Abstract
In this article, I explain how and why different attempts to defend absolute divine simplicity fail. A proponent of absolute divine simplicity has to explain why different attributions do not suppose a metaphysical complexity in God but just one superproperty, why there is no difference between God and His super-property and finally how a absolute simple entity can be the truthmaker of different intrinsic predications. It does not necessarily lead to a rejection of divine simplicity but it shows that we may consider another conception of divine simplicity compatible with some metaphysical complexity in God.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Bacon J. (1995) Universals and property instances: The alphabet of being. Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford
Bergmann M., Brower J. (2006) A theistic argument against platonism (and in support of truthmakers and divine simplicity). Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 2: 357–386
Brower J. (2008) Making sense of divine simplicity. Faith and Philosophy 25(1): 3
Brower, J. (2009). Simplicity and aseity. In T. Flint & M. Rea (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophical theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Campbell, K. (1981/2002). The metaphysics of abstract particular. In D. H. Mellor & A. Oliver (Eds.), Properties. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Funkhouser E. (2006) The determinable-determinate relation. Noûs 40(3): 548–569
Hughes C. (1989) On a complex theory of a simple God: An investigation in Aquinas’ philosophical theology. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY
Leftow B. (1990) Is God an abstract object?. Noûs 24(4): 581–598
Lowe E.J. (2006) The four-category ontology: A metaphysical foundation for natural science. Clarendon Press, Oxford
Marion J.-L. (1991) God without being. University of Chicago Press, Chicago
Marion J.-L. (2001) The idol and distance: Five studies. Fordham University Press, New York
Mertz D.W. (2006) Essays on realist instance ontology and its logic. OntosVerlag, Frankfurt
Plantinga A. (1980) Does God have a nature?. Marquette University Press, Milwaukee
Prior A.N. (1949) Determinables, determinates and determinants. Mind 58(229): 1–20
Rodriguez-Pereyra G. (2002) Resemblance nominalism: A solution to the problem of universals. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Simons P. (1994) Particulars in particular clothing: Three trope theories of substance. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54(3): 553–575
Wolterstorff N. (1991) Divine simplicity. Philosophical Perspectives 5: 531–552
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Schmitt, Y. The deadlock of absolute divine simplicity. Int J Philos Relig 74, 117–130 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-012-9336-7
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-012-9336-7