博士論文

Categorizing Art

(芸術をカテゴライズする)

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Introduction

This dissertation is concerned with the practice of categorizing works of art and its relation to art criticism. I follow Carroll (1999) and others in that the main task of the philosophy of art is to collect, analyze, organize phenomena and statements concerning art, formulate meaningful questions, and provide answers, and here I do so with a particular focus on art categories[1] and their roles in criticism[2]. The central task of this dissertation is to elaborate and defend the idea that the way a work of art is categorized influences how it is appreciated and criticized.

Categories of art gained attention in the philosophy of criticism with the publication of Kendall Walton's "Categories of Art," published in 1970. Walton argues that how we categorize artworks influences our judgments about them, both psychologically and normatively. This may seem obvious today, but it was not at the time of the publication. At that time, formalism about art was dominant, as represented by Beardsley (1958) in aesthetics and Greenberg (1965) in art criticism. Formalists treat artworks as unique, autonomous entities, detached from their context, and attempt to

[1] Though this will be clarified during the course of the thesis, by "category" I mean a group of items that share some interesting feature, as opposed to an arbitrary class of items. Works of art can technically be grouped in arbitrary ways. A set of items with nothing significant in common and no utility is still a set. However, none of the forms, styles, media, genres, and so forth that we will focus on are such arbitrary sets of works. Categories of art such as painting and opera, horror and science fiction, Baroque and Rococo, Impressionism and Minimalism, Magic Realism and Vaporwave are groups based on some crucial commonality or utility.

[2] "Criticism" refers to an activity of writing or stating something about the qualities, meanings, values, backgrounds, and so forth, of an item. Art criticism is criticism of individual works or groups of works, but there is little or no consensus among critics or philosophers on what critics do and what is their aim. Carroll (2009; 2016) argues that criticism is about sizing up value without regard to the evaluator's (dis)likings, while Gorodeisky (2021a; 2022) argues that the communication of emotional responses is central. Despite being a crucial part of the practice of art, criticism remains mysterious to us.

draw meaning and value from them by referring only to their experiential aspects. Against this background, "Categories of Art" can be said to have encouraged the subsequent rise of contextualism[3] by highlighting how the categories and relevant contextual facts concerning an artwork enter into aesthetic judgments. Building on Walton's arguments, Noël Carroll extended the discussion of categories in art to criticism. According to Carroll (2009), a critical evaluation—such as that an artwork is good due to the presence of certain features—can acquire some objectivity by referring to the art category to which it belongs and the contextual facts relevant to its membership. It is widely accepted today that categories play a role in various appreciative responses, not only in evaluation, but also in artistic interpretation or imagination.[4] The idea that categories matter in appreciation and criticism has become a commonly accepted view in the field.

However, the arguments put forward by Walton and Carroll contain significant shortcomings concerning some crucial aspects of categories of art. These shortcomings have not been adequately addressed in the subsequent literature. Above all, neither offered a significant examination of the dynamics of art categories, what kind of ontological structure they have, how they are generated and sustained, or how they function. As art criticism has transitioned from a formalist to a contextualist approach, the importance of categories has diminished, giving way to the broader focus on context. This has led to a decline in attention towards art categories. Nonetheless, I contend that revisiting categories can lead to valuable insights into the philosophy of criticism.

Particularly lacking in the literature is a point of view that sees categorization as a dynamic social act. My proposal, very roughly, is that some categories (specifically, genres) should be regarded as clusters of rules that regulate the responses and behavior of agents; the critical and appreciative practice of which categorizing is a part is a social practice of making, declaring, proposing, reforming, and developing rules for appreciation. How we appreciate artworks, and how criticism guides our

[3] For example, Wollheim (1980); Levinson (1980), (2007); Danto (1981); Currie (1989).

[4] For example, Levinson (1996); Currie (2004); Davies (2006); Laetz and Lopes (2008); Friend (2012); Abell (2015), (2020); Liao (2016); Lopes (2018); Terrone (2021).

appreciation, is sensitive to how we categorize artworks. How we categorize artworks is sensitive to what categories have been set up in our community and which categories are active regarding each artwork. Informed and inspired by debates on social interaction,[5] this dissertation aims to illuminate the practice of categorizing art.

Chapter 1 examines Kendall Walton's argument in "Categories of Art" concerning the mode of judgment traditionally discussed as *aesthetic* judgment. Aesthetic judgments, together with the aesthetic properties attributed by them, were assumed to be perceptual in nature: we do not grasp that an item is graceful by thinking about it, but by seeing its gracefulness. However, there is tension between this view and the fact that art criticism is often made with reference to the context outside a work. If aesthetic judgments about works of art were purely perceptual judgments, there would be no room for considerations of authorship, social context, and so on, and if these considerations enter them, that would make the resultant judgments impure (in the sense of *not purely aesthetic*). Walton's 1970 paper brought about a paradigm shift in addressing this tension by invoking the *categories* concerning artworks. In this chapter, I will reconstruct Walton's theory of categories and suggest some modifications which, I will argue, better serve his purpose.

Walton's argument is limited in that it deals only with the *perceptual* role that categories play in *aesthetic* judgments to artworks. Chapter 2 offers a general characterization of criticism, showing that interests in art are not limited to an interest in the aesthetic. I will defend the view that art criticism is a guide for appreciation. In itself, this view changes rather than answers the question, What is art criticism? However, it implies that an answer to this question will be found in an answer to the question, What is art appreciation? Thus, since this dissertation is a philosophy of criticism, it is also automatically a philosophy of appreciation. The task of characterizing appreciation is not simple, but I will argue in favor of a pluralistic understanding, rejecting essentialist viewpoints that seek a homogenous, unified definition. Appreciation, in my view, should be understood as a blend of various

[5] For example, Searle (1995), (2010); Hindriks (2009); Epstein (2015); Guala (2016). For a survey, see Epstein (2021).

activities. Using this pluralistic lens, I also endorse a similar perspective for criticism. Above all, I will challenge the traditional and recently updated view that closely intertwines the artistic and the aesthetic.

Chapter 3 examines an issue that Walton did not adequately address: the ontology of categories, particularly the meta-categorical distinction. While much attention has been paid to the role and function of art categories, there has been strangely little discussion of what art categories are in the first place. Artworks are classified according to various categories, which are, in turn, classified according to meta-categories. Meta-categories include genre, media, style, form, movement, author, region, period, and so on. I will characterize the meta-category of *genre* in particular, given its importance to the argument of my dissertation. What is unique about the categories and only those that are *genre* categories? I will argue that genres are clusters of regulative *rules*. This conception gives them a fundamentally different status and role compared with, say, styles and forms. The genres-as-rules account intrinsically connects genres to the ontology of social and institutional entities. This chapter will elaborate and defend this idea by exploring genre practice as a distinct form of social practice.

Chapter 4 delves into the conditions under which a genre, understood as a cluster of rules, is correctly applied. If genres are rules and serve to regulate art appreciation and criticism, then the following question arises: which genre is *active*, in the sense that it is appropriate to apply it to a particular artwork, and what determines active genres? After explaining why an intentionalist account fails to answer this question, I will offer and defend the following view, relying heavily on Francesco Guala's (2016) theory of institutions: active genres that normatively support the appreciation and criticism of artworks are analogous to institutions as "rules-in-equilibrium," and like institutions, they are open to reformation.

Chapter 5 clarifies the validity and scope of my proposal as I address more specific, developmental issues. In recent years, Catharine Abell has offered an interesting account to the problems concerning fiction, using a similar tool to this dissertation. In analogy with serious assertions

about the real world that are based on the speaker's intention to make us believe something, the content of fiction has been said to be based on the author's intention to make us imagine something. Abell criticizes this intentionalism and points to the role of institutions of fiction as mediators. Although Abell and I are both institutionalists and share many points of view, I will object to the task of communicating imaginings that Abell takes as the starting point for her account. I will argue that the practice of interpreting and evaluating works of fiction can also be better understood under the genre practice I will theorize.

Scope

There are a number of topics that are related to this dissertation but that I do not have space to examine in detail. For example, I do not give a definition of what it is to be an artwork. Defining art is a complex and difficult task, but for the purposes of this dissertation, we can do without a definition of a work of art. I agree with Lopes (2014) that philosophers of art should shift their attention from the theory of artworks to theories of the arts (art kinds). Note that by "works of art," I do not mean to restrict the topic to the fine arts or high arts. For my purposes here, watching a music video of NewJeans, reading *Chainsaw Man*, or drinking a beer from Other Half Brewing is art appreciation in exactly the same sense as seeing an installation by Christian Boltanski in a museum. In this dissertation, an artwork is any product of agency that attempts to demonstrate *art* (in its original sense of "skill"), whether highbrow or lowbrow, smart or poor, and should be understood as an item subject to appreciation and criticism in as broad a sense as possible. Loafers, guitars, and hamburgers are not excluded from works of art in this sense, and any appreciation or criticism of them is within the scope of this dissertation.

I also adopt, on many occasions with little defense, Experientialism about art (implicitly in chapter 2 and explicitly in chapters 4 and 5), a view that has gradually come to be treated as controversial in recent years. According to this view, what is crucial to a work of art is the valuable experience it provides, whatever it is. That experience may be a valuable means to a further end, or it

may have value for its own sake, an intrinsic value. Either way, the work of art itself is an instrument to that end, and its value is constituted by affording a valuable experience. The most popular version of Experientialism is Hedonism, and according to Hedonists, what is essential to a work of art is specifically the pleasure it provides.[6] Despite being a widely accepted view since modern aesthetics, it has been increasingly argued in recent years that Hedonism may not be as well supported as commonly supposed, and may even not have been the consensus in 18th-century aesthetics.[7] However, Experientialism remains a promising option, which others are adapting and defending in the face of recent criticisms.[8] To be a part of this defense is a complex matter beyond the scope of this dissertation. I will not pursue this issue further in this dissertation, as I believe my proposal, with suitable modifications, is also compatible with other views concerning the value of art.

[6] Bell (1914); Beardsley (1982a); Mothersill (1984); Dickie (1988); Levinson (1996: Chap. 1); Walton (2008: Chap. 1); Matthen (2017), to cite only a few.

[7] For example, Shelley (2003), (2010), (2022); Lopes (2018); Van der Berg (2020); Gorodeisky (2021a), (2021b); Carroll (2022).

[8] For example, Levinson (1996: Chap. 2); Goldman (2006); Stecker (2010), (2019); Grant (2023).

1 Aesthetic Judgments in Categories of Art

The attribution of aesthetic properties to items (aesthetic judgments), such as being balanced, graceful, dynamic, serene, vivid, or garish, is an activity that is both commonplace and mysterious to us, and has received special attention in the tradition of analytic aesthetics. In this chapter, I examine the contribution made by Kendall Walton and his paper "Categories of Art" (1970) (hereafter CA) in the debate over aesthetic judgment. CA contains somewhat complicated motivations and details. As Laetz (2010), whose interpretation will be discussed later, notes, Walton's claims are often misunderstood. A special issue of the *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* in 2020 celebrated the 50th anniversary of the publication of CA, but even here, some of Walton's precise claims and their validity escaped thorough examination. On some points, even Walton (2020) himself seemed unsure of his original intentions at the time of writing CA.

At first glance, Walton's theory of art categories seems simple and plausible. Its primary motivation is explicitly to counter the formalism and anti-contextualism that had long been dominant concerning aesthetic judgment. The defenders of this traditional view, most prominently represented by Monroe Beardsley, argued that art criticism should rely only on what can be perceived in works of art, without taking into account the author's intentions or historical facts (e.g., Wimsatt and Beardsley 1946; Beardsley 1958).

> [T]he design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of literary art […]. (Wimsatt and Beardsley 1946: 468)

Arguments in CA, broadly speaking, support the opposing contextualist camp in that it argues for the legitimate involvement of considerations external to an artwork in making aesthetic judgments about it. However, what makes it ingenious on the one hand, and difficult to interpret on the other, is that Walton does not develop a straightforward contextualism position but makes allowance for formalist commitments in some substantial respects. Emphasizing this point, Laetz (2010: 288) sees a

significant difference between Walton and the mainstream contextualists such as Levinson (1980) and Currie (1989).

The first aim of this chapter is to clarify and resolve some disputed interpretive issues, and properly situate Walton's theory of art categories (Sections 1). Given that (as I will argue) commitments in CA have not been sufficiently understood, this task is a necessary first step before suggesting revisions to them. I will offer a reconstruction of Walton's position that seeks to reconcile *Ontological Contextualism* with *Epistemological Formalism*. The position is ontologically contextualist since many aesthetic properties that a work of art actually possesses are argued to have as part of their foundation contextual facts that are external to the work. Facts external to a work *make* it elegant or garish. However, the position reasons epistemologically formalist since aesthetic properties are argued to be known through the sole mobilization of the perceptual faculty. That is, aesthetic properties are grasped by simply seeing and hearing, not by mobilizing beliefs and knowledge of contextual facts. Following formalists, such perceptual grasping is considered the only proper access to aesthetic properties. Laetz (2010) convincingly showed that Walton's position is epistemologically formalist, however, there has been little discussion of the ontological commitments contained in CA. As I hope to make clear, the uniqueness of Walton's theory lies in the fact that he incorporated the intuitions of the formalists while developing an ontology of aesthetic properties that is consistent with the subsequent contextualists.

However, a theory that is faithfully reconstructed according to Walton's intentions is not necessarily the best theory. The second aim of this chapter is to point out some problems with Walton's theory and suggest modifications that fix them (Section 2). Early in CA, Walton seems to limit the categories under his consideration to what he calls "perceptually distinguishable categories" (338). The purpose of this limitation has puzzled interpreters. I will suggest that this limitation serves both commitments in CA, Ontological Contextualism and Epistemological Formalism, but I will also provide reasons to resist this limitation. The perceptually distinguishable categories, as stipulated in CA, have theoretical problems and are not necessary for the purposes of CA.

Nor does Walton in CA comprehensively address the roles of art categories. Walton's interest is limited to aesthetic judgments, especially the process of the perceptual formation of them. However, art categories play many more roles in art criticism and appreciation. I will end the chapter by outlining how limited it is and how we can expand the argument of CA (Section 3). A detailed argument showing that art appreciation and art criticism are of broader interest is left to the next chapter.

1.1 Reconstructing the Argument of "Categories of Art"

The argument of CA is not in the service of a single, homogenous claim, but can be divided into four themes: psychological, normative, ontological, and epistemological. Let me begin by spelling out these themes in terms of four basic theses and, for each, a number of related supplementary claims:

A) **The Psychological Thesis**: What aesthetic properties one perceives in an item sometimes depends on the categories in which one perceives it.
   1. Aesthetic judgments are based solely on aesthetic perceptions (perceptual attributions of aesthetic properties).
   2. Aesthetic perception depends on the perception of non-aesthetic properties.
   3. Aesthetic perception sometimes depends on the perceived weightings of non-aesthetic properties too.
   4. The perceived weightings of non-aesthetic properties depend on the perceived categories.

B) **The Normative Thesis**: The correct aesthetic judgment of a work of art is sometimes, partly, determined by contextual facts.
   1. Objective truth or falsehood can be attributed to aesthetic judgments of a work of art.
   2. An aesthetic judgment that is true about a work of art is based on an appropriate aesthetic perception of it.
   3. An appropriate aesthetic perception of a work of art is based on the categories in which the work is correctly perceived (abbreviated as the "correct categories" of the work).
   4. The correct categories of a work of art are partly determined by four considerations, including contextual facts.

C) **The Ontological Thesis**: Some aesthetic properties that works of art actually have are partly determined by contextual facts.

1. In general, the property that an appropriate perception attributes is one that the item actually has.
2. The aesthetic property that an appropriate aesthetic perception of a work of art attributes is one that it actually has.

D) **The Epistemological Thesis**: It is not the acquisition of knowledge but the training of perception that is more important in arriving at correct aesthetic judgments.

1. Acquiring knowledge of a category is neither necessary nor sufficient for appropriately perceiving an item in the category.
2. Having perceptual training in a category (being exposed to many examples of the category) is necessary and sufficient for appropriately perceiving an item in the category.

I believe this set of claims gives the full complex picture that CA urges. While Walton explicitly develops the first two theses, he only suggests the remaining two theses in the conclusion. I will justify the attribution of each in turn.

1.1.1 The Psychological Thesis

1.1.1.1 Aesthetic Judgment and Aesthetic Perception

Aesthetic judgment refers to a mental state or statement that attributes an aesthetic property or quality to an item. More specifically, an aesthetic judgment corresponds to thinking or stating that an item possesses such aesthetic properties as "tension, mystery, energy, coherence, balance, serenity, sentimentality, pallidness, disunity, grotesqueness" (CA: 337). The distinction between aesthetic and non-aesthetic properties is not easy to make. Aside from the intension of the concept, it is helpful to look at as many examples as possible in order to grasp its extension.[9] Aesthetic terms addressed in Sibley (1959) include unified, lifeless, sombre, dynamic, powerful, vivid, graceful, garish, beautiful, robust, strident, turbulent, gaudy, monotonous, ugly, and so on. However, aesthetic terms should not be confused with aesthetic properties. As Sibley (2001: 1–2) argues, whether it is an aesthetic property that is being referred to by an aesthetic term depends on the context. Some of the listed terms have non-aesthetic uses. Aesthetic properties are properties that are attributed by using those terms in a somewhat standard context, mobilizing "taste, perceptiveness, or sensitivity" (Sibley 2001: 1).

[9] See De Clercq (2008: 895) for a detailed list of aesthetic terms.

A judgment is a neutral concept with respect to the process leading to it and the faculties to be mobilized. The property predicate judgment "*x* is *F*" can be arrived at in a variety of ways, including perception, testimony, inference, interpretation, and imagination. However, it is only the first of these, *aesthetic perception*, that has traditionally been thought of as the proper process to an aesthetic judgment and the proper faculty to be mobilized. Aesthetic properties are considered to be perceptual properties, and grasping them is understood analogously to the grasping non-aesthetic perceptual properties such as being red, triangular, and large. Aesthetic judgments, such as that an item is graceful or garish, are not based on inference or interpretation, but only on aesthetic perception of the corresponding aesthetic property. In this sense, aesthetic judgments are accompanied not only by the essential characterization concerning what to be judged, but also by one concerning how to judge.

One that has been particularly influential concerning the perceptual nature of aesthetic properties and aesthetic judgments was Frank Sibley's characterization. Strictly speaking, Sibley was not discussing aesthetic properties or their ontological structure, but rather the application of aesthetic terms and their logic. Thus, what follows is not so much a thesis to be attributed to Sibley himself, but rather a Sibleyian thesis drawn out by interpreters. Expanding on what Sibley explicitly stated, we can summarize the essence in two theses (Sibley 2001: Chap. 1, 3). First, aesthetic properties depend on non-aesthetic properties.

> In short, aesthetic terms always ultimately apply because of, and aesthetic qualities always ultimately depend upon, the presence of features which, like curving or angular lines, colour contrasts, placing of masses, or speed of movement, are visible, audible, or otherwise discernible without any exercise of taste or sensibility. (Sibley 2001: 3)

Aesthetic properties are higher-level properties that depend on non-aesthetic properties, and it is not possible to skip the perception of non-aesthetic properties altogether and perceive only aesthetic properties. For example, aesthetic properties such as being graceful and garish are, respectively, based on non-aesthetic properties such as thin curves and widely arranged primary colors, and it is in virtue

of perceiving the latter that we can perceive the former. Second, however, Sibley (2001: 4) states that aesthetic concepts are *not condition-governed*.

> There are no sufficient conditions, no non-aesthetic features such that the presence of some set or numbers of them will beyond question logically justify or warrant the application of an aesthetic term. (Sibley 2001: 5)

Aesthetic properties as gestalt properties emerge based on the entire non-aesthetic structure of items. To change even the smallest non-aesthetic detail can make an item's aesthetic property something else entirely. A painting may not be graceful but rather garish despite having a thin curve.[10]

The perceptual nature of aesthetic properties and judgments forms tensions between several pre-theoretical observations. The first observation is related to the fact that aesthetic properties have non-aesthetic properties that are responsible for them, as Sibley acknowledges. Critics often *seem* to justify, support, and defend their own aesthetic judgments by referring to those base properties. Those who want to say that aesthetic judgments are purely perceptual judgments must give error theory to the observation and say that, as a matter of fact, critics can neither support, justify, nor defend aesthetic judgments like that. However, it is not easy to defend the non-inferentiality of aesthetic judgments in this way.[11] Often, this view dismisses aesthetic justification by begging the question or falls back on mere stipulations that only judgments without reasoning are aesthetic judgments. I will address this issue in the final section.

A second observation, more significant to Walton's interests, is that, especially when making aesthetic judgments about artifacts such as works of art, critics *seem* not to simply direct their senses to artworks, but instead to investigate their provenance, history, author's intentions, related works, and

[10] The view that aesthetic concepts are not condition-governed and therefore aesthetic judgments are not inferential has developed into the so-called *Acquaintance Principle*, which has been widely accepted. According to that, aesthetic judgments must be judgments based on first-hand experience, not testimony (Wollheim 1980: 156; Robson 2012). This Acquaintance Principle has also been recognized concerning art appreciation (Tormey 1973: 39), since the aesthetic and artistic realms have often been lumped together.

[11] See Schellekens (2006); Dorsch (2013); Cavedon-Taylor (2017); Robson (2018).

so forth, or refer to facts external to the work in their criticism. Critics do not merely render a verdict of being graceful or garish, but sometimes describe the social situations of the time when the work was created and offer hypotheses about the artist's intentions. This is precisely Walton's concern: How do these investigations and references match the thesis that aesthetic properties are simply perceived, not inferred or interpreted? Walton seeks to reconcile the Sibleyian thesis that aesthetic judgments are perceptual in an essential sense with the role of contextual facts (Walton 2020: 79).[12]

1.1.1.2 Categories and Weightings

Walton seeks to add the concept of *perceiving in categories* to Sibley's framework. Artworks are perceived in a variety of media, genres, styles, and forms (CA: 340). Here is the opening for the fact that physically identical items can differ in their aesthetic character. By determining the weightings of non-aesthetic properties, categories influence aesthetic perception and aesthetic judgment.

It is important to note that nowhere in CA does Walton state that aesthetic perception is *always* category-based. Category-independent aesthetic perception is widely accepted, especially when the object is a natural object.[13] When we perceive the color of a particular stone as beautiful, our mental states are not referring to any category. The color is not beautiful *as a stone*; it is simply beautiful. Undoubtedly, we are also capable of some category-independent aesthetic perception of works of art. Purely formal aesthetic judgments are an independently interesting topic, but let us put it

[12] Walton (CA: 335) suggests, incidentally, that his theory could apply to novels, plays, and poetry "with suitable modifications," but he sets aside the aesthetic properties of literature for the moment. Walton's hesitation here may be due to a certain non-perceivability of literary works: if they have aesthetic properties, they are not rooted in sensible features. However, there remains room to argue that the aesthetic properties of literary works are also perceptual in the sense that they are non-inferentially grasped (Shelley 2003; Friend 2020). After all, "perceptual" is ambiguous. I agree that the CA argument can be expanded to non-sensible works of art, including literary works, but here I will follow Walton and keep only sensible art forms in mind (painting, sculpture, music, and so forth).

[13] On category-independent aesthetic judgments, see Zangwill (2000); Sibley (2001: Chap. 13); Sackris (2013).

aside for now. If we follow Walton's intention, his claim is no more than that we *can* perceive in categories, and *often* do so.

Each category is said to be associated with a particular set of standard/variable/contra-standard features. For example, for the category of painting, being flat is standard, what is depicted is variable, and having three-dimensional objects sticking out or moving is contra-standard. Being standard/variable/contra-standard are each defined by their contribution to category membership (CA: 339). Having standard features for category *C* qualifies an item as a member of *C*. Lacking standard features or having features that compete with standard features (contra-standard features) disqualifies an item as a member of *C*. Having variable features is independent of whether or not the item belongs to *C*. Henceforth, I will refer to the specific set of standard/variable/contra-standard features associated with a category as the *SVCs* of it.

Walton (CA: 339; 352) introduces the relationship between category membership and SVCs as a tendency, but we can also follow Friend (2012: 187) and interpret SVCs as a cluster of features relevant to category membership. Works that conform to the SVCs of a category qualify as members of it, but the individual features that make up the SVCs are not essential in the sense that they are necessary or sufficient conditions for belonging to it. To some extent, items that do not conform to the SVCs of a category, i.e., that have some contra-standard features and lack some standard features of the category, do not lose any chance to belong to it. The SVCs are *pro tanto* (in the sense of "to that extent") normative reasons in determining category membership.

Now, aesthetic perception does not depend solely on *which* non-aesthetic properties are perceived, but also on *how* these properties are perceived. The same non-aesthetic property, whether perceived as a standard/variable/contra-standard feature, makes a difference in aesthetic perception.

> [W]hat aesthetic properties a work seems to us to have depends not only on what nonaesthetic features we perceive in it, but also on which of them are standard, which variable, and which contra-standard for us. (CA: 338)

The weightings of non-aesthetic features have an effect on aesthetic perception only insofar as the *subject* grasps the weightings, that is, insofar as the recognition of being standard/variable/contra-standard appears in the subject's perception. Being standard/variable/contra-standard is introduced as a relation between properties and categories and then transformed into a relation between properties and perceivers (CA: 342). While subjects often perceive non-aesthetic properties of an artwork in multiple categories, features that are standard for one or more of them and not contra-standard for any of them become standard for the perceiving subject. A feature that is variable for all those categories is variable for the perceiving subject. Finally, a feature that is contra-standard for one or more categories is contra-standard for the perceiving subject. Thus, a particular brush stroke, sometimes seen as a standard feature that is taken for granted, and sometimes seen as a contra-standard feature that is an anomaly, can have very different aesthetic effects.

Walton illustrates the effects of differences in categories and SVCs on aesthetic perception by specific examples. Among the most famous is the "guernicas" thought experiment (CA: 347–8). Pablo Picasso's *Guernica* (1937) appears "violent, dynamic, vital, disturbing" when seen in light of the SVCs of the category of painting. However, when seen in light of the SVCs of a fictional category of "guernicas," it may appear "cold, stark, lifeless, or serene and restful, or perhaps bland, dull, boring." The difference in aesthetic perception stems from the difference between the referred categories and their SVCs. In the imaginary community, each of the examples of guernicas has the same depictive contents as *Guernica*, and the colors and lines viewed head-on are identical to those of Picasso's *Guernica*. However, guernicas is imagined as an art category that creates variations by undulating in the manner of a three-dimensional relief map. Whereas flatness is standard and what is depicted is variable for the painting category, what is depicted is standard and each undulation is variable for the guernicas category. The impression Picasso's *Guernica* provides to us and to the inhabitants of a fictional community familiar with guernicas would be considerably different. While *Guernica* is a

highly innovative work in terms of the variable feature of painting (what it depicted), it is a work that is either uninteresting or ironic in terms of the variable feature of Guernicas (what undulations it has).

The aesthetic response to a work depends on whether the perceived features are standard, variable, or contra-standard to us, and, in turn, depends on the category in which we perceive items. Section 3 of the CA also lists several other interesting kinds of examples:

- Examples where the presence of standard features is ignored (CA: 343–7). When we look at a portrait or a bust of a person, we do not feel the dissimilarity to the model due to the fact that the painting is flat or painted, or that the bust is uniformly colored and cut off at the chest. This is because these features are standard for paintings or busts, and are usually ignored when we perceive items in these categories.
- Examples where standard features give a sense of order (CA: 348–9). Classical sonatas have a standard form, and works that conform to this form give the impression of being authentic classical sonatas.
- Examples where standard features form a constraint (CA: 349–51). For a piano sonata, it is variable how long a given note lasts, but it is standard for it to fall within a certain range. Because it is heard within the constraints of this medium, certain piano passages that are relatively stretched are heard as cantabile. Conversely, if a piece is listened to in electronic music with no constraint on standard speed, one may not feel energy and brilliance, no matter how fast the piece is.
- Examples where standard features form a rule (CA: 351–2). The tension and sense of release with the progress of a particular modulation are perceived because the work is perceived under the rules of sonatas.
- Examples where contra-standard features are present to some extent that they do not alter the categorization (CA: 352–4). Yves Klein's monochrome paintings are painted in one color in a way that is contra-standard for traditional painting, and shocking when seen in it.

This list goes much of the way toward exemplifying art categories, but the issue of specificity remains to be addressed until the normative thesis is developed. Walton also imagines cases outside art in which an item is perceived in different categories. An elephant that appears small and charming in the category of elephants can be seen as large and powerful in the fictional category of mini-elephants (CA: 350–1). The psychological thesis under explanation can also be applied to aesthetic judgments of natural objects.

1.1.1.3 Perceptually Distinguishable Categories

Categories and their SVCs affect aesthetic perception in various ways, and, in turn, aesthetic judgment. In Walton's scenario, however, we do *not* grasp the conditions of category membership, infer from them that a work belongs to that category, and then mobilize the knowledge thus gained to make aesthetic judgments. As Laetz (2010) argues and I agree, Walton seems to respect the formalist thesis that aesthetic judgments are based solely on perception by showing that categories are also non-inferentially grasped by perception. In other words, we not only perceive *in* categories, we perceive categories. In CA, Walton introduces the concept of *perceptually distinguishable categories* (hereafter PDCs) without specifying his motivation.

> Such categories include media, genre, styles, forms, and so forth—for example, the categories of paintings, cubist paintings, Gothic architecture, classical sonatas, paintings in the style of Cezanne, and music in the style of late Beethoven—if they are interpreted in such a way that membership is determined solely by features that can be perceived in a work when it is experienced in the normal manner. Thus whether or not a piece of music was written in the eighteenth century is irrelevant to whether it belongs to the category of classical sonatas (interpreted in this way), and whether a work was produced by Cezanne or Beethoven has nothing essential to do with whether it is in the style of Cezanne or late Beethoven. (CA: 338–9)

The PDC is grasped simply by the perceiver perceiving the gestalt of the corresponding category (CA: 340). Groups of items that appear to be paintings, cubist paintings, or Cézanne paintings in their perceptual aspects do not necessarily correspond to groups of works that are actually paintings, belong to the cubist movement, or were made by Cézanne. Walton (2020: 80) contrasts PDC with a group of categories "membership in them depending as it does on circumstances of works' genesis," i.e., *historical categories*. Perhaps for simplicity, Walton also includes the category of painting as an example of PDC in the above quote, but strictly speaking, this should mean a category grouping items that *appear to be* paintings. Even everyday categories such as painting and photography are not

strictly PDC but historical categories. Pictorialist photographs, such as Robert Demachy's *Speed* (1904), are actually photographs but at the same time apparent paintings, and Superrealist paintings, such as Chuck Close's *Big Self-portrait* (1969), are actually paintings but at the same time apparent photographs. In this passage, Walton seems to limit his discussion of CA to PDC.

A PDC is stipulated as a category based solely on perceptible features and whose members can be identified only via perception. Clearly, the categories thus stipulated are distinct from the categories of art with which we deal every day. We usually make a judgment based on the fact that an item is a real painting or a Cézanne painting, and not simply on the fact that it is an apparent painting or apparent Cézanne painting. Even if such an appearance-based judgment is made, it is unlikely to be considered justified in any way.

There is little explicit statement in the CA as to why the item PDC was introduced, and Walton (2020: 81) also seems uncertain about his intention at the time. Laetz (2010: 301) interprets Walton as taking a concessionary position toward formalism. If Laetz is right, Walton was fully committed to the formalist thesis that aesthetic judgments are purely perceptual. On the other hand, Davies (2020: 76) points out that it would beg the question to discuss the role of historical categories in developing a valid counterargument against the formalists. If Davies is right, Walton introduced PDC as a strategy, not a concession, and was only tentatively committed to the thesis that aesthetic judgments are purely perceptual.

It seems to me that the role of the PDC falls somewhere in between these two interpretations. The central purpose of the CA, as I interpret it, is to reconcile the perceptual nature of aesthetic judgments with the role played by contextual facts and the PDC is introduced as relevant to this purpose. To state that those categories unidentifiable without investigating facts outside the work influence aesthetic judgments is to give up the perceptual nature of aesthetic judgments. In other words, in identifying the categories, the inference that Sibley attempted to exclude intervenes in the process of aesthetic judgment. Only by assuming that categories are perceived can Walton consistently describe category-dependent aesthetic judgments as entirely perceptual processes. In this respect,

Laetz's interpretation is plausible, however, in favor of Davies's interpretation, it is also true that introducing the PDC allows for an objection to the traditional formalism without begging the question. Therefore, PDCs are both a concession and a strategy. Nevertheless, whether it was appropriate to introduce them, as suggested above, in light of CA's purpose, will be a central consideration in the latter part of this chapter.

Thus, we arrive at the *Psychological Thesis* (CA: 343; Laetz 2010: 290): an individual's aesthetic perception and aesthetic judgment of an item depend on the category in which it is perceived and judged; different categories accompany different weightings of SVCs assigned to non-aesthetic properties, and different weightings lead to different aesthetic responses by the perceiver. Simply put, what aesthetic properties we see and hear depends on what category we see and hear them in.

1.1.2 The Normative Thesis

1.1.2.1 Correctness for Judgments and Contextual Facts

Does the psychological thesis imply that aesthetic judgments can only be true or false in a category-relative manner? In other words, do we perceive different aesthetic properties based on different categories and SVCs, and is there no objectivity in this? For example, one person may perceive the roughness of *Guernica* in category *C1*, while another may perceive the calmness of *Guernica* in category *C2*. Under relativism, both judgments would be correct, and *Guernica* could not be described as rough or calm simply. Such a picture makes disagreement about aesthetic judgment, and learning and training to make better aesthetic judgments, incomprehensible. Walton sees this consequence as problematic and moves toward objectivism about aesthetic judgments.

Walton acknowledges categorical relativism when it comes to aesthetic judgments of natural objects, but rejects it when it comes to aesthetic judgments of artifacts such as works of art (CA: 355). Anyone who judges *Guernica* as cold and rigid *as a guernicas* is not making a category-relatively correct judgment, but is simply wrong. This raises the question: when is an aesthetic judgment of a work of art *correct*? According to CA, the correct judgment should be based on the appropriate perception, and the appropriate perception should be based on the correct category.

> [A]t least in some cases, it is correct to perceive a work in certain categories, and incorrect to perceive it in certain others; that is, our judgments of it when we perceive it in the former are likely to be true, and those we make when perceiving it in the latter false. (CA: 356)

Here again, Walton's reservation, "at least in some cases," suggests that the aesthetic perception of a work of art is not *always* a matter of correct categories. Walton does not deny that there are works of art that can be viewed under any category. However, such cases are not exemplified or treated in detail.

The question is, in the kind of cases where correctness is at stake, which are the categories in which it is correct to perceive a work of art, and what determines them (hereafter, I will use *correct categories* as an abbreviation). While acknowledging that the factors involved in the determination are diverse and that no single criterion applies to all cases, Walton points to four "several fairly definite considerations" concerning circumstances which "count toward its being correct to perceive a work, *W*, in a given category, *C*" (CA: 357).

> (i) The presence in *W* of a relatively large number of features standard with respect to *C*. […] it has a minimum of contra-standard features […].
>
> (ii) *W* is better, or more interesting or pleasing aesthetically, or more worth experiencing when perceived in *C* than it is when perceived in alternative ways.
>
> (iii) the artist who produced *W* intended or expected it to be perceived in *C*, or thought of it as a *C*.
>
> (iv) *C* is well established in and recognized by the society in which *W* was produced. (CA: 357)

Let us call these considerations the (i) conformity, (ii) goodness, (iii) intention, and (iv) establishment criteria, respectively. If there is a category *C* such that its SVCs fit the features of a work, make the work look better, are intended by its author, and are well established in the society in which the work was produced, then it would be very plausible that perceiving the work under *C* is correct. Walton places particular emphasis on the role of criteria (iii) intention, and, for example, considers it correct to hear a Schönberg work as twelve-tone music because it was clearly intended by the author, though

not well established in the society in which it was created (CA: 360–1).[14] In other words, it is inappropriate to regard the music as chaotic in light of traditional tonal music, and it is appropriate to hear it in light of the author's intended twelve-tone music, even if the category is not yet widely recognized. This is a case where the (iii) intention criterion takes precedence over the (iv) establishment criterion.

Both the (iii) intention criterion and the (iv) establishment criterion make us take into account contextual facts that cannot be perceived in artworks. The direct role given to context in CA is to determine the category to be followed, or the appropriate way to perceive it aesthetically. They naturally also determine the aesthetic properties to be found objectively and the aesthetic judgments that are true. Contextual facts do have a role, though indirect, in aesthetic judgments. Thus we obtain the *Normative Thesis*.

However, what, in the end, is the category in which it is *correct* to perceive an artwork, the correctness of which is favored by these considerations? Laetz (2010: 289) addresses this question, pointing out the misunderstanding of the conventional interpretation and offering an alternative interpretation. Although somewhat cumbersome, this is an inescapable matter in understanding CA as a unique position that differs from ordinary contextualism. In what follows, I will refer to the conventional interpretation as the *equivalence interpretation* and the interpretation by Laetz as the *partial equivalence interpretation* (or the *partial interpretation* for the sake of brevity), and will summarize them respectively.

1.1.2.2 The Equivalence Interpretation of Correct Categories

The fact that there are *correct* categories in which it is correct to perceive an artwork, and that there are the considerations listed above concerning its correctness, naturally suggests the following interpretation. That is, the correct categories in which a work should be perceived are none other than *categories to which the work actually belongs*. For example, since *Guernica* belongs to the categories of painting, Cubism, and depictions of aerial bombings but *not* to the categories of sculpture,

[14] See Nathan (1973); Walton (1973) for a discussion on the need of the intention criterion.

Impressionism, or undersea depictions, the correct aesthetic judgment of *Guernica* should be based on the former, not the latter.

It is also tempting to understand the four criteria listed by Walton as criteria for whether a work belongs to a specific category. In particular, (iii) being intended and (iv) being an established category are facts that can also be the basis for a work's category membership, and the specific intention, which appears in (iii) the intention criterion, is nothing but an intention regarding category membership. (i) The fact that conformity with SVCs is a consideration is also plausible if one recalls that standard/variable/contra-standard features were defined in the first place in terms of their contribution to category membership. In fact, Carroll (2009: 178) and Friend (2012: 187) divert the three criteria as they are, with the exception of (ii) goodness criterion, as clues to identify the category to which an artwork belongs. This scheme is simple anyway. The correct category of an artwork and the category to which it actually belongs are considered equivalent, based on the same considerations. Let us call this the *equivalence interpretation* of the correct categories.

However, the equivalence interpretation is inconsistent with Walton's argument and is officially rejected by Walton (2020). As Laetz (2010) points out, a significant discrepancy emerges from Walton's limitation of his argument to PDC early in CA. Recall that a PDC is a category whose "membership is determined solely by features that can be perceived in a work" (CA: 339). Here, it is stipulated that having suitable perceptual features is necessary and sufficient for belonging to a PDC. That membership in a PDC is determined in this manner is inconsistent with the interpretation that the four considerations, including contextual facts, are the general criteria for category membership (Laetz 2010: 296). PDCs are, by definition, categories whose membership is determined solely by perceptible features. So, it makes no sense that when it comes to determining the correct PDC for a given artwork among its multiple PDCs, we care about contextual facts to let us know the categories it actually belongs to. This eventually makes it unclear whether category membership in Walton is context-dependent or context-independent. To resolve the inconsistency, we must either consider that CA has already lifted its limitation to the PDC or reject the equivalence interpretation. And if PDC

plays such a theoretically important role, as we have already seen, it is hard to believe that Walton has implicitly abandoned it.

Laetz (2010: 296–7) points out two other issues where the equivalence interpretation is inconsistent with the argument of CA. First, equivalence interpretation does not allow for the demarcation that Walton was trying to draw between aesthetic judgments of works of art and aesthetic judgments of natural objects. Walton generally accepted categorical relativism concerning aesthetic judgments of natural objects (CA: 355). However, it is clear that there are categories to which natural objects belong. My dog is a dog, not a cat. If we equate the correct categories with the categories to which items actually belong, then the Normative Thesis also holds for aesthetic judgments of natural objects. Second, the equivalence interpretation does not allow us to avoid the categorical relativism that Walton was trying to avoid concerning aesthetic judgments of works of art. Insofar as there is more than one category to which a work of art actually belongs, aesthetic judgments about it will fall into categorical relativism. In sum, the equivalence interpretation does not allow Walton to claim what he is trying to claim by appealing to the correct categories.

Thus, we must also be careful with the expression "correct category," which many commentators use relatively casually. The correct category is too quickly associated with the category to which a work of art actually belongs. However, such an equivalence interpretation is not an interpretation that is consistent with Walton's argument. We must also note that Walton prefers to refer to artworks being "correctly perceived" rather than being perceived in the "correct category." Strictly speaking, correctness does not apply to a category, but to perceiving in a category. In this sense, the correctness of a categorization is not the same as the fact that a work actually belongs to that category. In the context of examining Walton's position, "correct categories" must be used only as an abbreviation to indicate the category in which it is correct to perceive an artwork.

Later, Walton (2020: 80) explicitly rejected the equivalence interpretation:

> A work might be perceived correctly in categories to which it does not belong, or belong to categories it is not correctly perceived in. (Walton 2020: 80)

The four "considerations" mentioned in the previous section are also thereby clarified as not intended to be criteria for determining category membership, but rather to be "criteria for determining which categories a work is correctly perceived in" (Walton 2020: 84). What, then, is the correct category if not just the category to which an artwork actually belongs?

1.1.2.3 The Partial Interpretation of Correct Categories

Laetz rephrases the notion of a "correct category" in Walton as the *aesthetically active category*, which allows a more nuanced interpretation of this notion:

> A different way to see Walton's discussion supposes that a correct category is not merely one that a work belongs to. Rather, among all the various categories any work belongs to, it is a special, privileged category that actually helps determine a work's aesthetic character. On this interpretation, seeking a correct category to judge a work is not to seek a category that it belongs to; instead, it is to seek—among all the categories we already know it belongs to—one that is aesthetically active. [...] Walton's historical guidelines are not intended to discern what aesthetically relevant categories a work belongs to, on this view. We already know what perceptually distinguishable categories a work belongs to via perception. The guidelines are merely meant to determine which of these is actually aesthetically active. (Laetz 2010: 296)

In this interpretation, Walton introduces PDCs as a subset of the categories to which a work actually belongs. The fact that a category is perceptually distinguishable in a work entails that the work belongs to the category, by the definition of the PDC. In Laetz's (2010: 298) account, *Guernica* actually belongs to both PDCs of apparent painting and apparent guernicas. Therefore, the line of belonging/not belonging is not a line that serves to exclude apparent guernicas from the correct categories in which it is correct to perceive *Guernica*. According to Laetz, the four considerations are only used to further narrow down the PDCs. They draw the line between aesthetically active and aesthetically inactive in PDCs, not between what an artwork actually belongs or does not belong in all categories. The "correct categories" of an artwork are a part of PDCs, which are a part of the

categories to which it actually belongs. Let us call this the *partial interpretation* of the correct categories (See Figure 1).



Figure 1: Partial Interpretation of Correct Categories

According to the partial interpretation, the aesthetically active category normatively supported by the four considerations is the correct category to follow for correct aesthetic judgment and appropriate aesthetic perception. And an aesthetically active category for a given artwork is necessarily also a category to which the artwork actually belongs, insofar as CA limits its argument to PDC. Laetz interprets the Normative Thesis in this way. The partial interpretation is an interpretation more sensitive to PDC introduced by Walton for specific purposes. Laetz's conclusion that the partial interpretation approximates Walton's intention better than the equivalence interpretation seems plausible to me. However, the partial interpretation is not without its own inconsistencies with CA, and I do not think that all of the arguments presented by Laetz to dismiss the equivalence interpretation have been successful.

Laetz attributes to Walton (1) aesthetic relativism for natural objects and (2) aesthetic anti-relativism for works of art, and from these perspectives, he dismisses the equivalence interpretation of correct categories. If the correct categories of an artwork are those to which it actually belongs, then bringing up the correct category does not support (1) and (2). However, as far as I interpret CA, Walton did not introduce the correct category in order to support those two positions. Therefore, the fact that it does not serve these purposes is not material to dismissing the equivalence interpretation of the correct categories.

First, CA does not advocate relativism about natural objects as strongly and clearly as Laetz interprets it. According to Laetz, if one adopts the equivalence interpretation, "Walton's denial that there are correct categories for nature is tantamount to denying that natural objects belong to categories" (Laetz 2010: 296). Laetz dismisses the equivalence interpretation because this consequence is not plausible, but I think he overstates this issue. Walton himself does not say that there are no correct categories for natural objects—he merely states that his account for aesthetic judgments of artworks "is not readily applicable to most judgments about natural objects" (CA: 355). This sentence can plausibly be read to mean that there *are* correct categories to be followed in aesthetic judgments of natural objects, but the criteria do not depend on the intentional and social considerations he lists below. CA interpreted in this way is compatible with views such as Carlson's (2000), which defend objectivism regarding aesthetic judgments of natural objects. When he discussed the correctness of categories, Walton was not committed to aesthetic relativism about natural objects.

Second, CA does not advocate anti-relativism about works of art as strongly and clearly as Laetz interprets it. According to Laetz, works often belong to more than one category, so appealing to the category to which they actually belong does not settle competing aesthetic judgments. Laetz (2010: 297) worries that *Twilight* (2008) has a particular aesthetic property as a vampire movie and a different aesthetic property as a teen romance, but to be concerned with relativism here and to state that only one of the categories is aesthetically active, is to give away part of a very legitimate aesthetic

judgment about this work. There are countless similar examples, and we indeed often make multifaceted aesthetic judgments about an artwork. Even Walton (CA: 362) speaks of the richness of an artwork in cases where there are multiple acceptable ways of perceiving it. When he brought up the correct categories, Walton was not trying to demolish aesthetic relativism about artworks.

Note that whether one adopts the equivalence interpretation or the partial interpretation does not affect the four considerations listed by Walton as considerations contributing to the correctness of categories, so it is not plausible that these considerations could only work to undermine relativism when one adopts the partial interpretation and not if one adopts the equivalence interpretation. It is easy to imagine a case where these considerations could sustain relativism because they support multiple aesthetically active categories to the same degree.[15]

Even though the above points somewhat remove the motivation to adopt it, I still believe that the partial interpretation is a better interpretation than the equivalence interpretation in that it is an interpretation more sensitive to the item of PDC. To fail to understand the significance of Walton's introduction of PDC and to understand the correct categories under the equivalence interpretation in the same way as a standard contextualist threatens to trivialize Walton's position as a very standard contextualism. However, it is not easy to read CA as a straightforward contextualist in light of its purpose and arguments. Walton was clearly developing a more elaborate position, and to recognize this we will adopt the partial interpretation for now and move on.

[15] A further concern, albeit minor, is that the partial interpretation does not fit the first half of Walton's comment that "A work might be perceived correctly in categories to which it does not belong, or belong to categories it is not correctly perceived in" (Walton 2020: 80). In the partial interpretation, the correct categories for a work are necessarily also the categories to which it belongs. However, what is a category to which an artwork does not belong but in which it is correct to perceive it? If it is a category to which an artwork does not belong, then, by definition, it is not a PDC of the work, and it goes beyond Walton's own scope. As we lack any other clues, it is unclear what categories Walton had in mind in the above quote. Therefore, on this point, we should assess Walton's explanation as incomplete rather than assessing Laetz's interpretation as being at fault.

1.1.3 The Ontological Thesis

Section 5 of CA, which contains an argument too rich to be titled "Conclusion," makes two commitments: one ontological, the other epistemological. Neither of these theses is a direct consequence of the two theses we have seen so far, but they are theses that involve further commitments.

One argument included in CA that is rarely addressed speaks to its ontological commitment. The four "considerations" discussed above, including contextual facts, are addressed as more than mere clues. The considerations are not merely used as hints to identify the correct categories. Instead, it is these four facts relevant to a work that *determine* the aesthetic properties the work actually possesses (CA: 357; Walton 2020: 84).

> It should be emphasized that the relevant historical facts are not merely useful aids to aesthetic judgment; they do not simply provide hints concerning what might be found in the work. Rather they help to *determine* what aesthetic properties a work has; they, together with the work's nonaesthetic features, *make* it coherent, serene, or whatever. (CA: 364)

It is plausible to interpret the "determine" here as an ontological grounding or constitution,[16] not merely as a determination in the sense that an interpreter is convinced or confirmed of a particular fact. The remark that historical facts are not mere hints but *make* a work coherent or serene more clearly supports this interpretation. In other words, an ontological constitutive relationship is recognized between relevant facts and aesthetic properties. Let us call this the *Ontological Thesis*.

This is a strong thesis because it makes Walton commit not only to objectivism regarding aesthetic judgments, but also to realism regarding aesthetic properties. Logically, neither the fact that objective correctness can be asked for aesthetic judgments nor the fact that aesthetic properties are real on the side of the environment entails the other. It is possible to endorse objectivism and also anti-realism (e.g., Goldman 1995; Genka 2017). However, by the Normative and Ontological Theses,

[16] See Benovsky (2012) for these ontological relations concerning aesthetic properties.

Walton seems to have chosen a more orthodox position, both objectivism and realism (e.g., Zemach 1997; Zangwill 2001; Levinson 2001; 2005).

Walton can delve into the ontology of aesthetic properties because CA's arguments have consistently centered on perception, and because, as Genka (2015: 197) points out, "perception bridges the ontological matter of what exists in the environment and the epistemological matter of how we know it." Perceptual experiences reflect how things are in the environment (Hopkins 2012: 711). In normal circumstances (I am not hallucinating, the light is sufficient, etc), if I perceive that an item is elegant, and perceive it in its correct category supported by the four considerations (in Walton's sense, perceive it correctly), it is the case in the environment that the item is elegant. As the correct aesthetic perception partly depends on contextual facts, the aesthetic properties represented in perception are also ontologically dependent on the same contextual facts. It is precisely because perception is a transparent interface to reality that such an ontological dependency can be noted. If an aesthetic judgment is not purely perceptual and mobilizes inference or interpretation, it does not guarantee that what is represented is the case in the environment.

The four considerations, including historical facts, directly determine the correct category of an artwork and indirectly determine the aesthetic properties that the work actually possesses. The ontological dependencies in CA can be summarized as follows:

Ontological Contextualism in CA

(1) Contextual facts relevant to an artwork ontologically determine (2) the category in which it is correct to perceive the work (proper aesthetic perceptions of the work) which ontologically determines (3) the aesthetic property that the artwork actually possesses (correct aesthetic judgments about the work).

Since dependencies are transitive, we can say that the aesthetic properties of an artwork are often and partly based on contextual facts about the work. I believe this is what Walton meant when he stated that historical facts make a work coherent. Indeed, Walton (2020: 84) makes it clear that the four considerations and the correct category are not merely connected in the way that the former is an

epistemological cue for the latter, but are in a metaphysical relation of determination. And if the correct categories partly determine aesthetic properties, then the relevant facts partly determine aesthetic properties from the transitivity. Although somewhat unique in that it is via the correct categories and their SVCs, the Ontological Contextualism ultimately supported by Walton is aligned with ordinary contextualists (e.g., Levinson 2007: 4).

On the other hand, Walton is continually cautious concerning the epistemology of aesthetic properties or how we access them. The introduction of PDC and his rejection of the equivalence interpretation of the correct categories suggest that Walton consistently tries to maintain Epistemological Formalism. Walton has not let go of the formalist claim that perception is the solo interface to aesthetic properties, and the remaining part of Section 5 of CA is devoted to defending it.

1.1.4 The Epistemological Thesis

Appropriate aesthetic perception depends on contextual facts associated with categories. Perceivers must have relevant *categorical expertise* in some way, but the question is what precisely this expertise is. Walton emphasizes that this is not knowledge in the narrow sense. Even if a set of contextual facts underlie an aesthetic property, one could succeed in accessing the aesthetic property without knowing the underlying facts, and one might fail to do so even with knowledge of the underlying facts. Walton argues that the key is not knowledge independent of perception, but rather the *training* of perceptual skills.

> Perceiving a work in a certain category or set of categories is a skill that must be acquired by training, and exposure to a great many other works of the category or categories in question is ordinarily, I believe, an essential part of this training. (CA: 366)

An amateur without sufficient experience with examples of a category may fail to perceive aesthetic properties in two ways. First, an amateur who has not grasped the relevant discriminative features may be unable to identify the instances of the category. If one does not know what perceptual features are standard for Cubist painting, one cannot identify the members in the first place. Second, and perhaps more importantly, even if a category could be identified (relying on testimony, for example), the

amateur may be at a loss for how to respond aesthetically to it. Even if one is informed that the correct category for the work at hand is Cubist painting and that it must be seen as such (and one trusts the information), if one has no grasp of what it means to see it as a Cubist painting, its aesthetic properties will not pop up. Amateurs cannot perceive the categories, nor can they perceive in the categories.

Thus, aesthetic perception and judgment are very much a matter of perceptual expertise, not of know-what, but of know-how. In this respect, the phenomenon that Walton seems to have in mind is not so much compatible with the cognitive penetration discussed by Stokes (2014), but with the perceptual learning as discussed by Ransom (2022). Stokes addresses the phenomenon of the perception of aesthetic properties being affected by some cognitive state (knowledge, beliefs, desires, and so on). For example, a perceiver who knows from a set of contextual facts that a painting should be seen as a Cubist painting may perceive elegance in a painting in a way impossible for a perceiver without the knowledge. However, as Ransom (2022: 9) points out, the model of cognitive penetration is inconsistent with the phenomenon Walton addresses in that it focuses on the role played by having some cognitive state, which is necessary for the phenomenon. In CA, possessing relevant propositional knowledge is not necessary for appropriate aesthetic perception.

Instead, CA is concerned with the phenomenon of the perceptual system itself being transformed by the accumulation of relevant cognitive and non-cognitive training. According to Ransom (2022: 12–4), perceivers who have undergone attentional weighting and stimulus imprinting through repeated exposure to certain types of stimuli acquire prototypical representations that enable them to distinguish an instance of a given category. If the perceiver has learned from appropriate samples of Cubist paintings and has acquired the appropriate prototype representation, she has acquired the ability to detect the members of Cubist paintings. Gaining knowledge of relevant facts might be helpful in terms of speeding up the formation of prototypes, but it is not necessary. Walton (2020: 82) also argues that it is perceptual dispositions that are acquired through training, and that trained perceivers are automatically able to perceive in the appropriate category without thinking. In general, Walton seems to exclude from his scenario the process of forming knowledge about the

relevant contextual facts through investigation and mobilizing factual knowledge to infer the correct category of works.[17]

We thus gain the *Epistemological Thesis*. While holding the Normative Thesis (context determines correct judgments) and the Ontological Thesis (context determines actual properties), Walton rejects "aesthetic judgments" that investigate and infer from context. Proper aesthetic judgment is instead described as follows: one acquires the relevant perceptual faculties by being exposed to many examples of a category and becomes able to automatically perceive in the category; then, one can make non-inferential and perceptual aesthetic judgments by automatically inputting non-aesthetic properties and outputting aesthetic properties. This process does not include the acquisition or mobilization of knowledge in the narrow sense.

Naturally, contextual facts relevant to an artwork may be investigated. When a critic who has undergone the necessary perceptual learning and is consciously trying to make the correct aesthetic judgment realizes that an artwork is perceptible in more than one category, she may wish to obtain assurance in which category she can perceive the aesthetic properties the work actually possesses. The knowledge gained in this motivation may influence the critic's aesthetic judgment. Walton (2020: 82) acknowledges the role of this knowledge, but does not incorporate it into his main picture. He hastens to add that:

> Nevertheless, we often perceive and judge works of art without making use of, or even bothering to acquire, the art-historical information that bears on which categories they are

[17] The model of perceptual learning is not without its concerns. While Stokes (2014: 5) acknowledges the phenomenon of perceptual learning for evolutionarily important categories (such as food), he is skeptical of the account of a fundamental transformation of the perceptual system concerning art categories. Goldstone (1998: 587), cited by Ransom (2022), also characterizes perceptual learning as improving a creature's ability to apply itself to its environment, but Walton and Ransom do not explain where this characteristic is found in perceptual learning in art. It does not seem that transforming perceptual systems for Cubism immediately contributes to our ability to apply ourselves to our environment. This point will be an explanatory problem for those who appeal to perceptual learning in art.

> correctly perceived in, and no doubt, we frequently perceive them correctly and judge them accurately. (Walton 2020: 82)

The investigation of contextual facts is a relatively trivial task for Walton: checking aesthetic perceptions and judgments. The knowledge gained through this investigation has a causal role in choosing among the categories that are already available options through perceptual learning, but no further role. Walton carefully excludes scenarios in which having art historical knowledge makes one capable of perceiving a specific categorical or aesthetic perception, or in which aesthetic perception requires specific factual knowledge.

If my above interpretation is correct, and if Walton's argument is right, then CA has succeeded in reconciling two positions that are apparently in tension.

> **Ontological Contextualism in Walton (1970)**
>
> The aesthetic properties possessed by an artwork are not always entirely grounded by its perceptual features, but are often partly grounded by contextual facts related to it.
>
> **Epistemological Formalism in Walton (1970)**
>
> For grasping the aesthetic properties possessed by an artwork, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to know the contextual facts related to it, but all mobilized for that is one's perceptual faculty.

Almost from the very beginning, Walton stated:

> [T]he view that works of art should be judged simply by what can be perceived in them is seriously misleading, though there is something right in the idea that what matters aesthetically about a painting or a sonata is just how it looks or sounds. (CA: 337)

Now the true intention of this ambivalent sentence is clear. The view that "works of art should be judged simply by what can be perceived in them" is misleading because it is often understood as ontologically formalist.[18] If the Ontological Contextualism is correct, the aesthetic properties of a

[18] As Walton also points out, this view is also misleading in that it suggests that even perceptual learning outside of the judged artwork is not necessary.

work of art are not always grounded fully by its perceptual features. On the other hand, Walton acknowledges something right in the view that "what matters aesthetically about a painting or a sonata is just how it looks or sounds," because Walton himself is committed to Epistemological Formalism. As Laetz points out, the latter commitment has often been overlooked and Walton has been misinterpreted as an ordinary contextualist. I guess it is precisely because of this that a minor revision to the version of CA in the 2008 collection of essays makes the following modification:

> [T]he view that works of art should be judged simply by what can be perceived in them is seriously misleading. *Nevertheless* there is something right in the idea that what matters aesthetically about a painting or a sonata is just how it looks or sounds. (Walton 2008: 197, my italic)

The previous sentence is split into two sentences here, with more emphasis on the latter part. CA is a unique paper, committed not only to Ontological Contextualism but also to Epistemological Formalism.

1.2 Rethinking Perceptually Distinguishable Categories

According to my interpretation, PDC is introduced as an important part of the argument for both Ontological Contextualism and Epistemological Formalism. It is important for the Ontological Thesis that the relevant categories are perceptually distinguishable because if the grasping of categories is by inference or interpretation, it is no longer a transparent process, and the argument that the aesthetic property ultimately attributed is one that the item actually possesses collapses. It is also important for the Epistemological Thesis that the categories involved are perceptually distinguishable because if the grasping of categories is by inference or interpretation, then it cannot be said that aesthetic judgments of works of art are judgments that purely mobilize only perceptual faculties. However, there are problems with this idea, as I described below.

1.2.1 An Objection from Agency

To begin with, a category that fits the strict definition of PDC may not play the role that Walton expected. Davies (2020: 77–9) makes this point in terms of the lack of *agency* in PDC. According to Davies (2013a; 2020), it matters in art appreciation in general that the object of appreciation is an artifact:

> We apprehend a canvas in terms of an artistic, rather than a physical, medium, that is, as composed of brushstrokes rather than marks, and design rather than pattern (Davies 2020: 78)

As even Beardsley (1982b), a leading formalist, acknowledges, the object of appreciation in dance is not physical movement but moving and posing. To characterize the aesthetic judgment of artworks, it is essential to recognize that the objects are not items randomly generated in the environment, but items created by human beings with a specific intention.

The ontology of social or artifact kinds would be helpful to understand the "agency" that should be kept in mind when making aesthetic judgments about an artwork. It is widely acknowledged that being a work of art or belonging to a particular art kind is a social fact that depends on our beliefs and behaviors (Kubala forthcoming). A PDC, where merely exemplifying a certain perceptual feature is both necessary and sufficient for an item to belong to it, is the opposite of such a social or artifact kind. An item may be a work of art, a sculpture, or a Cubist painting insofar as it is situated in an artistic context and subject to particular beliefs and regards. According to Davies (2020: 78–9), the agency is a second-order property concerning how non-aesthetic properties are brought about, thus ascribing the weightings of SVCs to non-aesthetic properties. The fact that the painting is not merely an apparent Impressionist painting, but is actually a member of the category of Impressionist paintings, makes this fact normatively influential on the correctness of aesthetic judgments and the aesthetic properties that the work actually possesses.

If we put weight on this fact, we ought perhaps to let go of Epistemological Formalism and re-interpret the CA argument in a way consistent with the equivalence interpretation. Regardless of his explicit intention, Walton was forced to put aside PDCs and discuss historical categories when he

addressed the correct categories grounded by the four considerations. In this regard, it is puzzling that Walton (2020: 84) states that "[t]here is no good reason to suppose that exactly the same criteria, similarly weighted, govern category membership." It is puzzling because, first, the categories of art that appear in the author's intentions or are socially established are sculpture and Impressionist painting, not *apparent* sculpture or *apparent* Impressionist painting. It is not easy to conceive of a case in which a certain work of art is intended to be of an apparent *C* but is not intended to be a *C*, or a case in which the category of apparent *C* is established at the time of publication but the category of *C* is not established. When (iii) the intention criterion or (iv) the establishment criterion supports a PDC, the same considerations also support a historical category. As proponents of the equivalence interpretation hold, there are good reasons to suppose so.

The PDCs are parasitic on historical categories (Ransom 2020b: 69). The category of apparent Cubist painting is comprehensible because the category of Cubist painting already exists and is in force. After all, in situations where the four considerations suggest that it is correct to see an artwork in apparent Impressionist painting, the work actually belongs to the Impressionist painting as a historical category as well, and we should regard the latter fact as the normative fact for aesthetic judgments. In light of the purpose of moving from the Psychological Thesis to the Normative Thesis, perhaps it is Walton's side that should let go of the partial interpretation and embrace the equivalence interpretation.

In summary, the tension between the need to step on the agency of works of art and the need to make aesthetic judgments solely in PDCs is perhaps more serious than Walton thought, and the argument in CA does not adequately reconcile that tension. If there is normativity in aesthetic judgments of works of art that is not present in aesthetic judgments of natural objects (CA: 355), it is based on the agency of art kinds, i.e., that they are social and artifact kinds associated with the beliefs and behavior of people.[19]

[19] Incidentally, many commentators, including Davies, have emphasized agency as one whose source is the author's intention. According to them, an item belongs to category *C* because it is intended to perform the

1.2.2 An Objection from the Perceivability of Kind Properties

Walton does not say much about perceptual categorization. It reads as if it is just assumed that we have the capacity to perform perceptual categorization. However, if the perceptual categorization in Walton corresponds to the perception of kind properties in the philosophy of perception, as Genka (2015) argues, then Walton is committed to a highly controversial position. It is widely accepted that we see and hear, i.e., represent in perception, lower-order properties such as color and shape, whereas it is not necessarily obvious that kind properties are perceptible.[20] Kind properties such as being a dog or being a Cubist painting may not be represented in perception, but only in judgment via inference and interpretation based on the perception of the base properties.

It is also unclear that perceptual learning, as discussed by Ransom (2022), is a process equivalent to the perception of kind properties, as the name implies. It is true that trained perceivers experience the world differently than untrained perceivers. After a perceiver acquires the ability to distinguish a pine tree from random trees, the pine tree will pop up in the perceiver's experience differently than before (Siegel 2006). However, such a phenomenological change may not be due to the ability to perceive pineness as a kind property in the object, but only due to enhanced awareness of a group of (lower-order) discriminative features relevant to pine trees.[21]

We cannot settle the question of the perceivability of kind properties here, so let me discuss both possibilities. If we suppose that kind properties are *not* perceptible (the first possibility), the argument in CA will be problematic in two ways. First, the Ontological Thesis via the transparent

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function of category *C*, or simply because it is intended to belong to *C*. Nevertheless, it is debatable to regard authorial intention as a necessary condition for belonging to a social or artifact kind. The collective belief of the relevant agents (not necessarily the author) that an artwork is a member of *C*, or the fact that it actually performs the functions of *C* (or at least be expected and accepted as such), may be sufficient conditions for it to belong to *C* (Evnine 2015; Terrone 2021). The relationship between art categories and authors' intentions will be discussed in Chapter 4.

[20] See Bayne (2009); Brogaard (2013); Siegel (2006); Genka (2017).

[21] See Ransom (2020a) for a response to this concern.

nature of perception cannot be developed.[22] If categorical judgments are interpretive judgments that mobilize other than perceptual faculties, and if aesthetic judgments include this process, there is no longer any reason to believe that they reflect the reality of the side of the environment. Unlike perception, interpretation is not transparent. Second, apparently, the commitment to Epistemic Formalism becomes unsustainable. If inferences and interpretations are made in the process of grasping categories, aesthetic judgments can no longer be said to be made by mobilizing perception alone, and CA would be in a position not much different from ordinary contextualism. In sum, if kind properties are not perceptible in the first place, Walton loses his grounds for supporting both Ontological Contextualism and Epistemological Formalism.

What if kind properties *are* perceptible (the second possibility)? In my opinion, PDC would be unnecessary in this case, since categories that we can perceive by looking at the item are no longer apparent painting or apparent Cubist painting as PDC, but simply painting or Cubist painting. There is no substantial difference between perceiving dogness and perceiving apparent dogness. All that is required in this case is the reservation that the category so perceived is associated with a discriminative perceptual prototype. Indeed, Ransom (2020b: 69), who supports the perceivability of kind properties, believes that PDC is unnecessary in the framework of perceptual learning. Ransom cites two reasons. First, the discriminative perceptual prototype of a PDC of apparent Cubist painting is clearly identical to that of a non-PD historical category of Cubism. As mentioned above, the former is parasitic on the latter. Second, in perceptual learning, our training set for forming a prototype is usually not items belonging to the apparent Cubist painting, but works belonging to Cubism. If it is causally determined from the training set what the prototype representation formed is, then it is a prototype for Cubist painting, not one for apparent Cubist painting. In sum, if kind properties are perceptible, there is no need for PDC, and the perceptual category in a more minimal sense is sufficient.

[22] See Genka (2015) for this line of objection to CA.

To organize, let us divide the grounding relationship between property and category membership into the following cases.

(1) Perceptual properties fully ground membership to category *C*.

(2) Perceptual properties partly, and non-perceptual and contextual facts partly ground membership to category *C*.

(3) Non-perceptual and contextual properties fully ground membership to category *C*.

The PDC in CA eliminated not only (3) but also (2) by stipulating categories whose membership is determined *solely* by perceptual features. However, if Ransom is correct, categories that fall into (2) are also perceptible, and one can perceive artworks in them. Even if the category is partly based on contextual properties, if it is associated with a discriminative perceptual prototype, it can be a category that influences aesthetic perception through perceptual learning. Thus, some historical categories are rescued into the range of CA, unless they are historical categories in the strong sense corresponding to (3).

Perceptual categories in the minimal sense, associated with discriminative perceptual prototypes, are also useful enough for Walton's purpose of maintaining Epistemological Formalism. One of his aims in introducing PDC in CA is to eliminate the categories corresponding to (3) above, specifically the categories of forgery and readymade, and the minimal perceptual categories fully accomplish this aim. The reason forgery cannot be the correct category in which individual works should be perceived is that forgeries have no discriminative perceptual prototype. Insofar as they can be of any appearance, they are not useful for perception in the category in the first place. To show the same thing, there is no need to bring up PDC with its extreme stipulation that the category membership is determined solely by perceptual features. In fact, Walton (2020: 80–1) later acknowledged the need for such a modification and extension.

1.2.3 Are PDCs Kind Properties?

One way to rescue PDCs from the dilemma over the perceivability of kind properties is to suppose that PDCs are not really kind properties. This is somewhat strange and comes at a cost, but it may be

an interpretation consistent with Walton's intention in CA. According to this interpretation, a PDC is merely a paraphrase of a set of perceived features; a category whose "membership is determined solely by features that can be perceived in a work when it is experienced in the normal manner." It simply is a set of properties that can be directly seen and heard. An item can exemplify this set of properties and thus belong to the relevant PDC, but the latter fact is not substantial. There is no difference between an item being apparently red and being apparently a Cubist painting, in the sense that being either may be nothing more than being such as to be disposed to look thus.[23] PDCs are merely more complex than colors, but they are of the same ontological category. On this understanding, a PDC, however complex, is merely a perceptual property, not a kind property.

In fact, the distinction between an entity being a property and being a kind is not clear. Both are universals, exemplified by individual objects and expressed as *Fa* in modern first-order predicate logic. There is a technical debate over this distinction in contemporary ontology,[24] but a discussion of this would take us too far afield. The point here is that there is some room left to understand PDCs not as kind properties, one of the higher-level properties, but simply as complex but perceptible, lower-level properties.[25]

As a result, if we adopt this interpretation, CA would be describing a process where one perceives an aesthetic/non-aesthetic property or a set of them, is somehow non-cognitively affected, and then perceives another aesthetic property. No kind or category is needed for this scenario. Non-aesthetic properties, aesthetic properties, and categorical properties are all perceptual properties, differing only in being complex or simple. This argument depends on whether a higher-level property

[23] See Maund (2022) for a discussion on colors.

[24] See Lowe (2006); Kurata (2017) for discussions on the ontology of kinds.

[25] Relatedly, although hesitant to do so in CA, Walton (2020: 80–1) attempts to count categories that are grounded by aesthetic properties as a kind of PDC as well. "Serene things" could also be a PDC in which an item is perceived. This is because Epistemological Formalism was defended in the conclusion of CA, according to which aesthetic properties are also "features that can be perceived in a work when it is experienced in the normal manner." Thus, categories that are grounded by aesthetic properties are not excluded from PDCs.

such as an aesthetic property is perceptible, but not on whether kinds are perceptible, for kinds do not appear anywhere.

However, when PDCs are interpreted in this way, the first problem of lack of agency becomes more serious. Rather, the lack of agency becomes obvious. The PDC is now exactly the same as the property of being red or triangular, and the item has (or does not have) these properties irrespective of any intention or expectation. If it does not make sense to say, "It looks triangular because it is red," then why does it make sense to say, "It looks graceful because it looks apparent Cubist painting"?

Thus, the theoretical item of the PDC is put in a very unfavorable situation. If a PDC is equivalent to a kind property, and the kind property is not perceptible, then the PDC is invalid. If the kind property is perceptible, then we can go on with everyday, historical categories without bringing up the PDC in the first place. Moreover, if the PDC is not equivalent to the kind property, it cannot account for its normative power over appropriate aesthetic perception and correct aesthetic judgment. This is because if it is merely a perceptual property analogous to shapes and colors, it does not incorporate the agency required for judging an artwork as an artwork.

1.3 Beyond "Categories of Art"

The argument of CA would be more plausible if PDCs were replaced by minimally perceptual categories, which is at the same time partly constituted by contextual facts to compensate for the lack of agency. We aesthetically perceive items in categories that are both artificial and minimally perceptual, such as paintings, Cubist paintings, and Cézanne paintings. Contextual facts partly determine the appropriate aesthetic perception and indirectly determine the aesthetic properties an artwork actually has. Thus, with some modifications, CA's model would be a plausible and insightful model of aesthetic perception, aesthetic judgment, and the role that art categories play therein.

I need to say, however, that Walton's interests and the scope of CA were still very limited. CA is a product of an era in which perceptual aesthetic judgment was considered the central mode of judgment of art. Engagement in hearing the graceful or seeing the gaudy in a work of art no longer

seems to be either exhaustive or central to our engagement with works of art. As will be discussed in detail in the following chapters, the artworld is, or at least became, a much broader and far more pluralistic realm than CA captures. In light of the interests of this dissertation, we need to go further.

1.3.1 Categories and the Formation of Aesthetic Judgments

In general, I will follow Schellekens (2006) and distinguish between the *formation* of an aesthetic judgment and the *justification* of an aesthetic judgment as different processes. We seem to not only form judgments, but also contemplate whether they are appropriate judgments and cite what seems to be reasons to justify or support them. CA barely addresses the role of categories in justifying aesthetic judgments, and addresses only a small part of their role in the formation of aesthetic judgments. Let us begin with the latter limit.

To summarize the role of categories in the formation of aesthetic judgments, the aesthetic judgment "*x* is *F*" is enabled or encouraged by the subject's categorical expertise, or, conversely, is disabled or impeded by it. There were two interpretations of this categorical expertise. According to the model of perceptual learning, *the familiarity* with the relevant categories influences what *x* is perceived as, and, in turn affects what aesthetic judgment is formed. Only subjects who are familiar with Cubist paintings can see the elegance in a painting. Such categorical expertise is considered to be different from knowledge in the narrow sense. As we have already seen, Walton's view in CA was compatible with this model.

However, there was another interpretation of categorical expertise. According to the model of cognitive penetration defended by Stokes (2014), *the cognitive state* of "*x* is *C*" influences what *x* is perceived as, which, in turn, what aesthetic judgment is formed. A painting may seem graceful by virtue of the knowledge that it is a cubist painting, or it may seem less graceful by virtue of the knowledge that it is a forgery. Even if this is not the correct interpretation of the categorical expertise in CA, it is worth believing independently that there are cases in which aesthetic judgments are influenced by the aesthetic perception being cognitively penetrated.[26] Moreover, as Sauchelli (2013:

[26] For an argument supporting the cognitive penetrability of aesthetic perception, see Nanay (2015).

48–9) argues, even if cognitive penetrability of aesthetic perception were denied, we could still argue that knowledge about categories transforms the phenomenological character of aesthetic experience. That is, even if we catch exactly the same group of non-aesthetic properties at the level of perception with or without knowledge, what that perceptual experience feels like as an experience may be influenced by the presence or absence of knowledge. Even if the penetrability at the level of phenomenological character is denied, it is possible to say that the kind of knowledge mobilized in deliberation influences what aesthetic judgments are formed. Knowledge of categories can have influences in many scenes, from early to late in the process of an aesthetic judgment.

When influencing our formation of aesthetic judgments at various levels, categories do not necessarily influence us by making us aware of their SVCs. Laetz (2010: 303–5), by categorizing the variations in the roles that categories of art can play, shows that Walton has covered only a small portion of them. Laetz first divides cases where categories are directly relevant and cases where they are indirectly relevant. As an example of the former, a category such as forgery makes us refrain from certain aesthetic judgments and value judgments simply by the fact that an artwork belongs to it, but this is not the case that Walton focuses on. Laetz then divides indirectly relevant cases into cases where categories are comparatively relevant and cases where they are ideally relevant. As an example of the former, a category such as Cézanne's paintings prompts comparisons with a group of works and a relative judgment by the fact that an artwork belongs to it. However, this is not the case that Walton focuses on either. Finally, Laetz divides ideally relevant cases into cases where categories are teleologically relevant and cases where they are non-teleologically relevant. As an example of the former, a category such as horror encourages the attribution of certain constitutive purposes and evaluative judgments in terms of the adequacy of means and achievement by the fact that an artwork belongs to it. While Carroll (2009) mainly has in mind cases in which categories are teleologically relevant, it is not even this mode that Walton focuses on.

In this branch of different modes, CA focuses only on a specific mode in which categories are indirectly, ideally, and non-teleologically relevant. There, by grasping an art category, we grasp

perceptual SVCs and become aware of in which respects the perceived work is exemplary and in which respects it differs. The distance from the SVCs manifests itself as various aesthetic effects, as has already been variously illustrated. However, if Laetz and the contextualists are correct, categories can directly influence aesthetic judgments, or they can influence aesthetic judgments by presenting comparisons or purposes. The role played by presenting SVCs is only one of these various modes.

1.3.2 Categories and the Justification of Aesthetic Judgments

Categories of art can be involved in the formation of aesthetic judgments in far more ways than Walton focused on. However, categories of art have a further role. They are also involved in the justification of aesthetic judgments. To summarize this role, the appropriateness of an aesthetic judgment "*x* is *F*" is supported by an appeal to the more fundamental fact that "*x* is *G*," but such support is supported by an appeal to a categorical fact that "*x* is *C*." A subject may want to make a correct, accurate, and appropriate judgment, or she may be required to defend her judgment. Categories play a more conscious role when subjects seek support, justification, and reasoning for their judgments. The facts about categories become reasons for why the reasoning is possible. A critic might say that it is a particular rough brushstroke that makes a painting graceful, and when asked why he considers the rough brushstroke to be graceful, he might say that the painting is an Impressionist painting, and Impressionist paintings are meant to be considered that way. While Carroll (2009) is particularly concerned about it, Walton shows little interest in the role of categories in justifying judgments (what we might call meta-justification). CA's focus is consistently on the steps of forming aesthetic judgments.

However, before we can discuss these roles played by categories, we must first make the idea of justification of aesthetic judgments intelligible. I dare say Walton was reluctant to address the issue of justification because, under Sibley's influence, there was a strong consensus to recognize the non-inferential nature of aesthetic judgments. Sibley has always attacked the view that with sufficient evidence, it is possible to conclude by inference, without perception, what the aesthetic character of an item has, i.e., Inferentialism. Anti-inferentialists like Sibley find the justifiability of aesthetic

judgments to immediately threaten the thesis of non-inferentiality. The fact that a critic can make reasoning by citing the features that make a painting graceful (for example., a certain thin curve) seems to entail that the listener can derive the same aesthetic judgment from the same reasoning by mirroring it. However, this entailed view conflicts with the second Sibleyian thesis, the non-inferentiality thesis. Aesthetic judgments are made immediately through perception, and do not seem to be inferred by appeal to any principle. Conversely, if aesthetic judgments cannot be formed inferentially based on any evidence or reason, then critics cannot support or justify their judgments by reason. Since Walton generally shared these views of Sibley, it seems that he rarely went into the issue of justification of aesthetic judgments.

Let us recall, however, that there was a certain tension between the two Sibleyian theses. First, Sibley acknowledges that there are (non-aesthetic) base properties responsible for aesthetic properties. A painting is graceful by virtue of having a thin curve. As a pre-theoretical observation or intuition, it would seem that a critic can support, justify, and defend her aesthetic judgment that it is graceful by referring to such base properties. Indeed, when asked if there is any justification for the aesthetic judgment, the critic will mention the thin curve. More to the point, Sibley (2001: Chap. 3) acknowledges the possibility of critics referring to such base properties to *explain* and even some of the explanation's significance. Still, Sibley's second thesis denies that such an aesthetic explanation is an aesthetic justification. The fact that a painting has a thin curve is not evidence that justifies a critic's judgment, even *pro tanto*, that the painting is graceful. It is argued that pointing out that fact does not bring the critic's judgment any closer to being a judgment worth believing. Here, the first thesis and the observations friendly to it are batting against the second thesis.

Faced with the ambivalent nature of aesthetic judgments, there are several options. First, aesthetic judgments cannot be justified by evidence or reasoning, but may be justified in a non-inferential way. This is the option that Sibley has chosen, and Walton seems to agree implicitly. According to Sibley, the only fact that justifies the aesthetic judgment that a painting is graceful is the experiential fact that it actually looks graceful. Thus, through explanation, the critic can share with a

listener that a judgment is a justified judgment only by causing the listener to have the same perceptual experience. Sibley calls this process *perceptual proof*. The idea of non-inferential justification is suggestive, but it has some problems (Dorsch 2013). Such alternative accounts are ultimately inconsistent with the observation and intuition that critics seem to support, justify, and defend their judgments by presenting some kind of evidence. The possibility of a non-inferential justification does not entail that there cannot be an inferential justification, and no convincing error theory is offered as to why we take a task that is not actually justification, reasoning, or inference mistakenly as one.

There are also several options that defend the justifiability of aesthetic judgments in a way that weakens the second Sibleyian thesis. Schellekens (2006) seeks to resolve the tension by distinguishing between the formation of aesthetic judgments and the justification step, as discussed above, and by distinguishing between aesthetic perception and aesthetic judgment. According to Schellekens (2006: 175–6), aesthetic judgments are derived from reflection, even if aesthetic perception is unmediated or instantaneous. The fact that the formation of aesthetic judgments is based solely on non-inferential aesthetic perception does not preclude the possibility of justifying already formed aesthetic judgments by retrospective reasoning. Conversely, the fact that an aesthetic judgment, such as that a painting is graceful, can be retroactively justified by the fact that it has a certain thin curve, does not entail that one can conclude through prospective reasoning that any given painting is always a graceful painting if it has exactly the same thin curve. If Schellekens is correct, we will find how the non-inferential thesis has been exaggerated. The fact that aesthetic judgments are non-inferential and unmediated in important respects (specifically, in their proper process of formation) is compatible with the recognition of a rational structure of justification between aesthetic and non-aesthetic properties.

Another option is to bravely allow that both the formation and justification of aesthetic judgments can be inferential. Dorsch (2013: 682), after pointing out the difficulties of Non-Inferentialism like Sibley's, suggests the possibility that *implicit* inference like abduction or informed guessing is involved in aesthetic judgments. Even if the view that deductive inference, appealing to general principles, underlies aesthetic judgments is not plausible, we still have room to

argue that aesthetic judgments are based on another type of inference. If Dorsch is correct, we will also find how the non-inferential thesis has been exaggerated. The fact that we cannot form or justify aesthetic judgments by deductive reasoning does not preclude that we can do so by another type of reasoning. Thus, we need not give up the idea that aesthetic judgments have reasons to support, justify, and defend them.

What should be of interest here is the question of what realizes the justifying structure between aesthetic and non-aesthetic properties. After all, how can having a thin curve be a reason for gracefulness? In some cases, the justifying structure has a biological basis. Being symmetrical in composition can be a justifying reason for judging a painting to be beautiful because we equip a perceptual and cognitive system that finds symmetrical design satisfying (Ransom 2022: 127). However, not all aesthetic reasoning can be understood in this way. Marcel Duchamp's *Comb* (1916) is provocative because it is visually mundane. Such a reasoning, in my opinion, cannot be understood without appealing to a category of art like *readymade*. Here, the fact about the art category serves as a non-biological basis, which justifies the justification of the aesthetic judgment. This role played by categories is quite different from the role they play in the formation of aesthetic judgments.

1.3.3 Categories and Art Criticism

Finally, categories not only influence our aesthetic judgments. Art critics do not only care whether a film is dynamic or whether a dance is monotonous. We are concerned with far more diverse qualities, values, and meanings in our appreciation and criticism. *Aesthetic* judgments, as I will provide a detailed argument in the next chapter, are only one kind of judgment that agents make in the artworld. Even if the strong non-inferentiality thesis about aesthetic judgments is defended and their justifiability is denied, it does not entail that a different kind of judgment or response to art is unjustifiable. As many of the commentators examined in the next chapter acknowledge, art criticism can be a reasoned and rational activity, even if aesthetic judgment is not (e.g., Carroll 2009). Each of our various judgments and responses about the quality, value, and meaning of a work of art can be

justified by good reasons, and such a structure of justification is, in my view, associated with the categories of art.

Let us leave further discussions to the following chapters. In sum, categories of art matter in broader contexts and in various ways. As I am generally interested in them, I cannot be satisfied with understanding only the phenomena Walton has addressed.

Moreover, the variety of ways in which categories can be relevant in appreciation and criticism highlights an important unresolved issue in CA. Walton said little or nothing about what art categories are, after all, and how they arise, persist, change, and disappear. It is understood in CA that the repertoire of paintings, Cubist paintings, Cézanne paintings, and so on, are simply assumed to exist in association with their respective SVCs. We need to examine, from an ontological perspective, the art categories that sometimes directly influence aesthetic judgments, sometimes inform us of comparisons, and sometimes inform us of the purposes of artworks. This will be the subject of Chapter 3.

Summary

Around 1970, when "Categories of Art" was published, traditional formalism, which held that aesthetic judgments were based solely on perception, was still strong, and on the other hand, people were gradually becoming aware of the insufficiency of attending to perception alone concerning art. In this transitional period, CA emerged as a challenging attempt to reconcile Ontological Contextualism and Epistemological Formalism. Since then, CA's precise motivation and commitment have been difficult to see in the contemporary philosophy of art, where philosophers have developed the separation of aesthetic and artistic values, and focused on the various artistic properties, which are not necessarily aesthetic. This chapter has attempted to reconstruct CA. The argument in CA, which emphasizes the perceptual aspects of aesthetic judgments, is not a mere historical relic. It offers a variety of ideas that intersect with still controversial topics, such as the possibility of perceiving higher-level properties, cognitive penetration, perceptual learning, or supervenience and grounding.

CA's argument, by and large, moves in the direction of presenting Ontological Contextualism. The aesthetic properties attributed to a work of art in a correct aesthetic judgment, i.e., the aesthetic properties that the work actually possesses, are aesthetic properties attributed in an appropriate aesthetic perception based on the correct categories to be followed. The correct category is determined from four considerations, including contextual facts. From the transitivity of dependencies, the actual aesthetic properties of a work are determined, in part, by contextual factors external to the work.

At the same time, CA seeks to maintain its commitment to Epistemological Formalism. The claim that aesthetic properties are constituted by contextual facts does not entail the claim that aesthetic properties are identified by investigating the context, acquiring beliefs and knowledge, and inferring. Possession of relevant knowledge is neither necessary nor sufficient. Instead, an aesthetic property is something that is simply seen or heard after appropriate training of perception.

In CA, the concept of perceptually discernible categories carries much weight. Because both categories and non-aesthetic properties given the weighting of SVCs are perceived, the aesthetic properties that emerge from them can be said to be grasped without mobilizing any faculties other than perception. It also opens the way toward ontological arguments on the basis of the transparent nature of perception. In this chapter, however, we have seen that the notion of a PDC introduced for these purposes has its own problems, such as the lack of agency and the dilemma surrounding the perceivability of kind properties. The CA argument could be modified to be more plausible by appealing to a less problematic minimally perceptual category.

Art categories play a variety of roles in the artworld beyond influencing aesthetic perception and aesthetic judgment through the presence of SVCs. In Chapters 3 and beyond, I will argue that the category of genre in particular is closely tied to the practice of criticism. In order to make this case, it will be important to be clear about what I take art criticism to be. This is the task of the next chapter.

2 Criticism as a Guide to Appreciation

Frédéric Chopin's *Prelude No. 4 in E minor* is a piano piece in which a single-note melody is played over chords whose component notes descend by semitones. It is a minimalist and elegant piece that is not too difficult to play and is therefore a part of my repertoire. I particularly like its heartbreaking aesthetic quality but, until a certain point, I did not fully understand what made it so heartbreaking. Often, a work of music strongly affects us before we understand it. We appreciate the effect without understanding what makes it so aesthetically pleasing. One explanation I once read (I cannot now recall the source) greatly enhanced my understanding of this piece: the left hand accompaniment symbolizes an ever-changing society or world, while the melody of the right hand, which moves back and forth between the two notes without any stability and is dragged down by the accompaniment, symbolizes a human being. The overall image is that of a human being forced to give up a small personal life at the mercy of external forces. The earnest wish to stay the same forever is frustrated by a fate that is, if not violent, peremptory. In the middle section, by returning to the first theme again, the individual is allowed to recover and make a fresh start, but a stormier fate awaits her. Eventually, the melody is swallowed by the accompaniment, and the piece quietly comes to an end. The piece is also known to have been arranged as an organ piece and played at Chopin's funeral.

What I read altered my response to the piece (needless to say, for the better). This chapter explores the nature of the items that bring about these kinds of changes. These are works of criticism. Elucidating the nature of criticism will be necessary in order to establish the importance of art categories for criticism.

Art criticism, speaking very generally, is the activity of stating or writing something about the meaning, value, or context of works of art, but what exactly do critics do? How can we characterize their aims and tasks? The inquiry into the nature of criticism occupies a crucial place in the philosophy of art, along with the inquiry into the nature of artworks. Needless to say, critics do many

things; they describe the characteristics of a work, elucidate its depiction and symbolism, interpret its subject matter, classify and contextualize it, analyze its elements, and evaluate it (Carroll 2009: 6). It would be unproductive to nominate any one of these activities as the "true" task of a critic, just as it would be ridiculous to assert that shooting for goal is the only real task of a soccer player and that running and passing are incidental. However, it can be productive to ask which activity is more central and what relationship exists between the various activities.

In this chapter, I will first show that the inquiry into the nature of criticism is linked to the inquiry into the nature of appreciation. At first glance, existing accounts of criticism seem to be in fierce dispute: some argue that criticism is reasoned evaluation; others see the critic as a teacher of aesthetic perception; and still others argue that the articulation and communication of aesthetic pleasure is the critic's task. However, I will try to show that the various characterizations of criticism form a consensus on the following view.

Criticism as a Guide to Appreciation

A's product *P* (a text, speech, and so forth) is a criticism of an artwork *x* if and only if *P* has the function of guiding its readers' appreciative response to *x*.

The core of criticism lies in guiding appreciation. This characterization, however, is not a complete answer to the question of what criticism is, but rather changes the focus of the inquiry. What is then needed is an answer to the question of what is the *appreciative* response. The *Criticism as a Guide to Appreciation* principle asserts that by identifying the core of appreciation, the core of criticism is thereby identified. However, without a characterization of appreciation, the principle does not tell us the difference between criticism and non-critical, art-related discourse (advertising, art history, philosophy of art, and so forth).

The new question, what appreciation is, is also directly related to the debate over the reasoned, rational nature of criticism.[27] The critic does not simply command a particular response, but supports

[27] See for example, Beardsley (1982a: Chap. 12, 19); Kaufman (2003); Hopkins (2006); Cross (2017); Lord (2019); Gorodeisky (2022).

her guide by offering reasons that such a response is appropriate. For example, a critic might call attention to the relationship between melody and accompaniment in order to help us understand the heartbreakingness of *Prelude No. 4 in E minor*. Such a critic would be giving reasons to support that apprehension.

The concept of *reason* as it appears in this context would require a bit more explanation. In standard contemporary meta-ethics, normative reasons (good reasons, justifying reasons) are conceptually distinguished from motivational reasons.[28] The former is a fact that justifies a certain response and makes it a response that should be made insofar as it is justified, while the latter is a set of beliefs or desires that causally explain why a person who has made a certain response has come to make that response. Being delicious is a normative reason in favor of the choice of action to eat a certain cake, and believing that it is delicious and wanting to eat something delicious are motivational reasons for a person to eat it. Motivational reasons are not necessarily normative reasons. A subject who believes that a cake is a real cake when in fact it is made of plastic will be motivated to eat the cake by that misunderstanding, but there is no normative reason to eat the plastic cake here.[29]

The critic can obviously cite motivational reasons, but that is not of interest here. What is important is the question of whether the critic guides the reader's appreciative response by citing normative reasons. Hereafter, unless otherwise noted, all reasons will refer to normative reasons, and reasoning will be used to refer to the process of referring normative reasons. As an observation that has already appeared in the previous chapter, it seems that critics often refer to the lower-order features of a work or to the context of the work to justify the prompted response and make it appropriate to the extent. The supposed reasoning answers questions such as why a work is graceful,

[28] See Bishago (2016); Alvarez (2017).

[29] According to the internalist view of normative reasons, represented by Williams (1981: Chap. 8), a fact is a normative reason for a response only if, under the right conditions, it is a reason that motivates the subject to a certain response. Externalism is a position that denies or weakens this requirement, but that debate is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

why it is valuable, and how it symbolizes a certain matter. This process is analogous to listing the evil behaviors of a person in order to show this person is bad. The receiver of a criticism mirrors the reasoning and, if she sees the prompted response as legitimate, will be led to that response.

However, not all theorists recognize such critical reasoning. According to skeptics (e.g., Isenberg 1949; Sibley 2001: Chap. 3), critics can, at best, offer motivational reasons for their own responses, not normative reasons to show that their responses are generally appropriate. However, we cannot jump to conclusions. In my view, whether criticism is a rational activity that includes reasoning, and what type of reasoning it can provide, also depends on the appreciative response that the criticism is supposed to prompt. For example, the skeptics about critical reasoning often emphasize the perceptual aspect of appreciation, and they are skeptics since perception is not something that can be derived through reasoning. Conversely, a theorist who emphasizes the doxastic aspect of appreciation (e.g., Carroll 2016) would more naturally accept the task of critics presenting evidence to justify their judgments about the meaning and value of a work.

The existing accounts of criticism can be more clearly reconstructed as a debate over the characterization of the appreciative response. It is precisely because the supposed appreciative responses guided by criticism are different that different pictures of criticism are given. Section 1 will defend the *guide-to-appreciation* account of criticism from some objections, and Section 2 will give a positive argument by presenting this reconstruction.

Section 3 will examine an *affective account* defended by Keren Gorodeisky (2021a; 2022). According to the affective account, appreciation is essentially an affective response. The affective account understands artistic value as aesthetic value, art appreciation as aesthetic pleasure, and art criticism as aesthetic criticism, but this approach is problematic. Many art movements, styles, and theories that emerged in the 20th century have shown that it is no longer possible to understand the artistic fully in terms of the aesthetic. In response to this trend, Gorodeisky's affective view is an ambitious attempt to link the artistic to the aesthetic once again. However, I believe it has not escaped the conventional problems with that link sufficiently.

Eventually, I will defend the following pluralistic account of appreciation.

Cluster Account of Appreciation

B's response to an artwork *x* is an appreciative response if and only if *B* engages in any of a variety of responses, such as (1) understanding *x*'s specific value, meaning, or function, (2) perceiving *x*'s aesthetic quality, or (3) having aesthetic pleasure with *x* as its content.

Then, following the *guide-to-appreciation* account of criticism, a pluralistic picture of criticism is also defended. A liberal view does not entail being a non-controversial view. A cluster account of criticism would accommodate some of the items we seldom call criticism within criticism. Section 4 clarifies and provides justification for this position.

Section 5 examines the criteria for good criticism. Obviously, there are good and bad examples of criticism, just as there are good and bad examples of works of art. As is well known, David Hume, in "Of the Standard of Taste" (1757), listed the qualities that a true judge must meet. However, a criticism written by a qualified critic is not necessarily a good criticism, and nothing prevents a good criticism from being written by an amateur. Therefore, instead of listing the criteria for a good critic, I will point out some of the criteria for a good work of criticism.

2.1 Criticism as a Guide to Appreciation

Grant (2013: chap. 1) considers the aims of (1) aiding selection, (2) aiding perception, (3) providing evaluation, (4) providing explanation, and (5) aiding appreciation, and finds none of them appropriate as a constitutive purpose of criticism. Grant's disproof is based mainly on observation, and he proceeds to dismiss each candidate by presenting cases where a critic does not have each aim, but the product is still a criticism. What I am now trying to defend is criticism as the guide of appreciation. To begin, I will respond to Grant's view that aiding appreciation is not the constitutive aim of criticism.

If Grant (2013: 27–8) is correct, criticism does not necessarily have the function of guiding appreciation, and its absence does not prevent its being a work of criticism. Grant cites the following

examples as cases where an item is still a work of criticism even though it does not serve as an aid to appreciation.

> Criticism of works that the critic knows cannot be experienced anymore, and of which she knows there are no appropriate reproductions, performances, etc., provide counter examples. Such criticism can be addressed to readers who never have been and never will be in a position to appreciate the work. The aim of criticizing them cannot be to aid appreciation of such works. (Gran 2013: 27)
>
> It might be very useful to know whether a film is terrifying, funny, challenging, clichéd, thrilling, etc., when trying to decide whether to watch it. However, such information might be useless for the purpose of gaining a *better* appreciation of the work than one would be likely to acquire by experiencing it without the criticism. For those who have seen or are watching the film, being told that it received four stars will probably not enable them to appreciate it any better. (Grant 2013: 28)

For the first case, we would first need to distinguish it from similar cases that do not stand as counterexamples. It cannot be, for example, a case in which an artwork disappears after criticism has been written. The reason that case cannot be a counterexample to the view that criticism is an aid to appreciation is that performing a function is not the same as having a function. The Second Imperial Hotel by Frank Lloyd Wright does not exist, but the text written at the time about its elegance is still a criticism of it today, as it guided appreciation at the time it existed. A broken bottle opener still has the proper function of opening bottles. The simple explanation for an artifact's function is that the producer intended it.[30] Even if the artwork no longer exists, and even the photographs and videos have completely disappeared, it remains a criticism because the fact remains that a text was intended to serve the function of guiding appreciation. This consequence does not change if one adopts a less intentionalist account of the function of artifacts (e.g., Millikan 1984). If a text is embedded in a history that has reproduced items that serve as guides to appreciation, even if the object to which the

[30] See Preston (2022).

individual text refers no longer exists, its proper function is to guide appreciation and it is a work of criticism.

Also, as has been explicitly stated, in the first case, there are not even adequate reproductions of the artwork. If they did exist, the mere disappearance of the artwork itself would not be a counterexample to the view that criticism is an aid to appreciation. The text so written could well be said to guide the appreciation through the reproductions. Neither Grant (2013: 30–1) nor I endorse the extreme version of the acquaintance principle and believe that appreciation and criticism through reproductions are impossible.

Furthermore, as implied, in the first case, the critic must have appreciated the artwork. One cannot provide a counterexample by a case in which one has not appreciated the artwork, but wishes to write a criticism of it. This is because, in a situation where there is no artwork or reproduction, it is completely incomprehensible to attempt to write criticism about a work that one has never seen or will see. Both Grant (2013: 39) and I support the minimal version of the acquaintance principle and believe that in writing criticism, the critic needs to access and appreciate the artwork in some way. Furthermore, as has been explicitly stated, the intended audience for the criticism is those readers who have missed appreciating the artwork while it was in existence. Cases in which criticism is written for readers who have already seen the work also fail as a counterexample. This is because it is perfectly understandable for a critic to attempt to write a work of criticism in order to enhance and guide the appreciation of such readers (even though the artwork or document no longer exists).

Under a view that regards criticism as a guide to appreciation, criticism written about an overdue exhibition of an installation or a one-time performance art would be incomprehensible. This seems to be the case Grant was concerned about. One way to deal with these counterexamples is to modify the *guide-to-appreciation* account of criticism by assuming that the guide of appreciation is a counterfactual guide. Instead of writing criticism for contemporaries who have already lost the opportunity to see the artwork, the critic assumes the appreciative response the reader would have if confronted with the artwork and takes care to generate an item that would make it better. Readers will

read the critic's product as an item that would guide their appreciation if they were confronted with the artwork, or at least they will accept the critic's product as embedded in a history of reproducing such items. Whichever account we adopt of the function of artifacts, there remains room to say that criticism in the first case still has the function of guiding appreciation.

On the other hand, the second case does not seem to be a serious counterexample. It is not a counterexample unless one interprets a review that merely gives four stars as an example of a genuine work of criticism, and it seems to me that interpretations might differ on this point. Carroll (2009: 8), for example, keeps such an unreasoned, definitive verdict from being an example of a genuine work of criticism. Even if it is a genuine criticism, a review that only gives a thumbs up or down would be a rather peripheral and uninteresting example of criticism. The TV show by Gene Siskel and Roger Ebert became popular for its simple method of rating films by thumbs up or thumbs down, but of course, that was not their only job as critics. If one element is removed from their criticism and it ceases to be criticism, I believe that element is still the function of guiding appreciation.

Grant's position is a pluralistic one like mine in that it allows for different types of appreciative responses (perceptual, cognitive, cogitative, affective, and conative). However, it is even more liberal than mine in that it allows for criticism to be incomplete.

> One criticizes an artwork only if one aims to communicate:
>
> (a) what parts, features, or represented elements appreciation can involve responding to; or
>
> (b) what responses appreciation of it can involve; or
>
> (c) what appropriate reasons for these responses there are. A necessary condition of criticizing, I suggest, is that one aim to give one's reader to understand that such-and-such is a part, feature, or represented element to which appreciation can involve responding. (Grant 2013: 39)

As is clear from the fact that the first case is considered a counterexample, in Grant, criticism is an articulation of appreciation, not necessarily a guide. A text may not fully articulate appreciation, nor may it necessarily guide the appreciation of others, but it is considered criticism because it has the

constitutive purpose of articulating appreciation. However, I could not share the motivation for adopting such a permissive position to cover the above-mentioned definitive verdict as criticism.

In placing various appreciative responses at the core of criticism, Grant's and my views have important common ground, and one should not overemphasize the difference in whether it is the articulating or the guiding of appreciation that constitutes criticism. In fact, articulating appreciation and guiding appreciation do not seem to me to be so clearly distinct purposes. Guiding appreciation is usually (if not always) done by articulating appreciation, not by commanding or brainwashing. As long as articulations of appreciation are genuine, they are expected and accepted as guides to appreciation, and, in some way, are useful for that purpose too. For a writer to produce criticism with the intention of articulating appreciation, but without intending it to function as a guide of appreciation, seems to me as strange as trying to produce a katana without intending it to have the capacity to kill.

If the above replies are persuasive, those concerns do not seem to threaten the *guide-to-appreciation* account of criticism. Then, until further concerns are presented, I would consider it a useful equality for organizing existing positions and eliciting and answering meaningful questions about criticism. And even if the above replies are not sufficiently persuasive, I would state the following. How one characterizes a criticism as such is undoubtedly partly a verbal matter. There are groups of items that articulate appreciation and groups of items that guide appreciation, each with significant overlap, and which of these should be called criticism, or whether the union or the intersection should be called so, is a matter of decision to some extent. Since I am not aiming at a conceptual analysis of the term "criticism," I do not intend to stick too tightly to some inconsistency with the everyday use of the term. I will take the same stance later in supporting the cluster account of criticism.

2.2 Reconstructing Existing Accounts of Criticism

Keren Gorodeisky, whose view I will examine in a later section, states:

> critics standardly articulate their *appreciation* of the work, and guide their audience to *appreciate* the work similarly. (Gorodeisky 2022: 315)
>
> It is dubious that critics of this practice would take their aim to be fulfilled if their audiences did not embrace the kind of response that we regard as appreciation. (Gorodeisky 2022: 316)

According to Gorodeisky, criticism is an articulation and guide of appreciation. On the surface, Gorodeisky and my *guide-to-appreciation* account of criticism appear to support the same thesis. However, whether they are really the same thesis depends on the meaning of appreciation. Appreciation is a tricky term. To say the least, appreciation has meanings such as to judge, to understand, to interpret, to evaluate, to admire, to savor, to enjoy, and to like. We must be careful of such polysemy. It seems to me that Gorodeisky misses the ambiguity of "appreciation" and implicitly commits to a particular connotation when she criticizes, for example, Carroll's (2009) doxastic account with the thesis that criticism is a guide to appreciation. As a result, the criticism of the doxastic account under it becomes unfair. Gorodeisky criticizes the doxastic account, which regards the communication of a judgment about the value of a work of art as criticism, as a position that neglects the appreciation of the artwork. However, what is missed here is that Carroll (2016: 3) labels the response that Gorodeisky criticizes as *a mere* formation of beliefs about value as nothing other than art appreciation. Carroll (2016: 3), clearly aware of the difference between appreciation-as-liking and appreciation-as-sizing-up, argues that art appreciation should be characterized as a non-affective belief formation or judgment.

> [M]y preference is for the appreciation-as-sizing-up approach to art appreciation as against the appreciation-as-liking approach. One of my leading reasons for this preference is that it seems to me that there is no contradiction, for example, in asserting that a certain work of art is good, but not to one's liking. You may admit that Wagner is a great composer but also say that you do not like his operas. (Carroll 2016: 6)

The doxastic account is by no means a position that actively puts forth that the point of art criticism is not appreciation. It is just that the response Carroll has in mind by appreciation is different from the

response Gorodeisky has in mind.[31] In the end, the point of contention is what appreciation is, not whether criticism guides appreciation.

How has the appreciative response to works of art been characterized in previous studies? Again, few accounts say that shooting is the only soccer play and that running and passing are not. The viewers respond in a variety of ways: paying attention to the work, perceiving its aesthetic qualities (gracefulness, garishness, and so forth), valuing it, understanding its symbol, sympathizing with the characters, learning about the background of the work, being moved by it, liking it, and so forth. The key question is which response is central to art appreciation and what hierarchy exists among the various responses.

The *doxastic account*, as we have already briefly examined, is a position that regards the appreciative response guided by criticism as a doxastic response (e.g., Beardsley 1958; 1982a; Danto 1996; Carroll 2009; 2016; 2022). Specifically, the process of thinking about, understanding, and forming beliefs about the meaning and value of a work of art is considered the core of appreciation. Within the doxastic accounts, there is a conflict between Carroll, who emphasizes evaluative beliefs, and Danto, who emphasizes interpretive beliefs. The *perceptual account* has emerged as the main rival to the doxastic account (e.g., Isenberg 1949; Sibley 1959, 1965; Walton 1970; Mothersil 1984). The perceptual account is motivated by skepticism toward inferential judgments assumed by the doxastic account. Many perceptualists believe that there are no general criteria for the quality or value of a work of art. A painting may be graceful and beautiful because of specific thin curves, but the very same thin curves in another painting may make the painting weak and bland. Therefore, the critic's verdict cannot be a communication of reasoned beliefs, nor can the viewer rely on testimony alone to determine the quality or value of the work. Perception, not belief formation, is the key to the quality and value of a work. The critic is a teacher of perception, engaged in the activity of making us see or hear certain qualities or values by various means. Clearly, the core of the appreciative response is regarded here as perceptual.

[31] See King (2022: 4) for this point.

The controversy over the characterization of criticism has long developed as a conflict between the doxastic account and the perceptual account, but some new accounts have been emerging in recent years, the *practice account* and the *affective account*. Cross (2017), developing on Ziff's (1966) view of criticism, analogizes various appreciative responses to actions. According to Cross, attending to a work in a particular way, sympathizing with a character, and grasping historical facts through an artwork are all actions supported by practical reasons. The point of the practical account is that it puts the practical reasons supporting actions on the table for the discussion, rather than the theoretical reasons supporting beliefs that orthodox doxastic accounts have addressed. On the other hand, the affective account supported by Gorodeisky (2021a; 2022) analogizes art appreciation to emotional aesthetic pleasure and theorizes criticism as a guide for affective responses. The affective account will be examined in detail in the next section. Other, more recently updated perceptual accounts exist that understand appreciation as a perceptual response but attempt to encompass the possibility of reasoning (Hopkins 2006; Lord 2019).

In sum, the doxastic, perceptual, practical, and affective accounts conflict with each other regarding the character of the appreciative response and, therefore, conflict regarding the character of criticism. The pluralism I ultimately intend to adopt following Grant (2013: 31–3) is a view that does not see these characterizations as competing, but instead sees appreciation as a sum with each aspect (Grant 2013: 31–3). Indeed, there are many hybrid accounts, if not pluralistic accounts, that understand art appreciation as a hybrid of several types of responses. Clive Bell (1914) focused on the perception of significant form and the experience of aesthetic emotion caused by it. Frank Sibley (2001) took up not only the communication of aesthetic perception but also the doxastic explanation as an important task for critics. Monroe Beardsley (1958; 1982a), who rather favored the affective account of appreciation, was concerned about the lack of objectivity in articulating or guiding affective responses and, as a next best thing, focused on the more doxastic aspects of appreciation when he addressed criticism. As a more recent account, Martínez Marín (2023) regards appreciation

as a hybrid of judgments and likings, and argues that this is why aesthetic akrasia can arise, such that one forms a liking that is not coherent with her judgment.

I will not defend pluralism by a last-one-standing argument that dismisses all existing positions. Instead, I intend to defend pluralism from partial abduction by identifying a particular theory as my rival and pointing out its problems. The reason I position the affective account as this rival is that I believe this position is not only traditional in aesthetics and philosophy of art, but is also the clearest form of essentialism that contrasts with pluralism.

2.3 The Affective Account of Criticism

2.3.1 What Is the Account?

In the quotation above, Gorodeisky remarks that to engage in criticism is to articulate one's appreciation and to guide the reader's appreciation. Then, what kind of response is appreciation for Gorodeisky? Appreciation is only suggestively described as a cognitive-emotional experience in Gorodeisky (2022: 316), but she is more explicit in relating it to "pleasure in art" in Gorodeisky (2021a: 205) and "aesthetic pleasure" in Gorodeisky (2021b: 269). According to Gorodeisky (2021a: 206–7; 2021b: 269–71), appreciation, or pleasure in art, or aesthetic pleasure, is (1) affective and (2) self-maintaining just as ordinary sensory and passive pleasures, but it is something more. Aesthetic pleasures are unique in that they are (3) holistically complex, (4) revealing of the item's value, (5) subject to rational assessment, (6) universal, (7) self-contained, and (8) influenced by background experience.

> Responsively evaluating a work requires not that one correctly attribute value to it, but that one correctly experience the value that it indeed has and, at the same time, be responsive to what it merits. PA [pleasure in art] functions as both: by presenting the work as that which merits itself (PA), it both reveals its value and is responsive to its merit. (Gorodeisky 2021a: 209)

In aesthetic pleasure, a self-reflective state is established in which the value of the item is revealed in the affective response to the item, and in which one is aware of the appropriateness of one's affective response in light of the value found (Gorodeisky and Marcus 2018: 117–8; Gorodeisky 2021a: 217). Moreover, such aesthetic pleasure is rational in the sense that it can be supported by reason (Gorodeisky 2022: 318–9). Just as there may or may not be reasons to be afraid, corresponding to the presence or absence of danger, and just as it may or may not be rational or irrational to be afraid, corresponding to the presence or absence of reasons, there are situations in which it is rational or not to react with aesthetic pleasure.[32]

The point here is that the affective account is a strongly essentialist view of art appreciation. Art appreciation is an affective response, and perception, belief formation, or performance of any action without a sense of pleasure, enjoyment, (dis)liking is not appreciation, or at least not a proper, central, or primary way of appreciation. Let us summarize the affective account by Gorodeisky as follows:

> **An Affective Account of Appreciation (Gorodeisky's Version)**
>
> *B*'s response to an artwork *x* is an appreciative response if and only if *B* has aesthetic pleasure with *x* as its content. In other words, (1) *B* is aware of the value of *x* as a work of art in affectively responding to *x*, and (2) B is aware that his/her own affective response is appropriate in light of the value thus grasped.

Gorodeisky criticizes the existing positions in the following way. The picture given by the doxastic account is inaccurate since, by observation, critics do not just aim to make us believe something.

> [M]erely believing that W is of aesthetic value or acting on its behalf without appreciating it falls short of hitting the mark of success of aesthetic recommendations and criticism. It is a reason for disappointment. (Gorodeisky 2022: 317)

[32] I will not pursue this point but the idea that there are reasons for affective attitudes is controversial. See, for example, Maguire (2018); Naar (2022).

Artistic value is the type of value that makes it appropriate to respond with aesthetic pleasure, and to simply believe in it without feeling pleasure falls short of an appreciation. There is a sharp contrast made here between simply believing or understanding that something has artistic value and feeling artistic value. Thus, the doxastic account, which focuses only on the former, is rejected.

On the other hand, according to Gorodeisky (2022: 323), the practical account is problematic in that the appreciative response prompted is not sufficiently specified. In effect, Cross's (2017: 306–7) position is pluralism: he argues that the target of criticism is not limited to the acts of aspection as an intrinsically valuable perceptual act, as addressed by Ziff (1966), but also encompasses a wide range of appreciative acts, such as sympathy for characters, knowledge formation about history and context, and so forth. In Gorodeisky's view, the problem with both Cross's and pluralist accounts is that there is no proper delineation of appreciative response. After all, if we want this delineation, Gorodeisky argues that appreciation must be characterized as aesthetic pleasure in the way that she characterizes it. Thus, the practical account and pluralism are rejected.

Finally, according to Gorodeisky (2022: 323–4), reason in criticism cannot be understood as bearing both theoretical and practical reasons simultaneously. Again, the pluralistic view is rejected in this regard. In aesthetic pleasure, according to Gorodeisky, beliefs, perceptions, and actions are unified under emotion. Appreciation is not separable into these different responses, but is a unified experience where the emotion is central and modifies each response. Therefore, the reasons given by critics are also considered to be unified reasons that support aesthetic pleasure, and are different from theoretical or practical reasons.

The virtue of the affective account, I believe, is that it puts the concept of pleasure once again on the table of aesthetics. The pleasure-based account of beauty and aesthetic judgments is traditional, but the recent rise of the non-affective accounts has overly beaten it down. Gorodeisky's defense is meaningful, and I also see that it has contributed in no small measure to the revival of modern aesthetics. It is also remarkable to avoid the problems facing traditional hedonism by appealing to the

concept of *meriting*.[33] According to Gorodeisky (2021a: 201–2; 2021b: 274–5, 277–8), aesthetically valuable items have a primitive value tied to the appropriateness of responding with aesthetic pleasure, instead of having instrumental value in virtue of affording valuable aesthetic pleasure, as hedonist says. Gorodeisky's affective account is arranged to address the issues surrounding the criteria of taste and the objectivity of judgment that have troubled the traditional pleasure-based account.

However, I still feel the need to repeat the following classic criticism to this updated affective account: there, the artistic and the aesthetic are not sufficiently separated, so that pleasure is also associated with art, which is inappropriate in light of the practice of art. Gorodeisky's view can be seen by juxtaposing two articles she published in 2021. According to Gorodeisky (2021a: 200), the value of an artwork *qua* artwork is constituted by meriting aesthetic pleasure. On the other hand, according to Gorodeisky (2021b: 262), aesthetic value is constituted by meriting aesthetic pleasure. Here, two seemingly different concepts are given exactly the same analysis. Since it is hard to believe that Gorodeisky understands aesthetic value as a subset of artistic value, it reads to me that she understands artistic value as a subset of aesthetic value.

It may be that Gorodeisky is actively equating the artistic with the aesthetic rather than confusing the two, but in any case, such a view is reactionary in light of the history of the debate. Historically speaking, the rise of art genres that do not afford aesthetic pleasure (conceptual art, painful art, and so forth) has led the debate in the direction of separating artistic value, art appreciation, and art criticism from aesthetic value, aesthetic pleasure, and aesthetic criticism (Shelley 2022). The viewer who examines *Fountain, Brillo Box,* or *One and Three Chairs* does not have an aesthetic experience, and the critic who ascribes value to these items is not ascribing aesthetic value. As is well known, Marcel Duchamp criticized *retinal* paintings that only please our eyes, Arthur C. Danto (1964) acknowledged that the essence of art lies in its indiscernible (and therefore

[33] See Howard (2023) for the Fitting Attitude Theories of value in general and Kriegel (2023) for a discussion of this approach with respect to the aesthetic value.

non-aesthetic) aspects, and Barnett Newman ridiculed the need for aesthetics for artists by saying that it is like ornithology for birds. We will need to examine again what ideas were behind them.

2.3.2 What Is the Problem?

As the first objection to the affective account, artistic value is not exhausted by aesthetic value. Michael Haneke's films upset us with unreasonable violence, and Lars von Trier's films upset us with relentless pessimism. As a pre-theoretical intuition, their properties are not analogous to beauty, nor their experiences to pleasure (Carroll 2022: 5–6, 22). Gorodeisky (2021b: 269–70) states that painful art also merits a holistic and complex pleasure, but this reply seems ad hoc to me and seems to use the term "pleasure" more prescriptively than is permissible. Even without such a prolongation of the term "pleasure," these genuinely unpleasant works can be said to have some non-aesthetic artistic value.

As Stecker (2010: Chap. 11; 2019: Chap. 3) addresses, there are historical values (impact on art history and originality) and cognitive values (extending our capacity of thought, imagination, and perception or providing knowledge). Many other values are non-aesthetic but still crucial to art, including ethical, political, social, and religious values. Pablo Picasso's *Les Demoiselles d'Avignon* and Mike Bidlo's appropriation of it are perceptually identical and therefore have the same aesthetic value, but differ entirely in artistic value. Thus, monism does not seem to be a plausible option for the values critics target.

Gorodeisky is committed to essentialism, which takes aesthetic value as the sole artistic value. However, what poses a difficulty for any essentialism is the concern that "artistic value" may, in the first place, be merely a label that summarizes the different types of value that a work of art may have.[34] As a category for valuing, art is too large and too miscellaneous. Pluralists are also divided on this point. According to the Steckerian view, there is a substantial common ground among artistic values in that miscellaneous values are values that are drawn from the understanding or interpretation of a work of art. The Lopesian view, on the other hand, is more eliminativist (Lopes 2011; 2014: Chap. 5). We

[34] See Dickie (1988); Zangwill (1995); Stecker (2010); Lopes (2011); (2014: Chap. 5); Hanson (2013). As a survey, see also Mori (2017).

rarely evaluate or criticize a work of art *qua art*. We may say, "That is a good painting," but rarely do we say, "That is good art." Therefore, it is a mistake to assume the value from an artistic point of view, when, in fact, we are simply evaluating works of art from different perspectives in different genres and media.[35] My view, which I will present in the next chapter and thereafter, favors the latter, but it is not necessary to choose one or the other at this point. Either way, when it comes to the value of art, the aesthetic value associated with aesthetic pleasure is not the only game in town.

Gorodeisky (2022: 316; 2021a: 208–10), acknowledging the diversity of criticism and artistic evaluation, emphasizes that affective evaluation through aesthetic pleasure is (1) complete, (2) primary, and (3) aesthetic. However, in my opinion, (1) and (2) beg the question, and (3) misses the point. Gorodeisky's reason why evaluation and appreciation without aesthetic pleasure fall short and are secondary is based on Gorodeisky's own analysis, which assumes that artistic value is constituted by meriting aesthetic pleasure. The non-affective accounts do not accept that analysis in the first place, and argue that there is artistic value that is not constituted by aesthetic pleasure. And it is no problem for the non-affective accounts that engaging in such values is not an aesthetic engagement. Moreover, a non-affective account does not require any engagement to be artistic in the sense that it is unique to the arts in particular. Artistic engagement is also merely a label that brings together miscellaneous types of engagement (Carroll 2016: 11; 2022: 17). Instead of being particular about the label "aesthetic" or "artistic," the pluralist accounts of the value of art and art appreciation voluntarily try to distance themselves from it. We may engage a non-artwork in the same way we engage an artwork, or we may engage an artwork in the same way we engage a non-artwork.

As a second objection to the affective account, the value of a work of art is not the only target of appreciation and criticism (e.g., Dickie 1965; 1974b; Carroll 2001: Chap. 1). Even if one accepts the view that the aesthetic value is the only artistic value, in order to support the affective account of appreciation and criticism with this, one must also say that the focus of appreciation and criticism is

[35] Lopes also envisions grouping miscellaneous values of art under the label of aesthetic value, but it is clear that the aesthetic value he envisions is no longer the type of value that is constituted by aesthetic pleasure.

always the value of artworks. However, this is not plausible. At least, a critic who offers only an interpretation and encourages understanding of the intricate contents of a work is not necessarily aiming to evoke some kind of emotional response, and the viewer who reads the criticism to deepen her understanding of the artwork is not responding emotionally to the artwork. We do not need to be emotionally engaged to understand that the key in his hand indicates that the person being depicted is St. Peter, nor is there any reason to think that emotion is always involved in a more complex understanding of contents (for example, why Hamlet postpones his revenge). We can appreciate artworks by applying a non-affective interpretive interest to them, and critics can guide such appreciation.

The view that there is purely interpretative criticism and that it guides purely interpretative appreciation is perhaps consistent with Danto's (1996) idea, but it is at odds not only with Gorodeisky's affective account, but also with Carroll's doxastic account. Interestingly, while Carroll (2001: 9) rejects affective accounts of art appreciation and emphasizes the historical importance of interpretive appreciation, Carroll (2009: 16) is concerned that criticism and other art-related discourses are indistinguishable unless we locate evaluation at the heart of the former. In other words, Carroll does not accept the *guide-to-appreciation* account that if a response is a proper appreciative response, then the item that guides that response is criticism. However, as Carroll (2009: 5) himself observes, with so much attention given to interpretation as a critics' task, it is, in my opinion, too revisionary to say that purely interpretive criticism is not criticism or is non-central or secondary. Critical interpretation and critical evaluation are independent, and the former can, but is not necessary to, support the latter.[36]

[36] The same argument also dismisses the essentialist perceptual account of appreciation. Seeing or hearing a work of art's elegance or garishness is often an important part of appreciation, but it is not the whole picture. Andy Warhol's *Empire* (1965) is a perceptually painful avant-garde film that only displays the Empire State Building for eight hours. Its being neither beautiful nor ugly, and extraordinarily long, exhausts the perceptual capacities of ordinary people, but such unwatchability is the very theme of *Empire* (Carroll 2019b). Central to

I am neutral on the affective account of the aesthetic. An item's aesthetic value may be constituted by its capacity to provide a valuable aesthetic pleasure or by the fact that it fits an aesthetic experience. And the proper, central, and primary way of engagement with an aesthetic item may be nothing but an aesthetic pleasure. However, it is a leap to derive an affective account of art appreciation from an affective account of the aesthetic. Art appreciation is a cluster of different responses, and likewise, art criticism is a cluster of different guides of them. The list of paradigm appreciative responses is open, and the emphasis may differ from period to period and region to region.

Finally, the pluralism of appreciation and criticism is also supported by anti-essentialism in the definition of works of art (Weitz 1956; Kennick 1958). I am not at all convinced that the aesthetic definition of art is still valid today. The institutional and historical definitions that have been defended since then are all definitions that allow the status of being a work of art to be given in a pluralistic manner (Dickie 1974a; Levinson 1979; Carroll 2001: Chap. 5). If a work of art is such, then its appreciation and criticism cannot be monistic.

2.3.3 A Possible Reply and a Further Objection

The following response is possible in defense of affective accounts. The aesthetic, detached from the artistic, is only the perceptual. Thus, it is actually the perceptual account that I have dismissed, not the affective account. According to the advocates of this idea, the aesthetic has often been understood as perceptual, but there is a great misunderstanding here. For example, one might say that I have fallen into this kind of misunderstanding concerning the case of *Les Demoiselles d'Avignon* and its appropriation art. My argument is:

(1) Suppose there is no perceptual difference between two items, X and Y.

(2) Differences in aesthetic value supervene on perceptual differences.

(3) Therefore, X and Y necessarily have the same aesthetic value.

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the appreciation of many conceptual artworks, including *Empire*, is the understanding and reflection on the deception of perceptual accounts. A work of art can be appreciated without being perceived.

(4) However, it is possible that X and Y differ in artistic value.

(5) Therefore, there are artistic values that are not aesthetic.

According to the objector, premise (2) is false. Aesthetic value is not fully grounded by perceptual features. Therefore, premise (3) is also false, and even if premises (1) and (4) are true, we cannot draw the conclusion (5). Thus, even if *Fountain*, *Brillo Boxes*, and *One and Three Chairs* have an artistic value that is not based on perceptual features, there is no reason to think that they are not aesthetic values. The aesthetic is not limited to the perceptual, but is broad enough to cover the value and appreciation of non-perceptual art.

James Shelley is a central defender of this conception of the non-perceptual aesthetic, describing how the aesthetic and the cognitive became separated. According to Shelley (2022), the cognitive and the aesthetic were not originally in opposition, but the rise of perceptual formalism and the critical debates based on it in the first half of the 20th century led to a widespread understanding that it is only perceptual properties that are aesthetically important. Shelley cites Hanslick, Bell, and Greenberg as theorists and critics who promoted this trend, and Beardsley as a philosopher who actively defended this view. As resistance to perceptual formalism grew in the second half of the 20th century and the cognitive aspect of art was emphasized, the aesthetic was banished from the artworld while being equated with the perceptual. According to Shelley, however, it is the aesthetic, only narrowly understood, that has been so banished.

According to Shelley (2003), in modern aesthetics, especially in Francis Hutcheson, aesthetic judgments, values, and properties did not necessarily imply those based on perception by the senses. Rather, the core of the aesthetic is the non-inferentiality, immediacy, and practical disinterestedness of recognition, not perceptuality. Therefore, it is not at all strange to speak of the beauty of literary works, conceptual art, theorems, and proofs in light of this root of the aesthetic. Their properties, such as being daring, impudent, irreverent, witty, or clever, strike us in much the same way that the elegance of a painting or sculpture strikes us.

And if Shelley is correct, Sibley (2001: Chap. 1, 3), who states that aesthetic judgments are perceptual in nature, is misleading but not wrong. According to Shelley (2003: 371–3), Sibley's point is clearly the non-inferential nature of aesthetic judgments, and in this respect, he stands on the same understanding as Hutcheson. For aesthetic properties to be perceptual does not mean that they have their basis in or non-aesthetic, sensory properties grasped through the senses, but rather that aesthetic properties themselves are grasped immediately and not by inference. Strictly speaking, "perceptuality" which has been wrongly associated with the aesthetic is sensory-ness in the sense of mobilizing the five senses.

The aesthetic and the cognitive are not competing, for the aesthetic properties of cognitive items are also immediately grasped. Thus, aesthetic value, pleasure, and criticism regain their original range and can even cover the value, pleasure, and criticism of conceptual art and pain art, which were their concerns. Indeed, Shelley (2003: 378), by acknowledging the validity of this wide-scope notion of the aesthetic, goes so far as to doubt the existence of non-aesthetic art. Just as to fail to feel the wit of *Fountain* is to fail to appreciate it fully, every work of art may have aesthetic properties that are relevant to its appreciation.

It is an enlightening reply. Shelley acknowledges the diversity that Stecker and I recognize in the value and the appreciation of art (which include values and responses that we consider non-aesthetic) but, contrary to us, tries to show that they are all still within the range of the aesthetic. Moreover, Shelley does not do this by redefining the concept of the aesthetic, but by returning to its more traditional conception. I admit that Shelley's interpretation of the aesthetic is a fascinating one. In particular, it helps to give aesthetics a portrait not as a less empirical philosophy of perception, but as a domain with its own problems and interests.

Although Shelley (2003) emphasizes the non-inferential nature of the aesthetic, he does not specifically emphasize the affective nature. However, it is clear that Shelley endorses one version of the affective account, as he is inspired by Hutcheson, who speaks of aesthetic experience as a pleasurable sensation, and he uses the metaphor that aesthetic properties "strike" us. The proper

response to a work of art is an affective response, in which aesthetic value is grasped immediately, rather than by inference.

Can this view salvage Gorodeisky's affective account of criticism? My first objection to the affective account was that some works of art have non-aesthetic artistic value. My second objection was that there are purely interpretive responses to works of art. If Shelley's view is correct, they are once again entitled to citizenship as aesthetic values and aesthetic responses. However, there is clearly a limit to the recovery of the artistic to the aesthetic in that way. Shelley has successfully shown that the cognitive and the aesthetic are compatible, but he has not succeeded in showing that the cognitive in art is always, at the same time, the aesthetic.

When we speak of the different artistic values of *Les Demoiselles d'Avignon* and its appropriation art, the difference to which we are referring is clearly not that one is graceful while the other is impudent. *Les Demoiselles d'Avignon* has artistic value in its art historical achievement of attacking the tradition of linear perspective since the Renaissance and pioneering the category of Cubism by offering a pictorial perspective that transcends the ordinary vision. On the other hand, Bidlo's appropriation has artistic value in that it attacks the Romanticist view of art as the creation of genius and symbolizes the end of art, an era in which it is no longer possible to create something brand new. These are historical and cognitive values, respectively. I do not grasp them immediately, but by hearing or reading something, by taking time to think and understand it, and by mobilizing my art historical knowledge to make inferences. When I teach about these values in a class of fine arts, I am not guiding the students' emotions, but their understanding.

This is even more evident in the interpretive response, where value is not at issue. Interpreting the philosophical questions presented in *Fountain* is not the same as perceiving the wit in *Fountain*. If the latter is an affective and immediate grasp, the former is a process of thinking, understanding, and reasoning. Thus, even if aesthetic differences are not merely perceptual differences, not all artistic differences can be recovered in aesthetic differences. My two objections are still valid objections to the policy of linking the artistic with the aesthetic.

In the first place, even if we acknowledge that every work of art has an aesthetic property that is involved in its appreciation, it is a leap to think that the affective account of appreciation can be supported by it. At best, it is only the following thesis that can be supported by the extension of the aesthetic: the artistic value (value *qua* a work of art) of any given work of art includes its aesthetic value, and the proper appreciative response to it includes responding with aesthetic pleasure. This dissertation does not show that aesthetic value is the only or especially central artistic value, nor does it show that aesthetic pleasure in response to aesthetic properties or values is central to art appreciation. Thus, Shelley's (2003: 378) conclusion that "the artworld is really just a colony on what Duchamp called 'the planet of aesthetics'" still seems to me to be exaggerated and quite difficult to accept.[37]

There are two options left for affective accounts that wish to equate the artistic with the aesthetic. Either they deny that these values and responses are included in the domain of the artistic/aesthetic, or they extend the aesthetic further and recover these values and responses in the domain of the artistic/aesthetic. The first option is too revisionist, as I have already shown in defending pluralism. We cannot dismiss the values and responses already embedded in the artworld by philosophical definition. The second option is, in my opinion, ad hoc. Perhaps its purpose cannot be achieved unless one stipulates that any response that is considered appreciation is an aesthetic response, and any property associated with it is an aesthetic property. And even Shelley (2003) admits that such a stipulation is undesirable.

2.4 The Cluster Account of Criticism

The cluster account of appreciation and the *guide-to-appreciation* account of criticism entail the cluster account of criticism.

Cluster Account of Criticism

A's product *P* (a text, speech, and so forth) is a criticism of an artwork *x* if and only if *P* has

[37] For another objection to Shelley's conclusion, see Carroll (2004).

the function of guiding any of a variety of responses, such as (1) a specific belief formation about *x*, (2) aesthetic perception of *x*, or (3) aesthetic pleasure through *x* by the readers of *P*.

So far, I have analyzed the responses, but not discussed the nature of *guiding*. Simply put, guiding the viewers is to make them respond to the work in a way that was impossible before, to make them respond in a more detailed, profound, and justified way (but not necessarily in a way that increases pleasure). Insofar as we rely on such everyday understandings, there is a concern that items with the function of guiding appreciation might include those we do not necessarily label as criticism, such as advertising, art history, philosophy of art, or artist biographies, interviews, and even audio tours of museums. All of these can function to make the receivers' appreciation more detailed, profound, and justified. In addition, the curation and layout of the exhibition, laugh track in Sitcoms, or even simply making one wear glasses, might be cases of criticism merely because they guide appreciation. As I am taking a pluralistic view about the guided appreciative responses, these concerns are all the more serious. Is the cluster account too permissive a view about criticism?

I have a couple of replies. First, the stipulation of *having the function* of guiding appreciation would address some of the counterexamples. In particular, it would be desirable to modify the function of guiding appreciation to having it as a *primary*, rather than an incidental, function. As mentioned above, the most typical way for an artifact to have a function is that its producer intended it to have one. The primary function of a biography, as intended by the author, is to communicate historical facts about the artist, not to be a guide of appreciating individual works. However, here, I must admit that this response is only suggestive, as I cannot present a complete analysis of what it is to have a function.

Second, it would be helpful to add that critics usually, if not always, guide appreciation *by explanation*. Though *explanation* is as polysemous a term as reason, what I have in mind for critical explanation is not a causal explanation of what mental state motivated one's judgment, but the metaphysical explanation that reveals and illustrates the grounding relationship between the

lower-level and higher-level properties of an artwork.[38] Jacques-Louis David's *Death of Socrates* (1787) is well-balanced in virtue of having a poison cup placed almost in the center of the canvas and putting a dense crowd on the right and the passageway leading to the back on the left. The target of such an explanation might be the relationship between aesthetic and non-aesthetic properties, as Sibley (2001: 37) thinks, or, more generally, the relationship between meaning or value and base properties, as Grant (2013: 26–7) has in mind. The critic guides further belief formation, aesthetic perception, and aesthetic pleasure by providing texts and speeches that describe and make us grasp which properties of the work are the basis of which properties. Sitcom laugh tracks or glasses would be driven to the edge. They might guide appreciation, but not by explanation.

Third, I am ready to accept these supposed counterexamples as criticism instead of somehow excluding them. There seems to be no particular reason to deny that captions and audio tours which guide the appreciation of artworks through explanations are simultaneously criticisms. I am concerned with criticism as a mode of engaging with artworks, and critics as the subjects of this engagement, not with criticism or critics in light of any official institutions. Those who raise the counterexamples above might suppose only those criticisms in more official venues, specifically in newspaper reviews, anthologies of critical works, and papers in journals like *Artforum* and *October*, and only those writers who act as critics in more official ways, specifically writers like Denis Diderot, T.S. Eliot, and Clement Greenberg. However, items that function as guiding appreciation are everywhere, from IMDb to everyday conversation, and are produced daily by people who are not professional critics. It is no surprise that an item that is not a work of criticism in the institutional sense can have a critical aspect in the sense of guiding appreciation. Here is one interesting example. Reinbert de Leeuw's recording of Erik Satie's *Gnossienne* (1995) is hauntingly slow and melancholic, entirely different from Pascal Rogé's clear but mischievous playing (1984). Both recordings are works of art in their own right, and at the same time, they have the function of guiding the listeners' appreciation by making them attend to different aspects of the piano piece of *Gnossienne* (the score of which contains many mysterious

[38] See Brenner et al. (2021); Ricki and Trogdon (2021).

instructions of playing). In fact, "interpretation" has this usage of referring to the reading of scores and the realization through performance. Even a work of art can be a work of criticism simultaneously.

Fourth, if the above responses are still not persuasive, I have one last move, which is to accept that this is not an analysis of criticism in the narrow sense, but of criticism in the broad sense. Gorodeisky (2022), who I think presents a too restrictive account of criticism, seems to acknowledge that her analysis does not apply to the whole practice of criticism when she hesitates to use the term "art criticism" and instead favors the expression "aesthetic criticism" or "this practice of criticism" (316–7). On the contrary, while my delineation may be too permissive in light of the activities that are actually called criticism, items that are so grouped are still those that share the significant function of guiding appreciation. I am not claiming that the function of guiding appreciation is shared by all and only those items we label as criticism, but suggesting that those that have this function should be labeled as criticism.

2.5 Good Criticism

This section explores the considerations that make a criticism, at a general level, a good criticism (or a bad criticism). According to the view defended in the previous sections, criticism is an activity that guides various appreciative responses, often through explanation. The cluster theory of criticism suggests that the type of appreciative response being prompted is not directly related to whether it is good or bad *qua* criticism. There is no such implication that criticism that targets aesthetic perception is superior to criticism that targets belief formation. How, then, can we identify good and bad criticism?

It is compatible to have some criteria on a general level and others on more specific levels. One criticism may be a good criticism because it contains an aesthetic rhyme that is comparable to poetry. One criticism may be a good criticism, although modestly, because it expresses the writer's personal style and teaches us something about a unique personality. There are countless considerations

that make an individual criticism a good criticism. However, they are, at best, criteria for the *value of criticism*, not for *value qua criticism*. A criticism that is as beautiful as a poem, but does not guide us in any way regarding our appreciation of the target artwork, is not a good criticism in the more vital sense. It is only in this more vital sense that I pay attention. A beautifully decorated pair of scissors is a better pair of scissors than one that is not so decorated, but that is not what we want to know about criticism.[39]

In other words, there are numerous subgenres within the genre of criticism, each with its own specific criteria for evaluation. In one type of criticism, it is essential to make the reader buy or go see the artwork, so any instance that results in that outcome is a good instance. In the type of criticism written for those who have not yet seen the artwork, one virtue is to avoid spoilers, and in criticism for those who have already seen the artwork, one virtue is to describe the scene well enough to help them remember it. However, whether or not these specific criteria are met, it can and should be asked whether or not a criticism meets the general evaluative criteria *qua* criticism. So, if criticism is a guide to appreciation, what kind of criticism is good criticism?

2.5.1 Consequential and Formal Criteria

While Grant (2013: 42) does not recognize the aid of appreciation as a constitutive purpose of criticism, he emphasizes it as a non-constitutive purpose that is relevant to a criticism's being good or bad. In his view, criticism is good criticism if it can change the reader's appreciative experience for the better. What, then, is a good appreciation? As we saw above, Grant divides criticism into three

[39] Technically speaking, goodness *qua a particular kind* means the attributive goodness, which Thomson (2008) describes as being inseparable from the goodness-fixing kinds (See Geach 1956; Sibley 2001: Chap. 12, 13). A green book is a book, and it is green independently of being a book (adjectives that can be split from kinds in this way are called predicative adjectives). However, it is not the case that good money is money and is good independently of being money. Value *qua* money is the value associated with the essence (or constitutive function) of the kind. Similarly, when a work of criticism is good criticism in this sense, it does not mean being a criticism and being good. It is good in light of the constitutive function of the kind, criticism.

components. That is, criticism communicates either (a) which part, feature, or represented element the appreciation involves a response to, or (b) what kind of response the appreciation involves, or (c) what are the appropriate reasons for responding in these ways. Correspondingly, good appreciation is described as (1) paying attention to the elements to which one should direct attention through appropriate means, or (2) responding appropriately on these grounds, or (3) responding in that way for appropriate reasons (Grant 2013: 43). The materialistic and dry impression given by Haruki Murakami's *Hear the Wind Sing* (1979) derives from its somewhat awkward style of Japanese, which seems as if it has been translated from English. A better appreciation is one that more closely approximates this object-response-reason set in the artwork. A reader who appropriately savors the materialistic and dry impression of the work, but has not yet grasped what brings it about, can be said to have reached a better appreciation if she becomes able to grasp it. A reader who is aware of the translation-like style by appropriate means (in this case, by reading), but fails to savor the aesthetic effect it brings, can be said to have reached a better appreciation if she becomes able to savor it. I agree with Grant that whether a critic can bring about change in this way corresponds to whether her product is good or bad as criticism.[40] A criticism is good if it makes readers understand a point that they did not understand, see an aesthetic quality that they did not see, arrive at an aesthetic emotion that they did not feel, and recognize a reason that they did not recognize.

What is considered a good work of criticism under this criterion is one that has a good consequence of good appreciation, and thus, the value is instrumental. However, there can also be a more formal criterion for good criticism. As mentioned in the previous section, the critic often, if not always, guides the appreciative response through explanation. This implies the following evaluation

[40] Here, recall that Grant and I disagree on whether the guide to appreciation is a constitutive aim of criticism. According to Grant, the guide to appreciation is a non-constitutive aim of criticism, and therefore can be a criterion for good criticism. However, as I argued above, we need to focus on the constitutive function of criticism if we want to elucidate the *value as criticism*. It is the constitutive function of a kind that constrains the good-making features of that kind.

thesis. For at least one criterion, good criticism is one that includes good explanations. What, then, is a good explanation?

Song (2021) focuses on the selectivity in aesthetic explanation and, on the basis of an analogy between aesthetic and causal explanations, offers a principle of selection that rests on a sort of economy. Critics who explain the elegance of a work of art aim for maximum delivery at minimum cost. That is, by referring to as few features as possible, but also by referring to modally rare features that would make a similar work without those features elegant if only it had them counterfactually, the aesthetic explanation aims to be as economical as possible. Thus, just as the causal explanation for a wildfire might refer to the fact that a cigarette was littered but not to the presence of oxygen, the aesthetic explanation for the elegance of Constantin Brancusi's *Bird in Space* (1924) refers to its unique shape, but not to its size or weight. This is because (1) it is rare for a work to have the same shape as *Bird in Space*, while it is not so rare for a work to have the same size and weight, and (2) it is very likely that a non-elegant work would become elegant if it had the same shape as *Bird in Space*, while it is very unlikely that a work that it would become elegant if it had the same size and weight as *Bird in Space*.

This principle of selection is not limited to cases of attributing aesthetic properties, but can be extended to cases of attributing any higher-level property to a work of art. Critics should aim for maximum delivery at as little cost as possible, also in cases where they present interpretive explanations, rather than mentioning all relevant features. And I believe that the fidelity to this principle of selection is directly an evaluative principle for a critical explanation as well. A criticism that includes economical explanations is a good criticism; a criticism that includes redundant or inadequate explanations is a bad criticism. This formal criterion is independent and compatible with the first criterion, which focuses on consequences. A criticism that is good in that it leads the viewer to an appropriate response to an artwork is not necessarily a good criticism in that the explanations it contains are economical, and vice versa.

2.5.2 Two Rationalist Criteria?

The base properties that appear in a critical explanation are normative reasons for the latter, depending on the type of response it grounds. The cluster account of criticism predicts that critics often, if not always (i.e., except when they are trying to prompt some irrational appreciative response), support the guide of the appreciative response by offering reasons. If so, of course, the reasons given by a critic must match the guided appreciative response. In this sense, there is a demand from rationality for criticism. In an internalist view, the normative reasons for a given response must be those that motivate a rational subject to that response. Just as it is irrational to accuse someone of being a bad person because she helps others, it is irrational to describe a painting as gaudy because it has a thin curve, or as bad because it is graceful. In the *guide-to-appreciation* account, criticism is a guide to appreciation, so it is suggested that the rationality demanded upon criticism is derived from the rationality demanded upon appreciation. This is because if appreciation is not a rational response, it is not rational to demand rationality only on the criticism that guides it.

The call from rationality accompanies various types of criticism, but as an example, let us focus on criticism that communicates evaluative judgments. Throughout his career, Beardsley (1958; 1982a: Chap. 12, 19) has argued that three properties and only those properties—unity, complexity, and intensity—can be normative reasons for aesthetic evaluation (in Beardsley, simultaneously evaluation *qua* art). That is, the fact that a work is more coherent and complete, more complex, and has stronger aesthetic qualities are each reason to judge it to be a *pro tanto* good work, and a lower-order property enters into the reasons for evaluation insofar as it brings them about. In Beardsley's criteria, a criticism stating that a work is good because it is unified is a good criticism, while one stating that it is good because it is disunified is a bad criticism. In the latter case, the reason provided does not match the evaluative judgment being prompted.

Beardsley seems to have assumed instrumentalism about artistic value and thought that it was those three properties and only those that causally bring about valuable aesthetic experiences, but not a few commentators have challenged this view (Dickie 1987; Sibley 2001: Chap. 8; Goldman 2005;

Tsu 2019). According to the more moderate view offered by Sibley and Dickie, many aesthetic properties have a default valence that, in the absence of a reversing explanation, is a reason for positive evaluation. Elegance, by default or on its own, becomes a reason matched to evaluate its holders as good; likewise, garishness becomes a reason matched to evaluate its holders as bad. Only when combined with other elements and working negatively, does elegance become part of the reason for negative evaluation. To cite elegance as a reason for judging something as bad, or to cite garishness as a reason for judging something as good, without a reversing explanation, would render a criticism irrational and bad, in that it contradicts the default valence of those aesthetic properties.

Nevertheless, further explanation would be needed as to why certain facts match certain responses, indeed justify those responses, and motivate rational subjects to those responses. Neither Beardsley nor Sibley gave a detailed explanation of why certain aesthetic properties are associated with certain valences. As mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, the question of how having a thin curve can be a reason for being graceful, and how being graceful be a reason for being a good painting, is still not fully resolved. Whatever basis may be given to that structure of justification, however, the point here remains the same. In any case, a criticism is irrational unless the reasons it refers to match the responses it prompts, and it is a bad criticism. It is not impossible that irrational criticism may also guide appreciation in a positive way. Still, being irrational is a flaw *qua* criticism to that extent.

Appreciation and criticism are also required to be rational in the following respect. Martínez Marín (2023: 251) addresses structural rationality as distinguished from substantive rationality. Appreciation is not only subject to the requirements of *substantive rationality* in the sense that one should respond in a way that one has reason to do so, but also to the requirements of *structural rationality* in the sense that one's compound attitude must be consistent. For example, it is structurally irrational to judge a certain cinematic work as silly and bad while at the same time enjoying and experiencing aesthetic pleasure. Conversely, it is also structurally irrational to judge a piece of avant-garde art to be of high value and yet not personally enjoy it at all. Such aesthetic akrasia arises

only when one adopts a hybrid account of appreciation, as Martínez Marín and I do. If one of forming beliefs or feeling pleasure is not considered part of a proper appreciative response, it does not follow that appreciation is irrational, even if there is a mismatch between judgment and feeling.

If such structural rationality is required of appreciation, then the same would be required of the criticism that guides appreciation. A criticism that explains why one personally dislikes something while explaining why it has high value, or a criticism that explains why one personally prefers something while explaining why it has low value, is irrational. Such a criticism is considered a bad criticism in the sense that it is inconsistent. I agree that the kind of appreciation that such an akrasia actually accompanies is indeed an irrational and bad appreciation, and that an inconsistent criticism that ends up guiding an acratic appreciation is a bad criticism. Contrary to Martínez Marín, however, I suspect that cases in which appreciation and criticism are truly acratic in this way are rare.

First, akrasia occurs only when people form inconsistent judgments and emotions towards the same feature, and there is nothing irrational about forming separate judgments and emotions towards different parts of an artwork. Therefore, the fact that there are parts of a work that one evaluates positively and likes and parts that one evaluates negatively and dislikes is not in itself a fact that makes an appreciation irrational. Being aware of this point, what Martínez Marín (2023: 252, 261) takes issue with is the formation of overall judgments and emotions toward a work of art, and the inconsistency between them. I agree that it is irrational to judge a work of art as a masterpiece and dislike it, all things considered, or to judge it as a poor piece of art and love it. However, how often do we actually form overall judgments and emotions toward a work of art and also be inconsistent?

An overall judgment or liking is given as the sum total of pro tanto judgments or likings one holds toward parts. It is incomprehensible that one has an opinion about the whole of an artwork while having no opinion about its parts. If this is the case, then two error theories can be given for the appreciative reports that Martínez Marín sees as aesthetic akrasia. The report could simply be a report of the separate existence of a part one likes and a part one judges to be poor. There is nothing inconsistent about liking the story and direction of “Intern” (2015) while rating its casting negatively.

In other words, the reporter may just be confusing her judgment and liking for parts with overall judgment and liking. Or, even in the actual formation of an overall judgment or liking, one could be miscalculating at the step of adding up the various considerations. After all, overall judgments or likings are formed in a very rough manner. The appreciative state of disliking while approving, all things considered, may be resolved by reflecting on one's judgments and likings toward parts. A person who reports disliking a Jackson Pollock painting while attributing high aesthetic value to it may dislike it less by reconfirming that she approves of many parts of it, or may withdraw her evaluation by reconfirming that she dislikes many parts of it.

Second, even if there are indeed cases in which people form inconsistent judgments and emotions toward a single feature, this would not be a problem if the judgments are not aesthetic judgments. In this respect, Martínez Marín, like Gorodeisky, seems to confuse aesthetic value, which is constituted by pleasure, with artistic value, which is a label that summarizes various values. It may be irrational to judge an object to have the aesthetic value of beauty but not to feel pleasure. This is because having an aesthetic value of beauty is, by analysis, nothing but meriting a kind of pleasure. On the other hand, it is not irrational not to feel pleasure while appreciating a feature as beneficial for gaining insight about a fact. This is because having cognitive value is not the same as having reasons to particularly like, enjoy, or feel pleasure. Cognitive values, political values, historical values, and so on may also be analyzed as meriting some pro-attitude (for example., approval) insofar as they are positive values, but not all pro-attitudes are pleasure. By acknowledging the value that the theory of relativity has, I am approving of it, but I neither like nor dislike it. Similarly, attributing a particular positive value to a work of art while stating that you do not like it is not a problem as long as it is not an aesthetic value.

If aesthetic akrasia in appreciation is largely dismissed by these accounts, then it would also largely dismiss any case in which the criticism that guides appreciation is acratic. Thus, while I do not particularly reject the criterion that a criticism is good if it is consistent in the overall doxastic and

affective responses it prompts, and bad if it is acratic, I see little place for this criterion in practice. The appreciation and criticism that is supposed to be acratic can often be articulated in ways that are not.

Summary

One characterization of criticism that can form a consensus and clarify points of contention is to regard criticism as a guide to appreciation. Criticism is primarily intended (or otherwise accepted as such) to guide appreciation (whether actually or counterfactually), often through explanation. The conflict between doxastic, perceptual, practical, and affective accounts of criticism has been reconstructed as a conflict over the appreciative response that each assumes. In examining the affective accounts in particular, I have shown that essentialism about appreciation is hopeless, and that pluralism is promising. The affective account equates aesthetic value with artistic value, aesthetic pleasure with art appreciation, and aesthetic criticism with art criticism, but I have emphasized again that there are problems with this equation that have been pointed out for a long time. First, art appreciation is not solely concerned with aesthetic value, and second, it is not solely concerned with value. The affective account, with a broader conception of the aesthetic, might be able to recover some of the artistic values and artistic responses that I have taken up as counterexamples, again in the realm of the aesthetic. However, not everything can be recovered.

Appreciation is a cluster of multiple, mutually heterogeneous responses, and following the *guide-to-appreciation* account, criticism is also pluralistic. There are multiple criteria for good criticism in a very general sense, and I have addressed three of them. First, a criticism is a better criticism if it leads to better consequences, i.e., better appreciation, whatever the process. Second, since criticism often involves explanation, a criticism is a better criticism if it involves a more economical explanation. Third, there are demands from rationality on a criticism and the appreciation it guides, and it is a better criticism if it meets these demands. I have argued, however, that while the demand to be structurally rational is valid in criticism and appreciation, cases of akrasia that are truly in violation of this demand will be rare.

Whichever type of appreciative response one guides, the critic often offers reasons in support of it. I have never doubted that the critic can offer normative reasons for the appreciative responses she prompts. Skepticism is the result of an overemphasis on the perceptual aspect of appreciation, and if appreciation is not merely perceptual, the ground for thinking that critical reasoning is impossible is lost. Moreover, if Hopkins (2006) and Lord (2019) are correct, appreciation and criticism can be both perceptual and reasoned. Skepticism about critical reasoning and explanation is not a view that will stand up under scrutiny unless it addresses these contemporary responses.

Nevertheless, the skeptic's view is quite right in the following points. The critic is not making deductions under universal laws that an artwork has this value because it has this feature, or that it has that meaning because it has that feature. After all, some paintings are graceful and beautiful because of their thin curves, while others are weak and boring because of the very same thin curves. The reasons given by critics have only limited generality. Thus, the interests of this chapter merge with those of the previous chapter. Whether or not a critical reasoning can be given, whether or not a critical explanation is a plausible explanation, is often sensitive to how one categorizes a work of art and whether or not that categorization is appropriate. If something is called for that reasons critical reasonings, justifies justifications, and explains explanations, then the categories of art, I believe, are the ones to play that role. In the next chapter, I will begin exploring this fact.

3 Genres as Rules

Works of art are categorized. The categories are too diverse to list exhaustively but an illustrative list might include horror, science fiction, painting, film, Baroque, Expressionism, blues, haiku, Impressionism, Nouvelle Vague, Hitchcock films, Faulkner novels, French literature, Asian films, 19th-century poem, and 1980s manga. These categories are further subdivided into subcategories. For example, horror includes splatter, psycho horror, zombie, vampire, and occult horror, and further subdivisions are possible. Some categories are also hybrid. Horror-comedy, Jazz-funk, and space western are some examples. The artworld is abundant with a variety of art categories.

As addressed in Chapter 1, Walton (1970) discussed the influence of categorization on aesthetic judgments. By the end of Chapter 1, I had shown that the role of categories that Walton addresses is actually very limited; he primarily focused on categories' role of influencing the formation of aesthetic judgments through their standard, variable, and contra-standard features (SVCs). In the realm of art criticism, however, categories play more diverse roles. Describing these roles and the mechanisms behind them is the main task of this chapter.

I will not argue that all art categories, *in general*, play a role in appreciation and criticism. Certain categorizations are normatively neutral. For example, the fact that an artwork was created in 1970 does not play any role in how one should appreciate or criticize it, unless one associates it with some further interest. Nevertheless, there is no reason to deny that *artworks made in 1970* is an art category. Often neglected in previous literature is the task of distinguishing from among the various categories of art only those categories that are relevant to appreciation and criticism.

The art categories listed in the opening paragraph of this chapter fall into various *meta-categories*, such as form, style, media, genre, movement, author, region, and period. Different meta-categories have different rationales; some are obvious, while others are unclear. I will propose later that the categories that fall into the meta-category of *genre* are the categories that are relevant to

appreciation and criticism, and that we should use the term "genre" to refer to these categories and only to them. In order to make this case, it is necessary to clarify what is meant, or ought to be meant, by "genre" as opposed to the other meta-categories. While the concepts of style and medium have been widely discussed in the philosophy of art and art history,[41] there have not been many discussions on the concept of genre.[42]

In Section 1 of this chapter, I examine the view that meta-categorical differences correspond to differences in the types of features that a category tracks. According to this view—the *genres-as-features* account—there are certain types of features that are tracked by only those categories that are genres; individual artworks belong to a certain genre by exemplifying a set of features that are instances of the specific type. Such a view assumes and emphasizes that categories exist essentially to classify items, that items belong to categories, and that categories are associated with standard features that are relevant to such classification and membership. While I do not attempt to deny this general understanding of categories, I will show that the genres-as-features account cannot capture what is unique about the genre meta-category. Genre practice is not merely a matter of classifying artworks.

In Section 2, I will elaborate and defend an idea that has been implicitly included in some existing theories of genre: the *genres-as-rules* account. According to this account, an art genre is a cluster of (often implicit) rules that regulate various appreciative responses. For example, it is appropriate to consider the visual mundaneness of an artwork as provocative because it is under the regulation of the rule of *readymade* as a genre.

Section 3 identifies the ontological structure of genres as rules. Genres such as readymade are included as available in our conceptual repertoire, but what exactly does it mean for a genre to exist?

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[41] For discussions, see Ross (2003); Meskin (2013) for style and Gaut (2010: Chap. 7); Lopes (2014: Chap. 7); Carroll (2019a) for medium.

[42] The exceptions which I will address below include Currie (2004); Laetz and Lopes (2008); Abell (2012), (2015); Friend (2012); Evnine (2015); Liao (2016); Terrone (2021); Malone (2022).

By the genres-as-rules account, we are naturally led to the ontology of rules. I will use a model devised by Brian Epstein (2015) to show how genres are set up in a given community.

In Section 4, I argue that statements attributing a certain genre to an individual artwork can be speech-acts of *framing* rather than classifying. Framing is both declaration and proposal concerning how an artwork should be appreciated, and the starting point of genre practice. I will also examine the view of Evnine (2015), who like I rejects the genres-as-features account but understands genres as traditions as particulars. While genres-as-rules and genres-as-traditions accounts share many points, I will show that the former is more promising in that it avoids the problematic claims that accompany the latter. Section 5 presents one case study in order to give a concrete example of genre practice.

3.1 Genres as Features

3.1.1 Classification According to Standard Features

Common sense suggests that a genre is a way of *classifying* artworks, and that classification is based on the features possessed by artworks. The approach to understanding genre by focusing on the way in which genres are associated with the features or properties of artworks has been called variously like "genres as regions of conceptual space" (Evnine 2015: 2), "Genres-as-Concepts" (Terrone 2021: 17), "genres-as-features" (Malone 2022: 2). The common idea is that genres track sets of features that are relevant to genre membership, and individual artworks are judged to belong to a genre by virtue of possessing the relevant features (e.g., Todorov 1990; Currie 2004). As a very simple example, a comedy is a group of artworks that share the function of making people laugh. This does not necessarily mean that there are supposed to be necessary and sufficient conditions for genre membership. According to the more promising version of this view, the genre membership is based on the possession of a sufficient *cluster* of the relevant features (Abell 2012: 70; Friend 2012: 187; Terrone 2021: 18). A fantasy might be considered to be an artwork that depicts many, if not all, of a repertoire that includes fantastical beasts, magic, witches, and so on. A paradigm case of the genre would fulfill most of the features group, while a borderline case would fulfill only some.

I will follow Walton (1970: 339) in referring to the features relevant to the membership of a category as its *standard features*. As we saw in Chapter 1, an artwork is more qualified for a member of a category if it has more of the standard features of that category, and less qualified for a member if it does not have them or has more of the competing features (contra-standard features). For a painting, being flat or stationary is a standard feature, while a three-dimensional object sticking out or moving is contra-standard. Epistemologically, standard features provide clues to our classification of artworks into categories.

Being associated with a set of standard features, however, does not help us to identify what is unique about genres. This is because categories of art in general, not just genres, are associated with a set of features. Painting is a category of art associated with a set of standard features, but it is not necessarily a genre. Painting is usually considered a paradigmatic example of the meta-category of media rather than genre (Abell 2012: 80). The advocates of the genres-as-features account are often indifferent to this issue, using "genre" as a synonym for "category." For example, Friend's (2012) and Terrone's (2021) respective attempts to characterize "fiction as a genre" and "science fiction as a genre" could easily be paraphrased as characterizations of "fiction as a category" and "science fiction as a category," since a "genre" in their uses means nothing more than a category associated with a set of standard features.

The advocates of the genres-as-features account need to go further if they wish to identify what distinguishes genres from other meta-categories. One natural approach that builds on the genres-as-features account is to associate different meta-categories with different types of standard features. In this approach, genres, forms, and styles differ because the standard features that each category tracks are different in type. Let us avoid calling it the *genres-as-specific-type-of-features* account and simply let the "genres-as-features account" mean this modified view.

Genres as Features

A category *C* is a genre if and only if *C* tracks standard features of a specific type.

The task is then to identify what specific type of features are tracked by genres; what type of features are those that, other things being equal, counts it toward for an individual artwork to belong to a genre category.

We can start by distinguishing different types of properties that an artwork can have. For example, one type of property is a *contextual* property to do with the origin and history of a work: being directed by Hitchcock, painted in New York, exhibited at the first Impressionist exhibition, and so on. Membership in an authorial, period, or regional category is straightforwardly determined, necessarily and sufficiently, by these sorts of facts about origin and history. The attribution of the category of Hitchcock films is, in this sense, equivalent to pointing out the fact that the film was made by Alfred Hitchcock.[43]

Formalism, which I dealt with in Chapter 1, was a position that denied the relevance of contextual properties in criticism and focused on *intrinsic* properties of artworks. Among the intrinsic properties, being red, being symmetrical, having a height of 2 meters, and having a running time of 100 minutes are *non-aesthetic* properties. They are a group of properties easily grasped by a person merely with normal perceptual faculties who exercises them under appropriate conditions or by appropriate means of measurement.

Artworks have *aesthetic* properties too. It may not be immediately apparent to everyone that a work is graceful, garish, balanced, dynamic, sad, tender, or melancholy. Aesthetic properties arguably often entail value and suggest evaluation.[44] In Chapter 1, we discussed two important theses about aesthetic properties proposed by Sibley (2001: Chap. 1, 3). Firstly, the possession of an aesthetic quality depends on the possession of some set of non-aesthetic properties; a thin curve makes an artwork graceful, and an enormous size makes it powerful. Secondly, however, aesthetic concepts

[43] Laetz and Lopes (2008: 156), contrasting genres and traditions, point out that genre is not such a category that is defined by social factors related to the producers, but I think it is too hasty to make this point. Membership in a genre may be partly, if not fully, grounded in the possession of certain contextual properties (Abell 2012: 73).

[44] See Sibley (2001: Chap. 7); De Clercq (2008).

cannot be applied mechanically. Having any particular set of non-aesthetic properties cannot be a sufficient condition for having an aesthetic quality. An artwork may have a thin curve and yet not be graceful, or it may be enormous and yet fragile.

Artworks also have *representational* properties. Representational properties are generally concerned with the semantic content of artworks or what they are about, such as iconographic symbols, narrative events, scene settings, and themes. A subcategory of the representational property is the *depictive property*, which is particularly important for pictorial art forms.[45] Examples include depicting the American West in the pioneer days, depicting Mozart, depicting monsters, depicting the sinking of a luxury liner, and so on.

Finally, artworks have a variety of *functional properties*. Typical examples are the emotional and physical effects on viewers, such as scaring them, giving them a sense of wonder or pleasure, making them want to dance, and so on. Other examples include promoting the formation of attitudes and beliefs about certain facts and ideas. Both aesthetic and representational properties could perhaps be understood as functional properties, but the point here is that artworks can have even greater functions than the aesthetic and representational functions.[46]

This list may not be exhaustive, but it does illustrate the diversity of features that an artwork may have. The genres-as-features account assumes that the meta-categories, including the meta-category of genre, are simply logical groups of these features. For example, one might think that the *formal* categories track non-aesthetic properties (especially non-aesthetic structures) and the *stylistic* categories track aesthetic properties. The form of haiku requires having a specific number of syllables and the style of Baroque requires having that massive and dynamic aesthetic quality. As for the *genre* categories, one might think that some track representational properties and some track

[45] See Kulvicki (2006), (2014), (2020); Hyman (2021); Sen (2021) for debates on depiction.

[46] Having a function or effect is a dispositional property of an artwork, whereas being intended or expected by the artist to do so would be an example of a contextual property related to the origin or history of the artwork. On functions of artworks, see, for example, Beardsley (1982a); Gaut (2000); Gilmore (2011); Abell (2011).

functions to evoke emotion. The genre of crime stories requires depicting a crime incident and the genre of comedy requires having the function of making people laugh.

The approach of distinguishing meta-categories by focusing on feature tracking is elegant. Besides, the suggestion above seems to cover a wide range of categories that we consider genres. It is easy to identify the representational content characteristic of science fiction, romance, action, drama, crime, adventure, fantasy, hero, history, war, music, and westerns, as well as the function and effect characteristic of comedy, horror, thriller, and mystery. However, this account suffers from obvious difficulties, which render the genres-as-features account, in the end, untenable.

3.1.2 Problems with Genres as Features

A closer look would reveal it is simply not the case that categories within a same meta-category always track the same type(s) of features (Laetz and Lopes 2008: 156; Abell 2015: 26). The above suggestion already acknowledges that genres are split into categories that track representational *or* functional properties, but even this disjunctive conception fails. Counterexamples erupt especially when the concept of genre across artistic media is at issue. The suggestion above might fit well with genres of films, literature, theater, painting, and video games, but not necessarily to genres of music, for example (e.g., Ross 2003: 232–3).[47] For one thing, except for some music categories such as program music, typical musical genres such as Pop, Rock, Jazz, Hip-hop, R&B, Reggae, Country, Metal, and Punk are not essentially focused on tracking representational properties. A Hip-hop song is not Hip-hop because it is about life on the streets. Moreover, except for some musical categories such as Hymn music and Dance music, musical genres are not essentially focused on tracking functional properties. A Metal song is not Metal primarily because it excites listeners to the point of headbanging. Tracking representational and functional properties does not seem to be central to what

[47] Existing discussions of genre often begin by limiting the scope of the discussion to representational and narrative art genres (Abell 2015: 27; Terrone 2021: 17). However, I am concerned that this trivializes the issue. The claim that all flying birds fly is trivial, even if true, and the claim that all birds fly is still problematic insofar as there are birds that do not fly. See my objection to the genre restrictivism below.

most music genres do *as genres*. Rather, what is relevant to musical genres involves a wide range of contextual properties (such as what instruments are used), non-aesthetic properties (such as what structures a piece has), and aesthetic properties (such as whether it is funky or heavy).

The genres-as-features account fails not only because there are various genres tracking different types of features, but also because many individual genres track multiple types of features simultaneously. Film noir, for example, tracks not only artworks depicting hard-boiled middle-aged men and femme fatales, but also their being produced in the 1940s or 1950s, their dark, sharp screens, the atmosphere of ennui they express, their capacity to evoke a sense of stagnation and fatigue, and so on. There are many different types of features that make a film noir a film noir, and they are by no means limited to one or two types. If this is the case, then, is film noir a genre, a style, or a form? Any theory that assumes competition and exclusivity among meta-categories fails here. In terms of feature tracking, we must admit that film noir is a mixture of a genre, a style, a form, and a historical profile tied to a specific period or region. While I do not intend to deny this consequence, it does not reveal, after all, what component makes film noir a genre.

The set of features that constitute an art category is not only diverse in type, but also has a non-accidental connection. The general fact that the properties relevant to a kind *co-occur* across types also stands against the genres-as-features account which seeks uniformity in the type of standard features.[48] As we have already seen, aesthetic properties depend on non-aesthetic properties. Even if the relationship is not condition-governed, a non-accidental pattern can be recognized in it. Having a particular non-aesthetic quality or depictive content often contributes to having a particular aesthetic quality, other conditions being equal. Indeed, even Sibley, who has been most careful about the connection between aesthetic and non-aesthetic properties, admits that certain aesthetic properties

[48] Richard Boyd theorizes the natural-kind as the *homeostatic property cluster*: "either the presence of some of the properties in F tends (under appropriate conditions) to favor the presence of the others, or there are underlying mechanisms or processes that tend to maintain the presence of the properties in F, or both" (Boyd 1999: 143).

require, presuppose, or are typically associated with certain non-aesthetic properties, and even suggests that it might not be an accidental connection.

> In music and verse, quietness and slowness have some close connection with sadness and solemnity, and speed with gaiety and excitement; bright colours are somehow related to garishness and gaudiness, curving lines to gracefulness, and so on. I shall say that they are *typically* or *characteristically* associated. [...] Exactly what these general relationships are often remains clouded; certainly a common assumption, sometimes explicit, is that they are empirical and contingent. That there may be certain conceptual relationships has been less noticed [...]. (Sibley 2001: 46)

In order to express ennui through a certain scene in a film, it is usually effective to cover the screen with cold or achromatic colors instead of warm ones, and to depict a street corner or a bar at midnight instead of a sunny meadow. The relationship between the intended purpose of the artwork and the chosen means is also not accidental. Depicting a monster rather than a still life will usually contribute to evoking fear. Needless to say, religious paintings can be an aid to faith because they depict specific religious scenes or saints. As a tendency, crime films are more likely than romance films to have aesthetic qualities of brutality and tension, because murderers are more brutal and tense than lovers. The properties of artworks, such as non-aesthetic and aesthetic properties, functional and representational properties, and representational and aesthetic properties, cross over types and are often connected in a non-accidental way. Thus, a category that tracks one will also track the other.[49]

Nevertheless, one might object that we do not think that being savage is standard for a crime film in the same way that we think that depicting crime is standard for a crime film. In other words,

[49] The same is true not only of genre but also of style. The contrast between Classical and Baroque styles by Wölfflin (1915) is a contrast that focuses partly on non-aesthetic and formal aspects, but partly on differences in aesthetic quality. Contrary to the traditional view that styles track only how things are told (means), Goodman (1978) holds that what is told (content) is also tracked. Styles also track multiple features of different types simultaneously.

we might narrow the focus of categories by treating some of the ties as only secondary elements. However, such a focus does not guarantee that only one or two types of property will turn out to be the type(s) that genres and only genres track. The question of whether an artwork is a horror because it frightens the viewer or because it depicts frightening things is a question of chicken first or egg first. Moreover, the distinction between a truly standard feature for a category and a merely secondary feature may not be a genuine one, but only a matter of how standard it is.

Not only categories that are given explicitly hybrid names, such as Texas country music or J-horror movies, but also categories that do not have hybrid names are, in fact, hybrid categories that simultaneously track multiple features of different types. Comedy tracks not only the function of making people laugh, but also a pleasant and optimistic mood, while science fiction tracks not only the setting of a scene, such as the future or outer space, but also the function of providing cognitive insights (Suvin 1979). Horror, defined by Carroll (1990: 27) as a genre that (1) evokes a unique mixture of fear and disgust (art-horror) through (2) depictions of dangerous and impure monsters, is a hybrid category that tracks function and representation. The fact that most categories are hybrids frustrates approaches that attempt to individuate meta-categories according to the type of feature being tracked. In conclusion, there are no types of features that are tracked by genres and only genres.

3.1.3 Possible Replies and Further Objections

Faced with the diversity of features that genres track, one possible reply is this. We want to be strict about meta-categorical distinctions, but because we do not have a sufficient vocabulary to do so, we often mistakenly believe that the concept itself is pluralistic. However, it is not. Perhaps "genres" that track non-aesthetic or aesthetic properties, such as most musical genres, are strictly *forms* or *styles* and should not be regarded as genres. Even if the hybrid categories have aspects that track such features, they are not genre aspects. Proponents of this view may be uncomfortable with the disjunction of "standard representational *or* functional features" in the previous hypothesis, and may be tempted to regard only one of these as a legitimate target for genres. For example, strictly speaking, genres are those categories such as science fiction and romance that are individuated by specific representational

properties, while horror and comedy, which are individuated by functional properties, should be given independent meta-category names. It is said that the problem lies in the poverty of our vocabulary, not in the uncertainty of our concepts.

Genre restrictivism is not only problematic because it places a burden of correction on our understanding of genre in our practice of art and criticism, but also because it offers few independent reasons why we should associate the term genre with a particular feature tracking. After all, why should we think of genres as categories like science fiction or romance that are individuated by representational features? Why not regard categories like horror and comedy, which are individuated by their functional properties, as proper genres, and regard it as an error to treat science fiction and romance as genres? Art genres are artificial concepts that are part of the artworld and useful only in that context, and we can only rely on our practice of art to understand them. It is not easy to justify only certain usages in a revisionist way to the practice. It could become a mere stipulation rather than an explanation.

Another possible reply is this. Genre may not be misused, but simply a broad concept with a wide extension. If the disjunction "representational or functional property" is accepted, then we can just expand the disjunction to cover genres that track other types of properties. The genre of Blues might track a piece of music having a specific structure consisting of 12 bars, while Metal might track a distorted sound. Funk might track the specific aesthetic property of groove, and Country might track the author's southern background. The word "genre" has radically different meanings, depending on the context and subject matter in which it is used. So it goes. It is said that the concept of genre is broad enough to allow for all of these usages.

Genre permissivism, by itself, is equivalent to giving up the task of identifying what is unique about the categories and only those categories that are genres. There is no feature that a genre aspect or dimension specifically tracks. This is because the disjunction of the types of features that a genre tracks as a genre covers a wide range of possible types of properties that an artwork can have. Thus, genre falls back to a very neutral concept that is interchangeable with a category of art.

As a third way of thought, perhaps we should admit that we have chosen the wrong path. That is, the assumption that what distinguishes meta-categories from each other is the difference in the type of standard features they track was wrong.

In any case, even if we could identify the feature type that is tracked by genre and genre only, a further problem remains. Even if it is necessary to track features of the type in order to be a genre, it cannot be the case that tracking a feature of the type is a sufficient condition for being a genre (Malone 2022: 5–13). "The group of artworks depicting the American West in the pioneer days" would certainly constitute a genre, but "the group of artworks depicting a mouse and a cat" is just an arbitrary class of artworks. Such a line cannot be understood even if the type of properties tracked by genres is revealed to be representational. Merely sharing the standard features of the type in question does not guarantee that a given class of artworks is a genre. This suggests the existence of a further factor for a category to be an *actual, established* genre.

3.1.4 The Social and Normative Nature of Genres

Is there any alternative approach to characterizing genres other than focusing on feature tracking? One promising candidate has been repeatedly, but often in a fragmentary manner, expressed in previous literature. The broad consensus on genre is that it plays a role in our engagement with artworks, whether through appreciation, interpretation, or evaluation. To put it as a slogan, categorizing is not merely classifying. Categorization by genre does more than that.

> Category K is a movie genre if and only if K has multiple members, which are made by more than one artist (for any given artist role), from any background, and K has features in virtue of which K figures into the appreciations or interpretations of K's audience. (Laetz and Lopes 2008: 156)

> A genre, for my purposes, is a way of classifying representations that guides appreciation, so that knowledge of the classification plays a role in a work's correct interpretation and evaluation. (Friend 2012: 181)

> [G]enre is important for explanations in aesthetics because individual genres are more than mere classifications. Genre also holds implications for the normativity and psychology of narrative engagement. Disagreements about genre in everyday discussions of narratives are often more than just disagreements about classifications. When people disagree about whether a novel is appropriately classified in the genre of magical realism or realistic fiction, they might also be disagreeing about whether it is literally true in the story—as opposed to merely metaphorical—that a character was washed into the world by a great tide of tears. When people disagree about whether a movie is appropriately classified in the genre of horror or the genre of black comedy, they might be also disagreeing about whether it would be fitting for them to laugh at a gruesome decapitation scene. Genre influences the propositions that are warranted to be fictional in a narrative and the ways that one ought to, and actually does, engage with a narrative. (Liao 2016: 470)

Abell (2015: 25) and Terrone (2021: 18) agree that the interpretive and evaluative role of genre is an important explanatory constraint for an account of genre. The facts about an artwork's genre influence the meaning and value we attribute to it. To summarize, genre is *normative* for appreciation and criticism.

And, perhaps not unrelated to this normative force, it has often been noted that genre is also *social*. For example, Currie (2004, 49–50); Friend (2012: 189); Terrone (2021: 20) point to the existence of networks of expectation, Malone (2022: 12–5) to the existence of practice and community, Abell (2012: 77–8; 2015: 32) to the existence of conventions and common knowledge, and Evnine (2015: 4–6) to the tradition combining related entities, respectively as an important factor for genre. Genres are social entities and can play normative roles because they are embedded in our appreciative and critical practices.

I believe that an approach that focuses on these facts provides a plausible account of the nature of the genre, but it is necessary to clarify what exactly is the social and normative nature of the genre. In my view, the previous theories choosing this approach, setting aside a few extreme claims,

are not competing but are describing one and the same idea from different dimensions. They all support the *genres-as-rules* account.

3.2 Genres as Rules

3.2.1 Appreciative and Critical Roles of Categories

Chapter 1 examined the role of art categories in aesthetic judgments. If Walton (1970) is right, categorical expertise influences our aesthetic perceptions and, thus, the aesthetic judgments we form. At the end of Chapter 1, I suggested that categories are often relevant even in situations to which Walton paid little attention, namely, the justification of aesthetic judgments. Duchamp's *Comb* (1916) is provocative because it is visually mundane, and it can be reasoned in this way because *Comb* is regarded as a *readymade*. The above reasoning, however, does not stand for any mere comb. The facts about categories determine what aesthetic judgments are justified. Furthermore, in Chapter 2, I showed that appreciative responses to artworks are far more diverse than aesthetic responses, and the criticisms that guide them are also diverse. The occasions in which categories play a role are correspondingly diverse.

Interpretation, particularly concerning the extent to which the content of an artwork depends on the author's intentions, is commonly discussed.[50] Both intentionalists and non-intentionalists often acknowledge the role of categories in interpretation (Levinson 1996: Chap. 10; Davies 2006; Carroll 2009). The facts about categories, directly or indirectly, prompt or justify the attribution of a specific semantic content based on a specific set of features of an artwork. If one sees an artwork as a western, it is natural to understand the setting as the American West in the pioneer days. If we see it as a musical, we can understand why characters who seem to suddenly burst into song do not confuse other characters around them. Whether a sentence should be interpreted literally or as a metaphor or irony, or what an item implies or symbolizes, can be heavily influenced by the facts about the artwork's category (Abell 2015: 26–7).

[50] See Irvin (2006); Lin (2018); Kubala (2019).

In another context related to interpretation, it has been actively discussed what kind of imaginings authors of fictive artworks prescribe and what kind of imaginings readers engage in. This issue has been discussed in somewhat overly technical terms as the question of what is *true in fiction* (Lewis 1978; Walton 1990; Currie 1990). The view that categories play an important role in the debate over fiction and imagination is also gaining attention (Liao 2016; Abell 2020). I will address this issue in Chapter 5.

The role of categories in evaluation has been highlighted as a reply to the traditional concerns about the generality of evaluative criteria (Isenberg 1949: 330; Mothersill 1961: 75). The value (being good or bad) of an artwork is usually attributed by virtue of its having specific features. However, according to skeptics, it is impossible to infer value from features, since having particular features can be a merit for one artwork and a demerit for another. A widely accepted strategy to deal with this problem is to appeal to the kind- or category-relative criterion (Kaufman 2002, 2003; Carroll 2009; Gilmore 2011, 2013). That is, the fact that an artwork has a certain feature can be a reason for a verdict that it has a certain value because it belongs to a certain category. Having the ability to scare is a merit if the artwork is a horror, but a demerit if it is a lullaby, for the ability to scare serves the purpose of horror, but conflicts with that of lullaby. Supporting the category-relative criterion, Carroll (2009: 29–30) states that this is a sufficiently general, albeit limited, criterion.

Categories also play roles in the diverse appreciative responses that Cross (2017) analogized to acts and in the practical reasoning about what to do with artworks. As Cross points out, critics facilitate a variety of appreciative acts, such as paying attention in a particular way, empathizing with a character, or forming historical knowledge. One could say that categories serve as background to this kind of practical reasoning, influencing which acts seem appropriate. When watching a long shot with a fixed point camera in a work of slow cinema, I should focus on the pictorial composition of the fixed screen; when watching a high-tempo blockbuster film, I should focus on the sequence of action across cuts. I will try to finely track the emotions of the protagonist if it is a tragedy, but I will not devote such sympathetic faculties if it is a comedy.

It is difficult to fully explain these appreciative and critical roles from the genres-as-features account. For one attempt, Currie (2004: 45–6), while explicitly adopting the genres-as-features account, aims to explain the interpretive role of genres by appealing to the expectations of viewers and genre-based implications. According to it, if a mysterious old man appears in a magical fantasy, we are justified in assuming that he is a wizard, even if it is not explicitly specified. This is because it is what the audience would naturally expect in light of the magical fantasy genre. While I do not dispute that genre can play an interpretive role through such implications, there seems to be a gap between the fact that genre tracks standard features and the fact that it aids interpretation through implication and the expectations of viewers (Abell 2015: 30). What is the connection between the fact that an artwork qualifies as a member of a genre by fulfilling a set of features and the fact that a particular interpretation by a viewer is justified by the facts about the genre? As Evnine (2015: 13) points out, the normativity of genres that can be explained solely by the fact that they are associated with standard features is extremely limited. They would probably remain trivial norms, such as "Have standard features," "Don't have contra-standard features," "Regard artworks with standard features as authentic," and "Regard artworks with contra-standard features as odd." In this regard, it seems to me that Laetz and Lopes, who discuss the mechanisms by which genre aids interpretation through expectation and implication without necessarily assuming the genres-as-features account, are closer to the core of genres with their "Genre principle":

> Genre principle: a story belonging to genre *K* represents that *q* if it explicitly represents that *p1* … *pn* and it is a feature [say, a convention] of *K* that it would be the case that *q*, were it the case that *p1* … *pn*. (Laetz and Lopes 2008: 153)

The various roles played by categories can be generalized as follows. We attribute a certain meaning or value to an artwork, or generally respond to it in some way, because it has certain properties. However, why does having that property become a reason for that response? It is because the facts about the category of the artwork form the background that justifies the reasoning. Different categories justify different reasonings. If we express X justifying Y as "X→Y," then the relation can be

established between any given artwork x, a fact C about a specific category, a basic property F, and an appreciative response R, Cx→(Fx→Rx). In my opinion, these roles are characteristic of the categories and only those that are genres, since not all categories play these roles. Being a Hitchcock film may only tell us that the artwork was created by Alfred Hitchcock, or being a haiku may only tell us that the artwork has the combination of syllables 5-7-5. They do not play the role of genre in these contexts.

Genres, then, are those categories that serve as the background for appreciative and critical reasoning, and when any category serves this role, it is *being used as a genre*. This helps explain why categories can be hybrid and why it is difficult definitively to say whether a category is a genre or some other meta-category. There is no reason to deny that categories such as Hitchcock films or haiku *can be used* as genres. In particular contexts, they can indeed justify critical reasonings. If one regards a text as haiku, one might thereby be justified in condemning the artificiality of its expressive qualities. Categories of art are genres *in a specific context*. I next need to clarify what it is for a category, being used as a genre, to be the background for appreciative and critical reasoning.

3.2.2 A Cluster of Regulative Rules

My proposal is that a genre supports a set of reasonings because a genre is a cluster of *rules*. By rules, what I have in mind here are regulative rules that can be formalized as a conditional strategy, such as the following:

If an artwork *x* has property *F*, make an appreciative response *R* to *x*.

Such a rule is a function from the property that artworks have to the response that agents are supposed to make. Different rules pick up different properties and direct different appreciative responses. This should be distinguished from rules about category membership, which can be formalized as, "If an artwork *x* has property *F*, *x* is a member of a category *C* (or *x* belongs to category *C*)." While both Malone (2022) and I emphasize the social and normative aspects of genres, the rules that Malone (2022: 22) has in mind, namely, membership rules, are essentially different from the regulative rules that I propose. In the next chapter, I will discuss in more detail how membership rules and the

regulative rules are related. In what follows, when I refer to rules without qualification, I mean regulative rules.

The idea that rules play a role in the practice of appreciation was recently developed in Catharine Abell's theory of fiction. According to Abell (2020: 35), the practice of fiction is regulated by content-determining rules formalized as "*If an agent produces an utterance of type Z, imagine X*." This corresponds to a kind of regulative rule that directs the specific appreciative response of imagination. If the content to be imagined is simply the semantic content of a fictive work, then it can also be understood as a set of rules that directs the attribution of content. In fact, Abell argues that it is through the mediation of these rules that the contents of fictive artworks are understood. The rules I will discuss, however, are more general in two respects. First, they can output a variety of responses, including evaluative, perceptual, and affective responses, in addition to imaginative and interpretive responses. Second, they regulate not only the practice of fiction, but also the practice of appreciation and criticism of artworks more broadly.[51]

Concerning evaluation, especially of aesthetic value, Dominic McIver Lopes proposes a similar idea. According to Lopes (2018: 129–30), aesthetic practices are associated with *aesthetic profiles:* specific correlations between the non-aesthetic properties an item can have and various aesthetic properties (aesthetic value). Two items that are identical in non-aesthetic aspects can have different aesthetic values because of the different aesthetic profiles applied to them. An identical action by a dancer can be emphatic in light of the aesthetic profile of tap dance, but heart-wrenching in light of the aesthetic profile of contemporary dance. There is some other movement that realizes heart-wrenchingness in tap dance, and yet another movement that realizes emphaticness in contemporary dance. If we replace the output part of the profile with an appropriate verb ("attribute aesthetic property/value R"), an aesthetic profile can be understood as a set of rules directing aesthetic evaluation. The rules of genre I am proposing are broader in scope than Lopes' concept of aesthetic

[51] Abell's theory of fiction will be examined again in Chapter 5 since the rule-centered approach she adopts can be regarded as an alternative to the approach I will present below.

profiles, in that they also allow output other than aesthetic evaluation. On the other hand, Lopes' concept of the aesthetic profile is broader than my concept of genre in that it assumes aesthetic evaluation of any kind of item, not just artwork. Although our scopes are not strictly aligned, I will later develop an ontology of genre that is very much inspired by the ontology of aesthetic profiles provided by Lopes.

In my view, the group of "modes" listed by Laetz (2010: 303–5) in which a category of art is relevant to appreciation and criticism can all be abstracted into being relevant as rules. Laetz suggests that in addition to cases in which a category is non-teleologically relevant by presenting SVCs, such as those discussed by Walton, there are also cases in which it is teleologically relevant, comparatively relevant, and directly relevant (see 1.3.1). Cases of direct relevance, can straight-forwardly be characterized as applications of rules: the rules of forgery include a rule that calls for refraining from certain aesthetic judgments and evaluative judgments. The comparatively relevant cases can similarly be understood as cases of applying rules. For example, appreciation of an artwork in comparison to other artworks by the same author may include regarding a method that is repeatedly employed as clichéd, or a method that has not yet been tried as challenging. Or it may be justified to read a certain meaning into an element because it has appeared in other artworks by the same author. When serving these roles, the comparative category of the oeuvre of an artist can be abstracted into a genre consisting of numerous rules (when "Hitchcock film" is used as a genre, for example). Similarly, the teleologically relevant cases can be encompassed as cases of applying rules. If to make the audience frightening is the constitutive purpose of horror, then the set of features that contribute to it outputs a pro-attitude, and the set of features that impede it outputs a con-attitude. No matter how complex the comparison or the purpose may be, we can still abstract it into rules that direct us to respond in a certain way if a certain kind of feature is present. After all, it is precisely because we can grasp these rules (albeit often fragmentarily) that we can understand what it means to appreciate an artwork while comparing it with others, and what it means to appreciate it in light of a purpose.

To summarize, I propose that an art genre is a cluster of regulative rules. Different genres are constituted and individualized by different clusters of rules, and by picking up different properties, they direct different appreciative responses. With a genre as rules, the fact that an artwork has specific features is a good reason to make a specific appreciative response to it. In other words, the facts about the genre become the background for a set of possible reasonings.

Some clarifications concerning the regulative rules of genres are needed before we proceed further. Firstly, there are obviously limits to the input of regulative rules. Being a horror suggests a set of rules that direct how one should respond to creeping black shadows, sudden sound effects, and their frequency, but not how one should respond to every single component of an artwork. The fact that the protagonist's name is Mary is a feature that is irrelevant to the horror genre simply because it is not a component of any of the rules of horror. It is also debatable to what extent a feature external to an artwork can be a legitimate input (e.g., whether Reggae includes a rule to regard a piece of song being made by a musician from Jamaica as authentic).[52]

Secondly, the output of regulative rules can be quite broad. As I have mentioned, there is a large diversity of appreciative responses and criticisms that guide them, but our engagement with artworks is not limited to appreciation and criticism. Appreciation as a mode of engagement has been de-emphasized in recent years. Lopes (2018: 33) notes that traditional aesthetics has overemphasized appreciation of artworks and calls attention to the diversity of aesthetic engagements in aesthetic life. Within the aesthetic domain, there is a division of labor and a variety of aesthetic experts, each engaging with aesthetic items in their own way: selecting, protecting, collecting, editing, curating, and so on. If genres affect these various engagements as well, it would be inappropriate to tag the output of regulative rules as an *appreciative* response. Indeed, the normativity of genre reaches artists as well as viewers and critics (Todorov 1990: 18; Evnine 2015: 13–4). The artist's choices in creation are also regulated by the genre she aims for. Having said this, while it is a point in favor of my theory that there is room to extend the theory in this way, I will not do so in this dissertation. The interest of this

[52] See Lopes (2018: 130); Abell (2020: 12).

dissertation is art criticism and the appreciation of art that it guides, and the categories of art that influence them. In this regard, what this dissertation aims to present is limited to a consumer theory of the artworld, not a producer theory.

Thirdly, the rules of genres are often implicit. That is, those who follow a set of rules of a genre may not necessarily be able to represent them in a list of statements. This is a general feature of the psychology of social rules (Guala 2016: 7; Lopes 2018: 120, 135). If the genres-as-rules account is right, a central task for the descriptive study of an individual genre would be to make explicit a set of rules for that genre, but this is not my task here, which is rather to explain what it means for a cluster of rules to be valid and obeyed by the agents involved, despite being implicit.

Finally, the rules of genres are obviously not as universal as the laws of nature. The force of a regulative rule is, at best, relative to a group of agents at a point in time. This is another general feature of regulative rules. A rule that requires you to drive on the left side of the roadway is not applicable everywhere and for everyone. In this regard, I follow Lopes (2018; 2022) and Kubala (2021) in understanding genre as a social practice that distinguishes insiders and outsiders. The task of characterizing the meta-category of genre should be formulated as the task of filling in the following blank, where this is relativized to a group of agents:

> For a group of agents G at a time t, a category C is a genre if and only if C is a cluster of regulative rules, and it is the case that ____.

This formulation not only clarifies the remaining task, but also suggests the ontological structure of genres: they are rules with some social foundations. In the next section, I will provide a model for genre-as-rules and then address some candidates for filling the blank above.

3.3 Setting Up Genres

As the genres-as-features account should not count any arbitrary set of standard features as a genre, the genres-as-rules account should not count any cluster of regulative rules as a genre. For example, the rule to "applaud every time a dog appears in the middle of a movie and evaluate it positively"

doubtfully constitutes a genre (at least at the moment). Strictly speaking, genres are not merely rules but *valid* rules. So what is the difference between genres that actually exist and sets of rules that are merely potential genres?

I have already suggested that genres as rules are the *background* that allows for reasoning in appreciation and criticism, not the *reasons themselves*. Under the rules of Impressionism, a painting is lush because it has specific brush strokes. From a pre-theoretical point of view, the two factors that make a painting lush—(1) the non-aesthetic base properties of the painting and (2) the rules it follows—are clearly different in type. However, this has often been ignored in explanations that appeal to the single relation of *supervenience*. When X supervenes on Y, X cannot change without Y changing (the converse does not hold; Y can change without X changing). Supervenience is such a one-way covariance relation, which has often been taken up in explaining the ontological structure of aesthetic properties.[53] According to contextualists who appeal to supervenience, the aesthetic value of an item supervenes on (1) its non-aesthetic properties and (2) the relevant contextual facts. A painting is lush by virtue of a certain brush stroke, and by virtue of a set of contextual facts that make it appropriate to appreciate it in Impressionist painting. The contextual facts are also included in the base properties of the aesthetic supervenience. As I showed in Chapter 1, Walton (1970) is also committed to this kind of ontological contextualism.

However, to work through the single relation of supervenience in this way obscures an important difference between the two types of factors. The two factors appear in different explanations to different questions (Lopes 2018: 194–5). It is natural to explain why a painting is lush by saying, "Because it has this brush stroke." Having a particular brush stroke is the reason for the lushness. To answer this question by saying, "Because the rules of Impressionism apply," is not an answer to what the questioner wants to know. The reply, "Because the rules of Impressionism apply," is an answer to another question: "Why is having that particular brush stroke a reason for having lushness?" Facts

[53] See Levinson (1980), (1984); Bender (1987), (1996); Zangwill (2001); Benovsky (2012); Hick (2012); Watkins (2021); Sauchelli (2022).

about rules appear when one takes issue with the foundation of a reason, not within the reason itself. Even if Y is the reason for X and Z is the reason for Y being the reason for X, it does not entail that Z is the reason for X.[54]

Lopes (2018: 186–9, 192–6), referring to Epstein's (2015) model of social facts, models aesthetic values by appealing to two relations. Facts about non-aesthetic properties *ground* facts about aesthetic values, whereas contextual facts about aesthetic agents *anchor* a principle (for Lopes, the aesthetic profile) for such grounding. Epstein describes this structure in the following way:

> I will take anchoring to be a relation between a set of facts and a frame principle. For a set of facts to anchor a frame principle is for those facts to be the metaphysical reason that the frame principle is the case. In this sense, anchoring is very much like grounding. For a set of facts *g1*, …, *gm* to ground fact *f* is for *g1*, …, *gm* to be the metaphysical reason that *f* obtains in a world. For a set of facts *a1*, …, *an* to anchor a frame principle R is for *a1*, …, *an* to be the metaphysical reason that R holds for the frame. Both are "metaphysical reason" relations. But they do different work, and stand between different sorts of relata. (Epstein 2015: 82)

This is a two-step explanation. First, some contextual fact sets up a frame principle (for me, a *regulative rule*). Second, given this, the fact that an item has a certain feature then grounds the fact that it has a certain aesthetic value. Contextual facts do not themselves ground the fact that an item has a certain aesthetic value.

As mentioned above, genres that I am addressing are different in scope from Lopes' aesthetic profiles in that they specifically regulate art appreciation and take various appreciative responses as their output. Figure 2 is one with the necessary modifications according to my interests.[55] For simplicity, it shows one genre with one regulative rule, but note that, in practice, regulative rules work as clusters, and often multiple genres work collectively.

[54] See Skow (2016: 76).

[55] See Epstein (2015: 84) for the original model and Lopes (2018: 195) for a model for aesthetic value.



Figure 2: Model for Genres-as-Rules

The fact that *Impression, Sunrise* (1872) by Claude Monet contains a rough brush stroke is a reason for praising it as delicate and graceful, rather than condemning it as poor. There is no natural basis for such reasoning. We are not equipped with a perceptual-cognitive system that always favors similar brush strokes. For example, if the same brush stroke is found in a Neoclassical painting, that would be a reason to condemn it as poor. Behind the reasoning about *Impression, Sunrise* are the regulative rules of the genre of Impressionism. Impressionism as a genre directs us to attribute delicacy and elegance to rough brush strokes, instead of poorness. Such rules become valid and constitute genres when they are anchored by some social fact. It has often been pointed out that genres are tied to the community,[56] and I believe the connection can be understood as follows. It is precisely the social fact that the agents of a community associated with Impressionism collectively accept the rules in question or behave accordingly that makes the genre of Impressionism established. A mere set of rules without such a social foundation is not a genre, or only potentially so. The social and normative nature of genre is that it plays an appreciative and critical role in these ontological

[56] See Currie (2004: 49–50); Abell (2012: 77–8); Evnine (2015: 14); Terrone (2021: 20); Malone (2022: 12).

structures. Simply put, established art genres are socially based, regulative rules that govern appreciative responses.[57]

So, what exactly are the key social facts that set up the regulative rules of a genre? I have already suggested that there are two candidate accounts: one that appeals to the collective, or at least shared, beliefs of the relevant agents and the other that appeals to their patterns of behavior (Searle 1995, 2010; Epstein 2015; Guala 2016). Catharine Abell's account of genre corresponds to the former:

> [G]enres are sets of conventions that have developed as means of addressing particular interpretative and/or evaluative problems, and have a history of co‐instantiation within a community, such that a work's belonging to some genre generates interpretative and evaluative expectations among the members of that community. (Abell 2012: 77–8)

The idea that genres are conventions is explained more clearly in the later 2015 paper as based on common knowledge:

> A genre is a category of works determined by the purpose for which they are produced and appreciated, where the means by which they pursue that purpose rely at least partly on

[57] Such an ontological structure also provides an answer to the question of why the genre often changes yet preserves its identity (e.g., Abell 2015: 28; Evnine 2015: 10; Terrone 2021: 20). As Hick (2022) shows, the negative emotions evoked by horror have many variations that are not reducible to each other (terror, revulsion, the uncanny, and the abject), and the set has changed over time. What is a standard feature at one point is no longer standard at another. If a genre is an abstract entity defined by a fixed set of standard features, then it is difficult to understand how a genre can remain the same while the set of standard features changes. This problem can also be understood as an identity problem accompanying changes in the rules of genres. Here, the fact that a genre can persist as the same genre while its regulative rules change can be explained by appealing to the identity of the anchoring facts. It is because the anchoring social fact has historical continuity in an important sense that a genre can remain the same while changing its rules historically. Even though the rules applied in early and contemporary horror are quite different, the art practice, the practice of horror, that sets up each rule is continuous.

> producers' and audiences' common knowledge that the works are produced and to be appreciated for that purpose. (Abell 2015: 32)

Common knowledge is an idea derived from Lewis (1969) and refers to a chain of higher-order knowledge: You and I know about a certain thing, I know that you know it, and you know that I know that you know it, and so forth. This idea has often been taken as a cognitive schema for social interaction. To better understand the facts that anchor genres, let us briefly examine Abell's teleological approach.

First, although genres are teleologically relevant to appreciation in Abell, I point out above that following a purpose can be transformed into following rules. Recognizing that an artwork has a certain purpose is equivalent, for the relevant agent, to recognizing reasons why she should appreciatively respond in certain ways to certain features. This interpretation seems consistent with the role of genre that Abell (2015: 26–7) has in mind. The account I offer is in some respects more general and abstract in its perspective on the role of genres than Abell's account, but it does not deny that a purpose could accompany a genre and thus become relevant to appreciation.

However, we would disagree if Abell's account entails that directing appreciative responses in association with constitutive purposes is the *sole* way in which genres can play a normative role. I follow Laetz (2010) in acknowledging a wider variety of cases in which genre is relevant to appreciation. While my account abstracts them all into cases of applying rules, strictly speaking they include cases where genres are directly relevant, comparatively relevant, relevant through paradigm, and so on. The case of being teleologically relevant is only one sort of case. In other words, a category can serve as a genre even if it is not tied to a constitutive purpose.

In emphasizing cases where genres are teleologically relevant, Abell effectively commits to the genres-as-features approach—genres track functional properties of artworks. As we have seen above, this approach has serious problems, especially that it is difficult to interpret the wide variety of genres as corresponding to the same types of features. In particular, Abell seems forced to ascribe constitutive purposes to genres that are usually regarded as individualized by their representational

properties as well. The result is that those purposes, as suggested by Abell, seem to me to be fairly ad hoc: science fiction is "to describe logically coherent alternative worlds" (2015: 31), and romance is "to explore the theme of romantic love" (2015: 34). This problem is made worse in light of Abell's idea that genre purposes are part of common knowledge; one might suppose that, if so, the purposes of these genres should be more self-evident.

Even if some purposes or rules of a genre can be more clearly described, it seems to me too demanding to require that they are parts of common knowledge. The account I propose does not require this: behavior according to the rules of a genre may be replicated simply because there are salient precedents (Xhignesse 2020: 478–9). In this case, the agent properly engaging with an artwork may not have any beliefs about the relevant purposes or rules (much less about the beliefs of others about them). Genre rules can thus be implicit. A horror enthusiast's approval of a creepy scene in one artwork may be merely because she has responded similarly to similar input. Even if there were specific tasks, definite rules, and pioneers' beliefs about them at the origin of a genre, the relevant agents today may have forgotten them in the cycle of the continuous reproduction of the genre. What is important for agents is to acquire the tendency or know-how to behave according to the rules of a genre when they receive relevant input, even if they are not consciously aware of them, and I believe this is not necessarily a matter of knowledge or belief in the narrow sense of the term; this is also a lesson from Walton, examined in Chapter 1. In sum, there is room to argue that genre rules are anchored by the stability of certain behaviors in a given community. Lopes also suggests that aesthetic profiles are anchored in this way.

> What anchors the practice? According to the network theory, the practice is anchored by the fact that (enough) of its members act in ways that comply with its core norms, which centre on its aesthetic profile. (Lopes 2018: 195)

Perhaps we are not forced to choose, but should simply acknowledge that there can be more than one case for the anchoring facts of genres' regulative rules (Epstein 2015: 105; 2016). In any case, Abell's requirement that relevant agents have common knowledge of the genre's purpose is too strict as an

explanation of how a genre is established. We may form certain patterns of behavior through unconsciously following precedents, and this can result in a genre. However, even without a definite answer to what kind of facts set up genres, we can understand what happens in genre practices, which I will illuminate in the next section.

3.4 Understanding Genre Practices

3.4.1 Genre Attribution as Framing

While I see no reason to limit the types of facts that can anchor a genre, it is natural to suppose that, whatever they are, it is the corresponding beliefs and behaviors of individual agents that are its causal base. Although it is not clear whether individualism about anchoring in general can be made to work,[58] focusing on micro interactions and on what individuals do with genres and genre rules can help us better understand the practice of genre.

We should begin by examining the category-attributing statements expressed by individual agents, of the form "*x* is a member of *C*" or "*x* belongs to *C*." According to the genres-as-features account, what is done by these statements is *classifying*. The category attribution is just a statement that an individual artwork has enough of the standard features of a category, a judgment that can only be true or false according to the facts already established about the category membership. Here, category membership is assumed to be logically prior to category attribution: *Comb* belongs to readymade by possessing the standard features of readymade, and the statement "*Comb* is a readymade" means that it possesses the relevant standard features. Such a closed relationship by itself, however, does not tell us anything about the roles of genres in appreciation and criticism. Moreover, if category attribution is only about feature tracking, the disagreement over category attribution can only be either (1) a conflict of recognition of the standard features tied to the category name or (2) a conflict of observation about the features that individual artworks have, and in either case, the disagreement is superficial and futile (Evnine 2015: 15–6). Of course, it is common for

[58] For a critical assessment of individualism about anchoring, see Epstein (2015: Chap. 8).

category-attributing statements to be used for the purpose of classification, and it is not uncommon for superficial conflicts to arise due to attributors' misunderstandings or oversights. However, that is not the whole story.

I contend that there is a role for category-attributing statements such as "*x* is *C*" that goes beyond what has been recognized so far. Thus, we first need to examine what it means to attribute a particular category to a particular work, instead of when and why a work belongs to a category. The genres-as-rules account suggests that the attribution of a genre by individual agents indicates the rules to be followed by relevant agents, including the attributors themselves. Let us call this act *framing*.[59] Those who say, "This artwork is horror," are thereby *declaring* their stance to appreciatively respond to the artwork in accordance with the rules of horror, and are *proposing* to their listeners that they share this stance. Understood in this way, the disagreement over genre attribution can be understood as an inter-imposition of rules. It is not a classificatory conflict, which can be resolved by simply confirming some facts related to the artwork. The conflict over framing is a normative and substantive conflict over how one should respond to an artwork with certain features.

In fact, when framing a work in genre *C*, the work does not even need to have many of the standard features of *C*. Framing is not an act that presupposes genre membership. There can be infelicities, misfires, or insincerities with a non-descriptive act, but it is not something that can be judged false according to the facts. This makes *forcible* statements such as "The genre of *2001: A Space Odyssey* (1968) is horror" or "The genre of *Texas Chain Saw Massacre* (1974) is comedy" comprehensible, instead of simply dismissing them as false. The genre attributors do not mean that the artworks have enough of the standard features of the respective genres, and thus belong to them. When asked to confirm, "Are you saying that *Texas Chain Saw Massacre* belongs to comedy?"

[59] In the environmental aesthetics, the term "framing" is used slightly differently to refer to the act of determining the focus of aesthetic appreciation in open nature. See Hepburn (1966); Carlson (2000); Aota (2020). Our interests are aligned insofar as framing in this sense is concerned not only with what to appreciate, but also with how to appreciate.

attributors do not necessarily state "yes." They are performing an act of framing, which is distinct from classifying: they are indicating a set of regulative rules for a genre, declaring and proposing that appreciation and criticism of the artwork at hand should follow them. As Carroll (2009: 94) points out, "situating the work as a certain kind of artwork at the same time implies the type of criticism suitable to bring to bear upon the object." Carroll's point is that classifying is simultaneously framing, but in my opinion, the act of framing can be performed independently of classifying in the first place. Framing is creative: as long as there is a relevant input, we can try to impose some rules of appreciation and criticism on the artwork, no matter what it is in other respects.

The role of framing can be found not only in genre attributions to artworks, but also in everyday declarations such as "I am a police" or "This is a private area." The point of these is not so much to call attention to already established facts about a person or place, but rather to inform the listener how she should respond and, in some cases, what rights or obligations she may have. To borrow an expression from Searle and Vanderveken (1985: 93), there is not only a "word-to-world" direction of fit, but also a "world-to-word" direction. However, it is not necessary for framing to be linguistic. In responding to an artwork according to the rules of comedy in an externally observable way, I am, in effect, framing the artwork as a comedy. By observing what features I see and laugh at, an observer might infer what features are appropriate to laugh at. Gestures and eye contact can also indicate certain rules. A pair of chess players need not confirm to each other, either beforehand or during the game, that "this is chess and its rules are so and so." Again, the rules can be shared implicitly.

It is time to justify that the categories characterized by rules and framing are genres, not forms or styles. Why should we take the concept of genre, and nothing else, in terms of rules and framing? How does this differ from genre restrictivism, which we dismissed as mere stipulation? I justify the connection between genre and rules from a strange but interesting consistency with everyday language. As noted above, the fact that genres are clusters of rules and genre attribution is framing makes such forceful statements as "The genre of *2001: A Space Odyssey* is horror" or "The genre of

Texas Chain Saw Massacre is comedy" comprehensible. What if these were statements such as "The form of *Texas Chain Saw Massacre* is a musical," "the (personal) style is Hitchcockian," and "the (general) style is Baroque?" Each of these statements would seem to be simply false if we are concerned strictly with the formal and stylistic aspects of the category. It is precisely because the *Texas Chain Saw Massacre* does not have enough of the standard features of those forms and styles. Here is only a "word-to-world" direction of fit. Thus, there is reason to believe an asymmetry exists between genres that permit forceful statements and other meta-categories that do not.

This asymmetry between genre and other meta-categories can be confirmed as well by the fact that individual artworks are naturally described as *having* a certain form/style, whereas it is rare to describe them as *having* a certain genre. The reason why *Piano Sonata No. 14* by Beethoven can be said to have the form of a piano sonata is that the artwork actually has the standard structural feature of piano sonatas. On the other hand, it does not have the genre of piano sonata. If genre is a rule, it is not something that an individual artwork possesses, but something under which it is placed or something to which it is applied. The point of forms and styles is to track features, but not of genres. If one wants to map the concept of rules to a meta-category name, genre is the most appropriate candidate.

3.4.2 Genres as Traditions?

Simon J. Evnine, who, like me, sees the genres-as-features account as problematic, has arrived at a far more radical theory of genre than mine. Evnine, too, finds classification, membership, and standard features to be poor explicans in understanding changing genres, genre normativity, and disagreement over genre attribution. My alternative view of genre as a cluster of rules regards genre as an abstract entity. On the other hand, according to Evnine, genres are rather traditions as particular entities. It is important to compare Evnine's proposal with mine.

Evnine (2015: 4–5) first calls attention to the term "tradition" being polysemous. In one sense, a tradition is an abstract entity. Evnine cites as examples the tradition of wearing black for mourning and the tradition of sending one's eldest son to the navy. These traditions have instances, and instances

have spatial location and temporal persistence, but a tradition itself, the conventional pattern, exists as a universal. On the other hand, in another sense, traditions are temporally extended particulars. Evnine cites the Jewish tradition as an example.[60] It contains as its parts people, books, objects, places, institutions, musical styles, and many other things, and by their generation, the tradition is generated, and by their disappearance, the tradition also disappears. Hereafter, I will refer to traditions understood as universals as type-traditions, and traditions understood as particulars as token-traditions. Evnine's focus is on the latter, token-traditions, with regard to theorizing genre.[61]

> Genres are traditions that are organized, in a certain way, around the production of artworks. A genre such as science fiction has many parts—readers, writers, works, practices of reading and interpreting, publishing houses, fan organizations, conferences, and so on. (Evnine 2015: 5)

Above all, according to Evnine, it is the artist and her act of creation that is central to the tradition of art genres.

> [A]uthors produce works in the knowledge, and under the influence, of works previously produced as parts of the tradition; the works are read by readers in the ways developed by previously produced works; the publishing houses publish such works, the conventions invite

[60] Evnine's attempt to show this distinction by examples seems to be a little misleading since there is a particular conception of the tradition of wearing black for mourning and a universal conception of the Jewish tradition. I believe the distinction between type-traditions and token-traditions would make his point clear.

[61] See Wollheim (1980); Levinson (1980); Wetzel (2006) for the distinction between types and tokens. The relationship between a type and tokens corresponds to the relationship between a sort and its instances. 'My Funny Valentine,' as a type-music, is a structural entity composed of specific notes, written by Richard Rodgers and Lorenz Hart in 1937. What Chet Baker recorded in a studio in California in 1954, Bill Evans and Jim Hall recorded in New York in 1962, and Miles Davis played in a concert in Milan in 1964 are tokens-music of it. Token-music is an event with a specific temporal duration, while type-music is a universal, like a proposition or a number, not something to be seen or heard. We can access 'My Funny Valentine' as a type by listening to its tokens and reproductions.

> the authors, who may produce new works in the light of interactions with fans, and so on. (Evnine 2015: 5–6)

The genres-as-traditions account might be seen to encompass the genres-as-rules account, since it counts behavior according to conventional rules and the individual appreciative responses made under those rules as part of a genre, according to the genres-as-traditions account. However, it holds that a genre is not a cluster of rules as an abstract entity, but rather a token-tradition with temporal duration and spatial location, including as its parts particular objects and events that are related to it.

According to the genres-as-traditions account, the relationship between a genre and individual artworks is not that of instantiation between a kind and its instances, but that of a part-whole relationship between objects. Genres-as-traditions account suggests that *2001: A Space Odyssey* as a member of the science fiction genre means that *2001: A Space Odyssey* is part of the tradition of science fiction. Naturally, Genres can change just as a football match can change with individual goals and fouls; genres change with the addition of particular objects and events. The disagreement over genre attribution is regarded as a substantive conflict over whether a given individual artwork should be accepted as part of a genre as tradition (Evnine 2015: 16). It is not a superficial conflict over the facts of whether or not a work meets the standard features and is actually a member of that genre. Evnine argues that

> To argue that a work belongs to a genre is to make a plea that it be taken up, acknowledged, discussed by one's fellow tradition-members, read and interpreted in the light of previous works in the genre, anthologized, and, perhaps most importantly, be taken into account and looked to as a source of influence in future works. To argue to exclude a work from a genre is, accordingly, to make a plea that it be ignored by the tradition, that its influence be muted or nullified altogether, that future works not resemble it in certain ways or follow in its direction, that it not be read and evaluated in the light of other works from that genre. (Evnine 2015: 16)

How, then, does the fact that a genre is a token-tradition give rise to the normativity of the genre? Evnine (2015: 13–4) generally adopts Scheffler's (2010: Chap. 11) account of the normativity of

tradition. First, tradition is a repository of wisdom and experience, which gives artists a reason to follow it. This is because artists strive for success, and following tradition increases their prospects for success. Second, tradition motivates loyalty. To be part of a tradition is to be part of something larger than oneself, with various debts, and it gives the artist a reason to faithfully inherit it. Third, according to Scheffler (2010: 297), following the familiar routine of tradition gives us existential comfort. Routines give us a sense of domesticating time, just as we domesticate space by forming private areas. Evnine suggests that genres-as-traditions have the same aspect. Although Evnine addresses the normativity that genre has on artists in all cases, it is not difficult to predict that it also has normativity on appreciators in the same respects.

The genres-as-traditions account and the genres-as-rules account share far more in common than they conflict. The picture of multiple agents interacting as parts of a genre as tradition is similar to the picture I give, in which a genre as a cluster of rules is anchored in social interaction. The explanation that the attribution of a genre to an artwork is not merely a classification, but a plea for a particular kind of treatment to be or not to be given, also aligns with what I have in mind about framing. Depending on one's interpretation, the genres-as-traditions account and the genres-as-rules account may just describe different aspects of the same phenomenon.

However, I believe that Evnine's central claim, that genres are token-traditions—particulars containing individual artworks, people, and events as parts—contains a serious problem. I see a crucial similarity between Evnine's strategy to explain genres as individuals that of some philosophers of biology, that is, proponents of the biological-species-as-individuals account.[62] With regard to species, entities that are abstract on the one hand and exhibit object-like behavior on the other, the individuals-account has emerged as a position that gives more weight to the latter aspect and paraphrases or gives error theory to the former aspect. The biological-species-as-individuals account and the genres-as-traditions account share the thesis that there is a part-whole relation rather than a universal-instance relation between a kind and objects. However, there is a serious concern about this

[62] See Ghiselin (1974); Hull (1976).

thesis. The problem arises from the fact that part-whole relations are transitive, but this does not seem to be true for kinds and their instances. If X is a part of Y and Y is a part of Z, then X is a part of Z. In general, however, the relation of instantiation between a kind and objects is not likely to exemplify transitivity.[63] Let us concentrate here on examples of art genres. Since *2001: A Space Odyssey* is part of the tradition of science fiction, can we say that every single part of that work (a certain cut, music, dialogue, character, costume) instantiates science fiction, i.e., is science fiction? It seems to me that the sci-fi-ness of *2001: A Space Odyssey* emerges from a collection of these elements rather than every element of it being sci-fi. Even if one accepts that at some point in time, Stanley Kubrick's team of filmmakers and my appreciation of *2001: A Space Odyssey* are parts of the tradition of science fiction, it seems odd that Kubrick's clapperboard, my fingernails, and their molecules would also compose a part of science fiction. We would not say, "Kubrick's clapperboard during filming was science fiction," or "my fingernails during appreciation were science fiction," and even if we did, we would take them as simply false statements, but genres-as-traditions account makes them comprehensible and true statements.

To address this concern while inheriting the explanatory merit of the genres-as-traditions account, it would still be reasonable to recognize genres as clusters of rules as abstract entities. Indeed, what Evnine saw as problematic when he problematized the genres-as-features account was a particularly extreme version of it, that is, the view that genres have necessary and sufficient conditions for membership. However, as Terrone (2021: 20) replies, each genre can be a cluster of standard features with some social foundation, a universal which persists through time while the relevant features of which may change historically. I have shown that there are difficulties with the genres-as-features account even in the permissive version that Terrone employs, but in any case, it does not follow in one step from this approach being unpromising that genres are the four-dimensional particulars of tradition. We have an even more promising and moderate approach: genres-as-rules.

[63] Kurata (2017: 42–3) addresses this point as a problem with the biological-species-as-individuals account.

3.5 A Case Study: Color Photography

The above discussion has shown the promise of the idea that genres are clusters of regulative rules, that they are backgrounds that enable appreciative and critical reasoning, that they have a social basis, and that they are established by act of framing. At this point, it will be illustrative to put philosophical theory construction aside and examine a specific case.

Until the middle of the 20th century, color photography had not been established as a serious art genre.[64] Though it was already in practical use by the 1940s and was widely employed in advertising and news photography, it had technical problems such as unstable color tones and fading over time. While these problems were gradually resolved with the development of technology, the notion that artistic photography should be in black and white remained strong, and color photography was rarely featured in the world of high art. When Edward Weston and Ansel Adams were at the center of the scene, the accepted rule was to regard colorful photographs as crude and vulgar. In today's artworld, such a rule is hardly valid. We no longer consider photographic artwork to be vulgar simply because it is in color, but this change did not happen out of the blue. The genre of color photography has undergone a gradual transfiguration through conflicts and negotiations involving multiple agents. By tracing this history, I will illustrate the process by which a genre as a cluster of rules came into being, modified, and established itself.

Widely acknowledged as an important turning point was the 1976 exhibition *Photographs by William Eggleston* at the Museum of Modern Art in New York. John Szarkowski, director of the photography department at MoMA at that time, discovered the virtually unknown photographer Eggleston and organized a solo exhibition of his work. The exhibition, along with the photobook *William Eggleston's Guide* published as a catalog, provoked a mixed response, and is credited with sparking a widespread debate about whether color photography could be a serious art genre. Contrary to the story often told, however, Eggleston's exhibition was not the first exhibition of color photography in the history of art, nor was it the first exhibition of color photography at MoMA.

[64] I consulted Masuda (2004) for the following historical discourse.

MoMA had already held a solo show of Eliot Porter's series of color photographs of birds as early as 1943, and presented an exhibition of color artwork by several photographers, organized by Edward Steichen in 1950. In the press release for the latter, Steichen stated,

> This exhibition explores and evaluates the status of color photography as a creative medium. Is it a new medium for the artist or is it a means of supplementing or elaborating the recognized attainments of black and white photography? [...] In any attempt to evaluate the present status of color photography, one must recognize that color was introduced into films as well as into stills after they had been established and fully accepted as black and white. It is obvious that neither the photographer nor the public has as yet overcome the unconscious conditioning firmly established by the black and white photograph.[65]

The expression "unconscious conditioning" nicely captures the essence of genres-as-rules. Here, we can see that the debate later revived by Eggleston's solo exhibition had already emerged. Szarkowski also organized an exhibition of color photographs by Ernst Haas in 1962, declaring that,

> The color in color photography has often seemed an irrelevant decorative screen between the viewer and the fact of the picture. Ernst Haas has resolved this conflict by making the color sensation itself the subject matter of his work. No photographer has worked more successfully to express the sheer physical joy of seeing.[66]

It would be a mistake to regard this as merely a descriptive discourse of rules. Szarkowski is declaring and proposing a rule that was still considered provocative at the time. MoMA has always functioned to draw attention to the artistic status of color photography, its widely accepted rules, and its existing framing, and to correct and promote them. Eggleston's solo exhibition is the culmination of these efforts.

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[65] Museum of Modern Art (MoMA), "Color Photography", https://www.moma.org/calendar/exhibitions/2408

[66] Museum of Modern Art (MoMA), "Ernst Haas: Color Photography", https://www.moma.org/calendar/exhibitions/3432

It was Sally Eauclaire, a curator and critic, who organized and outlined the trends in color photography after the exhibition of Eggleston. She curated an exhibition of color photographs at the International Center of Photography in 1981, and in publishing the catalog of that exhibition, *the new color photography* (1981), she became the namer of the genre of "new color." She continued to promote this trend by editing such books as *New Color/New Work: 18 Photographic Essays* (1984) and *American Independents* (1987). The new category of new color does not simply classify color photographers such as William Eggleston, Stephen Shore, and Joel Meyerowitz. Clearly, it is a genre in the sense I mean it, a new set of rules. The rule that considers being colorful to be crude is explicitly excluded from it.

The genre of new color thus established also has more positive rules. These include a rule that makes us positively value the banal and deadpan (Cotton 2020 Chap. 3). Photographers grouped under new color often shoot ordinary scenes in sharp focus: Edggleston's photographs are of everyday scenes from the American South; Shore's subjects are artificial spaces such as gas stations and parking lots; and Meyerowitz photographed anonymous people passing by on the street. The lack of the dramatic in these photographs is in contrast to Eliot Porter's photographs of spectacular natural landscapes, plants, and animals, or Ernst Haas's photographs, which have the exquisite compositions of abstract paintings. Eggleston's exhibit often provoked reactions lacking understanding, not only because the works were in color, but also because they were banal. Presenting a snapshot of a rusty tricycle as a serious artwork is, in no small part, the transfiguration of the commonplace. Advocates of the new color have declared and proposed new rules while at the same time canceling a kind of framing to color photographs.

The banality-rule did not emerge and became established only in the context of color photography. Another factor that helped establish this rule was the exhibition of *New Topographics* at the George Eastman House in 1975. Featuring works by photographers such as Robert Adams, Lewis Baltz, Bernd and Hilla Becher on the subject of the mundane artificial landscape, the exhibition advanced the transfiguration of the commonplace as described above prior to the new color

movement. Going further back in a wider context, we might reach the ideal of straight photography advocated by Alfred Stieglitz or the deadpan street photographs by Jean-Eugène Atget. In its interaction with these various artworks and genres, new color incorporated the banality-rule.[67]

When we look at the works of contemporary photographers such as Thomas Ruff, Wolfgang Tillmans, and Alec Soth, we no longer say that their artwork is crude or vulgar just because it is in color. Instead, we attribute lushness and restrained sentiment because the subjects they choose and the way they photograph them are non-dramatic and mundane. Thomas Ruff by repetition, Wolfgang Tillmans by spatial arrangement will accelerate the genre's interaction with installation art, and Alec Soth will reconnect the genre to the tradition of documentary. The rules for appreciating and criticizing a work as a color photograph have constantly changed and will continue to change as more artists, directors, curators, and critics interact.

Summary

This chapter had two tasks. First, I attempted to elucidate the roles that categories play in appreciation and criticism. Second, I have tried to characterize the meta-category of genre and distinguish it from other meta-categories. These two tasks have been addressed in articulating the conception of genres as rules.

The approach that attempts to explain genres by focusing on feature tracking is frustrated by its failure to identify the type of features that categories and only categories that are genres track. The actual categories are not neatly grouped into genre, form, style, media, historical profile, and so on, but are often hybrids of them, tracking various types of features. Concepts such as classification, membership, and standard features are not good explicans for understanding the concept of genre.

According to the alternative approach presented in this chapter, a genre is a cluster of rules that direct appreciative responses. This directly explains the social and normative aspects of genres.

[67] On the emergence of new hybrid categories from the interaction of existing categories, see Levinson (2011: Chap. 2). On the hybrid nature of digital photography in particular, see Anscomb (forthcoming).

Since a genre is a cluster of regulative rules accepted by a group of agents, responding to an artwork in a certain way may be appropriate or inappropriate. Thus, the non-biological basis for critical reasoning, which was left unresolved in the preceding chapters, is revealed. The feature of visual mundaneness is a good reason for considering *Comb* to be provocative, because there is a rule for the genre of readymade in the background that justifies such reasoning. The validity of the rules of a genre is anchored, set up, and validated by the facts about the relevant communities and agents. I have opted to be open while suggesting a pluralism about these anchoring facts. At least, the act that seems to be the causal starting point is the framing that individual agents perform upon individual artworks. Agents can indicate certain rules, declaring and proposing to follow them by means of category-attributing statements such as "*x* is *C*." The act of framing is dynamic and creative and is the basis of the practice of genre. Let us summarize as follows:

> **Genres as Rules**
>
> For a group of agents *G* at a time *t*, a category *C* is a genre if and only if *C* is a cluster of regulative rules represented as 'If an artwork *x* has property *F*, make an appreciative response *R* to *x*,' and a particular *G*-associated-fact at *t* anchors *C*.

What this chapter has revealed, however, is that a number of genres become established in each community. It has not yet accounted for the fact that, as Walton argued in his Normative Thesis of "Categories of Art," *individual artworks* have *correct categories* in which it is correct to perceive them. Clearly, the rules accepted in a given community overlap in their inputs. Certain brush strokes are graceful in Impressionism, but poor in Neoclassicism. The rules of slapstick comedy direct a pro-attitude toward pratfalls, and serious tragedy directs a con-attitude toward the very same pratfalls. It is natural to wonder, then, which rules are appropriate for an individual artwork to apply in appreciating and criticizing it. Often, this question has been read as a question of which category an individual artwork actually belongs to. Contextualists, including some who do not read it that way, such as Walton (1970), have argued that the correct categories are determined by contextual facts. I believe, however, that the traditional approach has often addressed this issue in a misleading, if not

incorrect, manner, and that there are still points that have been missed or lack clarification in the contextualist accounts given for the correct category. In light of the genres-as-rules account, I shall address this issue in the next chapter.

4 Genres as Rules in Equilibrium

Around 2010, a meme emerged on the internet that sampled existing music, slowed down the tempo and lowered the pitch by the technique of chopped and screwed, and presented it with nostalgic imagery. Sampled sources include Smooth Jazz, Fusion, and Soft Rock from the 1980s and 1990s, as well as commercial elevator music, startup sounds of devices, and television commercials, often ripped from sources illegally uploaded to YouTube and then released without paying attention to copyright. The album artworks and music videos are miscellaneous collages of classical sculptures, old PCs and game consoles, lo-fi media such as VHS and cassette tapes, shopping malls, representations of bubble-era Japan, and machine-translated, broken Japanese. Pioneering works include “Memory Vague” (2009), a collection of audiovisual pieces by Daniel Lopatin, better known as Oneohtrix Point Never, and “Chuck Person ’s Eccojams Vol. 1” (2010), which he sold on cassette tape under the name Chuck Person. A particularly significant contribution to outlining the genre was “Floral Shoppe” (2011), released by Ramona Andra Xavier, better known as Vektroid, under the name MACINTOSH PLUS, including the track “Lisa Frank 420 / Modern Computing,” which samples “It’s Your Move” by Diana Ross and is now considered a paradigm of the genre. Vektroid and another early contributor to the genre, Robin Burnett, aka INTERNET CLUB, released numerous artworks under multiple names, setting the direction of the genre in terms of both sound and visuals. By approximately mid-2012, Vaporwave became the established name for the genre. In a high-profile essay on the genre, “Vaporwave and the Pop Art of the Virtual Plaza” (2012), Adam Harper called vaporwave “accelerationist pop” and depicted it as a critical philosophy of late capitalism. Since then, vaporwave has developed as a mysterious practice that is a kitschy internet meme and yet seems to contain some critical elements in terms of cultural ideology.

The main players in the practice of Vaporwave include anonymous producers, whose exact intentions no one knows, and anonymous fans who share their opinions with each other on online

forums like Reddit and 4chan, and critics who often read too much into its iconography. During 2018–2019, I was one of those critics writing about Vaporwave. Participating in the practice of Vaporwave was a delightful experience for me. Each artwork emerged with a profundity that made us believe that no one, including the creators, fully understood it. We wrote reviews, created album guides, shared opinions, and sometimes disagreed, all in an attempt to somehow gain a deeper appreciation of the artworks of Vaporwave. I am convinced that that genre practice was neither a bilateral relationship between me and the artwork, nor a tripartite relationship involving the author, but a more complex and nuanced social interaction.

Thus, the theme of this chapter is the interaction arising from genre. In the previous chapter, I identified the ontological structure of genres. Ultimately, I argued that genres are clusters of regulative rules tied (i.e., anchored) to communities through the collective beliefs or behaviors of the agents involved. This account maximally respects the roles in appreciation and criticism that genres are widely expected to serve. It can be assumed that the setting of a western is the West America in the frontier days, even if this is not explicitly specified in the story. When seen as a musical, we should not consider it silly when the characters suddenly burst into singing and dancing. This is because the western or musical is a cluster of rules regulating such appreciative and critical behavior.

What I will address in this chapter is the appropriateness of applying certain rules (framing, in my terminology) to an individual artwork. A brushstroke can be judged crude as a Neoclassical painting but graceful as an Impressionist painting. In this case, in a community where both genres, Neoclassicism and Impressionism, are anchored together, which rule should be followed in judging the brushstroke? A single artwork can, in principle, be viewed from several different genres. As Walton (1970) argued in his Normative Thesis, however, there are appropriate and inappropriate ways of viewing an artwork. In any case, it misses the point to see *2001: A Space Odyssey* as a boring, uninspired, and time-wasting romance film. The fact that it *can* be framed in different ways means that you can try them, not that they are all equivalent. At the very least, I agree with Walton, along with

many other commentators, that extreme category relativism is not an attractive option. Framing should be constrained by norms.

In Section 1, I clarify the explanatory task. I will first show that addressing this issue under the label of "correct categories" could easily be misleading. In this case, the interrelated but fundamentally different acts of classifying and framing are mingled together without clarification. I will illustrate the differences and connections using the distinction between constitutive rules and regulative rules as addressed in social ontology. Then, with the aid of an approach that reduces constitutive rules to regulative rules, I will show the way to skip the question of classification and unify the question into one of framing. Then, as a less misleading description, I propose the label of "active genres."

In Section 2, I will reject intentionalism concerning active genres. The view is persistent that the rules under which an artwork should be appreciated and criticized are simply the rules intended by the author. However, genre intentionalism is, on the one hand, an account that confers unreasonably strong powers of determination on the author and, on the other hand, an account that can not account for the creative aspects of genre practice.

As I showed in the previous chapter, I believe that the foundation of genre practice lies more in the framing by individual appreciators than in the act of creation by artists. Strange as it may sound at this point, it is we, not the author, who determine the appropriate way to respond to an artwork. In section 3, after introducing Francesco Guala's theory of institutions, I analogize active genres to social institutions. I will argue that, for an individual artwork, an active genre is one in which the strategy of responding to the artwork according to the rules of the genre is in equilibrium in the relevant community. Chapter 4 clarifies this institutional approach by explaining the details.

Social institutions have two aspects. First, institutions as rules-in-equilibrium have stability. Second, however, they are also open to revision. In Section 5, I will show that it is also useful to analogize active genres to institutions in order to analyze their contingency, plurality, and revisability. A genre may be useful as a point of reference in responding to an artwork, and thus be widely

referenced and may eventually become established in our practice of appreciation and criticism with the imperative force that it should be referenced. This does not imply, however, that the framing is the best or that it is universal or absolute. An established framing can be revised to another framing, and we have the means to do so if we want.

4.1 From Classifying to Framing

Since Walton (1970), the normative question of category has often been discussed as a question of what determines the *correct category* of an artwork. However, if the discussion in the preceding chapters is correct, such an approach is problematic. This inquiry has often been read as an inquiry into the categories to which individual artworks actually belong, even though Walton himself has never so argued. This assumes there is correctness in the sense that it is an accurate *classification* that represents the fact that an individual artwork belongs to a particular category. For feature-tracking categories, such an explanation makes sense. Whether or not it is correct to classify a painting as belonging to Baroque painting is a matter of whether or not the artwork actually has the aesthetic (and other properties) that are standard for the Baroque style. Similarly, whether it is correct to classify a text as belonging to haiku is a matter of whether the artwork actually has the standard number of syllables for the haiku form. Whether it is correct to classify a film as a Hitchcock film is only a matter of whether it was made by Hitchcock. Classification is a matter of veridicality.

In the previous chapter, however, I showed that the practice of tracking standard features and classifying individual artworks in this way (i.e., judging the facts about membership) is fundamentally different from the practice of applying rules in appreciation and criticism. If my central claim that genres are clusters of regulative rules is correct, then the point of genre attribution is not membership or classification, but framing, the application of rules. And categorization, in the sense of framing rather than classifying, is not, in my view, a matter of truth or falsity, even if it is a matter of being appropriate or inappropriate. In the context of genres-as-rules and where framing is at issue, the label of "correct category" is extremely misleading. It obscures the difference between the two aspects of

categorization, that is, classifying, with its "word-to-world" direction of fit, and framing, with its "world-to-word" direction of fit.

Instead, following Laetz (2010: 295), I will use the expression *active genre*. The questions at hand are: which rules are *active*, in the sense of being normatively supported and justified for use in appreciating and criticizing a relevant artwork; and what determines that. We can try different framings toward individual artworks, but which are appropriate and good framings? These questions are different from the question of what is the true and correct way to classify works, assuming facts about category membership. And, as I see it, most of the theorists who, on the surface, are concerned with the correctness of category membership are, in fact, concerned with active genres in the above sense. The question here is about the appropriateness of a framing that determines the appropriate interpretation and evaluation, not about the neutral fact of category membership itself.

Nevertheless, the issue of classifying is connected to the issue of framing. Otherwise, it would be hard to understand why the two issues are so easily confused. To clarify this, I will use the terms "constitutive rule" and "regulative rule," developed by John Searle (1995). *Regulative rules*, as they have already appeared, are rules that describe and guide the behavior of agents in society. On the other hand, *constitutive rules* are rules that define new social roles. Regulative rules are those that direct the behavior we already understand and perform, whereas constitutive rules are those that create social facts that would not exist without them. Formally, a regulative rule can be represented as "If X, do Y" or simply "Do X," whereas a constitutive rule is represented as "X is considered as Y in C." Papers and coins that have undergone the proper procedures and have the proper design in a particular community are considered to be money. According to Searle, a social entity such as money cannot exist without a constitutive rule that defines the conditions of satisfaction.

When applied to categories of art, constitutive rules can be regarded as conditions of satisfaction that govern category membership. As mentioned in the previous chapter, membership in a category of art is not usually defined by explicit necessary and sufficient conditions. The conditions of satisfaction for categories of art should be considered much more loosely stipulated than those for

money, as clusters of standard features (Friend 2012; Terrone 2021). However, this only means that the conditions of satisfaction are relatively loose, and a rule still stipulates that any object that satisfies the condition will be considered a member of the category. An individual artwork that meets as many of the standard features of fantasy as possible in the relevant community would be considered a member of fantasy. In other words, it seems that not only the regulative rules of the genre, as discussed in the previous section, but also the category membership rules, which are formalized as follows, are anchored in each community.

If an artwork *x* has property *F*, *x* is a member of a category *C*.

The question is whether, from a theoretical perspective, such constitutive rules are required independently of regulative rules. Searle acknowledges the fundamental role of constitutive rules in making social interactions possible. On the other hand, Hindriks (2009), Hindriks and Guala (2015), and Guala (2016) suggest that the distinction between constitutive rules and regulative rules is superficial, and the former can be reduced to the latter. An important point is that constitutive rules do not merely stipulate that satisfying certain features is the basis for having a certain social status, but that it is a *status* that is conferred, and that is accompanied by a set of rights and obligations (in Searle's terminology, deontic powers). The mere fact that an item is money without the fact that it accompanies the rights and obligations to engage in some economic activity is of no significance. Thus, a constitutive rule can be decomposed into the following two rules (Hindriks and Guala 2015: 189; Guala 2016: 61–5).

Base Rule: If C, then X is Y.

Status Rule: If Y, then Z.

The Y term represents social status, such as money, property, prime minister, or judge. The X term represents individual objects, the C term represents the conditions of satisfaction for being Y, and the Z term represents the set of rights and obligations that accompany the status of being Y. An example offered by Hindriks and Guala is a situation where two tribes (the Nuer and the Dinka) interact over the segregation of grazing lands. The base rule stipulates that if a piece of land is on the north side of a

certain river, it is the property of the Nuer, and the status rule stipulates that if a piece of land is the property of the Nuer, the Nuer graze on it.

The crucial point is that when the constitutive rules can be decomposed in this way, contrary to Searle, no acts appear in them that would be possible only through the constitutive rules. Rather, the base rule and the status rule can be transformed into a simpler regulative rule. That is, "If C, then X is Y, and if Y, then Z" is no different from the shortened one, "If C, then Z," except that there appears the institutional term Y. After all, the Nuer can be ignorant of property, an institutional status that only comes into being through constitutive rules, and still behave according to the rule that if a piece of land is on the north side of the river, the Nuer graze on it, and if a piece of land is on the south side of the river, the Nuer do not graze on it. In Hindriks and Guala's view, rules can be transformed into simple regulative rules by eliminating institutional terms from the constitutive rules, and conversely, constitutive rules can be derived from regulative rules without cost by introducing a new Y term and splitting the regulative rules.

The lesson of this reductive approach is that we can do without the mysterious item of institutional status. My idea is that this reduction can be applied directly to the reduction of states that individual artworks belong to categories. For us, the fact that an artwork is a member of Cubism or Horror is as much a social and institutional fact as the fact that a piece of land is their property is for the Nuer.

As formalized above, a condition of membership to an artwork is expressed according to the base rule as follows:

Membership Rule: If an artwork x has property F, x is a member of a category C.

And in the interest at hand, category membership does not appear as a mere neutral fact, but as something that plays a role in appreciative and critical reasoning. If the fact of belonging to Cubism were not accompanied by the fact of influencing the appropriate aesthetic judgment of it, there would be no point in bringing up the category of art in the first place. In this regard, most of the previous studies that have discussed the appreciative and critical role of categories have had in mind only those

cases in which artworks belong to a category in a way that is not normatively neutral. The point is not so much about being a member of the kind itself, but about what rights and obligations that status entails.

> Status Rule: If an artwork *x* is a member of a category *C*, then apply the regulative rule *P* to *x* (i.e., if *x* has property *G*, then make an appreciative response *R* to *x*).

If an artwork belongs to a particular category, it becomes *appropriate* to assume that the setting is America, or it becomes *inappropriate* to evaluate it as silly just because the characters suddenly start singing and dancing. Again, this is analogous to money. If a piece of paper has certain historical and physical properties, it is money, and if it is money, it comes with a set of rights and obligations regarding economic behavior. The above two rules can then be converted into one simple rule.

> Regulative Rule: If an artwork *x* has property *F* and *G*, then make an appreciative response *R* to *x*.

Since property *F* already refers to a group of standard properties, there is no inconvenience in shortening this rule to "If an artwork *x* has property *F*, then make an appreciative response *R* to *x*." The rule that emerges in this way is the regulative rule of appreciation and criticism that I have been addressing since the previous chapter. There appears only the direction to respond in a certain way to any item that has certain properties. The question of category membership or classification was skipped. In addition, by following the reverse procedure, the genre membership rule can be derived from the genre's regulative rules. In particular, the conditional parts, or input properties, of regulative rules which include the output of attributing order, stability, and legitimacy to an item, can be regarded as the standard features of the genre. As Walton (1970: 348–9) has argued, these aesthetic effects are tied to, among other things, having standard features.

Issues of the correct membership and the appropriate framing are tied together because the membership rule and regulative rules of a genre are tied together in this way. Carroll (2009: 94) stated that "situating the work as a certain kind of artwork at the same time implies the type of criticism suitable to bring to bear upon the object," and the grounds for saying so are now clear. A membership

rule combined with status rules is equivalent to a set of regulative rules, and if this analysis is correct, then trying to identify the genre to which an individual artwork actually belongs is equivalent to trying to identify the appropriate regulative rules for appreciating and criticizing that artwork. Ultimately, we can set aside notions of classification, membership, and standard features, and focus only on regulative rules and framing.

This analysis does not apply to every category of art. The simple fact is that not every category of art is a genre. As a purely fact-descriptive category, 1980s artworks have only membership rules and usually no status rules. The mere fact that an artwork was created in the 1980s does not make a certain appreciative response appropriate or inappropriate. The difference between genre and non-genre meta-categories can be described as follows: non-genre categories have only membership rules, but genres have status rules in addition to membership rules, and can be represented as clusters of regulative rules by linking the membership rules and status rules.

4.2 Intentionalism about Active Genres

Through the discussion in the previous section, the explanatory task at hand has been organized into which genres are active for individual artworks and what determines them. As cited in Chapter 1, Walton (1970: 357) sketched four factors that "count toward its being correct to perceive a work, *W*, in a given category, *C*." Let us restate them here.

> (i) The presence in *W* of a relatively large number of features standard with respect to *C*. […] it has a minimum of contra-standard features […].
>
> (ii) *W* is better, or more interesting or pleasing aesthetically, or more worth experiencing when perceived in *C* than it is when perceived in alternative ways.
>
> (iii) the artist who produced *W* intended or expected it to be perceived in *C*, or thought of it as a *C*.
>
> (iv) *C* is well established in and recognized by the society in which *W* was produced. (CA: 357)

In particular, Walton emphasizes the importance of criterion (iii), i.e., the author's intention (Walton 1973). The idea that the author's intention determines the correct categories of artworks is supported by those who otherwise prefer a non-intentionalist approach. Instead, it might be said that categorical intentionalism has been employed as a limiter for moderate anti-intentionalism. According to Levinson (1996: Chap. 10), the content attributed by the correct interpretation of an artwork is not the content intended by the actual author, but the content attributed by the best hypothesis the appropriate readers form. However, with respect to categories that serve as clues to such interpretations, Levinson concedes that they are directly determined by the author's intention.

> Semantic intentions […] do *not* determine meaning, but categorial intentions […] *do* in general determine how a text is to be conceptualized and approached on a fundamental level and thus indirectly affect what it will resultantly say or express. (Levinson 1996: 188–9)

Similarly, according to Davies (2006), the content attributed by the correct interpretation of an artwork is the content attributed through the readers seeking to maximize the value of the artwork. However, like Levinson, Davies adopts intentionalism concerning the correct category to refer to.

> Some of an author's intentions seem to be essential to her work's identity and thereby central to the identification of the appropriate object of interpretation. For instance, she determines its category or genre and its title. (Davies 2006: 233)

There are reasons and cases for doubting intentionalism regarding proper framing. Since a genre is a set of rules for interpretation and evaluation, to regard categorical intention as sufficiently grounding an active genre is to give the artist suspiciously strong power in determining the meaning and value of her artwork. It allows the artist to set any convenient hurdle for her artwork. It is not plausible that, for an artwork that is merely incoherent and sloppy, it is appropriate to assign meaningful symbolism or positive value to its failures simply because its author intended it to be read as absurdist literature.

As Walton (1970: 357) and Carroll (2009: 172) suppose, the author's intention is, at best, only one of those considerations that ground appropriate categorization. Many genre theorists, including

Friend (2012: 193–4); Abell (2015: 32); Evnine (2015: 7); and Terrone (2021: 23), while emphasizing the author's intention, seem to acknowledge that it is not the sole and decisive consideration for an active genre. Read favorably, neither Levinson nor Davies may be arguing that the author's intention, standing alone, fully grounds an active genre. The expression "determines" is ambiguous as to whether it means partial or full grounding. According to the moderate intentionalism of framing, the author's intention is called upon as the tie-breaking factor when there are multiple plausible but competing framings of an individual artwork. In other words, the author's intention partially grounds the appropriate framing.

However, even this moderate position remains problematic. It is, in my opinion, too restrictive to regard authorial intention as necessary as the basis for a partially active genre. As is evident in practice, artworks are often appreciated and criticized under framings that the author did not intend at the time of their creation. To read Raymond Carver's works as minimalist literature, to see Mark Rothko's paintings as formalist painting, to listen to Claude Debussy's music as Impressionist or Portishead's music as trip-hop all involve framings that the author(s) did not intend or publicly rejected. In addition, artworks can be appreciated and criticized under categories that their authors *cannot* intend. Reading the works of Franz Kafka or Fyodor Dostoevsky as existentialist literature, or viewing the works of Andrei Tarkovsky or Chantal Akerman as slow cinema involves a framing that was established long after these artworks were created. Concerning these genres, it seems that non-authorial agents are behaving with far greater power of decision than the authors (Malone 2022: 20). Appreciators, critics, and curators do not necessarily approach artworks according to the rules specified by their authors, but sometimes they use associations to divert the rules, and sometimes they create the rules themselves.

Under the view that authorial intention is a necessary condition for appropriate framing, any framing that is contrary to intention would be considered informal, disingenuous, and something to be refrained from. From another perspective, however, these anti-intentionalist framings are not entirely arbitrary or futile, but rather are a highly creative part of our practice of appreciation and criticism.

Since such framing practices do exist, it would be a cost to theoretically dismiss these framings as inaccurate. I would rather seek a category theory that endorses a variety of practices.[68]

It might be objected that the determination of active genres has moral considerations. A framing is a good framing because it respects the fact that an artwork is an artifact, the product of an intentional act by an individual(s). According to this objection, the attempts of others should be respected; it is immoral to interpret them carelessly, and we are morally required to track intentions and to appreciate and criticize artworks according to the intended rules. These moral considerations are in no small part behind Carroll's (2009: 144–5; 2011: 133) defense of intentionalism in the interpretation of artworks. Simply put, we should appreciate and criticize a work according to the rules specified by the author, so as not to be rude to her. Would not it be sacrilegious to take issue only with the superficial color and form of a painting by Mark Rothko, a painter who intended it to be an expression of something profoundly spiritual, even if it were accompanied by a favorable evaluation of the work?

Of course, the view of the objector is not fact-descriptive. Now and then, the artworld is full of viewers and critics who are rude in this sense. The consideration of respecting the artist as an individual, while not entirely absent, does not seem to be a particularly prioritized consideration when confronted with a work of art. Is it, then, a consideration that should be prioritized in particular? I do not have a definitive answer to this question because it seems to me that the answer must be more of a political decision than a philosophical analysis.

Let me defend myself as follows. First, I am open to the normative claim that we should respect the categorical intentions of authors in order to be moral appreciators. My aim is to describe the underlying mechanisms of framing practices as they are currently practiced in the artworld, not to attempt normative ethics. I will then show that the framing that the mechanism results in is rational from another point of view, even if it contains aspects that are irrational from a moralist's point of

[68] Such a policy is the same as that taken by Gaut (1993: 605) in the face of the diversity of interpretations of artworks.

view. Finally, I will show that the mechanism itself is morally neutral. The mechanism driving the framing practice does not necessarily result in immoral framing contrary to the author's intention, nor does it lack the possibility of escaping from immoral framing.

Finally, one could argue, though, that we are talking about the author's purpose or achievement. This, the objector believes, is evidence that we care about the author's intentions and that we are following or attempting to follow the rules as they were intended. It is not difficult, however, to offer an error theory to this observation. We often misinterpret framing that is not in line with the author's intention as being in line, and we misinterpret the reception value resulting from it as a success value on the part of the author. I might judge *Plan 9 from Outer Space* (1959) to be a well-made postmodern film and declare, "This is truly an achievement of Ed Wood." However, in fact, there is no consideration of the filmmaker's purpose or demonstrated ability. There is a reason why we confuse reception value with success value. It is the obvious fact that there is a causal relationship between the producer and the artwork being appreciated and criticized that promotes this confusion. However, it is like slipping from the judgment that a child is brilliant to the judgment that the parents are brilliant. This fallacy was pointed out as early as in Wimsatt and Beardsley (1946).

> [T]o insist on the designing intellect as a *cause* of a poem is not to grant the design or intention as a *standard*. (Wimsatt and Beardsley 1949: 469)

Thus, the observation that we are talking about the author's purpose or achievement is a weak observation by itself in support of framing intentionalism. When it comes to framing, we cannot say that we care, or should care, about the author's intentions.

There is yet another serious problem with intentionalism about active genres. In part because it confuses the issue of appropriate framing with the issue of correct classification, intentionalists often offer answers that are far more ambitious than I find plausible. That is, the fact that the author intended a certain framing is not relative to a point in time or to a group of agents, but to an objectively established fact on the part of the world, which implies that the active genre grounded on it is also objectively established across time and place intentionalism is an answer like this.

Intentionalism about Active Genres

> The fact that a genre *C** is an active genre of an artwork *x* is fully, or, at least partly, grounded by the fact that the author(s) of *x* intended so.

However, the picture suggested by such an answer is not compatible with framing practice being a dynamic practice. If, as we saw in the previous section, the active genre is not a matter of correct classification or veridicality, but rather a matter of which is the better way to look at an individual artwork, then all we can expect is an answer that, at best, fills the following blank.

> For a group of agents *G* at a time *t*, category *C** is an active genre if and only if, concerning *C**, it is the case that ____.

The active genres, the clusters of rules under which individual artworks should be appreciated and criticized, are norms that are limited to a certain time and place, and regulate appreciation and criticism within those limits. It does not necessarily have any force at another point in time or in another community. The label of active genre is also appropriate in that it suggests the possibility that it may cease to be active. Intentionalism is problematic in that it gives too universal an answer.

I am not claiming that an active genre *must* be fully grounded in some consideration other than authorial intention. In fact, I do believe that, but what I will support at this point is a more moderate anti-intentionalism. According to it, the active genre of an individual artwork *can* be fully grounded in some consideration other than authorial intention. This view was predicted in Evnine's theory of genre.

> The substantive conditions on a work's belonging to a genre are, roughly, these. First, there are factors on the upstream side of the work, all those things involved in its genesis. There is the process of its composition by an author, who is influenced by, constrained by, and responsive to other books, publishers' demands, reviews, expectations, and so on. Second, there are factors on the downstream side. The work is read, has influence, is judged, printed, anthologized, criticized, classified, and so on. […] I note here only that an author's intention that a work belong to a genre is surely very important to its belonging, though neither

> necessary nor sufficient, and that unanimous classification as belonging to a genre on the downstream side of things looks close to being sufficient for membership (if everyone says a work is science fiction, then it is science fiction), but is certainly not necessary. (Evnine 2015: 7)

My task below is to present the detailed scenario.

4.3 An Institutional Approach to Active Genres

Concerning active genres, what I take to be an important consideration is one that Walton gave little weight to, and Carroll explicitly rejected: whether a given framing makes an artwork "better, or more interesting or pleasing aesthetically, or more worth experiencing." Certainly, the fact that an artwork gives *me* a better experience in a certain framing is not a sufficient basis for making it an appropriate framing. However, it is not necessary to understand a valuable experience in this individualistic way. There is room to think that the appropriate framing is one that we establish in the pursuit of experiences that are valuable to *us*. To develop this idea, I must first introduce a general theory of social interaction.

4.3.1 An Institution as Rules-in-Equilibrium

Francesco Guala (2016: 51) features *institutions* as *rules-in-equilibrium*. Guala's approach combines the rule theory and the equilibria theory of institutions, thereby compensating for the demerits of each. If institutions are rules, we can explain their aspects of normatively guiding behaviors. However, if they are merely rules and not equilibria, then we cannot understand the difference between institutions that are obeyed and those that are not. If institutions are equilibria, we can understand whether they are followed or not by looking at whether there are sufficient incentives. However, if they are merely equilibria, not rules, then we cannot explain their aspects of guiding behavior. Guala uses the notion of correlated equilibrium in coordination games as a clue to show that institutions are both rules *and* equilibria.

Let me start with a general introduction to *strategic games*. In Japan, where I live, cars are required to drive in the left lane. In a given society, it is not important whether traffic laws regulate driving on the right or on the left. What is important is to avoid a situation where each driver chooses her lane freely and causes chaos. The payoff matrix for the lane choice game is represented in Table 1.

	Right lane	Left lane
Right lane	1, 1	0, 0
Left lane	0, 0	1, 1

Table 1

Each cell shows the payoff for Player 1 (row chooser) on the left and Player 2 (column chooser) on the right. The specific numbers themselves are not important; what is important is the magnitude relationship. By assumption, a rational player will always act to maximize her own payoffs when possible. Player 1 drives in the right lane only when Player 2 drives in the right lane, and drives in the left lane only when Player 2 drives in the left lane. Player 2 thinks the same way. There are two *equilibria* in the game, i.e., combinations of strategies in which no single player can benefit more from deviating alone. The task of the players is to reach one of the equilibria through coordination. Strategic games that involve such a problem of selecting an equilibrium are called *coordination games*.

An equilibrium can be reached by pure chance or luck, but it can also be reached in a more reasonable way. Schelling (1960) called it a focal point when one of several options is salient in some respect. In another game in which we are asked to choose one of three stars to match without consulting the other player, we would usually choose the middle star. The option is perceptually salient, even though it does not guarantee coordination or is obviously better in some way. Options can also be culturally salient. In a community that shares a language in which sentences are spelled from left to right, the star on the left would be a more salient option than the star on the right. In a society where the lore says, “The star in the middle is unlucky,” the star in the middle would be a salient option to be avoided. Alternatively, the history of play could be the focal point. When the game

of matching stars is played multiple times, the more times a star is matched in several plays, the more salient an option it will become in the subsequent plays. Players can rely on this salience to coordinate, even if they are not given the opportunity to communicate directly with each other. This is because players can predict that their opponents will be aware of its salience just as they are aware of it, and will prioritize it just as they prioritize it.

Focal points can also be designed as publicly observable signals. Indeed, to achieve the equilibrium of driving in the left lane, we teach each other to do so in driving schools and in everyday conversation, and we install road signs and markers. These agreements and items expand the game and add new options of conditional strategies to behave accordingly. I will drive in the right lane if they require me to do so, and I will drive in the left lane if they require me to do so. Strategies based on external signals, such as agreements and items, lead to *correlated equilibrium*. It does no good for individuals to ignore instructions and signs and randomly choose lanes on their own. Insofar as other players have followed and will continue to follow them, every player will follow them.

However, correlated equilibrium as a pattern itself can also be found in the world of animals, which are usually regarded as having no institutions. The fact that left-lane driving is not just a behavioral pattern but an institution means that it is also a rule, in the sense that it is embedded in the beliefs of the players and guides their choices (Guala 2016: 54–5). They are not merely "rules" in the sense of describing and summarizing the behavior patterns of the players (observer-rules), but rules in a more substantive and perhaps everyday sense that we refer to, understand, and follow (agent-rules). Human beings differ from other animals that are simply equipped with certain patterns of behavior in that we can reflect on a rule and strive to modify it into a different rule if we need to.

As in the game of choosing lanes, an agreement often evolves into a law. Laws reduce incentives to deviate and reinforce normality by stipulating penalties for violating them. In this way, a certain rule-governed behavior is reproduced in a given society.

Correlated equilibrium can also be applied to cases where payoffs are asymmetric. Consider a strategic situation called the "battle of the sexes" (Table 2). Suppose a couple is deciding where to go

on a date, and Player 1 wants to go to A, and Player 2 wants to go to B. At the same time, suppose that neither of them wants to make as selfish a choice as to give up their date. The difference from the game of choosing lanes is that each player is not indifferent about which of the multiple equilibria to realize.

	Go to A	Go to B
Go to A	6, 2	1, 1
Go to B	0, 0	2, 6

Table 2

In such a situation, an agreement to toss a coin to decide where to go, for example, could be a signal to facilitate coordination. Suppose that the probability of getting a heads or tails is one-half each, and that a heads result in going to A and a tails result in going to B. If the balance of payoffs is as described here, participation in the coin toss is a correlated equilibrium since there is no greater payoff in rejecting the coin toss and going where one wants to go. Thus, the strategy of "If it is heads, go to A; if it is tails, go to B" becomes rules-in-equilibrium (Table 3). It is also desirable in terms of being fair.

	Go to A	Go to B	If heads, then go to A If tails, then go to B
Go to A	6, 2	1, 1	$\frac{7}{2}, \frac{3}{2}$
Go to B	0, 0	2, 6	1, 3
If heads, then go to A If tails, then go to B	3, 1	$\frac{3}{2}, \frac{7}{2}$	4, 4

Table 3

I will argue that the practice of framing in the artworld corresponds to a strategic situation analogous to these, and that an active genre is analogous to an institution as rules-in-equilibrium. Players who apply rules to an artwork for appreciation and criticism are often faced with the task of reaching one of several possible equilibria. The framing that is reached, the equilibrium where sole

deviation from it no longer improves one's personal payoff, is the active genre, and is what has been called the "correct category" in the traditional debate.

4.3.2 The Framing Game

How is the game of framing an artwork played? Let us assume two things, for which I will provide additional justification in the next section. First, each player has an incentive to frame an artwork in a way that enhances the value of her own appreciative experience of the artwork. Each of us aims to have the most valuable experience of the artwork, either via a process or as the end result of arriving at a consistent and interesting interpretation or evaluation. Judgments about which framings enhance the value of one's appreciation are not necessarily consistent across agents. The content of a valuable experience may be aesthetic pleasure or cognitive insight. Whatever the case, approaching an artwork with such a purpose is a fact that, in my opinion, comes straight out of being an appreciator. To be sure, this is not an assumption that every player is trying to maximize the value of *the artwork*, as value-maximization theory assumes concerning interpretive practice (e.g., Goldman 1990; 2013; Davies 2006). Rather, I am assuming that every player is trying to maximize the value of *her own experience* of the artwork when making choices concerning framing. Appreciators approach artworks as *value-seekers*, in a sense additional to what Davies suggests (2006: 241). Players in the framing game have a selfish and individualistic side.

However, there is a further aspect to the task of maximizing the value of appreciation. Viewers have an incentive to choose the same framing as other viewers. Explaining this second incentive is not as easy as explaining the first incentive for individuals to pursue experiences that are valuable to themselves. Yet, it is not so mysterious as to be totally incomprehensible from a pre-theoretical point of view. When I listen to Debussy in the genre of Musical Impressionism and form some interpretation or evaluation, I am not just acting selfishly, but in some way, I am sensitive to the way the music is framed by other players besides me. I want my categorizations and critical judgments to be accepted, where acceptance is mentally rewarding while rejection is a knock to the ego. I try to be somewhat in tune with my surroundings, and I hope that my surroundings will be somewhat in tune

with me. As described in the previous chapter, framing is a declaration and proposal about how to appreciate an artwork. There is no such thing as a proposal that is not sensitive to other people's reactions and proposals.

As a result, players in the framing game are often torn between the two incentives. We seek to maximize our experience of an individual artwork, which is a matter of personal value on the one hand, and a matter of communal value on the other. Simply behaving selfishly or simply following the judgment of others does not make us happy. What kind of game the framing game constitutes depends on (1) whether the agents' preferences are aligned and (2) how the two incentives are balanced.

Needless to say, the players in the framing game do not face a difficult coordination problem in all cases. Let the payoff for each agent in the combination of strategies that are against one's own preferences and out of sync with one's opponent be 1, and let the improvement in payoff when framing is consistent with preferences be represented by the variable $\alpha\,(1 \leq \alpha)$, and let the improvement in payoff when framing is in sync by the variable $\beta\,(1 \leq \beta)$. In the case of Table 4, both agents prefer to reach an equilibrium in framing A.

	Framing A	Framing B
Framing A	$\alpha\beta,\ \alpha\beta$	$\alpha,\ 1$
Framing B	$1,\ \alpha$	$\beta,\ \beta$

Table 4

Depending on the balance between the two incentives, the case with shared preferences may not create a coordination problem in the first place, or if it does, it will create a coordination problem where one of the two is clearly the inferior equilibrium. Tables 5 and 6 show the cases with constant values put into $\{\alpha,\ \beta\}$, respectively.

	Framing A	Framing B
Framing A	$6,\ 6$	$3,\ 1$
Framing B	$1,\ 3$	$2,\ 2$

Table 5

	Framing A	Framing B
Framing A	6, 6	2, 1
Framing B	1, 2	3, 3

Table 6

It is not difficult to assign a genre whose rules are clear and which has already been established in society to an artwork as its active genre. No agent hesitates to categorize *The Shining* (1980) as a horror film. It is obvious that it is an artwork that affords a thrilling terror and not a heartwarming drama, and that the appreciation is more valuable when viewed as the former. However, framing *The Shining* as a comedy might be considered moderately promising, though not as promising as horror. *The Shining* is a moderately funny film, even when seen as a comedy. Agents may form an equilibrium in the framing of horror, using its salient similarity to prior horror artworks as a focal point, or they may form a different equilibrium due to some external factor. If there is a clearly superior framing, it may shift to that equilibrium through the mechanism of revision that will be described later.

If agents have different preferences, α will appear in a different position than it did earlier (Table 7).

	Framing A	Framing B
Framing A	αβ, β	α, α
Framing B	1, 1	β, αβ

Table 7

Depending on the balance between the two incentives, the framing game constitutes a situation analogous to the game played by the lovers who have different preferences but somehow manage to coordinate in deciding where to go on a date. However, when the incentive β to coordinate is small, it becomes an equilibrium for each player to frame differently. Tables 8 and 9 show the cases with constant values put into {α, β}, respectively.

	Framing A	Framing B
Framing A	6, 3	2, 2
Framing B	1, 1	3, 6

Table 8

	Framing A	Framing B
Framing A	6, 2	3, 3
Framing B	1, 1	2, 6

Table 9

In the former, there is no equilibrium that is clearly superior and satisfies any of the agents. The latter is more serious, and the equilibrium is to maintain the conflict in separate framings rather than to converge in the same framing. A truly problematic case corresponding to this situation would be one in which a pioneering artwork requires a pioneering rule. Lopes (2014: 190) calls such artworks free agents. According to Xhignesse (2020: 474), "their existence calls for a theory of the art-kind which they pioneer, […] they call for the development of conventions." Concerning Marcel Duchamp's *Fountain*, Alejo Carpentier's *The Kingdom of This World* (1949), Herschell Gordon Lewis's *Blood Feast* (1963), The Sugarhill Gang's 'Rapper's Delight' (1979), and so on, it is not enough to assign to them genres that were already established at the time of their release and to appreciate and criticize them according to those rules. It is not difficult to imagine that even the genres that are now well-established had pioneering artworks that called for new genres at the beginning of their history. Framing for free agents may converge in a particular manner that fails to satisfy some agents, or it may not converge in the first place, but may generate disruption of multiple framings one after the other.

If we are confronted with a free agent, form conflicting opinions about framing, but still want some kind of better resolution, we can only form public signals through trial and error. In other words, invent a new genre. This process can be understood in two phases. In the *institutionalizing phase*, players try various framings. As mentioned in the previous chapter, genres are rules, and they allow

for forceful application. The *Fountain* may have been tentatively framed as a sculpture, and it may have been regarded as not just a poorly made sculpture, but a sacrilegious sculpture. History shows, however, that this framing ultimately did not stick. Players eventually went on to create a whole new genre, a new framing, called readymade. Its rules direct that visual mundaneness be considered provocative and witty. Thus, in the *institutionalized phase*, the appropriate appreciative response to *Fountain* is established to regard it as provocative and witty, and the collective choice of that regulative rule constitutes the equilibrium. The trial-and-error of experimental framings brings about a newly established genre and an active genre for *Fountain* at the same time. Thus, the agents are given the possibility to reach a better equilibrium by inventing new and better rules (Table 10, 11).

	Framing A	Framing B	Framing C
Framing A	6, 3	2, 2	2, 2
Framing B	1, 1	3, 6	1, 2
Framing C	2, 1	2, 2	6, 6

Table 10

	Framing A	Framing B	Framing C
Framing A	6, 2	3, 3	3, 3
Framing B	1, 1	2, 6	1, 3
Framing C	3, 1	3, 3	6, 6

Table 11

In all cases, the common fact is that framings for an individual artwork reach an equilibrium through the interaction of the agents. In my view, such rules-in-equilibrium are simply the appropriate rules under which an artwork ought to be appreciated and criticized, i.e., active genres. In light of the task of maximizing the value of appreciation, solely deviating from the equilibrium framing does not enhance an agent's payoff. It is appropriate framing in the sense that there is reason to choose it if one wishes to appreciate the artwork better. Let us call this an *institutional approach* to active genres.

The most radical claim of the institutional approach is that the currently "correct" framing in equilibrium, and the interpretations and evaluations made under that framing, are historically contingent. That way of viewing is merely the widely adopted way for a group of agents at a given point in time. The stable state of a game often has a *path dependency* on its initial conditions. Consider a situation in which a coordination game is played repeatedly in a group. The strategy chosen by a randomly selected agent is influenced by the proportion of agents in the group that choose a certain strategy. If more agents use Windows, they choose Windows, and if more agents use a Mac, they choose a Mac. If the proportion of agents using Windows is above a certain level, randomly selected agents have a stronger incentive to choose Windows, and her choice of Windows will further boost the proportion. Eventually, an equilibrium is achieved in which most agents choose Windows. The same can happen for Macs since the equilibrium achieved depends on the initial conditions at a given point in time. In the real world, although there are many other factors, it is in part precisely this kind of mechanism that led VHS to beat Betamax and Blu-ray to beat HD DVD. Similarly, the current "correct" framing of an artwork is contingent and, like a social institution, is not necessarily the best one.

The accidental nature of active genres is also related to the role the author has in the task of maximizing the value of appreciation. I am not denying any privilege of the author of an artwork in this model. As the first critic of her own artwork, the author can offer strategies that can guide subsequent appreciative responses. The author is, of course, the agent with the earliest access to her artwork, and the one who can suggest framing in the most salient way. Framing by the author can be the focal point that guides subsequent framing. Movements and genres that had artists who were self-reflexive about rules and had a theorist temperament, specifically Surrealism and the Nouvelle Vague, could, in this sense, be said to have formed rules-in-equilibrium from the self-criticism of the artists themselves.

This could provide yet another error theory for intentionalism about active genres. In a sense, the author is indeed in a privileged position in determining the active genre of an individual artwork.

In the framing game, the author is a particularly influential agent. However, to think that this means that the author's intentions ground (even partially) the active genre is to confuse a causal relation with a metaphysical relation of determination. A group of agents could have arrived at the same equilibrium without any statement of intention by the author, or they could have arrived at a different equilibrium, ignoring any statement of intention by the author. An active genre is grounded on the equilibrium of a framing game, not on a particular state of mind possessed by the author.

If the above discussion is sound, then the following analysis is given for an active genre as rules in which it is appropriate to appreciate a certain artwork.

Institutional Approach to Active Genres

For a group of agents *G* at time *t*, category *C** is an active genre of an artwork *x* if and only if the strategy of appreciating *x* according to *C** is an equilibrium for the coordination problem of maximizing the value of appreciation that *G* in *t* addresses.

4.4 Some Clarifications

4.4.1 Comparison with the Institutional Account of Art

A clarification may be in order as to the relationship between the so-called institutional account of art[69] and the institutional approach to active genres that I am developing in this chapter. I believe the two are not entirely unrelated, but equally they do not overlap much, either in the explanatory task or in the explicans to be referred to.

One commonality worth articulating is that neither of them, under the label of institutional account, is calling for formal conversation such as a council, nor are they calling for someone in a privileged position such as a judge. Obviously, whatever are the appropriate rules or the status of artworks, there are no such people making decisions in such a place and making us obey them. An

[69] See Dickie (1974); (1984); Davies (2004); Abell (2012). Danto's (1964) ideas had a major influence on the establishment of the institutional account, but he himself has repeatedly criticized Dickie's institutional account.

institution is a kind of system that serves as a foundation for various social interactions, and we must be careful not to mistake this analogy as directed towards formal institutions such as governments.

One important difference is that the institutional account of art is concerned with elucidating the state of affairs of an item being a work of art, i.e., the definition of the artwork. While the essentialist definition of a work of art was heavily criticized by Weitz (1956) and Kennick (1958), Mandelbaum (1965) suggested an approach that defines a work of art by its non-exhibited, relational properties. The institutional definition by Dickie (1974), in particular, clearly undertook this comeback. However, I am not concerned with the status of being an artwork as such. My explanatory task is to elucidate active genres and the state of affairs in which sets of rules of behavior are accepted in the artworld. An account according to which the status of items as art is institutionally given is not the same as the account according to which the way we respond is institutionally regulated. Even if an anti-institutional definition of artwork is successfully defended, that would not undermine an institutional approach to active genres.

A second difference is that the concept of institutions that institutional definitions of artworks use is often informal (Buekens and Smit 2018). In contrast, the conception of institutions I take up explicitly follows the account by Guala (2016) and refers to the rules-in-equilibrium for strategic games. Danto (1964) did not provide any clear explanation of the artworld (the theoretical atmosphere that makes artworks artworks). Dickie's theory (1974a; 1984) is frequently misunderstood and (in my opinion) often unfairly attacked, due in part to his failure to offer a general explanation of what it means to be institutional.

Institutional definitions of art have only begun to be assessed more formally in recent years. Buekens and Smit (2018: 57) and Xhignesse (2020: 477–8) have developed arguments that are worth considering in light of my approach. According to them, it is inappropriate to regard the practice of art production as a coordination game. They agree that agents engage in art-related coordination games on various occasions, such as exhibitions, collections, and research. However, they argue that there are no specific tasks that are constitutive for art production, an activity that is directly relevant to the status

of artwork. Therefore, Buekens and Smit conclude, institutional definitions of artwork fail as long as institutions are formally understood as equilibrium solutions to coordination games. As an alternative approach, Xhignesse (2020: 477–8) takes the more naturalistic concept of convention by Millikan (1984), instead of Lewis's (1969) concept of convention, which is committed to the existence of such coordination games. Kubala (forthcoming) also concludes that the more promising candidate is not institutionalism but a (Millikanian) conventionalism, which more broadly acknowledges the arbitrariness of art.

Again, however, the failure of the institutional account to adequately define artworks as such does not threaten the institutional approach to active genres. My concern is not with art production, but with art appreciation and art criticism. Neither Xhignesse nor Buekens and Smit have shown that there is no coordination game involved in appreciation and criticism. In fact, they acknowledge that the artworld includes a variety of coordination games, and it is sufficient for me to state that one of these games is the practice of framing. Next, let me defend this.

4.4.2 Maximizing the Value of Appreciation

What I have placed at the center of the framing practice is the strategic game of maximizing the value of appreciation. As I have already mentioned, this game can be represented as various payoff matrices, depending on the two incentives. In what I consider the standard situation, agents are moderately selfish and sufficiently sensitive to each other's choices. In a community composed of such agents, the framing game becomes a coordination game analogous to the game of choosing lanes or the battle of the sexes.

It is not difficult to understand that there is a selfish side to the agents of the artworld. As an appreciator, I expect artworks to provide me with an appreciative experience that is maximally valuable to me, and I mobilize all my faculties and knowledge for a valuable appreciation. I showed in Chapter 2 that appreciation is pluralistic. It follows naturally from this that the value of appreciation is pluralistic. There are obviously differences among individuals as to which valuable experiences they prioritize more.

Having said this, it would be a mistake to understand the value of the appreciative experience in a unitary way, simply as a degree of pleasure. Recall our discussion in Chapter 2: there are examples of artworks that give us a terribly unpleasant experience that cannot be adequately covered by the label of "pleasure." Michael Haneke's films upset us with unreasonable violence, and Lars von Trier's films upset us with relentless pessimism. However, I argued that these artworks also have non-aesthetic artistic value, suggesting that they afford a valuable, if not pleasurable, experience. One of the most likely candidates would be the cognitive value of making us understand those particular discomforts. The viewer needs to be maximally uncomfortable in order to engage in appreciation that maximizes this value. For these artworks, that is a more valuable appreciative experience. However, it is hard to deny that some agents are completely indifferent to this cognitive value. After all, there is no uniform weighting regarding the various values of art appreciation. Thus, we have the first, self-serving incentive to frame artworks.

I believe it is similarly not difficult to understand that there is an altruistic aspect to the agents of the artworld. The picture I give concerning the practice of art is influenced by the picture given by Adam Smith (1759) concerning moral practice:

> How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. (The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 1.1)

According to Smith, humans are selfish, but they are also sensitive to the choices and feelings of others and to how their choices are evaluated by others. My conscience monitors my choices as an impartial spectator within, and if I make too selfish a choice, I will be mentally kicked. If Smith is correct, human temperament in society is generally like this, and I see no reason to think that the artworld or the scenes of framing games are the exception.[70]

[70] Thus, I also feel some hesitation in saying, as Buekens and Smit (2018: 57) and Xhignesse (2020: 477–8) do, that art production is not a coordination game.

Moreover, Smith's moral theory also presents a useful idea for an institutional approach in the following respect. According to Smith, it is the human capacity for empathy that makes possible the interaction of agents with conflicting incentives. Empathy allows us to replicate the mental states of others and to take their preferences and possible choices into account in our own choices.

Similar ideas were also addressed by Guala (2016: Chap. 7) regarding mind-reading abilities across agents. Achieving coordination requires prediction and trust. However, the necessary mutual expectations can easily fall into infinite regress, such as, in order for me to make a certain choice, I need to believe that you believe that I believe that you will make a certain choice, and so on. It is not plausible to model that agents make theoretical inferences from sufficient assumptions to form accurate predictions. As an alternative, Guala (2016: 96–7) draws on the model of *solution thinking* from Adam Morton (2003). By default, we establish mutual expectations by projecting our own reasoning onto other players. When I think that a solution is the obvious solution to the game, I assume that you also think it is the obvious solution to the game. In most cases, simulation provides the necessary foundation for interaction, preventing the infinite regress of beliefs. In my interpretation, the faculty of empathy in Smith plays a similar role. We have a cognitive schema to guide our coordination game to a solution.

If the above points are on the right track, the agents participating in the framing game are not so selfish that there is no chance of coordination, nor so altruistic that no problems arise, nor do they lack the cognitive schema to solve the problems. We mutually propose, persuade, and empathize with each other to determine the active genres for individual artworks.

4.4.3 The Relationship between Established Genres and Active Genres

The relationship between established and active genres will require further explanation. In the previous chapter, I theorized about what makes a set of rules a genre, i.e., about the base fact that anchors a certain cluster of regulative rules to a community. I offered a view that leans toward anchor pluralism in examining Abell (2015), who considers common knowledge of purpose to be the anchoring fact. The implication is that a cluster of regulative rules can be anchored by the stability of

behavior in accordance with the rules, independent of agents' beliefs and knowledge. In other words, a set of rules can be an established genre because the rules representing that "If any given artwork *x* has property *F*, make an appreciative response *R*" is in equilibrium. If one takes anchor pluralism, this is a sufficient but not a necessary condition. The acceptance of a set of rules in collective belief, without the behavior according to the rules being in equilibrium, is also a candidate for an anchoring fact. Pluralists do not deny this possibility, but for simplicity's sake let us assume that the necessary and sufficient fact to anchor a genre is an equilibrium of behavior. The fact that a community has an equilibrium of behavior that considers the visual mundaneness of a given artwork to be provocative sets up the genre of readymade in that community.

Readers might be confused as the above explanation of established genres is very similar to the explanation of active genres. I have not explained the same phenomenon twice: what I am theorizing in this chapter is the base fact that makes a set of rules an active genre for an individual artwork. I am arguing that a rule constitutes an active genre for an individual artwork by virtue of the fact that the behavior following that rule is in equilibrium. Note that it is the individual equilibrium concerning an individual artwork that I consider to be the basis of an active genre. The fact that the behavior to regard the visual mundaneness of *Fountain* as provocative is in equilibrium in a certain community makes the rule of the readymade an active genre for *Fountain*. Active genres are logically prior to established genres in the sense that individual regulative rules, framings, and equilibria are prior to general ones. The active genre for *Fountain* is established when the behavior that considers the visual mundaneness *of Fountain* to be provocative reaches equilibrium. The rules of readymade is set up as a genre in virtue of this fact about *Fountain, plus* the fact that the visual mundaneness of many other works is also considered to be provocative, specifically the same framing is in equilibrium concerning *Comb*, *Bottle Rack* (1914), and *In Advance of the Broken Arm* (1915). For only then is the behavior of considering the visual mundaneness of *any given artwork* as provocative in equilibrium, and the fact that anchors a genre is established. An established genre arises from the existence of (usually multiple) active genres.

An established genre is a general institution with respect to any given artwork, while an active genre is an individual institution with respect to a specific individual artwork. By analogy, a monetary institution in which economic activity is conducted using any item that meets certain conditions logically presupposes a monetary institution in a more individual sense, in which specific economic activity is conducted using this paper or that coin that meets those conditions. I am part of an equilibrium in which I drive in the left lane on Meguro-dori Avenue, and I am also part of an equilibrium in which I generally drive in the left lane on roads in Japan.

Thus, the fact that readymades do not yet exist within the repertoire of established genres in a given community at a given time does not prevent a particular framing of *Fountain* from being appropriate. It is not the case that readymades are an active genre of *Fountain* because they are, first of all, an established genre and also because they are rules-in-equilibrium with respect to *Fountain*. In other words, my explanation does *not* take the following form.

> For a group of agents *G* at time *t*, category *C** is an active genre of an artwork *x* if and only if *C** *is an established genre for G at t, and* the strategy of appreciating *x* according to *C** is an equilibrium for the coordination problem of maximizing the value of appreciation that *G* in *t* addresses.

Active genres are considered here to be subsets of established genres, which misunderstands the logical order of the two concepts. Before a pattern of behavior that can regard any visual mundaneness of any given artwork as provocative can be stable, there must be stability of behavior regarding the visual mundaneness of *Fountain* or *Comb* as provocative. The existence of a number of individual equilibria grounds the existence of a general equilibrium. First, there are some active genres, and *by virtue of them*, there are established genres.

The invention of genres is intelligible because active genres are prior to established genres. Of course, in many cases, the choice of active genres is based on and picked up from the repertoire of established genres. Whether or not *Fountain* should be seen as a sculpture is a matter of whether or not it should be seen under a certain established genre. However, it may be an artwork that offers a

more valuable appreciation when seen under a new framing, one that has not yet been generally established. It is because of this realization and many fortunate coincidences that we have acquired the readymade as an active genre for *Fountain* and also the readymade as an established genre in general.

4.5 Implications and Further Developments

4.5.1 Weeding Out and Coexistence

It might be objected that I have attributed too uniform a preference or disposition to the agents of the artworld. According to this objector, the agents of the artworld are not a group of people who work toward coordination and equilibrium, but conflict daily on many issues and are motivated to constantly deviate from the existing ways of doing things. The selfish and altruistic agents that I assume are only a small part, if any, of the group, and a much larger part are agents who are far more selfish and, therefore, able to transcend existing institutions, rules, and values. This is what it means to be avant-garde, so this objection may go.

I believe that this picture of agents is greatly exaggerated. The fact that there is far more agreement than conflict over framing suggests that we have an incentive to agree and converge rather than continue to confront and diverge. An artworld where no one cares about the rules and just continues to appreciate and adopt as different a way of doing things as possible is no less miserable than an artworld where everyone converges on just one way of doing things. Fortunately, the real artworld has not and is not likely to ever be in a state of complete uniformity or a complete war of all against all. This is because we have the appropriate balance of incentives to act egocentrically and altruistically.

Nevertheless, this imagined objector would be correct that I have oversimplified the issue. It is true that depending on the balance between the two incentives, an active genre may not be easily established. This would happen when an individual's incentive to frame selfishly is much greater than the incentive to align their framing with other players. By analogy, if, in deciding where to go, both players are willing to prioritize their own preferences over the realization of a date, the only

equilibrium is to give up the date. Extending the game by adding a strategy of participating in a coin toss does not change the uniqueness of the equilibrium (Table 12).

	Go to A	Go to B	If heads, then go to A If tails, then go to B
Go to A	6, 2	3, 3	$\frac{9}{2}, \frac{5}{2}$
Go to B	0, 0	2, 6	1, 3
If heads, then go to A If tails, then go to B	3, 1	$\frac{5}{2}, \frac{9}{2}$	4, 4

Table 12

Here, the couple is in the so-called prisoner's dilemma. Despite the fact that the strategy of participating in the coin toss is superior in terms of payoffs, the players cannot help behaving selfishly. There is only one dominant but inefficient equilibrium in the prisoner's dilemma. This is not a coordination game, since the problem of choosing among multiple equilibria does not arise. In the classic example given by the name, the prisoners have the option of remaining silent or confessing, and the option of both remaining silent is efficient but not an equilibrium. The risk of letting the opponent confess is extremely high, and in any case, confessing improves one's own payoff. Thus, the prisoners are unable to arrive at the mutually optimal strategy combination of keeping silent together, and end up in an equilibrium where both sides confess (Table 13).

	Remain silent	Confess
Remain silent	2, 2	0, 3
Confess	3, 0	1, 1

Table 13

Similarly, a framing game involving self-interested appreciators might present such a dilemma. However, the possibility of such a dilemma is not so pessimistic. As a framing game, it just means that a collectively satisfactory framing has not yet been found, and that arbitrary framings are being tried—such a situation is common. As mentioned above, the framing game can be solved by

finding a better equilibrium through trial and error. What results is a kind of reflective equilibrium (Carroll 2009: 101). Even if an undesirable interpretation or evaluation is made, the features and facts of the artwork that are not in harmony with it do not disappear. This encourages re-framing and moves toward better framing. We do not determine active genres through a coin toss. Trial and error involves complex negotiation, which also modifies the payoff for each agent.

In preparation for a further objection that my picture is too optimistic, let me present a slightly more complex model here. In a given community, the preferences of agents are divided into two types, Type 1 and Type 2. Type 1 agents find the visual mundaneness of *Comb* to be provocative, and in doing so, they have a more valuable appreciative experience. Type 2 agents, on the other hand, see its visual mundaneness as simply boring. Adopting the same framing as Type 1 agents is unlikely to further enhance the value of appreciation that Type 2 agents experience. On the contrary, to a Type 2 agent, framing A seems a terribly snobbish and even irritating approach. The payoff matrix is shown in Table 14.

	Framing A	Framing B
Framing A	3, 1	0, 0
Framing B	0, 0	1, 2

Table 14

In such a case, there does not seem to be a very realistic path for a third framing that satisfies both and leads to a correlated equilibrium. A more realistic solution might be that one type is weeded out. Now, let x be the proportion of Type 1 agents who chose framing A, and let $(1 - x)$ be the proportion of those who chose framing B. Similarly, let y be the proportion of agents of Type 2 who choose framing A, and let $(1 - y)$ be the proportion of those who choose framing B ($0 \leq x \leq 1,\ 0 \leq y \leq 1$). The expected payoff for a randomly selected agent of a certain type choosing a certain framing is calculated as follows:

For a Type 1 agent to choose framing A:

$$3 \times y + 0 \times (1 - y) = 3y$$

For a Type 1 agent to choose framing B:

$$0 \times y + 1 \times (1 - y) = 1 - y$$

For a Type 2 agent to choose framing A:

$$1 \times x + 0 \times (1 - x) = x$$

For a Type 2 agent to choose framing B:

$$0 \times x + 2 \times (1 - x) = 2 - 2x$$

When the game is played repeatedly, which framing a randomly selected agent chooses is sensitive to the proportion of framings already chosen in the opponent population. A Type 1 agent will choose framing A when $3y > 1 - y$, i.e., when the ratio of Type 2 agents choosing framing A is greater than $\frac{1}{4}$, and will choose framing B when the ratio is less than $\frac{1}{4}$. This is because the player, by assumption, will always choose the strategy with the higher expected payoff whenever possible. Similarly, a Type 2 agent will choose framing A when $x > 2 - 2x$, i.e., when the proportion of Type 1 agents choosing framing A is greater than $\frac{2}{3}$, and will choose framing B when the proportion is less than $\frac{2}{3}$. What this shows is that given a constant ratio of *x* and *y*, a randomly selected agent will choose a strategy using her type and the given ratio as considerations, and this choice will modify the ratio of *x* and *y*. Let us assume the following five initial conditions for the ratio.

(1) More than $\frac{2}{3}$ of Type 1 and more than $\frac{1}{4}$ of Type 2 agents choose framing A.

(2) Less than $\frac{2}{3}$ of Type 1 and less than $\frac{1}{4}$ of Type 2 agents choose framing A.

(3) Less than $\frac{2}{3}$ of Type 1 and more than $\frac{1}{4}$ of Type 2 agents choose framing A.

(4) More than $\frac{2}{3}$ of Type 1 and less than $\frac{1}{4}$ of Type 2 agents choose framing A.

(5) Approximately $\frac{2}{3}$ of Type 1 and approximately $\frac{1}{4}$ of Type 2 agents choose framing A.

In case (1), a randomly selected agent, regardless of one's own type, can expect a higher payoff by choosing framing A. The choice will further increase the proportion of agents choosing framing A in the group. Thus, as the game is played repeatedly, an equilibrium is eventually reached where both

types of agents choose framing A. If the initial condition of the ratio is (2), the repeated game will reach an equilibrium in which everyone chooses framing B. The equilibrium of a rule is not necessarily reached by some agreements, but can also be reached by weeding out one side over time in this way.

Such dynamics have been discussed in evolutionary game theory. To explain the mechanism of natural selection, John Maynard Smith and George R. Price (1973) introduced the concept of *evolutionarily stable strategy*. When a game is played repeatedly and reaches one of the above equilibria through selection, the strategy employed there is evolutionarily stable. That is, even if a few more mutant players emerge who choose competing strategies, mutant strategies will not proliferate because the selection mechanism will bring the game back to a steady state again.

A further, more interesting solution can be seen in another equilibrium in the game described above. Case (5), in which $\frac{2}{3}$ of the Type 1 agents choose framing A and the rest choose framing B, and $\frac{1}{4}$ of the Type 2 agents choose framing A and the rest choose framing B, is also a possible equilibrium for the game, employing *mixed strategies*. If the initial conditions for the ratios are (3) or (4), the choice in the group approaches this mixed strategy equilibrium. Once again, if there is a slight bias toward (3) or (4), the ratio is pulled back toward (5). In my interpretation, the existence of an equilibrium with such a mixed strategy indicates that for a given group of agents at a given point in time, there can be multiple competing active genres for a given individual artwork. This is a situation where agents who consider each of the two genres to be normative are segregated in a particular proportion. The institutional approach allows for there to be multiple competing active genres. The framing of Henry James's *Turn of the Screw* (1898) is an example of such segregation. Framing this story as a ghost story and framing it as a psychoanalytic novel, with their competing interpretations

and evaluations, are supported to the same degree, and neither can be said to be simply wrong insofar as they form a mixed strategy equilibrium.[71]

However, equilibria with mixed strategies are not evolutionarily stable. This is because they have the power to pull back from a bias toward (3) or (4) to an equilibrium of (5), but are powerless against a bias toward (1) or (2). As noted earlier, the increase in the number of agents choosing framing A regardless of type in case (1) and the increase in the number of agents choosing framing B regardless of type in case (2) will bring them closer to their respective equilibria. When a community includes agents of fundamentally different types, equilibria by segregation are always accompanied by the possibility that the community will drift to one side or the other. To avoid uniformity, the community will need to maintain an appropriate ratio.

4.5.2 Reforming Genres

Not all institutions are the best, and some rules-in-equilibrium are morally, aesthetically, and epistemologically better or worse than others. We may just not be aware of better strategies, or we may be aware of them but be prevented from transitioning by the current equilibrium. The rule of keeping one side of an escalator open for users who walk up is apparently not a good rule, given the risk of accidents. However, once a rule has reached equilibrium, it is often not easy to change. Even if the railway companies set new official rules and announce them over and over again (as they do in Tokyo), we still follow the rules that are currently in equilibrium. Agents may also have difficulty breaking out of an equilibrium due to a lack of information or echo chambers (Nguyen 2020).

Similarly, not every active genre is the best. Here, one might worry that once an active genre becomes established, it cannot be easily changed, even if it involves sexism, racism, or cultural appropriation. To consider the representation of the bucktooth Japanese man in the film version of

[71] Even the fact that the author declares in the preface that it is a ghost story is not a consideration that ultimately settles the matter. For discussions on the case of *Turn of the Screw*, see Carroll (2009: 177–8); Kubala (2019: 509).

Breakfast at Tiffany's (1961) as funny is not a good framing, even if it was at some point a framing in equilibrium.

This concern is legitimate. However, it is not my task to evaluate whether the accepted framing of a particular artwork at a given point in time is good framing. My task is to elucidate a mechanism, not to comment on its particular output. Evaluating an institution from each point of view is a task left to each domain. The institutional approach is neutral about the value of individual institutions, except for one consideration (Guala 2016: 5, 78). That, too, is no more than that an equilibrium framing is a good framing since that is favorable to the task of maximizing the value of appreciation. What we have here is simple instrumental reasoning.

(1) An agent wants to maximize the value of appreciation.

(2) Some framing is favorable to the task of maximizing the value of appreciation.

(3) That agent has a *pro tanto* reason for choosing that framing.

The conclusion (3) is a paraphrase of the fact that the framing is *pro tanto* good for that agent. These claims are compatible with any moral, aesthetic, or epistemological criticism of a particular framing. As we noted when examining intentionalism, there are plenty of considerations that make a given framing a good framing. Those considerations may be *pro tanto* reasons not to do that framing and may modify the agent's payoff. Thus, we should not expect active genres to have hard normativity, such as obligations.[72] Following Dancy's (2021: Chap. 18) distinction, beliefs about active genres are enticing reasons, but not peremptory reasons.

Putting aside such further values and normativity, let us now answer a simpler question. Can an active genre as an institution ever change? What can agents do? The answer is that active genres can change, and agents can do several things. A catalyst for reform is the fact that we are participating in a framing game that is played repeatedly, in which we continuously update our beliefs and desires. Recall the case of a group of agents of different Types 1 and 2 interacting with each other (Table 14).

[72] See King (2018); Dyck (2021).

	Framing A	Framing B
Framing A	3, 1	0, 0
Framing B	0, 0	1, 2

Table 14

The possible equilibria of this game include two evolutionarily stable equilibria, one with convergence in framing A and one with convergence in framing B, and one evolutionarily unstable equilibrium with segregation through mixed strategy. We have already seen that in the case of segregation, when there is a significant bias toward one of the two other equilibria, there can be a sudden shift toward them. The question is whether a shift from the first case to the second case or vice versa is possible, and in particular, whether it can be artificially induced.

The changes in which agents rush from one equilibrium into another across a turning point are discussed by Guala (2016: 128) as *informational cascades*, adopting Schelling's (1978) model.

> [S]uch an abrupt change can be brought about only by an external shock. It may be a new piece of information, for example the report of a rating agency saying that the bank has falsified its accounts. (Notice: the report need not be true-it is sufficient that it is believed to be true.) But a declaration of war, or a sudden political crisis may have the same effect. The common feature of such events is that everyone has to form very quickly new beliefs about the behavior of others, in unusual circumstances that they have never faced before. There is a lot of uncertainty, and people may go for the option that seems safest—to withdraw their savings for example—or simply copy the behavior of others. (Guala 2016: 128)

Institutions are vulnerable to external shocks, even if they are rules-in-equilibrium. Hearsay, whether true or false, affects players' beliefs, and even more so when its sender is an influential group or person. Such vulnerability may seem to be a bad aspect of institutions in general, but it is not. They can be the catalyst for a shift from an inferior equilibrium to a superior one. Reformists will be driven to despair if institutions have no vulnerability.

Similarly, such an informational cascade can occur in the framing game. If, in a community that is already in equilibrium in framing A, an administrator emerges who is extremely displeased with avant-garde art, agents will seriously consider whether it does them any good to continue to treat *Comb* the way they do now. Even if the shock is not as intense as this, the causal factors for an equilibrium shift are all over the place. Conversely, suppose an influential critic publishes a criticism in defense of *Comb* in a community where most agents are Type 2 and are not interested in *Comb*. To other agents, the criticism appears to be a salient example of framing A. There, the visual mundaneness is positively valued; it describes how provocative the work is, showing the traditions that preceded the artwork and its prospects. Such information can significantly alter agents' preferences. In light of the task of maximizing the value of appreciation, let us express the fact that framing A appears as a more attractive strategy and framing B as less attractive as follows (Table 15), setting a variable α ($0 < \alpha \leq 1$).

	Framing A	Framing B
Framing A	$3 + \alpha,\ 1$	$0,\ 0$
Framing B	$0,\ 0$	$1 - \alpha,\ 2$

Table 15

The implications of this change are clear if we compute the expected payoff for the Type 1 agent.

For a Type 1 agent to choose framing A:

$$(3 + \alpha) \times y + 0 \times (1 - y) = 3y + \alpha y$$

For a Type 1 agent to choose framing B:

$$0 \times y + (1 - \alpha) \times (1 - y) = \alpha y - \alpha - y + 1$$

A randomly selected agent of Type 1 chooses framing A when $3y + \alpha y > \alpha y - \alpha - y + 1$, i.e., when the ratio of Type 2 agent who is choosing framing A accounts is greater than $\frac{(1-\alpha)}{4}$. Let us compare this with the situation before the criticism was published. In the absence of α, she would have chosen framing A if the Type 2 agent choosing framing A occupied a proportion greater than $\frac{1}{4}$. That is, now, the Type 1 agent became more likely to choose framing A even when the proportion of

Type 2 agents choosing framing A was lower. In other words, the presentation of the criticisms reduced the distance between the turning point of equilibria and the current equilibrium, which converges in framing B. For simplicity, I assume here only the effect of criticism on Type 1 agents, but the preferences of Type 2 agents can be modified in the same way. Simply put, the activities of a critic have made it easier for the community to reach an equilibrium shift.

The artworld is full of agents, not just critics, who are trying to influence people's preferences in this way, shift turning points, and promote equilibrium shifts. Within a community, anyone can be a game changer in the framing game. Thus, even if active genres are analyzed as rules-in-equilibrium, we should not assume that what they give us is a rigid picture of the artworld. The institutional approach contains a wealth of tools to capture the dynamics of the reformation of active genres.

4.5.3 Role of Critics

When it comes to criticism, intentionalism about active genres supports a very strong objectivism in the following way. When critic facilitates a certain response *R* on the basis of a feature *F* of artwork *x*, the reasoning contained in such a guide, "If *F*, then *R*," is part of genre *C**, and the appropriateness of applying that rule to the artwork at hand is guaranteed by the author's intending *C**. The fact that this reasoning is given in the background of the rule as intended by the author guarantees that the attribution of meaning or value by the critic is correct. When critics disagree, according to this picture, it is usually because one side simply misunderstands the author's intention.

However, I have banished "correctness" from the practice of framing in the first section. The matter of which rule is good for viewing an artwork is not a matter of which one is ultimately correct in light of some fact, including the author's categorical intention. Thus, categorical intention is no longer a guarantee of objective criticism. The idea that the critic can make the *correct* judgment with the appropriate evidence and appropriate reasoning, as the intentionalists believe, is not, in my opinion, in line with the practice of criticism, nor is it attractive.

What the institutional approach to active genres supports is a very weak objectivism. A critic can apply certain rules to an artwork because they are already rules-in-equilibrium. The fact that

Comb is framed as readymade and attributed provocativeness because of its visual mundaneness, and that it is the behavior in equilibrium in the community, justifies critics behaving in the same way to that extent. This is because what we are addressing is the problem of maximizing the value of appreciation, and the framing is an equilibrium solution to this problem. The critic's judgment that *Comb* is provocative because it is visually mundane is more appropriate for the artwork in comparison to a judgment made in reference to arbitrary rules that are not in equilibrium. However, it is a very tentative appropriateness based on a very contingent foundation.

The more interesting and rewarding work for critics is to invent a new genre and to propose to frame an existing or new artwork within it. The thesis I defended in Chapter 2, that criticism is a guide to appreciation, will hopefully sound richer now. The job of critics is not merely to make us notice features of an artwork to be noticed, recognize reasons to be recognized, and make responses to be made, all within the range framed by the author. It is also the job of critics to discover undiscovered equilibrium solutions and to expand the repertoire of possible appreciations in light of our task of maximizing the value of appreciation.

A more modest but important task for critics is to articulate the rules of genres and, in some cases, to name them. During the institutionalizing phase and the institutionalized phase, genres are named conceptual art, Magic Realism, splatter film, rap music, and so on. However, in practice, we can do without genre names. Active genres are rules-in-equilibrium, and what is important to their compliance is (1) not to mistake the rules to be grasped and (2) not to misunderstand what the rules are (Lopes 2018: 133–5). Conversely, it is not necessary to know the name of the rule as long as you can recognize what to do in what situation. Rules-in-equilibrium do not necessarily have names, like the etiquette of standing to one side when using an escalator. Still, we can form equilibrium by being taught the rules or by simply observing those who already follow them. The same is true for framing practices. Jan Švankmajer's artwork is authentic when seen in the category of evoking disgust through vulgar eating scenes. When viewed in such a category, we discover and admire the artwork's clever arrangement of sticky chewing sounds, half-eaten food, disfigured faces, and filthy floors and tables,

and we appreciate the artwork better. No proper name of the genre is necessary for this kind of framing.

However, being unnecessary does not mean that it is useless. Clearly, having a summary name is a shortcut in thought and communication, and extremely advantageous in reflection and modification. Genre names make the cluster of rules we implicitly accept more clear and manageable. Without the elegant genre name "*readymade*," we would have had a much harder time dealing with artworks like *Fountain* and *Comb*. The name of Vaporwave, evoking vaporware (products announced to be published but canceled), sums up the emptiness of the music and allows the genre to become the subject of more complex thought. For these public benefits, giving a genre name to informally accepted rules and outlining them will be an important task for critics to undertake.

Summary

In the previous chapter, I showed that a genre is a cluster of regulative rules, such as "If it is visually mundane, regard it as provocative," which are set up in a certain community at a certain point in time. What did this chapter reveal? It is that the appropriateness of applying the rule "If it is visually mundane, regard it as provocative" to *Comb* is not grounded on the fact that the author intended it, but on the fact that such a framing of *Comb* is in equilibrium in the relevant community. An active genre is an institution in the sense of being rules-in-equilibrium.

The question concerning the appropriateness of a certain framing for an artwork has often been confused with a fact-based question concerning the category to which it actually belongs. I have shown that they are interrelated but fundamentally different issues, and I set the former as the explanatory task for this chapter. The view that appropriate framing is fully determined by the author's intention is indefensible, and even the more moderate view that it must, at least in part, be intended by the author is problematic, too. The actual practice of genre is quite distant from what would be predicted by intentionalism. Instead of theoretically rejecting many fascinating anti-intentionalist framings, I have attempted to describe the mechanisms by which they are established.

I have relied heavily on the framework of game theory, in particular, Guala's (2016) theory of institutions. In framing games, where the shared task is to maximize the value of appreciation, agents are torn between the incentive to choose selfishly and the incentive to tune in to the choices made by others. I do not want to be alone in finding the visual mundaneness of *Comb* provocative; I want my choice to be approved of by others, and I want them to make that choice as well. Interaction may make us aware of better framing, it may weed out some framing, or it may allow multiple framings to coexist. Analogizing active genres to institutions has many advantages in the task of understanding their dynamics.

5 Fiction as a Genre

In the course of this dissertation, we have touched on many different genres as examples. The main purpose has been to illuminate what I have called "genre practice"—what we do when we ascribe genres to works of art, and in particular how that practice relates to the appreciation and criticism of art. The purpose of this chapter is to show how the institutional approach to genre that I advocate can illuminate other philosophical issues. I will primarily focus on problems concerning appreciating *fiction*.[73]

Though we normally talk about genres of fiction, Friend (2012) has argued that fiction itself is a genre. I agree and believe that viewing fiction this way gives us a better approach to problems in how works of fiction are appreciated and criticized.[74] What does it mean for a work of fiction to be appreciated *qua fiction*? To clarify the unique considerations at work here is to clarify the rules of fiction as a genre.

Philosophy of fiction has important commonalities with the philosophy of criticism in that it takes literary artworks and their corresponding appreciative responses as significant samples. Nevertheless, the philosophy of fiction is not by any means a subfield contained within the philosophy

[73] "Sherlock Holmes lives at 221B Baker Street," generated by Conan Doyle, is a *text of fiction*. Philosophy of fiction has developed as a field that takes as its central target of inquiry the nature of such texts, as distinguished from everyday assertion or description, as well as a variety of other topics related to fiction. See Stecker (2010: Chap. 8); Davies (2013b); Kroon and Voltolini (2019) for general introductions to the philosophy of fiction.

[74] Friend's conception of genre and mine, however, are quite different in that Friend adopts the genres-as-features account, which I reject. By the statement that "fiction is a genre," Friend means that fiction cannot be understood as a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, but is characterized by more permissive clusters of standard features. I mean, on the other hand, that fiction is a cluster of valid rules that regulate appreciation and criticism in a characteristic way. Still, we agree that the genre of a work is relevant to its appreciation, and fiction is one of the genres.

of criticism. Fiction can be found outside the artworld, and artworks are not exclusively fiction. The questions involved are largely metaphysical, epistemological, and psychological.[75] The philosophy of fiction is an interdisciplinary field involving philosophy of language and philosophy of mind, cognitive science, linguistics, and also, as merely one strand of research, philosophy of art and criticism.

However, two recently published monographs, Stock (2017) and Abell (2020), demonstrate that the epistemology of fiction and the debate over the critical interpretation of artworks are of very close interest. The cognitive activity of identifying the semantic contents of works of fiction can be better understood by reference to the general discussion of the cognitive activity of identifying the semantic contents of works of art. In turn, those theories of fiction can also be read as philosophies of criticism that offer new ideas about interpretation in general.

In particular, Catharine Abell's *Fiction: A Philosophical Analysis* (2020) is closely related to my institutional approach. This book is an ambitious attempt to provide a unified answer to the broader questions surrounding fiction, and at its core is an institutional approach similar to the one I have presented above regarding genres. According to Abell, fiction practices are set up with numerous content-determining rules, by which the understanding of works of fiction is regulated. The picture that appreciative responses are mediated by institutions is broadly the same picture that my institutional approach gives. However, there are also important differences, and the main task of this chapter is to compare Abell's and my institutional approach by clarifying these differences.

In Section 1, I outline Abell's theory of fiction, and in Section 2 I point out some of its problems. Abell's framework posits "communicating imaginings" as a unique and constitutive

[75] Key questions of the philosophy of fiction include the following: What is the element that makes a given fiction fiction and distinguishes it from non-fiction?; What is it for a proposition to be true in fiction (even though it is false in the real world, taken literally)?; What ontological status do fictional characters, items, and places have?; How do we access the contents of fiction? What faculties do we mobilize in doing so?; How can works of fiction evoke real emotions (even though it is obvious that they are not telling us about the real world)?; Can works of fiction give us knowledge about the real world?

coordination problem for fiction, which I will argue is problematic . In Section 3, I will show that my institutional approach to genres, which I have developed in the previous chapters, can provide a better account of the phenomena Abell addresses, and that elements can be found in Abell's theory that might connect her account to my alternative. Concerning fiction practice, Abell's theory has implications not only for the interpretation or understanding of works of fiction, but also for their evaluation. In this respect, it might be said that her institutional approach is more systematic and should be preferred to the alternative I present. In Section 4, however, I respond to this possible objection by showing that the evaluation thesis Abell presents is not consistent with actual practice of evaluating fiction. Finally, I show that a more plausible evaluation thesis for fiction can be derived from Kendall Walton's theory of fiction, and that it is more compatible with my institutional approach to genres.

5.1 Abell's Institutional Approach to Fiction

Before introducing the proposal by Abell, let us briefly review the debates over the meaning and interpretation of artworks and summarize the current situation.[76] The view that the meaning of an artwork is determined by the author's intention has been criticized repeatedly. If the author's mere intention to make a certain text mean a certain thing is enough to establish that meaning, then the word "red" could even mean blue. So, extreme intentionalism is not defensible. However, it is also difficult to deny that the author's intention is an important consideration in some situations of interpretation. Critics do, in fact, often speak of the author's purpose or achievement, and when there are two equally plausible but competing interpretations (for example, over whether a text is ironic or not), it is understandable to be at a loss for how we can settle on anything other than the author's intention. On the other hand, however, the view that the semantic content of an artwork is determined independently of the author's intention has also been criticized repeatedly. If it is up to each individual appreciator to decide what she reads into a text, then there is no interpretation that is true or false,

[76] See Irvin (2006); Lin(2018); Kubala (2019).

acceptable or unacceptable, and any interpretive "disagreement" is not really a disagreement at all. Therefore, extreme anti-intentionalism is also not defensible. However, it is also difficult to deny that in some situations of interpretation, there are crucial considerations that are independent of the author's intention. Anti-intentionalism, as represented by Beardsley (1982a: Chap. 11), argues for semantic contents and interpretation of them independent of intention by appealing to the context in which the text is situated and the conventions established there.

Similar debates have developed over the meaning and interpretation of works of fiction but it is reasonable to say that intentionalism has been more dominant here. According to a popular view, the contents of fiction are grounded on the authors' specific intentions; it is a kind of intention that makes a work of fiction, fiction (e.g., Currie 1990; Lamarque and Olsen 1994; Davies 2007). The most extreme version of intentionalism has recently been presented by Stock (2017). Stock is committed to the view that the contents of fiction are grounded *solely* and *fully* on the authors' specific intentions.

> Extreme (actual author) intentionalism says that authorial intention of a certain sort is both necessary (*has to* be present) for fictional content of a given kind *and* sufficient (its presence is *enough*) for fictional content of that kind. (Stock 2017: 14)

Abel's proposal can be positioned as contrary to this position. With the above view of Stock seemingly in mind, Abell states:

> I am an anti-intentionalist about the contents of fictive utterances, if anti-intentionalism is construed simply as the denial that the contents of fictive utterances are ever determined by authors' intentions that their utterances have certain contents. (Abell 2020: 188)

As we will return to later, in fact, Abell is committed to only a very modest version of anti-intentionalism. It is a rejection of the view that "authors' intentions that their utterances have certain contents" (let us call it the *semantic intention*) are sufficient to ground meanings, i.e., extreme intentionalism; it is not a defense of the view that meanings can be fully grounded without any intention.

How, then, are the contents of works of fiction determined and identified in Abell's view? Abell (2020: 9–10) starts from the asymmetry found between the communication of semantic contents in real utterance and that in works of fiction. In a real utterance, a speaker who communicates content X by a certain type of utterance Z believes that it is X and intends to make the listener believe that X is the case. The listener, inferring the speaker's belief and intention, elicits X from Z. Here, assumptions such as "the speaker must be communicating what she believes" and "what is being communicated must be in accordance with facts in the real world" are used as cues in identifying the content. When it comes to the communication of beliefs in reality, there is little danger of falling into agnosticism by adopting an inference model of intentionalism. We have epistemological strategies to infer the speaker's intentions.[77]

Similarly, in a fictive utterance, the author of the fiction communicating content X by a certain type of utterance Z is imagining X and intends to get the audience to imagine X. However, it is not easy for the audience to elicit X from Z. This is because the epistemological strategies that were available for the real utterances are not available for identifying the contents of fictive utterances. The author may be trying to communicate imaginings that are outlandish and not at all in accordance with the way the real world is. When Conan Doyle writes, "Sherlock Holmes lives at 221B Baker Street," he does not believe that this is the case in reality, and the audience is aware of this. Motivated by this asymmetry, Abell moves toward a rejection of the popular view that the meaning of a work of fiction is determined simply by the author's semantic intention to make us imagine X. Such intentionalism will turn out to be agnostic unless accompanied by a plausible supplementary account of how the receivers access the authors' semantic intention.

Thus, agents in fiction practice are faced with the unique task of *communicating imaginings*. According to Abell, communicating imaginings is a coordination problem, which I addressed in Chapter 4.

[77] See Grice (1989); Sperber and Wilson (1995).

> All forms of communication pose coordination problems. If two agents want to communicate with one another, each wants her own mental representation to resemble that of the other agent. Consequently, how the communicating agent modifies the physical environment of the other in order to get the other agent to construct a mental representation similar to her own depends on what mental state she thinks that agent will construct in response to her modifications. Similarly, what mental state the other [communicated] agent constructs depends on what mental state she thinks prompted the communicating agent to make those modifications. Consequently, all successful communicative practices can be understood as equilibrium solutions to coordination problems. (Abell 2020: 30)

The author wants the audience to imagine a certain content X by a certain type of text Z, and the audience wants to imagine X by seeing or reading Z. In communication, there is a goal to be achieved by multiple agents working together, each agent's decision depends on the decisions of the other agents, and furthermore, there are multiple ways to achieve the goal. Therefore, Abell sees communication in general as a coordination problem. Communicating imaginings in the fiction practice is an instance of this, and is seen as analogous to problems such as which side of the roadway to drive on, where to go on a date, or how to segregate grazing lands.

Again, the difference between the coordination game surrounding real and fictive utterance is that the inference models available in the former are not available in the latter. Therefore, Abell adopts a *code model* instead of the inference model for accessing fictive contents. Abell employs, as I did in the previous chapter, the concept of institution as rules-in-equilibrium by Guala (2016), arguing that the problem of communicating imaginings is mediated and solved by fiction institutions. As in the case of choosing lanes, there are multiple equilibria in coordination games, and the problem of choosing an equilibrium arises. The problem is solved if there is a shared traffic rule that says, "In this country, drive in the right lane," and if each agent follows this rule. Abell's basic idea is that just as there are traffic institutions that regulate lane choice, there are fiction institutions that regulate

imagination. According to Abell, the *content-determining rules* constitutive of a fiction institution take the following form.

If an agent produces an utterance of type Z, imagine X. (Abell 2020: 35)

Let us look at some of the specific examples given. The reader of the sentence "He gave up his heart quite willingly" in a romance is directed to imagine that the person did not literally donate his organs, but that he was sincere in his devotion. Even if a character's lines in a historical drama are written in a contemporary language, we are encouraged to imagine that the character is not speaking literally, but in the language appropriate to the period in which the story is set. A depiction of a scene in realism is to be imagined exactly as it is, down to the smallest detail. The reader is regulated to imagine a certain content, even though there are many alternative imaginings available for the same type of text. Just as traffic laws direct us to drive in different lanes in different regions, there is no single fiction institution, but rather multiple fiction institutions, such as romance, historical drama, realism, and so on. Our imagination, and thus our interpretation of a work of fiction, is regulated by these fiction institutions.

As long as the semantic content of a text is subject to the content-determining rules of the relevant fiction institution, the audience is freed from the epistemologically difficult task of accessing the semantic intentions of the author. We are not inferring without a clue, but decoding based on rules we can rely on. As an author, one can smoothly convey imaginings by following the content-determining rules shared with her audience.

What is unique about fiction institutions? Abell (2020: 35), following Guala (2016: 196), suggests that there is a function that individualizes the type of institution. Each fiction institution addresses the same task of communicating imaginings and shares the function of providing an equilibrium solution to it. Given the fiction institutions (or fiction practices) thus characterized, Abell defines fiction as follows:

A work is fiction if and only if:

1. there is a practice of fiction such that audiences' responses to the series of utterances by which that work was produced are intended to conform to it; and
2. at least one utterance in the series by which it was produced is governed by a content-determining rule that regulates that practice. (Abell 2020: 37)

In a community where there is a fiction institution regulating imagination, all and only those items that are intended to be decoded under that institution (let us call the author's intention an *institution-compliance intention*) and that actually contains a decodable part is, in Abell's definition, fiction. Interestingly, this definition does not allow all items that are intended to communicate some imaginings as works of fiction, nor does it exclude from fiction items that are intended, in part, to communicate true beliefs about the real world. The fact that I imagine the weather tomorrow and ask you to imagine the same content does not by itself constitute fiction, for it does not necessarily follow that there are content-determining rules relevant to decoding or my intention to comply with them. A novel that tells, and is intended to tell, what is true in reality in many parts can also be properly considered a work of fiction if it meets the definition above in other parts. According to Abell (2020: 43), fictionality is not a matter of degree, but a matter of whether or not it was produced with an institution-compliance intention and contains rule-governed parts.

Finally, a little more explanation will be needed as to what exactly are the positions that Abell's institutional approach to fiction is a denial of. The elements that make fiction fiction have been explored in a variety of fields.[78] First, Abell's position, along with many analytic philosophers,[79] rejects the view that there are syntactic features that make fiction fiction. While stylistic features such as free indirect speech have received widespread attention (especially in the field of literary theory) as being salient in works of fiction, it is a leap to assume that fiction and only fiction contains such features. One could list any number of works of fiction that do not include free indirect speech, and

[78] See Kiyozuka (2017).

[79] For example, Searle (1979); Currie (1990); Carroll (1997).

any amount of non-fiction that does include free indirect speech, and the same could be said of any candidate for a syntactic feature. Second, Abell's position, while being a version of the view that it is a specific kind of intention that makes fiction fiction, rejects many of the more popular versions. These include the view that fiction is intended to be a pretense of assertion (Searle 1979) and that it is intended to represent speech-acts (Beardsley 1981). Among others, Abell's clear rival seems to be the view that works of fiction are intended to make us imagine particular contents (e.g., Currie 1990; Lamarque and Olsen 1994; Davies 2007; Stock 2017). In contrast with those views, Abell emphasizes that it is the institution-compliance intention that grounds the fact that an item is a fiction, not the semantic intention to make us imagine a particular content. The novelty of Abell's theory lies in that, by appealing to fiction institutions, there is no need to refer to the semantic intention to prescribe imaginings.

I am deeply sympathetic to Abell's approach of replacing intentionalism with institutionalism, and in fact her model greatly inspired the genres-as-rules-in-equilibrium account I proposed in the preceding chapters. In the next section, however, we will see what differences there are between us.

5.2 Two Institutional Approaches

Abell's theory of fiction and my theory of genre share important insights in that they portray the audience and their responses as directed by rules: in both theories, the appropriate interpretation of an individual artwork is not constrained by the semantic intention of authors, but regulated by the rules that are set up in communities. A particularly important lesson from Abell (2020) is that instead of having one comprehensive fiction institution, we have multiple fiction institutions; instead of being appreciated as fiction, artworks are appreciated under different fiction institutions, such as romance, historical drama, realism, and so on. In this respect, Abell's theory of fiction has a different structure than Friend's (2012), which takes up "fiction as genre" and attempts to identify the unique

considerations involved in appreciating artwork *as fiction*.[80] And the examples Abell takes up as individual fiction institutions are compatible with those I have discussed as examples of genre.

According to my analysis in previous chapters, genres are clusters of regulative rules. I believe the fiction institutions that Abell describes are essentially genres in my sense, as she formalizes the role of genres as follows:

> *If an author utters representation R in the production of a work belonging to genre G, imagine X*. (Abell 2020: 81)

Here, a fact about genre membership qualifies the input part of the content-determining rule; thus, in effect, genres influence the appropriate imaginative responses. Abell incorporates genre as part of the regulative rule, but following the distinction between grounding and anchoring as we discussed in Chapter 3, it seems that the rule should be converted as follows: instead of applying to an artwork whose active genre is G1 the rule that "If an author utters representation R in the production of a work belonging to genre G2, imagine X," one applies to an artwork whose active genres are G1 and G2 the rule that "If an author utters representation R, imagine X." If this conversion makes no substantive difference, it indicates that Abell's fiction institution is, after all, equivalent to my genre. If the genre to which a work belongs changes, the type of text to be picked up as the target of assigning content and the content to be assigned will also change. As I argued in the previous chapter, the issue of genre membership can be obviated by converting it into an issue of framing. Thus, it would not be a distortion to say that Abell is concerned with the appropriateness of genre and framing, exactly as I am, but limits herself to cases relevant only to fiction and imaginative responses. Therefore, let us focus on the more substantive differences as an institutional approach.

[80] As we will see in the later section, however, Abell's (2020: 43-51) theory of the evaluation of fiction can be read as assuming a single fiction as a genre: what is discussed there are considerations for evaluating a work of fiction as fiction, the rules of fiction as a genre.

5.2.1 The Necessity of Institution-compliance Intentions?

As made clear in the passage cited earlier, Abell (2020: 188) is anti-intentionalist only in denying the view "that the contents of fictive utterances are ever determined by authors' intentions that their utterances have certain contents." What is being denied here is only the extreme version of intentionalism that Stock (2017) defends.

Indeed, Abell's theory retains much of its intentionalist aspect. In particular, Abell takes a strongly intentionalist view when it comes to determining which fiction institution to follow. Recall that a regulative rule of fiction institutions is "If an agent produces an utterance of type Z, imagine X." Different fiction institutions have different content-determining rules to follow and, thus, differ in types of utterance Z to be picked up as the target of assigning content, and differ in contents X prescribed to be imagined. Since we are clearly under the regulation of several established fiction institutions, and since the inputs of the rules overlap, the question arises as to which rule is appropriate to apply to any particular work of fiction. This is precisely the question about active genres that I sought to answer in Chapter 4. Abell's answer is as follows:

> An author's [institution-compliance] intention that audiences' responses to the series of utterances by which a work is produced conform to a practice of fiction determines which institution of fiction regulates her fictive utterances and therefore which content-determining rules govern those utterances. However, it does not follow that authors' [semantic] intentions determine the contents of their fictive utterances. (Abell 2020: 60)

This view corresponds to intentionalism about active genres: the rules under which an artwork should be interpreted are determined by the author. Whether "determine" should be read as a full grounding or a partial grounding is not clear, but in any case, the problem with intentionalism about active genres was shown in Chapter 4. Abell's anti-intentionalism is quite modest: once the fiction institution to be followed is determined, what content is assigned to it does not depend on the author's semantic intentions.

However, there is something peculiar about a view that does not recognize a role for semantic intention but does recognize a role for institution-compliance intention. The problem with communicating imaginings stems from the fact that it is difficult for audiences of fiction to infer the authors' intention. If there is an obstacle to inferring semantic intentions, why is it considered easier to infer institution-compliance intentions? The author may intend for the artwork to be appreciated according to the rules of comedy while presenting it in a way that many audiences can only infer that it follows the rules of horror. As Gilmore (2022: 177–8) points out, if we infer the author's institution-compliance intention in order to identify the content-determining rules to follow, it seems almost the same as a model that infers the author's semantic intention from the beginning.

Certainly, Abell's institutional approach leans toward anti-intentionalism in that it allows for cases where semantic intentions fail. However, the only cases where intentions fail are those where one misunderstands a fiction institution but intends to comply with it, and thus, the semantic content is assigned according to the unintended content-determining rules. The more radical case in which an active genre is fully grounded without even an institution-compliance intention is not recognized in Abell's institutional approach. As I not only recognize this possibility, but regard it as a fairly standard case for an active genre, I doubt whether Abell's anti-intentionalism is sufficiently stoic.

Summarizing Abell's theory as anti-intentionalist is also inappropriate in the following respect. The scope of the content-determining rules of fiction institutions is quite limited. It is not argued to be the mechanism by which the whole semantic content of a work of fiction is determined and identified. Abell (2020: 88) distinguishes between (1) *contents of fictive utterances* and (2) *interpretative fictive contents*. These two together constitute the whole fictive content of a work of fiction. In a terminology I have never employed, Abell uses the term *interpreting* to refer only to the access to the latter, distinguishing it from the access to the former, by *understanding*:

> *Understanding* a work of fiction involves grasping the contents of the fictive utterances by which it was produced by appeal to the content-determining rules of a fiction institution. By contrast, *interpreting* it involves relying on one's grasp of the contents of those fictive

utterances together with other background knowledge in order to draw inferences to the best explanation about the intentions with which it was produced. (Abell 2020: 88)

This distinction seems to correspond roughly to the distinction between elucidation and interpretation in Carroll (2009: 108–12). The former covers the identification of explicitly stated matters, depicted objects, simple iconographic referents, and so on, while the latter covers the identification of higher-level contents, such as the theme, message, idea, or concept of an artwork. Abell stipulates the interpretive fictive content as follows:

A work has a certain interpretative fictive content if and only if:

1. its author intended to prompt her audience to imagine that content;
2. she intentionally produced utterances with certain features as an instrumental means of realizing that intention;
3. utterances with those features comprise a means of prompting an audience that lacks independent knowledge of the relevant intention to engage in the intended imagining; and
4. those utterances are not governed by content-determining rules of fiction that prescribe audiences to engage in the intended imagining. (Abell 2020: 111)

Abell acknowledges that there is no general principle that can be employed in identifying interpretive fictive contents and chooses to take a moderate actual intentionalism. As clause 1 indicates, the semantic contents at this level are grounded in the semantic intentions of the author, and the interpreting audience is to trace the author's intentions, taking into account any available evidence. As more comfortable terms, I will refer to them respectively (1) the basic contents and (2) the higher-level contents of works of fiction. Abell's (2020) position is non-intentionalism concerning the basic content and intentionalism concerning the higher-level content.[81]

[81] Interestingly, this sharply contrasts with Stock's (2017) position, which defends extreme actual intentionalism for basic contents but not necessarily for higher-level contents.

As I see it, the semantic contents at issue in everyday interpretive debate are exclusively at the level of higher-level contents, not at the level of basic contents. In this respect, it is appropriate that Abell associates the activity of "interpretation" exclusively with the level of higher-level contents. What does the blue bird in the painting symbolize? Is the artwork defensive or critical in its attitude toward the events it describes? What were the characters doing in the scenes that were not depicted? Each of these questions concerns the higher-level content of an artwork. On the other hand, at the level of basic contents, there are questions such as whether the sentence "He gave up his heart quite willingly" should be read literally or as a metaphor, or how we should take a line in a historical drama written in contemporary language. However, it is unlikely that any serious disagreement in practice will arise over these issues. As Abell showed, one reason for less conflict may be that, at that level, semantic contents are easily assigned by existing fiction institutions.

However, if this is the case, Abell's theory commits only to anti-intentionalism concerning what can be identified in a very innocuous and non-controversial way, and to intentionalism about contents concerning which the more crucial interpretive conflict arises. Such a position would be a far cry from anti-intentionalism in the eyes of theorists friendly to poststructuralism or reader-response criticism. Indeed, the claim that basic contents can be sufficiently grounded without semantic intention is a claim that is available to ordinary moderate actual intentionalism (e.g., Carroll 2001: Chap. 12). What makes it a *moderate* intentionalism is just that it does not adopt extreme intentionalism, that semantic intention alone determines the content of an artwork. It is only this extreme version of intentionalism that Abell rejects. Thus, when read as a theory of interpretation, I think Abell's (2020) position is one that should be called a *modified intentionalism*, rather than an anti-intentionalism.

What is expected of an anti-intentionalist is not only a denial of the sufficiency of the author's intention, but also a denial of its necessity. I believe Abell was on the right track when she rejected the need for semantic intentions, but at the cost of that, she allowed institution-compliance intentions to have a decisive role. My institutional approach is more steadfastly anti-intentionalist in that I have argued that active genres can be grounded without categorical intention, which plays the same

theoretical role as institution-compliance intention in Abell. Any kind of intention is neither necessary nor sufficient in determining the rules to be followed by a given group of agents in a given community. The arguments for this view were presented in the previous chapter.

Furthermore, I do not think that an anti-intentionalist explanation is valid solely at the level of the basic content. This is because I believe that Abell's distinction between (1) basic contents as determined by institutions and understood by code models and (2) higher-level contents as determined by intentions and interpreted by the inference model cannot be neatly drawn and, in fact, it is just a matter of degree. Science fiction generally allows one to imagine and understand the sentence "He gave up his heart quite willingly" as a literal donation of an organ because, at some point in the history of the genre, there existed individual artworks that allowed such content to be inferred and interpreted from such a sentence. If that individual interpretation eventually became established as a general rule of understanding, allowing us now to skip the inference to intention, the same could be said for any given content. If we specify the inputs of regulative rules in sufficient detail, nothing prevents the establishment of an institution that allows us to decode, understand, and imagine any given higher-level content from certain features of a given artwork. It is simply a matter of how complex the method of identifying a certain content is and how well-established it is as a convention. The themes, messages, ideas, and concepts of an artwork can also be determined by institutions and understood by the code model.

I do not mean to deny that there are cases where the author's semantic intentions are used as clues for plausible interpretations of the complex higher-level content of an artwork for which there is no well-established rule of decoding. Simply relying on existing genres as rules would never tell us who Godot is in Samuel Beckett's *Waiting for Godot* (1952). However, it is a leap to say that the correct interpretation is determined by the author's intention; it only means that the active genre and appropriate interpretation do not yet exist. In my steadfast anti-intentionalist account, appropriate framing and the appropriate interpretation under it are a matter of how we interact with each other over the task of maximizing the value of appreciation.

5.2.2 Communicating Imaginings as a Coordination Problem?

Next, I will examine the more important aspect of Abell's approach, namely, its institutionalist aspect. For an account of institutions, Abell employs Francesco Guala's (2016) rules-in-equilibrium account as I do, and briefly discusses the merits of adopting Guala's account over alternative accounts of institutions (Abell 2020: 8–9). According to Abell, Guala's theory of institution has the advantage of not including the controversial commitment included in Searle (1995: 2010) that institutions require the collective approval of constitutive rules. Whether there are collective beliefs that are not reducible to merely shared individual beliefs is a controversial matter. Guala's theory also has the advantage of not including the accompanying and equally problematic commitment that such collective approval requires agents to have linguistic competence. I agree with this assessment, and these are some of the reasons I adopted Guala's theory in the previous chapter. However, in applying the concepts that are characteristic of Guala's theory, specifically the coordination problem and rules-in-equilibrium, to issues of fiction, Abell's argument seems to me to contain some explanatory gaps. I will first articulate these gaps in this section and then show how my account of genres can fill them in the next section.

Regarding the practice of fiction, Abell provides the following scenario: two agents, the author and the audience, wish to communicate through imagination; the author wants the audience to imagine a certain content X, and the audience wants to imagine X; here arises the coordination problem of communicating imaginings; a fiction institution with a content-determining rule, "If an agent produces an utterance of type Z, imagine X," is established; the author produces a text with the appropriate features, and the audience decodes that text in light of the rule.

It seems to me that there are problems with this scenario. It is not obvious that (1) the task of communicating imaginings is central to the practice of fiction, nor is it obvious that (2) communicating imaginings is a coordination problem. Abell provides few justification for (1) and only briefly justify (2) by stating all forms of communication pose coordination problems (Abell 2020: 30).

Abell's view that agents in fiction practice address the task of communicating imaginings may be riding on the consensus established among advocates of so-called *speech-act accounts*, including

Currie (1990), Lamarque and Olsen (1994), Davies (2007), and Stock (2017). The general idea of this view is that what makes a fiction fiction is the distinctive speech-act of fiction-making, which is constituted by the intention of the author to prescribe imaginings (Matravers 2014: 21; Abell 2022: 18). Abell's institutional approach, while rejecting many versions of this view and though indirectly via the intermediation of institutions, is clearly committed to a speech-act account in linking fiction with the intention of prescribing imaginings (Abell 2020: 39). That the task of communicating imaginings is central to fiction practice may have been seen as requiring little justification in light of the tradition of speech-act accounts.

However, philosophical assumptions aside, it is not at all obvious that, in the practice of fiction, the audience wants to communicate as much as the author wants to communicate. As John (2021: 515) points out, the audience may seek out works of fiction because in fiction practice, unlike in everyday life, they can feel comfort not having to share the beliefs or imaginings of the sender. The folk belief that works of fiction can be read and imagined freely and enjoyed at will is a far cry from Abell's view that the audience is engaged in communication with the author. Let us leave aside whether such folk beliefs are valid or sound. Insofar as such beliefs are widespread in practice, the view that the audience wants to communicate with the author may be suspect. The audience is not especially engaged in, or attempting to engage in, communication. It is true that imaginings in fiction practice often converge in a certain way. However, this may be an accidental consequence of a variety of factors, not because we have addressed and provided solutions to the constitutive problem for fiction.

Certainly, it is hard to deny that there are agents who are trying to imagine what the author wants them to imagine. Thus, I am not denying that the problem of communicating imaginings arises in some situations. However, I am not sure that this is a *coordination problem*. What seems missing from Abell's theory is an adequate explanation of the incentives of the author and audience to participate in communicating imaginings. Does the strategic game that results from the premise that one side desires to prescribe a certain imagining and the other side desires to share that imagining

really constitute a coordination game? To what extent is it analogous to, for example, the game of choosing lanes? Is the state of convergence of imaginings in compliance with certain content-determining rules an equilibrium? In other words, is imagination that solely deviates from it an option that has no chance of improving the payoff for any author or audience? No doubt we continue to follow the current traffic laws, afraid to risk our lives by deviating alone and bumping other vehicles. What incentives, then, motivate us to engage in the coordination game of communicating imaginings and to maintain a particular equilibrium? Moreover, how can the task of communicating imaginings, which was simplified as something to be addressed between one author and one audience, be extended to a general coordination game between authors and readers? Are the audiences really aiming to solve problems in coordination *with the authors*? The brief explanation that "all forms of communication pose coordination problems" leaves these questions unanswered.

Given this, one might wonder how different Abell's institutional approach is from a more traditional version of anti-intentionalism: conventionalism. The view that what content is assigned to what text type depends not on what semantic intention the author had, but on what conventions are in place has already appeared in Beardsley (1982a: Chap. 11).[82] In order to make enough use of Guala's (2016) account of institutions and to present a complete institutionalist theory beyond a variant of conventionalism, it seems necessary to say more about the assumed coordination game and the implications of fiction institutions being rules-in-equilibrium. This seems to me a key vulnerability in Abell's account, which I believe can be repaired by a more thorough-going institutionalism that explains the coordination game in terms of maximizing the value of appreciation.

[82] Many of the reviewers of *Fiction: A Philosophical Analysis* (John 2021; Currie 2022; Gilmore 2022; Woodward 2023) seem to read Abell's theory as a model that does not really differ from ordinary conventionalism.

5.3 Maximizing the Value of Fiction Appreciation

I propose that fiction practice be understood under genre practice. The origin of the rules that Abell addresses as regulating imaginings is not an interaction over communicating imaginings, but, as is the case with genres in general, an interaction over maximizing the value of appreciation.

The fact that the agents of fiction practice are engaged in maximizing the value of appreciation explains why framings can be made contrary to the author's institution-compliance intention, why contents can be imagined differently from what the author intends to have us imagine, and why fiction practice is nevertheless not pure chaos. Agents of fiction practice want maximally valuable appreciation, as do agents of the artworld in general. In choosing a framing for individual artworks, the audience is often torn between two incentives. On the one hand, selfish choices enhance the value of appreciation; on the other hand, coordinated choices with others enhance it. I do not assume, unlike Abell, that one side of the players in the coordination game is the author. The audience is also sensitive to how other audiences engage in imagining based on that type of text. The problem of maximizing the value of appreciation is solved by the establishment of a fiction genre as the active genre of an individual work. However, such a stable state is contingent and always open to reformation. Though undoubtedly there are details that need to be filled in here, this institutional approach offers a more promising account of the mechanisms by which fiction institutions or genres are born, established, maintained, and reformed.

It is worth noting that in the final section of the last chapter of *Fiction*, Abell (2020: 173–83) makes an argument that seems to bring her position sharply closer to mine. According to her argument in this section, the author and audience not only want the imaginings to be communicated successfully, but they also want them to be communicated in the artistically best way possible. Agents have preferences as to whether a given imagining Z should be communicated by type of text X or by type of text Y. For example, some agents think it is artistically best to communicate a character's thoughts by first-person text, while others think it is artistically best to communicate them by free indirect speech. Here, Abell acknowledges that, in determining an active content-determining rule, the

consideration of whether or not it is artistically best is involved, along with considerations of whether or not it is ready and reliable in the light of convention and tradition. Authors and audiences make evaluative judgments about whether a certain content should be communicated by a certain type of text, and Abell recognizes an important role in the formation and expression of such judgments (what she calls external thought and talk).

> First, such external talk can improve the stability of the rules of fiction institutions by making participants in fiction institutions aware of the preferences of other participants. Secondly, external talk in which participants engage in debate about the artistic merits of different ways of communicating certain types of imaginings can improve the stability of the rules of fiction institutions by helping to bring about a coincidence in participants' preferences. Finally, external thought about the artistic merits of various ways of responding imaginatively to utterances with certain features can enable participants to coordinate, on the fly, on equilibrium solutions to novel coordination problems of communicating imaginings. (Abell 2020: 174)

She does not specify what considerations are involved in an artistic judgment or evaluation, and is neutral on whether it is equal to an aesthetic evaluation (Abell 2020: 172). In contrast, I am not neutral: in Chapter 2, I defended the view that various types of value besides aesthetic value are included under the label of "artistic value". If that argument is sound, then artistic evaluation is also a cluster of evaluative judgments made from a variety of points of view: aesthetic, cognitive, historical, ethical, political, social, religious, and so on.

In any case, to acknowledge that these considerations frequently intervene in the problem of communicating imaginings, influencing the equilibrium, and modifying the agents' payoffs seems as good as to acknowledge that the problem being addressed in fiction practice really is the problem of maximizing the value of appreciation and not the pure communication of imaginings. Considerations of whether or not it is advantageous for communicating imaginings do intervene, but they do so under the more comprehensive interest of maximizing the value of appreciation.

In sum, Abell's central idea that there are rules regulating imagination in the appreciation of works of fiction is available without assuming that communicating imaginings is the constitutive coordination problem for fiction practice. We determine active genres as we address the coordination problem of maximizing the value of appreciation, and some of these genres contain rules that regulate imaginative responses.

5.4 Having Value as Fiction

Abell makes further use of the theory that fiction is the communication of imaginings to explain the *value* of works of fiction as fiction. To the extent that it can successfully do so, her theory retains merit and might still be preferred to mine on balance, for being systematic is a virtue for a theory. This is especially so given that surprisingly few philosophers have discussed the value and evaluation characteristic of works of fiction. If her approach is successful in this, this is a reason to retain communicating imaginings as the core of fiction practice. To defend my view against this possible objection, in this section I will argue that communicating imaginings is not a good way of explaining value as fiction. I begin by explaining Abell's argument about value, then say why I do not think it can be made to work, and then briefly describe a Waltonian alternative which is compatible with my account.

5.4.1 Abell's Evaluation Thesis

Because communicating imaginings is a core function fiction for Abell, it makes sense that we can evaluate a work of fiction based on whether it does this well or badly:

> A feature of a work is a good feature of that work, considered as fiction, to the extent that it is an effective means of communicating imaginings. It is a bad feature of that work, considered as fiction, to the extent that it is an ineffective means of communicating imaginings or it impedes the effective communication of imaginings. [...] A given feature of a work of fiction comprises an *effective* means of communicating an imagining to the extent that it works, either alone or in conjunction with other features, readily and reliably to elicit the imagining

> its author intended it to elicit in the members of its intended audience. A feature comprises an *ineffective* means of communicating an imagining when it works, either alone or in conjunction with other features, to elicit that imagining in at least some of its audience, but not readily and reliably to do so in the members of its intended audience. A feature of a work impedes the effective communication of an imagining when it causes the work to elicit that imagining in its intended audience less readily and reliably than it would otherwise do. (Abell 2020: 45–6)

This view, which I will call Abell's Evaluation Thesis, is based on a functionalist conception of fiction. As mentioned above, Abell's position is ontologically and epistemologically more indirect in its appeal to the intermediation of institutions, but it is still a version of the so-called the speech-act account. Roughly, advocates of this view share the following definition thesis: an item is fiction if and only if it has the function of communicating imaginings. Here, whether it has a function is a matter of whether the author had a particular intention.

In general, a definition thesis of a functional kind supports its evaluation thesis. That is, in light of a functional kind K associated with some constitutive function S, any feature F is a good feature as K if it is a feature that contributes to S and a bad feature as K if it is a feature that impedes S. For example, let us assume that the function of money is to serve as a measure of value and to mediate exchange and storage. Then, being light and easy to carry, sturdy, and having a definite shape for easy counting are good features as money in that they each contribute to the function of money. Conversely, being too heavy, too fragile, or having an irregular shape is a bad feature as money in that it impedes the function of money. Similarly, if the constitutive function of fiction is to communicate imaginings, then, as Abell states, the features that promote that function are good-making features as fiction, and the features that impede it are bad-making features as fiction.

Abell (2020: 88–9) distinguishes between two types of imaginings and, accordingly, two ways they are communicated: basic contents are understood through fiction institutions, whereas higher-level contents are interpreted through direct inference of the author's intentions.

Correspondingly, Abell distinguishes between cases in which a feature is effective for communicating basic content and those in which it is effective for communicating higher-level content. Regarding the level of understanding, features that allow for a ready and reliable grasp of the relevant content-determining rule are effective for communicating imaginings (Abell 2020: 46). As a concrete example, Abell cites an artwork that is about a story set in the Middle Ages and written in contemporary English. A fiction institution is assumed to contain a content-determining rule that takes lines written in contemporary English as input and makes us imagine that characters are speaking in medieval English. To the extent that the story can be smoothly (readily and reliably) communicated via it, lines written in contemporary English are effective and are good features as fiction. Conversely, being written in medieval English is ineffective to the extent that it makes it difficult for most readers to imagine, which is a bad feature of fiction.

According to Abell, unlike basic contents, higher-level contents are identified by inference. Instead of referring to the content-determining rules of a fiction institution, the interpreter explores whatever evidence of the author's intention is available and infers from that. Features that help us infer and imagine readily and reliably are considered to be effective for communicating imaginings (Abell 2020: 48). For example, naming or depicting a character in a way that makes audiences imagine a personality that is contrary to the personality the author intends them to imagine about the character is a bad feature, while giving the character a name or depiction that is consistent with his or her personality is a good feature. Trying to get the audience to imagine a certain father as a sympathetic character, but adding depictions of him frequently beating his children constitutes a bad feature of fiction, since it makes inferences to the author's intention difficult.

In sum, in Abell (2020), a good work *qua* a work of fiction is one that has many features that help the audience in decoding based on the institution and in inferring the author's intention, and in short, is one that is organized for the audience to imagine smoothly. Conversely, a work of fiction that is hard to imagine is considered a bad work of fiction. A similar evaluation thesis, though not as explicitly endorsed, can be derived from the definition of fiction by Currie, Stock, and others since the

consensus among speech-act accounts is that fiction has the constitutive function of communicating imaginings.

5.4.2 Problems with the Account

However, the above Evaluation Thesis, which Abell explicitly endorses and could potentially be endorsed by many theorists, does not seem to align with observations about the evaluative practice of fiction. In some cases, the means that are favorable to the task of communicating imaginings are evaluated negatively, while in others, the means that are unfavorable are evaluated positively. A work that straightforwardly follows the rules of a fiction institution could be regarded as a merely conventional artwork; a work that leaves obvious evidence of intention for the audience to infer it could be regarded as excessively blatant. It is commonplace to evaluate such features as undesirable, and they are rarely taken up for praise. If any feature that assists imagination is considered a good feature as fiction, the author can make a better work of fiction by writing many guides to imagination in the notes, such as "this passage should be read according to rule X" or "I had a semantic intention Y on this passage." In practice, however, no one would create or praise such a work of fiction. The awkwardness of evaluations such as "This is a good work of fiction because it is a medieval tale written in contemporary English" or "This is a good work of fiction because it is designed to make clear the author's intention to make us sympathize with this character" suggests that we have different rules for evaluation concerning the genre of fiction.

On the other hand, in fiction practice, a work of fiction can be regarded as good because it has features that impede the audience's imagination. Unreliable narrators, disturbances of timelines and narrators, extreme digressions, excessive length and complexity are some of the features that have been much appreciated, at least in 20th-century literature, but their function is to impede rather than to facilitate imagination. Those who say that the novels of Thomas Pynchon and José Donoso are "beyond the imagination of most people" could be using these statements as a positive evaluation. Not a few literary artworks have left their mark on the history of literature by making the audience's epistemological task even more difficult and, in some cases, fundamentally impossible to accomplish.

When Gabriel García Márquez won the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1982, he won it for writing pieces "in which the fantastic and the realistic are combined in a richly composed world of imagination,"[83] not for writing something smoothly imaginable. If we had strictly rejected works of fiction that were hard to imagine, there would be no *Tristram Shandy* (1759–67) or *Finnegans Wake* (1939) in the history of literature. A statement like "That's beyond my imagination!" can constitute praise.

Let us concentrate here on the latter, the case in which features that impede imagination constitute good-making features as fiction. In the next section, I will argue that we should reject the Evaluation Thesis on the grounds that it is inconsistent with the evaluative practice of fiction, and this is further reason to doubt that there is a coordination game of communicating imaginings at the center of fiction practice. We begin by addressing the question: what features impede imagination, and how can they constitute good-making features as fiction?

5.4.2.1 Impeders of Imagination

Not all cases of positive evaluation using statements like "That's beyond my imagination!" are of current interest. Some casual evaluative usages should be placed outside the question beforehand. The phrase, "That's beyond my imagination!" may simply say that an artwork is simply good, or that it has merit in some way unrelated to the imagination. It may also mean that the artwork exceeds prior expectations, that it is more desirable and creative than one might have expected. In any case, these evaluative uses have nothing to do with the audience's imagination. In addition, "That's beyond my imagination!" can be used as an exaggeration. The evaluator who says, "George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (1949) is beyond imagination" is not necessarily having difficulty imagining ideas such as Newspeak or doublethink. What is being stated there is merely that the artwork is imaginatively rich and informative.

We should also rule out the following cases in light of the debate on so-called imaginative resistance. Sometimes, the audience is placed in a situation where they *won't* rather than *can't* imagine

[83] The Nobel Foundation, "The Nobel Prize in Literature 1982,"
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/literature/1982/summary/

what a work of fiction prescribes. The propositional imaginings that the artwork prescribes may be unacceptable in light of the evaluative beliefs (morals or commitments) that the audience has in reality. Otherwise, the experiential imaginings that the artwork prescribes may be so distressing that even just imagining them may be intolerable.

> If it is the dirty element that gives pleasure to the act of lust, then the dirtier it is, the more pleasurable it is bound to be. (Marquis de Sade, *The 120 Days of Sodom*, 1904)

The audience does not want to believe the immoral propositions, does not want to perceive the abducted children being abused and killed, and does not want to feel the same pain as the abused or the same pleasure as the abuser. For the audience, these are things they do not want to even imagine, and thus, reading *120 Days of Sodom* generates an imaginative resistance. However, according to one interpretation of imaginative resistance, in such resistance, the audience does not want to imagine, but it does not mean they cannot imagine.[84] The relevant propositional and experiential imaginings are available to the audience, and it is precisely because they have actually held these imaginings in their minds and experienced moral conflict or phenomenological pain that they are prompted to resist further imagining. Strictly speaking, it is not the audience's imagination that Marquis de Sade's novel exceeds, but rather their morality and tolerance for pain.

What I want to address are features that directly impede the mobilization of the imagination. If imagination is considered a cognitive activity, then artworks with such features are cognitively deficient. In the first case, there may be a contradiction between the propositional imaginings that a work of fiction prescribes. Whether a work of fiction can actually have contradictory content or prescribe contradictory imaginings is a controversial issue, but without going too deeply into it, there is little doubt that some works make imagination difficult by containing contradictions or quasi-contradictions. José Donoso's *Obscene Bird of Night* (1970) is beyond imagination in that there are contradictions in the events narrated and in the profiles of characters, making it impossible to consistently grasp the fictional world. At one moment, Humberto Peñaloza is a young man, an

[84] See Gendler (2000); Stokes (2006).

aspiring writer obsessed with ambition, and a secretary to Don Jerónimo. However, at another moment, he is a deaf-mute with 80% of his body removed, who calls himself El Mudito and is the caretaker of Don Jerónimo's disabled son, Boy. In yet another moment, he is none other than Don Jerónimo, the Boy. Similarly, the father in Donald Barthelme's *Dead Father* (1975) is alive but dead, and the knight in Italo Calvino's *Nonexistent Knight* (1959) exists but does not exist.

As a second case, the imagination that the artwork prescribes may be extremely informative and far beyond the imaginative resources of the ordinary person. Thomas Pynchon's *Gravity's Rainbow* (1973) contains as many as 400 characters, a great deal of flaunting of engineering, historical, and religious knowledge, including some too-specialized ones, and an enormous number of allusions, puns, and rhymes. Even if there are no contradictions, it is very difficult (for the average person) to completely grasp the fictional world. Similarly, Herman Melville's *Moby-Dick* (1851) would have been a much more manageable novel had it not been so detailed in its descriptions and depictions of whaling.

As a third case, artworks can make what would otherwise be consistently and completely imaginable hard to imagine by placing narrators and timelines in a disruptive manner. It would afford a much smoother imagining if we removed the polyphonic, schizophrenic narration of Joseph Heller's *Catch-22* (1961), Juan Rulfo's *Pedro Páramo* (1955), or Gabriel García Márquez's *Autumn of the Patriarch* (1975) and made it communicate the events in chronological order. However, Heller, Rulfo, and Márquez chose not to do so. It is hard for me to believe those stories would be more valuable as fiction if they were sorted chronologically.

As a fourth case, similar to the case involving contradictions, a literary fiction may be structured in such a way as to impede the imaginative formation of imagery. *The Soluble Fish* (1924) is a nonsense text written by automatic writing, which is bankrupt both syntactically and semantically.

> The park at this time of day, stretched its blond hands over the magic fountain. A meaningless castle rolled along the surface of the earth. (André Breton, *Soluble Fish,* 1924)

It is truly a text that is impossible to visualize, a text that is impossible to even imagine the scene visually. Richard Brautigan's *Trout Fishing in America* (1967) consists of 47 fragments linked by the symbolic term of the title. One of them begins as follows:

> Trout Fishing in America Shorty appeared suddenly last autumn in San Francisco, staggering around in a magnificent chrome-plated steel wheelchair.
>
> He was a legless, screaming middle-aged wino.
>
> He descended upon North Beach like a chapter from the Old Testament. He was the reason birds migrate in the autumn. They have to. He was the cold turning of the earth; the bad wind that blows off sugar. (Richard Brautigan, *Trout Fishing in America*, 1967)

Although we can barely infer from the preceding and following descriptions that this is a vagrant described in this chapter, the name "Trout Fishing in America Shorty" continually impedes the imagination. Our imagination becomes even more difficult and uncertain in the middle of the story, when the narrator and his friend come up with the idea of packing Trout Fishing in America Shorty in a box and sending it to Nelson Algren. Some parts of the story are intelligible only if Trout Fishing in America Shorty is a man, but others are not intelligible if it is a man. In the end, we cannot visualize the figure even by piecing together fragmentary information.

As a fifth case, the text may be structured in such a way as to impede the mirroring of emotions and thoughts. We have strategies for sympathy that we have acquired in our daily lives. However, works of fiction often depict behaviors that seem to deviate from that pattern, thus impeding our imaginative sympathy for a fictional character. In Albert Camus' *The Stranger* (1942), the emotions and thoughts that motivated the protagonist to murder cannot be mirrored. In *Waiting for Godot*, the two characters are waiting for someone, but why they are waiting is never disclosed.

> ESTRAGON: Let's go!
>
> VLADIMIR: We can't.
>
> ESTRAGON: Why not?
>
> VLADIMIR: We're waiting for Godot.

ESTRAGON: (despairingly) Ah! (Samuel Beckett, Waiting for Godot, 1952)

The audience looks for a coherent purpose, intention, or plan there, but Beckett carefully removes any possibility of sympathy for his characters through broken conversations and plot loops. Similarly, in Paul Auster's *City of Glass* (1985), a novelist forced to become a private detective faces a series of troubles that threaten his identity, but it is obvious that he perversely desires troubles. Despite, or precisely because, of the detailed monologues, he emerges as an increasingly unsympathetic person.

Many good works of fiction, by employing these techniques, impede smooth propositional and experiential imaginings. The authors make works of fiction hard to imagine by chopping and shuffling the content of imagination, removing what is essential, and transplanting what is unnecessary. If communicating imaginings readily and reliably is their primary purpose, then the authors are clearly destroying themselves by adopting these techniques. However, works of fiction beyond our imagination often leave their mark on the history of fiction not as poor, but as technically important.

5.4.2.2 Fiction That Challenges You

The picture that it is the author's purpose to communicate imaginings by appropriate means and the audience's purpose to grasp this accurately may be confusing the *purpose* and *goal* of the agents in fiction practice. Arriving at a correct judgment is a goal in a practice of art, but not a purpose.[85] Audiences approaching an artwork aim to arrive at correct judgments about the meaning and value of the artwork, but they do not engage in appreciation in order to reach them. The task of accurately grasping the content of a work of fiction does not motivate us to approach the artwork. Instead, it is the intellectually and emotionally rewarding process while approaching a correct judgment, that is, the valuable experience of art itself, that provides the reason that motivates the audience to participate in the appreciation of art. Certainly, there is an epistemological aspect to art appreciation in that judgments about the meaning and value of artworks are the goal, but what is more important is the temporally unfolded appreciation itself. We approach a work of fiction in order to engage in a valuable

[85] The distinction between purpose and goal comes from Nguyen (2019: 1136). However, unlike my focus on art practice, Nguyen focuses on aesthetic practice and aesthetic engagement.

imaginative experience, and the realization of communication with the author might be a goal associated with it, but it is not our purpose that motivates us.

If there were a drug that instantly let me know what I am prescribed to imagine about Virginia Woolf's *To the Lighthouse* (1927), I would not be inclined to drink it because it is more fun to engage in trial and error imagination in my own way. On the other hand, if there were a drug that instantly informed me of what I am prescribed to know about Martin Heidegger's *Being and Time* (1927), I might be more inclined to take it. There is an asymmetry of purpose between believing or knowing something in reality and imagining something via a work of fiction. This asymmetry should not be overlooked when trying to situate fiction practice under a general cognitive practice such as communication. Appreciation of fiction is not a matter of getting able to imagine exactly what is to be imagined.

The various features seen in the previous section can constitute good-making features as fiction in that they enable the audience to engage in particularly challenging imaginings. Games that present challenging tasks have a distinctive value that games that present easily manageable tasks do not. Indeed, functionalist definitions of art in general often count as one of the artistic functions the affordance of intellectually challenging experiences.[86] The complexity of *Gravity's Rainbow* provides an opportunity to engage in challenging imaginings, and to that extent it is instrumentally a good feature as fiction.

Why is being challenging valuable? Why does a challenging work of fiction merit praise, selection, and promotion? The value of being challenging can be explained from several points of view. First, one might say that there is intrinsic value in challenge.[87] According to one account of gameplay, it is the achievement of difficult tasks that constitutes its intrinsic value. We have a *pro tanto* reason to choose whatever is more difficult to achieve. According to Nanay (2022), aesthetic experiences are not merely passive pleasures, but are acquired as active achievements. Valuable

[86] See, for example, Gaut (2000: 28).

[87] See Hurka (2006).

aesthetic experience is not unilaterally afforded by an item, but comes from a mental effort to acquire it. I see this active aspect in appreciative responses in general, including non-aesthetic ones. If art appreciation is an achievement, then achieving an appreciation of a more challenging artwork would be of greater significance to the subject.

Of course, the value of being imaginatively challenging can also be analyzed as an instrumental value, in that it leads to other values. For example, the cultivation of imagination has instrumental value in achieving a variety of further good, and imaginatively challenging artwork can have instrumental value in aiding such cultivation.[88] If there is merit in having muscles, then there is merit in heavy dumbbells. Challenging something can also have an instrumental value in that it brings about self-understanding. Approaching a difficult artwork, even if the difficulty is overwhelming, can provide an understanding of the range and limits of one's imagination. There can be an existential and epistemological value in self-understanding. We seek challenging appreciation that allows us to know ourselves better, and this is what hard-to-imagine fictions afford.

By analogy, we have reasons to climb steeper mountains, unpack more esoteric philosophy books, play with stronger soccer teams, and listen to Free Jazz as well as Swing Jazz. It gives us the opportunity to develop our athletic abilities, critical thinking skills, and tastes in ways that we would not get if we chose easier tasks, and challenges also allows us to learn about the range and limits of our own competence. Even without those by-products, one might say that challenging has value for its own sake.

The value of being challenging explains, in some measure, why features that impede imagination can constitute good-making features as fiction. However, it does not explain all cases. Some of the features addressed in the previous section that impede the imagination were more radical. Artworks can be hopelessly disrupted by features such as containing contradictions. Such artworks are not merely challenging to imagine; they are impossible. No one normally wants to engage in a mountain with no summit, a philosophical book written in an incomprehensible way, a soccer game

[88] See Kind (2022); Peacocke (2021).

that never ends, or random noise. If there is no goal to reach, it is not even a challenge to begin with. How can we understand the cases where artwork with these features is still praised?

5.4.2.3 Fiction That Gets You Lost

As Nguyen (2019: 1143) states, aesthetic engagement is an activity where striving itself is more meaningful than achieving. However, Nguyen maintains the assumption that it is a goal-set activity. Aesthetic engagement is understood analogously to gameplay in that it is constrained by a set goal, within which various engagements are enjoyed.

However, we may have to let go of such a picture when it comes to fiction practice, where even the experience of getting lost and wandering aimlessly in the imagination can be valuable. For those of us engaged in *Waiting for Godot*, it is perhaps never possible to grasp Godot's true identity or to sympathize with Vladimir and Estragon. There is no task, challenge, or game in the narrow sense, only an essential unimaginability. Still, there is value in the experience of drifting imaginatively. Unreliable narrators, disturbances of timelines and narrators, extreme digressions, excessive length and complexity are instrumentally good features as fiction, insofar as they afford the experience of getting lost in imagination.

Why is it valuable to get lost in imagination? Why does a work of fiction that leads us astray merit admiration, selection, or promotion? It is difficult to explain clearly, nor does it seem to be something that can or should be explained through an argument. Its value can only be found in individual experiences. Nevertheless, I would like to mention four related points here.

First, unlike the real world, which is largely logically consistent, imaginative encounters with largely disrupted worlds may provide transformative experiences and defamiliarization of everyday life.[89] If the transformation they bring about is existentially desirable, then the experience of getting lost in imagination may have some instrumental value. However, it is not a very plausible scenario that we enter into a collapsed imaginary world because of the legitimate expectation of a desirable

[89] See Paul (2014) for transformative experiences.

transformation. Frequently, we are caught up in fiction and forced to transform without ever forming a proper prediction. Aumann (2022) calls it the seduction of art.

> I hold that art can motivate transformations. This implies that art can provide us with reasons to undergo them—but not necessarily with good or normative reasons. In fact, art rarely if ever gives us such reasons. [...] It seduces us into thinking that we know what it would be like for us on the other side of the transformation when in fact we do not know. And this unjustified forecast is integral to why we pursue the transformation. (Auman 2022: 573)

Artworks do not rationally motivate transformation by informing me exactly what kind of transformative experience they offer, whether it is a good or bad transformation for me. Artworks and aesthetic objects have a seductive power to motivate engagement beyond rational choice. We follow the rabbit down the hole, and by the time we wake up, we are someone else.

Second and relatedly, to put it less exaggeratedly, imaginative encounters with largely disrupted worlds satisfy our curiosity. As Lopes (2022) argues, aesthetic life is varied in multiple dimensions and is a place that suits our desire to try many different things. Valuing the cognitively confused is a disadvantageous strategy in many practices where one must acquire correct knowledge, infer appropriately, and make choices of action. However, if such seriousness is not required in situations where we engage in works of fiction or generally in art appreciation, then the experience of getting lost in imagination through fiction is rather a compensation for real life, where we cannot afford to form bankrupt beliefs. Its enjoyment is analogous to the enjoyment of role-playing.

Third, generally speaking, meta-evaluations of unpleasant experiences can be reversed between reality and fiction. Sadness and fear are unpleasant emotional experiences, and in reality, we are motivated to avoid them. However, we are not similarly motivated when appreciating a tragedy or horror. Instead, we actively participate and may even praise a work of fiction precisely because it evokes sadness or horror. Likewise, confusion in beliefs calls for avoidance and resolution, while confusion in imagination can call for participation and continuance. Why this reversal occurs is a question that has been addressed under the labels of the paradox of tragedy or the paradox of horror,

and if certain answers to this can be obtained, the paradox of the imaginative stray may also be answered (See Smuts 2009; Strohl 2019). For example, while belief confusion, in reality, is a crisis of practical disadvantage, imaginative confusion in fiction involves no such danger, and we may be able to enjoy confusion because it guarantees mental safety. There may be a psychological mechanism that converts imaginative confusion into pleasure (Hume 1985), and the artwork may have a structure that also affords us enough pleasure to compensate for the confusion (Carroll 1990). We may marvel at the very structure that confuses us so effectively, or we may feel meta-pleasure in evaluating an artwork as intensely confusing (Walton 2008: Chap. 1). Pluralism, in which there are multiple mechanisms for reversing the imaginative stray into valuable appreciation, is also a plausible option.

Fourth and relatedly, I believe that the closest experience that has been discussed to getting lost in imagination is the awe that the sublime provides. The experience of the sublime has traditionally been understood in association with incomprehensibility and a sense of helplessness. As Arcangeli and Dokic analyze, the experience of the sublime is a radical limit-experience in which one meta-recognizes one's own perceptual and imaginative inadequacies from an encounter with something cognitively overwhelming. It brings a negative feeling of uncertainty and self-denial, but this is turned into a positive aesthetic experience through different types of aesthetic accommodation. Of course, a detailed analysis of this aesthetic concept is a task beyond the scope of this dissertation.

5.4.3 A Waltonian Alternative

As I hope to have shown above, the idea that the constitutive function of fiction is to communicate imaginings, from which it follows naturally that having value as fiction corresponds to whether a feature facilitates or impedes communicating imaginings, does not capture what we often value in works of fiction.

Let me propose an alternative. We should first note the following point: prescribing imaginings and communicating imaginings are different functions. The latter can only be constituted by adding a communicative intention to the former. According to advocates of the speech-act account, fiction is not merely constituted by imaginings, but by the intention of communicating imaginings.

This view, while influential, is not the consensus.[90] At least, one of the most influential players in the field, Kendall Walton, clearly rejected the speech-act account. The model that Walton (1990) gives for fiction practice does not stem from an author's semantic or institution-compliance intention. He states:

> Fiction making is not reasonably classified as an illocutionary action, and works of fiction are not essentially vehicles of acts of fiction making. It may be that language is centered on the actions of speakers. The institution of fiction centers not on the activity of fiction makers but on objects—works of fiction or natural objects—and their role in appreciators' activities, objects whose function is to serve as props in games of make-believe. Fiction making is merely the activity of constructing such props. The fiction maker does come into play insofar as function is understood to depend on her intentions. But it need not be understood to depend on them. (Walton 1990: 88)

Walton never analyzed what he regards as the constitutive function of fiction, that is, the function to serve as a prop in imaginative make-believe, in terms of the actions or specific intentions of the producer. Instead, he rightly recognizes that the more crucial factors are the consumer and the social context. For Walton, to prescribe imaginings is not to intend to communicate imaginings, nor is the fact that an item has the function of prescribing imaginings a matter of whether the author intended it to. Functions are assigned to items in a more pluralistic way for Walton, and what imaginings they prescribe is not simply a matter of the author's intention. Let us call this Waltonian functionalism:

> **Waltonian Functionalism**
>
> An item is fiction if and only if it has the function of prescribing and making its receivers engage in various imaginings, where this is a matter of how audiences treat it in the relevant practice.

[90] The view that Matravers (2014: 21) calls the "consensus view" of fiction merely recognizes a constitutive relationship between fiction and imagination. Thus, taking up some kind of intention is an additional commitment to the consensus view.

The features that hard-to-imagine works of fiction possess impede the constitutive function of fiction in Abell's sense, that is, the author's communication of imaginings. However, these features do not impede the constitutive function of fiction for Waltonian Functionalism, where the work prescribes and affords a variety of imaginings in the context of social interactions. Instead, they can be features that contribute in interesting and innovative ways to perform the function. Thus, the paradox of hard-to-imagine fiction is resolved in a way that is consistent with actual evaluative practices of fiction rather than a stipulation. This conclusion is in the spirit of my institutional approach, in which appropriate evaluation of an artwork is not constrained by the author's purpose and achievement, but depends on the interaction of agents who undertake the task of maximizing the value of appreciation.

Summary

In this chapter, I examined Catharine Abell's theory of fiction. In Abell's model, the coordination problem of communicating imaginings between author and audience leads to establishing a fiction institution with specific content-determining rules that regulate the understanding of the content of works. Audiences who lack the resources to directly infer the authors' semantic intentions can smoothly imagine the content to be imagined by following the rules of institutions. The model in which appreciative responses are regulated by the intermediation of institutions, is similar to the model I gave for genre in the previous chapter, but Abell's and my model differ in several respects.

First, Abell's position has clear intentionalist elements in that it recognizes the important role of the author's institution-compliance intention and acknowledges the role of institutions only with respect to basic contents. Given the series of problems associated with intentionalism about active genres, I argued that a steadfast anti-intentionalist approach is more promising. Second, Abell's theory models fiction practice by taking the task of communicating imaginings as its starting point. However, I am concerned that Abell does not adequately justify that it is at the heart of fiction practice and that it is a proper coordination problem. Instead, I argued that we can better develop an institutional

approach to fiction under the umbrella of a theory of genre practice that takes maximizing the value of appreciation as its starting point. We have not created rules in an attempt to communicate with authors, but simply in an attempt to better appreciate artworks together.

Conclusion

The central task of this dissertation was to clarify and defend an idea concerning the practice of categorizing art: the way a work of art is categorized influences how it is appreciated and criticized. Let me conclude by briefly reviewing the discussion in each chapter.

Chapter 1 examined Kendall Walton's (1970) theory concerning the role of categories in aesthetic judgment. I introduced Walton's argument by decomposing it into four parts: (1) the Psychological Thesis, (2) the Normative Thesis, (3) the Ontological Thesis, and (4) the Epistemological Thesis. Eventually, I reconstructed it as aiming to reconcile the following two views, which seem to be in tension:

> **Ontological Contextualism in Walton (1970)**
>
> The aesthetic properties possessed by an artwork are not always entirely grounded by its perceptual features, but are often partly grounded by contextual facts related to it.
>
> **Epistemological Formalism in Walton (1970)**
>
> For grasping the aesthetic properties possessed by an artwork, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to know the contextual facts related to it, but all mobilized for that is one's perceptual faculty.

In both defenses, the concept of perceptually distinguishable categories plays an important role. However, I have shown that it is unnecessary and even obstructive for Walton's purposes. For the purpose of discussing the role of categories in aesthetic judgments, it is sufficient to prepare more minimally perceptual categories. At the end of Chapter 1, I showed that the role Walton discussed is not the only role that art categories can play, and that aesthetic judgments and their formation process are not our only concerns, building a bridge to the next chapter and beyond.

Chapter 2 was devoted to characterizing criticism. I began by showing that our interest in criticism is inseparable from our interest in appreciation:

Criticism as a Guide to Appreciation

A's product *P* (a text, speech, and so forth) is a criticism of an artwork *x* if and only if *P* has the function of guiding its readers' appreciative response to *x*.

The question of what criticism is is answered in answering what appreciation is. After reconstructing the existing views on criticism with a focus on the appreciative responses assumed therein, I have chosen the affective account as my rival in Chapter 2. According to the affective account, the proper appreciative response is an emotional response, pleasure, and enjoyment. Criticism is a guide to aesthetic pleasure, not something that simply makes us believe or do something. I pointed out that one of the problems with the affective account is that it does not adequately distinguish between the aesthetic and the artistic. The equation of artistic value with aesthetic value, artistic appreciation with aesthetic pleasure, and art criticism with aesthetic criticism is indefensible, even if one has a broad conception of the aesthetic. Instead, I have defended the following pluralisms:

Cluster Account of Appreciation

B's response to an artwork *x* is an appreciative response if and only if *B* engages in any of a variety of responses, such as (1) understanding *x*'s specific value, meaning, or function, (2) perceiving *x*'s aesthetic quality, or (3) having aesthetic pleasure with *x* as its content.

Cluster Account of Criticism

A's product *P* (a text, speech, and so forth) is a criticism of an artwork *x* if and only if *P* has the function of guiding any of a variety of responses, such as (1) a specific belief formation about *x*, (2) aesthetic perception of *x*, or (3) aesthetic pleasure through *x* by the readers of *P*.

After expressing my attitude toward cases that seem to be counterexamples to my view, I suggested some general criteria for good criticism.

Chapter 3 characterized the meta-category of genre. It is in this chapter that I started a full-blown theoretical construction. I first showed that it is difficult to identify what is unique about the categories and only categories that are genres by the genres-as-features account:

Genres as Features

A category *C* is a genre if and only if *C* tracks standard features of a specific type.

We found no type of feature that categories and only categories that are genres track, and it is revealed that most categories track more than one type of feature. Focusing only on aspects such as classification, membership, and standard features misses the more crucial aspects of categories and fails to characterize genres. The crucial aspects are the various critical and appreciative roles we acknowledge in categories, and genres can be characterized as clusters of rules that are abstracted from them.

Insofar as we understand genres as rules, what requires additional explanation is the distinction between valid and non-valid rules. Referring to the model discussed in social ontology, I have shown the ontological structure in which genres as rules are anchored, set up, and validated by facts relevant to a particular group of agents at a particular point in time. For the specific content of the anchoring facts, I chose to be open, suggesting several candidates. The genres-as-rules account is summarized as follows:

Genres as Rules

For a group of agents *G* at a time *t*, a category *C* is a genre if and only if *C* is a cluster of regulative rules represented as 'If an artwork *x* has property *F*, make an appreciative response *R* to *x*,' and a particular *G*-associated-fact at *t* anchors *C*.

One of the key concepts that emerged in Chapter 3 is framing. We declare and propose a kind of appreciation of artworks by, sometimes forcefully, applying genres as rules to artworks. If the categorization of art includes the aspect of framing, we cannot understand it merely as classification.

Chapter 4 was a chapter describing the social interactions that are structured by framing. Individual artworks have rules that are appropriate to apply to them (active genres) and rules that are not. From what does this appropriateness stem? I rejected the following view:

Intentionalism about Active Genres

The fact that a genre *C** is an active genre of an artwork *x* is fully, or, at least partly, grounded by the fact that the author(s) of *x* intended so.

The view that the correct way to appreciate an artwork is determined by its author is both inaccurate in light of practice and unattractive, even if it is a partial, rather than decisive, determination. The game of art appreciation and criticism cannot just be about identifying the mental state of the author. Instead, I advocated the following institutional approach:

Institutional Approach to Active Genres

For a group of agents *G* at time *t*, category *C** is an active genre of an artwork *x* if and only if the strategy of appreciating *x* according to *C** is an equilibrium for the coordination problem of maximizing the value of appreciation that *G* in *t* addresses.

Active genres are the result of social interaction by agents who are selfish on the one hand and sensitive to the choices of others on the other. The institutional approach has many implications. Appropriate framings cannot be universal or absolute, are contingent rather than inevitable, and are open to reformation by their vulnerability, sometimes weed out others, and sometimes segregate. All of these dynamics are analyzable using the simple tools of game theory. What I have finally given is a picture of critics, positioned as one type of players in these social interactions, working on the institutions. Their goal of creating a better appreciation is pragmatic in nature.

Chapter 5 was guided by Friend's (2012) slogan that "fiction is a genre," and Abell's (2020) institutional approach to fiction. I examined Catharine Abell's theory of fiction and compared it with my institutional approach to genres. Abell's institutional approach relies on what I believe to be a problematic premise: communicating imaginings. As Chapter 4 suggests, I advocate thorough-going anti-intentionalism. The model of informational communication between an author and audience via imaginings inevitably leaves an intentionalist aspect, and suffers from the same problems facing intentionalism about active genres. Once again, the game of art appreciation and criticism is not

exhausted by identifying the mental state of the author. I argued that the practice of fiction regulated by rules could be better understood as part of the practice of genres.

Of categories, the clusters of rules I have taken up as genres arise in the social interaction of framing and regulate our criticism and appreciation. I hope this conclusion takes over and reinforces one traditional view in the philosophy of art. That is, works of art are not necessarily seen with innocent eyes, nor do they need to be.

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