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Being of Two Minds: Belief with Doubt (1995)

I

Belief is systematically connected with a variety of psychological attitudes. Disbelief is, in a certain sense, the opposite of belief. But one may fail to believe something—say, that Ortcutt is a spy—without going so far as to disbelieve it. One may suspend judgment on the issue. For the purposes of the present discussion, let us agree to stipulate the following definition for the word 'doubt':

> *A doubts p* $=_{\text{def}}$ (*A* disbelieves *p*) $\lor$ (*A* suspends judgment concerning *p*).

Notice that according to this definition, in order for Ralph to count as doubting whether Ortcutt is a spy, Ralph need not even believe it unlikely that Ortcutt is a spy. It is enough that Ralph have no opinion on the matter. This constitutes a departure from standard usage, but it is merely a stipulation concerning how the word 'doubt' will be used here.[1]

What, now, is the relationship among these five: belief, disbelief, failure to believe, failure to disbelieve, and suspension of judgment?

Here is one plausible way to make out the connections. Let us tentatively lay down the following additional definitions, treating the English verb 'believes' together with the standard truth-functional connectives as primitive:

> *A disbelieves p* $=_{\text{def}}$ *A* believes $\sim p$.
>
> *A fails to believe p* $=_{\text{def}}$ $\sim$ (*A* believes *p*).
>
> *A fails to disbelieve p* $=_{\text{def}}$ $\sim$ (*A* disbelieves *p*).
>
> *A suspends judgment concerning p* $=_{\text{def}}$ (*A* fails to believe *p*) $\land$ (*A* fails to disbelieve *p*).

[1] One finds a similar usage elsewhere in the philosophical literature. See, for example, Bertrand Russell, "Belief, Disbelief, and Doubt," in his *Theory of Knowledge* (London: Routledge, 1992).

Notice that disbelief is (unlike failure to believe, failure to disbelieve, and suspension of judgment) a form of belief: it is belief of the denial. Suspension of judgment is defined as the joint failure of both belief and its opposite, disbelief. This definition is objectionable on the ground that genuine suspension of judgment requires in addition, for example, that one have a grasp—some apprehension, perhaps even if imperfect—of the proposition in question. One might suppose furthermore that suspension of judgment, in Russell's words, "represents the result of an attempt to decide between the two"—i.e. that in order to count as suspending judgment on some matter one must have at least consciously considered the question at issue.[2] The points I shall make below are not greatly affected if one adds such restrictions as these to the proposed definition. For the most part, the discussion will require only minor modification to take account of the further conditions (for example by restricting the range of the propositional variable 'p' to propositions that A apprehends). As we did for doubt, let us simply stipulate that as we use the phrase here, suspension of judgment does not require that one have consciously considered the question.

Some immediate consequences of the definitions should be noted. We have made doubt definitionally equivalent to the disjunction of disbelief with suspension of judgment, thereby making for two distinct ways of doubting something. The definitions, as given, yield an alternative equivalent disjunction: To doubt something is to disbelieve it, or alternatively, simply to fail to believe it. It is not that failure to believe is equivalent to suspending judgment, suspending judgment, as defined above, entails failing to believe, but not vice versa. In failing to believe something one either disbelieves it, thereby doubting by disbelieving, or failing that, one suspends judgment (by definition), which is the second way of doubting. But the definitions allow for at least the possibility of someone believing something while also disbelieving, and hence doubting, it. Having contradictory beliefs is depicted here as at least a logical possibility, even if it is an irrational possibility and even if, as some have argued, it is a psychological impossibility. With this in mind, one can see that doubt is not simply identified with failure to believe. It is logically possible for one to doubt something while still believing it, but only by believing it and disbelieving it at the same time. The only way to fail to doubt something is to believe it but without also disbelieving it, i.e. to believe it in the normal way.

Such consequences as these are more easily seen if our definitions are symbolized in a standard logical notation. Let upper-case 'P' symbolize 'Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy', and let upper-case 'Q' symbolize 'Ralph disbelieves that Ortcutt is a spy'. The following symbolizations for the notions of failure to believe, failure to disbelieve, suspension of judgment, and doubt are thereby generated:

Ralph fails to believe that Ortcutt is a spy: $\sim P$.

Ralph fails to disbelieve that ortcutt is a spy: $\sim Q$.

Ralph suspends judgment concerning whether Ortcutt is a spy: $\sim P \wedge \sim Q$.

Ralph doubts whether Ortcutt is a spy: $Q \vee (\sim P \wedge \sim Q)$.

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[2] *Ibid.*, p. 143.

The decision to symbolize in this manner presupposes the logical independence of belief and disbelief. One may compensate for this, if one wishes, by laying it down as a special postulate that Ralph does not both believe and disbelieve that Ortcutt is a spy, $\sim (P \wedge Q)$. In the general case, let us call the following postulate '*A*'s Consistency':

$\sim$ (*A* believes *p* $\wedge$ *A* disbelieves *p*).

Here now are several theorems, each of which is easily derived from the definitions in standard propositional logic:

T1: *A* believes *p* $\vee$ *A* doubts *p*.
T2: $\sim$ (*A* believes *p* $\wedge$ *A* suspends judgment concerning *p*).
T3: $\sim$ (*A* disbelieves *p* $\wedge$ *A* suspends judgment concerning *p*).
T4: *A* doubts *p* $\equiv$ $\sim$ (*A* disbelieves *p* $\equiv$ *A* suspends judgment concerning *p*).
T5: *A* doubts *p* $\equiv$ (*A* believes *p* $\supset$ *A* disbelieves *p*).
T6: (*A* believes *p* $\wedge$ *A* doubts *p*) $\supset$ *A* disbelieves *p*.

Theorem *T1* tells us of every proposition within the range of '*p*', that *A* either believes it or doubts it, where *A* can be anyone at all. Theorem *T2* tells us that no one both believes and suspends judgment concerning the very same proposition, and theorem *T3* tells us that no one both disbelieves and suspends judgment concerning the very same proposition. Theorem *T4* indicates that doubting—which was defined as the inclusive disjunction of disbelief with suspension of judgment—is equivalent to the *exclusive* disjunction. This equivalence is an immediate corollary of *T3*. Theorem *T5* indicates an alternative equivalent of doubting *p*: if one believes *p*, then one also disbelieves *p*. This was foreshadowed in our observation that doubt is definitionally equivalent to the disjunction of disbelief with mere failure to believe. Theorem *T5* immediately yields the result, given in *T6*, that believing while at the same time doubting the same thing inevitably requires one also to disbelieve that same thing—a corollary that resonates with *T2*.

Taking *A*'s Consistency as a postulate yields the following addenda to *T1* and *T2*:

C1: $\sim$ (*A* believes *p* $\wedge$ *A* doubts *p*).
C2: $\sim$ (*A* believes *p* $\equiv$ *A* doubts *p*).

A's Consistency thus tells us of every proposition within the range of '*p*', that *A* either believes it or doubts it, but never both. We noted above that the logical possibility of believing while also disbelieving is all that prevents the identification of doubt with simple failure to believe. Consequence *C2* immediately yields the following additional consequence, as a strengthened replacement for *T5*:

C3: *A* doubts *p* $\equiv$ *A* fails to believe *p*.

It is easily shown that each of *C1, C2*, and *C3* is in fact equivalent to *A*'s Consistency.

II

All of these theorems and consequences are questionable results. In effect, they exclude various combinations of doxastic attitudes and/or the lack of doxastic attitudes as logically impossible—or in the case of *A*'s Consistency, as perhaps impossible in some other manner (e.g. psychologically). In particular, *T2* through *T6* and *A*'s Consistency and its equivalents exclude as impossible various ways of being of two minds, combining belief with doubt. What shall we make of these results?

Whatever oddity there may be in *T1* results entirely from our decision to understand *suspension of judgment* in a passive way. If we bear in mind that, so understood, merely failing to believe something while also failing to disbelieve it qualifies as suspending judgment concerning it, and hence as doubting it, *T1* should not strike us as unacceptable—or at least it should not strike us as being unacceptable in some further way. The case is very different, however, with *T2* through *T6*, and with *A*'s Consistency and its equivalents. For the combinations of conflicting attitudes that they rule out are evidently combinations that one may nevertheless exhibit.

Is it possible, in a real sense, to have genuinely conflicting doxastic attitudes? One immediately thinks of the subconscious and of self-conscious ambivalence. It is arguable that such cases provide genuine counterexamples to *T2* through *T6* and/or to *A*'s Consistency and its equivalents. It is equally arguable that they do not. Let us set such cases aside. The philosophy of language has provided an altogether different kind of example of conflicting attitudes.

Nearly four decades ago in his classic "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes," Quine made a significant case against *A*'s Consistency.[3] He there provided a now famous example in which it would be clearly correct to say that, because he has failed to recognize Ortcutt in his different personae, Ralph believes Ortcutt to be a spy while simultaneously believing Ortcutt not to be a spy. Being a Millian with respect to proper names, I accept Quine's example as a case of Ralph both believing that Ortcutt is a spy, and at the same time also disbelieving, and hence doubting, that Ortcutt is a spy. Quine himself evidently does not so construe the case, insisting instead on Ralph's Consistency and on the inaccuracy of characterizing Ralph as believing of Ortcutt that he is a spy. But his argument for this is confused and, in my judgment, very much mistaken.[4]

[3] In Quine's *The Ways of Paradox* (New York: Random House, 1966), pp. 183–194.

[4] Cf. my "Relational Belief," in P. Leonardi and M. Santambrogio, eds., *On Quine*, Proceedings of the 1990 San Marino Conference on Quine's Contributions to Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1994), first note. Quine objects to the claim that Ortcutt is believed by Ralph to be a spy on the questionable grounds that "if so, we find ourselves accepting a conjunction of the type *w* sincerely denies '. . .' & *w* believes that . . . as true, with one and the same sentence ['Ortcutt is a spy'] in both blanks" (*op. cit.*, p. 185). Quine takes no notice of the fact that this involves the tacit assumption that if Ralph believes Ortcutt to be a spy, in virtue of believing that the man in the brown hat is a spy, then Ralph also believes *that Ortcutt is a spy*. This assumption is highly controversial. Perhaps a majority of philosophers of language reject it; Quine himself almost certainly does. By contrast, I accept it, together with the consequence that Ralph sincerely denies

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   Even setting Quine's example alongside cases from the subconscious and
ambivalence, similar sorts of examples are driving an increasing number of
philosophers to the same conclusion that failure to recognize someone or something
typically results in contradictory beliefs about that one or that thing. Nothing
has done more to lend credence to this conclusion, and to foster its widespread
acceptance, than Kripke's recent classic "A Puzzle about Belief."[5] Kripke himself
concludes his trenchant essay by cautioning against drawing any significant
theoretical conclusions from his arguments and examples.[6] And indeed, several
remarks seem to indicate that he adamantly opposes this conclusion in particular.[7] In
hindsight, however, his examples and arguments are today very often seen—perhaps
even usually seen—as making an extremely strong case (however inadvertent) against
A's Consistency. Those examples and arguments also make an extremely strong case
against claims like those made in *T2* through *T6*, when taken in their usual senses,
or something close to it (as opposed to the nonstandard senses imposed on them by
the proposed definitions). The case against the "theorems" is in many respects quite
similar to, even though significantly stronger than, Quine's (equally inadvertent) case
against *A*'s Consistency and its equivalents.
   Kripke's examples refute *A*'s Consistency by providing cases in which a rational
believer, Pierre, is unknowingly of two minds concerning whether London is pretty.
Although frequently overlooked, one of the most significant aspects of Kripke's
examples is that the difficulties they raise for *A*'s Consistency and its equivalents are
quite independent of the on-going debate between Millianism (or neo-Russellianism)
and Fregeanism. Millians and Fregeans alike have concluded that Pierre is of two
minds, harboring conflicting attitudes toward the single proposition that London
is pretty. In the central example, Pierre both believes and disbelieves that London
is pretty. Kripke also briefly considers a modified example in which Pierre instead
both believes and suspends judgment without disbelieving (*op. cit.*, pp. 122–123).
Although Kripke does not do so, one might also consider an alternative modified
example in which Pierre disbelieves and suspends judgment without believing. In

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something he in fact believes. Indeed, he sincerely denies that Ortcutt is a spy precisely because he
disbelieves it.

   [5] In N. Salmon and S. Soames, eds., *Propositions and Attitudes* (Oxford Readings in Philosophy,
1988), pp. 102–148.
   [6] At p. 136.
   [7] At p. 122 (top paragraph). Cf. also pp. 131–136, especially 132. Some of these passages
suggest that Kripke may endorse the postulate of Pierre's Consistency. However, this is very likely
a misrepresentation of his position. Kripke argues vigorously that when we attempt to evaluate
the English sentences 'Pierre believes that London is pretty' and 'Pierre disbelieves that London
is pretty' as true or false, "we enter into an area where our normal practices of interpretation
and attribution of belief are subjected to the greatest possible strain, perhaps to the point of
breakdown" (pp. 134–135). As I read him, Kripke thinks—unofficially, as it were—that both
sentences are probably neither true nor false, in his example (owing to some sort of conceptual
deficiency in the verb 'believes'). This would make their conjunction also neither true nor false, and
hence also the negation of that conjunction—which is Pierre's Consistency. Cf. my *Frege's Puzzle*,
pp. 129–132; and "Illogical Belief," in J. Tomberlin, ed., *Philosophical Perspectives, 3: Philosophy of
Mind and Action Theory*, 1989 (Atascadero, Ca.: Ridgeview, 1989), pp. 243–285, at pp. 255–256,
276–277*n*14.

fact, it is a simple matter to extend the original example into one in which Pierre is of three minds. Imagine that Pierre has learned not only English but also Italian by direct assimilation (not by translation into either French or English). He comes to believe that the city named '*Londra*' is a third city, distinct from both the pretty city named '*Londres*' and the ugly city named 'London'. When queried in Italian, '*Londra è graziosa?*', he neither assents nor dissents, explaining that he has no opinion on the matter. In this example, he believes, disbelieves, and also suspends judgment with respect to the same proposition that London is pretty! This and the other permutations on Kripke's original example, I contend, invalidate each of *T2* through *T6*, when taken in something like their standard senses, as well as *A*'s Consistency.[8]

Since each of these theorems follow logically from the proposed definitions, the examples thereby discredit those definitions. Our conclusion, then, is that, however plausible they seemed at first sight, at least one of our definitions has missed its intended target. Which one, or ones?

It is under the pressure applied by examples of someone being of two minds—combining belief with doubt—that I have suggested alternative accounts of belief and doubt.[9] Many commentators have thought that my alternative account is proposed as an *ad hoc* supplement to my advocacy of a Millian theory of names, in order to make the theory more palatable. Let me emphasize that the pressure to adopt some such alternative account does not come from my Millianism, except perhaps by a very circuitous route. If I were a Fregean, I would still advocate my alternative account of the doxastic attitudes, and for very much the same reasons. Even looking at the situation through Fregean lenses, one is drawn to the conclusion that someone in Pierre's state of confusion is, or at least can be, of two minds (or of three or more minds) with respect to one and the same proposition—or in Frege's preferred terminology, with respect to one and the same "thought" (*Gedanke*).[10] To account for this anomaly, the Fregean need only turn to his/her notion of *indirect sense* (*ungerade Sinn*). The indirect sense of an expression is the sense that the expression allegedly takes on in positions in which it has indirect reference (*ungerade Bedeutung*), referring not to its customary referent but to its indirect referent, which is the sense customarily expressed. Indeed, although I do not know of anyone who has explicitly responded to Kripke's arguments by invoking the orthodox Fregean notion of indirect sense, that notion is tailor-made to explain predicaments like Pierre's.[11] The English 'London is pretty', the French '*Londres est jolie*', and the Italian '*Londra è graziosa*' all express the same proposition. Pierre fully understands each of the three sentences. Each of those sentences therefore expresses the very same thing even for Pierre. But he does not realize that. The sentences present their shared proposition

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[8] For those who insist that issues of inter-language translation are importantly relevant to Kripke's examples, this case may be replaced, exactly as Kripke suggests, by one in which Peter believes, disbelieves, and suspends judgment concerning whether Paderewski has musical talent.

[9] *Frege's Puzzle* (Atascadero, Ca.: Ridgeview, 1986, 1989), in chapter 8, at pp. 103–118.

[10] Frege himself probably would not have accepted this conclusion regarding Pierre's particular circumstance. But see note 12 below.

[11] Cf. Alonzo Church's review of the famous Black/White exchange concerning the paradox of analysis, in *The Journal of Symbolic Logic*, 11 (1946), pp. 132–133.

content to Pierre in different ways. Though exactly alike in customary sense, the three
sentences thus differ in indirect sense, at least for Pierre, as he understands them.[12]

Although I am not a Fregean, I have helped myself, enthusiastically, to certain
aspects of Frege's notion of sense—or more specifically, to certain aspects of his
notion of indirect sense.[13] I have done so not because my Millianism imposes a
special requirement to do so, but because Pierre's predicament does. Pierre is of
two (or more) minds concerning the proposition that London is pretty because he
takes the proposition in different ways, mistaking it for two (or more) independent
propositions—just as he mistakes London for two (or more) different cities. If a
believe *A* treats a pair of propositions *p* and *q* as being distinct, then he or she
takes *p* and *q* in different ways—even if, in fact, *p* = *q*. Thus if *A* mistakes *p*
for two independent propositions, then he or she takes *p* in two different ways.
I have proposed that we recognize a ternary relation, *BEL*, underlying the binary
relation between believer and proposition believed. The *BEL* relation obtains among

[12] The indirect-sense solution just adumbrated is not necessarily Frege's own. In light of his
remarks in the famous second footnote to "*Über Sinn und Bedeutung*" pertaining to the name
'Aristotle' and the sentence 'Aristotle was born in Stagira', Frege himself would have likely denied
that the name 'London' is a part of English—or, at least, that it is a univocal part—and that the
name '*Londres*' is a part of French, etc. Carried through to its natural conclusion, this denial would
involve a refusal to apply the disquotational principle on which Kripke relies in developing his puzzle
to sentences involving either name, on the grounds that such sentences occur only in individual
idiolects and not in any public natural language. Pierre's sincere and reflective dissent from 'London
is pretty' indicates his disbelief of the proposition ("thought") expressed by that sentence *in his
own idiolect*. But according to Frege, we cannot report Pierre's attitude using the sentence 'Pierre
disbelieves that London is pretty' unless we happen to attach the very same (customary) sense to
'London' as Pierre—an extremely unlikely coincidence, on Frege's view.

A couple of points should be made in this connection. First, the famous translation test
advocated and successfully employed by Frege's most ardent follower, Alonzo Church, would
seem to support the conclusion that the English 'London is pretty' and the French '*Londres est
jolie*' express the same proposition. The proposed indirect-sense solution is the natural Fregean
position, once this conclusion is conceded (contra Frege himself). More importantly, situations
like Pierre's can be reproduced using general terms in place of genuine proper names. Kripke, in
a slightly different connection, suggests examples using natural-kind terms (*op. cit.*, pp. 128–130;
see also pp. 108–110, 115–117 for related discussion). I have elsewhere suggested examples using
'ketchup'/'catsup', 'color'/'colour', and even differing pronunciations of 'tomato'. See my "A Millian
Heir Rejects the Wages of *Sinn*," in C. A. Anderson and J. Owens, eds, *Propositional Attitudes:
The Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind* (Stanford, Ca.: CSLI, 1990), pp. 215–247, at
p. 220–221; and "Relative and Absolute Apriority," *Philosophical Studies*, 69 (1993), pp. 83–100,
at pp. 86. Frege's views about genuine proper names, however reasonable they may seem at first
blush, cannot be plausibly extended to cover all of these examples. Where they cannot, the
indirect-sense solution is the only appropriately Fregean response.

I should add that I believe the indirect-sense solution, although in some respects natural,
is ultimately quite implausible. See my "A Problem in the Frege-Church Theory of Sense and
Denotation," *Noûs*, 27, 2 (June 1993), pp. 158–166. I thus sharply disagree with those who
maintain that Kripke's examples pose no serious problem for the Fregean (as for example, William
Taschek, "Would a Fregean be Puzzled by Pierre?" *Mind*, 97, 385 (January 1988), pp. 99–104).

[13] I reject the charge that my doing so makes me a closet Fregean. As I said in the previous note,
I believe the orthodox indirect-sense solution is ultimately quite implausible; I employ only certain
aspects of Frege's notion of indirect sense. See João Branquinho, "Are Salmon's 'Guises' Disguised
Fregean Senses?" *Analysis*, 50, 1 (January 1990), pp. 19–24; and my "A Millian Heir Rejects the
Wages of *Sinn*."

a believer A, a proposition p, and a way x of taking p, when A is disposed to cognitive assent to p, taking it in way x. Or something along those lines. The important point is that A may stand in *BEL* to p and one third relatum x (one way in which A takes p), yet fail to stand in *BEL* to p and some other third relatum $x' \neq x$ (some other way in which A takes p). When one fails to recognize something or someone, one's attitude toward that thing or that one may depend on *how one takes it*, on which thing or which one it is taken to be.

The simple claim 'A believes p' is analyzable as A's standing in *BEL* to p and some way or other in which A takes p:

$$(\exists x)[A \text{ takes } p \text{ in way } x \wedge BEL(A, p, x)].$$

A point that has escaped many of my commentators is that this analysis makes belief a binary, rather than a ternary, relation. One might view my reliance on the *BEL* relation as making for a relative notion of belief, one that obtains *relative to* ways of taking propositions. If one does, then ordinary belief is nothing other than the absolute notion naturally corresponding to this relative one. The English verb 'believes' may be regarded as a dyadic predicate for the relation between individuals and propositions defined by the expression displayed above (more accurately, for the relation defined by prefixing '$(\lambda A, p)$' to the expression displayed above).

Combining this analysis for belief with our earlier definitions, we arrive at the following analyses for 'A disbelieves p', 'A fails to believe p', and 'A fails to disbelieve p', respectively:

$$(\exists x)[A \text{ takes } \sim p \text{ in way } x \wedge BEL(A, \sim p, x)];$$
$$\sim (\exists x)[A \text{ takes } p \text{ in way } x \wedge BEL(A, p, x)];$$
$$\sim (\exists x)[A \text{ takes } \sim p \text{ in way } x \wedge BEL(A, \sim p, x)].$$

These constructions simply insert a negation sign at one place or another in the analysis for 'A believes p'. There is at least one other position in which the negation sign might be sensibly placed. To account for situations like Pierre's, I offered an analysis of a supplementary notion, which is modelled in a certain sense after the notion of failure to believe, and which I called 'withheld belief'. 'A withholds belief from p' is analyzed as:

$$(\exists x)[A \text{ takes } p \text{ in way } x \wedge \sim BEL(A, p, x)].^{14}$$

Notice that this notion is logically compatible not only with failure to believe and with disbelief, as analyzed above, but also with belief of the very same proposition p. Taken together with our analysis of belief it immediately yields the following theorem:

T7: $(\exists x)(A \text{ takes } p \text{ in way } x) \supset (A \text{ believes } p \vee A \text{ withholds belief from } p)$.

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[14] *Frege's Puzzle*, p. 111. The analysis was inspired by an argument in David Kaplan, "Quantifying In," in D. Davidson and J. Hintikka, eds, *Words and Objections: Essays on the Work of W. V. Quine* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1969), pp. 206–242. See especially section XI, at pp. 233–235.

This tells us that anyone who apprehends a given proposition without believing it withholds belief from it. But refraining from believing an apprehended proposition is not the only way to withhold belief. One can both believe and withhold belief from the same proposition.

In place of the earlier definition for *suspension of judgment*, we now have the following analysis for '*A* suspends judgments concerning *p*':

$(\exists x)[A$ takes p in way $x\ \wedge\ \sim\ BEL(A, p, x)\ \wedge\ A$ takes $\sim p$ in way $Neg(x)\ \wedge\ \sim BEL(A, \sim p, Neg(x))]$,

where $Neg(x)$ is the corresponding way of taking the denial of the proposition that x is a way of taking.[15] This immediately yields the following theorems:

T8: *A* suspends judgment concerning $p \supset A$ withholds belief from p.

T9: *A* suspends judgment concerning $p \supset A$ withholds belief from $\sim p$.

These theorems, taken together with our new analysis of suspension of judgment, tell us that to suspend judgment concerning a proposition is to withhold belief both from that proposition and from its denial, but to do so in a special manner *via* a single way of taking the matter.

III

We have seen that failure to believe an apprehended proposition entails withholding belief from it, but not vice versa. What is the relationship among disbelief, withheld belief, suspension of judgment, and doubt?

To answer this question, I propose assuming three special postulates.[16] The first I shall call '*A*'s Comprehension':

A takes p in way $x\ \equiv\ A$ takes $\sim p$ in way $Neg(x)$.

This tells us that if *A* apprehends a certain proposition *p*, then *A* also apprehends its denial $\sim p$ in the appropriate way corresponding to the way in which *A* takes *p*, i.e. as the denial of *p*. It also tells us that if *A* apprehends a certain negative proposition $\sim p$ in an appropriate manner (i.e. as a negative proposition), then *A* also apprehends the proposition *p* that $\sim p$ negates in the appropriate way corresponding to the way in which *A* takes $\sim p$, i.e. as the proposition negated by $\sim p$. *A*'s Comprehension (in the left-right direction), taken alone, yields the following consequence:

C4: *A* withholds belief from $p\ \supset\ (A$ disbelieves $p\ \vee\ A$ suspends judgment concerning p).

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[15] This is a minor modification of the analysis proposed in *Frege's Puzzle*, p. 172*n*1. The different analyses are rendered equivalent under the assumption, to be proposed shortly, of *A*'s Comprehension.

[16] Other postulates may be assumed in addition to these. A trivial case in point is what I call 'the *BEL* Principle': '*BEL(A, p, x)* $\supset A$ takes *p* in way *x*.' This merely encapsulates the triviality that if *A* believes *p* relative to a particular way *x* of taking *p*, then *A* takes *p* in way *x*. (It renders part of the proposed analysis of belief redundant).

The second postulate I shall call 'the Negativity Principle':

A takes $\sim p$ in way $x \supset (\exists y)(x = Neg(y))$.

This tells us, in effect, that to any way of taking a negative proposition $\sim p$ there corresponds an appropriate way of taking the proposition p negated by $\sim p$. The third postulate, which I shall call 'A's Rationality', replaces the now discarded A's Consistency:

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$\sim [BEL(A, p, x) \wedge BEL(A, \sim p, Neg(x))].$[17]

Recall that A's Consistency, in its consequence *C3*, rendered doubt equivalent to failure to believe. Using the Negativity Principle and A's Comprehension (in the right-left direction only) in combination with A's Rationality, we may derive:

A disbelieves $p \supset A$ withholds belief from p.

Combining this consequence with *T8* and *C4* we have the following:

C5: A withholds belief from $p \equiv A$ doubts p.

Consequence *C5* is our replacement for *C3*. Although the definition for 'doubt' has not been altered, the notion so defined has changed significantly. This is because doubt is defined in terms of suspension of judgment, and our new notion of suspension of judgment is significantly different from our old one. Consequence *C4* yields a near entailment between the old notion and the new one:

$(\exists x)(A$ takes p in way $x) \supset [(A$ fails to believe $p \wedge A$ fails to disbelieve $p) \supset A$ suspends judgments concerning $p]$.

This tells us that if A apprehends p but neither believes it nor disbelieves it, then A suspends judgment. But we no longer have that if A apprehends p and suspends judgment concerning it, then A fails to believe it, and likewise we no longer have that if A apprehends p and suspends judgment concerning it, then A fails to disbelieve it. In short, the new notion of suspension of judgment is, in a sense, weaker than the old one. Most significantly, 'A suspends judgment concerning p' is now consistent both with 'A believes p' and with 'A disbelieves p'. In fact, even A's Rationality (with or without the other two postulates) does not exclude the joint truth of all three. This is all for the good, since on the amended example, Pierre believes, disbelieves, and suspends judgment with respect to a single proposition. The new, weaker notion of suspension of judgment yields a notion of doubt that is likewise weaker than the old one.

We have already seen our replacements for the discarded A's Consistency and its equivalents. But what has become of the previous theorems *T1* through *T6*? In place of *T1*, as a direct consequence of *T7* and *C5* we now have:

C6: $(\exists x)(A$ takes p in way $x) \supset (A$ believes $p \vee A$ doubts $p)$.

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[17] General claims to the effect that we form beliefs in accordance with the rules of logic have to be weakened in analogous ways. Cf. my "Illogical Belief."

Thus failing to believe an apprehended proposition remains one way of doubting it.

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By contrast with *T1*, all of *T2* through *T6* simply go by the wayside.[18]

IV

I have stressed that my postulation of a ternary relation underlying the binary relation between a believer and the proposition believed is motivated primarily by considerations that are largely independent of the controversy between Millians and Fregeans. Recognition of the *BEL* relation allows for the natural definition of a relation of suspension of judgment that is compatible with both belief and disbelief of the same proposition, and with belief-with-disbelief. It also allows for a straightforward understanding of such notions as that of *believing the same thing in two different ways* or *believing the same thing twice over*, of *doubting the same thing twice over*, etc. Examples like Kripke's compel one to recognize these various doxastic notions, and the examples do so largely independently of one's theory of meaning. I have also relied on the presence of the *BEL* relation in the underlying structure of the belief relation to explain the prevailing intuitions against some of the consequences of Millianism

FN:19

concerning substitution.[19]

Other philosophers have looked to the *BEL* relation to do independent duty as part of a device that can rescue Millianism altogether from its untoward consequences. One strategy is to treat the grammatical complement clause in a belief attribution as specifying at one and the same time both the proposition, belief of which is being attributed, and with it also a specific third relatum for the *BEL* relation. For example, an English belief attribution of the form

α believes that φ,

where α is a singular term and φ is a declarative sentence, might be regarded as expressing a proposition about the referent of α, to the effect that he/she stands in *BEL* to p and w (or that he/she believes p "relative to" w), where p is the proposition content of φ and w is a particular third relatum for the *BEL* relation carried by the very sentence φ for the referent of α. The complement clause φ is thus pressed to perform two separate roles, determining distinct relata in separate argument places of the *BEL* relation. Indeed, on this theory, the belief attribution may be regarded as a shorthand for something like the following:

$BEL(\alpha, \text{ that } \varphi, W[\alpha, \varphi])$,

where 'W' is special operator, not appearing explicitly in the surface structure, such that the result of attaching it to a singular term α and a sentence φ in brackets refers to the way the referent of α takes the content of φ when that proposition is presented

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[18] There are, of course, replacements for *T2* through *T6* involving '*BEL*' in place of 'believes'. Each is trivial.

[19] *Frege's Puzzle*, especially pp. 114–118; "Illogical Belief," especially pp. 248–253.

to him/her by means of (his/her version of) the very sentence φ. Let us call this *the double-dipper theory*.[20]

Assuming that pairs of co-contentful sentences like 'Hesperus appears at dusk' and 'Phosphorus appears at dusk' provide speakers with distinct ways of taking their shared proposition content, the double-dipper theory offers a ready explanation for the appearance of a failure of substitution in problematic attributions like 'Jones believes that Hesperus appears at dusk': Whereas substituting 'Phosphorus' for 'Hesperus' preserves the attributed proposition, doing so does not also preserve the specified way of taking that proposition, and hence need not preserve truth value for the whole attribution. The double-dipper theory is in fact reminiscent of Fregeanism. One of the principal characteristics that distinguish the double-dipper theory from a mere notational variant of Fregeanism is that the thing said to be believed in 'Jones believes that Hesperus appears at dusk' (or the thing said to be doubted in 'Jones doubts whether Hesperus appears at dusk', etc.) is not supposed to be the proposition-cum-way-of-taking-it provided by the complement clause, but merely the proposition, in this case a singular proposition. As will become clear in due course, this feature of the double-dipper theory is significant. Another feature of the double-dipper theory that differentiates it from Fregeanism is that it is refuted by Alonzo Church's famous translation argument.[21]

Stephen Schiffer has proposed a close relative of the double-dipper theory, which he calls *the hidden-indexical theory*.[22] The hidden-indexical theory, or something extremely similar, has been defended by Mark Crimmins and John Perry.[23] The central idea is that an English belief attribution of the form

α believes θ,

with α a singular term and θ a term referring to a proposition, is indexical, expressing different propositions with respect to different contexts of utterance. With respect to

[20] I have argued that belief attributions are often used to convey precisely the information ascribed to them as their semantic content by the double-dipper theory, rather than the nonspecific, existential information that my own theory ascribes as semantic content. (See the previous note.) It is important to note that even if one succeeds in asserting the former sort of information in uttering a particular belief attribution, it does not follow that the attribution itself semantically contains this same information, rather than information of the latter sort, with respect to the context of utterance. See note 27 below.

[21] Alonzo Church, "On Carnap's Analysis of Statements of Assertion and Belief," in L. Linsky, ed., *Reference and Modality* (Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 168–170.

[22] Schiffer deems the hidden-indexical theory the best theory of the semantics of belief attributions that is predicated on the relatively uncontroversial assumption (which Schiffer himself rejects) that natural language "has a correct compositional truth theory." He first presented a version of the theory in "Naming and Knowing," in P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein, eds, *Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977, 1979), pp. 61–74, at pp. 65–67. See also his "The 'Fido'–Fido Theory of Belief," in J. Tomberlin, ed., *Philosophical Perspectives, 1, Metaphysics*, 1987 (Atascadero, Ca.: Ridgeview, 1987), pp. 455–480; and "Belief Ascription," *Journal of Philosophy*, LXXXIX, 10 (October 1992), pp. 499–521. (I respond to the second mentioned article at some length in "Illogical Belief," *loc. cit.*)

[23] Crimmins and Perry, "The Prince and the Phone Booth: Reporting Puzzling Beliefs," *Journal of Philosophy*, LXXXVI, 12 (December 1989), pp. 685–711; Crimmins, *Talk About Beliefs* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992). The latter work is the most thorough in its detailed development and defense of the theory.

a given context *c*, it expresses (or at least commonly expresses) a proposition about the referent of α with respect to *c* and the referent of θ with respect to *c*, to the effect that the former stands in *BEL* to the latter and *w*, where *w* is a particular third relatum for the *BEL* relation, one that is implicitly or tacitly referred to ("unarticulated," to use Perry's term) in, and determined only relative to, the context *c*. It is as if the attribution were shorthand for something like the following:

$BEL(\alpha, \theta,$ that way of taking θ).

Here the third argument is a demonstrative phrase which is 'hidden' in the surface structure, and by means of which (or as if by means of which) the speaker refers, in his/her context, to a particular way of taking a proposition.[24]

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[24] Schiffer refers to the third relata of the *BEL* relation by the Fregean epithet 'mode of presentation', but he defines modes of presentation essentially as whatever plays the role of third relata for the *BEL* relation. Crimmins and Perry take the third relata to be mental particulars. The objections to be raised below are independent of these matters. I shall continue to speak of the third relata as "ways of taking propositions," but I mean this phrase to be neutral regarding the exact nature of the third relata (as with Schiffer's use of 'modes of presentation'). Cf. *Frege's Puzzle*, pp. 111, 119–120, 126–128.

The hidden-indexical theorists allow that belief attributions need not always involve implicit contextual specification of a particular third relatum for *BEL*, and may instead merely characterize a third relatum as being of a certain implicitly, contextually indicated kind (for example when simultaneously attributing belief to a plurality of believers rather than to a single individual). It is also allowed that, on comparatively rare occasion, there is neither contextual specification nor contextual characterization, but merely existential generalization—the last being precisely what I contend is the correct analysis for all belief attributions. In the general case, a belief attribution of the form 'α believes θ' is shorthand (or, in some way, as if it were shorthand) for something like: '(∃*x*)[*x* is a way of taking θ & *x* is of *that* kind & *BEL*(α, θ, *x*)].' Here the demonstrative '*that*' refers, with respect to a context, to a kind of way of taking a proposition (or to a property of ways of taking propositions). Typically, the kind in question may be uniquely specific to one way of taking a proposition, but in an extreme case, the kind in question may be utterly nonspecific, including every way of taking a proposition.

The theory thus appears to offer a great deal of flexibility. By the same token, however, it comes perilously close to being an ambiguity theory of belief attributions. (The ambiguity would presumably trace to a lexical ambiguity in the English verb 'believes'.) As such, the theory may be subject to special objections that do not arise with respect to the variant that treats belief attributions as always involving contextual specification. See for example Kripke's "Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference," in P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein, eds, *Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977, 1979), pp. 6–27, at p. 19. The objections there adduced against ambiguity hypotheses may apply to a significant extent also to indexicality hypotheses of the sort proposed by the hidden-indexical theory. (Is there a significant difference between the usual view that the English word 'bank' is ambiguous, and the "rival" theory that 'bank' univocally means "object of *that* kind," where the implicit demonstrative always refers either to the kind *Financial Bank* or to the kind *River Bank*, as determined by the context?)

For simplicity, in the text I consider only the less flexible uniquely-specific version of the theory. This simplification invites the worry that the more general theory might have been originally motivated, in part, by some of the very considerations to be adduced below. But my central objections might be extended to the theory in its full generality, provided the hypothesized variability of specificity (or the alleged ambiguity) is systematic to a sufficient degree. Extending the objections in this way is a somewhat delicate matter, since the theory's defenders might respond that the particular example at hand cannot involve the typical sort of case, and instead necessarily involves one of the relatively rare occasions on which the third relatum is neither specified nor

Both the double-dipper and the hidden-indexical theories, as well as my own theory, are compatible with, and even strongly suggest, the thesis that a 'that'-clause ⌜that φ⌝, with φ a declarative sentence, is a singular term (or at least a term much like a singular term) referring to the proposition content of φ. As I have noted elsewhere, independently of the rivalry among these theories, this thesis regarding 'that'-clauses is both natural and plausible.[25] It provides the best explanation, for example, for the validity of inferences like the following:

(*I*):   Pierre believes everything Jean-Paul says about London.
    Jean-Paul says (about London) that London is pretty.
    Therefore, Pierre believes that London is pretty.

Indeed, Schiffer cites this observation as yielding a very important consideration in favor of the hidden-indexical theory over alternative theories that preclude treating 'that'-clauses as singular terms for propositions.[26] Notice furthermore that the hidden-indexical theory provides an analysis for belief attributions of the form '*A* believes θ' even when the proposition term θ does not take the form 'that φ', with φ a declarative sentence, and instead takes the form of a definite description ('the proposition to which our nation is dedicated', 'what Jean-Paul said') or a name ('Church's Thesis', 'functionalism'). It is questionable whether the double-dipper theory can be plausibly extended to cover attributions of the more general form. The hidden-indexical theory may thus afford significantly greater flexibility in this regard.

There is considerable intuitive evidence, however, that typical belief attributions do not semantically specify (or even constrain) particular third relata for the *BEL*

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substantively characterized but merely existentially generalized upon. The theory may have to be judged ultimately by the plausibility, or implausibility, of this additional claim.

[25] Cf. *Frege's Puzzle*, p. 5.

[26] "The 'Fido'–Fido Theory of Belief," at pp. 458–461; "Belief Ascription," at pp. 504–505. The account presented in Kaplan, "Quantifying In", in connection with *de re* constructions like 'Pierre believes of London that it is pretty' is the forerunner, and perhaps the best known instance, of the sort of theory that Schiffer is arguing against. Cf. my "A Millian Heir Rejects the Wages of *Sinn*," at pp. 239–242. I should note, however, that the hidden-indexical theory is primarily a theory of *de dicto* constructions. A hidden-indexical theorist need not treat the 'that'-clause in a *de re* attribution as a term for a proposition, as my own theory does (though he/she may).

While expressing sympathy for most of the ideas defended here, Neale argued in his comments at the American Philosophical Association session that an alternative explanation for the validity of (*I*) is provided by the rival hypothesis that the phrase 'that London is pretty' is a compound quantifier, perhaps synonymous with 'some unique proposition expressed [in English] by 'London is pretty''. Neale argued further that evidence for the superiority of this rival hypothesis is provided by the difficulty that otherwise arises in interpreting 'that'-clauses that are bound by a quantifier (as in 'Every man believes that he is moral'). Contra Neale, quantification into a 'that'-clause, even when the latter is taken to be a singular term, presents no special problem of interpretation. Open singular terms (including variables) refer only under an assignment of values to their free variables. Open 'that'-clauses ('that *x* is moral' with its free '*x*', or 'that he is moral' with its free pronoun), when evaluated with respect to assignments of values to their free variables, simply refer to singular propositions. It is as much a confusion to ask for the referent of a *bound* occurrence of a 'that'-clause as it is to ask for the referent of the bound occurrence of its variable or pronoun. (Cf. *Frege's Puzzle*, pp. 2–6.) Moreover, the particular hypothesis mentioned here is again refuted by Church's translation objection, cited above in connection with the double-dipper theory.

Belief

relation—whether explicitly or implicitly, whether contextually or noncontextually.
The point at issue parallels in many respects the much-debated question of whether
so-called indefinite descriptions, like 'a man', are singular terms or instead nonspe-
cific existential-quantificational constructions.[27] For example, suppose Peter utters
the attribution,

$\mathcal{P}$: Pierre believes that London is pretty

based on the erroneous assumption that Pierre, on reflection, is disposed to assent sin-
cerely to the sentence 'London is pretty'. To press the case even further, suppose that
the background for Peter's utterance of $\mathcal{P}$ includes special attention to the matter of

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[27] See Charles Chastain, "Reference and Context," in K. Gunderson, ed., *Minnesota Studies in
the Philosophy of Science VII: Language, Mind, and Knowledge* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1975), pp. 194–269; Keith Donnellan, "Speaker Reference, Descriptions, and Anaphora,"
in P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein, eds, *Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of
Language* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977, 1979), pp. 28–44, at pp. 38–39;
Kripke, "Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference," at pp. 17, 24n24, 26n32; Peter Ludlow
and Stephen Neale, "Indefinite Descriptions: In Defense of Russell," *Linguistics and Philosophy*, 14
(1991), pp. 171–202. It is my view that many, perhaps most, of the positive arguments offered
by the hidden-indexical theorists commit a special fallacy, one that is also committed in many
arguments for the thesis that indefinite descriptions are singular terms (and indeed is prevalent
in much recent philosophy of language). See my "The Pragmatic Fallacy," *Philosophical Studies*,
63 (1991), pp. 83–97, especially p. 96n15. The sort of inference to which I object is virtually
demanded by a particular conception of semantics which fails to distinguish sharply between
properly semantic ideas and those pertaining primarily to speech acts—for example, between the
semantic content of a sentence with respect to a given context and the content of the assertion, or
assertions (statements, utterances), made by the speaker in uttering the sentence in that context.
I believe this *speech-act centered conception* presents a seriously distorted picture of what semantics
is—as does the analogous *thought centered conception*. (Cf. *Frege's Puzzle*, p. 174n2.) It very often
happens that what certain words express or refer to diverges in various ways from what a speaker
expresses or refers to in uttering those same words. The conception of semantics reflected in the
work of Crimmins, Perry, Schiffer, and many others, is unable to draw this distinction correctly.
The speech-act centered conception fuels a host of questionable theories in philosophical semantics,
including the double-dipper theory as well as the hidden-indexical theory. (Cf. Crimmins and Perry,
p. 711, final paragraph; Crimmins, p. 7n.)
   Although I largely steer clear of these broader foundational issues in the text, I believe they lie at
the heart of the matter with regard to the double-dipper and hidden-indexical theories. I note here
that the intuitive case to be presented against those theories—especially the examples concerning the
intuitive correctness of certain inferences—also applies to a significant extent against the conception
of semantics that drives those theories. By the same token, anyone who is theoretically committed
to, or otherwise under, that misconception may for that very reason lack the intuitions on which
I shall rely, and hence may not find the case particularly troubling. My arguments are addressed
not so much to my partisan opponents as to the neutral agnostic—such indeed is the nature of
philosophical debate in general. On the other hand, as I note below, Schiffer, in the very course
of defending his hidden-indexical theory, explicitly endorses the major premise of my principal
objection, evidently unaware that it conflicts with the theory.
   I learned as the present paper was going to press that Mark Richard has criticized the hidden-
indexical theory on some grounds very similar to (even if not exactly the same as) those to be
presented here—especially in connection with the intuitive validity of certain types of inferences
counted invalid by the theory, and more generally with regard to the dependence of the hidden-
indexical theory on what I am calling 'the speech-act centered conception of semantics'. See his
"Attitudes in Context," *Linguistics and Philosophy*, 16 (1993), pp. 123–148, at 143–147. (But see
also note 31 below.)

what sort of impression one forms of London based primarily on an exposure to its slums. There is some temptation to judge that $\mathcal{P}$ is false, as uttered by Peter under these circumstances. And this is exactly the verdict delivered by the hidden-indexical theory.[28] Yet (as Kripke forcefully demonstrates), on reflection there is a solid intuitive basis for the contrary judgment that $\mathcal{P}$ is literally true in English, with respect to Peter's context, even though Peter's basis for it is seriously flawed. For Pierre does indeed assent to the proposition that London is pretty when it is presented to him by means of the French sentence '*Londres est jolie*'; he thus believes the proposition in at least one way ("relative to" some way or other). One might rightfully say that Peter spoke incorrectly; perhaps one may even say that Peter said something false about Pierre. But none of this overturns the thesis that the sentence Peter used is literally true.[29] The situation here is exactly analogous to the debate concerning whether 'I met a man this afternoon' is true in English even if the man the speaker has in mind was in fact met that morning—the speaker's watch was mistakenly set an hour ahead—when the speaker also met some man or other that afternoon, even though the speaker has forgotten all about it. A sentence that is true by sheer accident or dumb luck is no less true than one whose iron-clad support is still fresh in one's mind.

If there is a genuine clash of reflective intuitions here, then it is no defect in the hidden-indexical theory (or indeed in any other theory) that it fails to accommodate all of the relevant intuitions. However, a much more serious problem arises from the fact that the hidden-indexical theory makes the additional, distinctly counterintuitive claim that $\mathcal{P}$ is literally true with respect to some contexts, while also being not merely misleading or otherwise infelicitous but literally false with respect to others (like the one described above)—this even though Pierre's relevant opinions remain unshakably firm.[30]

Perhaps the most compelling intuitive evidence against the hidden-indexical theory is provided by valid inferences that the theory declares invalid. Crimmins and Perry discuss a special version of Leibniz's Law:

α believes θ

$\alpha = \beta$

Therefore, β believes θ.

[28] Cf. Crimmins, *op. cit.*, pp. 160, 176, 198–199.

[29] In my view, the hidden-indexical theory here declares a true attribution not true. The theory also declares some intuitively false attributions not false. See Crimmins, p. 184. (The view expressed there differs significantly from Crimmins and Perry, pp. 702–704.)

[30] Crimmins and Perry, pp. 687, 706–707. Crimmins, p. 163; see also p. 199. Crimmins ascribes to Kripke the view that $\mathcal{P}$ is literally true with respect to some contexts and literally false with respect to others (p. 141), claiming that this verdict is recommended by intuition (pp. 28, 145). I believe this is a serious misrepresentation of Kripke's view. (See note above.) I would also emphasize that one's having an intuition that $\mathcal{P}$ is true with respect to a particular context c and also a second intuition that $\mathcal{P}$ is false with respect to a different context c' does not preclude one from having a third intuition, which may be stronger than either of the first two, that $\mathcal{P}$ cannot be simultaneously true with respect to one context and false with respect to another context unless Pierre changes his mind between the two. Indeed, there is an obvious sense in which Kripke's puzzle turns on just such intuitions as these, especially the third.

Crimmins and Perry argue that this inference is logically invalid, in the sense that there are instances for which there is a single context with respect to which the premises are true and the conclusion false.[31]

The claim that this inference is invalid on the hidden-indexical theory is, at best, misleading. The issue is complicated. Inspection of the case discussed by Crimmins and Perry reveals that, on their view of the matter, the substitution performed on the first premiss necessarily alters the context, thereby shifting the reference of the hidden indexical between the relevant (minor) premiss and the conclusion, providing a different "unarticulated constituent." If this were indeed the case, we would not have a situation in which truth fails to be preserved when the premisses and conclusion are all evaluated with respect to a single context. Rather, what Crimmins and Perry seem to be claiming is that truth fails to be preserved when the premisses are evaluated with respect to a single context and the conclusion is evaluated with respect to a different context, one just like the context of the premisses except for the presence of different words being uttered. It is precisely this shift in context that is supposed to explain the difference in "unarticulated constituents" between premiss and conclusion.[32] Compare: Giogione was called by *that name* because of his size. Giorgione = Barbarelli. Therefore Barbarelli was called by *that name* because of his size.

Where indexicals are involved, the classical notion of logical validity must be adjusted to take account of context. But truth preservation under shifting contexts does not constitute the proper notion of validity. Rather, what is at issue is truth

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[31] Crimmins and Perry, pp. 708–709, 710; Crimmins, pp. 30–32. The particular example they discuss is from Mark Richard's phone-booth example, in "Direct Reference and Ascriptions of Belief," in *Propositions and Attitudes*, pp. 169–196:

The man watching you believes that you are in danger. I am the man watching you.

Therefore, I believe that you are in danger.

Richard assumed, correctly, that the inference is valid. (Nevertheless, I believe Richard may be re-evaluating his position on this issue.)

[32] This is explicitly acknowledged by Crimmins and Perry, at p. 709. This acknowledgement, however, is in tension with remarks on p. 710 (and with Crimmins, pp. 30–32). The text, and especially the accompanying note (p. 710*n*), suggest that Crimmins and Perry may be using the word 'context' in such a way that a single context may be said to undergo changes in its semantically relevant features. The changes that a context (in this sense) undergoes depend not on the passage of time (each context has a particular time built into it), but, mysteriously enough, on which expression is being evaluated with respect to that context. Crimmins and Perry also seem to argue that a more useful notion of context for the purposes of semantics would be such that a context is unchangeable but includes the expression under evaluation (or a possible utterance of that expression) among its semantically relevant features. Schiffer makes some related unconventional remarks concerning the semantic nature of contexts, in "Belief Ascription," p. 505*n*6. All of these unorthodox remarks represent a concession to the speech-act centered conception of semantics. In my judgment, they constitute further evidence of the extent to which that conception is a misconception. (See note above.) A proper conception of semantics must allow for the evaluation of any expression with respect to any context. It must therefore allow for the evaluation of different expressions with respect to the same context, and also for the evaluation of expressions with respect to contexts in which those very expressions are not uttered, and in which perhaps completely different expressions are uttered. (There must be contexts, for example, with respect to which the sentence 'I am speaking' is false; otherwise the sentence becomes logically valid.)

preservation under fixed contextual parameters (in every model).[33] This notice accommodates the classically valid inference form '$\varphi \therefore \varphi$'. It also validates the above inference involving Barbarelli. Furthermore it declares logically inconsistent the illusionist's trademark slogan 'Now you see it; now you don't'. I accommodate the slogan and lose the inference involving Barbarelli, one may define a complementary notion for the assessment of arguments, one that looks at such phenomena as the shifting of contexts that occurs, or may occur, in the actual utterance of an argument. One might then reject even repetition inference of the form '$\varphi \therefore \varphi$'—for example, replacing 'I am seeing a flash now; therefore I am seeing a flash now' with 'I am seeing a flash now; therefore, I *was* seeing a flash *then*'. (Notice that the latter is semantically invalid.) Let us call this speech-act centered notion *pragmatic cogency*, to distinguish it from semantic validity.[34] It is not the proper notion of logical validity, but it is not a useless notion. With it one can see a genuine aberration in the hidden-indexical theory: Whereas, *pace* Crimmins and Perry, the theory in fact accommodates the semantic validity of Leibniz's Law when applied to belief attributions, it fails to accommodate its pragmatic cogency. The willingness of the theory's adherents to embrace this consequence, or their possible willingness to do so, does not alter the fact that the consequence is decidedly counterintuitive.[35]

Perhaps the most compelling evidence that belief attributions do not semantically specify (or constrain) any way of taking a proposition in addition to the proposition itself is provided by the validity of inference (*I*) displayed above. Ironically, in the proper sense of 'valid', the hidden-indexical theory fails to accommodate inferences of the very sort that Schiffer cites in defense of that theory. According to the theory, the conclusion of inference (*I*), $\mathscr{P}$, will (typically) specify, with respect to any given context *c*, the same way of taking the proposition that London is pretty that is specified with respect to *c* in the minor premiss 'Jean-Paul says that London is pretty'. Indeed, if either the double-dipper theory or the hidden-indexical theory were correct, the

[33] I am indebted here to the penetrating work of David Kaplan. See his "Demonstratives" and its "Afterthoughts," in J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein, eds, *Themes from Kaplan* (Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 481–563, 565–614. In this connection see especially pp. 522, 546, 584–585. See also notes 27 and 32 above.

[34] Notice that the sentence 'I am speaking', though not logically valid, may well be deemed pragmatically cogent, since there can be no context in which it is uttered falsely. See note 32 above.

[35] Perhaps the hidden-indexical theorists discard such intuitions as irrelevant. But Crimmins dismisses the sort of account I advocate, saying that "the obvious criticism of this view is that it seems clearly to fail as a truth-conditional analysis of belief reporting: it makes predictions about substitutivity and so on that simply do not correspond to our intuitions about the truth values of reports" (p. 205). This same criticism may be made of his own version of the hidden-indexical theory, and with at least as much force.

In addition to the counterintuitive consequences already noted, and a further one to be noted below in the text, Crimmins, like Schiffer, endorses latitudinarianism with respect to exportation—the inference from the *de dicto* reading of a belief attribution to the *de re*—even while acknowledging (p. 86) that latitudinarianism is clearly counterintuitive. And indeed, latitudinarianism plays a crucial role in Crimmin's richly developed version of the hidden-indexical theory. For Schiffer's endorsement of a version of latitudinarianism, see his "The Basis of Reference," *Erkenntnis*, 13 (1978), pp. 171–206. (The paper, however, involves a curious inconsistency on that point. Cf. my "How to Measure the Standard Metre," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 88 (1987/1988), pp. 193–217, at p. 199*n*.)

conclusion of (*I* would contain more information than one would be warranted in inferring on the basis of the premisses. Far from supporting the hidden-indexical theory as Schiffer argues, the evident validity of such inferences thus intuitively refutes both the double-dipper theory and the hidden-indexical theory.