – and this especially applies to deeply-rooted key ones, such as the views that concern on the one hand the moral standing of autonomy in medical practice, and on the other the very import of the notion when it comes to such issues.

Respect for one's autonomy in its strict sense (the way most Kantian ethicists understand the import of the notion) means allowing one's will to be the ruler of itself, at least when it comes to issues that regard fundamental decisions concerning one's life; in the case of John, this is usually taken to imply that he should be allowed to decide according to his own free will whether he should be treated by means of standard or placebo medication – therefore all relevant information

should be available to him in order to make up his mind on his own. However, this only applies in the case John really wants to have all relevant information available; in the case he does not, disclosing such information would mean compromising John's autonomy – this is why the right not to know[18] (or the right to ignorance) has already been included in many codes of medical deontology and conduct. The issue in John's case is that the doctor cannot provide John the option to decide for himself whether he wants to know or not, unless he first discloses all the data concerning the therapeutic options available John would have to decide about whether to know or to ignore; the doctor should tell John something like this: "Your condition may be – almost equally successfully – dealt with either by means of standard medication, or by means of placebo treatment; nevertheless, for the latter to be effective, I need to withhold the truth concerning your treatment and never tell you that you receive sugar pills. Do you agree to be deceived into believing that you are receiving standard medication?" This would allow John the option to claim his right not to know, but in such a case he would already have been aware of the possibility to receive placebo medication, which would render the dilemma altogether obsolete: as I previously mentioned[19], in the case of MDD if the patient knows that he is receiving placebo medication, responsive rates are reduced to such a degree, that this kind of treatment could no more be considered as an option. Both the doctor and the patient seem to be stuck in a dead end: they both will at the same time on the one hand to secure the best outcome for the patient's health, and on the other to keep the patient's autonomy intact (either by disclosing all relevant information, or by granting the right not to know); the issue in this case is that these two – shared by both – wills *are conflicting*. One would have to assume either that moral agents are in general expected to have two conflicting – but equally reasonable – wills with regard to the very same issue, or that one of these wills is not grounded on reason. Since, however, – at least according to the Kantian analysis I discuss here – a moral agent's will is subject to this "special kind of causation", namely the laws of reason, and since reason mandates that when it comes to disjunctive syllogisms of the form *either p or q* not both p and q may be right, one has to assume that whenever any moral agent has two conflicting wills concerning the same issue, one of them should be either irrational or confused. In my view, in the case of John this betrays *conceptual confusion*.

To start with, in the situation described above allowing John's will to be the ruler of itself implies that the doctor should disclose every piece of information *that would be necessary* for John in order to decide according to his own free will – this means *not all relevant* information, but only what would be of key importance to the

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[18] For a thorough discussion of the right not to know see among others Ruth Chadwick, Mairi Levitt and Darren Shickle, eds., *The Right to Know and the Right not to Know* (Ashgate: Aldershot, 1997); also Roberto Andorno, "The Right Not to Know: An Autonomy Based Approach", *Journal of Medical Ethics* 30, no. 5 (2004): 435-440.
[19] See supra n. 14.

average patient[20]; this excludes – among others – mentioning extremely rare side-effects, referring to drastic substances, explaining the way the medication will affect one's chemical situation etc. This is simply *unnecessary information* for any patient in order to decide; moreover, information as such could even turn out confusing and misleading. In my view the kind of information John needs to decide whether he would accept the treatment his doctor suggests or not concerns on the one hand its effectiveness and on the other its safety[21]; in other words, he needs to know that the suggested treatment would be at least as effective and as side-effects-free as any other available, or that it offers the best possible balance between effectiveness and side-effects – given that the latter are not unacceptable to him. In that sense, if John's doctor decided not to make John aware of the fact that he would be receiving sugar pills instead of standard medicaments – provided that he would inform John on the fact that the treatment he suggests is slightly less effective than alternative ones, but entirely side-effects free and, therefore, according to his judgment this option is the best available for John's case – he would be doing exactly what any other doctor does when omitting to disclose to his patients information concerning the drastic substances involved in his treatment, or the way these substances would affect the chemistry his bodily condition etc. After all, visiting a doctor is not attending a biochemistry class.

Of course, all the above apply only in the case John's will is to become aware *only* of the facts he really needs to be aware of in order to make up his mind, and not of *all* the information that is relevant to the treatment his doctor suggests. Suppose, however, that John actually *willed – and demanded – to receive all the information* with regard to the suggested treatment, including the kind of substances involved. In his case this seems to mean that John is in the awkward position of having two conflicting wills concerning the same issue: on the one hand he wants to be effectively treated – after all, this is why he has asked for his doctor's services at the first place; on the other he doesn't want to have his autonomy compromised. But this is not true: the average reasonable patient would be justified to demand *detailed* information on all additional data (apart from those already discussed) that are relevant to the therapy he is going to receive only if such information wouldn't jeopardize the potential effectiveness of the therapeutic approaches that would be otherwise available. In the case of John, moreover, having such a will would mean that John wishes to know even though such knowledge would dramatically diminish the effectiveness of the *best* therapeutic option available to him, given that standard medical treatment would only slightly raise responsive rates while at the same time it would almost eliminate John's chances to acquire offspring –

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[20] See Anne Barnhill, "What It Takes to Defend Deceptive Placebo Use", *Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal* 21, no. 3 (2011): 219-250.

[21] John, of course, would also need to know that his therapeutic options do not involve something morally questionable or reprehensible.

which, however, is of enormous significance to John and a key criterion for his final decision.

The problem with this situation is that John couldn't be in a position to decide on his own whether he wants to know *everything* concerning his therapy or not, unless the doctor informed him that one of his options are to be administered placebo medication – but then again John *would have already become aware* of what he himself should have decided whether to know or not, and the effectiveness of his treatment would have already be dramatically reduced; and this, in my view, would actually be compromising John's autonomy. It seems that in this case the doctor will have to interpret John's will in order to preserve John's autonomy.

Interpreting one's will is in general an impossible – as well as an extremely risky – task; in my view, however, challenging as it may be, in John's case such an endeavor has quite good prospects to succeed – provided that both John and his doctor are rational, competent adults. The situation is roughly as this:

   i. John's declared will is to have his condition successfully treated – we need to keep in mind that in John's case a successful treatment would drastically improve his condition and at the same time wouldn't eliminate his chances to acquire offspring.
   ii. The only available treatment that meets with these particular requirements is the one that involves the administration of placebo medication.
   iii. Placebo medication can be effective only in the case the patient is unaware of the fact that he doesn't receive standard medicaments.
   iv. John's only option to be successfully treated is to be administered placebo medication without knowing.

Now let us assume that next to these, John also wills at the same time to maintain his autonomy intact; let us also assume that to John preserving his autonomy means being disclosed *every piece of information* concerning his treatment options, and not just the *minimum amount* I advocated above – in other words John has a *thin notion of autonomy*. This, however, would entirely eliminate John's chances to be successfully treated. Since these two wills openly contradict each other, only one of them may be sound and grounded on reason; the other would be necessarily misguided, therefore its maxim would be unsuitable to be considered as a potential universal law of nature. In my view this is the case with John's will to have all relevant pieces of information, even those that are not necessary for him to decide, and thus undermine his prospects of having his condition successfully treated. John's will, in that case, actually is to have his condition treated and not treated at the same time; such a will, however is contradictive and, therefore, by no means a rational – and, hence, an autonomous – one. It seems that pursuing autonomy in its strict sense – the thin notion of autonomy – in this case undermines John's capacity to be autonomous.

This is why I previously argued that interpreting John's will is not an impossible task to the doctor: it only takes to judge what a rational moral agent would will in John's case or, better, what a rational moral agent *would be justified to will*. Or, in other words, the doctor needs to decide whether a rational patient would be expected – or, better, *justifiably* expected – *not to claim* his right not to know in a situation as such. Reason mandates that anyone who asks for a doctor's services should be doing so in order to have his condition treated or healed, and not to be fully informed on all the details of any available therapeutic procedure. As I see it, if *tertium non datur* but only: [a] not to be disclosed the full truth and be healed, or [b] to be disclosed the full truth and remain sick, any patient who would opt for [b] would thus reveal a quite confused conception of autonomy.

Conclusion

The morally relevant questions in any case as such is whether [a] not letting the patient know that he will be administered placebo medication is deceiving him and, therefore, infringing his autonomy, [b] if the patient would reasonably will to have *all* information – and not just the *minimum necessary amount* – relevant to the therapeutic options available to him in order to determine according to his own free will, even if he knew that such knowledge would eliminate the prospect of successful treatment.

As for the first question I argued that the doctor in my view is under no moral obligation to inform his patient on every detail concerning the therapeutic options available, but only on those that are necessary to his patient to determine: the prospective responsive rates and the potential side-effects, if any, as well as that none of the available therapies involves something that could be considered morally objectionable or *malum per se*. In the case of John, for example, if the doctor told John that there are two therapeutic options, one with 59% responsive rates but sever side-effects, and another with 46% effectiveness and totally side-effects free, and that both are this should be sufficient to John to decide which one to opt for, even if the doctor failed to inform John that one of the available treatments would involve placebo administration. In such a case nobody, not even John himself if he later became aware of the "full truth", would plausibly or justifiably assume that John was deceived into choosing this option over the other, nor that he would have chosen otherwise if he was informed on the nature of the medication he assented to receive. Therefore, John's autonomy wouldn't have been violated in the case his doctor failed to inform him that one of his options involves placebo administration.

As for [b], I argued that John wouldn't be justified to claim his right to know if this would totally deprive him of the hope to be successfully treated; at least, we could much more plausibly assume that John would claim his right not to know instead. In the case, however, he insisted to be fully informed even to the detriment

of his health condition just because he is persuaded that this would be the only way to maintain his autonomy intact, this would reveal conceptual confusion on John's behalf concerning the actual import of autonomy. In Kantian terms John would be willing to be and not to be successfully treated at the same time, which is absurd and, therefore, not an autonomous decision. Since John could never rationally will to know the details that would undermine the possibility of a successful treatment, the doctor is justified to interpret John's rational will and withhold these details without infringing John's autonomy.

The principle of respect for autonomy is the cornerstone of medical ethics, and this is not without a good reason: especially when it comes to health care issues, the autonomy of the moral agent tends to be extremely fragile and vulnerable. Still, respect for autonomy requires a coherent and informed insight concerning the actual import of the term when it comes to health care services: any patient who asks for a doctor's services does so because he is convinced that the latter will do the best he can to safeguard his best interests and provide the best possible treatment to his condition while at the same time eliminating all potential risks. To me it seems almost self-evident that if a patient were to decide for himself, probably he would rather be "deceived" by his doctor and have his condition improved, than have his autonomy preserved but his condition impoverished. This is mostly because the doctor-patient relationship is not an ordinary social one, where autonomy is actually an issue of fundamental moral importance; rather it is a relationship of unilateral dependence based on trust and competence: the patient is convinced that his doctor is trustworthy and competent in such a degree, as to have his health his life trusted in his hands. In such a context, autonomy in the strict sense becomes an irrelevant issue. The upshot is that a moral agent would be justified to decide not to be told the full truth concerning the therapeutic options available to him, but only be disclosed the minimum necessary piece of it, and still keep his autonomy intact.

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RELIGION, IDENTITY, CITIZENSHIP
Modern Greek Culture and the European Identity

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Abstract: *The ambitious goal of this paper is to make a foreigner to understand the rather complex relationship between the Orthodox Church, the Greek Society and the Hellenic State. It investigates the various historical and political circumstances in Greece after 1828, the official establishment of the Modern Greek-State after a national uprising against the Ottoman Empire, taking also into account the post-byzantine Ottoman occupation of the Hellenic territory (15th - 20th century). Orthodoxy either as a Church mechanism or as a profoundly rooted traditional value code is ubiquitous in Greece, infusing all aspects of public life. Greeks become nominal members of the Church within a year of their birth. Although today it's enough for the parents to fill out a form at the Registrar's Office, only few parents opt for this way. Birthdays are commonly celebrated as in other western countries, but an equally if more important time for celebration is the "name-day", the day when the Church celebrates the memory of the saint the child is named after. The identity formation of the modern Greeks is attributed to various cultural sources and their identity is deeply tradition based. The paper claims that only longstanding processes towards supranational Paradigms, such as E.U., could reform the traditional value established national identities; this can only become effective when time is ripe and only when people are eager to adopt modernity in their quasi-homogenous European environment.*

Keywords: *tradition, Orthodoxy, culture, identity, modernity, citizenship, European, modern-Greek, Church.*

Prolegomena - The argument

This paper mainly focuses on the various historical and political circumstances in Greece after 1828, when the first London Protocol officially enacted the Independence of the Modern Greek-State from the Ottoman Empire, a process lasted until 1832. Nevertheless, it takes into account the post-byzantine Ottoman occupation of the Hellenic territory (15th - 19th century). The ambitious goal of this attempt is to make a foreigner to understand the rather complex relationship between the Orthodox Church, the Greek Society and the Hellenic State.

After the establishment of the modern-Greek state (1828-1832) there were various attempts to promote the qualities of citizenship in the Independent Greece

of the 19th and 20th century, while the territorial accomplishment of modern Greece was being expanded from 1828 till 1948, covering a period of 120 years. The long-lasting progress of this unusual phenomenon did have a multi-parameter effect on the modern-Greek i.e. national *homogenization*.

My argument attempts to put forward a cultural explanation of the controversial southern European modern-Greek peculiarity. It takes into account three fundamental premises:

• the modern-Greek identity was developed within the societal and cultural institutions of a post-byzantine era, especially the 18th and 19th century Enlightenment period of the Hellenic nation,

• it is until now continuously irrigated by value systems belonging both to East and West, or to the Oriental and the Occidental cultural spheres,

• the longstanding process of territorial integration of the Greek sovereignty (1827-1947), a period of 120 years.

The methodological concepts: Citizenship and Acculturation

It was T. H. Marshall who introduced the theory of *citizenship* in his treatise *Citizenship and Social Class* (1949). Academic interpretations or even abuses of this illuminating but controversial work abound in the literature. Despite the vivid interest of the research community, it could be argued that no widely accepted theory of citizenship has prevailed in the social sciences over the last 35 years or so.

Acculturation is another relevant concept. It refers exactly to the process of mixing people belonging to different cultural *milieux*, who demonstrate behaviours dictated by different cultural protocols.[1] In the world, there is no specific mode of being citizen of a specific country. According to Berry et al. (2002)[2], we're all human beings, and we express this common humanity in culturally different ways, both around the world and within our contemporary nation states. Thus, not only is immigration a normal process, but so is the resulting cultural diversity within the different countries. These two processes provide novelty and vitality to individuals and communities.[3] One formulation has been widely quoted[4]: "Acculturation comprehends those phenomena which result when groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact, with subsequent changes in the original culture patterns of either or both groups…under this

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[1] See the lecture by John W. Berry, titled *Acculturation and Adaptation among Immigrants: Learning to Live in Another Culture*, given to the Alumni Association of the Onassis Foundation in 2006 (under publication in Greek in my own translation).
[2] John W. Berry, Y. H. Poortinga, M. H. Segall, and P.R. Dasen, *Cross-Cultural Psychology: Research and Applications* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
[3] John B. Berry, "Acculturation and Adaptation in a New Society", *International Migration* 30, no. 1 (1992): 69-85.
[4] The initial interest in acculturation grew out of a concern for the effects of European domination; see Richard Thurnwald, *Die eingeborenen Australiens und der Sudseeinseln* (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1927).

definition, acculturation is to be distinguished from culture change, of which it is but one aspect, and assimilation, which is at times a phase of acculturation".[5]

The historical background

The post-byzantine period (15th - 20th centuries)

The Ottoman occupation and rule saw the demise of the byzantine era, but the Orthodox Church was left untouched, preserving its privileges; eventually the power of the Church increased under the ruling system employed by the Ottomans, the *millet system*. People were bound to their millets by their religious affiliations or their confessional communities, rather than their *ethnic origins*, according to the *millet* concept.[6] This system divided the subjugated peoples of the Ottoman Empire according to their religion and the peoples were administered by their Clergy leaders, their religious heads.[7]

Gradually, if not soon enough, the Christian Orthodox Greeks ended up being directly under the ecclesiastical and political authority of the Patriarch, ruling them somehow instead of the Sultan, regardless of specific ethnicity. This held true for other religions like Jews, Christians of other dogmas, etc. Privileges and obligations were connected to religious affiliation. This system enhanced the emergence of *a new élite in Constantinople*, the *Phanariotes*. The *Phanariotes* were Greeks living in the *Fanari* (now *Fener*, means *lantern* in Greek) region of the city who somehow rose in key-roles (which means *in power*) as merchants, clergy leaders, diplomats and dragomans.[8] This meant wealth, education and exposure to western culture and ideas during the critical period of the Renaissance and the Age of Enlightenment.

The *millet* system may appropriately stand as one of the reasons for the establishment of a profound liaison between ethnicity and religion, since the Ottoman Empire did not make the national difference between Greeks, Serbs, Albanians etc. and only saw religion and a specific communitarian structure of the tax-payers of their multi-cultural (multi-national, multi-lingual and multi-doctrinal) Empire; this communitarian spirit merging religious doctrine and political administration survived in a concrete way from the very origins of the fledgling Hellenic State in the first decades beginnings of the 19th century.

The particular formation of the modern-Greek people comprises equally religious and quasi-political features; the "mosaic" produced is rather an one of

[5] Robert Redfield, Ralph Linton, and Melville J. Herskovitz, "Memorandum for the study of acculturation", *American Anthropologist* 38 (1936): 149-152.

[6] For more on this: Stanford J. Shaw, "Dynamics of Ottoman Society and administration", in *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*. Vol. 1, 112-165 (Cambridge: CUP, 1997).

[7] Carol G. Thomas in the 8th chapter of her book *Greece* titled "Ottoman Greece: 1453-1821" exposes a concise history of that era. For the era after 1821 see John S. Koliopoulos and Thanos M. Veremis, *Modern Greece* (Chichester: Wiley, 2014).

[8] A dragoman was an interpreter, translator, and official guide between Turkish, Arabic, and Persian-speaking countries and polities of the Middle East and European embassies, consulates, vice-consulates and trading posts. A dragoman ought to have knowledge of Arabic, Persian, Turkish, and European languages.

believer than of a *citizen*, and thus this dual nature of the Greeks needs time to adjust to Western structures and traditions, mainly politically or institutionally. The East cultural tradition of Greece refers to its religious cultural origin, which is the Christian Orthodox doctrine, and the West ideological tradition which is interwoven with the Western European thought of the Enlightenment, which particularly indicates an energetic group of French and Scottish thinkers who thrived in the mid-eighteenth century: the *philosophes*.[9]

The Greek Enlightenment and Orthodox Clergy

The Age of Enlightenment influenced only partially Greece while the Greeks were still under the Ottomans. With many of the influential Greeks in the Ottoman bureaucracy (mentioned above as the *Phanariotes*) being members of the clergy, the Enlightenment *value of Liberty* was readily absorbed, but its anti-clericalist sentiment was effectively silenced or mentioned in a palatable way. It is indicative to say that the intensely anti-religious and secular works of Thomas Paine or Voltaire are rather missing from the Greek Enlightenment published thought.

Some notable Greek Enlightenment figures:

Methodios Anthrakitis (1660-1736). He was schooled in Venice (natural sciences) and when returning in Greece he became director of the ecclesiastical school of Kastoria. He wrote on philosophy, ethics and science, and although he did not advocate for the Copernic system, he taught it, while criticizing the higher clergy officers for their behavior; he was also one of the first advocates for the use of the demotic Greek language instead of the archaic one.

Iosipos Moisiodax (1725-1800). A monk who became director of the Princely Academy of Iași (Romania) and professor of philosophy. He was influenced by John Locke and was an advocate of the western philosophical tradition instead of the Neo-Aristotelian tradition of *Theophilos Korydalleus* (1563-1646) that was widely spread in Greece at the time.[10]

Anthimos Gazis (1758-1828). A priest from Vienna who circulated the first Greek periodical "Hermes o Logios" (see his portrait below)[11] and was a central figure in the failed insurrection of Thessaly in 1821.

Athanasios Psalidas (1767-1829), was a philosopher, translator and novelist, known for being engaged into issues like the existence of God, immortality and

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[9] See http://richard-hooker.com/sites/worldcultures/ENLIGHT/PHIL.HTM.
[10] Theophilos Korydalleus or Skordalos was a severe critic of medieval scholasticism and the religious matters; he was a free spirit thinker, an advocate for rationalism and thus characterized as the first revolutionary thinker in Greek East and as the proponent of free thinking in Southeastern Europe.
[11] For more on Hermes o Logios see Marjolijne Janssen, "The Greek pre-revolutionary discourse as reflected in the review *Hermes o Logios* (1811-1821)", http://cf.hum.uva.nl/natlearn/balkan/athens_janssen.pdf.

ethics.

Theophilos Kairis (1784-1853). A controversial figure of the Enlightenment, a priest who taught philosophy and natural sciences and advocated a variety of Deism called *Theosophy*.

Theoklitos Farmakidis (1784-1860) Also a clergyman, he continued Gazis' publication of "Hermes o Logios" and was politically active in Hellenic State.

Rigas Feraios-Velestinlis (1757-1798). One of the most celebrated figures of the Greek Revolution, he was one of the most vocal supporters of a pan-Balkan revolt against the Ottoman Empire and of cooperation and fraternity between the Balkan national groups. He was arrested by the Austrians while attempting to meet with Napoleon and executed.

Adamantios Korais (1748-1833). Korais was a moderate visionary of the national Renaissance, associated with the French Ideologues and an adherent of their analytical theory.[12] Studied medicine in Montpellier, France, and notably worked a philologist and theologian in Paris. He was also a supporter of the use of the *katharevousa* version of - mostly scholar - Greek language, in-between archaic and demotic Greek. From the Greek- Enlightenment figures Korais was mostly significant since he early underlined the priority of distinguishing Church and Polity in the fledging modern-Greek state.[13] He unsuccessfully suggested the immediate independence of the local Orthodox Church in Greece from the Oecumenic Patriarchate and the simultaneous fall of the entire Clergy under the supervision and control of the Greek State.

From the data cited above it is clear that the Church was intensely involved in the pre-revolutionary preparations, including the very ideological fermentation of the national independence idea. During the pre-revolt period apart from several minor revolts the Orloff Revolt 1768-1774 took place in the Balkans; it was a significant attempt just before the main 1821 Greek uprising.[14] Apart from military subdual, the Turks responded with various attempts of wide *islamization* of the Christians, so many people, clergy and laity alike, were being executed for refusing conversion. The quasi-massive martyrdom crystallized the confidence that the Orthodox faith was worth dying for and this belief prevailed in the national uprising narrative. By now it should be rather clear that *unlike the American or the French Revolution*, the Clergy spearheaded the Greek uprising for independence; the

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[12] Anna Tabaki, "Neo-Hellenic Enlightenment, An Introduction", in *The Enlightenment in Europe: Unity and Diversity*, ed. Werner von Schneiders, (Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2003), 45-56.

[13] Anna Tabaki, "Greece", in *Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment*, ed. Alan-Charles Kors, vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 157–160. For a detailed account on the relations between Orthodox and Roman-Catholics in the Hellenic territory during the first years of the Revolt, see Konstantinos Manikas, *Orthodoxy and Roman-Catholicism in Greece during the Revolution (1821–1827)* (Athens: Stamouli, 2002). About Korais and the Greek struggle for independence, see: Apostolos Daskalakis, *Admantios Korais and the freedom of Greeks* (Athens, 1965).

[14] For a rather detailed account of the circumstances at the time, see Wladimir Brunet de Presle, *Grèce: depuis la conquête romaine jusqu' à nos jours* (Paris: F. Didot frères, 1860), 393-558.

Orthodox Church accompanied the secular forces and thus enriched the political reasons of the Revolt with religious and cultural dimensions. This resulted to a quest for not merely a national, but also religious liberty and identity and it also gave room for spreading the belief that the Orthodox Church preserved the Greek national identity unspoiled and imperishable.

Up to this point the Church was continuing to accumulate wealth both in gold and in real estate. Money was collected through tax collecting and pilgrimages. The real estate property was achieved mainly through inheritance, especially from those without heirs, who preferred to pass their assets to the Church preventing thus an eventual Turkish ownership.

The tumultuous 20th century: Middle-war and WWII

During the first decades of the 20th century, Greece experienced two Balkan Wars (1912-1913), the Great War or First World War (1914-1919) and the disastrous Asia Minor Campaign (1919-1922). The engagement into the wars left Greece with almost twice the territory, but also a huge influx of approx. 1,5 million refugees expelled from Smyrna, the Ionian coast, Constantinople and the Black Sea; there was a coordinated extermination of the majority of the Greek population remaining in the Ottoman Empire region while it was gradually turning into a nation-state, Turkey.

After the Old Greece populations, in 1864 the Ionian Sea population was added to the terriroty of Greece. That population was never in contact with Ottoman rulers, they had European administration by Italians and British. In 1881 Thessaly, with illiterate villeins and serfs, asking for land for farming. In 1913 Macerdonia and Epirus after the Balkan wars, and Crete after a domestic revolution had been annexed to the Greek territory. In 1923 Thrace and NE Aegean islands and in 1947-8 Dodecanese from Italy, as a compensation and reparation from damages during the WWII.

The acculturation processes in all these cases were not ending and constantly demanded for new frameworks. The national identity was also questioned; old Greeks were "more Greeks" than the newcomers; still, in church they were equally fidels. Despite the fact that civilians had a varying degree of "hellenicity", being Hellenes, inside the flock of the christian church they were Orthodox Christians of the same kind.

The refugees were helpless people with no housing and cultivation leading thus the state between 1917 and 1930 to a large expropriation program targeting to the vast monastic properties (*vakıf*). Seemingly, the Church never received more than a low percentage of the amount due and this probably is one of the reasons explaining why the State pays the clergy's salaries up to this day. In 1930 another law was passed for the expropriation of more plots of land owned by monasteries. The monasteries were given in return future securities, but their value evaporated due to

WWII and the German Occupation Loans. The State also took over the salaries of the clergy for as long as the surplus from the liquidation would suffice, although it is thought that it would be forever.

The populations merged in the Greek territory were holding back the country's institutional modernization that was launched by Ioannis Kapodistrias (1776-1831) – an impeccable Governor, considered as a very significant political personality of the beginnings of 19th century, together with Klemens von Metternich (1773-1859) and Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord (1754-1838).

The rulers of Greece were foreigners and Greece was a nation-state under a monarch of another national origin; that was peculiar or similar to the Ottoman rule, when they were administrated by a political leader (the Sultan) and being congregated by the Clerical personnel, their priests. The image of Europe in the middle war period is shown below:

In August 4, 1936 the Ioannis Metaxas' dictatorship came to power. The regime was patterned after the fascist regimes in Italy and Germany, but without the imperialism and with an emphasis on religion and the restoration of the past glory of the Hellenic civilization. In 1938 the regime intervened in the election of the Archbishop of Athens, in an attempt to control the Church. The Metaxas regime was abolished when the Nazis occupied Greece in April 1941.

The Occupation, a miserable and tragic period in modern-Greek history, proved somehow beneficial for the Church's reputation among the people. Bulgaria was put by the Nazis in charge of Central and Eastern Macedonia and Thrace and the differences that ignited the Macedonian Struggle in the first place (1893-1908) re-emerged[15], as Bulgarians became more confident that they would manage to preserve their possessions after the war. This resulted in a new wave of *neo-martyrs* who did not cooperate with the occupying forces, not only in the Bulgarian zone, but also in the Nazi Holocaust project, the anti-Jewish pogrom.

Civil War and the Aftermath

Soon after the German Occupation ended (1944), the Civil War erupted in Greece. The belligerents were the standing Greek Army and the Democratic Army of Greece (ELAS/ DAG the Communist Party guerillas, supported by the Soviet Union). The Church was overwhelmingly in favor of the Greek Government, since the Communists were widely considered as forwarding an anti-clerical and anti-religious perspective, though the ELAS did have a few members of the clergy in its support.

April 21st 1967 marks a major *coup d'état* in modern-Greek history, sever years-long and bloodiest, with various and complicated consequences effecting even the

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[15] For an account on Macedonian struggle see: Douglas Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia 1897–1913* (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1996).

present of modern-Greece. The *Junta* was undoubtedly caused by the Truman Doctrine; the Junta's main goal was to cut off a likely "Soviet invasion" in the country's academia, press and military and its efforts were all put towards rooting out Communists, perhaps with intense fervor, turning the country into a police state.

As with the Metaxas regime, the Junta addressed to the religious public sphere, the Christian Orthodox civilians; it's motto was "Greece for Christian Greeks", while it also borrowed from Christian and pagan mythology, such as "Christ is risen, Greece is risen" and its use of a logo, depicting the phoenix rising from its ashes. The Junta would eventually collapse after the scandalous failed coup against the President and Archbishop of Cyprus, Makarios, which led to invasion of Cyprus by the Turkish army and the continuing occupation of the northern part of the island to this day. It also had the unfortunate by-product of the oppressed Leftists having to coexist with the collaborators of the Junta and those who merely stood by and watched; an issue that still scars the Hellenic society to this day.

The Charter of the Church of Greece

The restoration of democracy in Greece and its entry in the European Economic Community (the precursor of the EU) marked the beginning of a major fracture between the Church and the State. For the newly restored democratic government, one of the first orders of business was to settle ecclesiastical matters with a refreshed Charter of the Church of Greece, enshrined into law in 1977.

This shows clearly how entrenched is the Church in legislation and how deep is the entanglement of Church and State.

The 3rd Hellenic Republic

In 1981 Andreas Papandreou and the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) rose to power, leading to sweeping reforms in family law. The most important change of all was the concept of "civil marriage" which was unknown in Greece up to that point. Papandreou was eventually unable *to completely cancel the legal validity of the religious marriage* (and keep it only as a secondary option for those who wanted it), but was able to have both types of marriage as having equal legal validity. In 1987 PASOK made the final attempt to utilize the remaining real estate in the hands of the monasteries. The "Tritsis Law"[16] - after the name of the minister who brought the law to Parliament - was violently opposed by the Church, which claimed that it's property was being illegally seized. Given its prior exchanges with

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[16] YTB Footage from the demonstrations against the law in 1987 on the monastic property. Speakers (timestamps): https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=220&v=7du9OUvqZIE, Archbishop of Athens Serafeim (2'07"), Metropolitan of Florina Avgoustinos Kandiotis (3'29"), Metropolitan of Volos Christodoulos (3'45") future Archbishop of Athens.

the State, they could hardly be blamed. The Church eventually fought against the law, first with popular support (mottos of the era included "hands off the church" and "the land to the people, not the parties") and then legally; the matter was brought before the European Court of Human Rights, which ruled in its favor: the monasteries should either keep their property or be reimbursed. The Government dropped the issue and the law was left inactive.

Orthodoxy either as a Church mechanism or as a deeply rooted traditional morality is ubiquitous in Greece, infusing all aspects of public life.[17] Greeks become nominal members of the Church within a year of their birth. Infant baptisms are the norm; baptisms are public affairs that typically involve many guests and a celebratory meal afterwards. The child's godparents are doctrinally obligated to teach the child the basics of the religion, but today their obligations are limited to gifts on holidays. Up to a few years ago a baptism was the only way for a child to be assigned a name. Today it's enough for the parents to fill out a form at the Registrar's Office, but only few parents chose this way. Birthdays are commonly celebrated as in other western countries, but an equally important time for celebration is the "name-day", the day when the Church celebrates the memory of the saint the child is named after. Since the name and the day of celebration is common knowledge, this a good opportunity for socializing for people who do not know each other well.

"Marriage" in Greece means getting married in church. While the civil equivalent exists since the 80s, people mostly opt for the religious ceremony which is dressed with a large variety of local customs, though a large reception with all the acquaintances of the couple AND the couples' parents are invited. The current economic crisis has now limited the size of receptions and forced many people to get married with a civil ceremony (until they can afford a "proper" religious wedding). The Church, of course, doesn't recognize the civil wedding and considers those married that way "in prostitution" and "adultery". Extra conservative priests also consider this a sign of withdrawal from the church and may even refuse to perform a funeral for such people.

Death is also surrounded with a variety of religious ceremonies and local customs. The funeral is typically followed by at least an offering of coffee and cookies or a meal. Memorial services are then performed three, nine and forty days after the funeral, on the first year anniversary of the death and then whenever the family desires it. Extra conservative priests (apart from the previously cited example) might also refuse to perform a funeral service for a child that was not

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[17] In 1992 the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the emergence of the currently named "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" caused a major stir in Greece and in the Greek Diaspora abroad. Spearheaded by the Church, major protest rallies were organized, including one with 1 million claimed participants in Thessaloniki. This marks the very first attempt of the Church to actively insert itself in matters of politics and foreign affairs. YTB footage https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5PsXQ_FUF_8 of protests about the name of FYROM and protests on new civilian identities June 21, 2000, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OVy3u3M6WKQ.

baptised and someone who committed suicide.

Church and the State

The Autocephalus Church of Greece is the main organized church in the country. Its head is the Holy Synod, which makes all the important decisions, and its chairman is the Archbishop of Athens and all of Greece. He is not the leader of the Church though, neither administratively or spiritually. The Synod makes administrative decisions for the entire country, though each Metropolitan has absolute jurisdiction in his own Metropolis. The Church's spiritual leader is the Ecumenical Patriarch, but he is nowhere near the status of the Pope, since only a Pan-Orthodox Ecumenical Synod can decide on matters of doctrine. The Patriarch is also marginally involved with the Metropoles of the areas annexed by Greece after 1912. Until the era of Archbishop Christodoulos, the church kept its own tail outside everyday politics and minded its own business and its charities. It did make sure to covertly support conservative politicians of what is quaintly referred to as "the Right of the Lord", but nowhere near the level of direct intervention that appeared in the 2000s. During that period political messages from the pulpit became commonplace and still remain today, though the attitude of the new Archbishop has toned them down. Typical examples include the Metropolitan of Thessaloniki (with an interest in the FYROM naming dispute and recently opposing the liberal Mayor and his gestures of friendship to Turks, Jews and homosexuals), the Metropolitan of Piraeus (who often comments on matters of science and atheism) and the Metropolitan of Kalavryta (extra conservative, who was fervently opposed to the current SYRIZA government and made overtures to the Golden Dawn).

It should also be stressed that the Church in general (especially the monasteries) control an impressive amount of wealth, in cash, real estate (transformed from fields to now lucrative city properties in 1952) and precious metals (mainly gold and silver). Given the tax evasion orgies that have been going on in the past few decades, it's impossible to determine what sorts of projects might have been funded by ecclesiastical entities. And while the Church operates many pointedly visible charities, it's doubtful that more than a trickle of the Church's money is actually spent to aid the poor; most of the money come from donations.

The Greek National Identity

Two centuries of the tight embrace of the Church and the State and the religious origins of the State of Greece have practically fused Orthodox Christianity and the Greek National Identity in a single alloy, forged in the fires of the nationalism prevalent in the Balkan Peninsula. For the average Greek it's practically impossible to tell where his Hellenic or Greek identity starts and where

his religious affiliation ends. This creates interesting juxtapositions and issues that under normal circumstances would be a major source of cognitive dissonance.

Simply speaking, someone who is Greek is inalienably both Greek and Orthodox. He is convinced he is as purely Greek as were the Byzantines and the Ancient Greeks; to doubt the spiritual, if not genetic, purity of this lineage is a grave insult and borders on the treasonous (the politics in the Balkans have made sure of this). He is also completely Orthodox, but since he gains the title by birthright and has not really earned it, he can spout any sort of gross heretical opinion and it still rings Orthodox to him (e.g. he can believe in reincarnation, doubt the veracity of Scripture and liberally hate his enemies and still feel Orthodox; this becomes even more evident in the diaspora, where churches also double as community cohesion centres). Even observing non-religious customs surrounding religious events are often considered per se religious acts.

Greeks value the Church as an institution and in the same time anticlericalism is quite common, if not fashionable, and usually expressed against the corrupted clergy.

What to do

Not all groups and individuals undergo acculturation in the same way; there are large variations in how people seek to engage the process. These variations have been termed as acculturation strategies. The various groups in contact (whether dominant or non-dominant) usually have some notion about what they are attempting to do (e.g. colonial policies, or motivations for migration), or what is being done to them, during the contact. However, through a *deconstructive process* of the concept of national identity of the European citizen, another equally longstanding "synthetic" procedure emerges: *the construction or formation of the supranational identity*. The "new" citizenship merges and contains the partial fragmental nationalities, i.e. the national identities. A novel collective identity is thus formed through *common life-experience* and *interaction*, sharing myths and collective memories. This quasi-political identity could eventually function towards the integration of the fragmental nationalities and the fragmented national characteristics in a common mould of qualities for the "new" citizenship. The amalgam of identities within a specific social or geographic formation such as Europe produces a rather refined citizen, more tolerant towards "otherness". This citizen fights for social solidarity, access to knowledge, and political rights. Citizenship is probably the most essential ingredient for constructing a "confederation" within the European Union (EU).

Thus, a *unified European identity* could be shaped, based on two groups of actions.[18]

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[18] Detailed presentation in Kostas Theologou, *Citizen and Society in the European Union* (Athina: Papazissi, 2005), 136-154.

The first group of actions includes:

o The unification of the educational system as a mechanism of political socialization.
o The institutional facilitation for obtaining property in other countries.
o The broadening of the workers' mobility within the European Union.[19]

The second and parallel group includes innovative actions for improving access to:

o Public debate: How could one induce a sense of constitutional awareness for the democratic rules, reflection, respect and tolerance for diversity and difference?
o Public information: How the Internet (or other technological platforms) can be used in order to facilitate access to public information? What should the principles of openness and transparency mean in a European public sphere?[20]
o Knowledge: How the use of the NT could foster life-long learning, since the well-educated citizen is the best foundation for a democratic society, and the basis for the Europeanization of the civic society? For instance, thanks to the Internet and to other similar tools, the inhabitants of the EU (and the whole planet) are in a position of exchanging messages regardless of distance, and other crucial characteristics.[21]

Conclusion

The identity formation of the modern Greeks is attributed to various cultural sources and their identity is profoundly *tradition based*. It seems that only longstanding processes aiming to supranational Paradigms could effectively reform such value established national identities, but only when time is ripe and only when people are eager to take this transition towards… the European modernity. It also seems that legislation and fast track memorandum agreements cannot produce reformations of such a kind.

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[20] Massimo La Torre, "European identity and citizenship", in *Reflections on European Identity*, ed. T. Jansen, 81- 88 (Brussels: European Commission, Forward Studies Unit, 1999).

[21] e.g. Jacques Lévy, "Vers une société civile mondiale?", in *L' identité - L' individu, Le groupe, La société*, ed. Jean-Claude Ruano-Borbalan (Paris: Editions Sciences Humains, 1998), 363-368.

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