

of the *i*-states to predicate properties to the same thing (the subject) while reducing the number of token *i*-representations. The claim, as I interpret it, is that phenomenal consciousness is unified by a process that involves a reduction in token *i*-representations, which occurs when *i*-states enter the *i*-file.

To return to the initial examples, a subject sees something coming towards it, remembers an encounter, or is aware of its actions. Peacocke proposes that such mental states involve an *i*-notion that has non-conceptual first-person content. He also claims that the unity of phenomenal consciousness depends on the integration of those *i*-states of which the subject becomes aware and that this requires the reduction of *i*-tokens by means of their entry into a subject file (an *i*-file). I have not tried to assess his claim concerning the unity of phenomenal consciousness supervening on the integration of *i*-states. Instead, I have focused on some of his claims and arguments concerning the relevant representations with non-conceptual contents. In this respect, I find that his proposal raises at least as many questions as it answers but that puzzling over Peacocke's view is, as usual, richly rewarding. I have argued that we should remain sceptical of the *i*-notion's existence. But I also think that the intriguing idea of an *i*-notion and the entering of *i*-states into *i*-files helps to bring out a cluster of important questions about the way in which how-things-are-with-a-subject is represented by that subject from a first-person perspective.

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De Se Content and De Hinc Content

BY SUSANNA SCHELLENBERG

In his sweeping and masterful new book, *The Mirror of the World*, Peacocke develops a subtle and elegant account of the subject of consciousness with his characteristic attention to detail and historical perspective.¹ Traditionally there are three classical views of the subject of consciousness: the Cartesian ego, the

1 Peacocke 2014.

Strawsonian person and a broadly Humean construction of various mental and non-mental entities. Against this backdrop, Peacocke develops a radical new way of understanding the subject of consciousness. One key element of this view is a metaphysics-first approach: Peacocke argues for a primitive form of representation of one's location and body, in which more complex and cognitive high-level forms of self-representation are grounded. This primitive level is characterized by representing one's location in relation to other objects without representing oneself as occupying that location. Following the venerable tradition of using Latin for kinds of contents, I will call such contents *de hinc* contents.

In this article, I will take a closer look at the limits of *de hinc* content. I will explore at what point we need first person representation, rather than mere representation of one's location. By examining the transition from *de hinc* content to *de se* content, I will explore to what extent 'here' can feature in the content of a subject's perceptual state without 'I' featuring in that content.² I will argue that perspectival consciousness and the first person perspective can be explained in terms of mental states featuring *de hinc* content, rather than *de se* content.³ In doing so, I will challenge Peacocke's view that for a creature to engage in intentional action and enjoy the first person perspective it is necessary that its mental states feature *de se* content rather than mere *de hinc* content. What is at stake is the extent to which first person representation is needed at all to be a subject of consciousness and to account for the first person perspective.

1. *De hinc content and de se content*

Peacocke distinguishes three degrees of self-representation. At the lowest level, we have a creature at Degree 0. Such a creature is conscious and can represent locations in its surroundings but it does not represent any particular location as 'mine'. So this subject is conscious only of a map of objects that might be marked in various ways, such as by an unlabelled dot, a dot with a name or a dot with a 'here'. In other words, this subject might mark its map in any way that uses names or indexicals so long as it does not use first personal *de se* content. In short, its mental states include states that are characterized by *de hinc* but not *de se* contents.

- 2 On one standard use of '*de se* content' it marks any essentially perspectival content, which would include not just 'I' but equally 'here' and 'now'. My distinction between '*de se*' and '*de hinc*' would, on this use, be regarded as a distinction between first personal *de se* content and locational *de se* content. I am interested in the difference between 'here' and 'I' and am using *de hinc* and *de se* to mark that difference. The reader who thinks of 'here' as *de se* should understand my use of '*de se*' to cover first personal *de se* content as given specifically by 'I' and its cognates.
- 3 The same presumably holds for 'now' and other speaker-centred indexicals, but I will in this article be focusing on 'here'.

At Degree 1, a subject enjoys mental states that have *de se* content but the content is non-conceptual. As Peacocke puts it such contents ‘represent the subject as standing in spatial relations to other objects and events in the spatial world. The subject perceives a tree as in front of him (*de se* content); the sun to his right and so forth. Such *de se* perceptions are often accompanied by perception of the subject’s own body, possibly by internal proprioception, possibly by visual perception of some of the subject’s own body parts’ (35f.).

Finally, a subject at Degree 2 enjoys mental states that are characterized by the conceptual first person. So not only can the subject represent herself, she can moreover represent herself involving concepts referring to the first person, such as ‘I’, ‘me’, ‘mine’ or ‘self’. Thus Peacocke’s three degrees may be understood as follows:

Degree 0 *de hinc* content

Degree 1 non-conceptual *de se* content

Degree 2 conceptual *de se* content

As Peacocke argues, the states characterized by *de hinc* content make possible the states characterized by non-conceptual *de se* content, which in turn make possible the states characterized by conceptual *de se* content.

What are the implications of the idea that a subject can perceive and act by representing *de hinc* content, but without representing *de se* content? According to Peacocke, there are two main implications. One implication is that it undermines Evans’s idea that the indexicals ‘here’, ‘I’ and ‘now’ form a local holism that are each only part of a subject’s mental state if all the other elements are part of as well.⁴ A second implication is that, contra Kant, a creature can have consciousness without self-consciousness. After all, if the above considerations are correct, then a creature can have a conscious perceptual state without representing *de se* content.

What is at issue between Peacocke and me is the capacities of creatures that do not represent any *de se* content, and in particular whether they can engage in intentional bodily action and can have a first person perspective. So I agree with Peacocke that we should recognize that a creature can enjoy consciousness without any kind of self-consciousness. I will suggest, however, that such a creature can have more complex mental states than Peacocke allows. So will argue that we should extend the realm of mental states that are conscious without involving and kind of self-consciousness.

Let’s first take a closer look at Degree 0 creature that represents *de hinc* content without any *de se* content (non-conceptual or conceptual). According to Peacocke, such a creature is part of reality but does not represent itself as such. Such a creature can represent perceptual constancies,

4 See Evans 1982, Sections 6.3, 7.1; for discussion, see Peacocke, p. 34.

such as shape, colour, size, or texture but does not represent anything as standing in certain relations to itself. It can generate a map of the world around itself and moreover it can keep track of where it is on that map. By generating time-indexed maps, representing *de hinc* contents makes it possible to represent how the spatial world changes over time. So *de hinc* contents even allow for memories of how things were at different locations. Those memories, however, have the form ‘that place was φ ’ rather than ‘I was at a place that was φ ’.

To clarify the idea of *de hinc* content, in contrast to *de se* content, consider the following five maps:

- (1) An ‘objective’ or ‘God’s eye’ view map with no dot or other centring information.
- (2) A map with an unlabelled dot.
- (3) A map with a dot that is labelled but not in an indexical way, perhaps even by a name (e.g. ‘Sam’).
- (4) A map with a dot that is labelled with the indexical ‘here’.
- (5) A map with a dot that is labelled with the indexical ‘me’.

It is only at (5) that we have *de se* content of the relevant sort. At (4) we have *de hinc* content. When I speak of a subject who enjoys mental states with *de hinc* content, I mean a subject capable of representing the world using any of maps (1)–(4). A creature that represents *de se* contents can, by contrast, represent itself on such maps as itself. This allows the creature to represent that others are friendly or angry to itself, rather than merely friendly or angry to Sam, or to this place or friendly or angry *tout court*. What is at stake is the extent to which a subject who engages in intentional bodily actions and enjoys a first person perspective on the world around herself needs the sort of *de se* content that arises only at (5).

According to Peacocke, creatures that have only Degree 0 self-representation are very primitive. He writes about them:

This creature has needs and desires, but it does not represent them as its needs and desires. Its needs and desires explain its actions, which consist not in bodily movements, but in such matters as change of color, or electric charge, or the release of chemicals for attack or defence. It absorbs foodstuffs in the liquid as it passes through regions that are nutritious. If it is moved towards a dangerous object, it releases attacking or defensive chemicals. (30)

Moreover, as Peacocke argues of the subject who perceives the world but does not self-represent: ‘The case as described does sever any tight connection between the presence of spatial content in perception and spatial bodily action by the creature. The envisaged creature does not engage in actions that are bodily movements’ (31). To be sure, Peacocke allows some connections between perceptual content and action even for the creature that does

not self-represent. But what he has in mind are actions of a very primitive sort:

When our creature releases some chemical because it is very close to an object of a certain shape, where such objects are recognized as dangerous, the action of releasing the substance is explained under the description 'release when close to an object of such-and-such shape', and indeed under the relational description 'release because close to that object of such-and-such shape'. (30)

We are more complex than such creatures and arguably at least some of our mental states have *de se* content:⁵ we eat rather than absorb food by passing through nutritious regions; we react in complex and varied ways when we come near an object of danger rather than merely releasing chemicals for attack or defence; and we enjoy what we hear, see, and smell.

My central question for Peacocke is why a Degree 0 subject cannot do more, including engaging in intentional bodily action and enjoying the first person perspective. I will argue that (1) even quite sophisticated perceptual states have only *de hinc* rather than *de se* content, and that (2) these perceptual states are sufficient for accounting for intentional bodily action and the first person perspective. First, I will defend the claim that sophisticated perceptual states have mere *de hinc* but not *de se* content. I will do so by outlining a view of perception that makes use of *situation-dependent properties* together with representations of a 'here' from which one both perceives objects and would act in relation to objects were one to act. This 'here' is of course the subject's own location. My point is that *it need not be marked as such* in order for perceptual states to guide intentional action. In light of this, I will argue that *de hinc* content (in conjunction with the perceptual capacities employed) is sufficient to account for the first person perspective. In short, no appeal to *de se* content is necessary to account for the first person perspective.

To clarify, I am *not* claiming that perceptual states cannot have *de se* content. There are reasons to believe that we can perceive ourselves as ourselves and that we can perceive ourselves as standing in relation to other objects. My claim is rather that perceptual states can, and typical do, lack *de se* content, including in quite sophisticated cases involving perceptual states of objects as being in three-dimensional space, and that bodily actions that these perceptual states yield need not involve *de se* content.

2. *Egocentric frames of reference and de hinc content*

Despite the fact that one perceives objects from a location and so in an egocentric frame of reference, one can nonetheless perceive perspective-

5 Though for a view that holds otherwise, see Cappelen and Dever 2013. See Ninan Forthcoming for a critical discussion.

independent shapes and sizes and moreover one can still see objects as three-dimensional space occupiers. For instance, one can perceive a coin as circular, even if one does not see it from directly above. One can perceive same-sized objects located at different distances from oneself as same-sized. And one can perceive objects as having rear sides despite being visually confronted only with facing surfaces. More generally one perceives the intrinsic spatial properties of objects, even though what is immediately perceptually available is only the ways objects are presented in one's egocentric frame of reference. By *intrinsic properties* I mean the perceivable properties that an object has that are independent of a perceiver's location. For the present discussion the most salient intrinsic properties are the shapes and sizes of objects. The way an object is presented in a perceiver's egocentric frame of reference is determined by the intrinsic properties of the object and the location of the perceiver. If the way an object is presented is recognized as being external and mind-independent, it can be analysed in terms of properties the object has, namely *situation-dependent properties*. Situation-dependent properties are properties of the object given the perceiver's location. They are a function of the object's intrinsic properties and the perceiver's location.⁶

If it is right that one always perceives objects from a particular location, but nonetheless can perceive their intrinsic properties, then an explanation is needed for how this is possible. So let's consider in more detail what is required for spatial perception. To perceive perspective-independent shapes and sizes and to perceive objects as three-dimensional space occupiers, a subject needs spatial understanding that allows her to transition from egocentric frames of reference to allocentric frames of reference. I will argue that moving from egocentric to allocentric frames of reference requires that the subject represent her location in space to abstract from this location. Call this *the self-location thesis*. What is in question is whether *de hinc* content suffices for such self-location or whether *de se* content is needed. I will argue that such self-location requires mere *de hinc* content without any *de se* content.

The cognitively most minimal way to represent one's location in space is as the vantage point from which one is currently perceiving and from which one would act in relations to objects were one to act.⁷ Such self-location allows one to abstract from one's particular vantage point and gain an understanding of space as containing different possible perspectives for perception and action. By having a practical understanding of space as containing different possible perspectives for perception and action, the subject gains the capacity to transcend her egocentric predicament and recognize that how things appear from her perspective does not exhaust how things are. Rather objects

6 I develop the notion of situation-dependent properties and argue for the thesis that perception is a three-place relation between subjects, objects and situations, rather than a two-place relation between subjects and object in Schellenberg 2008.

7 See Schellenberg 2007 and 2010 for a detailed defence of this thesis.

have perspective-independent, intrinsic properties that ground their situation-dependent properties. It is because the coin is intrinsically circular that it has the situation-dependent properties of *appearing in this way to a perceiver from this perspective* and *appearing in that way to a perceiver from that perspective*. The perceptual system is then tasked with the job of gleaning backwards to the ground and recovering the intrinsic property as the ground for a whole range of situation-dependent properties.

To represent her location in this way, the subject needs to represent both her actual present location and her bodily orientation, and this requires a map with a point of origin and axes relative to the body. These axes are determined by our *dispositions to act* that bring about a *practical* understanding of basic spatial directions. The idea is related to Evans's thought that an understanding of spatial directions is not simply related to the place we occupy but is related rather to the possibilities for action that one has given the way one occupies that location. When I tilt my head, I do not see objects on the verge of sliding off the surface of the earth. The reference of 'up' is not determined by the direction of my head but rather by how I would move my body given the position of my body.⁸ One needs at least an understanding of what it would mean, say, to reach out to a glass to perceive it as within reach. Likewise, one needs an understanding of what it would mean to move one's body upwards to understand the spatial direction of up.

A different way of articulating the same idea is that one must be able to create what could be called an intentional web that is recentered as one changes one's position in space. The intentional web is determined by the directions and distances one would move were one to come in contact with the objects around oneself.⁹ A creature that has this capacity need not *actually* relocate. Nor does it need to know how precisely its dispositions to act would change were it to occupy a different location. It must only be able to entertain the possibility of relocating and remapping its spatial orientation. So it must only be able to entertain the possibility of adapting its dispositions to perform bodily movements to potential changes of its location.

The origin and axes of one's perceptual map change as the spatial relations between oneself and the perceived objects change, and these changes allow one to represent one's location in relation to these objects. Through changes in perception brought about by changes in the spatial relations to objects one can triangulate back to one's location. If this is right, then perception alone or action alone cannot be sufficient to gain the self-location necessary for

⁸ Evans attributes this thought to Taylor (1964).

⁹ Peacocke expresses a similar thought when he says that perception involves perspectival sensitivity (1983: 67). On his view, dispositions to perform bodily movements change as one's spatial relations to perceived objects change. This is just to say that one's behaviour displays perspectival sensitivity insofar as it is spatially dependent on the particular perceptions one has.

perception of objects as three-dimensional space occupiers. These considerations bring out not only how self-location comes about but also what is represented. One represents one's location as the vantage point of perception and the location from which changes in perception are registered that are brought about through changes in the spatial relations to perceived objects.

I have argued that perceiving the intrinsic spatial properties of objects requires moving from egocentric to allocentric frames of reference. Moving from egocentric to allocentric frames of reference in turn requires representing one's location so as to abstract from that location. The cognitively most minimal way to represent one's location is as the location from which one both perceives objects and acts in relation to these objects were one to act.

I am now ready to come to the crucial question of how the origin and axes of the perceptual map are represented. The argument presented does not assume that representing one's location involves any kind of self-representation. The idea is rather that one represents one's location in a dual mode: as both the point of origin of perception, and as the point of origin for bodily movement. Nothing in the requirement of having an origin and axes on the perceptual map requires any *de se* representation of the origin point via 'I'. All that is required is that there be some such origin and axes, and that they are available for perception and action to operate on as relevant locations and orientations. It is the locational and not the first-personal aspect – the 'here' and the associated 'up', 'down', 'left' and 'right' – that matters. Although this 'here' is to be understood as the place where the subject is, the subject does not represent this place as 'the place where I am'. So the 'here' in a *de hinc* content is simply a representation of the subject's location in relation to other particulars in the vicinity. Thus *de se* content is not necessary for a subject to enjoy perceptual states with sophisticated spatial content that allows it to intentionally act in relation to its surrounding. What is required is *de hinc* content.

So I say that (1) even quite sophisticated perceptual states have mere *de hinc* rather than *de se* content and (2) these perceptual states are sufficient for accounting for intentional bodily actions. After all, we have such perceptual states, and we act, and these perceptual states play a role in accounting for our bodily actions.

Peacocke acknowledges that creatures at Degree 0 perceive perceptual constancies. So he would not disagree with me that they perceive what I have called intrinsic properties. But he denies that they can engage in bodily actions: 'The envisaged creature does not engage in actions that are bodily movements' (31). So Peacocke argues that only creatures with non-conceptual or conceptual *de se* content engage in bodily actions. By contrast, I have argued the capacity to act and the capacity to perceive three-dimensional space-occupiers come packaged together and should be acknowledged as available even to Degree 0 creatures. Second and perhaps more deeply, while Peacocke thinks that spatial representation and *de hinc* content is

possible without the capacity to act, I say that the very capacity for spatial representation already presupposes the capacity to act (and to perceive). Hence on my view the capacities for spatial representation, perception, and action come bundled together, and neither can be accounted for without the others.

3. *Perspectival consciousness without de se contents*

Peacocke not only distinguishes between three degrees of self-representation but also between three kinds of self-consciousness: the perspectival, the reflective, and the interpersonal. Perspectival self-consciousness goes beyond the minimal capacity of having mental states that involve *de se* content in that the subject has a third person perspective on herself. Reflective self-consciousness involves the subject's state being self-reflexive. Interpersonal self-consciousness involves featuring oneself in another person's consciousness.

I will focus here on perspectival self-consciousness, so let's take a closer look at what it amounts to. As Peacocke understands it:

a necessary condition for perspectival self-consciousness is the capacity to come to know propositions of the form *I'm φ* , for some range of concepts φ that are not anchored in the subject. When a subject meets this condition with respect to such a concept, I say the subject is perspectively self-conscious with respect to that concept'. (195)

So a subject who is perspectively self-conscious is a subject who is 'capable of knowing he falls under concepts for which his fundamental understanding is not given in terms of what it is for him to fall under them' (196).

In this sense, a subject who enjoys perspectival self-consciousness is a subject who can take a third person perspective on himself. In the rest of this article, I will argue that many of the phenomena that Peacocke discusses as kinds of perspectival self-consciousness can be understood as kinds of perspectival consciousness and indeed as lacking any kind of *de se* element. More generally, I will suggest that we should make room for perspectival consciousness that does not amount to perspectival *self*-consciousness and so we should make room for a notion of the first person perspective that does not include any kind of *de se* element.

I should say immediately that Peacocke does not argue that there cannot be perspectival consciousness that does not amount to perspectival self-consciousness. His examples, however, leave a large gap between creatures at Degree 0 and creatures that enjoy perspectival self-consciousness. According to Peacocke the Degree 0 creature is moved around in liquid, absorbs food in the liquid, and when under threat releases attacking or defensive chemicals (30). Arguably, a lot of our conscious states require neither *de se* content nor perspectival self-consciousness yet are significantly more sophisticated than the way that Peacocke describes the mental states of

creatures at Degree 0. Indeed, a whole range of complex actions and perceptions are arguably characterized by perspectival consciousness without including any kind of self-consciousness, and so without including any kind of *de se* element.

Without further ado, let's look at specific examples. Peacocke argues that 'the understanding-conditions for the concepts pain and experience of red' make 'special reference to the first person application of the concept' (195). But arguably a creature can experience pain without experiencing that *it* is in pain. Were we to deny this, we would have to say that any animal that experiences pain must also have the capacity for perspectival self-consciousness and so the capacity to represent *de se* content. But arguably many non-rational animals do not have the capacity to represent *de se* content but nonetheless do experience pain.¹⁰

More generally, we can say that while any mental state needs to be possessed by someone, a creature can have a mental state and be in a state of consciousness determined by the content of that mental state without being aware that *it* has that mental state. So a creature can be in pain and so be experiencing pain without representing itself as experiencing pain. I see no reason to deny that a creature can be aware of pain in its toe without being aware that it is experiencing that pain. The very same thing can be said about the experience of red.

Now, as Peacocke acknowledges, many spatial concepts can be analysed without attributing the exercise of self-consciousness to the subject who employs those concepts. He considers the judgments *That chair is more than a foot from me* and *I am in front of a house* and argues 'the rationality of making a specifically first person ascription in these cases is adequately explained by the conditions for something to be my body, and the fact that, for example for *That chair is more than a foot from me* to be true is for it to be the case that *That chair is more than a foot from my body*' (199). For this reason, Peacocke holds that such judgements do not involve perspectival self-consciousness. The subject is not taking a third person perspective on herself, but is rather taking no more than a first person perspective on herself. Arguably, the very same thing could be said of experiences of red and pain. Moreover, we can take this a step further and say that such experiences do not even include taking a first person perspective on oneself and so do not include a *de se* element.

If it is right that such perceptions do not include any kind of *de se* element, surely one has some sort of first person perspective in perception. If not *de se* content, what accounts for this first person perspective? As I argued above, one critical element is the location of the perceiver and the *de hinc* content represented. But location is not sufficient to constitute a first person perspective. If it were, everything that would be located would have a first person

¹⁰ See Smith and Lewin (2009).

perspective. *De hinc* content in conjunction with location is not sufficient either. After all, two distinct perceivers can perceive the same scene in different ways, even if they occupy the very same location. Indeed the same perceiver can perceive the very same scene in different ways while occupying the very same location. What else do we need to account for the first person perspective without introducing a *de se* element?

One possible approach is to argue that perceptual experience is fundamentally a matter of employing perceptual capacities from a particular location by means of which we single out particulars in our environment. The relevant perceptual capacities are low-level discriminatory capacities that function to discriminate, single out and in some cases type the particulars in our environment. So for example if I possess the perceptual capacity *red*, I am in a position to discriminate instances of red from other colours in my surrounding and to single out instances of red.¹¹

Understanding perceptual experience in this way accounts for both an external and an internal element of the first person perspective. The external element is constituted by the location of the perceiver and the particulars singled out, that is, objects, events, and property-instances. The internal element is constituted by the perceptual capacities employed. Employing perceptual capacities does not include any kind of *de se* content. After all, such capacities are low-level mental capacities to discriminate particulars in one's surrounding and as such are directed exclusively at those mind-independent, external particulars. In this sense, understanding perceptual experience as fundamentally a matter of employing perceptual capacities from a particular location allows for an elegant way of accounting for the first person perspective without including any kind of *de se* content. This is desirable since accounting for the first person perspective in terms of *de se* content would over-intellectualize perception. After all, many creatures enjoy sophisticated perceptions without having the capacity to represent *de se* content. Giving an analysis of more high-level perceptions without appealing to any kind of *de se* content allows us, moreover, to give an account of human perceptions that do not include any kind of self-representation.

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¹¹ For a detailed development of such an account of perception, see Schellenberg 2011 and 2014.

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The Nature and Role of First and Second Person Content

BY CHRISTOPHER PEACOCKE

Naomi Eilan's comments raise some fundamental issues. I hold that for creatures at Level 1 and above, their perceptual states have a first person, *de se* content. Eilan holds that my position on the *de se* content of perceptual awareness is incompatible with the position stated by Evans in this passage from *The Varieties of Reference*:

... a subject can know he is in front of a house simply by perceiving a house. Certainly what he perceives comprises no element corresponding to 'I' in the judgment 'I am in front of a house': he is simply aware of a house. (Evans 1982: 232)

There is no incompatibility. Evans's claim is about what the subject perceives. That is a claim about the objects of perception, something concerning the level of reference, rather than the level of intentional content, here understood as the level of the way in which things are given in such a perception. The crucial point in dissipating any sense of incompatibility is that an intentional content (a notion) can feature in the representational content of a