Abstract.
This paper explores the usefulness of the 'ethical matrix', proposed by Ben Mepham, as a tool in technology assessment, specifically in food ethics. We consider what the matrix is, how it might be useful as a tool in ethical decision-making, and what drawbacks might be associated with it. We suggest that it is helpful for fact-finding in ethical debates relating to food ethics; but that it is much less helpful in terms of weighing the different ethical problems that it uncovers. Despite this drawback, we maintain that, with some modifications, the ethical matrix can be a useful tool in debates in food ethics. We argue that useful modifications might be to include future generations amongst the stakeholders in the matrix, and to substitute the principle of solidarity for the principle of justice.
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Notes
Virtue ethics, an approach which has seen a revival over the past decades has not been included explicitly, although one could argue that 'justice' being one of the cardinal virtues also represents virtue ethics.
For an extensive bibliography of debates on technology assessment, see Gethmann and Grunwald (1996).
These five comments were not chosen randomly by us but selected by Ben Mepham as 'Comments on the matrix' (Mepham, 2001:7). For the remainder of the article, we shall disregard the comment that the matrix is useful for education purposes, as we are interested in classical technology assessment, which is not directly related to education. All comments relate to the use of the ethical matrix in public participation exercises. Although one of us (DS) was involved in an expert committee that used the matrix, not enough comments from other expert committees were available to include this form of technology assessment.
Painful inflammation of the udder.
Bovine somatotrophin is being used widely in dairy cattle in the United States, but its use is prohibited within the European Union.
Baier (1965:150–162) gives a partial answer in that he argues for the superiority of moral reasons over considerations of self-interest. Increased farming profits following the introduction of BST would only outweigh animal suffering if animals were excluded from the moral sphere. If animal suffering counted as a morally relevant fact, BST could not be rationally justified according to Baier's 'best reasons morality'.
This, to some extent, resembles the approach taken by Donald Van De Veer in 'Interspecific justice' (1979).
For a good comment on deliberative democracy, see Robert Goodin 'Democratic deliberation within' (2000). Clearly, difficulties arise in this analysis both with respect to what constitutes stakeholders—can the environment be thought of as a stakeholder?—and also concerning how to deal with those one might definitely want to include as stakeholders (e.g. animals and children) but who are unable to enter deliberative discourse themselves. These issues obviously require further investigation.
Although it has been argued that future persons 'have no rights against present persons nor, therefore, any rights that present persons save or conserve anything for them' (Steiner, 2002:295), this does not mean that future persons' interests should not be taken into consideration. It simply means that nothing as strong as rights can be ascribed to them, as rights—according to Steiner—necessitate correlativity, which, in principle is not given between present and future persons. (The same lack of correlativity applies to the relationship between humans on the one hand and animals and the environment on the other hand).
Ben Mepham suggested this to one of us as the reason for limiting principles.
This, of course, poses a difficulty for those who believe that an ethical theory is about a method rather than principles. For instance, if one believed that consequentialism is essentially about maximising of a chosen principle rather than the principle itself, one is already at a loss as to what should be included in the matrix.
A theory of justice deals with questions of national distributive justice, whilst The law of peoples deals with international distributive justice. However, the tensions described do not simply arise because of the different contexts, they could just as well arise within the national sphere only.
Solidarity is not included amongst Aristotle's list of virtues in the Nicomachean ethics, but it can be understood as a 'sister virtue' of generosity, for two reasons. First solidarity requires sacrifice for the benefit of others, i.e. giving to others, as does generosity. Hence, both fall under the genus 'benevolence'. Second, although it might appear that solidarity requires a broader set of beneficiaries—in its universal form even humankind—one would not normally call a person generous if s/he was generous in a very selective way. Hence, both virtues involve giving to others without prejudice and selectivity. The only difference between the two is that solidarity comes with a pre-determined reason for generosity, namely fellow feeling, whereas generosity as such can be undertaken from a variety of motives (e.g. a belief in egalitarianism, a wish to create happiness for others).
See, for instance, Val Plumwood's argument for the importance of solidarity in 'Deep ecology, deep pockets and deep problems: a feminist ecosocialist analysis' (2000).
An example will clarify this point. A person (A) is presented with two men, one highly malnourished (X), one in the possession of reasonable supplies of food (Y). Alas, Y refuses to give any food to X. Judging this situation without any further information, A can reasonably come to the conclusion that Y is not blessed with the virtue of solidarity (assuming that the food is not needed for others who are malnourished or starving). On the other hand, A cannot yet proclaim on whether Y is just or not. It is possible that there are just reasons for Y's refusal to share food with X. Since Aristotle, justice requires identical cases to be treated identically. If, for instance, X has in the past—due to sheer laziness—stolen food from Y leaving Y malnourished, Y can justly refuse to give food to X. In that case, X has no right to food from the point of view of justice. However, from the point of view of solidarity, Y might still—despite X's past deeds—feel the obligation to share food with him.
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Parts of this paper were presented at the 2002 public meeting of the Society for Applied Philosophy, UK, as well as at a colloquium at the European Academy for the Study of the Consequences of Scientific and Technological Advances, Germany. We would like to thank participants for their comments. We are also grateful to Miltos Liakopoulos for comments on an earlier draft, and to Ruth Chadwick, Ben Mepham, and Michiel Korthals for discussions about the 'ethical matrix'.
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Schroeder, D., Palmer, C. Technology assessment and the 'ethical matrix'. Poiesis Prax 1, 295–307 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10202-003-0027-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10202-003-0027-4