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Three Perspectives on *Quantifying In**

NATHAN SALMON

I

David Kaplan provided two very extensive, yet very different, commentaries—nearly twenty years apart—on Quine's classic 1956 article "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes." These are "Quantifying In" and "Opacity."[1] The two commentaries represent two very distinct periods in Kaplan's philosophical development—the earlier commentary reflecting the Fregean presuppositions he had acquired from Rudolf Carnap and Alonzo Church, the later reflecting the revolutionary ideas of the anti-Fregean and neo-Russellian *direct-reference theory*, of which Kaplan is a co-founder alongside Keith Donnellan, Saul Kripke, Ruth Barcan Marcus, Hilary Putnam, and others. Besides "Opacity," which supercedes "Quantifying In," Kaplan has also produced widely studied work on demonstratives and the direct-reference theory, which also repudiates some of the central philosophical ideas of "Quantifying In." But there remains much of lasting value in "Quantifying In." My present purpose is to ensure that in the haste to repudiate the obsolete Fregean predispositions of an earlier era the baby is not thrown out with the bathwater.

One philosophical idea that underlies a great deal of Kaplan's work is that of a *singular proposition*. This is what our British colleagues often

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[1] Kaplan 1969, 1986. In his replies Quine called "Quantifying In" a "masterly essay," and "Opacity" a "fun to read workout."

mean in calling a proposition *object-involving* or *object-dependent*, that is, a proposition that is about some particular thing by virtue of that thing's occurring directly in the proposition as a proper constituent, instead of being represented therein by means of something conceptual or intensional, such as a Fregean sense (*Sinn*). As Kaplan notes, this is exactly the sort of proposition that is expressed when one uses a demonstrative appropriately in a sentence—for example, while pointing to something that is visually discernible in the context. As Kaplan also notes, it is also exactly the sort of proposition that is expressed by an "open sentence" (or open formula) under an assignment of values to its free variables.

The very idea of a singular proposition is due primarily to Russell. He had the idea well before he invented his famous Theory of Descriptions, but the idea arises quite naturally in connection with that theory's distinctions of scope. For the *primary occurrence* reading (i.e., the *wide-scope* reading) of "George IV wondered whether Scott is the author of *Waverley*" positions an open sentence ("Scott is *x*") within the scope of an expression of propositional attitude ("George IV wondered whether"). There is a pressing question here for the Fregean: On the primary-occurrence reading, which proposition does King George allegedly wonder about? Not so for the Russellian. If the question is raised, Russell's theory provides a ready response: The variable is a logically proper name, and the open sentence therefore expresses a singular proposition about *Waverley*'s author, under the relevant assignment. The original problem of quantifying in is a Fregean problem, not Russellian.[2]

The problem took on a peculiar spin in Quine's critique. He argued that quantification into a nonextensional ("opaque") context is meaningless, in fact semantically incoherent. Suppose, following Quine, that Ralph erroneously believes that the man in the brown hat, whom Ralph suspects is a spy, is someone other than Ortcutt, whom Ralph saw once at the beach. Of the following two sentences, the first is true and the second false on their Russellian secondary-occurrence (narrow-scope) readings.

(1) Ralph believes that the man in the brown hat is a spy
(2) Ralph believes that the man Ralph saw at *t* is a spy

[2] This is not to say that there are no pressing questions for Russell in connection with quantifying in.

Consider now the particular construction,

(3) Ralph believes of the man Ralph saw at *t* that he is a spy,

or what comes to the same thing, Russell's analysis of the primary-occurrence reading of (2),

(3′) $(\exists x)[(y)(y \text{ is a man Ralph saw at } t \equiv x = y)$ & Ralph believes that x is a spy].

Quine raises the following puzzle question: Is (3)—alternatively (3′)—true? Or is it false? That is, given that (1) is true while (2) is false, *concerning Ortcutt himself, does Ralph believe that he is a spy?* Put another way, is Ortcutt someone whom Ralph believes is a spy?

Sentence (3)—and likewise (3′), which involves quantification into "Ralph believes that"—is supposed to be somehow less specific, hence weaker, than either of (1) and (2) in its attribution to Ralph. It might appear that (3) and (3′) are therefore straightforwardly true in virtue of the truth of (1), even though (2) is false. But, Quine argued, (3) and (3′) cannot even be univocally assigned a truth-value. For according to classical Tarskian semantics, (3′) is true if and only if the man Ralph saw at *t* (i.e., Ortcutt) satisfies the right-hand conjunct,

(4) Ralph believes that x is a spy.

Analogously, (3) is true if and only if "Ralph believes that he is a spy" is true when the pronoun "he" is used to designate Ortcutt. And there's the rub. Quine's principal argument that (3) is semantically incoherent evidently employs the following three premises (the first two of which are tacit):

P1: If (3) is semantically coherent, then so is (4).

P2: If an open formula ϕ_α, with α its only free variable, is semantically coherent, then it expresses (or designates, or is in some other manner semantically associated with) a property P of individuals (rather than, say, a property of concepts or of *notions* of individuals) such that ϕ_β is true iff the designatum of β has P—where β is a closed term and ϕ_β is the result of uniformly substituting β for the free occurrences of α in ϕ_α.

P3: (1) is true and (2) false even though "the man in the brown hat" and "the man Ralph saw at *t*" (closed terms each) designate Ortcutt.

Quine might have relied instead on the following variant of (*P2*), which is more Quinean in spirit, and which I shall call *Quine's Lemma*:

QL: If an open formula ϕ_α, with α its only free variable, is semantically coherent, then ϕ_β is true iff the designatum of β satisfies ϕ_α—where β is a closed term and ϕ_β is the result of uniformly substituting β for the free occurrences of α in ϕ_α.

Either of (*P2*) or (*QL*) in combination with (*P1*) and (*P3*) validly delivers Quine's conclusion.

As Quine sees the matter, Ortcutt neither satisfies nor fails to satisfy (4) independently of how he is described. Likewise, the sentence "Ralph believes that he is a spy," with its pronoun designating Ortcutt, is neither true nor untrue independently of how Ortcutt is described. Ortcutt satisfies (4) under the description "the man in the brown hat" (substituting the latter for "*x*") but not under the description "the man Ralph saw at *t*," whereas the variable "*x*" itself, and likewise the pronoun, carries with it no description whatsoever. The variable's only meaning is the individual assigned to it as value. The variable is like life: it has no more meaning than whatever meaning one chooses to give it.

The author of "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes" rejected the central puzzle question as unanswerable in principle. This despite the fact that Quine sets out his example, ironically, with the explicit *stipulation* that Ortcutt is such that Ralph believes he is a spy.[3] Quite properly, however, Quine was not content to let matters rest with his conclusion that it cannot be said that Ortcutt is, or that he is not, someone whom Ralph believes is a spy. For Ralph plainly does believe *someone* to be a spy—by virtue of believing that the man in the brown hat, whoever he is, is a spy—and that someone is in fact Ortcutt. Quine proposed replacing the supposedly incoherent construction (3) with a coherent substitute, which Kaplan calls "syntactically *de re*":

(5) Ralph believes$_R$ the man Ralph saw at *t* to be a spy.

The subscript "*R*," which stands for "relational" (in contrast to "notional"), indicates that the transitive verb is different from that occurring in (1)–(4). The verb for relational (*de re*) belief takes an indirect object as well as a direct

[3] Quine's puzzle would have been more effectively posed if it had been set out merely with the stipulation of (*P3*).

object (''the man Ralph saw at *t*'' and ''to be a spy''), whereas the verb for notional (*de dicto*) belief takes only a direct object (''that the man Ralph saw at *t* is a spy''). In (2), ''the man Ralph saw at *t*'' is within the clutches of opacity; in (5) it has been liberated, available for substitution or *EG*.[4]

Ostensibly, ''Quantifying In'' is a neo-Quinean program. Its burden is to provide a philosophical analysis of relational belief in terms of notional, that is, a philosophical definition of the syntactically *de re* verb ''believes$_R$'' in terms of the syntactically *de dicto* ''believes.'' (More accurately, the ostensible project is to provide an analysis of Quine's allegedly intension-free, antiseptic replacement for ''believes$_R$'' in terms of his equally antiseptic replacement for ''believes.'') ''Quantifying In'' analyzes (5) (roughly) as:

(5′) $(\exists\alpha)[\alpha$ ***represents***$_{\mathbf{B}}$ the man Ralph saw at *t* to Ralph & Ralph believes $\ulcorner\alpha$ is a spy$\urcorner]$,

where, on Kaplan's analysis, a term α ***represents***$_{\mathbf{B}}$ an individual *x* to a subject *y* iff α designates *x* and is also a *vivid name of x* for *y*, in a special sense of ''name *of*.'' Although Kaplan does not provide a full analysis of what it is for a term (really a concept) to be a ''name of'' an object, he does provide a working idea.[5] The important feature is that it is not merely a matter of *fit* (which might be accidental), but a matter of a *real* connection—on the analogy of a photograph being a picture of an object even if it is a terrible picture that better resembles another object. Kaplan's ***representation***$_{\mathbf{B}}$ is a very special kind of designation, therewith avoiding the excesses of *latitudinarianism* (or ''unrestricted exportation'')—the doctrine that *de dicto* (supplemented by an existential premise) entails *de re*.

From the perspective of ''Opacity,'' the project of ''Quantifying In'' is wrongheaded right from the outset. Kaplan observes in ''Opacity'' that Quine's arguments for the conclusion that (3) is incoherent are themselves incorrect. (I have analyzed Quine's argument somewhat differently from Kaplan.) Specifically, Quine's Lemma (*QL*)—alternatively,

[4] The logical form of (5) is that of a triadic predication: **Believes**$_R$ (Ralph, the man Ralph saw at *t*, to be a spy). Quine would write (5) thus: ''Ralph believes *z*(*z* is a spy) of the man Ralph saw at *t*.'' Kaplan formulates his version using passive voice: ''The man Ralph saw at *t* is believed by Ralph to be a spy.'' I cannot believe that the passive construction makes any difference. It is possible Kaplan disagrees.

[5] Strictly speaking, on the ''Quantifying In'' analysis, the vivid name α is ultimately not a term but an individual concept, and the quasi-quotation marks are quasi-indirect-quotation marks. This leaves Kaplan's concept of *vividness* and being a *name of* something in need of further explanation. Still, one gets the rough idea.

premise (*P2*)—has not actually been proven. Quine's Lemma is easily proved by induction for a classical, extensional language. The proof breaks down, however, the moment the nonextensional operator "believes that" is appended to the language.[6] More importantly, (*QL*) is not merely unproven; it is unprovable. Insofar as definite descriptions are regarded as singular terms (*contra* Russell), (*QL*) is not even true. For in that case, the designatum of "the man Ralph saw at *t*" (in accord with (*P3*)) satisfies (4) even though (2) is false. Likewise, contrary to (*P2*), the designatum of "the man Ralph saw at *t*" has the property semantically associated with (4)—being someone whom Ralph believes is a spy—despite the fact that (2) is false.

Indeed, with all due respect, Russell's Theory of Descriptions together with his apparatus of singular propositions already prove that (3) is perfectly coherent. *Pace* Quine, there is no need to replace (3) with (5), and hence no need to analyze (5) other than by means of (3) itself. In short, "Quantifying In" is a solution without a problem. It merely haggles with Quine over price, while it buys his defective bill of goods.

II

While this diagnosis of the situation is roughly correct as far as it goes, it misses the big picture. One need not endorse Quine's replacement of (3) by (5). Especially if one questions the philosophical propriety of singular propositions, as Frege did, one may want an analysis of (3) itself in terms of belief of Fregean "thoughts" (*Gedanken*), i.e., belief of general (nonsingular) propositions. The analysis that "Quantifying In" provides for (5) may be pressed into service for this neo-Fregean purpose.

Only now the spin is somewhat different. On Frege's view, a term cannot be assigned Ortcutt (or anything else) as its designatum directly.

[6] Even given the hypothesis of induction that "The man Ralph saw at *t* is a spy" is true iff the designatum of "the man Ralph saw at *t*" satisfies "*x* is a spy," it cannot be inferred that (2) is true iff the designatum of "the man Ralph saw at *t*" satisfies (4). In adding "Ralph believes that" to the language, it is assumed: (*i*) that (2) is true iff Ralph believes the proposition expressed by "The man Ralph saw at *t* is a spy"; and (*ii*) that an individual satisfies (4) iff Ralph believes the proposition expressed by "*x* is a spy" under the assignment of that individual as value for "*x*." The hypothesis of induction merely provides semantic truth conditions for "The man Ralph saw at *t* is a spy," which are entirely irrelevant to (2). (Notice in particular that Ralph can believe the proposition expressed by "*x* is a spy" under the assignment of the designatum of "the man Ralph saw at *t*" as value for "*x*" without believing that the designatum of "the man Ralph saw at *t*" satisfies "*x* is a spy.")

Instead the term must be assigned a sense, which independently provides an object on its own hook. For the Fregean, there are infinitely many propositions, *that the such-and-such is a spy*, each about Ortcutt, and none is privileged. The open sentence, ''*x* is a spy,'' may equally express any one of them, but only by assigning the relevant sense-value to its free variable (the semantic analogue of substituting a description for the variable). As Russell put the matter, ''there is no backward road'' from Ortcutt to any specific concept of him. The issue of which proposition is designated by ''that *x* is a spy'' turns on which particular Ortcutt-determining sense-value is assigned to the variable. In the absence of any assignment of a sense-value to its free variable, the open ''that''-clause is without meaning.[7]

''Quantifying In'' indirectly provides a way for a Fregean to make sense of an open ''that''-clause without resorting to singular propositions, without assigning sense-values to its free variables, and without even regarding an open ''that''-clause as a designating expression at all. This can be accomplished by borrowing an idea from Russell, that of a *contextual definition*. ''Quantifying In'' insightfully lays out a way of isolating a special subclass of propositions about Ortcutt—let us call them the *representational thoughts*—which invoke a special sort of individual concept of Ortcutt, one that ***represents***$_{\mathrm{B}}$ Ortcutt to Ralph. For the Fregean, although ''that *x* is a spy'' has no meaning in isolation, it can be given a contextual definition that uses the subclass of representational thoughts while simulating the assignment of sense-values to the free variable. Specifically, the whole consisting of an open ''that''-clause, $\ulcorner$that $\varphi_x\urcorner$ with a single occurrence of ''*x*'' as its only free variable, occurring in an atomic sentential context,

$(C)\quad \psi(\text{that}\ \ \varphi_x)$

is defined as an abbreviation for

$(C')\quad (\exists\alpha)[\alpha\ \textbf{\textit{represents}}_{\psi}\ x\ \&\ \psi(\ulcorner\varphi_\alpha\urcorner)]$.[8]

In effect, singular propositions are deemed *logical fictions* or *constructions* (to use an older terminology) out of representational thoughts: discourse that

[7] Though they are somewhat different, Quine's argument against quantification into a nonextensional context owes more to Frege than Quine explicitly recognizes.

[8] In calling (*C*) *atomic*, I mean that it represents an *n*-adic predicate together with *n* occurrences of syntactically appropriate terms, at least one of which is the open ''that''-clause, $\ulcorner$that $\varphi_x\urcorner$. The definition is generalizable in the obvious way—and in alternative ways (as Kaplan indirectly shows in ''Opacity''

appears on the surface to mention a singular proposition is revealed instead, on analysis, to be about *some representational thought or other*.

Putting "is a spy" for φ and "Ralph believes" for ψ in (*C*) and (*C*′), one obtains the following as a purported analysis of (4):

(4′) $(\exists\alpha)[\alpha$ ***represents***$_{\mathbf{B}}$ *x* to Ralph & Ralph believes $\ulcorner\alpha$ is a spy$\urcorner]$.

Plugging this in for (4) in (3′) yields a trivial equivalent of (5′). We thus blaze a new trail from (3) to (5′), *via* Russell's (3′) instead of taking Quine's unnecessary detour through (5).[9]

In the original, neo-Quinean project of "Quantifying In," objectual quantification into the nonextensional is shunned as impermissible quantification into the "opaque," while Quine's substitute relational sense is analyzed in terms of the notional sense. On the reconstruction just suggested, apparent objectual quantification into the nonextensional is embraced, as shorthand for legitimized quantification into the "oblique" (*ungerade*), and it is explained without resorting to Russell's singular propositions in terms of representational Fregean thoughts. Looked at in this alternative, neo-Fregean way, "Quantifying In" completes Frege's program, filling in its most problematic lacuna in a manner that is (or purports to be) sensitive to the subtle discriminations among our ordinary *de re* attributions.[10]

appendix B, pp. 268-272)—to open "that"-clauses with more than one free variable-occurrence. If Ralph comes to believe that the man in the brown hat is taller than the man Ralph saw at *t*, then Ralph thereby believes of Ortcutt that he is taller than the man Ralph saw at *t*, and Ralph also thereby believes of Ortcutt that the man in the brown hat is taller than he (Ortcutt) is. Ralph thus believes of Ortcutt and of Ortcutt that the former is taller than the latter. Equivalently, and more interestingly, Ralph believes of Ortcutt that he is taller than he (Ortcutt) is. Yet Ralph does not believe Ortcutt to be someone taller than himself. In particular, though there are α and β, both representing Ortcutt to Ralph, such that Ralph believes $\ulcorner\alpha$ is taller than $\beta\urcorner$, there is no α such that Ralph believes $\ulcorner\alpha$ is taller than $\alpha\urcorner$. Cf. Salmon 1995: 206–228.

[9] I proposed this alternative, neo-Fregean interpretation in Salmon (1998: 85–110, at p. 92). There is at least the suggestion of this idea already in "Quantifying In," in its third footnote. Cf. also Quine (1979: 268–274, at p. 274*n*9); and Salmon (1998: 92–93*n*).

[10] The original analysis purports to uncover an existential quantifier and the accompanying left-hand conjunct "α ***represents***$_{\mathbf{B}}$ *x*" that were allegedly concealed in (5). The analysis locates the hidden restricted quantifier ultimately in the verb "believes$_R$" for *de re* ("relational") belief. The neo-Fregean contextual-definition reconstruction purports to uncover the same restricted quantifier allegedly concealed in (3) and (3′), locating the hidden quantifier instead ultimately in open "that"-clauses. Either way, as with Russell's contextual definitions for "denoting phrases" (determiner phrases), the restricted quantifier may compete for dominant position with other operators in more complex constructions (e.g., with the negation in "Ralph does not believe Ortcutt to be a spy," or with that in "Ralph does not believe of Ortcutt that he is a spy"), with resulting scope ambiguities. Cf. Kaplan (1969: sec. 11).

Influenced by Kaplan (1969: sec. 11) I argued in Salmon (1991: ch. 8) that all belief attributions—*de dicto* and *de re* alike—involve a hidden restricted existential quantifier, though a rather different one

III

On the neo-Fregean project, one resists Quine's defective bill of goods, and one still gets the discounted price . . . on a different bill of goods. The new bill of goods is the rejection of singular propositions—or the demotion of singular propositions to the status of mere *logical construct*. But Kaplan has since come to like singular propositions. In fact, he loves them. So do I; I'd be nowhere without them. As would Kaplan. Does this mean that there is nothing of value to salvage from the project of "Quantifying In" for the later Kaplan (i.e., for the author of "Opacity"), or for the present me?

It does not. Let there be quantification into nonextensional contexts. Let there be singular propositions. Let Ralph believe of the man seen at time *t*, *de re*, that he is a spy, while doubting *de dicto* that the man Ralph saw at *t* is a spy. Let Ralph do this by believing the singular proposition about the man seen at *t* that he is a spy while disbelieving the general proposition. There is still a problem. For Ralph believes the singular proposition that Ortcutt is a spy precisely *by* believing a (more or less) general proposition, that the man in the brown hat is a spy—just as Kripke's Pierre believes the singular proposition about London that it is pretty by believing that the European city called "*Londres*" is pretty, and George IV believed the singular proposition about Sir Walter Scott that he wrote *Rob Roy* by believing that the author of *Waverley*, whoever he is, also wrote *Rob Roy*. But neither Ralph nor we believe any singular proposition by virtue of believing that the shortest spy is a spy. In particular, we fail to believe the singular proposition about the shortest spy that he or she is a spy. We cannot even apprehend the proposition.[11] Nor do we believe any singular proposition by virtue of believing that the first child to be born in the twenty-second century will be born in the twenty-second century. Nor do we even apprehend any such proposition. And naming that future person "Newman 1" gets us no closer to doing so.[12] There is what Derridean literary theorists would call a *difference-in-between* the two sorts of cases: Walter

from that posited in "Quantifying In." I locate the hidden restricted quantifier ultimately in the verb "believes," hence in the very notion of *de dicto* belief. Cf. Salmon (1998: sec. 4).

[11] Contrary to popular opinion, it does not follow that we cannot even assert the proposition. This is something we easily can do, even if only by introducing a name.

[12] Though doing so does enable us to assert such propositions. See the previous note.

Scott, Ortcutt, and London on the one hand, and the shortest spy and Newman 1 on the other. What is the difference between them? Why can't we cognitively access singular propositions about the shortest spy or Newman 1 in the same way that we access singular propositions about the author of *Waverley*?

One possible answer is that "the man in the brown hat" and "the author of *Waverley*" are ***representing*$_{\mathbf{B}}$** terms, whereas "the shortest spy" and "Newman 1" are not. Question answered, problem solved. If so, "Quantifying In" shows its far-reaching vision by coming to our rescue even in the face of our acceptance of singular propositions. We have a deconstruction of "Quantifying In" and a reconstruction of it, this time neither as a neo-Quinean project nor as a neo-Fregean one, but as neo-Russellian.

Except that not all of these terms can reasonably be called "vivid." ("The man in the brown hat" *vivid*? Surely not.) For this reason, the author of "Quantifying In" should have answered Quine's puzzle question in the negative. Again, this despite the fact that Quine sets out his example with the explicit stipulation that Ortcutt is such that Ralph believes he is a spy. With all due respect to Quine, there is a fact of the matter concerning whether Ralph believes of Ortcutt that he is a spy, and with all due respect to Kaplan, that fact is that he does.

Kaplan's notion of ***representation*$_{\mathbf{B}}$** is, at bottom, a Fregean surrogate, or reasonable facsimile, for Russell's rather austere notion of *knowledge by direct acquaintance*. What is needed is further distance from Russell, by means of an even weaker notion of *representation*. But representation must not be weakened too much; else we fall into the pit of latitudinarianism. Robin Jeshion has recently argued, in effect, that the operative notion of representation consists entirely in a term's being a vivid designator of the relevant object.[13] I believe this suggestion clearly throws the baby out with the bathwater. As already noted, it robs Ralph, King George, and Pierre of their *de re* beliefs. On the other side of the coin, it also ascribes *de re* beliefs where none are to be had, at the precise moment that the descriptions in the shortest spy and Newman 1 cases are artificially enriched just beyond the threshold of vividness.

[13] Jeshion (2002: 53–78). To say that a designator is *vivid* is to say, among other things, that the designatum (if any) is *ipso facto* highly significant or relevant. Jeshion denies that it is a sufficient condition for a belief to be *de re* that its formulation should invoke a rich and detailed description, unless its designatum is ipso facto significant.

Instead, I say we dump vividness and be done with it. I submit that the difference between the two sorts of cases lies in the fact that ''the man in the brown hat'' (or rather its content) is a name *of* Ortcutt (in Kaplan's sense of ''name *of*'') and ''the author of *Waverley*'' is likewise a name *of* Scott, whereas neither ''the shortest spy'' nor ''Newman 1'' is a name *of* its respective designatum. And there we have our solution.[14]

Why did Kaplan include the vividness condition if it is not in fact a necessary condition? He argued as follows:

> . . . if we were to drop [the vividness condition], and allow any name which both denotes *x* and is a name *of x* to represent *x* to Holmes, then after Holmes observed the victim, ''the murderer'' would represent the murderer to him. And thus we would have:
>
> $(\exists\gamma)(\exists\alpha)[\alpha$ ***represents***$_{\mathbf{B}}$ γ to Holmes & Holmes believes $\ulcorner\alpha$ is the murderer$\urcorner]$,
>
> which is our present analysis of:
>
> $(\exists\gamma)$(Holmes believes$_R$ γ to be the murderer)
>
> which is, roughly, Quine's translation of:
>
> There is someone whom Holmes believes to be the murderer.
>
> But this last should presage an arrest and not the mere certification of homicide. [The vividness condition] is intended to block such cases. At some point in his investigation, the slow accretion of evidence, all ''pointing in a certain direction'' may just push Holmes description over the appropriate vividness threshold so that we *would* say that there is now someone whom Holmes believes to be the murderer.[15]

This argument confuses two notions that need to be kept sharply distinct: (*i*) believing of someone, or of some *F*, that he, she, or it is so-and-so (or that he/she/it is the such-and-such); and (*ii*) having a belief as to *whom*

[14] Cf. Donnellan (1977: 45–60, sec. VI, at p. 58); and Salmon (2004). I regret to say that the last I've heard, Kaplan rejects this position, on at least two grounds. First, he evidently believes that naming Newman 1 is sufficient to tear down the cognitive wall that separates us from him or her. Cf. Kaplan (1977: 383–400, at p. 397). Second, Kaplan evidently believes that (5) says something stronger than (3). Specifically, he evidently believes that (5) requires Ralph to be *en rapport* with Ortcutt after all—what I call a *de re connection* of Ralph to Ortcutt—whereas (3) does not. Cf. Kaplan (1989: 565–614, at pp. 605–606*n*95). I disagree on both counts.

[15] Kaplan (1969: sec. 10 = p. 232 of *Words and Objections*). I have altered the notation to make it conform to that of the present essay.

so and so is, or as to what *F* so-and-so is. There is a parallel epistemic distinction between knowing of someone (some *F*) that he or she is so-and-so and knowing *whom* (what *F*) so-and-so is. In neither case does the first notion entail the second. Indeed, it is possible to know of someone that he or she is the such-and-such without having even the slightest opinion whom the such-and-such is. Having witnessed a theft, one may correctly identify the perpetrator in a police line-up while not realizing it is the senior ranking member of the House of Representatives—indeed, while having no belief whatever concerning who the thief is.[16]

Likewise, on examining the victim Holmes is able to deduce much about the murderer, as a prelude to forming a judgment as to the murderer's identity. Among the things that Holmes knows in advance about the murderer is that he is the murderer. To this extent, there is indeed someone whom Holmes believes to be the murderer. There is even someone whom Holmes *knows* to be the murderer—although Holmes has so far, even if only briefly, no judgment concerning who it is. If an arrest is soon to follow, this is due to Holmes's powers of deduction, not ours. A suspect must first be identified. It is possible that Kaplan's notion of vividness speaks to the issue of *having a belief concerning whom* (or *what F*) is so and so. It is a straightforward mistake to infer that it is a condition on *de re* connectedness.

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[16] Cf. Sosa (1970: 890–891) and Salmon (1988: 205–206, and especially 213*n*17).

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