The Shocking *Non Sequitur*

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ABSTRACT: Analytic philosophy and phenomenology represent two major movements in the study of the mind. Both developed in the twentieth century, having roots that go back well before. Even though the two schools of thought have been in dialogue in the past, they are currently at an impasse. In this paper, I examine the origin of this impasse and suggest that at a crucial point in the conversation, right when the issues were clearly articulated and there was broad agreement on the key questions, analytic philosophy abruptly changed the subject. Early analytic philosophers, like Carnap and Schlick, sought to establish a sharp distinction between the objective content of one's claims and beliefs and what is merely subjective or perspectival. Phenomenologists denied this distinction. When efforts to defend the distinction failed, analytic philosophy took the distinction to be obvious and in no need of defense. I call this a shocking *non sequitur*.

WE CAN THINK OF contemporary Western philosophical discourses about the mind as falling into two broad categories: analytic and phenomenological. This split, which is much older than either analytic philosophy or phenomenology, can be traced back to Kant's critique of Leibniz, if not before. The purpose of this paper is to chronicle some of the interactions between these two different approaches to the mind. My account will clearly not be very detailed; however, a broad perspective has certain advantages. There are some things in history that are hard to see because they are too close. In such cases, it can help to take a step back and look at the big picture with fresh eyes. This is my goal in this paper. The two traditions that I will discuss have come to an impasse in their interactions. History can give us a critical distance necessary to see our way through it. I will suggest that at a certain point in the dialogue, right when the dispute between the two traditions was most clearly defined and the stakes were well understood, one side broke off the conversation. It did so by misinterpreting both itself and the other side. This interruption in the conversation, or *non sequitur*, has not been widely recognized. We are still too close to it to see it.

I will begin with a brief discussion of phenomenology as it is typically understood in analytic philosophy today. Phenomenology is invoked in the study of the conscious feeling of what it is like to have an experience, for example, the experience of tasting vegemite for the first time. Phenomenological questions are contrasted with psychological questions about our cognitive capacities. It is often supposed that in principle cognitive science, neurology, and related fields can explain our cognitive processes, thoughts, beliefs, desires, etc. Thus, as Jackendoff describes it, science addresses the computational mind-body problem, that is, the problem of the relation between the computational mind and the brain.[1] Such tractable problems are

[1]Ray Jackendoff, *Consciousness and the Computational Mind* (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1987).

typically contrasted with the so called "hard problem" of explaining consciousness. Jackendoff describes this as the problem of understanding the relation between the computational mind and the phenomenological mind. It is thought that *prima facie* there is an explanatory gap between any cognitive/computational account of cognition and what would be needed to explain one's conscious experience, for example, one's subjective sense of the color blue or the taste of honey.[2] Cognitive science and neurology seem, on the face of it, to be unable to account for why our conscious experiences have the particular qualitative character they do. A variety of thought experiments are used to get at this explanatory gap. For example, Jackson describes a neuroscientist, Mary, who learns all about the neurology of color vision but does not ever see colors. He suggests that there is something Mary doesn't know, namely, what it is like to see colors.[3] If science helps us to explain the relation between the computational mind and the brain, then we need a different methodology to help us to understand the relation between the computational mind and consciousness. Phenomenology is often invoked in this regard. It is thought to help us articulate a more difficult problem, the hard problem of explaining consciousness. In particular, phenomenology is thought of as providing the data that any complete account of the mind would have to explain. Philosophers like Dennett (who replaces phenomenology with what he calls "heterophenomenology") are often accused of ignoring the phenomenological data of consciousness that are uniquely accessible from a first-person perspective and thus require a first-personal methodology like phenomenology. Dennett is happy to explain why we give various reports on the contents of our consciousness, but he will not adopt a methodology that requires him to assume that such reports provide the data to be explained.[4] In the context of debates with Dennett, phenomenology often amounts to little more than the method of introspection. Do we or don't we have to account for some supposed data of introspection? In effect, debates around the hard problem of consciousness often turn on the status of the reports of introspection. Drawing on the history of the philosophy of mind, I will suggest that this way of conceiving of the problem of consciousness and the nature of phenomenology is far from philosophically neutral. It badly misconstrues the point and purpose of the phenomenological tradition and the problems with which it grapples. Husserl's method of phenomenology had very little to do with introspection.[5] But our story begins much earlier (well before phenomenology) with Kant's critique of Leibniz.

According to Kant, our empirical knowledge comes from two fundamental sources, the sensibility and the understanding.[6] It is important to Kant that the two

[2]David Chalmers, *The Conscious Mind* (New York NY: Oxford, 1996).

[3]Frank Jackson, "Epiphenomenal Qualia," *Philosophical Quarterly* 32 (1982): 127–36.

[4]Daniel Dennett, *Consciousness Explained* (Boston MA: Little, Brown, and Company, 1991).

[5]Introspection provides *a posteriori* information about the content of what we experience. But phenomenology is the study of the formal structure of our intentionality. For example, see Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to Phenomenological Philosophy*, trans. F. Kersten (Boston, MA: Kluwer, 1983).

[6]Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. N. K. Smith (New York, NY: St Martin's Press, 1965), A50/B74. Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (CPR) is customarily cited by pages of the first (A) and second (B) German editions of 1781 and 1787 respectively. My citations of Kant will follow this format.

be sharply distinguished. This is often his primary way of differentiating his view from the views of those who have come before him, particularly Leibniz. According to Kant, Leibniz's error was to ignore the essential and irreducible role played by the sensibility in human (as opposed to divine) perception.[7] Leibniz treated perception as if it were merely confused intellection, i.e., an imperfect operation of the understanding rather than a separate source of representations.[8] Kant thus accused Leibniz of *intellecualizing appearances*.

What precisely was it that led Kant to make this charge? Ultimately, the charge was directed at Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles. According to Kant, "Leibniz took the appearances for things in themselves, and so for intelligibilia, i.e., objects of the pure understanding . . . and on that assumption his principle of the identity of indiscernibles (*principium identitatis indiscernibilium*) certainly could not be disputed."[9] In effect, Kant criticized Leibniz for believing that a complete, purely qualitative description of the world tells us all the empirical facts there are to know about the world. For example, for Leibniz, to know where an object is, one need only know its relation to other objects. Against this Kant maintained that the sensibility makes possible differences in the empirical world that cannot be derived from the content of one's perceptions. For example, Kant rejected Leibniz's view of space. For Leibniz, there is nothing more to know about the location of an object once one knows the relation between that object and all other objects. For Kant, there is something more to know. Locating an object in space requires more than just locating it relative to other objects.[10] Kant rejected the view that the location or identity of an object can be fixed by giving a description of the object and its relation to other *things*.

The reason that appearances cannot be things in themselves for Kant is that things in themselves do not depend for their identity, shape, or location merely on one's subjectively oriented sense of where there are. But empirical objects do. This point is made clearest in Kant's discussion of our knowledge of left and right in his essay "What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking?"[11] We look up at the sky and see the locations of the stars in the sky. In doing this, we clearly have different beliefs than we would have if the sky looked like it does when seen in a mirror. There is an empirical difference between the world's being as it is and as it would be if seen in a mirror. But one's knowledge that the world is as it actually is, rather than as it would be if left and right were reversed, is not derived from the content of one's sensible intuitions. The difference between these two possibilities cannot be located purely in some mind-independent state of affairs that one observes, nor is it merely a subjective difference. The distinction between some supposed objective, perspective-free content of one's thought and a perspectival component breaks down when it comes to our knowledge

[7]CPR A271/B327.

[8]CPR A270/B326.

[9]CPR A264/B320.

[10]For Kant, space is not itself another object in the world as an absolutist about space like Newton held.

[11]Immanuel Kant, "What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking?" [hereafter "What"] in *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, ed. Allen Wood and George di Giovanni (Cambridge UK: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003).

of left and right. In other words, for Kant, if the world could (contrary to fact) be seen from no particular point of view (which would be possible if perception were a pure act of the understanding, as Leibniz thought), then there would be no difference between its being as it is and as it would be if reflected in a mirror. If Kant is right, then the difference between the world's being as it is and as it would be if reflected in the mirror cannot be located on either side of the distinction between objective and subjective/perspectival. The *content* of our visual and tactile sensible intuitions of a glove does not, by itself, determine whether the glove is right or left. For these sorts of judgments, space and time, the forms of sensible intuition, are also needed. This is surprising because space and time are *forms* of sensible intuition, not part of its matter or content. Nevertheless, they broaden the number of *empirical* distinctions that we are capable of drawing. In other words, some of the distinctions that we draw between states of affairs are partially constituted not by the content or matter of our sensible intuitions but by contingently discovered features of their presentational *form*. The forms of the sensibility expand the horizon of possible empirically distinct ways that we could discover the world to be. This would not be possible if we could adopt the view from nowhere and abstract the objective content of our beliefs from what is merely perspectival, which we would be able to do if perception were a pure act of the understanding and if appearances were things in themselves.

If Kant is right, then the world as we actually experience it is fundamentally different from how it would be if we could view the world from no particular point of view. This is the reason that Liebniz is wrong to individuate worlds purely by description. On Leibniz's view, the location of an object in space is a function of its relation to other objects in space and nothing else. Kant's critique of Leibniz on this point is thus linked to Kant's claim that the view from nowhere is incoherent, that is, that there is no abstracting the objective content of one's beliefs from some supposed perspectival component of belief. These issues are not merely of academic concern for Kant. They directly bear on the basic goals of Kant's work. One way to put the basic point of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is say that Kant sought to limit the pretenses of reason in order to make room for faith.[12] He wanted to open up space for the possibility that one's heart might have the right to lead one to accept what one's senses could neither confirm nor deny. He aimed to achieve this by introducing transcendental idealism, which entails that the purely subjective forms of sensible intuition play an essential role in making possible differences in the empirical world. It was crucial to Kant to deny that all one's objective discoveries about the world (specifically discoveries about spatial locations of objects) could be derived from the content of one's sensible intuitions. One's knowledge of space is made possible in part by one's subjective feeling of the difference between one's right hand and one's left, a feeling that "displays no outward designatable difference in intuition."[13] This provides a paradigm for us in thinking about navigating in the darkness, both literally and metaphorically. Reason can be guided by a subjective sense of God even if it cannot have definite knowledge of God. Our knowledge of

[12]Cf. CPR Bxxx: "I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for *faith*."
[13]Kant, "What," p. 4.

what is morally and spiritually higher is akin to our knowledge of left and right. In both cases one's subjective oriented sense can guide reason as it goes beyond what we have any objective grounds for believing:

> This geographical concept of the procedure of orientation can be broadened to purely mathematical orientation so as to include orientation in any given space. In the dark I orient myself in a familiar room when I can seize on a single object whose position I remember. Here obviously nothing helps me except the capacity of determining positions by a subjective ground of distinction. . . . Finally I can broaden this concept even more, since it consists in the ability to orient myself not merely in space (i.e., mathematically) but in thought as such (i.e., logically). One can easily guess by analogy that this kind of orientation will be the business of pure reason in directing its use when, starting from known objects of experience, it tries to extend itself beyond all boundaries of experience, finding no object of intuition but merely space for it. For it is then no longer capable of bringing its judgments, in the determination of its own faculty of judgment, under a definite maxim according to objective grounds of knowledge; it can do so only by a subjective ground of distinction. This subjective means which remains is nothing else than the feeling of a need belonging to reason.[14]

Ultimately what Kant finds in the darkness with only his subjectively oriented sense to guide him is God. Kant was at pains to establish our right to believe despite the fact that we cannot have any objective grounds for belief: "The right of a need of reason enters as the right of a subjective ground to presuppose and assume something which it may not pretend to know on objective grounds. Thus there is the right to orient one's self by reason's own need in thinking in the space of the supersensuous, which is for us immeasurable and as if filled with impenetrable darkness."[15]

Perhaps the movement most directly opposed to the Kantian claims just sketched is logical positivism. Kant's questions were extremely important to the positivists and were recognizably theological. For the logical positivists, it was essential to draw precisely the distinction between objective content and one's oriented feel for where things are that Kant denied. This distinction made possible the two central goals of logical positivism: (1) to provide a secure foundation for the sciences, and (2) to demonstrate the meaninglessness of all metaphysics, including belief in God.[16] Providing a secure foundation for the sciences required finding a way to abstract the objective content of scientific claims from that which is merely subjective. Once this sharp separation had been established, everything subjective—such as one's oriented feel for where things are, one's emotions, and one's belief in God—could be seen as independent of and ultimately irrelevant to the claims of science. In the last analysis, the only meaningful claims one could make would either be empirical or else merely analytic. Our religious and metaphysical beliefs are neither. From a Kantian perspective, the crucial claim that the logical positivists made was to deny our right to be guided by our oriented or subjective feeling in forming metaphysical

[14]Ibid., pp. 4–5.

[15]Ibid., p. 6.

[16]Hans Hahn, Otto Neurath, and Rudolf Carnap, "The Scientific Conception of the World Circle" in *Empiricism and Sociology*, ed. Marie Neurath and Robert S. Cohen (Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel, 1929).

beliefs about God, absolute good, and freedom of the will. All such seeming beliefs are really just confused and amount to nothing.[17] The positivists' objective would be achieved by clearly distinguishing between the objective, conceptualizable content of our claims and anything subjective or metaphysical.

So, how did the positivists go about defending this distinction? In precisely the way that Kant anticipated, the logical positivists, particularly Carnap in *Aufbau*, self-consciously adopted a broadly Leibnizian defense of the distinction. In doing so, they focused on the same features of the world that Kant did in his critique of Leibniz. The basic thesis of *Aufbau* is that all contents could be shown to be objective by being reduced to purely structural claims. This, in effect, is the view that Kant criticized Leibniz for holding. Here is what Carnap says:

> It becomes clear from the preceding investigations about structural definite descriptions that each object name which appears in a scientific statement can in principle (if enough information is available) be replaced by a structural definite description of the object, together with an indication of the object domain to which the description refers. This holds, not only for the names of individual objects, but also for general names, that is, for names of concepts, classes, relations. . . . Thus, each scientific statement can in principle be transformed into a statement which contains only structural properties and the indication of one or more object domains. Now the fundamental thesis of construction theory (cf. §4), which we will attempt to demonstrate in the following investigation, asserts that fundamentally there is only one object domain and that each scientific statement is about objects in this domain. Thus, it becomes unnecessary to indicate for each statement the object domain, and the result is that *each scientific statement can in principle be so transformed that it is nothing but a structure statement.* But this transformation is not only possible, it is imperative. For science wants to speak about what is objective, and whatever does not belong to the structure but to the material (i.e., anything that can be pointed out in a concrete ostensive definition) is, in the final analysis, subjective.[18]

By transforming claims so that they are purely structural, we are able to ensure their objectivity. The result is that our claims will be purged of any subjective, indexical, or perspectival element. Objectivity is thus aligned with structure or form and contrasted with "the material," that is, "anything that can be pointed out in a concrete ostensive definition." Although we can pick out particulars by ostension, all properly scientific statements will be free of ostension. Everything that can be said by science can be said by description alone. Ostension plays no essential role in scientific statements. Any claim that makes use of an ostensive definition of a particular can be transformed into a purely structural claim.

The logical positivists, especially Carnap, focus much of their energy and attention on the same issues that Kant did. They disagreed with Kant point for point about space, left and right hands, and the relation between the sensibility and the understanding. Their disagreement with Kant was so pervasive that it indicates a certain meta-level agreement with Kant on the core philosophical *questions*. *If* orientation

[17]The point is not that they are unjustified. The point is that they are cognitively meaningless.

[18]Rudolf Carnap, *The Logical Structure of the World*, trans. R. A. George (La Salle IL: Open Court, 2003), pp. 28–29.

has the role that Kant thinks it has, *then* belief in God might be reasonable. Kant could say the same for the positivists. *If* they could succeed in their project, *then* transcendental idealism would no longer be an attractive view and there would be no space for belief in God. This dispute was of no small consequence. It concerned some of the core claims of the most important philosophers for the past two hundred and fifty years. It concerned their basic conception of the world and their right to believe in God, a right that was very important to Kant and was hotly contested by positivists. Given the radically different theological perspectives of Kant and the logical positivists, the level of agreement between them on the crucial philosophical questions is striking. The battle lines were drawn, the questions were clearly understood by both sides. The positivists sought to develop structuralism in order distinguish those claims that provide us objective information (i.e., information about which possible world is actual) from those claims that do not. Kant would dismiss structuralism as neo-Leibnizian. So, what happened?

History tells us that logical positivism failed in its defense of the contested distinction. Their structuralist ambitions were thwarted and their projects were abandoned. One would therefore expect a growing suspicion of the distinction that they tried to defend. In fact, precisely the opposite has happened. Once the hopelessness of the defense of the distinction between objective content and what is merely perspectival was recognized, it was assumed that the distinction is obvious and never needed any defense after all. In addition, the fact that it was once believed to need a defense was promptly forgotten, and the actual goals of the logical positivists were badly misinterpreted.[19] The *non sequitur* is quite striking (shocking I would say) once one recognizes it. Even those analytic philosophers who purport to be most critical of our common sense (or folk psychological) ideas about the mind typically accept the distinction without question.

We can see that this is the case by returning to our discussion of phenomenology and the hard problem of explaining consciousness. Let us consider responses to Jackson's thought experiment with Mary. Consider, for example, Paul Churchland, well known for his willingness to scrutinize and question the claims of folk psychology. Here is Churchland's response to Jackson's argument:

> Jackson concludes from this, much as did Nagel before him, that there must be limits to what physical science can tell us about the contents of conscious experience. And because physical science leaves something out, he concludes, there must be a nonphysical dimension to one's conscious experience.
>
> A few moment's reflection will reveal the same conflation that we saw in Nagel's argument—a conflation between different *ways of knowing* on the one hand, and different *things known* on the other.[20]

[19]The fact that logical positivism was misinterpreted until quite recently has been made by quite a few contemporary historians. For example, Michael Freedman makes this point on the first page of his book *Reconsidering Logical Positivism* (New York NY: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999), citing thirty-five different authors. What merits further discussion, I think, is the question of why we misinterpreted the logical positivists so badly. I would suggest that it is directly related to their inability to respond to the Kantian and phenomenological challenge.

[20]Paul M. Churchland, *The Engine of Reason Seat of the Soul* (Cambridge MA: MIT Press,1995), p. 201.

Churchland misses the irony that this distinction is an essential part of folk psychology. Presumably Churchland thinks that *this* (positivist) part of folk psychology is here to stay. He leaves unconsidered the possibility that the moral to draw from Jackson's Mary is that we cannot extricate what Mary knows from the way that she knows it. He is not alone. Much of contemporary analytic philosophy of mind presupposes the positivists' distinction. For example, it is taken for granted when, with Perry, we distinguish subject matter content from reflexive content[21] or when, with Lycan, we distinguish factual information from computational information,[22] or when, following Frege's example, we distinguish a thought from its mode of presentation.[23] Despite their differences, both Kant and the logical positivists would view such distinctions as requiring a substantive defense and as a direct challenge to the coherence of our belief in God.

The hard problem of explaining consciousness, which I sketched above, looks quite different when seen in light of the history just sketched. Science is thought to give us what is objective by giving us knowledge of structure and function. The only question is whether there is something more, something that supplements structure and function, such as consciousness. Some like Chalmers think that there is something more. Some like Dennett and the Churchlands disagree. For them, everything about the mind can be explained in terms of structure and function. But they all agree in taking for granted the very distinction that Carnap sought to establish and that Kant would certainly deny. That is, they take for granted that knowledge of the structural and functional properties of cognition can be distinguished from anything subjective and/or perspectival. Consider, for example, John Perry's analysis of the problem of Mary. Perry draws an analogy between Mary and a person called Gary. Gary is lost in Little America. He is capable of reading a map and having all the relevant geographical knowledge of where things are but not of knowing where he himself is.[24] According to Perry, Gary is just like Mary. They both know all the objective facts (or have all the relevant subject matter content, as Perry puts it), but lack the relevant oriented awareness (which Perry calls reflexive content). Gary is taken to be self-explanatory and is used to account for Mary. But this takes for granted a fundamentally anti-Kantian conception of the mind. Let us consider how a phenomenologist like Merleau-Ponty would respond to Perry. According to Merleau-Ponty,

> The word "here" applied to my body does not refer to a determinate position in relation to other positions or to external co-ordinates, but the laying down of the first co-ordinates, the anchoring of the active body in an object, the situation of the body in the face of its tasks. Bodily space can be distinguished from external space and envelop its parts instead of spreading them out, because it is the darkness needed in the theater to show up the performance, the background of somnolence or reserve of vague power against which

[21]John Perry, *Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness* (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2001).

[22]John Lycan, *Consciousness and Experience* (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1996).

[23]Gottlob Frege, "Thought" in *The Frege Reader*, ed. Michael Beaney (Malden MA: Blackwell, 1997) pp. 325–45.

[24]Perry, *Knowledge Possibility and Consciousness*, pp. 113–15.

> the gesture and its aim stand out, the zone of not being *in front of which* precise beings, figures and points can come to light.[25]

Phenomenologists like Merleau-Ponty engage with structuralism and logical positivism in a way that analytic philosophy does not. To understand Merleau-Ponty's point, it helps to contrast him with a positivist like Mach. Mach held that to observe where something is is to observe where it is relative to one's body.[26] Thus, one does not hear where a sound is in absolute space; one hears where it is relative to one's body. Such a view is structuralist in that it treats all knowledge as ultimately of relations. For Mach, the body is an empirical object just like any other and all one ever learns about spatial locations is the differences between where objects are. Knowledge of relations is basic. Knowledge of the relata is derivative. Merleau-Ponty rejects this view by holding that one's own body in the present has a unique role to play in one's oriented perceptions of the world. What Merleau-Ponty calls the active body is the Archimedean point that allows one to locate objects not simply relative to each other, but relative to space itself. This is possible only on the condition that the active body alone is perceived as having an epistemically non-contingent location in non-relative space. On this view, Perry's distinction between subject-matter content (which is objective) and reflexive content (which is perspectival) is only possible in certain contexts on the condition that there is a problematic point of exception where the distinction breaks down; one's body is this problematic exception. Ultimately, Merleau-Ponty would reject the positivistic distinction between the supposedly objective content of one's knowledge of geography (subject matter content) and one's merely subjective kinesthetic awareness of the location of one's own body (reflexive content). The analogy between Gary and Mary could then be used by a phenomenologist to make a very different point. If the distinction breaks down for Gary, perhaps it breaks down for Mary too. That is, perhaps there is no way to rigorously distinguish the findings of science, which concern structure and function, from some supposedly subjective supplement, consciousness, qualia, etc.

According to Merleau-Ponty, "All knowledge takes its place within the horizons opened up by perception. There can be no question of describing perception itself as one of the facts thrown up in the world, since we can never fill up, in the picture of the world, that gap which we ourselves are, and by which it comes into existence for someone, since perception is the 'flaw' in this 'great diamond.'"[27] From Merleau-Ponty's perspective, the problem of consciousness is better understood as the problem of how one's oriented acts of perception could be identified with events in the world that are able to be abstracted from any particular point of view. If the problem is seen in this way, it could hardly escape his notice that perception was both what led to the break up of the Vienna Circle (i.e., in the protocol sentence debates) and is also the biggest obstacle in interpreting the best and most fundamental physical theory ever

[25]Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. C. Smith (Bury St. Edmunds Suffolk: Edmundsbury Press Ltd.,1994), pp. 100–01.

[26]Ernst Mach, *Space and Geometry, in the Light of Physiological, Psychological and Physical inquiry* (LaSalle IL: Open Court, 1960).

[27]Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, p. 207.

created (i.e., quantum mechanics).[28] The distinction between objective and subjective breaks down when it comes to the act of perception. Thus, for Merleau-Ponty, the question is not whether there is something isolated thing that science cannot explain, such as qualia. What needs to be questioned is our common sense idea that we can, in general, abstract what one knows from the oriented perspective under which one knows it.

Structuralism as articulated by Carnap was intended as a defense of the objectivity of science. Post-structuralists, such as Derrida, would interpret a critique of structuralism as a critique of the possibility of science by arguing that any system of knowledge depends upon a problematic center that would

> limit what we might call the play of the structure. . . . Thus it has always been thought that the center, which is by definition unique, constituted that very thing within a structure which while governing the structure escapes structurality. That is why classical thought concerning structure could say that the center is, paradoxically, *within* the structure and *outside it*. The center is at the center of the totality (it is not part of the totality), the totality *has its center elsewhere*."[29]

I do not mean to say that Derrida agrees completely with Merleau-Ponty's view of space or with Kant's. However, he would certainly agree with Merleau-Ponty's suggestion that our system of representing geographical knowledge (e.g., via latitude and longitude) requires a problematic Archimedean point. In the cases of Gary and Mary, what is in question is whether or not we can rigorously distinguish the objective (e.g., structural and functional) content of what one knows from everything else, such as one's kinesthetic awareness of one's own body that, according to Merleau-Ponty, serves to ground and center one's knowledge. What Derrida calls the center is the problematic Archimedean point that can neither be structuralized and thus incorporated into our system of knowledge, nor wholly excluded without a trace.

From the perspective of Merleau-Ponty and Derrida, the logical positivists argued precisely what they needed to argue, given their desire to show that genuine scientific knowledge is possible and that we could do science without having to worry about anything subjective or perspectival. Their positivist conclusion might have been controversial, *but they didn't beg the question*. They struggled valiantly to save a distinction in which they believed, and they failed. I have suggested that in the middle of the twentieth century something strange happened. The positivist commitment to the rigorous distinction between objective and subjective remained, but the attempt to defend it was given up, and the dialogue between the analytic and phenomenological traditions was abruptly cut short and forgotten.

If the analysis that I have given is correct, then contemporary debate about the hard problem of consciousness begs the question against the phenomenological

[28]I am referring here to the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. Schrödinger's equation describes the evolution of a physical system in terms of the superposition of different states. But any actual measurement will always discover the system to be in some particular determinate state.

[29]Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, trans. A. Bass (Chicago IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 278–79.

tradition broadly construed.[30] As I mentioned in the introduction, what is particularly striking about this is not so much the fact that analytic philosophers like Dennett tend to misconstrue phenomenology, but that they misconstrue the history of *their own tradition*. I will close with a suggestion about how to interpret this. For Freud, forgetfulness about one's own origins is seldom accidental. Some things are forgotten because they are too trivial to remember. However, at other times they are forgotten for the opposite reason; they are too significant. One is too close to them to see them. With the possible exception of Helen Keller, we do not, for example, remember learning our native tongue. I suggest that the historical forgetfulness that I have described in this paper is of the second kind. The commitment that motivates the founding gesture of analytic philosophy is forgotten not because it is trivial, but because it is too fundamental to be called into question at this time. In effect, analytic philosophy has repressed the traumatic memory of its birth.[31]

[30]I don't mean to suggest that Derrida is a phenomenologist. Rather, his basic orientation towards the mind is part of a tradition that also includes phenomenology but is quite disconnected from thinkers like Chalmers and Perry.

[31]This will, I presume, be interpreted as a criticism of analytic philosophy. But I think it is important to remember that for deconstructionists like Derrida, a critical self-blindness is essential to any system of knowledge. This point is made particularly clearly by fellow deconstructionist, Paul de Man, in his work, *Blindness and Insight* (Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1983). The dialectical situation is thus more complicated than it might at first appear.