

How Reinhold Helped Hegel Understand the German Enlightenment and Grasp the Pantheism Controversy

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Abstract

Hegel's unpublished, undated manuscript of background material on subjective mind (1789-1794?) appears to be generally Kantian but it is, above all, heavily informed by Reinhold's *Elementarphilosophie*. The proposition of consciousness allows Hegel to present the subjective mind almost exclusively in terms of representation: both outer (empirical) and inner intuitions have the objective status of representations. These, in turn, are gathered into concepts of the understanding, which are generalized representations. The common grounding of both intuition and conceptual reasoning in representation allows Hegel to see Enlightenment thought as unable to surpass the endless vacillation between poles of feeling (or faith) and ratiocination. The controversy between Jacobi and Mendelssohn can thus be seen as symptomatic of this fruitless and inevitable to-and-fro. Of course, the only way out and beyond, as Hegel already affirms in this early manuscript, is through a type of dialectical reason that allows the truth of both "Satz und Gegensatz".

In December 1794, while still stuck in Bern, Hegel, in a letter to Schelling, refers disparagingly to the state of philosophy at his old school, the Tübingen seminary, writing: "as long as someone like Reinhold or Fichte doesn't fill the Chair, nothing serious will take place there."¹ However, a year later, in January 1795, still in Bern, Hegel admits to knowing the depths of Kant's critical philosophy, "as little as those of Reinhold", further remarking that such speculations seem to have little bearing on the religious and political

¹ Johannes Hoffmeister, *Briefe von und an Hegel [Briefe]* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1953), letter 6, Christmas Eve, 1794.

realms that really interest him.² The following month, in February 1795, Schelling writes to Hegel, predicting that, thanks to Reinhold, “we will soon be at the highest peak of philosophy.”³

Between 1795 and 1801, there is a sea change in Hegel’s and Schelling’s attitudes toward Reinhold. This is probably because, in the latter year, Reinhold had published a critical review of K.W. J. Schelling’s *System des transcendentalen Idealismus* (*System of Transcendental Idealism*), in the *Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung*, at Jena, and, in his *Beiträge zur leichtern Übersicht des Zustandes der Philosophie beym Anfange des 19. Jahrhunderts* (*Contributions to a Simpler Overview of Philosophy at the Beginning of the 19th Century*), Reinhold had gone on to espouse C. G. Bardili’s philosophy of logical realism, in opposition to Schelling’s (and Hegel’s) philosophy of identity.⁴

² *Briefe*, letter 8.

³ *Briefe*, letter 10.

⁴ In fact, Schelling already suspected Reinhold of having published, in the same journal, a negative review of his earlier, Fichte-inspired philosophical work, *Vom Ich als Princip der Philosophie oder über das Unbedingte im menschlichen Wissen*. For an extensive treatment of the relationship between Reinhold, Schelling and, above all Hegel, see Martin Bondeli’s essential article “Hegel und Reinhold”, *Hegel-Studien* vol. 30 (1995) p. 45-87. See also Rolf Ahlers, “Reinhold and Hegel on the Principle and Systematicity of Philosophy”, *Idealistic Studies*, Vol. 35, Issues 2-3, (Summer-Fall 2005), pp. 215-253, and Pierluigi Valenza, *Reinhold e Hegel: ragione storica e inizio assoluto della filosofia* (Padova, Cedam, 1994).

Hence, in 1801, in a letter to G. E. Mehmel, Philosophy professor at Erlangen and editor of *Erlangenliteraturezeitung*, Hegel lumps Reinhold together with “Bouterwek, Krug etc.”, writing that, “each of them qualifies his insignificant, arbitrary form of reasoning as original and behaves as if he were truly a philosopher”, when, in fact, “these men have absolutely no philosophy”.⁵ More substantially, in 1801, Hegel takes Reinhold to task in his *Differenz des Fichte’schen und Schelling’schen Systems der Philosophie* (*Differenz-schrift*) which is Hegel’s main text on Reinhold. It is a response to Reinhold’s *Contributions to a Simpler Overview*.⁶

In the *Differenz-Schrift*, Hegel criticizes Reinhold for not distinguishing Schelling’s philosophy from Fichte’s subjective idealism. Reinhold, claims Hegel, is ignorant of Schelling’s new objective philosophy, his *System of Transcendental Idealism*, which includes incipient philosophies of nature and art. It is true that for Reinhold, in his *Contributions to a Simpler Overview*, intellectual intuition, in both Fichte and Schelling, is reduced to being a vacuous and thoroughly subjective intuition of the individual thinker. Surprisingly, Hegel’s defense of Schelling against this charge is rather unconvincing, consisting mainly of citing Schelling’s affirmations on the objective side of his philosophy, regarding his early philosophy of nature. Perhaps this is because Reinhold’s criticism of intellectual intuition prefigures Hegel’s own later criticism of intuitive knowledge, and ultimately of Schelling, in the Preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*’s reference to the famous cowless night of indifference. Reinhold’s critique of

⁵ *Briefe*, letter 31, September 26, 1801.

⁶ *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Gesammelte Werke* (GW) vol. 4, ed. Rheinisch-Westphalischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Hamburg: Meiner, 1968) pp. 77-92.

intellectual intuition also anticipates Hegel's polemical take on Jacobi and Schleiermacher, whom Hegel describes as the highest "Potenzirung" of the former, in *Glauben und Wissen (Faith and Knowing)* (1802),⁷ and again 20 years later, when Hegel attacks Schleiermacher in his Preface to Hinrichs's *Die Religion im inneren Verhältnisse zur Wissenschaft (Religion, in the Inner Relations to Science)*. Here, Hegel fully adopts Reinhold's idea that intellectual intuition is ultimately nothing but subjective feeling, applying the critique to Schleiermacher's notion of religion as a feeling of the universe. This allows Hegel to make the notorious remark that if feeling were the foundation of religion, a dog, who strongly feels dependence towards its master, would be the best Christian.⁸

In the *Differenz-schrift*, Hegel also describes the tortuous path Reinhold has taken, how he has moved from a Kantian position, to a Fichtean position, to Jacobi, before finally coming to rest with Bardili's logic, a journey that Hegel ironically qualifies as a "metempsychosis". Although Hegel seems to present this trajectory as evidence of dilettantism or philosophical flakiness, one is tempted to see his presentation of Reinhold's series of intellectual revolutions as a caricature of the very path of error that Hegel will later portray, in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, as the process of truth itself,

⁷ *Glauben und Wissen, oder die Reflexionsphilosophie der Subjectivität, in der Vollständigkeit ihrer Formen, als Kantische, Jacobische, und Fichtesche Philosophie.* GW vol. 4, p.385, line 15.

⁸ Hegel, *Berliner-Schriften (1818-1832)*, Walter Jaeschke (ed.) (Hamburg: Meiner, 1997) p.78, line 2.

even to its apotheosis in a type of realistic logic.⁹ In any case, in the *Differenz-schrift*, Hegel still defends, to a certain extent, Schelling's and his philosophy of identity, where speculative identity takes place in the primal indifference point between subject and object.

Hegel's later references to Reinhold seem to indicate a positive reevaluation. In the *Science of Logic* (1812-16), Hegel acknowledges Reinhold for his early speculative thinking on the question of the beginning in Science,¹⁰ a question that goes to the heart of the Hegel's systematic enterprise and to which he returns almost obsessively in the introductions to all his major works. In fact, the problem of finding the system's beginning is just as difficult and pregnant as the better-known issue of accepting or refusing its end, which is hardly surprising given that in Hegel's encyclopedic science, as in Proust's *Remembrance of Things Past*, the beginning is the end and the end is the beginning. Nonetheless, before concluding that, in the *Logic*, Hegel had definitively revised his earlier negative opinion of Reinhold, we should recall that his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, from the 1820's, reproduce almost word-for-word the same derogatory expression we find in the 1801 letter to Mehmel, where "Reinhold, Bouterwek, Krug etc.", are presented as insignificant and unphilosophical.¹¹

⁹ GW vol. 4, p.81, line 5. For a thorough exegesis of the *Differenz-Schrift*'s discussion of Reinhold, see Bondeli's above-mentioned article.

¹⁰ GW vol. 21, p.57, line 2.

¹¹ Hegel, *Werke in 20 Bänden*, Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, eds., (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970) vol. 20, p.387.

I want to return to an earlier, anonymous reference to Reinhold, in Hegel, to a “hidden” reference found in a text that Johannes Hoffmeister dates from 1794 and gives the title, *Materien zu einer Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes*. This text is pivotal to grasping Hegel’s view of the *Verstand* as a faculty of representation, and its central role in the relation between faith and knowing. The text can thus help us see how Reinhold’s theory of representation allowed Hegel to understand the Enlightenment and grasp the pantheism quarrel.

The text itself is a hybrid affair, with its own interesting, although putative, history. In the summer of 1789, while at Tübingen, Hegel chose to take the private, elective course, given by J.F. Flatt, who is best, though imperfectly known as the assistant of the dogmatic theology professor Gottlob Christian Storr.¹² Flatt’s course was entitled “Empirical Psychology and the Kantian *Critique*”. The fact that Hegel took this course has been established by Johannes Hoffmeister and confirmed some thirty years later by Dieter Henrich, who affirms that the central portion of the 1794 manuscript corresponds perfectly to the content of the notebook of another student who took Flatt’s 1789 course. Consequently, Hegel seems to have taken the course on psychology and

¹² Flatt tends to be unfairly maligned and underestimated. His criticisms of Kant’s philosophy were important enough to be taken into account by Kant himself, and his teachings certainly would have marked his three best-known students, Hegel, Schelling and Hölderlin. On Hegel and Storr, see my *Real Words: Language and System in Hegel* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007) p. 29-39.

incorporated its content, from his own class notes, into the 1794 manuscript on psychology or subjective spirit.¹³

Hoffmeister's remarkable analysis of the central portion of the 1794 manuscript further establishes that its content represents a compilation taken from a number of sources: the *Critique of Pure Reason*, but also from secondary literature, such as works by J. F. Abel, C. C. E. Schmid, Johann Schultz and Reinhold.¹⁴ Interestingly, it was Flatt who seems to have put together this compilation while preparing his 1789 course, which Hegel followed, faithfully taking and conserving the notes he would later incorporate into his 1794 catalogue of psychological concepts. The last part of the manuscript, however, cannot be drawn from the same source. The reason is simply that this part of the text

¹³ For a summary of the erudition pertaining to Hegel and Flatt's course and lecture notes, see H. S. Harris, *Hegel's Development*, vol.1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), p.83 n.1, p.84 n. For the critical edition of the psychology manuscript, see GW vol. 1, pp. 167-192, as well as the *Anhang* and the *Anmerkungen*. See also Johannes Hoffmeister, ed., *Dokumente zu Hegels Entwicklung* (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1974 [1936]), pp. 195-217 for the manuscript, with Hoffmeister's commentaries, pp. 448-453.

¹⁴ For the relation between these thinkers and the first Kantian Critique, and for background on Reinhold and the period immediately following its publication, see George di Giovanni's *Freedom and Religion in Kant and His Immediate Successors – The Vocation of Humankind, 1774 – 1800*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

contains explicit references to the *Critique of the Faculty of Judgment*, which was only published in 1790.

While the content of Flatt's course, and Hegel's notes, may contain elements from such Kantians or psychologists as Schmid, Abel and Schultz, it seems to me that the greater part of the text is above all informed by Reinhold's theory of representation. Flatt, in teaching Kant, was really teaching Reinhold's Kant, apparently emptying the first *Critique* of any ontological or metaphysical claims, concentrating entirely on the psychological elements from the transcendental aesthetics, those elements dealing with individual human consciousness. Hegel's letter to Schelling (1794) shows that, at this time, he still values Reinhold as an important philosopher, although to what extent he could distinguish Reinhold from Kant and Flatt is debatable. This might explain his 1795 comment to Schelling, that he knows little of Reinhold's theoretical philosophy. Perhaps he knew more than he realized.

Reinhold is central to the psychology text on two levels. First, his proposition of consciousness is used to ground epistemologically the very possibility of a speculative science of psychology. Then, more broadly, his theory of representation enables Hegel to grasp the true relationship between faith and knowing, the substance of the pantheism quarrel.

Reinhold's proposition of consciousness makes the science of psychology possible, for Hegel, by allowing it to get over a classical epistemological hurdle: how can the object of enquiry (the mind) also be the instrument of enquiry? This is the same problem, put differently, that so frustrated Hume – can we know our personal identity? In Kantian terms, in the 1794 manuscript, how can we know our own minds when, “the

concept of rational psychology is not based on any (sensuous) experience?” How can we have an empirical experience of the rational soul? The manuscript evokes this epistemological challenge at the outset and responds to it, further on, by citing Reinhold’s proposition of consciousness: “In consciousness, the representation is, through the subject, distinguished from and related to both the subject and the object. – proposition of consciousness.”¹⁵ The Hegel text immediately cautions against deriving or deducing the particular branches of psychology from the proposition, as Reinhold wanted to do. However, since the power of representation is the general power of the subjective mind, conscious thought allows us to study our psychological representations as distinct from ourselves. In other words, we can now take our mental phenomena as scientific objects since, as conscious beings, we distinguish ourselves from our subjectivity as it relates to objectivity and to itself, in its representations. Within ourselves, we are able to distinguish from ourselves both the representations of subjectivity and those of objectivity.

What is particularly significant here, regarding Hegel, is that the proposition of consciousness introduces the idea of an over-arching scientific subjectivity, a kind of meta-subjectivity capable of observing and reflecting upon the self as it relates to the world. As we will see, this bi-dimensionality of subjectivity is essential to Hegel’s idea of a phenomenology of consciousness, where the progression or movement of consciousness through its various, pre-determined forms is “for us”, Hegelian scientists,

¹⁵ GW vol. 1, p.169, line 7.

while, at the same time, taking place “behind the back” of consciousness itself.¹⁶

Similarly, in the 1794 text, through reference to Reinhold’s proposition of consciousness, psychology can take the point of view of a scientific subject that observes its own mental phenomena or facts of consciousness, both subjectively and objectively produced, as representations.

This is what the first third of the psychology text does: it deals with *Empfindungsvorstellungen*, the representations arising from outer sensory input as well as those arising from inner feeling. Both types are representations in the Kantian sense of intuition; they are spontaneously represented images stemming from inner feeling (through the pure form of time) or from the outward directed (space-related) senses. Representations from the outer senses are empirical. In psychology, we are dealing with the “laws and conditions under which, in the soul, a sensible intuition is brought to consciousness,” or how we come to be affected by objects through our senses of taste, smell, hearing, sight, touch and still distinguish these sensations from ourselves.¹⁷ On the other hand, the inner sense deals with objects “which we represent to ourselves solely in time.”¹⁸ These are inner feelings of our deepest soul (*Seele*), of our deepest self. “The fundamental power of the soul is a representing power” and within itself it perceives

¹⁶ Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, H.-F. Wessels and H. Clairmont (eds.) (Hamburg: Meiner, 1988), p.68, line 2.

¹⁷ Ibid. p.170, line 3.

¹⁸ Ibid. p.172, line 2

moods, feelings, dreams and conditions of *Gemüt*.¹⁹ Here, we discover the deepest “self-feeling”, at a pre-conscious level, where we immediately intuit changes within our bodies, a dreamlike experience and the possibility of dreams, sleep-walking and mental derangement through *idées fixes*, as well as the escape from the confines of the inner soul through the outward-directed exercise of habit.²⁰ In this material, we recognize the building blocks (*Materien*) of Hegel’s fully developed anthropology, in the Subjective Spirit section of the 1827 and 1830 editions of the *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences*, particularly in sections 401 to 409. For example, in the 1827 edition, the title preceding section 403 was, “The Soul that Dreams and Habituates itself”.

The 1794 manuscript then deals with cases of *Phantasievorstellungen*, representations arising from conscious memory, but also through fever, drunkenness, dreams, madness, religious or supernatural fanaticism and visions, as well as in artistic creation. This level of psychological activity refers to the actual production of representations, whether unconscious or conscious. Here, once more, we find original elements that can be rediscovered in Hegel’s mature science of subjective spirit. Indeed, he will never abandon the view of *Phantaisie* as productive of representations in language, through the production of linguistic signs (cf. the *Encyclopedia*, sections 457-60) and productive of representations in artistic works, which therefore also obtain in religion (which is fundamentally artistic). This is the highest destiny of representation, in Hegel, of what is usually translated, in English, as picture-thinking, to portray the

¹⁹ Ibid. p.172, line 14. Recall that *Seele* refers to the natural, anthropological dimension of soul, while *Gemüt* refers to its more creative, sensitive, spiritual side.

²⁰ Ibid. p.173, line 9.

Absolute Idea in art and religion. Indeed, picture-thinking can represent the highest, speculative truth. The Christian Trinity represents the speculative truth of the Idea, as does the more quadrilateral cosmogony of Jakob Böhme, just as the foaming chalice at the end of the *Phenomenology* represents the liberation of pure thought into the Logic. However, as we know, Hegelian scientific discourse claims to be more than the reflection or representation of truth. It must ultimately consist in conceptual language.

Following the representations of *Phantaisie*, in the 1794 text on psychology, understanding is addressed, true to Kantian form, as “the faculty of concepts”. However, the *Verstand* is then given a distinctly Reinholdian flavor, for its concepts are presented as “general representations that grasp within and under themselves other representations”.²¹

What is important for that part of my discussion pertaining to the pantheism quarrel, is that Reinhold’s theory of representation allows Hegel to grasp the understanding as a judging, conceptual faculty that draws upon both outer, empirical representations (sensations) and our inner representations or feelings. Hegel applies this truth to an area in which he is intensely interested, religion and the relation between faith and knowing. He does this in such a way that faith may be conceived in terms of subjective inner feeling (e.g. how Hegel portrays Jacobi in the 1802 essay, *Faith and Knowing*), as opposed to the empirically-derived reasoning. By presenting both inner feeling and reflexive empirical knowing as representations of subjective understanding, and not as irrevocably opposed theologico-philosophical tendencies, as they are presented in the starkest depiction of the pantheism quarrel (between Mendelssohn and Jacobi),

²¹ Ibid. p. 184, line 20.

Reinhold's theory of representation shows Hegel that the secret to overcoming the division between faith and rationalism lies not in choosing a winner but in discovering a way of thinking (i.e. speculative Reason, *Vernunft*) that goes beyond the representational thinking of the understanding. This also implies overcoming the Enlightenment.

For Hegel, the Enlightenment takes place under the sign of the understanding, which has, one might say, metastasized through the casuistry of Late Scholasticism, to the point where understanding has liberated itself from Church orthodoxy, in the bacchanal of free individual thinking known as the *Aufklärung*.²² Thanks to Reinhold, Hegel now sees that the understanding falls under the faculty of representation, which inevitably draws upon outer and inner sources while remaining fixated in their dichotomy and opposition. It is the bipolar aspect of the understanding, as the seat of both sentimental faith and empirical reason, that allows Hegel to grasp the pantheism quarrel and understand the Enlightenment. In fact, in Hegelian terms, the pantheism quarrel should be seen as the historical truth or actuality of the Enlightenment. To the extent that this intellectual movement promotes reasoning in the form of ratiocinating *Verstand*, it cannot but express itself in unilaterally opposed, yet mutually dependent representations of rational empiricism and feeling (rational determinism vs. faith and feeling).

The divisive nature of the dichotomy is inimical to the organic vision of systematic science. This is illustrated, in other contexts, by Hegel's use of the term "Barbarei" to describe either the unilateral representations of sentimental faith or those of empirical rationality. The concept of barbarism aptly reflects the insult, and indeed the

²² A clear presentation of this can be found in Hegel's Preface to Hinrichs's *Religion*. See my *Real Words*, p. 109-11.

threat that the fixated dichotomy opposes to the Athenian whole of Science. In parenthesis, Hegel seems to derive the idea of unilateral barbarism from Schiller's *Letters on the Esthetic Education of Man*, where *Barbar* and *Wilder* are applied to those who espouse either the Reinhold-derived *Formtrieb* or *Stofftrieb* at the expense of the reconciling *Spieltrieb*.²³ In the historical context of Hegel's manuscript on subjective spirit, the barbarism of understanding's dichotomy (and the unresolved conflict of the pantheism quarrel) has given rise to the anti-scientific expression of modern skepticism. Significantly, the skepticism of Gottlob Ernst Schultze's *Aenesidemus* stems from a reflection on Reinhold's *Elementarphilosophie*, the source of Hegel's take on the understanding as the seat of inner and outer representation. In any case, the only way to get beyond the pantheism quarrel and the problem of faith and knowing, without falling into skepticism, is to get beyond fixation in the understanding and its unilateral representations. This is the project undertaken in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, whose brilliant solution consists in harnessing the very negativity of skepticism in such a way as to dissolve the unilateral positions of the *Verstand* and put them into dialectical movement.

The *Phenomenology* is famously ambiguous in that it both recounts the apprenticeship of consciousness developing to the position where it can grasp speculative

²³ For example, Hegel uses the term in one of his Jena aphorisms to describe the intuitive representations of Jakob Böhme (1803-06), GW vol. 5, p.496, line 19, whereas, in his essay on skepticism (1801), he applies the term to reflexive understanding, GW vol. 4, p.222, line 26. Schiller uses the terms *Wilder* and *Barbar* in Letter 4 of his *Letters on the Esthetic Education of Mankind*.

science, as well as presenting the integral introduction to systematic science itself. In the latter context, the work expresses the self-consciousness of Spirit, which is absolute knowing. Both of these core aspects of the *Phenomenology* are related to Reinhold, through his theory of representation and the proposition of consciousness.

First, to the extent the *Phenomenology* recounts the development of consciousness, it seems clearly inspired by Reinhold's own phenomenological approach, the idea that to comprehend consciousness its facts may be observed, as both distinct from and related to the over-arching scientific subject mentioned above. To this aspect Hegel adds the dialectic already implicit in Reinhold's idea of consciousness: subjectivity's essential fact of both distinguishing itself from and relating itself to itself becomes an action. One might say the *Tatsache* becomes a *Tathandlung*. While many of Reinhold's contemporary critics used the apparent contradiction (between the subject as that which relates and the subject as that which arises out of having been related) to challenge his *Elementarphilosophie*,²⁴ Hegel seems to have grasped the dialectical nature of the contradiction as the movement essential to consciousness itself. Subjectivity, the movement of the concept and even natural life are essentially a self-relating through self-distinguishing.²⁵

²⁴ See Dieter Henrich's exposition of this contradiction. *Between Kant and Hegel: Lectures on German Idealism*, David Pacini, ed., (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press), p. 134-35.

²⁵ For example, in the Introduction to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel describes consciousness as "distinguishing something from itself, to which it also relates itself." *Phänomenologie op.cit.*, p.64, line 11.

On the second, systematic level, to the extent the *Phenomenology* is meant to be the integral introduction to Science, the coming to be of absolute knowing that foams forth into the Logic, it must reconcile faith and knowledge. The *Phenomenology* does so by grasping faith as a contemporary, immediate intuition of the absolute truth, as *Hen Kai Pan* or Science “coming on the scene”²⁶ in the form of intellectual intuition. However, this primary intuition, historically actual in the thought of Fichte, Hölderlin, Schelling, and perhaps Schleiermacher, must then be worked out by revisiting the path of knowing (as the historical progression through different, erroneous forms) that has allowed spirit to reach the initial intuition of the truth. Absolute knowing is nothing other than the remembering and interiorizing (*Erinnerung*) of the stages of consciousness that humanity or spirit has moved through until it is able to recognize itself in its past forms. Spirit realizes the injunction of the oracle: know thyself!

The development of knowing recounted in the *Phenomenology* is only possible because the entire truth of systematic science has already been felt as a massive, immediate intuition of the truth, a type of inner feeling or faith which then must be re-worked out in rational, conceptual knowing. In other words, the *Phenomenology* can only be the conceptual introduction to Science to the extent that Science as a whole is already there, felt as an act of faith, or, to use a more familiar Hegelian term, as a certitude that must become realized truth. As is well known, the dialectic between certainty and truth is played out, more discretely, within each revisited form of consciousness. Thus we can see the work as the dynamic and thorough overcoming of the unilateral representations of faith and reason, not by ignoring or refuting them, but by

²⁶ Ibid. p.60, line 2.

reinterpreting them speculatively and incorporating them into an organic, dialectical movement driven by the necessary third element, skepticism.²⁷

Hegel's project of overcoming the opposed positions of representational understanding by incorporating them into a dialectical movement is presented in another, non-phenomenological context, in the preliminary concept of the *Encyclopedia Logic*, where we discover the three forms of thought that precede (Hegelian) Science. Following the first form, which is classical metaphysics, as found in Leibniz and Wolff, the second form is Kantian empiricism and the third is immediate knowing, i.e. intuition or faith, explicitly in the figure of Jacobi. The latter two representational forms must be overcome and taken up in speculative science, the first moment of which is the Logic, i.e. the revealed truth of the first form of thought, metaphysics.

To conclude, I want to refer briefly to Hegel's last word on Reinhold, found in the 1830 edition of the *Encyclopedia*, where he is credited with having recognized the truth of Kantian philosophy, namely that it is really a philosophy of subjective consciousness and representation.²⁸ This association between subjectivity and representation, which Reinhold discovered in Kant, is, or should be, particularly meaningful for us today.

²⁷ The reconciliation between faith and knowing also takes place through the incorporation of the Religion chapter. Faithful to Lessing and to Kant (*Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft - Religion Within the Bounds of Reason Alone*), Hegel cannot conceive of absolute knowing that does not involve Revelation and the teachings of actual religion.

²⁸ Hegel, *Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften (1830)*, F. Nicolini and O. Pöggeler (eds.) (Hamburg: Meiner, 1991) §415, p.345, line 26. "Thus one may see as

Much of post-modern philosophy can be viewed as an attack on the notion of representation. Representation is generally suspect since its very idea seems to imply that metaphysical bugbear: the transcendental signified. Hence, in thinkers like Foucault and Derrida, representation is meant to be surpassed in favor of the new reality of language or writing. Beyond this turn to linguistic realism, Deleuze and Guattari's concept of desiring production involves a similar collapsing of the space between the represented and the representing, into a new reality of neutral, vitalistic flows and breaks. In all these cases, it is apparent that the disappearance of representation goes hand-in-hand with the evacuation of modern (i.e. free, rational, Kantian) subjectivity. The assault on representation seems to inevitably involve an assault on this notion of the subject. Could it be, as Reinhold discovered, that (free, rational) selfhood is fundamentally linked to our capacity to represent?

Other post-modernists such as Guy Debord, Jean Baudrillard and Louis Althusser seem to be rejecting representation as a phenomenon of bourgeois, late capitalism. They challenge the stultifying all-pervasiveness of representation in today's world, a world apparently sapped of any real substantial content or interest, absorbing us into the society of the spectacle. We seem to be living in the representation of a representation of a representation, between two mirrors facing one another, draining all reality and selfhood, until we are unable to tell the representations from the world or from ourselves. Needless to say, such a condition is experienced as a loss of freedom.

testifying to the exact sense of this [Kantian] philosophy the fact that it has been apprehended by Reinhold as a theory of consciousness, under the name of a faculty of representation.”

Reinhold helps us understand that being a self necessarily involves our capacity to represent, as well as the ability to relate to one's representations as one's own. Being a self also implies the ability to distinguish one's self and the world from one's representations. Without this relating and distinguishing, consciousness disappears, and with it, the modern concept of subjectivity and its freedom. Reinhold's discovery of the essential relation between modern subjectivity and representation may still have ethical and political repercussions beyond what Hegel could have imagined.

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