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The Logical vs. the Ontological Understanding of Conditions

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Metaphysica

Abstract

According to the truth-functional analysis of conditions, to be ‘necessary for’ and ‘sufficient for’ are converse relations. From this, it follows that to be ‘necessary and sufficient for’ is a symmetric relation, that is, that if P is a necessary and sufficient condition for Q, then Q is a necessary and sufficient condition for P. This view is contrary to common sense. In this paper, I point out that it is also contrary to a widely accepted ontological view of conditions, according to which if P is a necessary and sufficient condition for Q, then Q is in no sense a condition for P; it is a mere consequence of P.

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Acknowledgement

Thanks are due to Ingvar Johansson, Peter Melander, Bertil Strömberg and two anonymous referees for constructive critique of earlier versions of this paper.

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  1. Department of Historical, Philosophical and Religious studies & Department of Food and Nutrition, Umeå University, 901 87, Umeå, Sweden

    Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson

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  1. Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson
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Correspondence to Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson.

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Ingthorsson, R. The Logical vs. the Ontological Understanding of Conditions. Int Ontology Metaphysics 9, 129–137 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-008-0027-x

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-008-0027-x

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