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82

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## PRAGMATISM AND COMPROMISE

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Extensive literature on pragmatism and compromise, as well as their relationship to civic and political leadership, can be found in the field of public administration (hereafter PA). PA is broadly defined as that discipline of study addressing the development, institutionalization, and reconstruction of bureaucratic-governmental organizations, as well as the policies they are tasked to implement—or more “[s]imply stated . . . the management of government agencies” (Greene, 2005, p. 2). However, the literature is not limited to the works of PA scholars and practitioners. It also encompasses the writings of philosophers, and specifically philosophical pragmatists, who can contribute “a kind of methodological sophistication that either sharpens the issues at point in public controversy or discloses the absence of real or genuine issues, thus clarifying the options open for decision” (Hook, 1970, p. 467).

In this literature, questions arise as to how unelected leaders in governmental bureaucracies are guided by pragmatism or pragmatic ideas to: (1) negotiate with stakeholders to fashion appropriate compromise agreements, (2) solve policy problems within a zone of legally mandated authority, (3) clearly articulate the scope and content of that body of knowledge considered PA scholarship, (4) understand the origins of PA as a distinct discipline, and (5) bridge between the abstract principles offered by PA theorists and the concrete practices of bureaucratic-governmental organizations and public administrators. Classified thematically, these questions fit into four areas: first, controversy over whether administrative action is legitimate (questions 1 and 2); second, PA’s identity crisis as a discipline (questions 3 and 4); third, the gap between theory and practice (question 5); and fourth, the difficulty of integrating pragmatism and PA (1 through 5) (Snider, 2000, p. 351; Stever, 2000, p. 455).

### Three Senses of Pragmatism

In making these appeals to pragmatism, what exactly do PA practitioners and scholars mean? Is the pragmatism they invoke a theoretically sophisticated concept tied to philosophical notions of experience, truth, and language? Or are these appeals theoretically unsophisticated (or philosophically shallow) invocations of “what proves useful,” “what expedites the process,” and “what ultimately works”? A general, though incomplete, answer to these questions is that pragmatism is a contested concept. There exists extensive disagreement between and among PA scholars and practitioners over how to define the term pragmatism. Indeed, disputes over whether public administrators should behave in a pragmatic fashion can be traced to distinctly different usages. For a more specific and complete answer, it helps to clarify the meaning of pragmatism. There are at least three senses in which the term can be understood.

### Vulgar Pragmatism

In the first sense, the term denotes a naive, ordinary, vernacular usage—what is often referred to as *vulgar pragmatism*. In the vulgar sense, pragmatism also signifies a temperament commonly attributed to Americans or a feature of the American way of life. Robert Westbrook (2005) captures this meaning:

In ordinary speech, a “pragmatist” is someone (often a politician) who is willing to settle for a glass half empty when standing on principle threatens to achieve less. Pragmatists are concerned above all about practical results; they have a “can do” attitude and are impatient with those of a “should do” disposition.

never seem to get anything done. Americans are often said to be a particularly pragmatic people, and many Americans pride themselves on a sensibility others are inclined to label shallowly opportunistic. (p. ix)

In this vulgar sense, the term *pragmatic* has multiple synonyms: practical, expedient, useful, and even entrepreneurial (Commager, 1964, p. 101). Etymologically, the root *Pragma* means “things, facts, deeds, affairs” in action, from which our words ‘practice’ and ‘practitioner’ (James, 1981, p. 42). Despite skepticism that we talk about pragmatism generally or “simpliciter,” a commentator identifies revisable practice as the vital difference between vulgar or everyday pragmatism and philosophical pragmatism (Eldridge, 2009, p. 17).

### Classic Pragmatism

In the second sense, pragmatism is a sophisticated way of thinking about knowledge, existence, and social-political action initiated by several American philosophers (classic pragmatists) in the late-19th and early 20th centuries: Charles Peirce, William James, John Dewey, Jane Addams, and George Herbert Mead. Although the classic pragmatists by no means doctrinaire in their assumptions, several commitments can be distilled from their diverse writings. First, classic pragmatists placed immense importance on the idea that experience begins and ends in the middle of things, rather than from an initial position (e.g., John Locke or Thomas Hobbes’s state of nature) or terminating in a fixed final end (e.g., Aristotle’s *telos*). Second, human experience is not simply a spectator-like event or a matter of grasping (knowing) the unique essences of objects in the world (Diggins, 1994, p. 219). Instead, experience is a matter of active engagements or interactions between an individual and its environment. Through the use of various techniques, tools, or instrumentalities, humans manipulate their environment—whether by inquiring into scientific problems, appreciating art, or engaging in political action—and, in turn, their attitudes and habits are transformed by the interaction. Third, and last, classic pragmatists rejected some entrenched dualisms between, for instance, the individual and society, means and ends, and theory and practice. Treating these dualisms as fixed features of reality can be an obstacle to effective inquiry, because they artificially limit the range of options to which inquirers can imagine possibilities over and over again. Indeed, “pragmatism is a mediate compromise, and like all compromise programs must fight on many fronts at once” (Hook, 1927, p. 9). PA scholars, such as Patricia Shields (1996, 2003, 2008) and Karen Evans (2000, 2003), draw heavily on the political works of John Dewey, especially his book *The Public and Its Problems* (1996, LW 1:373–377). Contemporary philosophers who identify themselves as classic pragmatists and Deweyans, such as David Hildebrand (2003), Larry Hickman (2007), and Robert Shook (2000), understand pragmatism through the

lens of Dewey’s (1996) full corpus, which fills a total of 37 volumes.

### Neopragmatism

In the third sense, pragmatism is a relatively recent movement in philosophy termed *neopragmatism*. Neopragmatism revives features of classic pragmatism as well as ideas found in continental, postmodernist, and analytic philosophy. Contemporary philosophers who consider themselves neopragmatists include Hilary Putnam, Nelson Goodman, Richard Rorty, Donald Davidson, and Cornell West. Richard Rorty’s (1979) neopragmatism merges with Dewey’s classic pragmatism in its rejection of theories of knowing (epistemologies) that posit some objective reality (reason, sensations, clear and distinct ideas) as the ultimate ground for meaning (or the relationship between word and object):

We may think of knowledge as a relation to propositions . . . or we may think of both knowledge and justification as privileged relations to the objects [but either way] . . . to reach that point [i.e., the ultimate, real, or really real object] is to reach the foundations of knowledge. (p. 159)

However, Dewey and Rorty part ways on the topic of whether experience is more foundational than language, as well as the extent to which science and scientific method are significant drivers for human progress. For Dewey, scientific method and social inquiry empower members of a community—whether they are average citizens, policy leaders, or administrative experts—to intelligently inquire into and resolve their shared problems. For Rorty, science is not a privileged method for knowing reality; rather, it is one of many “optional tools” (1998, p. 33). Instead, the dominance of the scientific worldview ought to give way to a multiplicity of theoretical, theological, and philosophical perspectives, conversational networks, public expressions of solidarity, and private quests for self-realization (Rorty, 1989, 1998). PA scholars, such as Hugh Miller (2004, 2005), Richard Box (2001), and O. C. McSwite (1999), are especially concerned with the implications of Rorty’s neopragmatism for administrative theory and practice.

### Pragmatism and Public Management

Public management (hereafter PM) is a subfield of PA that addresses the ways in which leadership of public organizations maximizes organizational effectiveness, efficiency, and growth through the use of private sector administrative techniques (Tompkins, 2004). PM has attracted considerable attention from PA scholars seeking to integrate the insights of classic pragmatism with the theory and practice of PA (Terry, 1998).

### Administrative Leadership

With inspiration from John Dewey's (classic) pragmatism, the sociologist Philip Selznick (1980, p. 5) interprets modern bureaucratic-governmental institutions and PM from the perspective of a "moral pragmatist." In his landmark work, *Leadership in Administration*, Selznick (1984) differentiates his approach to studying bureaucratic institutions and management practices from those of Max Weber and Émile Durkheim. Whereas Weber and Durkheim erected strict dualisms (personal/impersonal, rational/legal, formal/informal) to analyze the structures and functions of bureaucratic organizations, Selznick conceives bureaucracies as organic communities that grow through the socialization of workers and the leadership of managers. From his perspective, the bureaucratization of governmental organizations and the PM practices to which they give rise is not just a matter of increasing rationalization, specialization, and division of labor. Instead, leadership guides public institutions, "infusing value" into the organizational culture, socializing their employees through exposure to the organization's core values, and adopting management practices that motivate coordinated and efficient activity (Selznick, 1984, p. 54).

### The Policy Imprint

In "Pragmatism," Shields (1996) argues that pragmatism can assist PM professionals in explaining how they "translate . . . [legal mandates] into working programs" (p. 392). Pragmatism understood as a theory of truth, a method of inquiry, and a tool of mediation can help the public manager capture the underlying or "organizing principle" or "policy imprint" of her practical problem-solving activity. According to Shields (1996), "Pragmatism is married to the concrete, chaotic, messy world of experience—a place where PA practitioners work and solve problems" (p. 395). A theory that stresses the need to overcome persistent dualisms, the value of practical experience, and the formation of intelligent habits through experimentation and learning is appropriate for PM practitioners. The theory empowers them to bridge the gaping divide between the theory and practice of PA: "Pragmatism is useful in the everyday life of the practitioner because it is so germane to the mid- and low-level theoretical problems they face daily" (Shields, 1996, p. 403).

### Inquiry as a Management Technique

In "Reclaiming John Dewey," Evans (2000) offers a framework for improving PM practices that resembles Selznick's and Shields's accounts: "The purpose of this article . . . [is] to begin a process of reclaiming the work of John Dewey as a frame for theorizing about public administration and public management" (p. 309). She argues that a classic pragmatist approach to PM balances the influence of

public input and expertise in the policy-making process. Accordingly, Dewey's philosophy "does not provide a prescription for public management; it provides, instead, a context in which to think about the future direction of public management" (Evans, 2000, p. 318). Successful social inquiry means tailoring means to ends, eschewing final objectives, collaborating with experts, deploying clear hypotheses and flexible goals (what Dewey called "ends-in-view"), and experimenting with alternative proposals to secure reliable results. Likewise, good management emulates the pattern of successful inquiry. In this way, public managers can dispel PA's dual categories (theory/practice, politics/administration, fact/value, etc.) that otherwise obstruct effective problem solving. According to Evans (2000), "pragmatism . . . dissolves all such dualisms, . . . seeing, instead, a continuum of experience" (p. 321). Also coextensive in experience are public management and leadership, for the public manager leads in the policy arena by eliciting advice and consent from politicians, experts, and other stakeholders. According to Evans (2000), "It is the leader's role to engage the public" (p. 322).

### The Experimental Attitude

In "Expertise or Experimenting?" Keith F. Snider (2000) highlights PA's "atheoretical, practical focus" (p. 338) on expertise, efficiency, and managerialism in contrast to classic pragmatism's emphasis on expert-citizen partnerships, meliorism, and the incorporation of theory with practice. In the 1920s and 1930s, the burgeoning PM scholarship moved to embrace managerialism and scientific management (or what is sometimes called "Taylorism" after the movement's founder, Frederick Winslow Taylor: Taylor, 1911). The growth of managerial theories signaled a desire among public managers to increase control over workflow, minimize waste, and maximize output through the scientific process of designing efficient organizational systems (Snider, 2000, p. 340). Though Dewey also appreciated the need to control one's environment and to employ the scientific method, these exigencies had to be balanced with a concern for cultivating the capacities of individuals (meliorism) and attending to a more extensive schedule of values (e.g., justice, fairness, and equality) than mere efficiency.

Ever since PA's founding, its leading thinkers have been preoccupied with how to develop a body of expert knowledge suitable for guiding public managers in administering their organizations' activities within the limits of their legally mandated authority. Instead of the classical pragmatist's "more modest alternative of *experimenting*," PA scholars focus on "the pursuit of certainty through administrative *expertise*" (Snider, 2000, p. 351). Given this stark difference, Snider (2000) contends that, at best, the influence of pragmatism on PA has resulted in a kind of "implicit pragmatism" (on par with vulgar pragmatism) evidenced in the scholarship of practitioners-cum-theorists in the 1940s and

1950s (the “traditionalists”) (pp. 348–349). Otherwise, pragmatism had minimal influence on those PA scholars and professionals responsible for refining the techniques of PM: Philosophers—even pragmatist philosophers such as James and Dewey—could only have been viewed as simply irrelevant in a field that focused on efficiency in administrative practice” (Snider, 2000, p. 336). Noticeably less sanguine than Evans (2000), Snider (2000) concludes that a fruitful partnership between classic pragmatism and PM would require a sea change “in [the] direction of the mainstream of thought extending all the way back to the founding of public administration as a self-aware field” (p. 351).

### Pragmatism and Public Administration

Although Evans (2000) and Snider (2000) address the specific relevance of classic pragmatism to PM, they ignited a broader debate among PA scholars and philosophers concerning the relationship between PA and philosophical pragmatism (Evans, 2005; Garrison, 2000; Hildebrand, 2005; Miller, 2004, 2005; Shields, 2003; Stever, 2000). Rather than plumb the depths of this scholarly literature, the present inquiry turns instead to an examination of two actual cases: (1) Banning dwarf tossing in Springfield, and (2) advocating for affirmative action in Pasadena. Both cases address municipal policy making in the face of a controversial issue. The analyses that follow each case summary illustrate how the pragmatic approach can assist civic and political leadership in resolving such controversial issues.

#### Case 1: Banning Dwarf Tossing in Springfield

When a nude dancing club in Springfield, Illinois, announced its intention to stage a dwarf-tossing competition in the summer of 1989, the Springfield city council and community members were outraged. Though the 4-foot, 8-inch, 120-pound man calling himself “Danger Dwarf” had fully consented to be thrown by the club’s patrons, city officials were determined to stop the practice of dwarf tossing within city limits. In other cities, such events had been shut down when the municipality threatened to rescind the business’s liquor license. However, in this case, the business served no alcohol and thus had no liquor license. When the city council passed a resolution condemning activities “such as dwarf tossing which represent conduct that is both demeaning and insensitive to human values” (Sandy, 1997, pp. 323–324), the club subsequently responded by canceling the event. In the next 4 weeks, the city council crafted and passed an ordinance fining businesses that held dwarf-tossing events that did not abide by a set of stringent requirements, including approval through a permit process. In the end, the regulations proved so burdensome that it was no longer profitable for businesses to stage dwarf-tossing competitions.

Dwarf tossing has a long and colorful history. Beginning in Australia as a competition between bouncers, the practice migrated to U.S. drinking establishments in the 1980s and became an attraction for customers interested in observing or participating. In its most common manifestation, the players try to toss the dwarf the longest distance, with the winner earning a prize. The dwarfs rarely suffer harm. Usually they wear protective gear and land on a cushioned surface. Part of their gear includes a harness with handle-holds for ease of tossing. One version of dwarf tossing involves attaching the dwarf to a skateboard and rolling him toward bowling pins—often referred to as “dwarf bowling.” The dwarfs consent to be tossed, and many make a profession of it. According to one source, “many of the dwarfs who are tossed apparently find the work easy, lucrative and even enjoyable, especially compared to their former jobs or their daytime employment” (Sandy, 1997, p. 324).

Critics of dwarf tossing, including members of the Springfield City Council and Little People of America, claim that the activity endangers the bodily integrity and self-esteem of the dwarfs who agree to be tossed. Not only does the practice humiliate them, it also can permanently damage their delicate skeletons, leading to permanent disability or death. Nonetheless, the preeminent value for those who object to dwarf tossing is the dignity of human beings, whether dwarfs or not. According to one critic, the activity “ridicules and demeans dwarfs. It causes people to view dwarfs as objects and freaks to gawk at. Dwarf-tossing affects not just the dwarfs who are thrown, but such exploitation hurts all dwarfs” (Miller, 1989; cited by Sandy, 1997, p. 324). Some critics go further and object that the practice of dwarf tossing not only harms dwarfs, but the residents of any municipality where the competitions are conducted. Those who defend dwarf tossing invoke the values of personal autonomy and liberty. According to them, cities that ban the activity infringe on the dwarf’s capacity to make a genuine choice about whether or not to partake in the contests. So, the debate over dwarf tossing reduces to the essential question of which value should prevail: personal liberty or human integrity?

#### Analysis

For the PA pragmatist, the matter is not as simple as selecting which of two abstract values should take priority. Political leadership ought instead to take into consideration the many concrete conditions of the particular situation and the wider sociocultural context while making a decision about whether or not to ban dwarf tossing. For Dewey, a problematic situation such as Springfield’s demands political-ethical inquiry. The method of political-ethical inquiry, or problem solving, loosely resembles the pattern of experimental inquiry in positive science: (1) the identification of a problem, (2) formation of a hypothesis, (3) working out the implications of the hypothesis, and (4) testing the

hypothesis (Dewey, 1996, MW 6:236). Where ethical and scientific inquiries differ is in their respective objectives: improving value judgments versus explaining phenomena. "The moral phase of the problem," Dewey notes, is just "the question of values and ends" (1996, LW 13:184). Values direct choice and action when existing habits prove unhelpful or obstructive to good conduct. Through the activity of judging, private preferences (or what Dewey terms "prizings," i.e., what is valued or desired) are readily converted into publicly shared values (i.e., what is valuable or desirable) (Dewey, 1996, LW 13:216–218). Individuals test their value judgments in lived experience, by (1) acting in accordance with them, (2) observing the outcomes, and (3) evaluating the degree to which they are acceptable. Value judgments can be assessed naturalistically, that is, in terms of whether they cultivate intelligent habits of ethical conduct—habits that make humans better adapted to their natural and social environment (Dewey, 1996, LW 7:285–309). They can also be assessed instrumentally, that is, in terms of their efficacy or success in achieving favored ends. Finally, they can be evaluated conventionally, that is, by recourse to widely approved or potentially approvable community standards (Dewey, 1996, LW 7:262–283). In sum, ethical inquiry for Dewey is a form of experimental inquiry, or method, a way of improving our value judgments relative to naturalistic, instrumental, and conventional criteria of acceptability. For a pragmatic policy leader, the matter of whether or not to adopt a citywide ban against dwarf tossing should, first, undergo political-ethical inquiry, preferably by a panel of citizens and experts, and second, be determined through some reasonable decision-making procedure (e.g., a vote or referendum).

### **Case 2: Advocating for Affirmative Action in Pasadena**

In 1985, the city council of Pasadena, California, was pressed by residents to revise current affirmative action policies to protect Armenian Americans from the effects of discrimination in the workplace. Although the Armenians constituted only 10% of the total population, the Armenian population was the fastest growing in Pasadena, and in no other place had Armenian Americans been designated a "protected class" for affirmative action purposes. While Pasadena's existing affirmative action ordinance ensured "that protected classes are represented in the work force to the same extent that they are represented in the relevant labor market," it also gave minority-owned businesses a decided advantage in securing government contracts (Varley, 1997, p. 294).

Pasadena is a city that, to all appearances, showcases the principle of peaceful pluralism, or that ethnically, religiously, and socially diverse peoples can live together in harmony despite their deep differences. When the revision to Pasadena's affirmative action ordinance was proposed, the city's population was as follows: 37% Caucasian, 25%

African American, 22% Hispanic, 10% Armenian, and 6% Asian. A majority of the city council as well as the top municipal administrator positions were held by Caucasian citizens. Socioeconomically, Caucasians tended to be the most advantaged, whereas African Americans and Hispanics were on average the least well-off. The Asian and Armenian populations were distributed along the entire socioeconomic ladder. However, most of the Armenian immigrants had not assimilated easily, unable to find similar work opportunities as they had in their home country and often unwilling to relinquish their linguistic and cultural roots. Many of Pasadena's Armenian Americans still maintained close political ties with the liberation movement in their native Armenia that fought against Soviet occupation (Varley, 1997, p. 294).

Supporters of the proposal claimed that it was necessary to give Armenians special treatment in light of several instances in which Armenians had been arbitrarily eliminated in competitions for government jobs and contracts. Two advocates for the proposal, Bill Paparian and Rick Cole, highlighted a case in which the city awarded a lucrative contract to a Caucasian-owned towing company over two Armenian-owned companies because the police department preferred the status quo, the continuance of the contract with the Caucasian-owned company. Paparian, an Armenian American lawyer, argued that although Armenians were 10% of the city's population, they held less than 1% of the city jobs. Cole, a member of the city council and a progressive reformer, allied with Paparian. He sought to disrupt the Caucasian-only power network that had for years dominated Pasadena's municipal government.

By extending affirmative action to Armenians, Cole believed that—in addition to opening job opportunities to a broader group—the council would increase the base of support for affirmative action, draw the Armenian newcomers into progressive politics, and ultimately strengthen the city's progressive coalition of young liberals and minority groups. (Varley, 1997, p. 295)

Although most critics of the proposal did not publicize their objections, they still acted through unofficial channels to prevent the extension of affirmative action protections to Armenians. Some opponents of the ordinance's revision were themselves Armenian Americans, fearing that preferential treatment would stigmatize them. Other critics were members of minority groups who worried that expanding protection to a new group would, in turn, reduce their members' access to city jobs and contracts. Yet another group of opponents argued that affirmative action was designed to correct historical discrimination occurring over a long period of American history—the best example being discrimination against African Americans. Armenians had not been subject to such longstanding discrimination—at least not in the United States. Most of them had immigrated to America in the 20th century, fleeing the Turkish

ment's Armenian genocide in 1915. Despite this spread opposition, the proposal for revision of Pasadena's affirmative action ordinance was overwhelmingly passed by the city council. However, in later years, the ordinance was disrupted over the extent to which Armenian American residents of Pasadena truly deserved protection compared to more marginalized groups. As the tension between Pasadena's Armenian community and its other minority groups has grown, it would seem, with the benefit of hindsight, that the revised ordinance had sown the seeds of intolerant discord and, looking forward, endangers Pasadena's reputation as an exemplar of peaceful pluralism (Shields, 1997, p. 296).

### Analysis

For a pragmatic policy leader, whether or not to extend preferential treatment to Armenian Americans is an issue that concerns both democracy and inclusion. John Dewey advances a theory of democracy—what he calls “democracy as a way of life”—that is strikingly similar to contemporary theories of deliberative democracy. (See Chapter 37, “Deliberative Democracy.”)

[i.e., the nature of our democratic life] is essentially a cooperative undertaking, one which rests upon persuasion, upon ability to convince and be convinced by reason . . . resulting from free exchange and communication of ideas, from teaching and from being taught. (Dewey, 1996, MW 10:404)

Instead of a monumental event such as a constitutional convention, democratic deliberation is an ongoing process of everyday discourse, a “back-and-forth give-and-take discussion” and a “conversation,” in which one conception, or set of conceptions, replaces another as the needs and projects of the community change (Dewey, 1996, MW 8:443). Community members working in concert with experts discuss and collectively decide how to understand their shared conceptions in the best possible way, or as would ideally suit their public values, and to solve their common problems and restructure their shared institutions accordingly. What is Dewey's own pragmatic standard of inclusion? In short, it is a highly procedural standard that asks and answers two questions. The first pertains to the plurality of interests held in common by different groups. It queries those groups, “How numerous and varied are the interests which are commonly shared?” The second question concerns whether groups are open to readjusting their ways of associating. It asks, “How full and free is the interplay [of conventional forms of association] with other forms of association?” (Dewey, 1996, MW 9:89). According to this two-step procedure, members of different groups, first, identify their shared interests and, second, propose novel and flexible ways of associating to address their shared problems. It is through such a procedure that minority groups and civic leadership in Pasadena might resolve the continuing

differences over how to implement the controversial affirmative action ordinance.

## Summary

In “The Community of Inquiry,” Shields (2003) proposes that the classic pragmatist's notion of a community of inquiry captures a practical (or pragmatic) ideal that most PA practitioners would feel is worthy of aspiring to: “In practice, the community of inquiry is an ideal position to which public administrators should strive. It is the position from which public administrators can most effectively examine how they approach problems, consider data, and communicate” (p. 511). Built into the notion of a community of inquiry are three key concepts: (1) the problematic situation (or the onset of a difficulty within a particular context as “a reason to undertake inquiry”), (2) scientific attitude (or “a willingness to tackle the problem [or difficulty] using working hypotheses”), and (3) participatory democracy (or that “[t]he democratic community takes into account values/ideals . . . as it [collaboratively] considers goals and objectives”) (Shields, 2003, pp. 516–525). Besides integrating these three concepts into “the PA workaday world,” public administrators should face the opportunities and challenges that beset the organization's policy environment with what Shields calls “a sense of critical optimism”: “Critical optimism [or meliorism] is the faith or sense that if we put our heads together and act using a scientific attitude to approach a problematic situation, the identified problem has the potential to be resolved” (Shields, 2003, p. 514; see also Koopman, 2006).

Shields also addresses how pragmatism can assist PA practitioners in leading their organizations and partnering with average citizens. In terms of leadership, classic pragmatism's community of inquiry empowers PA practitioners to lead by making tough choices about which values (equality, freedom, justice, efficiency, etc.) should inform policy implementation decisions, even when “cherished values” clash (Shields, 2003, p. 526). To address PA's enshrinement of administrative expertise, Shields (2003, p. 529) cites Dewey's (1996) well-known shoe analogy as alternative: “The man [or average citizen] who wears the shoe knows best that it pinched and where it pinches, even if the expert shoemaker [or administrative expert] is the best judge of how the trouble is to be remedied” (Dewey, 1996, LW 2:364; also cited in McAfee, 2004). Because the average citizen is best situated to locate the problem that affects her (“that it pinched and where”), she should consult with the administrative (or policy) expert who has the technical skill and experience with similar problems (“the best judge of how the trouble is to be remedied”) (Dewey, 1996, LW 2:364). Likewise, the expert should consult with the citizen in a reciprocal (and pragmatic) process of group problem solving—what Dewey calls “public spirit” (1996, LW 2:364, LW 3:152, LW 13:95).

Former President Bill Clinton once declared, "Sooner or later you figure out that pragmatism and compromise are principles in a democracy. It's not selling out your convictions" (as cited in Hurd, 2005, p. 1). Soon afterward, pundit Michael J. Hurd disputed Clinton's account: "Pragmatism means precisely what he [Clinton] says it does not mean. Pragmatism means denying or evading your convictions in favor of the expediency of the moment" (p. 1). Though Hurd was characterizing Clinton's pragmatism as vulgar, there is nothing about either variety of philosophical pragmatism (classic or new) that prohibits acting according to principle and *also* reaching compromise. By focusing on the conditions of the situation and appropriate policy tools, civic leadership can often reach consensus more effectively than if shared values or ideology were emphasized. Indeed, according to Charles E. Lindblom (1959), the key to "muddling through" a difficult negotiation is for the parties to agree on means, not ends: "The contestants cannot agree on criteria for settling their disputes but can agree on specific proposals. Similarly, when one's . . . objective turns out to be another's means, they often can agree on policy" (pp. 83–84). A contemporary philosopher concurs: "We can live together without agreeing on what the

values are that make it good to live together; we can agree about what to do in most cases, without agreeing what is right" (Appiah, 2006, p. 71). Thus, pragmatists can teach public administrators that the dualism between means (proposals about what to do) and ends (values to realize), similar to Woodrow Wilson's (1886) seminal dichotomy between politics (or policy creation) and administration (or policy implementation), should not be treated as strict and exclusive; rather, it is a functional distinction to be negotiated in any particular situation through dialogue and compromise (Garrison, 2000, p. 473; Goodin, 2003, pp. 86–87).

Although pragmatism is a contested concept, most contributors to the PA literature on compromise and leadership agree that in a democracy, pragmatic public administrators can legitimately reach compromises only if they operate within a zone of legally mandated authority and remain open to negotiating the ratio of shared values (ends) to policy tools (means). Indeed, even in the most recent incarnations of the debate over pragmatism's influence on PA, PA scholars and pragmatist philosophers can at least agree on these two conditions for integrating pragmatist theory and administrative practice (Hildebrand, 2008; Shields, 2008).

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