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11 Politics

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Any treatment of the relationship between pragmatism and politics would be incomplete without considering the multiple areas in which pragmatist thought and political studies intersect. Extensive scholarly work on pragmatism and politics can be found in the broad literature on political science, democratic theory, global political theory, public administration, and public policy. To a lesser extent, scholarship employing a pragmatist approach can be found in other subfields of political studies, including American politics and international relations. Unfortunately, the few works in these subfields tend to appeal to a generic form of pragmatism (e.g., pragmatism as brute instrumentalism or pragmatism as vicious opportunism), not the robust version associated with classic and contemporary philosophical pragmatism.[1] Most works on classic pragmatism and politics draw heavily on John Dewey's political and ethical writings. Pragmatism's two other founders remained relatively silent on the subject; in Robert Talisse's words, "neither [Charles Sanders] Peirce nor [William] James wrote systematically about politics."[2] Neo-pragmatist treatments of politics can be found in the works of the late Richard Rorty, Cornell West, and Richard Posner.[3]

By way of organization, the first section of this chapter chronicles pragmatism's influence on the scientific study of politics through a series of articles authored by political scientists and theorists. The second addresses, more specifically, pragmatism's relation to democratic theory. The third section extends the pragmatist's concern with politics to global political theory. The fourth section examines a wide-ranging debate about pragmatism's capacity to guide public administration theory and practice. The fourth and final section draws attention to pragmatism in the policy sciences, as well as the exciting potential for new scholarship at the nexus between pragmatism and politics.

Political Science

Political theory and philosophy are the primary areas in which pragmatism overlaps with political studies. Nevertheless, pragmatism has also piqued the interest of political scientists engaged in both the empirical study of political phenomena and the normative evaluation of the results of those empirical

studies. The 1999 issue of the *American Journal of Political Science* contains six essays on pragmatism and politics by political scientists and political theorists, addressing the relationship between experts and citizens in a democracy, the place of institutions in a pragmatist political theory, the possibility of a scientific approach to democratic governance and the relevance of pragmatism to empirical research methods in the social sciences, especially political science.

Debrah Morris's "How Shall We Read What We Call Reality?" reveals John Dewey's contribution to a "new science of democracy," particularly an emerging framework for postpositivist inquiry in political science (Morris, 1999, pp. 608–628). Dewey has been read in diverse ways, from a freewheeling postmodernist (Rorty) to a straightforward positivist (Bullert).[4] However, Morris contends that Dewey's method of intelligence aligns more closely with three themes in postpositivism: (i) a rejection of nomological-deductive explanation, (ii) the embrace of a more holistic account of scientific method that also applies to problems in ordinary experience and (iii) "a direct link to democratic theory" (Morris, 1999, pp. 610–614). While these themes clearly differentiate Dewey's method from positivism, they also separate it from the approach of postmodernism and some varieties of neopragmatism: "The postmodernist appropriation of pragmatism fails to recover Dewey's challenge to social science, the ways in which he radicalizes scientific method in the name of political thought and a revitalized democratic ideal" (Morris, 1999, p. 616). According to Morris, "Dewey's 'principal aim' is to recruit scientifically modeled inquiry in the service of 'democratic statecraft'" (Morris, 1999, p. 623). Still, what remains uncertain is whether the pragmatist's new science of democracy implies some clear set of ideological commitments or an ambiguous political valence.

In "Inquiry into Democracy," Jack Knight and James Johnson argue that pragmatist thinking about institutions is an impractical guide for addressing related political problems.[5] While Dewey was concerned with how to harmonize the private or egoistic demands of individuals with the greater public interest, his pragmatist philosophy provided little in the way of practical guidance. Borrowing from rational choice theory, Knight and Johnson show that a more feasible approach—for instance, in determining whether government should provide national defense or trash collection—would be to create an auction or artificial market in public goods, such that "the government will supply the good only if they [citizens] assign a combined value to the public good that exceeds the cost . . . [such that] citizens have an incentive to honestly reveal the value they attach to the public good" (Knight and Johnson, 1999, p. 581). Knight and Johnson observe that "pragmatists are an unruly lot: they disagree among themselves about various philosophical and political issues" (Knight and Johnson, 1999, p. 566). Nevertheless, they share three things in common: (i) a commitment to evaluating actions relative to their consequences (or consequentialism), (ii) a belief that the state of human knowledge is never fixed and settled for all

time (or fallibilism) and (iii) an optimistic attitude about the prospects for democratic reform and social improvement (or anti-skepticism) (Knight and Johnson, 1999, p. 567). While Knight and Johnson acknowledge the value of pragmatist theories of deliberative democracy, they nonetheless insist that "pragmatists are naïve about institutional matters . . . [and that] their preoccupation [with democratic deliberation] is very nearly utopian in the pejorative sense" (Knight and Johnson, 1999, p. 569).[6]

James Farr's "John Dewey and American Political Science" explores the possibility that Dewey's critique of political science has dampened contemporary political scientists' enthusiasm for his intellectual legacy.[7] Although Dewey acknowledged the potential for social inquiry to become experimental, he faulted what passed as political science in his day for being a "recluse," an "idle-spectator" of dynamic changes in political phenomena. (Farr, 1999, p. 524) In Dewey's vision of a new experimental political science, civic education and political reform would liberate human potentialities and empower citizens to criticize state-sponsored organs of propaganda. While the general disregard of Dewey's writings by political scientists was in full swing in the early 1960s, many group theorists, including Arthur F. Bentley, Charles E. Merriam and David B. Truman, regularly credited Dewey, especially his *The Public and Its Problems*, for inspiring their scholarly work. Farr also explores the relationship between Dewey's pragmatism and the development of the policy sciences (see "Public Policy" section below). He concludes the essay with a poignant question for political scientists: "Might Dewey help debates over the discipline's self-understanding in the present and future if we undertake some intelligent probing and critical reassessment of his actual writings and of the discipline's real history?" (Farr, 1999, p. 538).

In "Democracy as Inquiry, Inquiry as Democratic," James Bohman examines the link between science and politics in pragmatist theories of democracy.[8] While researchers often wish to segregate the two, Bohman sees them as continuous in pragmatist thought. Specifically, in John Dewey's writings on science and democracy, the direction of science is subject to democratic choice, and democratic choice is a matter of cooperative problem solving patterned after scientific inquiry. In at least this respect, Deweyan democracy approximates what contemporary political theorists refer to as deliberative democracy (see "Democratic Theory" section below). For deliberative forums to be effective, though designers must ensure that citizens have recourse to experts, cognitive work is fairly distributed and citizens are willing to defer to the expertise of others: "[P]ragmatists want to point out that better informed decision making requires some social organization of inquiry, and this in turn demands some sort of division of labor. [. . .] It implies the need for pervasive mechanisms of trust . . ." (Bohman, 1999, p. 591–592). Since citizens are rarely equipped to verify the authenticity of expert knowledge, deference can occur

when expertise is compromised or expert advice is contrary to the public interest, thereby undermining the trust implicit in the principal-agent relationship. While this dilemma is not peculiar to pragmatist thinking about politics, it is especially salient for pragmatists who recommend that democracies cultivate expert-citizen partnerships. Bohman's proposed solution is to empower citizens to participate in meta-deliberations about the norms that govern their own problem-solving and deliberative activities.

In "Experience as Experiment," Eric MacGilvray classifies contemporary pragmatists into two groups: (i) those who criticize traditional epistemology (or what Dewey derisively called "the epistemology industry") and (ii) those who vindicate democracy.[9] From this premise he argues that Dewey offers a moral conception of politics that bridges the divide between the two groups—what he calls "pragmatism as principled advocacy" (MacGilvray, 1999, pp. 561–562). Pragmatism as principled advocacy features a "pragmatic conception of human intelligence," a scientifically modeled method of inquiry and a melioristic faith in the capacity of humans to improve themselves. Unfortunately, Dewey's vision of democratic progress suffers from what MacGilvray calls a "heady optimism," or naïveté with regard to making "tragic choices" about how to fill "gap[s] not only between individual capacities and social circumstances, but also between the plurality of interests in the populace and the ability of institutions to represent them adequately" (MacGilvray, 1999, pp. 560–561). MacGilvray's criticism that Deweyan democracy cannot accommodate the "plurality of interests in the populace" anticipates a more recent debate over the compatibility of Deweyan democracy and John Rawls's notion of reasonable pluralism.[10]

● In "Pragmatic Inquiry and Democratic Politics," Marion Smiley explores three commitments that underlie pragmatist theories of democracy—or what she terms "democratic pragmatism."[11] The first is the pragmatist's conception of democracy as a method of scientifically modeled inquiry. In Smiley's words, "we are a community of inquirers who symbolically interpret the results of inquiry through collective symbols shared within what Dewey calls his 'public'" (Smiley, 1999, p. 631). The second theme is the need for rigorous inquiry to determine those standards that will effectively guide democratic practice and institutions toward shared goals. And the third is the open-ended character of pragmatism, which invites ongoing inquiry into the conditions that will promote more robust citizen engagement in democratic politics. In keeping with Dewey's definition of a public in *The Public and Its Problems*, Smiley insists that "pragmatists . . . ask 'How can we get individuals to acknowledge the consequences of [their] conjoint activity, consequences that they might prefer to ignore?'" (Smiley, 1999, p. 643). While the rational course of action for the voter might involve ignorance and apathy, citizens who wish to sustain a robust democracy must "acknowledge the consequences of [their] conjoint activity" and become informed and engaged members of the public (e.g., through

discussion, voting and organizing).[12] According to Smiley, democratic pragmatists are uniquely equipped to prescribe ways to inform and engage a democratic citizenry given their strong commitment to expert-citizen partnerships.

Democratic Theory

In the past decade, claims that John Dewey was a deliberative democrat or a proto-deliberative democrat have become increasingly common, both in the literature on deliberative democracy and the literature on classic American pragmatism. Among deliberative democrats, John Dryzek acknowledges that "an emphasis on deliberation is not entirely new," and points to "[a]ntecedents" in the ancient Greeks, Edmund Burke, John Stuart Mill, and "in theorists from the early twentieth century such as John Dewey."[13] Likewise, deliberative theorists Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson note that "[i]n the writings of John Dewey . . . we finally find unequivocal declarations of the need for political discussion . . . [and] widespread deliberations as part of democracy."[14] Deliberative democrat Jürgen Habermas invokes John Dewey's argument that genuine democratic choice cannot be realized by majority voting alone, but must also be complemented by deliberation—or in Dewey's words, "prior recourse to methods of discussion, consultation and persuasion" (Dewey, 1996, LW 2:365).[15] Jane Mansbridge and John Gastil have taken these Dewey-inspired theories of deliberative democracy a step further, employing them to study the actual phenomenon of deliberation in institutionalized forums and small groups.[16] Still, while the general idea can be traced back to John Dewey, the name "deliberative democracy" has a fairly recent origin. With genealogical precision, James Bohman pinpoints "its recent incarnation" in the work of the political scientist "Joseph Bessette, who [in 1980] coined it to oppose the elitist and 'aristocratic' interpretation of the American Constitution."[17]

Among Dewey scholars, the coronation of Dewey as a nascent deliberative democrat has been comparatively slower. One remarkable conversion was signaled by Dewey biographer Robert Westbrook's admission that Dewey's democratic vision resembles deliberative democracy more than participatory democracy. Writing after the publication of his widely heralded Dewey biography, he confesses:

. . . I think we might say that Dewey was anticipating an ideal that contemporary democratic theorists have dubbed "deliberative democracy." Indeed, I wish this term was in the air when I was writing *John Dewey and American Democracy*, for I think it captures Dewey's procedural ideals better than the term I used, "participatory democracy," since it suggests something of the character of the participation involved in democratic associations.[18]

According to Westbrook, Dewey developed an ideal of intelligent social action that outstripped the ideal of participatory politics. While Westbrook initially views the mass politics and direct action of grassroots groups in the 1960s (for instance, the Students for a Democratic Society) as distinctly Deweyan, he later revises his position. For Dewey, ethical deliberation pertains to moral judgment, choice, and action. In *Human Nature and Conduct*, he defines ethical deliberation as "a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing lines of action" (Dewey, 1996, LW 14:132). To deliberate, the moral agent must, first, temporarily disengage the engine of action; then, imagine the possible consequences, good or bad, of "various competing lines of action" (i.e., rehearsing them); and, lastly, decide on the best, or most morally defensible, course of action given the rehearsal of possibilities. Dewey compares ethical deliberation to an imaginative "experiment." Each possible course of action, once worked out, remains tentative and "retrievable":

It [i.e., deliberation] starts from the blocking of efficient overt action, due to that conflict of prior habit and newly released impulse to which reference has been made. Then each habit, each impulse, involved in the temporary suspense of overt action takes its turn in being tried out. Deliberation is an experiment in finding out what the various lines of possible action are really like. It is an experiment in making various combinations of selected elements of habits and impulses, to see what the resultant action would be like if it were entered upon. But the trial is in imagination, not in overt fact. The experiment is carried on by tentative rehearsals in thought which do not affect physical acts outside the body. Thought runs ahead and foresees outcomes, and thereby avoids having to await the instruction of actual failure and disaster. An act overtly tried out is irrevocable, its consequences cannot be blotted out. An act tried out in imagination is not final or fatal. It is retrievable. (Dewey, 1996, LW 14:132–133)

While deliberation for Dewey is a way of addressing moral problems, on Westbrook's reading, it additionally constitutes a method for resolving social and political problems: "Dewey's goal [in offering a theory of moral deliberation] is to move toward an account of public deliberation on issues of society-wide concern."[19]

When appreciated as a method for coordinating action through norm-governed discussion, deliberative democracy appears surprisingly similar to Dewey's vision of democracy. In Dewey's *The Public and Its Problems*, democratic methods encompass communication and collaborative inquiry undertaken by citizens within a community and against a rich background of supportive institutions: "To learn to be human is to develop through the give-and-take of

communication an effective sense of being an individually distinctive member of a community; one who understands and appreciates its beliefs, desires and methods, and who contributes to a further conversion of organic powers into human resources and values" (Dewey, 1996, LW 2:332). Through the activity of appraisal or evaluation, private preferences, or what Dewey terms "prizings" or "valuings" (i.e., what is subjectively valued or desired), are converted into publicly shared values or "valuations" (i.e., what is objectively valuable or desirable) (Dewey, 1996, LW 13:216-218; LW 4:207). Similarly, deliberative democrats model political deliberation as a communicative process for resolving collective problems which depends on converting individual ends and preferences into shared objectives and values. Political theorist Ian Shapiro claims that "[t]he unifying impulse motivating [deliberation] is that people will modify their perceptions of what society should do in the course of discussing this with others."[20]

A critical mass of Dewey scholars enthusiastically endorses the proposition that Dewey anticipated the deliberative turn in democratic theory. Some locate the source of Dewey's ideas about democratic deliberation in his books and articles on politics, while others see a closer connection to his works on ethics.[21] Three of the more prominent scholars in this group, Melvin Rogers, Noëlle McAfee, and William Caspary, explicitly tie what they see as Dewey's nascent theory of democratic deliberation to operative concepts in his logical, political, and ethical writings. Rogers detects the connection between Dewey and deliberative democratic theory in his logic of inquiry: "It is Dewey's appeal to inquiry as a method for justifying beliefs that feeds directly into and underwrites [the legitimacy of] democratic deliberation."[22] For McAfee, it is not Dewey's logic, but his notion of publicity that emerges in *The Public and Its Problems*. "Dewey's emphasis on publicness" and "public discourse" clarifies "how a given policy would or would not satisfy their [i.e., the discoursing citizens'] own concerns, values, and ends—including the value they place on the welfare of the community itself."[23] Publicness for Dewey resembles the contemporary deliberative democrat's full-blooded sense of public deliberation, that is, discourse intended to transform individual perspectives and goals into shared ideals and public values.

Global Political Theory

Beyond the subject-matter of democracy, pragmatism has also influenced contemporary trends in global political theory. Many of these recent theoretical treatments of global politics invoke Dewey's concept of a public. In *The Public and Its Problems*, Dewey understands a group impacted, either negatively or positively, by the activities of other groups as a "public," that is, "all those

affected by the indirect consequences of [other groups'] transactions" (Dewey, 1996, LW 2:255). While publics will often contain members with conflicting interests, what they have in common are the conditions of their shared situation. Frank Cunningham connects Dewey's notion of a public to political pluralism: "On a Deweyan conception . . . publics are not places of homogenous values, but preconditions for addressing common problems among people who otherwise may have a variety of sometimes diverging values."[24] Each is similarly affected by the problematic consequences of others' activities. Once those persons belonging to a public acknowledge their shared situation, the occasion arises for them to engage in collective inquiry leading to collective action. According to Paul Stob, "Dewey's terms speak not of what the public *is* but of what the public can *do*" (Stob, 2005, p. 237).

Dewey's conceptualization of a public in terms of those externalities one set of interacting groups creates for another has also made its way into scholarly work on global justice, global citizenship, and cosmopolitanism. According to Cunningham, "since [Deweyan] democracy is of unlimited scope and thus appropriate whenever the activities of some people affect others in an ongoing way, there are no boundaries, state-determined or otherwise, to it."[25] So, extending the notion of a public to include global publics, though absent in Dewey's original formulation, is nonetheless perfectly Deweyan (or in the spirit of Dewey's original formulation). On Larry Hickman's account, "Pragmatism provides tools for fostering global citizenship by indicating some of the ways in which global publics can be formed."[26] Moreover, Marilyn Fischer claims that "it is futile to theorize about cosmopolitanism [or the view that humans all over the world can exist in peace and harmony] as a goal without also attending to the means for attaining it."[27] One of the crucial means employed by pragmatists is to conceive publics as plural in character, global in scope, and problem-solving in function. Indeed, for Colin Koopman, theorists of global justice should concede the pragmatist's point that competing visions of global connectedness are plural and overlapping, since "our ideals inevitably intersect with those of others such that each ideal comes to define itself by reference to other ideals."[28]

Public Administration

Public Administration (hereafter PA) is broadly defined as that area of study addressing the development, institutionalization, and reconstruction of bureaucratic-governmental organizations tasked to implement public policies. While some PA scholars argue that there should be a strict separation between politics and administration, pragmatists see the dualism as untenable and the founding of PA and pragmatism at the start of the twentieth century as more than a mere coincidence.[29]

A lively debate over whether classic pragmatism or neopragmatism better informs PA began with an exchange between Patricia Shields and Hugh Miller. In "The Community of Inquiry," Shields observes that the classic pragmatist's notion of a community of inquiry captures a practical (or pragmatic) ideal that most PA practitioners would feel is worthy of aspiring to: "In practice, the community of inquiry is an ideal position to which public administrators should strive (Shields, 2003, p. 511).[30] It is the position from which public administrators can most effectively examine how they approach problems, consider data, and communicate" (Shields, 2003, p. 511). Built into the notion of a community of inquiry are three key concepts: (i) the problematic situation (or the onset of a difficulty within a particular context as "a reason to undertake inquiry"), (ii) scientific attitude (or "a willingness to tackle the problem [or difficulty] using working hypotheses") and (iii) participatory democracy (or that "[t]he democratic community takes into account values/ideals . . . as it [collaboratively] considers goals and objectives") (Shields, 2003, pp. 516–525). Besides integrating these three concepts, pragmatists in "the PA workaday world" should face the opportunities and challenges that beset their organization's policy environment with what Shields calls "a sense of critical optimism": "Critical optimism [or meliorism] is the faith or sense that if we put our heads together and act using a scientific attitude to approach a problematic situation, the identified problem has the potential to be resolved" (Shields, 2003, p. 514).

In "Why Old Pragmatism Needs an Upgrade," Hugh Miller criticizes Shields's "community of inquiry" idea for relying too heavily on the foundational claims of classic pragmatism in order to ground administrative practice.[31] Miller recommends a form of pragmatism without a strong faith in scientific method to assist public administrators in appreciating the multiplicity of methods at their disposal: namely, neopragmatism (Miller, 2004, p. 245). Richard Rorty's new pragmatism satisfies these requirements, since

... the foundational link between language and reality [words and objects] that Dewey relied on has been abandoned in new pragmatism. New pragmatists do not revere experience in the same way Dewey did. The word *experience*, in its attempt to denote a relationship with a presence, is accessible only by isolating its specific meaning in a particular linguistic system. (Miller, 2004, p. 245)

Rorty's neopragmatism shares some features in common with classic pragmatism, such as commitments to instrumentalism and value pluralism (Miller, 2004, pp. 244–246). However, most neopragmatists believe that meaning emerges through the antifoundational process of language use, conversation, or discourse.[32] Classic pragmatists understand the emergence of meaning differently. On Miller's account, they posit experience as a contextual background

(or given) that connects words (language) with objects (reality) (Miller, 2004, p. 245). Since classic pragmatists attempt to describe experience as it is in-itself (its essence), they err, similar to traditional philosophers, by erecting a proxy foundation for true knowledge (viz., experience) and a method to gain privileged access (viz., science). Miller recommends that pragmatist PA scholars upgrade their operative theory from classic pragmatism to neopragmatism. Neopragmatism would replace the classic pragmatist's single mode of scientifically modeled inquiry with plural discourses and diverse approaches to administering public organizations. This would have "radical implications" for PA practice, such as the widespread adoption of innovative methods for solving public problems and the transformation of "government . . . [in]to an art and craft composed of practices and procedures invoked in pragmatic situations" (Miller, 2004, p. 248).

This debate over pragmatism's relevance to PA theory and practice nicely illustrates the kinds of intramural disagreements that occur when classic pragmatists and neopragmatists seek to clarify the relationship between pragmatism and politics.[33]

Public Policy

The final area in which pragmatism and political studies intersect is public policy—or what is sometimes termed the "policy sciences." James Lester and Joseph Stuart define public policy as "a process or a series or pattern of governmental activities or decisions that are designed to remedy some public problem, either real or imagined."[34] An obvious similarity between the governmental process of policy making and the pragmatist process of inquiry is their similar emphasis on problem solving. In this vein, James Campbell argues that pragmatist policy making should resemble an open-ended course of inquiry and experimentation: "[A]ll policy measures should be envisioned as experiments to be tested in their future consequences. As a consequence of this testing, the program will undergo *ongoing revision*."[35] Before resolving a public problem, though, policy makers must initially agree on what features of the policy environment (or situation) make it problematic—what policy analysts call setting the agenda or framing the issue, and Dewey referred to as the "location and definition" of the problem (Dewey, 1996, MW 6:236). According to Sidney Hook, one of Dewey's more renowned students, pragmatism offers a better way of framing a policy problem, "a kind of methodological sophistication that either sharpens the issues at point in public controversy or discloses the absence of real or genuine issues, thus clarifying the options open for decision."[36]

Besides philosophical pragmatists, public policy scholars have also shed light on the commonalities between policy studies and pragmatism. Indeed,

one of the key figures in the founding of the policy sciences, Harold D. Laswell, invoked "the work of Dewey and other American philosophers of pragmatism" as a prime "example of what may be expected [. . . when policy scientists] quickly move to the consideration of social [and political] institutions."[37] Commentators, such as Douglas Torgerson and Frank Fischer, note that the policy sciences did not take the strongly positivist turn that the rest of political science did (via the so-called Behavioralist Revolution) largely because Laswell conceived policy making as a naturalistic and contextualized process—that is, on par with how Dewey conceived experimental inquiry.[38] After reviewing the sundry references to pragmatism made by leading policy scholars, James Farr concludes that "[s]uch [varied] reception, in any case, suggests how diffuse and unspecified was Dewey's influence, even in so 'pragmatic' a field as policy science."[39] So, incidental appeals to pragmatism in policy scholarship do not necessarily signal the presence or influence of philosophical pragmatism. They could signify a more generic sense of the term. Still, a public policy does resemble what Dewey called a "proposal" in that it suggests "some possible solution" to a social or political problem (Dewey, 1996, LW 12:116). According to Frank Fischer, "[p]olicies . . . represent [for Dewey] plans of action selected from alternatives having scientifically observable consequences that provide the basis for valid testing."[40] Although the union of pragmatism and public policy has still not crystallized into a definite research program, scholars of both continue to explore how pragmatism can serve as a theoretical resource for addressing specific policy issues and cases.[41]

Building bridges between political studies and philosophical pragmatism is therefore consistent with Dewey's call for philosophy to deal with "the problems of men" (Dewey, 1996, MW 10:42). As witnessed in the PA dispute between classic pragmatists and neopragmatists, intramural disagreements over the relative merits of different approaches will inevitably arise. Generally though, serious investments of effort to demonstrate that pragmatist ideas and political realities are continuous features of human experience should repay students and scholars of politics a significant dividend.

12 Education

Barbara J. Thayer-Bacon

Introduction

One cannot attend a major educational conference in America today without finding a paper being presented on the pragmatist philosopher John Dewey where his name appears in the title, or where he is used as a key source and appears in the reference section. Dewey's influence is still felt strongly in America's education, even though there have been periods (in America's last 150 years of educational history) where Dewey's philosophy of education has been out of favor. I do not think it is possible to write an essay concerning pragmatism and education that does not directly refer to John Dewey, due to his significant contribution to the topic. None of the other founding pragmatist philosophers devoted their attention to education at the same level as Dewey. One could argue that current work in pragmatism and education is all a footnote to John Dewey's work (Breault and Breault, 2005).

Dewey's educational ideas such as the need for a child-centered curriculum that is based on students' interests, and a holistic approach to education that has an interdisciplinary focus and uses an inquiry approach to learning, encouraging students to learn through direct experiences, became associated with "progressive education" during the first half of the twentieth century (Tanner, 1997). Progressive approaches to education have a history of becoming disfavored in American education when the pendulum swings "back to basics," often out of concern for national security and economic prosperity (Tozer, et al., 2008). The present time serves as an example, with the US's concern for economic competition at a global level resulting in a push to increase standards and require more high stakes testing of students. Even though many argue that Dewey's philosophy of education lost influence during the World War II–post-World War II "back to basics" time frame when Russia launched Sputnik, I argue that once Dewey began contributing to the educational conversation, his influence appears to have never really died out. One can find many references in educational journals to Dewey's ideas continually and consistently represented throughout the past century.

The case is not the same for Dewey within the field of philosophy, where his work is being "rediscovered" due to more recent references to classical

8 See Chapter 15, by Ulf Zackariasson, in this volume for a discussion of pragmatist philosophy of religion.

9 For instance, different metaphysical views on the nature of the mind, or person-hood, have implications on the ethical questions concerning the proper treatment of certain kinds of beings, for example, animals, unborn fetuses, or the permanently mentally ill.

10 See Michael Eldridge's contribution to this volume for an extended discussion of pragmatist ethics. On the relation between fact and value, see also "Research Methods and Problems" above.

11 Portions of this chapter were presented as parts of my talks in the Nordic Pragmatism Conference in Uppsala, Sweden; the 10th Anniversary Conference of the Central European Pragmatist Forum in Bratislava, Slovakia; and the Finnish-Russian Philosophy Conference in Helsinki, Finland (all in June 2010). I am grateful to the audiences of all three meetings for important questions and comments.

Chapter 9

1 See Seigfried (1990) for an excellent treatment of the aesthetic and practical interests.

Chapter 8

1 The distinction is well made by David Hildebrand (2003).

2 This paragraph owes much to my email exchanges with Welchman, who freely shared some of her work in progress and criticisms of an earlier draft of this essay. She, of course, is not responsible for the use that I made of our conversations.

3 See the article on social theory by Erkki Kilpinen in this volume.

4 Space does not permit me to discuss the many fine interpretations of Dewey's ethics, but the interested reader would be well advised to consult Fesmire (2003), Hildebrand, Lekan (2003), Pappas (2008), Rosenbaum (2009), and Welchman (1995 and 2010). Note how recent most of these are; also while they may have "pragmatist" in the title they focus on Dewey.

5 Pappas is critical of all consequentialist interpretations of Dewey's ethics, including Welchman's, although he does not discuss this recent account, published in the same year as his book. See pp. 9 and 11.

Chapter 10

1 This chapter was written while I had the privilege of a fellowship at the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in Uppsala 2009–2010. I wish to express my deepest gratitude and appreciation to its staff and my co-fellows for the most excellent working conditions and research atmosphere.

2 From the voluminous literature on Dewey and his social theory, I single out a contribution, Larry Hickman's (1998) anthology, because it well keeps what its subtitle promises: introduces Dewey to a postmodern generation. I also wish to point attention to a German anthology edited by Hans Joas (2000). For a very comprehensive

overview on contemporary social theory, from a sociological viewpoint and building in part on pragmatist principles, see Joas and Knöbl (2009). An anthology edited by Alan Sica (1998) approaches social theory from a philosophical viewpoint, on non-pragmatist principles.

3 For abbreviations in Peirce quotations, see the list of references. I also give the original writing year, if known.

4 Giddens equates habits with "routines" which means that vestiges of a dualism between habituality and intentionality remain even in his thinking. He does not marry these two as pragmatists do.

5 For detailed explications of Mead see Joas (1985) and Cook (1993).

6 It is not quite original to Mead, in that Peirce has had a similar notion about "man's circle of society as a sort of loosely compacted person, in some respects of higher rank than the person of an individual organism" (CP 5,421, 1905). However, Mead has drawn its psychological conclusions more explicitly and thoroughly.

7 The quotation is Sen's own quotation from a previous author, the Norwegian economist L. Johansen.

8 I have presented chapter-length summaries about Thomas and Znaniecki and Bentley, respectively, in Kilpinen (2000, chs. 5–6). Today there is burgeoning scholarship on Veblen, to a lesser extent also on Cooley.

Chapter 11

1 In international relations scholarship, there are exceptions. See Cochran (1996, pp. 29–52). See Kaag (2008, pp. 111–131).

2 Robert B. Talisse, "John Rawls and American Pragmatisms," conference paper presented at "Rawlsian Liberalism in Context," University of Tennessee, February 26–27, 2010, available on SSRN at < http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1611859> (accessed May 29, 2010).

3 See Rorty (1989), West (2004), Posner (2003).

4 See Rorty (1991) and Bullert (1983).

5 See Knight and Johnson (1999, pp. 566–589).

6 For an opposing view, see Ralston (2010a, pp. 65–84).

7 See Farr (1999, pp. 520–541).

8 See Bohman (1999, pp. 590–607).

9 See MacGilvray (1999, pp. 542–565).

10 For Rawls's statement of the idea of reasonable pluralism, see Rawls (1996, p. 10). For the debate, see Talisse (2003, pp. 1–21), Ralston (2008, pp. 629–659), Deen (2009, pp. 185–189), Clanton and Forcehimes (2009, pp. 165–183), and Talisse (2009, pp. 131–151), Cunningham (2002, pp. 142–162).

11 See Smiley (1999, pp. 629–647). See also the chapter "Democratic pragmatism" in

12 On rational ignorance, see Downs (1957).

13 See Dryzek (2000).

14 See Gutmann and Thompson (2004, p. 9).

15 See Habermas (1996, p. 304).

16 See Mansbridge (1980) and Gastil (1993).

17 See Bohman (1988 pp. 400–425, 400) and Bessette (1981, pp. 102–116).

18 See Westbrook (1998, pp. 128–140, 138; 1991).

19 See Caspary (2000, p. 140). For the view that appropriating and reinterpreting Dewey's theory of moral deliberation as a theory of political deliberation is illicit see Ralston (2010b, pp. 23–43).

20 See Shapiro (2002, pp. 235-265, 238).
21 See Colapietro (2006, pp. 21-31), Pappas (2008), Ralston (2005, pp. 17-25), VanderVeen (2007, pp. 243-258).
22 See Rogers (2009b, p. 21; 2009a, pp. 68-89).
23 See McAfee (2004, pp. 139-157, 149).
24 See Cunningham (2008, pp. 201-221, 205).
25 Cunningham (2002, p. 213).
26 See Hickman (2007, p. 42).
27 See Fischer (2007, pp. 151-165, 152). Fischer's alternative to Nussbaum's Kantian account of cosmopolitanism is what she calls an "earthy cosmopolitanism," "a description and conception of world citizenship for human beings who are planted in the mud: fully embodied, loving, hating, sometimes rational, sometimes not, strongly attached to their habits and conventions" (2007, p. 161).
28 Colin Koopman, "Pragmatist Public Pluralism: A New Orientation for Egalitarianism and Cosmopolitanism," unpublished manuscript. Also, see his "Statism, Pluralism and Global Justice," paper presented at the International Social Philosophy conference, University of Portland, July 17, 2008. Both are available at <http://cwkoopman. googlepages.com/cv.html>. For non-pragmatist accounts of pluralism in global affairs, the first based on the creation of a transnational public sphere and the second on the cultivation of regional decision making networks, see Bohman (2007) and Gould (2004).
29 For the classic statement of the politics-administration dichotomy, see Wilson (1886, pp. 1-15). In opposition to the dichotomy and in support of pragmatism's influence on PA, see Shields (2008, pp. 205-221); also, Hildebrand (2008, pp. 222-229). In opposition to pragmatism's influence on PA, see Keith F. Snider (2000a, pp. 329-354; 2000c, pp. 123-145).
30 See Shields (2003, pp. 510-538).
31 See Miller (2004, pp. 243-249).
32 See Box (2001, pp. 20-39), Rorty (1989), and Voparil (2006).
33 After the original exchange between Shields and Miller, a host of PA practitioners, PA scholars, and pragmatist philosophers responded over a period of three years. See Stolcis (2004), pp. 362-369), Hickman (2004, pp. 496-499), Webb (2004, pp. 479-495), Snider (2000b, pp. 487-489; 2005, pp. 243-247), Evans (2000, pp. 482-486; 2005, pp. 248-255), Hildebrand (2005, pp. 345-359), Hoch (2006, pp. 389-398), Shields (2004, pp. 351-361; 2005, pp. 504-518), and Miller (2005, pp. 360-374).
34 See Lester and Stewart (2000, p. 4).
35 See Campbell (1995, pp. 207-208).
36 See Hook (1970, pp. 461-470, 467).
37 See Laswell (1951, pp. 3-15, 12).
38 See Torgerson (1985, pp. 241-261, 245-246); Fischer (1980, p. 160).
39 See Farr (1999, p. 537).
40 See Fischer (1980, p. 160).
41 See Weber (2008, pp. 608-613) and Clemons and McBeth (2001).

Chapter 14

1 See West (2004, p. 225).
2 See, for example, Du Bois (1970, 1994) and Locke (1925). Taylor (2004a, pp. 99-114) explains why it matters whether Du Bois is considered a pragmatist.
3 See Dewey (1988, 1989); Royce (2009); Addams (2001).

4 See West (1989, "Afterword," pp. 225, 226).
5 See West (1989, pp. 212, 228).
6 See West (1989, p. 233).
7 By major publications, I mean single-authored books. I will focus on four books published in the last decade or so: Outlaw (1996), Glaude (2007), Sullivan (2006), and MacMullan (2009). See also the two edited collections on pragmatism and race that have been published recently: Lawson and Koch, (eds), (2004), *Pragmatism and the Problem of Race*, and C. Kautzer and E. Mendieta, (eds), (2009), While Scott L. Pratt's (2002) does not focus on race per se, it argues for the importance of Native American thinking to the development of classical American philosophy.
8 See, for example, Appiah (1989); and Zack (1993).
9 Paul C. Taylor (2004b) provides an additional argument to this effect in "Pragmatism and Race," in Lawson and Koch, (eds), *Pragmatism and the Problem of Race*, pp. 162-176.
10 See Outlaw (1996, p. 8).
11 See Outlaw (1996, p. 11).
12 See Du Bois quoted in Outlaw (1996 p. 154).
13 For an objection to Du Bois that argues that black political solidarity should be disentangled from a collective black identity, see Shelby (2005).
14 See Outlaw (1996, p. 13).
15 See Outlaw (1996, p. 152).
16 See Outlaw (1996, p. 170).
17 See Outlaw (1996, p. 17).
18 See Glaude (2007, p. 39).
19 For a critical account of Dewey's pragmatism that examines the relevance of his racial identity to the "blueness" (or lack thereof) of his philosophy, see Taylor (2004c, pp. 227-241).
20 See Glaude (2007, p. 53).
21 Inspired by Kwame Anthony Appiah, Tommie Shelby would agree with Glaude's criticisms of an archeological approach to black identity but disagree with Glaude that identities, even on a pragmatist historicist approach, are relevant to struggles for racial justice. See Shelby (2005) and Glaude's (2007, pp. 55-57) criticism of Shelby.
22 See Glaude (2007, p. 78).
23 See Glaude (2007, p. 86).
24 See Glaude (2007, p. 98).
25 See Glaude (2007, p. 149).
26 See Glaude (2007, p. 149).
27 See Outlaw (1996, p. 21), emphasis added.
28 See Du Bois, W. E. B. (1984, p. 296); quoted in Sullivan (2006, p. 21).
29 See Sullivan (2006, p. 167).
30 See Sullivan (2006, pp. 177-178).
31 For an excellent use of Du Bois to address race and racism in educational settings, see Heldke (2004, pp. 224-238).
32 See Sullivan (2006, p. 13).
33 See Sullivan (2006, p. 10).
34 See Sullivan (2006, pp. 165-166).
35 See MacMullan (2009, p. 3).
36 See MacMullan (2009, p. 5).
37 See MacMullan (2009, p. 141).
38 See MacMullan (2009, p. 215).
39 See MacMullan (2009, p. 172).
40 See MacMullan (2009, p. 175).

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