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Illogical Belief (1989)

I

My purpose here is to present a defense against some criticisms that have been leveled against various doctrines and theses I advanced in *Frege's Puzzle*,¹ and to draw out some philosophically interesting applications and consequences of some of the central ideas utilized in my defense. The two principal objections I shall consider—one of which is offered by Saul Kripke and the other by Stephen Schiffer—as I reconstruct them, tacitly presuppose or assume one or both of a pair of closely related and largely uncontroversial principles concerning belief and deductive reasoning. The first is a normative principle, which I shall call *the belief justification principle*. It may be stated thus:

Suppose x is a normal, fully rational agent who consciously and rationally believes a certain proposition p . Suppose also that x is consciously interested in the further question of whether q is also the case, where q is another proposition. Suppose further that q is in fact a trivial deductive consequence of p . Suppose finally that x fully realizes that q is a deductive consequence of p and is fully able to deduce q from p . Under these circumstances, x would be rationally justified in coming to believe q on the basis of his or her belief of p (and its deductive relationship to q), or alternatively, if x withholds belief from q (by disbelieving or by suspending judgement) for independent reasons, x would be rationally justified in accordingly relinquishing his or her belief of p .

The second principle is similar to this, except that it is descriptive rather than prescriptive. I shall call it *the belief closure principle*:

Make the same initial-condition suppositions concerning x vis a vis the propositions p and q as given in the belief justification principle. Under these circumstances, if x consciously considers the question of whether q is the case and has adequate time for reflection on the matter, x will in fact come to believe q in addition to p on the basis of his or her belief of p (and its deductive relationship to q), unless x instead withholds belief from q (either by disbelieving or by suspending judgement) for independent reasons, and accordingly relinquishes his or her belief of p .

Part of the present chapter was presented to the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association on March 26, 1987. It has benefitted from discussion with Stephen Schiffer and with Scott Soames. Thanks go also to Keith Donnellan and the participants in his seminar at UCLA during Spring 1987 for their insightful comments on *Frege's Puzzle*, and to the participants in my seminar at UCSB during Fall 1986 for forcing me to elaborate on my response to Kripke's objection to my position regarding his puzzle about belief.

¹ Cambridge, Mass.: Bradford Books/MIT Press, 1986.

The belief justification principle, since it is normative rather than predictive, may seem somehow more certain and on sounder footing than the belief closure principle, but both principles are quite compelling. I shall claim that there are situations that present straightforward counter-examples to both principles simultaneously. Specifically, I claim that these principles fail in precisely the sort of circumstances to which my objectors tacitly apply the principles.

First, a preliminary exposition of the project undertaken in *Frege's Puzzle* is in order. The central thesis is that ordinary proper names, demonstratives, other single-word indexicals or pronouns (such as 'he'), and other simple (noncompound) singular terms are, in a given possible context of use, Russellian 'genuine names in the strict logical sense'.² Put more fully, I maintain the following anti-Fregean doctrine: that the contribution made by an ordinary proper name or other simple singular term, to securing the information content of, or the proposition expressed by, declarative sentences (with respect to a given possible context of use) in which the term occurs (outside of the scope of nonextensional operators, such as quotation marks) is just the referent of the term, or the bearer of the name (with respect to that context of use). In the terminology of *Frege's Puzzle*, I maintain that the *information value* of an ordinary proper name is just its referent.

Some other theses that I maintain in *Frege's Puzzle* are also critical to the present discussion. One such thesis (which Frege and Russell both more or less accepted) is that the proposition that is the information content of a declarative sentence (with respect to a given context) is structured in a certain way, and that its structure and constituents mirror, and are in some way readable from, the structure and constituents of the sentence containing that proposition.³ By and large, a simple

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² See Russell's "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description," Chapter X of Russell's *Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays* (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1911), pp. 209–232, also in N. Salmon and S. Soames, eds., *Propositions and Attitudes* (Oxford University Press, Readings in Philosophy, 1988); and Russell's "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism," in his *Logic and Knowledge*, R. C. Marsh, ed. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1956), pp. 177–281; also in his *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism*, D. Pears, ed. (La Salle: Open Court, 1985), pp. 35–155.

³ This separates the theory of *Frege's Puzzle* together with the theories of Frege, Russell, and their followers, from contemporary theories that assimilate the information contents of declarative sentences with such things as sets of possible worlds, or sets of situations, or functions from possible worlds to truth-values, etc.

Both Frege and Russell would regard declarative sentences as typically reflecting only *part of* the structure of their content, since they would insist that many (perhaps even most) grammatically simple (noncompound) expressions occurring in a sentence may (especially if introduced into the language by abbreviation or by some other type of explicit "definition") contribute complex proposition-constituents that would have been more perspicuously contributed by compound expressions. In short, Frege and Russell regard the prospect of expressions that are grammatically simple yet semantically compound (at the level of content) as not only possible but ubiquitous. Furthermore, according to Russell's Theory of Descriptions, definite and indefinite descriptions ('the author of *Waverley*', 'an author', etc.), behave grammatically but not semantically (at the level of content) as a self-contained unit, so that a sentence containing such an expression is at best only a rough guide to the structure of the content. Russell extends this idea further to ordinary proper names and most uses of pronouns and demonstratives. This makes the structure of nearly any sentence only a very rough guide to the structure of the sentence's content. The theory advanced in *Frege's Puzzle* sticks much more closely to the grammatical structure of the sentence. (But see the following paragraph in the text concerning abstracted predicates.)

(noncompound) expression contributes a single entity, taken as a simple (noncomplex) unit, to the information content of a sentence in which the expression occurs, whereas the contribution of a compound expression (such as a phrase or sentential clause) is a complex entity composed of the contributions of the simple components.⁴ Hence, the contents of beliefs formulatable using ordinary proper names, demonstratives, or other simple singular terms, are on my view so-called *singular propositions* (David Kaplan), i.e., structured propositions directly about some individual, which occurs directly as a constituent of the proposition. This thesis (together with certain relatively uncontroversial assumptions) yields the consequence that *de re* belief (or *belief of*) is simply a special case of *de dicto* belief (*belief that*). To believe *of* an individual x , *de re*, that it (he, she) is F is to believe *de dicto* the singular proposition about (containing) x that it (he, she) is F , a proposition that can be expressed using an ordinary proper name for x . Similarly for the other propositional attitudes.

There is an important class of exceptions to the general rule that a compound expression contributes to the information content of a sentence in which it occurs a complex entity composed of the contributions of the simple components. These are compound predicates formed by abstraction from an open sentence. For example, from the ‘open’ sentence ‘I love her and she loves me’—with pronouns ‘her’ and ‘she’ functioning as “freely” as the free variables occurring in such open sentences of the formal vernacular as ‘ $F(a, x) \ \& \ F(x, a)$ ’—we may form (by “abstraction”) the compound predicate ‘is someone such that I love her and she loves me’. Formally, using Alonzo Church’s ‘ λ ’-abstraction operator, we might write this ‘ $(\lambda x)[F(a, x) \ \& \ F(x, a)]$ ’. Such an abstracted compound predicate should be seen as contributing something like an attribute or a Russellian *propositional function*, taken as a unit, to the information content of sentences in which it occurs, rather than as contributing a complex made up of the typical contributions of the compound’s components.

In addition to this, I propose the sketch of an analysis of the binary relation of belief between believers and propositions (sometimes Russellian singular propositions). I take the belief relation to be, in effect, the existential generalization of a ternary relation, *BEL*, among believers, propositions, and some third type of entity. To believe a proposition p is to adopt an appropriate favorable attitude toward p when taking p in some relevant *way*. It is to agree to p , or to assent mentally to p , or to approve of p , or some such thing, when taking p a certain way. This is the *BEL* relation. I do not say a great deal about what the third relata for the *BEL* relation are. They are perhaps something like *proposition guises*, or *modes* of acquaintance or familiarity with propositions,

⁴ There are well-known exceptions to the general rule—hence the phrase ‘by and large’. Certain nonextensional operators, such as quotation marks, create contexts in which compound expressions contribute themselves as units to the information content of sentences in which the expression occurs. Less widely recognized is the fact that even ordinary temporal operators (e.g. ‘on April 1, 1986’ + past tense) create contexts in which some compound expressions (most notably, open and closed sentences) contribute complexes other than their customary contribution to information content. See my “Tense and Singular Propositions,” in J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein, eds., *Themes from Kaplan* (Oxford University Press, forthcoming). The following paragraph in the text cites another largely overlooked class of exceptions.

or *ways* in which a believer may take a given proposition. The important thing is that, by definition, they are such that if a fully rational believer adopts conflicting attitudes (such as belief and disbelief, or belief and suspension of judgement) toward propositions p and q , then the believer must take p and q in different ways, by means of different guises, in harboring the conflicting attitudes toward them—even if p and q are in fact the same proposition. More generally, if a fully rational agent construes objects x and y as distinct (or even merely withholds construing them as one and the very same—as might be evidenced, for example, by the agent’s adopting conflicting beliefs or attitudes concerning x and y), then for some appropriate notion of a way of taking an object, the agent takes x and y in different ways, even if in fact $x = y$.⁵ Of course, to use a distinction of Kripke’s, this formulation is far too vague to constitute a fully developed *theory* of proposition guises and their role in belief formation, but it does provide a *picture* of belief that differs significantly from the sort of picture of propositional attitudes advanced by Frege or Russell, and enough can be said concerning the *BEL* relation to allow for at least the sketch of a solution to certain philosophical problems, puzzles, and paradoxes—including those in the same family as Frege’s notorious ‘Hesperus’–‘Phosphorus’ puzzle.⁶

In particular, the *BEL* relation satisfies the following three conditions:

- (i) A believes p if and only if there is some x such that A is familiar with p by means of x and $BEL(A, p, x)$;⁷
- (ii) A may believe p by standing in *BEL* to p and some x by means of which A is familiar with p without standing in *BEL* to p and all x by means of which A is familiar with p ;

⁵ An appropriate notion of a way of taking an object is such that if an agent encounters a single object several times and each time construes it as a different object from the objects in the previous encounters, or even as a different object *for all he or she knows*, then each time he or she takes the object in a new and different way. This is required in order to accommodate the fact that an agent in such circumstances may (perhaps *inevitably will*) adopt several conflicting attitudes toward what is in fact a single object. One cannot require, however, that these ways of taking objects are rich enough by themselves to determine the object so taken, without the assistance of extra-mental, contextual factors. Presumably, twin agents who are molecule-for-molecule duplicates, and whose brains are in exactly the same configuration down to the finest detail, may encounter different (though duplicate) objects, taking them in the very same way. Likewise, a single agent might be artificially induced through brain manipulations into taking different objects the same way.

⁶ The *BEL* relation is applied to additional puzzles in my “Reflexivity,” *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*, 27, 3 (July 1986), pp. 401–429; also in N. Salmon and S. Soames, eds., *Propositions and Attitudes*.

⁷ I do not claim that a sentence of the form ‘ A believes p ’ is exactly synonymous with the existential formula on the right-hand side of ‘if and only if’ in condition (i). I do claim that condition (i) is a (metaphysically) necessary, conceptually *a priori* truth. (See two paragraphs back in the text concerning the contents of predicates. It may be helpful to think of the English verb ‘believe’ as a *name* for the binary relation described by the right-hand side of (i), i.e., for the existential generalization on the third argument-place of the *BEL* relation.) My claim in *Frege’s Puzzle* (p. 111) that belief may be so “analyzed” is meant to entail that condition (i) is a necessary *a priori* truth, not that the two sides of the biconditional are synonymous. (My own view is that something along these lines is all that can be plausibly claimed for such purported philosophical “analyses” as have been offered for ‘ A knows p ’, ‘ A perceives B ’, ‘ A (nonnaturally) means p in uttering S ’, etc.)

- (iii) In one sense of ‘withhold belief’, A withholds belief concerning p (either by disbelieving or by suspending judgement) if and only if there is some x by means of which A is familiar with p and not- $BEL(A, p, x)$.

These conditions generate a philosophically important distinction between withholding belief and failure to believe (i.e., not believing). In particular, one may both withhold belief from and believe the very same proposition simultaneously. (Neither withholding belief nor failure to believe is to be identified with the related notions of disbelief and suspension of judgement—which are two different ways of withholding belief, in my sense, and which may occur simultaneously with belief of the very same proposition in a single believer.)

It happens in most cases (though not all) that when a believer believes some particular proposition p , the relevant third relatum for the BEL relation is a function of the believer and some particular *sentence* of the believer’s language. There is, for example, the binary function f that assigns to any believer A and sentence S of A ’s language, the way A takes the proposition contained in S (in A ’s language with respect to A ’s context at some particular time t) were it presented to A (at t) through the very sentence S , if there is exactly one such way of taking the proposition in question. (In some cases, there are too many such ways of taking the proposition in question.)

This account may be applied to the comic-book legend of Superman and his woman-friend Lois Lane. According to this saga, Lois Lane is acquainted with Superman in both of his guises—as a mild-mannered reporter and dullard named ‘Clark Kent’ and as the superheroic defender of truth, justice, and the American way, named ‘Superman’—but she is unaware that these are one and the very same person. Whereas she finds our hero somewhat uninteresting when she encounters him in his mild-mannered reporter guise, her heartbeat quickens with excitement whenever she encounters him, or even merely thinks of him, in his superhero guise. Consider now the sentence

- (0) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is Superman.

Is this true or false? According to my account, it is true! For Lois Lane agrees to the proposition that Clark Kent is Superman when taking it in a certain way—for example, if one points to Superman in one of his guises and says ‘He is him’, or when the proposition is presented to her by such sentences as ‘Clark Kent is Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman is Superman’. That is,

BEL [Lois Lane, that Clark Kent is Superman, f (Lois Lane, ‘Superman is Superman’)].

Lois Lane also withholds belief concerning whether Superman is Superman. In fact, according to my account, she believes that Superman is not Superman! For she agrees to the proposition that Superman is not Superman when taking it in the way it is presented to her by the sentence ‘Clark Kent is not Superman.’ That is,

BEL [Lois Lane, that Superman is not Superman, f (Lois Lane, ‘Clark Kent is not Superman’)],

and hence, since Lois Lane is fully rational, it is not the case that

BEL[Lois Lane, that Superman is Superman, f (Lois Lane, ‘Clark Kent is Superman’)].

II

It is evident that these consequences of my account do not conform with the way we actually speak. Instead it is customary when discussing the Superman legend to deny sentence (0) and to say such things as

(1) Lois Lane does not realize that Clark Kent is Superman.

According to my account, sentence (1) is literally false in the context of the Superman legend. In fact, (1)’s literal truth-conditions are, according to the view I advocate, conditions that are plainly unfulfilled (in the context of the Superman legend). Why, then, do we say such things as (1)? Some explanation of our speech patterns in these sorts of cases is called for. The explanation I offer in *Frege’s Puzzle* is somewhat complex, consisting of three main parts. The first part of the explanation for the common disposition to utter or to assent to (1) is that speakers may have a tendency to confuse the content of (1) with that of

(1’) Lois Lane does not realize that ‘Clark Kent is Superman’ is true (in English).

Since sentence (1’) is obviously true, this confusion naturally leads to a similarly favorable disposition toward (1). This part of the explanation cannot be the whole story, however, since even speakers who know enough about semantics to know that the fact that Clark Kent is Superman is logically independent of the fact that the sentence ‘Clark Kent is Superman’ is true (in English, according to the legend), and who are careful to distinguish the content of (1) from that of (1’), are nevertheless favorably disposed toward (1) itself—because of the fact that Lois Lane bursts into uncontrollable laughter whenever the mere suggestion ‘Clark Kent could turn out to be Superman’ is put to her.

The second part of my explanation for (1)’s appearance of truth is that (1) itself is the product of a plausible but mistaken inference from the fact that Lois Lane sincerely dissents (or at least does not sincerely assent) when queried ‘Is Clark Kent Superman?’, while fully understanding the question and grasping its content, or (as Keith Donnellan has pointed out) even from her expressions of preference for the man of steel over the mild-mannered reporter. More accurately, ordinary speakers (and even most nonordinary speakers) are disposed to regard the fact that Lois Lane does not agree to the proposition that Clark Kent is Superman, when taking it in a certain way (the way it might be presented to her by the very sentence ‘Clark Kent is Superman’), as sufficient to warrant the denial of sentence (0) and the assertion of sentence (1). In the special sense explained in the preceding section, Lois Lane withholds belief from the proposition that Clark Kent is Superman, actively failing to agree with it whenever it is put to her in so many words, and this fact misleads ordinary speakers, including Lois Lane herself, into concluding that Lois harbors no favorable attitude of agreement whatsoever toward the proposition in question, and hence does not believe it.

The third part of the explanation is that, where someone under discussion has conflicting attitudes toward a single proposition that he or she takes to be two independent propositions (i.e. in the troublesome ‘Hesperus’–‘Phosphorus’, ‘Superman’–‘Clark Kent’ type cases), there is an established practice of using belief attributions to convey not only the proposition agreed to (which is specified by the belief attribution) but also the way the subject of the attribution takes the proposition in agreeing to it (which is no part of the semantic content of the belief attribution). Specifically, there is an established practice of using such a sentence as (0), which contains the uninteresting proposition that Lois Lane believes the singular proposition about Superman that he is him, to convey furthermore that Lois Lane agrees to this proposition *when she takes it in the way it is presented to her by the very sentence ‘Clark Kent is Superman’* (assuming she understands this sentence). That is, there is an established practice of using (0) to convey the thought that

BEL[Lois Lane, that Clark Kent is Superman, *f*(Lois Lane, ‘Clark Kent is Superman’)].

III

The last part of the explanation just sketched may be clarified by considering an objection raised by Schiffer.⁸ Schiffer sees my theory as attempting to explain ordinary speakers’ dispositions to utter or to assent to (1) by postulating that in such cases a particular mechanism, of a sort described by H. P. Grice,⁹ comes into play. The mechanism works in the following way: A speaker deliberately utters a particular sentence where there is mutual recognition by the speaker and his or her audience that the speaker believes the sentence to be false. The speaker and the audience mutually recognize that the speaker is not opting out of Grice’s conversational Cooperative Principle (according to which one should make one’s conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the conversation) and hence that the speaker is subject to the usual Gricean conversational maxims. Yet the speaker and audience also recognize that there is a *prima facie* apparent violation of the first conversational *maxim of Quality*: ‘Do not say what you believe to be false.’ The audience infers, in accordance with the speakers intentions, that the speaker is using the sentence not to commit himself or herself to its literal content (which is taken to be false) but instead to convey, or to “implicate,” some saliently related proposition, which is easily gleaned from the context of

⁸ “The ‘Fido’-Fido Theory of Belief,” in James Tomberlin, ed., *Philosophical Perspectives 1: Metaphysics* (Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1987), pp. 455–480. Schiffer’s article includes a rejoinder, in an appended postscript, to many of the arguments of the present article. I think it is useful, however, to include in the present article my own statements of the arguments and replies that Schiffer is rejoicing in his postscript. It is left to the reader to evaluate the relative merits of my replies to Schiffer’s objections and Schiffer’s rejoinder to my replies.

⁹ “Logic and Conversation,” in P. Cole and J. L. Morgan, eds., *Syntax and Semantics*, volume 3 (New York: Academic Press, 1975), pp. 41–55; also in D. Davidson and G. Harman, eds., *The Logic of Grammar* (Encino: Dickenson, 1975), pp. 64–75; also in A. P. Martinich, ed., *The Philosophy of Language* (Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 159–170.

the conversation. In the case of sentence (1), or this account, the speaker employs this mechanism to implicate that Lois Lane does not agree to the proposition that Clark Kent is Superman when she takes it in the way it is presented to her by the very sentence ‘Clark Kent is Superman.’ Schiffer’s criticism is that this account flies in the face of the obvious fact that ordinary speakers do not believe (1) to be false, but believe it true.

This criticism is indeed decisive against the explanation described above for our propensity to say such things as (1). But this is not the explanation I proposed in *Frege’s Puzzle*. Oddly, the very example of sentence (1) comes from a particular passage in *Frege’s Puzzle* that explicitly precludes Schiffer’s interpretation:

Now, there is no denying that, given the proper circumstances, we say things like ‘Lois Lane does not realize. . .that Clark Kent is Superman’ . . . When we make these utterances, we typically do not intend to be speaking elliptically or figuratively; we take ourselves to be speaking literally and truthfully. (p. 81)

My pragmatic account of the appearance of truth in the case of such sentences as (1) is meant not only as an explanation of the widespread disposition to utter or to assent to (1), but equally as an explanation of the widespread intuition that (1) is literally true, and equally as an explanation of the widespread belief of the content of (1). What is needed, and what I attempt to provide (or at least a sketch thereof), is not merely an explanation of the disposition of ordinary speakers to utter or assent to (1) given the relevant facts concerning Lois Lane’s ignorance of Superman’s secret identity, but an explanation why ordinary speakers who understand (1) perfectly well, fully grasping its content, sincerely utter it while taking themselves to speaking literally and truthfully, without being exactly similarly disposed toward such synonymous sentences as

Lois Lane does not realize that Superman is Superman

when they also understand these sentences perfectly well and the common content of these sentences is something these speakers believe.¹⁰ The particular Gricean mechanism that Schiffer describes is no doubt part of the correct explanation in *some* cases of how ordinary speakers may use certain sentences to convey what these sentences do not literally mean. But the particular mechanism in question cannot yield a coherent account of why ordinary speakers believe that a given sentence is true. How would the alleged explanation go? “Here’s why ordinary speakers believe that sentence *S* is true: They realize that it’s false. This mutual recognition of its falsity enables them to use *S* to convey something true. Their use of *S* to convey something true leads them to conclude that *S* is true.” This alleged explanation is incoherent; it purports to explain ordinary speakers’ belief that a given sentence is true by means of their belief that it is false. Clearly, no attempt to explain the widespread view that (1) is literally true can

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¹⁰ Contrary to a proposal Schiffer makes in his postscript, the observation that the content of (1) is something ordinary speakers believe, *per se*, does not yield an adequate explanation here. For ordinary speakers are not similarly disposed toward ‘Lois Lane does not realize that Superman is Superman’ although they fully grasp its content, which (on my view) is the same as that of (1).

proceed from the initial hypothesis that ordinary speakers typically believe that (1) is literally false!

Schiffer's criticism concerns only the third part of the explanation sketched in the preceding section: the hypothesis that there is an established practice of using such a sentence as (0) to convey that Lois Lane agrees to the proposition that Clark Kent is Superman when taking it in the way it is presented to her by the very sentence 'Clark Kent is Superman'. I do not claim that this practice came about by means of a special Gricean mechanism requiring the mutual recognition by the speaker and his or her audience that sentence (0) is literally true. Quite the contrary, I suppose that many ordinary speakers, and most philosophers, would take the proposition that they use the sentence to convey to be the very content of the sentence. That is why they would deem the sentence literally false. Schiffer describes a particular mechanism that allows speakers to use a sentence to convey ("implicate") what it does not literally mean by means of a mutual recognition that what is conveyed cannot be what the sentence literally means. I had in mind an alternative mechanism that allows speakers to use a sentence to convey something stronger than what it literally means, thereby creating a mutual misimpression that what is conveyed is precisely what the sentence literally means. There is nothing in the general Gricean strategy (as opposed to the particular strategy involving Grice's first conversational maxim of Quality) that requires ordinary speakers to recognize or believe that the sentence used is literally false. Grice describes several mechanisms that involve speakers' using a sentence mutually believed to be true to convey ("implicate") something further that the sentence does not literally mean, and Schiffer himself cites such a mechanism in the course of presenting his objection. Surely there can be such a mechanism that, when employed, sometimes has the unintended and unnoticed consequence that speakers' mistake what is conveyed ("implicated") for the literal content. Consider, for example, the conjunction 'Jane became pregnant and she got married', which normally carries the implicature that Jane became pregnant before getting married. Utterers of this sentence, in order to employ it with its customary implicature, need not be aware that the sentence is literally true even if Jane became pregnant only after getting married. Some utterers may well become misled by the sentence's customary implicature into believing that the sentence literally means precisely what it normally conveys—so that, if they believe that Mary became pregnant only after getting married, they would reject the true but misleading conjunction as literally false. A similar situation may obtain in connection with certain English indicative conditionals ("If you work hard, you will be rewarded") and universal generalizations ("All white male cats with blue eyes are deaf"), which carry an implicature of some salient connection between antecedent and consequent that is more than merely truth-functional "constant conjunction." (The implicated connection need not be the temporal relation of earlier-later, as in the conjunction case.) It is this general sort of situation, or something very similar, that I impute to propositional-attitude attributions.¹¹

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¹¹ It is doubtful whether the conjunction and conditional cases, and the sort of situation I have in mind in connection with propositional-attitude attributions, qualify as cases of what Grice calls *particularized conversational implicature* (by far the most widely discussed notion of Gricean

Frege's Puzzle makes the suggestion that, in a certain type of case, a simple belief attribution $\lceil c$ believes that $S \rceil$ may be routinely used to convey the further information (not semantically encoded) that (assuming he or she understands his or her sentence for S) x agrees to the proposition p when taking it in the way it is presented to x by the very sentence S , where x is the referent of c and p is the content of the nonindexical sentence S .¹² The book does not include the much stronger claim that the manner in which such a belief attribution is routinely used to convey this further information must exhibit all of the features that characterize Gricean implicature—let alone does it include the highly specific claim that the phenomenon in question is an instance of Gricean particularized conversational implicature.

I have not thoroughly explored the relation of Grice's many rich and fruitful ideas to the sort of project undertaken in *Frege's Puzzle*; obviously, there is a great deal more to be investigated. It should be clear, however, that there is nothing in Grice's general apparatus that makes the sort of explanation I have in mind in connection with propositional-attitude attributions altogether impossible. Quite the contrary, some of the central ideas of the Gricean program are obviously directly applicable.

IV

In *Frege's Puzzle* I explicitly applied the various doctrines and theses sketched in Section I above to Kripke's vexing puzzle about belief.¹³ Kripke considers a certain Frenchman, Pierre, who at some time t_1 , speaks only French and, on the basis of

implicature); in a number of important respects, these cases better fit one or the other of Grice's two contrasting notions of *generalized conversational implicature* and *conventional* (nonconversational) *implicature*. Surely a great many speakers may be confused by the conventional or generalized conversational implicature of a sentence into thinking that the sentence literally says (in part) what it in fact only implicates. Grice's notion of particularized conversational implicature apparently precludes the possibility of this sort of confusion. (See the third essential feature of particularized conversational implicature cited *op. cit.* on p. 169 of Martinich.) In some cases, it may also be possible to cancel explicitly the conventional or generalized conversational implicature of a sentence. I am not suggesting that the case of propositional-attitude attributions is exactly analogous to the conjunction and conditional cases. (The issues here are quite delicate.)

¹² It might be thought that if ordinary speakers take a belief attribution $\lceil c$ believes that $S \rceil$ to express the assertion that x agrees to the proposition p when taking it in the way it is presented to x by the very sentence S , and they use the attribution to convey (or "implicate") precisely this proposition, then this proposition cannot help but *be* (part of) the content of the attribution. The fact that the attribution does not literally mean what it is used to convey is attested to by the validity of the inference from the conjunction 'Floyd claims that Superman is mild-mannered, and Lois believes anything Floyd says concerning Superman' to 'Lois believes that Superman is mild-mannered'. The inference would be invalid if its conclusion literally meant that Lois agrees that Superman is mild-mannered when she takes this proposition in the way it is presented to her by the very sentence 'Superman is mild-mannered'. The premise gives information concerning only what propositions Lois believes, not how she takes them in believing them. (Grice also insists, p. 169 of Martinich, that the supposition that an erstwhile implicature of a particular construction has become included in the construction's conventional meaning "would require special justification.")

¹³ "A Puzzle about Belief," in A. Margalit, ed. *Meaning and Use* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), pp. 239–275; also in N. Salmon and S. Soames, eds., *Propositions and Attitudes*. Kripke's puzzle is addressed in appendix A of *Frege's Puzzle*, pp. 129–132.

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deceptive travel brochures published by the London Chamber of Commerce and the like, comes to assent to the French sentence '*Londres est jolie*' (as a sentence of French), which literally means in French that London is pretty. At some later time t_2 , Pierre moves to London and learns the English language by direct assimilation (not by translation in an ESL course). Seeing only especially unappealing parts of the city, and not recognizing that this city called 'London' is the very same city that he and his fellow French speakers call '*Londres*', Pierre comes to assent to the sentence 'London is not pretty' (as a sentence of English), while maintaining his former attitude toward the French sentence '*Londres est jolie*'. Kripke presses the following question: Does Pierre believe at t_2 that London is pretty? The puzzle arises from Kripke's forceful demonstration that both the assertion that Pierre does believe this, and the denial that he does, appear deeply unsatisfactory (for different reasons). Likewise, both the assertion that Pierre believes at t_2 that London is *not* pretty and the denial that he does appear deeply unsatisfactory.

What does my account say about Pierre's doxastic disposition at t_2 *vis a vis* the propositions that London is pretty and that London is not pretty? I maintain that he believes them both. For he understands the French sentence '*Londres est jolie*' when he assents to it, fully grasping its content. That content is the proposition that London is pretty. Since he agrees to this proposition when he takes it in the way it is presented to him by the French sentence, he believes it. Exactly the same thing obtains with regard to the negation of this proposition and the English sentence 'London is not pretty'. Hence he believes this proposition too. In fact, Pierre presumably also assents to the conjunctive sentence '*Londres is pretty but London is not*', as a sentence of Frenglish, i.e. French-cum-English (French-English 'word-salad'). And he understands this sentence in Frenglish. Hence he even believes the conjunctive proposition that London is pretty and London is not pretty. If he is sufficiently reflective, he will even know that he believes that London is pretty and London is not pretty. For given adequate time to reflect on the matter he can, with sufficient linguistic competence and ample epistemic justification, assent to the sentence 'You, Pierre, believe that *Londres* is pretty but London is not', taken as addressed to him as a sentence of Frenglish. The tri-part explanation sketched in Section II above may easily be extended to account for our propensity to say such things (in Frenglish) as 'Pierre does not realize that London is *Londres*' despite their falsity.

Kripke objects to the sort of account I offer of Pierre's situation with some trenchant remarks. I quote at length:

But there seem to be insuperable difficulties with [the position that Pierre believes both that London is pretty and that London is not pretty]. . . We may suppose that Pierre, in spite of the unfortunate situation in which he now finds himself, is a leading philosopher and logician. He would *never* let contradictory beliefs pass. And surely anyone, leading logician or no, is in principle in a position to notice and correct contradictory beliefs if he has them. Precisely for this reason, we regard individuals who contradict themselves as subject to greater censure than those who merely have false beliefs. But it is clear that Pierre, as long as he is unaware that the cities he calls 'London' and '*Londres*' are one and the same, is in no position to see, by logic alone, that at least one of his beliefs must be false. He lacks information, not logical acumen. He cannot be convicted of inconsistency: to do so is incorrect.

We can shed more light on this if we change the case. Suppose that, in France, Pierre, instead of affirming ‘*Londres est jolie*,’ had affirmed, more cautiously, ‘*Si New York est jolie, Londres est jolie aussi*,’ so that [according to this account] he believed that *if* New York is pretty, so is London. Later Pierre moves to London, learns English as before, and says (in English) ‘London is not pretty.’ So he now [allegedly] believes, further, that London is *not* pretty. Now from the two premises, both of which appear to be among his beliefs, (a) if New York is pretty, London is, and (b) London is not pretty, Pierre should be able to deduce by *modus tollens* that New York is not pretty. But no matter how great Pierre’s logical acumen may be, *he cannot in fact make any such deduction, as long as he supposes that ‘Londres’ and ‘London’ may name two different cities*. If he *did* draw such a conclusion, he would be guilty of a fallacy.

Intuitively, he may well suspect that New York is pretty, and just this suspicion may lead him to suppose that ‘*Londres*’ and ‘*London*’ probably name distinct cities. Yet if we follow our normal practice of reporting the beliefs of French and English speakers, *Pierre has available to him (among his beliefs) both the premises of a modus tollens argument that New York is not pretty*. . . . (pp. 257–258)

. . . Pierre is in no position to draw ordinary logical consequences from the conjoint set of what, when we consider him separately as a speaker of English and as a speaker of French, we would call his beliefs. He cannot infer a contradiction from his separate [alleged] beliefs that London is pretty and that London is not pretty. Nor, in the modified situation above, would Pierre make a normal *modus tollens* inference from his [alleged] beliefs that London is not pretty and that London is pretty if New York is. . . . Indeed, if he *did* draw what would appear to be the normal conclusion in this case. . . , Pierre would in fact be guilty of a logical fallacy. (p. 262)

. . . The situation of the puzzle seems to lead to a breakdown of our normal practices of attributing belief. . . [The view that Pierre believes both that London is pretty and that London is not pretty] definitely get[s] it *wrong*. [That view] yields the result that Pierre holds inconsistent beliefs, that logic alone should teach him that one of his beliefs is false. Intuitively, this is plainly incorrect. . . [It is] *obviously wrong*. . . [a] patent falsehood. . . (pp. 266–267)

. . . when we enter into the area exemplified by. . . Pierre, we enter into an area where our normal practices of interpretation and attribution of belief are subjected to the greatest possible strain, perhaps to the point of breakdown. So is the notion of the *content* of someone’s assertion, the *proposition* it expresses.

. . . Pierre’s [case] lies in an area where our normal apparatus for the ascription of belief is placed under the greatest strain and may even break down. (pp. 269–270)

These passages indicate (or at least strongly suggest) that Kripke rejects as “plainly incorrect” the view, which I maintain, that Pierre believes at t_2 both that London is pretty and that London is not pretty.¹⁴

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¹⁴ I believe that a careful reading of “A Puzzle about Belief” reveals that Kripke probably ultimately rejects his schematic *disquotation principle* (pp. 248–249). The schema might be rewritten in the form of a single general principle (instead of as a schema), as follows: *If a speaker, on reflection, sincerely assents to a particular sentence S that he fully understands (as a sentence of his language), then he believes the content of S (in his language with respect to his context)*. By contrast with Kripke’s original principle schema, in this variation the sentence *S* may contain indexical or pronominal devices, and need not be a sentence of English. Either version, if correct, would entail that, since Pierre is a normal English speaker who fully understands, and on reflection sincerely assents to, the English sentence ‘London is not pretty’, he believes that London is not pretty, and since Pierre is also a normal French speaker who fully understands, and on reflection sincerely assents to, ‘*Londres* is pretty’, he also believes that London is pretty. It is this disquotation principle

V

Schiffer raises a second objection to the theory advanced in *Frege's Puzzle*—one that is evidently similar in certain respects to Kripke's, but focuses more on the *de re* mode than on the *de dicto*. Schiffer's second criticism concerns such nesting (or second-level) propositional-attitude attributions as

(2) Floyd believes that Lois Lane does not realize that Clark Kent is Superman.

Schiffer tells a little story according to which Floyd is an ordinary speaker who is fully aware that the mild-mannered reporter is none other than the man of steel himself, and who is also aware of Lois Lane's ignorance of this fact. Schiffer argues that, whereas sentence (2) is straightforwardly true in the context of this little story—since Floyd believes that sentence (1) is true (and knows that if (1) is true, then Lois Lane does not realize that Clark Kent is Superman)—I am committed by my adherence to my central thesis (which Schiffer calls 'the 'Fido'–Fido theory of belief') to the falsity of (2), and further by my account of the dispositions of ordinary speakers to utter or to assent to (1), to the erroneous claim that Floyd does not believe that sentence (1) is true, and instead believes it to be false.

We have seen in Section III above that, contrary to Schiffer's interpretation, the explanation I offer for Floyd's propensity to utter (1) does not involve the obviously false claim that Floyd believes (1) to be false. How is it that I am committed to the claim that Floyd does not believe that Lois Lane does not realize that Clark Kent is Superman, and hence to the falsity of (2)? Schiffer argues that I am thus committed by invoking a certain principle that concerns *de re* belief, and which he has elsewhere called 'Frege's Constraint'.¹⁵ Actually, the principle Schiffer explicitly cites is inadequate for his purposes, and should be replaced by a pair of principles which together entail the cited principle. The first might be called 'Frege's Thesis' and may be stated (using Schiffer's theoretical apparatus and terminology) as follows:

If x believes y to be F , then there is an object m that is a mode of presentation of y and x believes y under m to be F .

The second principle, which I shall call 'Schiffer's Constraint', is the following (again stated using Schiffer's theoretical apparatus and terminology):

If a fully rational person x believes a thing y under a mode of presentation m to be F and also disbelieves y under a mode of presentation m' to be F , then $m \neq m'$ and x construes m and m' as (modes of) presenting distinct individuals.

Together these two principles pose a serious obstacle to my taking the position, which seems undeniably correct, that sentence (2) is true. For Floyd, whom we may

that is 'subjected to the greatest possible strain, perhaps to the point of breakdown'. In contrast to Kripke's skepticism, I endorse the disquotation principle and its consequences. In fact, the principle is virtually entailed by the first condition on the *BEL* relation given in Section I above.

¹⁵ "The Basis of Reference," *Erkenntnis* 13 (July 1978), pp. 171–206, at p. 180.

suppose to be fully rational, no doubt believes that Lois Lane realizes that Superman is Superman. Yet given that Floyd is aware of Superman's secret identity, there do not seem to be the two modes of presentation required by Frege's Thesis and Schiffer's Constraint in order for Floyd to believe furthermore that Lois Lane does not realize that Clark Kent is Superman.

VI

Let us consider first Kripke's argument against the view that Pierre believes at t_2 both that London is pretty and that it is not. I briefly addressed Kripke's objection in *Frege's Puzzle*. I shall elaborate here on certain aspects of my reply.¹⁶

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Kripke's primary critical argument might be stated in full thus:

P1: Pierre sees, by logic alone, that the propositions (beliefs) that London is pretty and that London is not pretty are contradictory.

P2: If Pierre has the beliefs that London is pretty and that London is not pretty, then he is in principle in a position to notice that he has these beliefs.

Therefore,

C1: If Pierre has the beliefs that London is pretty and that London is not pretty, then he is in principle in a position to see both that he has these beliefs and that they are contradictory.

P3: But Pierre, as long as he is unaware that the cities he calls 'London' and '*Londres*' are one and the same, is in no position to see that the propositions (beliefs) that London is pretty and that London is not pretty are simultaneously beliefs of his and contradictory, and hence is in no position to see that at least one of his beliefs must be false.

Therefore,

C2: As long as Pierre is unaware that the cities he calls 'London' and '*Londres*' are one and the same, it is incorrect to say that he has the beliefs that London is pretty and that London is not pretty.

An exactly similar argument may be stated, as Kripke proposes, replacing the belief that London is pretty with the more cautious belief that London is pretty if New York is, and replacing the logical attribute of contradictoriness with that of entailing that New York is not pretty. Furthermore, in this case we may replace the epistemic state of being in a position to see that at least one of the first pair of beliefs must be false

¹⁶ I treat logical attributes (such as the relation of deductive entailment and the property of contradictoriness) here as attributes of propositions, setting aside for the present purpose my contention that these attributes are primarily and in the first instance attributes of sentences in a language, and that whereas it is not incorrect, it can be quite misleading to treat them also as attributes of propositions.

with the disposition of being such that one would be logically justified in inferring that New York is not pretty from the second, more cautious pair of beliefs.

Both the displayed argument and the one obtained by making the suggested substitutions are extremely compelling. But they are fallacious. I do not mean by this that they proceed from false premises. I mean that they are invalid: the premises are all true, but one of the critical inferences is fallacious. Which one?

The fallacy involved may be seen more clearly if we first consider the following simpler and more direct argument:

If Pierre has the beliefs that London is pretty if New York is and that London is not pretty, then (assuming that he consciously considers the further question of whether New York is pretty, that he fully realizes that the proposition that New York is not pretty is a trivial and immediate deductive consequence of the propositions that London is pretty if New York is and that London is not pretty, that he has no independent reasons for withholding belief from the proposition that New York is not pretty, and that he has adequate time for reflection on the matter) he will come to believe that New York is not pretty on the basis of these beliefs, and he would be logically justified in doing so. But Pierre, as long as he is unaware that the cities he calls 'London' and 'Londres' are one and the same, will not come to believe that New York is not pretty on the basis of his beliefs that London is pretty if New York is and that London is not pretty, and he would not be logically justified in doing so. Therefore, as long as Pierre is unaware that the cities he calls 'London' and 'Londres' are one and the same, it is incorrect to say that he has the beliefs that London is pretty if New York is and that London is not pretty.

This argument is evidently at least very much like one of Kripke's, and it is valid. I have formulated it in such a way as to make obvious its reliance, in its first premise, on the belief closure and justification principles. (Let p be the conjunctive proposition that whereas London is pretty if New York is, London is not pretty, and let q be the entailed proposition that New York is not pretty.) I maintain that Pierre's inability to infer that New York is not pretty presents a bona fide counter-example to these principles, so that the first premise of this argument is false. The theses advanced in *Frege's Puzzle* show how Pierre's case may be seen as presenting a counter-example. Pierre fully understands the English sentence 'London is not pretty' and also the Frenglish sentence 'Londres is pretty if New York is', grasping their content. In particular, he understands the Frenglish sentence to mean precisely what it does mean (in Frenglish): that London is pretty if New York is. (He does not misunderstand it to mean, for example, that *Rome* is pretty if New York is. If any French speaker who has never been to London can nevertheless understand French sentences containing the French name 'Londres', Pierre understands the particular sentence '*Si New York est jolie, Londres est jolie aussi*' as well as its Frenglish translations.) When these sentences are put to him, he unhesitatingly assents; he agrees to the propositions that are their contents when he takes these propositions in the way they are presented to him by these very sentences. Hence he believes these propositions.

Pierre also fully understands the English sentence 'London is pretty if New York is', grasping its content. He is fully aware that the proposition so expressed, taken together with the proposition expressed by 'London is not pretty', collectively entail

that New York is not pretty. Unfortunately for Pierre, he does not take this conditional proposition the same way when it is presented to him by the different sentences. He mistakes the proposition for two, logically independent propositions—just as he mistakes London itself for two separate cities. This is evidenced by the fact that he harbors conflicting doxastic attitudes toward the proposition. He believes it, since he agrees to it taking it one way (the way it is presented to him by the Frenglish sentence, or by its French translation), but he also withholds belief from it, in the sense specified in Section I above, since he does not agree to it taking it the other way (the way it is presented to him by the English sentence). It is this confusion of Pierre's—his lack of recognition of the same proposition when it is presented to him differently—that prevents Pierre from making the logical connection between his two beliefs and drawing the *modus tollens* inference. He fails to recognize that his belief that London is not pretty is the negation of the consequent of his belief that London is pretty if New York is.

It is precisely Pierre's sort of situation, in which there is propositional recognition failure, that gives rise to counter-examples to the belief closure and justification principles. The principles can, of course, be weakened to rescue them from vulnerability to this sort of counter-example. One way to do this is to adjoin a further initial-condition supposition: that x recognizes that q is a deductive consequence of his or her belief of p . That is, we must be given not only that x recognizes both that he or she believes p and that p entails q , but furthermore that x also recognizes that p is both a belief of his or hers and entailing of q . Since he is a logician, Pierre knows that the compound proposition that *whereas London is pretty if New York is, London is not pretty* entails that New York is not pretty, and he also knows (taking this proposition in a different way) that this proposition is something he believes, but since he fails to recognize this proposition when taking it differently, he does not recognize that this proposition is *simultaneously* something that entails that New York is not pretty and something he believes.¹⁷

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¹⁷ Suppose x does not have the belief that p entails q , because (for example) x does not have the concept of logical entailment, but that x believes p and can nevertheless reason perfectly well, etc. Surely in some such cases we should expect that x would still come to believe q on the basis of his or her belief of p , and that x would be justified in doing so. One reformulation of the belief justification principle that seems both invulnerable to the sort of counterexample at issue in Pierre's case and more to the point makes explicit reference to the third relata of the *BEL* relation:

Suppose x is a normal, fully rational agent who fully understands a particular sentence S (as a sentence of x 's language) and that $BEL[x, p, f(x, S)]$, where p is the content of S (in x 's context). Suppose also that x is consciously interested in the further question of whether q is also the case, taking q the way he or she does when it is presented to x by the particular sentence S' (of x 's language). Suppose further that x also fully understands S' (as a sentence of x 's language). Suppose finally that S' is uncontroversially a trivial deductive consequence of S (in x 's language) by logical form alone (without the help of additional analytical meaning postulates for x 's language). Under these circumstances, x would be rationally justified in coming to stand in *BEL* to q and $f(x, S')$ on the basis of his or her standing in *BEL* to p and $f(x, S)$ (and the deductive relationship between S and S'), or alternatively, if for independent reasons x does not stand in *BEL* to q and $f(x, S')$, x would be rationally justified in accordingly ceasing to stand in *BEL* to p and $f(x, S)$,

where f is the function that assigns to an individual speaker and a sentence of his or her idiolect, the corresponding third relatum of the *BEL* relation (e.g., the way the speaker takes the proposition

One might be tempted to defend these disputed instances of the belief closure and justification principles by arguing that if a normal, fully rational agent x knows both that a particular proposition p is something he or she believes and furthermore that p deductively entails another proposition q , then x can easily infer that p is simultaneously both something he or she believes and something that deductively entails q . Since the former conditions are already included as initial-condition suppositions in the belief closure and justification principles, the new initial-condition supposition would be entirely superfluous.

This purported defense of the belief closure and justification principles does not succeed. Notice how it is supposed to go. We might begin by noting that the argument form $\lceil a \text{ is } F \text{ and } a \text{ is } G; \text{ therefore } a \text{ is both } F \text{ and } G \rceil$ is valid, since it is simply a special application of the ‘ λ ’-transformation rule of *abstraction*, which permits the inference from a formula ϕ_a to $\lceil (\lambda_x)[\phi x](a) \rceil$, i.e. to $\lceil a \text{ is an individual such that } \phi_{it} \rceil$ (where ϕ_a is the result of uniformly substituting free occurrences of a for free occurrences of ‘ x ’ in ϕ_x —or for “free” occurrences of the pronoun ‘it’ in ϕ_{it}). In particular, then, there is a valid argument from ‘ x believes p , and p deductively entails q ’ to ‘ p is something that x believes and that deductively entails q ’. We then invoke the belief closure and justification principles to argue that if x believes the conjunctive proposition that he or she believes p and p deductively entails q , then (assuming the rest of the initial conditions obtain) x will infer that p is something that he or she believes and that deductively entails q , and x would be justified in doing so. This would be a *meta-application* of the belief closure and justification principles, an application to beliefs concerning inference and belief formation. But this meta-application of these principles is part of a purported justification of these very principles! The problem with this defense of the two principles is that, like the misguided attempt to defend induction-by-enumeration by citing inductive evidence of its utility, it presupposes precisely the very principles it is aimed at defending, and hence suffers from a vicious circularity. If we let x be Pierre, p be the conjunctive proposition that whereas London is pretty if New York is, London is not pretty, and q be the proposition that New York is not pretty, then the resulting instances of the belief closure and justification principles are precisely special instances whose truth is explicitly denied by the sort of account I advocate.

More generally, the theory advanced in *Frege’s Puzzle* distinguishes sharply between a complex sentence ϕ_a and the logically equivalent sentence $\lceil (\lambda_x)[\phi x](a) \rceil$ (or $\lceil a \text{ is such that } \phi_{it} \rceil$) as regards their proposition content. I have argued elsewhere for this distinction in some detail in connection with sentences ϕ_a that involve multiple occurrences of the name a .¹⁸ Thus, for example, Pierre no doubt believes

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that is the content of the sentence when it is presented to him or her by that very sentence). Cf. note 14 above. I am assuming here that ‘London is *Londres*’ is not a logically valid sentence of Frenglish (Pierre’s language), despite the fact that it is an analytic sentence of Frenglish. Cf. *Frege’s Puzzle*, pp. 133–135.

An analogous principle may be given in place of the belief closure principle. These more cautious principles must be weakened even further to accommodate cases in which the function f is not defined, as in Kripke’s ‘Paderewski’ case, pp. 265–266.

¹⁸ “Reflexivity.”

(putting it in French) that *Londres* is prettier than London, and (according to my view) he thereby believes the proposition (putting it in proper English) that London is prettier than London, but he does not thereby believe the unbelievable proposition that London exceeds itself in pulchritude (that London is something that is prettier than itself). Likewise, Pierre believes the conjunctive proposition that London is pretty and London is not pretty, but he surely does not believe that London has the unusual property of being both pretty and not pretty.

The fallacy in Kripke's argument, as reconstructed above, occurs in the inference from the subsidiary conclusion *C1* and the additional premise *P3* to the final conclusion *C2*. More specifically, the argument would apparently involve an implicit and invalid intervening inference from *C1* to the following:

C1': If Pierre has the beliefs that London is pretty and that London is not pretty, then he is in principle in a position to see that these propositions (beliefs) are simultaneously beliefs of his and contradictory, and hence in a position to see that at least one of his beliefs must be false.

This intervening subsidiary conclusion *C1'* together with premise *P3* validly yield the desired conclusion *C2*. The implicit inference from *C1* to *C1'* is, in effect, a meta-application of one of the disputed instances of the belief closure and justification principles. Pierre is indeed in a position to know that he believes that London is pretty and that London is not pretty. Being a logician, he certainly knows that the propositions that London is pretty and that London is not pretty are logically incompatible. But he believes these facts about these propositions only when taking one of them in different ways, believing it to be two logically independent propositions, failing to recognize it as a single proposition. He is in no position to see or infer that these two propositions are simultaneously believed by him and contradictory.

There is a serious residual problem with the account given so far of Pierre's situation. There is an extremely compelling reason to deny that Pierre believes that London is pretty: when the sentence 'London is pretty' is put to him (after t_2), he sincerely dissents from it in good faith, while fully understanding the sentence and grasping its content. The theoretical apparatus of *Frege's Puzzle* makes it possible to dispel at least some of the force of this sort of consideration. Using that apparatus, where ' f ' refers to the function that assigns to a speaker and a sentence of the speaker's idiolect the corresponding third relatum of the *BEL* relation (e.g., the way the speaker would take the content of the sentence were it presented to the speaker at t_2 by that very sentence), we may say that at t_2

$BEL[\text{Pierre, that London is pretty, } f(\text{Pierre, 'Londres is pretty'})]$,

or in French,

$BEL[\text{Pierre, that } \textit{Londres} \text{ is pretty, } f(\text{Pierre, 'Londres is pretty'})]$,

whereas we must deny that at t_2

$BEL[\text{Pierre, that London is pretty, } f(\text{Pierre, 'London is pretty'})]$.

Pierre believes the proposition that *Londres* is pretty, taking it as presented by those very words, but he also withholds belief from (in fact disbelieves) the proposition that London is pretty, taking it as presented by those very words. Pierre's doxastic disposition towards the proposition depends entirely on how the proposition is presented to him. The reason offered for denying that Pierre believes that London is pretty is a decisive reason for affirming that he disbelieves that London is pretty (and therefore that he withholds belief), but it is highly misleading evidence regarding the separate and independent question of whether he believes that London is pretty.¹⁹

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VII

I turn now to Schiffer's criticism that I am committed to the falsity of the true sentence (2). I fully agree with Schiffer that sentence (2) is straightforwardly true in his little story involving Floyd, as long as Floyd understands sentence (1) when uttering it or assenting to it. In fact, far from being committed to the claim that (2) is false, the theory advanced in *Frege's Puzzle* is in fact committed to the precisely the opposite claim that (2) is true! This virtually follows directly from the first condition on the *BEL* relation given in Section I above, according to which it is sufficient for the truth of (2) that Floyd should agree to the content of (1) when taking this proposition the way it is presented to him by the very sentence (1).²⁰ On my view, then, Floyd does believe that Lois Lane does not realize that Clark Kent is Superman. In addition, I also maintain (as Schiffer correctly points out) that Floyd believes that Lois Lane does

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¹⁹ A reply exactly similar to this can be offered to Steven Wagner's central criticism (in "California Semantics Meets the Great Fact," *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*, 27, 3, July 1986, pp. 430–455) of the theory advanced in *Frege's Puzzle*. Wagner objects (at pp. 435–436) that the theory is incorrect to characterize someone who knows that 'Samuel Clemens' refers (in English) to Samuel Clemens as thereby knowing that 'Samuel Clemens' refers (in English) to Mark Twain, since any rational agent who knows the latter, and the trivial fact that 'Mark Twain' refers (in English) to Mark Twain, is *ipso facto* in a position to infer that 'Mark Twain' and 'Samuel Clemens' are co-referential, and that therefore 'Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens', and all of its Leibniz's-Law consequences, are true. (Wagner, at pp. 445–446, acknowledges the effectiveness of the sort of reply I am offering here, but finds it excessively reminiscent of the Fregean account of propositional-attitude attributions. There is considerable tension, however, between this reaction and some of his remarks on pp. 431–432. Cf. also note 5 above and *Frege's Puzzle*, pp. 2–7, 66–70, and especially pp. 119–126.)

On a related point, I argued in *Frege's Puzzle* (pp. 133–138) that the sentence 'Hesperus, if it exists, is Phosphorus' expresses a truth (in English) that is knowable (by anyone sufficiently *en rapport* with the planet Venus) *a priori*, by logic alone. One may also know, by principles of (English) semantics alone, that *if Hesperus, if it exists, is Phosphorus, then the sentence 'Hesperus, if it exists, is Phosphorus' is true (in English)*. But knowing these things does not *ipso facto* place one in a position to infer (and thereby to know by logic and semantics alone) that 'Hesperus, if it exists, is Phosphorus' is true (in English). The inability to draw this *modus ponens* inference (justifiably) is an instance of essentially the same phenomenon as Pierre's inability to draw the *modus tollens* inference.

²⁰ In *Frege's Puzzle* I explicitly endorse (at pp. 129–130) Kripke's schematic disquotation principle. (Indeed, as pointed out in note 14 above, the principle is virtually entailed by the first condition on the *BEL* relation.) This disquotation principle (in turn) virtually entails the truth of (2) (in Schiffer's story), assuming Floyd fully understands (1) in assenting to it. Cf. also note 17 above.

realize that Clark Kent is Superman—since Floyd believes the proposition that Lois Lane realizes that Superman is Superman, and on my view this just is the proposition that Lois Lane realizes that Clark Kent is Superman. Thus, I maintain that Floyd both believes and disbelieves that Lois Lane realizes that Clark Kent is Superman.

Schiffer has uncovered a very interesting philosophical problem here. Before presenting my solution, I want to emphasize the generality of the problem. The general problem is not one that is peculiar to my own theory of propositional-attitude attributions (contrary to the impression created by Schiffer's presentation of his criticism), but is equally a problem for the orthodox, Fregean theory, and indeed for virtually any theory of propositional-attitude attributions.

Consider an analogous situation involving straightforward (strict) synonyms. Suppose that Sasha learns the words 'ketchup' and 'catsup' not by being taught that they are perfect synonyms, but by actually consuming the condiment and reading the labels on the bottles. Suppose further that, in Sasha's idiosyncratic experience, people typically have the condiment called 'catsup' with their eggs and hash browns at breakfast, whereas they routinely have the condiment called 'ketchup' with their hamburgers at lunch. This naturally leads Sasha to conclude, erroneously, that ketchup and catsup are different condiments, condiments that happen to share a similar taste, color, consistency, and name. He sincerely utters the sentence 'Ketchup is a sandwich condiment; but no one in his right mind would eat a sandwich condiment with eggs at breakfast, so catsup is not a sandwich condiment'. Now, Tyler Burge, who has a considerable knowledge of formal semantics and who is well aware (unlike Sasha) that 'ketchup' and 'catsup' are exact synonyms, would claim that Sasha believes that ketchup is a sandwich condiment but that Sasha does not believe that catsup is, describing his view in exactly so many words.²¹ Clearly, Burge believes that Sasha believes that ketchup is a sandwich condiment. (See note 23 below.) When queried, "Does Sasha believe that catsup is a sandwich condiment?", however, Burge sincerely responds "No," while fully understanding the question and grasping its content. Given Burge's mastery of English, there would seem to be every reason to say, therefore, that he also believes that Sasha does not believe that catsup is a sandwich condiment. Yet by an argument exactly analogous to Schiffer's, we are apparently barred, by Frege's Thesis and Schiffer's Constraint, from acknowledging this. For we have granted that Burge believes ketchup to be something Sasha believes is a sandwich condiment. If, while remaining fully rational, Burge also believed catsup (i.e. ketchup) *not* to be something Sasha believes is a sandwich condiment, there would be a violation of the conjunction of Frege's Thesis with Schiffer's Constraint. There are no relevant modes of presenting ketchup that Burge construes as (modes of) presenting different stuff, as are required by Frege's Thesis together with Schiffer's Constraint. The conjunction of Frege's Thesis with Schiffer's Constraint thus apparently prohibits us from acknowledging that Burge does indeed disbelieve what he sincerely claims to disbelieve—that Sasha believes that catsup is a sandwich condiment.

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²¹ See his "Belief and Synonymy," *Journal of Philosophy*, 75 (March 1978), pp. 119–138.

Some philosophers will conclude that, despite his insistence to the contrary, Burge really does not disbelieve that Sasha believes that catsup is a sandwich condiment, and when he protests that he does, he is operating under a misunderstanding of the phrase ‘believes that’. What Burge really disbelieves, they claim, is something linguistic, for example that Sasha believes that the sentence ‘Catsup is a sandwich condiment’ is true in English, or that Sasha satisfies the sentential matrix ‘ x believes that catsup is a sandwich condiment’ in English (i.e. that the open sentence ‘ x believes that catsup is a sandwich condiment’ is true in English when Sasha is assigned as value for the free variable ‘ x ’).²² Yet this seems plainly wrong—and therein lies the problem. Burge correctly understands the sentence ‘Sasha believes that catsup is a sandwich condiment’. He understands it to mean (in English) that Sasha believes that catsup, i.e. ketchup, is a sandwich condiment. He knows enough formal semantics to know that the sentence does not mean instead that Sasha believes that the sentence ‘Catsup is a sandwich condiment’ is true in English, nor that Sasha satisfies the sentential matrix ‘ x believes that catsup is a sandwich condiment’ in English. Burge sincerely dissents from this sentence (as a sentence of English) because of his philosophical views concerning belief (which assimilate the proposition so expressed with the false proposition that Sasha accepts, or would accept, the sentence ‘Catsup is a sandwich condiment’, understood in a certain way). Burge’s sincere dissent surely indicates a belief on his part (even if it is confused) that Sasha does not believe that catsup is a sandwich condiment—in addition to his correct belief that Sasha does believe that ketchup is a sandwich condiment, and in addition to his (erroneous) linguistic belief that Sasha fails to satisfy the sentential matrix ‘ x believes that catsup is a sandwich condiment’ in English. The problem is that this apparently conflicts with Frege’s Thesis in conjunction with Schiffer’s Constraint.

This time the objection is not an objection to my theory of belief attributions in particular. If Schiffer’s second criticism of my theory of belief attributions is sound, any reasonable theory of belief attributions, even a Fregean theory, would be required to deny that Burge believes that Sasha does not believe that catsup is a sandwich condiment.²³ Yet surely we are not barred by the demands of reasonableness (and

²² Cf. the discussion of Mates’s famous problem concerning nested propositional-attitude attributions in Alonzo Church, “Intensional Isomorphism and Identity of Belief,” in N. Salmon and S. Soames, eds., *Propositions and Attitudes*. Whereas I disagree with Church concerning Burge’s beliefs, I fully endorse his argument that the sentences ‘Burge disbelieves that Sasha believes catsup is a sandwich condiment’ and ‘Burge disbelieves that Sasha believes ketchup is a sandwich condiment’ cannot differ in truth value in English if ‘ketchup’ and ‘catsup’ are English synonyms.

²³ There is one potential difference between this case and that of sentence (2): Burge’s belief that Sasha believes that ketchup is a sandwich condiment is very likely based, to some extent, on Sasha’s readiness to assent to the sentence ‘Ketchup is a sandwich condiment’. But whereas it is clear that Lois Lane fully understands the sentence ‘Superman is Superman’, and grasps its content, it is arguable that Sasha does not fully understand the sentence ‘Ketchup is a sandwich condiment’, since he takes it to be compatible with ‘Catsup is not a sandwich condiment’. See the final footnote of Saul Kripke’s “A Puzzle About Belief,” concerning a “deep conceptual confusion” that arises from “misapplication of the disquotational principle” to speakers in situations like Sasha’s. Kripke’s view is that “although the issues are delicate, there is a case for” rejecting the claim that Burge believes that Sasha believes that ketchup is a sandwich condiment, on the grounds that Burge apparently misapplies the disquotation principle to Sasha’s assent to ‘Ketchup is a sandwich condiment’,

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consistency) from acknowledging that Burge does indeed disbelieve what he claims to disbelieve. Since it proves too much, there must be something wrong with Schiffer's argument. What?²⁴

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It is perhaps natural to point an accusing finger at Schiffer's Constraint. Since this principle (in conjunction with Frege's Thesis) apparently bars us—Fregeans, Russellians, and other theorists alike—from acknowledging what is patently true about Burge's beliefs, it would appear that it must be incorrect.

I was careful in *Frege's Puzzle* to avoid particular commitments concerning the nature of what I call 'proposition guises' or 'ways of taking propositions' or 'means by which one is familiar with a proposition'. However, I am prepared to grant, for present purposes, that *something* along the lines of Frege's Thesis and Schiffer's Constraint is indeed correct.²⁵ Does this, together with the doctrines and theses I

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thereby betraying a misunderstanding of the term 'believe'. (Kripke adds that he does not believe that his brief discussion of this sort of situation ends the matter.)

Against this, the following should be noted First, it is by no means obvious that Sasha fails to understand the term 'ketchup'; he has learned the term in much the same way as nearly everyone else who has learned it: by means of a sort of ostensive definition. If Sasha misunderstands the term 'ketchup', why does Lois Lane not similarly misunderstand the name 'Superman'? Second, even if Sasha's understanding of the term 'ketchup' is somehow defective, this does not make any difference to Burge's beliefs concerning Sasha's beliefs. Burge's philosophical views concerning belief allow that Sasha's grasp of the term 'ketchup', imperfect though it may be, is sufficient to enable him to form a belief that ketchup is a sandwich condiment. (See Burge's "Individualism and the Mental," in P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein, eds., *Midwest Studies in Philosophy IV: Studies in Metaphysics*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979, pp. 73–121.) Even if Burge's philosophical views are incorrect, they are views concerning belief. It would be implausible to claim that Burge's views in this connection *must* indicate a misunderstanding of the term 'believe' (as used in standard English), as opposed to advocacy of a somewhat controversial theory concerning (genuine) belief. Last but not least, even if Sasha's understanding of the term 'ketchup' is somehow defective, the claim that Sasha therefore fails to believe that ketchup is a sandwich condiment is fundamentally implausible. Suppose Sasha points to a bottle labeled 'KETCHUP', and sincerely declares, "This stuff here is a sandwich condiment." Does he nevertheless fail to believe that ketchup is a sandwich condiment, simply because he does not realize that 'ketchup' and 'catsup' are synonyms?

²⁴ The example of Sasha demonstrates that the difficulty involved is more general than it appears, arising not only on my own theory of propositional-attitude attributions but equally on a very wide range of such theories, including various Fregean theories. This feature is not peculiar to Schiffer's criticism. Although I cannot argue the case here, a great many criticisms that have been levelled against the sort of account I advocate—perhaps most—are based on some difficulty or other that is more general in nature than it first appears, and that equally arises on virtually any theory of propositional-attitude attributions in connection with the example of Sasha's understanding of the synonyms 'ketchup' and 'catsup'. The argument given here involving the terms 'ketchup' and 'catsup' is related to Kripke's "proof" of substitutivity using two Hebrew words for Germany, and to his argument involving 'furze' and 'gorse', in the conclusion section of "A Puzzle About Belief." All of these arguments are closely related to Church's famous arguments from translation. (See especially "Intentional Isomorphism and Identity of Belief.") I hope to elaborate on this matter in later work.

²⁵ For several reasons, I do not accept the letter of Schiffer's Constraint as here formulated, though I do accept its spirit. I believe that Schiffer shares some of my misgivings over the principle, as here formulated. He mentions potential problems arising from the '*F*' in the statement of the principle, and the need for "modes of presentation" for properties. A related difficulty is noted below. In addition, I do not accept the Fregean notion of a purely conceptual *mode of presentation* of an entity as an adequate substitute for my notion of a *way of taking* the entity in question. See note 5 above.

advocate in *Frege's Puzzle*, lead to a commitment to the falsity of (2), as Schiffer argues? If so, then my position is strictly *inconsistent* since I also maintain that (2) is true.

Contra Schiffer, my granting that something along the lines of Frege's Thesis and Schiffer's Constraint is correct does not commit me to the falsity of sentence (2). For illustration, first instantiate the 'x' to Floyd, the 'y' to the fact (or proposition) that Clark Kent is Superman, and the 'F' to the property of *being realized by Lois Lane*. On my theory, the fact (or proposition) that Clark Kent is Superman is just the fact that Superman is Superman. The relevant instances of the two principles entail that, since Floyd both believes and disbelieves this fact to be realized by Lois Lane, if he is fully rational he must grasp this fact by means of two distinct modes of presentation of it, he must take this fact in two different ways. I am happy to say that Floyd does. In fact, my theory more or less requires that he does. Unless Floyd himself believes with me what Schiffer calls 'the Fido-Fido theory of meaning', he may rationally proclaim 'The fact that Superman is Superman is trivial and something that Lois Lane realizes, whereas the fact that Clark Kent is Superman is neither; hence they are distinct facts'. As the discussion in Section I made clear, whatever else my notion of a *way of taking* an object is, it is such that if Floyd believes that a proposition p is distinct from a proposition q , then Floyd takes these propositions in different ways (even if $p = q$). If Floyd is sufficiently philosophical, he may mistake the singular proposition about Superman that he is him, when it is presented to him by the sentence 'Clark Kent is Superman', for some general proposition to the effect that the mild-mannered reporter having such-and-such drab physical appearance is the superhero who wears blue tights, a big 'S' on his chest, and a red cape, etc. Or instead he may mistake the proposition, so presented, for the singular proposition *taken in a certain way*, or what comes to the same thing, the singular proposition together with a certain way of taking it. This is how he takes the singular proposition when it is so presented. The fact that he knows this proposition to be true does not have the consequence that he sees it as the very same thing, in the very same way, as the corresponding thing (general proposition or singular-proposition-taken-in-a-certain-way) that he associates with 'Superman is Superman'.

Consider Frege in place of Floyd. On my view, Frege mistook the singular proposition about the planet Venus that it is it to be two different propositions ('thoughts'). He took this proposition in one way when it was presented to him by the sentence '*Der Morgenstern ist derselbe wie der Morgenstern*' (the German version of 'Morningstar is the same as Morningstar') and in another way when it was presented to him by the sentence '*Der Morgenstern ist derselbe wie der Abendstern*' ('Morningstar is the same as Eveningstar')—despite the fact that he was well aware that the names '*Morgenstern*' and '*Abenstern*' refer to ("mean") the same planet. That he took this proposition in two different ways is established by the fact that he took it to be two different propositions. Floyd is in a similar state with respect to the singular proposition about Superman that he is him—even if Floyd has not formed a specific view about the nature of propositions in general or about the nature of this proposition in particular, as long as he takes this proposition to be two different propositions. Anyone who does not consciously subscribe to the sort of theory advanced in *Frege's Puzzle* is likely to

have different perspectives on a given singular proposition of the form x is x when it is presented in various ways, seeing it as a different entity each time.²⁶

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Let us return to Frege's Thesis and Schiffer's Constraint. Suppose instead that the 'y' is instantiated this time to Superman (or to Clark Kent) and the 'F' to the property of *being an individual x such that Lois Lane realizes that x is Superman*, or *being someone that Lois Lane realizes is Superman*. Surely Floyd believes Superman to have this property. (We ask Floyd, "You know that man who calls himself 'Superman'. Does Lois Lane realize that he is Superman?" If Floyd understands the question, he should answer "Yes.") If at the same time Floyd disbelieves Superman to have this property, yet he remains fully rational, the conjunction of Frege's Thesis with Schiffer's Constraint will have been violated. As Schiffer points out, it will not do in this case to defend my theory by claiming that there are relevant modes of presentation m and m' of Superman that Floyd grasps but construes as (modes of) presenting different individuals, for there are no such modes of presentation in Schiffer's little story.

Does Floyd disbelieve Superman to be such that Lois realizes that he is Superman? Put another way, does Floyd believe Clark Kent to be someone that Lois Lane does not realize is Superman? I suspect that Schiffer assumed that if I were to concede that Floyd believes Lois Lane does not realize that Clark Kent is Superman, it would simply follow—according to my own theory—that Floyd believes Clark Kent to be someone that Lois Lane does not realize is Superman. That is, Schiffer's second criticism apparently involves an inference from

(2) Floyd believes that Lois Lane does not realize that Clark Kent is Superman

to

(3) Floyd believes that Clark Kent is someone that Lois does not realize is Superman.

On my theory, it virtually follows from (3) that Floyd believes Clark Kent not to be someone that Lois Lane realizes is Superman. The conjunction of Frege's Thesis with Schiffer's Constraint would thus bar me from acknowledging the truth of (2).

It is an essential part of the theory I advanced in *Frege's Puzzle*, however, that (3) does *not* follow from (2). The theory advanced in *Frege's Puzzle* distinguishes sharply between the proposition that Lois Lane does not realize that Clark Kent is such-and-such and the proposition that Clark Kent is someone that Lois Lane does not realize is such-and-such. These propositions differ in structure. Roughly put,

²⁶ In *Frege's Puzzle* I wrote: "The means by which one is acquainted with a singular proposition includes as a part the means by which one is familiar with the individual constituent(s) of the proposition" (p. 108). Contrary to the interpretation advanced in Schiffer's postscript, I never suggested that the way an agent takes a structured complex object, such as a proposition, is made up *without remainder* of the ways the agent takes the separate constituents of the complex (with these ways-of-taking-objects structured in a similar way). The principal criticism of Schiffer's postscript challenges my contention that Floyd takes the singular proposition (or fact) about Superman that he is him in two different ways. It is difficult to understand, however, why Schiffer—who himself advanced (something along the lines of) Schiffer's Constraint in criticizing the theory of *Frege's Puzzle*—insists, as part of the same criticism, that the fact that a fully rational agent believes that whereas p is trivial, q is not, does not yield an adequate reason to conclude that this agent takes p and q in different ways (by means of different "modes of presentation").

Clark Kent is the subject of the latter proposition, but not of the former. According to my account, Floyd believes that Lois Lane does not realize that Clark Kent is Superman but, at least very likely, he does not also believe of Superman that he is someone Lois Lane does not realize is Superman.

In fact, it is precisely in the implicit inference from (2) to (3) that Schiffer might be invoking the belief closure principle (and perhaps the belief justification principle as well). Here again, the relevant logical entailment is an instance of the inference rule of abstraction. And here again, we seem to have an example of someone believing a proposition while being in no position to infer a simple deductive consequence from the proposition. Worse, if Schiffer's apparent implicit inference from (2) to (3) is indeed based on an application of the belief closure principle, as it seems to be, it is a fallacious application. For one of the initial-condition provisos of the belief closure principle is that the agent is aware of the deductive relationship between his or her current belief and its deductive consequence. But it seems likely in Schiffer's little story that Floyd does not believe that the proposition that Clark Kent is someone that Lois Lane does not realize is such-and-such is a valid deductive consequence of the proposition that Lois Lane does not realize that Clark Kent is such-and-such.²⁷ Given his favorable attitude toward sentence (1), it is evident that Floyd believes that Lois Lane does not realize that Clark Kent is Superman, but he is in no position to infer that Clark Kent is someone that Lois Lane does not realize is Superman, and he would not be logically justified in doing so. For we may suppose that Floyd also believes that Superman is someone that Lois Lane realizes is Superman. On my view, this is just to say that Floyd believes the singular proposition about Superman, i.e. Clark Kent, that *he* is someone that Lois Lane realizes is Superman. Floyd is not about to relinquish this belief of his. He would indeed be less than fully rational, in the sense used in Schiffer's Constraint, if at the same time he also formed the belief of Superman (i.e. Clark Kent) that he is someone that Lois Lane does not realize is Superman.

Floyd would be less than fully rational, that is, *unless* he has gained a *new* mode of familiarity with Superman, an additional mode of presentation, by encountering Superman on another occasion and failing to recognize him, *or* he somehow mistakes the logically incompatible properties of being someone Lois Lane realizes is Superman and of being someone Lois Lane does not realize is Superman—which are properties that such individuals as you, me, and Superman either have or lack in an absolute *de re* way—for properties of *individuals-under-guises* (or equivalently, for binary relations between individuals and ways of conceiving them).²⁸ Either of these predicaments might rescue Floyd from irrationality even when he both believes and disbelieves Superman to be someone Lois Lane realizes is Superman. For present purposes,

²⁷ Furthermore, it is highly controversial whether the former is a valid deductive consequence of the latter, and indeed, Floyd's views entail a negative answer to this controversial question. This renders the alternative belief justification principle cited in note 17 above also inapplicable.

²⁸ The possibility of such confusion demonstrates a further difficulty with Schiffer's Constraint, as it is formulated here (see note 25), and that the principle should be stated more carefully—perhaps by adding a proviso concerning *x*'s lack of confusion in regard to the nonrelativity, and the consequent logical incompatibility, of the property of being *F* and that of not being *F*, and in regard to the sort of entities that are candidates for having either.

we may assume that Floyd has acquired neither a new mode of presentation nor this philosophically sophisticated confusion.

Suppose we queried Floyd, “You know that man who calls himself ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’. Does Lois Lane realize that he is Superman, or does she fail to realize that he is Superman?” If he understands the question, he should answer “She *does* realize that he is Superman.” If he were sufficiently philosophical, he might describe his pertinent beliefs by adding, “Lois does not realize that *Clark Kent* is Superman. But if you’re asking about the man himself (and not about the man-under-one-of-his-guises), she thinks he is two men. She *doubts* that he is Superman, but she also realizes that he is Superman. It all depends on the guise under which he is presented to her.” Floyd cannot fully rationally add to this stock of beliefs a further belief that he would express by ‘That man, Clark Kent, is someone Lois does *not* realize is Superman’. If he added this belief to his present stock, without relinquishing any of his current beliefs, he would believe of Superman that he simultaneously is and also is not someone Lois Lane realizes is Superman, that he both is and is not such that Lois Lane realizes that he is Superman. That would indeed be less than fully rational, in the sense used in Schiffer’s Constraint (unless Floyd is under the sort of confusion mentioned in the preceding paragraph). To use a piece of terminology recently introduced by Schiffer, Floyd, in both believing and disbelieving that Lois Lane realizes that Clark Kent is Superman, exhibits *the belief/disbelief phenomenon with respect to the phrase ‘that Clark Kent is Superman’* (which he does not construe as standing for the same thing as the phrase ‘that Superman is Superman’).²⁹ However, since on my view Floyd (unless he is under the sort of confusion mentioned above) does not disbelieve Clark Kent to be someone that Lois realizes is Superman, he does not exhibit the belief/disbelief phenomenon with respect to the name ‘Clark Kent’ (which he rightly construes as standing for the same individual as the name ‘Superman’). Hence, my theory does not conflict here with the conjunction of Frege’s Thesis and Schiffer’s Constraint.³⁰

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VIII

Although the general philosophical problem uncovered by Schiffer does not refute my theory of propositional-attitude attributions (or Frege’s), it does pose a very serious difficulty for—in fact, a refutation of—a proposal originally made by W. V. Quine in 1956 in his classic “Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes,”³¹ and more

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²⁹ Cf. Schiffer’s “The Real Trouble with Propositions,” in R. J. Bogdan, ed., *Belief* (Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 83–117, at p. 107*n*.

³⁰ Likewise, Burge believes ketchup, i.e. catsup, to be something that Sasha believes is a sandwich condiment, and he also believes ketchup to be something that Sasha disbelieves is a sandwich condiment. Furthermore, he disbelieves that Sasha believes that catsup is a sandwich condiment, but he does not disbelieve catsup to be something that Sasha believes is a sandwich condiment (I assume he is not under the sort of confusion mentioned in the preceding paragraph of the text)—otherwise he would not be fully rational in the relevant sense. Frege’s Thesis and Schiffer’s Constraint do not force us to deny that Burge disbelieves that Sasha believes that catsup is a sandwich condiment.

³¹ In Quine’s *The Ways of Paradox* (New York: Random House, 1966), pp. 183–194.

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recently endorsed (and improved upon) by David Kaplan.³² The proposal is one for translating (or in Quine's case, replacing) constructions involving quantification into intentional or content-sensitive operators by a certain type of construction—which Kaplan calls 'syntactically *de re*'—that avoids such quantifying in. In particular, a syntactically *de dicto* open sentence

c believes that ϕ_x ,

where 'x' is the only free variable of the open sentence ϕ_x , and has only one free occurrence therein (positioned inside the scope of the content-sensitive syntactically *de dicto* operator ' c believes that'), is to be replaced by

c believes the property of being an object y such that ϕ_y of x

(Quine), or equivalently, to be translated into the syntactically *de re*

x is believed by c to be an object y such that ϕ_y

(Kaplan). The proposed substitutes artfully leave the free variable 'x' outside the scope of 'believe'.³³ Accordingly, on this proposal, the syntactically *de dicto* open sentence

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(2') Floyd believes that Lois Lane does not realize that x is Superman

is rewritten as

Floyd believes the property of being an object y such that Lois Lane does not realize the property of being Superman of y , of x

(Quine), or as

x is believed by Floyd to be an object y such that y is not realized by Lois Lane to be Superman

(Kaplan), or more colloquially as

(3'') Floyd believes x to be someone that Lois Lane does not realize to be Superman.

Now, in Schiffer's little story, (2') is true when Superman is assigned as value for the variable 'x', i.e. Superman satisfies (2'). Yet Schiffer's argument demonstrates that (3'') is false when Superman is assigned as value for 'x', i.e. Superman does not satisfy (3''). If (3'') were true of Superman, Floyd would be less than fully rational, in the sense used in Schiffer's Constraint (unless he is under the confusion mentioned in the preceding section concerning the nature of the property of being someone Lois

³² "Opacity," appendix B, in E. Hahn and P. A. Schilpp, eds., *The Philosophy of W. V. Quine* (La Salle: Open Court, 1986), pp. 229–294, at pp. 268–272.

³³ The open sentence ϕ_y is the result of uniformly substituting free occurrences of the variable 'y' for free occurrences of the variable 'x' throughout ϕ_x . If 'x' has a free occurrence in ϕ_x inside the scope of a variable-binding operator on 'y', it will be necessary to use a different variable in place of 'y'. Kaplan's improvement on Quine's proposal introduces a somewhat more complicated translation, involving a procedure Kaplan calls *articulation*, in case ϕ_x contains more than one free occurrence of 'x' (as in 'x indulges x'). Such multiple-occurrence syntactically *de dicto* constructions will not concern us here.

Lane realizes is Superman), since he would then both believe and disbelieve Superman to be someone Lois realizes is Superman, while lacking the required “modes of presentation” construed as (modes of) presenting distinct individuals. The proposed translation of (2′) into (3′′) thus fails, and for precisely the same reason as Schiffer’s implicit inference from (2) to (3).³⁴

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³⁴ No doubt, Superman himself agrees with Floyd concerning Lois Lane’s ignorance of his secret identity, i.e. he believes with Floyd that Lois Lane does not realize that Clark Kent is Superman. But he also agrees with Floyd that Lois Lane realizes that he himself is Superman (since she realizes that Superman is Superman), and thus he believes himself to be someone Lois Lane realizes is Superman. Hence, being fully rational, he does not also believe himself to be someone that Lois Lane does not realize is Superman (although he believes himself to be someone that Lois Lane doubts is Superman). This refutes any attempt to analyze the so-called *de se* construction ‘*a* believes that $\phi_{he-himself}$ ’ by means of something along the lines of ‘*a* self-ascribes the property of being someone *y* such that ϕ_y ’. Such attempts are made by David Lewis, “Attitudes *De Dicto* and *De Se*,” *The Philosophical Review*, 88 (1979), pp. 513–543, and Roderick Chisholm. *The First Person* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), at pp. 34–37 and *passim*.

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