comments that, up to a point, the misuse is explicable. Characteristics like race and gender are visually salient to the filterer. Race and ethnicity thus become 'encroachers on the terrain of other predictive factors'; they 'occupy more of the decision-making space than their empirical role would support' (187). Schauer then turns this feature against use of race as a basis for decision-making: 'the strongest argument against using race is ... that race, even if relevant, is so likely to be overused that it is necessary to ... mandate its underuse just to ensure that things come out even in the end' (196). We should refrain from using even statistically justifiable racial factors in the service of avoiding isolation and stigmatization by race (197).

Such a conclusion issues many normative promissory notes, and the remainder of the book goes some way towards paying them off. Chapter 8 defends the Procrustean approach to blind equality. Equality as a goal, when justified, mandates the underuse of differences. Chapter 9 discusses presumptions in the criminal law. It's not news, Schauer says, that legislation classifies imprecisely. The important thing is to give fair notice of what is illegal. This argument itself gives fair notice of the 'rule of law' values that Schauer introduces in Chapter 10, in discussing mandatory sentencing guidelines. These are unpopular because they militate against individualized sentencing. But it's clear to Schauer what a morass a regime of wide judicial discretion on sentencing could become. Moreover, he argues, there is a deep truth to the image of Justice as blindfolded — the equality-based idea that we are all one before the law. Justice *should be* no respecter of persons: its demands fall, and should fall, on all of us equally. There is a fundamental connection between decision-making by generalization and the rule of law.

Thus we come to the remarkable Chapter 11. In this spirited and committed chapter, Schauer defends generality and reasoning from generalization as an instrument of liberal community. Rights are general in character. Rights create community by creating equality across differences. Reasoning from generalization both recognizes us for who we are, and makes us who we are. This is a somewhat romantic 'blue state' vision of the possibilities of the rule of law, especially for one who elsewhere (*Playing*, Chapter 7.6) has underlined the role of rules as neutral devices for the allocation of power. Think Josiah Bartlett, not George W. Bush. But, say I anyway, it's none the worse for that.

Profiles is a clearly and thoroughly argued, witty, passionate and compassionate book — one to be thoroughly recommended.

Roger A. Shiner
Okanagan University College

Bart Schultz has spent the last decade and a half researching the many sides of Henry Sidgwick. His efforts have helped make this period fecund for the study and evaluation of Sidgwick's life and works. It is due in part to Schultz that Sidgwick studies are now experiencing something of a renaissance.

Schultz' previous contributions to Sidgwick studies include the anthology *Essays on Henry Sidgwick* (Cambridge University Press 1992) and the CD-ROM *The Complete Works and Selected Scholarly Correspondence of Henry Sidgwick* (Charlottesville, VA: InteLex Corporation 1997; 2nd edition 1999). The latter is no small boon to those of us interested in all sides of Sidgwick. Schultz' articles often explore Sidgwick's lesser-known (and occasionally unpalatable) views on race, sexuality, and imperialism, among other things, usefully connecting them with his philosophical views, his historical context and his intimate friendships. They serve as an important corrective for those who study Sidgwick *sans* context. His knowledge of Sidgwick, his (often long-forgotten) peers and their history and culture, is immense in its depth and complexity.

His long-awaited book — nay, tome — *Henry Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe* (*HSE*) is a comprehensive and wide-ranging examination of the connection between Sidgwick's theoretical views, personal relationships, public activities and social milieu. It weighs in at an amazing (and at times exhausting) 858 pages, emerging from a thorough and all-encompassing reading of primary and secondary work on its subject. It will be a work on Sidgwick that all those who study him will have to reckon with for years to come. It is a welcome addition to the growing literature on Sidgwick.

The basic task that Schultz sets for himself is 'to convey some sense ... of how [Sidgwick's] "inner intellectual life" ultimately evolved, how he became what he was' (3). The portrait that Schultz hopes to paint is more favorable than the one that held sway amongst philosophers, e.g., Moore and Russell, at the beginning of the twentieth century, but more robust than the one common amongst recent admirers of Sidgwick, e.g., Rawls and Parfit. Finally, it is supposed to reveal that Sidgwick's utilitarianism is more sophisticated than many have thought.

Sidgwick devoted himself to two distinct but related intellectual issues. He was concerned with 'the deepest problems of human life', for example, the truth of Christianity, the existence of God, the so-called 'dualism of practical reason' (the claim that both utilitarianism and rational egoism are coordinate but conflicting requirements of reason), and the basis of moral obligation. He was also concerned with 'what is to be done here and now'. This forced him into debates regarding the higher education of women, clerical engagements,

the morality of strife, the nature of culture, and the ends of education, among other issues.

Sidgwick began to think seriously about these issues in the years between 1859 and 1869, his decade of 'Storm and Stress'. During this period his worries about the truth of Christianity led him to study biblical criticism, Arabic and Hebrew. Near the end of the decade his worries turned to skepticism, and the skepticism led to an ethical crisis. Sidgwick held a Fellowship at Trinity College, a requirement of which was subscription to the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England. His skepticism no longer allowed this, however, so in June of 1869 he resigned. Schultz' discussion of this, in Chapters two and three, is nicely organized and illuminating. Of note is his discussion of Sidgwick's early influences, including Edward White Benson, John Fredrick Denison Maurice, John Grote, various discussion groups (clandestine and public) that Sidgwick was involved in (especially the Cambridge Apostles), and his education at Cambridge. Schultz brings out the intimate connection between Sidgwick's intellectual development and his views of inquiry, democracy, and education.

While thinking about whether to resign his Fellowship Sidgwick developed his mature ethical views. He recorded these in *The Methods of Ethics* (*ME*). This work forms the basis of his reputation within philosophical circles. It is his best and most important work. *ME* is analyzed in Chapter Four of *HSE*. Part One of the chapter tackles mainly meta-ethical and axiological matters, while Part Two deals with the dualism of practical reason. The treatment of meta-ethical matters needs further development, especially the discussion of Sidgwick's account of the meaning of the term 'good'. Schultz appears to endorse Tom Hurka's view that Sidgwick's reduction of 'good' to 'ought or rational to desire' is problematic (160); however, instead of pausing to discuss this objection Schultz begins dealing with Sidgwick's axiology. He refrains from philosophically probing Sidgwick's rather interesting views on the meaning of 'ought', and he does not examine the philosophical plausibility of Sidgwick's non-naturalist meta-ethics, and how it might be 'minimal' (i.e., not Platonic) as some suggest.

Sidgwick's moral epistemology in *ME* remains controversial. Schultz claims that much of the previous debate 'seems rather ungenerous and anachronistic in its depiction of Sidgwick, failing to grasp his fallibilistic, multicriterial approach in anything like its true complexity' (197). Schultz favours a now popular view according to which Sidgwick endorses an epistemology that includes elements of both foundationalism and coherentism (200-4). The view is that there are some propositions that are known directly, the epistemic credibility of which can be enhanced by noting coherence with common-sense morality (which possesses merely 'initial credibility'). The appeal to common-sense morality enters the picture in the appeal Sidgwick makes to a set of tests applied to directly known propositions satisfaction of some of which amplify the epistemic status of propositions that are known directly. In endorsing this view Schultz ignores another, more plausible view according to which Sidgwick holds that certain propositions are directly warranted and that the tests function to help agents avoid error but not to amplify the warrant of the propositions in question. Many of Sidgwick's remarks in *ME* and elsewhere suggest such a view. Moreover, Schultz does not supply an adequate epistemology of common-sense morality, which is required to show that it possesses 'initial credibility' or 'imperfect certitude' (202). Sidgwick doubts that it possesses such credibility (*ME* xx-xxi, 263, 361, 383). Many of Schultz' comments undermine the view that Sidgwick believes that common sense has some built-in credibility, e.g., his claim that Sidgwick has disdain for common-sense morality and that he relies on it for merely strategic reasons (127, 181,187, 249-50, 511-12), and that he treats it as Mill does in *Utilitarianism*, i.e., as no more than beliefs about the effects of various actions on aggregate happiness (185-7).

HSE's fifth chapter deals with Sidgwick's work in parapsychology. The conclusion of *ME*, that both rational egoism and utilitarianism are equally plausible but conflicting requirements of reason, prompted Sidgwick to study paranormal phenomena. He found no philosophical way of reconciling the two requirements. God's existence would apparently make the requirements coincide, but he found no philosophical proof for God and a Kantian-style postulation seemed to him absurd. If he could find empirical proof of an afterlife, he might find proof of a God or moral governor and hence a way of solving his dualism. Alas, he found no such proof in his studies of telepathy, mediums, etc. Schultz does a nice job with this material, suggesting that Sidgwick's psychical and related studies speak to the 'ground of his unshakeable sense of the logical priority of egoism, of egoism as a reflection of the true self that somehow endured' (333).

In Schultz' view, Sidgwick's friendships are crucial to understanding his views. Core to Sidgwick's researches is the idea that truth is best explored through intimate friendships, based on candor, openness and shared hopes. Nowhere is this clearer than in his relationship with the gay poet and writer John Addington Symonds. Schultz' discussion in Chapter Six of Symonds and Sidgwick on the issue of Symonds' homosexuality and the ethics of 'coming out' are both informative and interesting, providing us with some insight into how Sidgwick developed his views regarding veracity, sexuality, and hypocrisy.

Chapter Seven examines Sidgwick's works on politics, political science and political economy. It deals mainly with Sidgwick's *The Principles of Political Economy* and *The Elements of Politics*. Schultz demonstrates how far Sidgwick strayed from early utilitarians, especially Bentham, by embracing semi-socialistic economic and political policies. There is a long discussion of Sidgwick's views on imperialism, race and colonization (605-68). Despite raising the importance of protecting the rights, etc. of those who are colonized and the difficulties associated with doing so, Sidgwick remained committed to the civilizing elements of the imperial project (it would bring 'better religion' and 'truer science', and more plausible political institutions). He often described non-Europeans as 'semi-civilized' or as belonging to 'lower' races or worse (316-17, 622, 631ff, 647). In the eighth and final chapter

Schultz further discusses Sidgwick's views on race, theism, paranormal phenomena, and other matters. Schultz accuses Sidgwick of not objecting strongly enough to the racist views that his friends published (especially James Bryce and Charles Henry Pearson). He calls Sidgwick dishonest for the role he played in helping Symonds' biographer represent his sexual agonizing as religious agonizing. This is unfortunate for those who think of Sidgwick as rather saintly. The second charge does not, however, serve to impugn Sidgwick's character. He had good reasons for lying (of which Schultz is aware): he would protect his friend's reputation, remain loyal to Symonds' wishes, protect his family, Sidgwick's own reputation and free Sidgwick's other endeavors (e.g., the promotion of women's higher education) of guilt by association (709-14). Schulz does not simply want to note Sidgwick's statements about race and his seeming dishonesty, however; he seems to think that Sidgwick's views on these and other matters cast a dark shadow over other parts of his work, threatening their philosophical viability (192, 273-74, 606-07). However, further argument is required to establish this.

Anthony Skelton
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

This is a collection of seventeen previously published papers. Smith's *The Moral Problem* (Blackwell 1994) has been a focus of discussion in meta-ethics and moral psychology for the past decade. In general, the papers reprinted here clarify, refine, and extend the arguments in Smith's earlier book. Some are responses to criticisms of *The Moral Problem* by Russ Schafer-Landau, David Brink, David Copp, and Geoffrey Sayre-McCord. A response to Philip Pettit on a topic featured in *The Moral Problem*, but stemming from an article in neither the earlier book nor this one, is also present. Besides its substance, one of the reasons for the centrality of *The Moral Problem* in meta-ethics is the clarity of Smith's writing, which is marked by a concisely presented, carefully articulated web of arguments. The present book exemplifies the same substantive and stylistic virtues. Readers familiar with *The Moral Problem* will find much of interest here. Readers unfamiliar with Smith's earlier work will here find concise presentation of many of the arguments

central to Smith's overall position. Despite being a collection of independent articles, *Ethics and the A Priori* strongly gives the impression of presenting a unified position. However, there is notable repetition of important arguments. Due to the unity of Smith's position, I will concentrate on central arguments, pointing to individual papers only insofar as they are of special interest. This brief presentation of arguments that Smith presents in several different ways cannot help but obscure important subtleties, but the overall shape of the position should be clear.

I shall call Smith's method *rational psychology* — the a priori exploration of the psychology of ideally rational agents. Smith here explores the psychology of such agents in connection with a) the explanation of action, and b) the nature of value. These considerations come together in Smith's important account of the nature of normative reasons. At the heart of this account is Smith's version of the dispositional theory of value. This sort of theory holds that facts about values are facts about idealized desires (e.g., 9), that is, the desires of ideally rational agents. The link between value and ideally rational agents is provided by the notion of *desirability* (e.g., 93): for something to be a value is for it to be desirable, where 'desirable' is to be taken, in the familiar parlance, as worth desiring. What is it for something — some course of action, for example — to be worth desiring for a given person X? The answer that Smith develops is that it is for that thing or course of action to be what an ideally rational version of X would want for X in X's circumstances. As Smith puts it, ' ... there is an analytic connection between the desirability of an agent's acting in a certain way in certain circumstances, and her desiring that she acts in that way in those circumstances if she were fully rational ...' (93) This view delivers, without further amendment, Smith's position on the nature of normative reasons. Normative reasons, in contrast with motivating reasons, are reasons that justify actions. Whereas Smith commits himself to a version of a Humean account of the nature of motivating reasons, and hence to a view of motivating reasons as constituted by belief-desire pairs, normative reasons are instead propositions, the content of which is delivered by the dispositional theory of value: 'normative reasons are propositions concerning the desirability of acting in certain ways, where facts about desirability are in turn simply facts about our idealised desires' (61). So, X has normative reason to do whatever a fully rational version of X would desire X to do in X's circumstances.

To recognize a normative reason is to have a belief. Smith's commitment to a Humean account of motivation entails that for X to act in accordance with normative reasons, X must also have a desire to do so. Smith's account of this turns on another feature of the psychology of the rational agent: coherence. Smith argues that when a rational agent believes that s/he has normative reason to perform a certain course of action, s/he will also form the desire to do so. Consider X again. X's normative reasons for action are determined by the perspective of a fully rational version of X. The importance of this perspective lies in its possession of a fully idealized set of desires. Smith holds that this set is maximally unified and coherent. So, for X to