

6

Genesis and Difference: Deleuze, Maïmon, and the Post-Kantian Reading of Leibniz

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Introduction: Deleuze, Maïmon, Leibniz

Deleuze's appropriation of Leibniz's philosophy is undertaken from a resolutely post-Kantian viewpoint. On this score, it would be difficult to overemphasize the influence on Deleuze of Salomon Maïmon, one of the earliest critics of Kant's critical philosophy. Maïmon's *Essay on Transcendental Philosophy* was published in 1790, one year before the publication of Kant's *Critique of Judgment*. It was Maïmon's critiques of Kant that largely determined the subsequent direction of post-Kantian philosophy, at least with regard to the issues that would come to preoccupy Deleuze's early work. The two primary substantive exigencies laid down by Maïmon in his critique of Kant reappear like leitmotifs in almost every one of Deleuze's books up through 1969, even if Maïmon's name is not always explicitly mentioned: the search for the *genetic* elements of *real* experience (and not merely the conditions of possible experience), and the positing of a principle of *difference* as the fulfillment of this condition (whereas identity is the condition of the possible, difference is the condition of the real). One might say that these two exigencies of Maïmon's thought are the two components of Deleuze's own 'transcendental empiricism'.¹

In this article, I would like to examine the way in which Deleuze's early interpretation of Leibniz was determined by his reading of Maïmon's critique of Kant. Deleuze considered Maïmon to be 'a great, great philosopher', (*CGD* 13 March 1978), and his own understanding of Maïmon was indebted to the well-known French interpretations of Martial Gueroult and Jules Vuillemin.² In general terms, Maïmon's influence on Deleuze can be traced to at least two factors.

First, within the context of the critical tradition, Maïmon is the great philosopher of immanence. 'For Maïmon', writes Gueroult, 'the only

untouchable aspect of the critical philosophy was the Copernican spirit of the method: nothing can be advanced that cannot be immediately justified from the viewpoint of the *immanent* consciousness in which alone the relation of the subject to the object must be determined' (Gueroult 1930, p. 110). Almost all Maimon's critiques are aimed at eliminating the illegitimate vestiges of transcendence that still remain in Kant, given the presuppositions of a transcendental subject. Like Jacobi, for instance, Maimon rejects the 'thing-in-itself' as the introduction of a transcendent element outside the immanent field of consciousness, an illegitimate transcendent application of the category of causality. Deleuze's own relation to Kant, of course, is far more complex: Deleuze aligns himself squarely with the critical project insofar as it is a purely *immanent* critique of reason;³ yet in making the field of immanence immanent *to* the subject (or consciousness), Kant reintroduced an element of transcendence that Deleuze rejects.⁴ Nonetheless, although Maimon's thought operates entirely within the presupposition of the transcendental subject, he remains a model for Deleuze on how to reconcile immanence and transcendental philosophy.

Second, in pursuing these immanent aims, Maimon produced a revised transcendental philosophy of his own described as a *Koalitionssystem*, a 'coalition system' that reached back to the pre-Kantians and incorporated elements of Spinoza, Leibniz, and Hume: a revised critical philosophy that deliberately combined the scepticism of Hume with the rationalism of Leibniz and Spinoza.⁵ In this sense, Maimon functions as a true precursor to Deleuze, who not coincidentally made use of the same three thinkers in formulating his own position, writing important monographs on each. Maimon's use of the history of philosophy is not only a model of the kind of methodology Deleuze utilizes in his own monographs, but the thinkers Maimon appeals to seem to have guided Deleuze directly in his own selection of precursors.

Using Maimon as our guide, then, the following sections will examine (1) Maimon's genetic critique of Kant, and Deleuze's appropriation of it in his reading of Nietzsche; (2) the reason a principle of difference is needed in a genetic philosophy (and Maimon's own hesitations on this score); and (3) Deleuze's own attempt to deduce the principle of difference in his reading of Leibniz.

The problem of genesis

Let us turn first to Maimon's genetic critique of Kant. Kant presents the critical philosophy as a tribunal of reason: reason is to sit in judgement

of itself. This is at once the greatness and limitation of the Kantian project. Kant's philosophy is a purely *immanent* critique of reason: what haunts reason are less the errors produced by *external* factors (the senses, the body, the passions) than the illusions generated *internally* by reason itself (the Self, the World, God). 'It is not the slumber of reason that engenders monsters', writes Deleuze, 'but vigilant and insomniac rationality' (AO 122). Beginning with Salomon Maïmon, however, the post-Kantians criticized this idea of a tribunal in which reason itself is at once defendant, prosecutor, and judge. 'Is this not the Kantian contradiction, making reason both the tribunal and the accused; constituting it as judge and plaintiff, judging and judged? Kant lacked a method which permitted reason to be judged from the inside without giving it the task of being its own judge. And in fact, Kant does not realize his project of immanent critique' (NP 91). The question then becomes: What method could fulfill this exigency of an immanent critique?

This is where Maïmon intervenes: his primary objection was that Kant ignored the demands of a *genetic* method. Kant relies on 'facts', for which he searches the conditions. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant does more than claim that reason implies *a priori* knowledge; he adds that the so-called universal knowledges of pure sciences such as mathematics are the knowledges in which reason necessarily manifests itself, they are *a priori* 'facts' of reason. The second Critique similarly takes as its point of departure the 'fact' of the judgement of value and moral action. Such is the circularity of Kant's method of conditioning: Kant simply assumes these 'original facts' of knowledge and morality as givens, and then seeks their conditions of possibility in the transcendental – a vicious circle that makes the condition (the possible) refer to the conditioned (the real) while reproducing its image. Maïmon, by contrast, argued that Kant's claim to ground the critique uniquely on reason would be valid only if these *a priori* knowledges had been deduced, or rather *engendered*, from reason alone as the necessary modes of its manifestation. The critical philosophy could not be content with Kant's simple method of *conditioning*, in other words, but had to be transformed into a method of genesis.⁶

The Kantian appeal to factuality has been critiqued on both *a posteriori* and *a priori* grounds. The *a posteriori* critique (Bachelard, Popper) rightly shows that Kant's 'facts' of both knowledge (Euclidean geometry and Newtonian mechanics) and morality (Protestant Religion and the Prussian state) are historically contingent, and hence that Kant's transcendental is little more than an abstract and atemporal image of the science and morality of his own epoch. 'Kant's "proper usage of the

faculties"', Deleuze writes, 'mysteriously coincides with these established values' (NP 93). This is what Deleuze calls the method of *tracing*: Kant's simply traced the structures of the transcendental from the empirical. Kant believed he was able to determine the necessary conditions of all possible experience, but in reality the Kantian transcendental is a false transcendental, and the Kantian critique is a false critique. Kant's 'universal' is simply a reflection of the universe of his time.

But this *a posteriori* critique remains inadequate if it is not taken to a properly *a priori* level. In *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Deleuze argues that Nietzsche's philosophy, far from representing a rejection of Kant, was in fact the first philosophy to truly fulfill the immanent aims of Kant's critical project. 'Nietzsche seems to have sought a radical transformation of Kantianism, a re-invention of the critique which Kant betrayed at the same time as he conceived it, a resumption of the critical project on a new basis and with new concepts' (NP 52). The reason: Nietzsche brought the critique to bear, not merely on *false claims* to knowledge and morality, but on knowledge and morality themselves, on true knowledge and true morality – and indeed, on the values of truth and reason themselves. 'The will to truth requires a critique – let us thus define our own task – the value of truth must for once be experimentally *called into question* ... We need a *critique of moral values, the value of these values must first be brought into question*'.⁷ As Deleuze puts it, 'Critique has done nothing insofar as it has not been brought to bear on truth itself, on true knowledge, on true morality' (NP 90).

Nietzsche and Philosophy explicitly interprets Nietzsche's project as a fulfilment of Maimon's demand for a genetic method. The post-Kantians, Deleuze writes, 'demanded a principle which was not merely conditioning in relation to objects, but which was also truly genetic and productive (a principle of internal difference or determination). They also condemned the survival in Kant of miraculous harmonies between terms that remain external to each other. [...] If Nietzsche belongs to the history of Kantianism, it is because of the original way in which he deals with these post-Kantian demands' (NP 51–2). Nietzsche was not content to discover transcendental principles that would constitute the *condition of possibility* for the 'facts' of reason (knowledge and morality). Instead, he was intent on discovering immanent principles that were capable of giving an account of the *genesis* or genealogy of knowledge and morality (and which he thought he had found in the will to power and the eternal return).

Nietzsche in this way carries the critique of Kant to an *a priori* level. He does not simply critique Kant for deriving the 'fact' of knowledge from empirical and historically contingent models; what Nietzsche places in question is rather the value and *a priori* status of knowledge itself as a supposed 'fact' of reason in the first place. Maimon's call for a genetic method, Deleuze suggests, found its fulfilment in Nietzsche's method of genealogy. The central chapter of *Nietzsche and Philosophy* ('Critique') outlines the means by which Nietzsche effected the transformation of Kantianism: conditions of real experience are substituted for conditions of possible experience; genetic and plastic principles are substituted for transcendental principles (in the Kantian sense of conditioning).

For Deleuze, then, the genetic method is the only means of fulfilling the immanent ambitions of the critical philosophy. 'Without this reversal', Deleuze writes, 'the famous Copernican Revolution amounts to nothing' (*DR* 162). But what exactly is the nature of the genetic method? And how does it transform transcendental philosophy (a transcendental philosophy *without* a subject)?⁸ Throughout his work, Deleuze elaborates several requirements for these genetic conditions. First, the condition must be a condition of *real* experience, and not merely of *possible* experience. This means, second, that the condition cannot be (or be conceived) in the image of the conditioned, that is, the structures of the transcendental field cannot simply be traced off the empirical. Third, to be a condition of real experience, the condition can be no broader than what it conditions; that is, the condition must be determined *along with* what it conditions, and must *change* as the conditioned changes (conditions are not universal but singular). Fourth, the nature of the 'genesis' in the genetic method must be understood, not as a dynamic genesis (a historical or developmental genesis) but rather as a static genesis (a genesis that moves from the virtual to its actualization). Finally, in order to remain faithful to these exigencies, the genesis requires an element of its own, something distinct from the form of the conditioned, 'something ideational or unconditioned', that would be capable of 'determining at once the condition and the conditioned' (*LS* 122).

It is precisely this latter criterion that lies at the basis of Deleuze's break with the post-Kantian tradition. What is the nature of this unconditioned element that lies at the basis of the genetic method? Is the unconditioned the 'totality' (Hegel) or the 'differential' (Deleuze)? Is it external difference (the 'not-X' of Hegel) or internal difference (the *dx* of Deleuze)?

The principle of difference

This leads us, then, to the question of difference. Maimon posed the fundamental exigency of a genetic philosophy: it requires something *unconditioned* capable of assuring a real genesis.⁹ But Martial Gueroult showed that Maimon himself hesitated between two ways of solving the problem of genesis:

The principle of identity, not as a simple concept of reflection, but as a transcendental principle determining the object in general a priori, is alone absolutely pure and a priori; in relation to it, difference as reality, under whatever aspect it is perceived [*sous quelque aspect qu'on l'aperçoit*], even in mathematics, is only a given. How can one bring together, in an *a priori* synthesis, in view of a pure genesis, an empty principle that is absolutely a priori with a material principle that is not? Maimon oscillates between two solutions: first, to turn difference into a pure principle like identity ... In a certain fashion this is the path Schelling will choose in the philosophy of Nature ... This conception everywhere has the same consequences ...: the suppression of the immanence in the knowing subject of the constitutive elements of knowledge; the finite subject Ego [*Moi*] is posterior to the realities of which it has knowledge ... But another solution presents itself: identity being absolutely pure, and diversity always being a given (*a priori* and *a posteriori*), identity can be posited as the property of the thinking subject, and difference as an absence of identity resulting from the limitation of the subject.¹⁰

My hypothesis is that this passage in Gueroult had an important influence on the early Deleuze, since it pointed the way to an alternate post-Kantian trajectory for him, one in which Maimon occupied a strategic position. Gueroult outlines two possible solutions to Maimon's problematic of genesis: *either* one turns to a pure (formal) principle of identity, as does Fichte (the I = I); *or* one turns to a pure (material) principle of difference, which is the path that will be retrieved and pursued by Deleuze. In the latter case, as Gueroult notes, the subject would be 'posterior to the realities of which it has knowledge', that is, the subject would no longer be *constitutive*, as it is in Kant. Speaking very generally, the latter is the function that the 'genetic method' takes on in Deleuze's philosophy. There is no universal or *a priori* transcendental subject that might function as the basis of knowledge or a universal ethics, but only heterogeneous processes of *subjectivation*, each of which must be

analyzed for its own account. (PV 14–17) There is no universal form of an ‘object = x’, defined by its identity to itself, but only diverse processes of *objectification*. There is no ‘pure reason’ or rationality *par excellence*, but only diverse and historically variable processes of *rationalization*, of the kind analyzed by Alexandre Koyré, Gaston Bachelard, and Georges Canguilhem in the field of epistemology, Max Weber in sociology, and François Châtelet in philosophy. There is no ‘One’, but only processes of *unification*; there is no ‘Totality’, but only processes of *totalization*; and so on.

What one finds in Deleuze’s early writings, then, is a reconsideration and inversion of the post-Kantian tradition. Starting with Fichte, the post-Kantian philosophers took up Maïmon’s challenge, but they still subordinated the principle of difference to the principle of identity. In Fichte, identity is posited as the property of the thinking subject, with difference appearing only as an extrinsic limitation imposed from without (the non-self, the not-X). Hegel, against Fichte, placed difference and identity in dialectical opposition; but even in Hegel, this contradiction always resolves itself, and in resolving itself, it resolves difference by relating it to a ground. This is the movement one finds in Hegel’s larger *Logic*: identity, difference, differentiation, opposition, contradiction and ground.¹¹ But although Deleuze’s early writings are marked by an anti-Hegelian reaction, Deleuze pursued his critique of Hegel in a deliberately oblique manner. Rather than writing directly on Hegel, Deleuze’s strategy seems to have been to return to the Maïmonian problematics that generated the post-Kantian tradition in the first place, but precisely in order to formulate a divergent solution to these same problematics. In this way, for the ‘major’ post-Kantian tradition of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, Deleuze substituted his own subterranean or ‘minor’ post-Kantian tradition of Maïmon, Nietzsche, and Bergson, which he linked up, following Maïmon’s suggestion, with the more recognizable pre-Kantian trio of Hume, Spinoza, and Leibniz. Deleuze’s writings on Bergson and Nietzsche are infused with Maïmonian themes; in them, one can easily discern, alongside the negative criticisms of Hegel, Deleuze’s positive movements toward an alternate formulation of the problems of genesis and difference. As Deleuze writes in another context, ‘the philosophical learning of an author is not assessed by number of quotations [...] but by the apologetic or polemical directions of his work itself’ (NP 162). Maïmon’s influence on Deleuze is all the more ubiquitous for not always being named: the questions Deleuze poses to Bergson and Nietzsche are most often Maïmonian questions.

This is the point at which Leibniz intervenes. Deleuze accepts Maimon's claim that a viewpoint on *internal genesis* needed to be substituted for Kant's principle of *external conditioning*. But as he would later explain, 'doing this means returning to Leibniz, but on bases *other* than Leibniz's. All the elements to create a genesis such as the post-Kantians demand it are virtually in Leibniz'¹² (CGD 20 May 1980). In other words, it was through his rereading of Leibniz that Deleuze would develop a formulation of the principle of difference that was adequate to the problem of genesis. Hence, although Deleuze published his book-length study of Leibniz rather late in his career, his more profound – and, I believe, more important – engagement with Leibniz had already occurred in the work leading up to *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense*, as well as in an important series of seminars on Leibniz that Deleuze gave in 1980. In these earlier works, Deleuze approached Leibniz from a Maimonian and post-Kantian point of view, claiming that the question of genesis (and the redefinition of the transcendental field) could only be resolved by returning to Leibniz, 'but on bases *other* than Leibniz's'. One of these other 'bases' was the formulation of a pure principle of *difference*, which alone would be capable of freeing thought from 'representation' (whether finite or infinite), and its concomitant subordination to the principle of identity. As Maimon had shown, whereas identity is the condition of possibility of thought in general, it is difference that constitutes the genetic condition of *real* thought. But how exactly does difference function as a genetic principle?

Leibniz: From identity to difference

In this section, I would like to show how Deleuze in effect *deduces* a principle of difference from Leibniz's thought – in a manner not evident in Leibniz himself – starting with the most simple expression of the principle of identity ('A is A'), and then making its way through the principles of sufficient reason and indiscernibility, and the law of continuity. What emerges from Deleuze's reading of Leibniz is, as Deleuze puts it, 'a Leibnizian transcendental philosophy that bears on the event rather than the phenomenon, and replaces the Kantian conditioning' (TF 120).

The principle of identity

Deleuze begins his deduction with the simplest statement of the principle of identity: 'A is A'. 'Blue is blue', 'a triangle is a triangle', 'God is God'. Leibniz himself had already asked: do these formal expressions

of the principle of identity make us think anything? Such formulae, he says, are certain but empty; they 'seem to do nothing but repeat the same thing without telling us anything' (NE 361). A more popular formulation of the principle of identity would be: 'A thing is what it is'. This formula goes further than the formula 'A is A' because it shows us the ontological region governed by the principle of identity: identity consists in manifesting the identity between the thing and what the thing *is*, what classical philosophy termed the 'essence' of a thing. In Leibniz, every principle is a *ratio*, a 'reason', and the principle of identity can be said to be the *ratio* or rule of essences, the *ratio essendi*. But Leibniz also provides us with a more technical formulation of the principle of identity, derived from logic: 'every analytic proposition is true'. What Leibniz means here is that the simple formal statement of the principle of identity ('A is A') has a *vector* running through it that moves from the predicate to the subject. This vector becomes clear when one considers the simplest form of judgement, the judgement of *attribution*, such as 'the sky is blue' or 'A is B'. Plato had already seen that every judgement of attribution (A is B) is a kind of an offence against the principle of identity (A is A).

Philosophy explains this by saying that a judgement of attribution attributes a property to a subject, or an attribute to a substance. In a judgement of attribution, in other words, A and B *are not the same*: 'blue' is a predicate that is attributed to the subject 'sky'. But this implies that even the formal statement of the principle of identity (A is A) is vectorized, even though it conceals this *internalized difference* between A and A. An *analytic* proposition is simply a proposition in which the subject and the predicate are *identical*, even though the distinction between subject and predicate remains. 'A is A' is itself an analytic proposition, since the predicate A is contained in the subject A; and therefore 'A is A' is true. But to complete the detail of Leibniz's formula, we would have to distinguish between two types of identical propositions: an analytic proposition is true either by reciprocity or by inclusion. The proposition 'a triangle has three angles' is an identical proposition because the predicate ('three angles') is the same as the subject ('triangle') and *reciprocates* with the subject. In the proposition 'a triangle has three sides', by contrast, there is no reciprocity, but there is a demonstrable *inclusion* or *inherence* of the predicate in the subject, since we cannot conceptualize a single figure having three angles without this figure also having three sides. One could say that analytic propositions of reciprocity are objects of *intuition*, whereas analytic propositions of inclusion are the objects of a *demonstration*. What Leibniz calls *analysis* is the

operation that discovers a predicate in a notion taken as a subject. If I show that a given predicate is contained in a notion, then I have done an analysis. All this is basic logic: up to this point, Leibniz's greatness as a thinker has not yet appeared.

Principle of sufficient reason

Leibniz's originality emerges with his second great principle, the principle of sufficient reason, which no longer refers to the domain of essences but the domain of things that actually exist, the domain of existences. The corresponding *ratio* is no longer the *ratio essendi* but the *ratio existendi*, the reason for existing. The popular expression of this principle would be, 'everything has a reason' – the great battle cry of rationalism. Leibniz needs this second principle because existing things seem to be completely outside the principle of identity. The principle of identity concerns the identity of the thing and what the thing is, even if the thing itself does not exist. I know that unicorns do not exist, but I can still say what a unicorn is. Leibniz thus needs a second principle to make us think existing beings (real experience, in post-Kantian terminology). The technical formulation of the principle of sufficient reason reads: 'all predication has a foundation in the nature of things'. What this means is that *everything* that is truly predicated of a thing is necessarily included in the concept of the thing. What is said or predicated of a thing? First of all, its essence, and at this level there is no difference between the principle of identity and the principle of sufficient reason, which takes up and presumes everything acquired with the principle of identity. But secondly, what is said or predicated of a thing is not only the essence of the thing, but also the totality of the affections and events that happen to or are related to or belong to the thing. For example: 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon'. Since this is a true proposition, Leibniz will say that the predicate 'crossed the Rubicon' *must* be contained in the concept of Caesar. 'Everything has a reason' means that everything that happens to something – all its 'differences' – must be contained or *included* for all eternity in the individual notion of a thing.¹³

Leibniz arrives at this remarkable claim, according to Louis Couturat, by reconsidering *reciprocity*. The principle of identity gives us a model of truth that is certain and absolute – an analytical proposition is necessarily a true proposition – but it does not make us *think* anything. So Leibniz reverses the formulation of the principle of identity using the principle of reciprocity: a true proposition is necessarily an analytic proposition. *The principle of sufficient reason is the reciprocal of the principle of identity*, and it allows Leibniz to conquer a radically new domain, the

domain of existing things.¹⁴ By means of this reversal, the principle of identity forces us to *think* something. The formal formula of the principle of identity ('A is A') is true because the predicate *reciprocates* with the subject, and Leibniz therefore applies this principle of reciprocity to the principle of identity itself. But the purely *formal* formulation prevents the reversal of the identity principle. The principle of sufficient reason is produced only through a reversal of the *logical* formulation of the principle of identity, but this latter reversal is clearly of a different order: *it does not go without saying*. Justifying this reversal is the task Leibniz undertakes as a philosopher, and it launches him into an infinite and perhaps impossible task. The principle of sufficient reason says not only that the concept of a subject contains everything that happens to the subject (all its differences), but also that we should be able to *demonstrate* that this is the case (just as we can demonstrate that the predicate 'three sides' is contained in the concept of the triangle).

Once Leibniz launches himself into the domain of the concept in this way, however, he cannot stop. Aristotle proposes an exquisite formula in the *Metaphysics*: at a certain point in the analysis of concepts, he says, it is necessary to *stop (anankstenai)*.¹⁵ For classical Aristotelian logic, concepts are *general*, not individual: the order of the concept refers to a generality, whereas the order of the individual refers to a singularity. By nature, a concept comprehends a *plurality* of individuals; the individual as such is not comprehensible by concepts. Put differently, *proper names* are not concepts. At a certain point, then, the process of conceptual specification must stop: we reach the final species (*infima species*), which necessarily groups together a plurality of individuals. Leibniz, however, did not heed Aristotle's warning: he does not stop. Leibniz's attempted to push the analysis of the concept to the level of the individual: in Leibniz, 'Adam' and 'Caesar' are concepts, and not simply proper names.

But this cry of sufficient reason will propel Leibniz into an almost hallucinatory conceptual creation. For if everything I attribute with truth to a subject is contained in the concept of the subject, Leibniz realized, then I am also forced to include *the totality of the world* in the concept by virtue of the principle of *causality*. The principle of sufficient reason ('everything has a reason') is not the same thing as the principle of causality ('everything has a cause'). 'Everything has a cause' means that A is caused by B, B is caused by C, and so on; 'everything has a reason', by contrast, means that one has to give a *reason* for causality itself, namely, that the relation A maintains with B must in some manner be included or comprised in the concept of A.¹⁶ This is how the principle

of sufficient reason goes beyond the principle of causality: the principle of causality states the *necessary cause* of a thing but not its *sufficient reason*. Sufficient reason expresses the relation of the thing with its own concept, whereas causality expresses the relations of the thing with something else. Sufficient reason can be stated in the following manner: for every thing, there is a concept that gives an account both of the thing and of its relations with other things, including all its causes and its effects. Thus, once Leibniz says that the predicate 'crossing the Rubicon' is included in the concept of Caesar, he is forced to include the totality of the world in Caesar's concept because all the causes and effects of this event (such as the establishment of the Roman Empire) are *also* included in the concept of Caesar. This is no longer the concept of inherence or inclusion, but the fantastic Leibnizian concept of *expression*: the concept of the subject expresses the entirety of the world.

But a second concept follows immediately: each individual notion comprehends or includes the totality of the world, he says, but only from a certain *point of view*. This marks the beginning of perspectivist philosophy, which has often been trivialized. Leibniz does *not* say that everything is 'relative' to the viewpoint of the subject, which would imply that the subject is prior to the point of view. In Leibniz, it is precisely the opposite: the subject is constituted by the point of view; points of view are the sufficient reason of subjects. The individual concept is the point of view through which the individual expresses the totality of the world. But what then determines this point of view? To be sure, the concept expresses most of the world in an obscure and confused manner in the form of *infinitely small perceptions* – a third concept. But there *is* indeed a finite portion of the world that I express clearly and distinctly, which is the portion of the world that affects my *body*. Leibniz provides a deduction of the necessity of the body as that which occupies the point of view: no two individual substances occupy the same point of view on the world because none have the same clear or distinct zone of expression on the world as a function of their body (I do not express clearly and distinctly the crossing of the Rubicon since that concerns Caesar's body). We can see how the problem of sufficient reason leads Leibniz to create an entire sequence of concepts – expression, point of view, minute perceptions, and so on – in accordance with Deleuze's definition of philosophy as the creation of concepts.

Principle of indiscernibles

But this leads us into a final set of problems. The world, Leibniz continues, has no existence outside the points of view that express it: what

is expressed (the world) has no existence apart from what expresses it (individuals). In other words, there is no world in itself: yet each of these individual notions must nonetheless express the *same* world. Why is this a problem for Leibniz? The principle of identity allows us to determine what is contradictory, that is, what is *impossible*. A square circle is a circle that is not a circle; it contravenes the principle of identity. But at the level of sufficient reason, things are more complicated. In themselves, Caesar not crossing the Rubicon and Adam not sinning are neither contradictory nor impossible. Caesar could have not crossed the Rubicon, and Adam could have not sinned, whereas a circle cannot be square. The truths governed by the principle of sufficient reason (truths of existence) are thus not of the same type as the truths governed by the principle of identity (truths of essence). But how can Leibniz at the same time hold that everything Adam did is contained for all time in his individual concept, and that Adam the non-sinner was nonetheless possible? Leibniz's famous response is that Adam the non-sinner was possible in itself, but it was impossible with rest of the actualized world. Leibniz here creates an entirely new logical relation of *incompossibility* which is irreducible to impossibility or contradiction. At the level of existing things, it is not enough to say that a thing is possible in order to exist; it is also necessary to know with what it is compossible. The conclusion Leibniz draws from this notion is perhaps his most famous doctrine, which was ridiculed by Voltaire in *Candide*: among the infinity of impossible worlds, God makes a calculation and chooses the 'Best' of all possible worlds to pass into existence, which is *this* world, a world governed by a harmony that is 'pre-established' by God.

But this sets us on the path of the third principle, the principle of indiscernibles, which is the reciprocal of the principle of sufficient reason. The principle of sufficient reason says: for every thing, there is a concept that includes everything that will happen to the thing. The principle of indiscernibles says: for every concept, there is one and only one thing. What this means is that, in the final analysis, *every difference is a conceptual difference*. If you have two things, there must be two concepts; if not, there are not two things. If you assign a difference to two things, there is necessarily a difference in their concepts. The principle of indiscernibles consists in saying that we have *knowledge* only by means of concepts, and this can be said to correspond to a third reason, a third *ratio: ratio cognoscendi*, or reason as the reason of knowing. The principle of indiscernibles has two important consequences for Deleuze. First, Leibniz is the first philosopher to say that concepts are proper

names, that is, that concepts are *individual* notions. But can we not say that the concept 'human', for instance, is a generality that applies to all individual humans, including both Caesar and Adam? Of course you can say that, Leibniz retorts, but only if you have *blocked* the analysis of the concept at a certain point, at a *finite* moment. But if you push the analysis to *infinity*, you will reach a point where the concepts of Caesar and Adam are no longer the same. According to Leibniz, this is why a mother sheep can recognize its little lamb: it knows its concept, which is individual. Second, in positing the principle of indiscernibles ('every difference is conceptual'), Leibniz is asking us to accept an enormous consequence. The reason: there are other types of difference, apart from conceptual difference, that might allow us to distinguish between individual things, such as numerical difference (for instance, I can distinguish drops of water numerically, or by number only, disregarding their individuality: one drop, two drops, three drops), spatio-temporal difference ('not *this* drop here, but *that* drop over there'), or differences in extension or figure (shape and size) and differences in movement (fast and slow). These are all non-conceptual differences because they allow us to distinguish between two things that nonetheless have the same concept. Once again, however, Leibniz plunges on; he calmly tells us, no, these differences are pure appearances, provisional means of expressing a difference of another nature, and this difference is always conceptual. If there are two drops of water, they do not have the same concept. Non-conceptual differences only serve to translate, in an imperfect manner, a deeper difference that is always conceptual.

It is here that we reach the crux of Deleuze's early reading of Leibniz. Although no one went further than Leibniz in the exploration of sufficient reason, Leibniz nonetheless subordinated sufficient reason to the requirements of 'representation': in reducing all differences to conceptual differences, Leibniz defined sufficient reason by the ability of differences to be represented or mediated in a *concept*.¹⁷ In Aristotle, what 'blocks' the specification of the concept beyond the smallest species are the accidents of matter; in Kant, it is spatio-temporal intuitions that remain irreducible to the concept. Leibniz is able to reconcile the concept and the individual only because he gives the identity of the concept an *infinite* comprehension: every individual substance (monad) envelops the infinity of predicates that constitutes the state of the world. Where the extension of the concept = 1, the comprehension of the concept = ∞ (an actual infinity). It is one and the same thing to say that the concept goes to infinity (sufficient reason) and that the concept is individual (indiscernibility). In pushing the concept to the level of

the individual, however, Leibniz simply rendered representation (or the concept) infinite, while still maintaining the subordination of difference to the principle of identity in the concept.

For Deleuze, it is this subordination of difference to the identity of the concept that is illegitimate and ungrounded. In Leibniz, the principle of sufficient reason is the reciprocal of the principle of identity, and the principle of indiscernibles is in turn the reciprocal of the principle of sufficient reason. But would not the reciprocal of the reciprocal simply lead us back to the principle of identity? (*CGD* 06 June 1980). The fact that it does *not*, even in Leibniz, points to the irreducibility of the principle of sufficient reason to the principle of identity – in other words, it points to the fact that sufficient reason finds its ground, not in a principle of identity, but rather in a principle of difference. Deleuze's thesis is that behind or beneath the functioning of the identical concept – even the concept rendered infinite – there lies the movement of difference and multiplicity within an *Idea*. 'If we ask what blocks the concept, [...] It is always the excess of the Idea, which constitutes the superior positivity that arrests the concept or overturns the requirements of representation' (*DR* 289). Indeed, Deleuze presents *Difference and Repetition* in its entirety as a research into the roots of sufficient reason, which is formulated in a theory of non-representational Ideas, and which ultimately finds the ground of reason to be strangely 'bent' or 'twisted' into the ungrounded – the 'without-ground,' the *sans-fond* (difference-in-itself). Leibniz himself nowhere explicitly formulates a theory of Ideas, at least in the sense that Deleuze gives this term (in the Platonic and Kantian sense). Nonetheless whereas for Kant, Ideas were totalizing, unifying, and transcendent, in Deleuze's theory, Ideas must be differential, genetic, and immanent. Despite critiques of Leibniz, and his obvious distance from many of Leibniz's presuppositions (notably his theological presuppositions), it is in Leibniz himself that Deleuze finds the key for his reformulation of the theory of Ideas on an immanent and differential basis.

The law of continuity (the differential relation)

This brings us, finally, to the law of continuity. What is the difference between truths of essence (principle of identity) and truths of existence (principle of sufficient reason)? With truths of essence, says Leibniz, the analysis is finite, such that inclusion of the predicate in the subject can be demonstrated by a finite series of determinate operations.¹⁸ The analysis of truths of existence, by contrast, is necessarily infinite: the domain of existences is the domain of infinite analysis. If I perform

an *analysis* demonstrating the inclusion of the predicate 'sinner' in the individual notion 'Adam', the analysis will be *infinite* because it has to pass through the entire series of elements that constitute the world, which is actually infinite.¹⁹ When I perform the analysis, I pass from Adam the sinner to Eve the temptress, and from Eve the temptress to the evil serpent, and so on. Moving forward, I demonstrate that there is a direct connection between Adam's sin and the Incarnation and Redemption by Christ. There are *series* that are going to begin to fit into each other across the differences of time and space. (This was the aim of Leibniz's *Theodicy*: to justify God's choice of *this* world, with its interlocking series.) What matters at the level of truths of existence, in other words, is not the *identity* of the predicate and the subject, but rather the fact that one passes from one predicate to another, from the second to a third, from the third to a fourth, and so on. Put succinctly: *if truths of essence are governed by identity, truths of existence, by contrast, are governed by continuity*. The best of all possible worlds would be the one that realizes the maximum of continuity for a maximum of difference.

Now it might seem that such an infinite analysis would be possible only for God, whose divine understanding is without limits and infinite. As finite beings, we humans seem to be incapable of undertaking an infinite analysis. In order to situate ourselves in the domain of truths of existence, we have to wait for experience: we know through experience that Adam sinned or that Caesar crossed the Rubicon. Yet in Deleuze's interpretation, Leibniz indeed attempted to provide us finite humans with an artifice that is capable of undertaking a well-founded approximation of what happens in God's understanding, and this artifice is precisely the technique of the infinitesimal calculus or differential analysis. We as humans can undertake an infinite analysis thanks to the symbolism of the *differential calculus*. Most of the concepts Deleuze develops in *Difference and Repetition* to describe the nature of Ideas (differential relation, singularities, multiplicities or manifolds, virtual, problematic, etc.) are derived from the calculus. I will simply focus on the first of these concepts – the differential relation – since this is where we reach the point of inversion, so to speak, where Deleuze substitutes a principle of difference for a principle of identity. What does it mean to say that there is a continuity between the seduction of Eve and Adam's sin, and not simply an identity? It means that the relation between the two elements is an infinitely small relation; or rather, that *the difference between the two is a difference that tends to disappear*. This is the definition of the continuum: continuity is defined as the act of a difference insofar as the difference tends to disappear. Between the predicate 'sinner' and the subject 'Adam',

I will never be able to demonstrate a logical identity, but I will be able to demonstrate (and here the word demonstration obviously changes meaning) a continuity, that is, one or more vanishing differences.

What then is a vanishing difference? In 1701, Leibniz wrote a three-page text entitled 'Justification of the Infinitesimal Calculus by That of Ordinary Algebra', in which he explained the nature of the differential relation using an algebraic example (Figure 6.1) (L 545–6). Leibniz draws two right triangles – CAE and CXY – that meet at their apex, at point C. Since the two triangles CAE and CXY are similar, it follows that the ratio e/c (in the top triangle) is equal to $y/(x - c)$ (in the bottom triangle). What happens if we move the straight line EY increasingly to the right, so that it approaches point A, always preserving the same angle at the variable point C? Even though the length of the straight lines c and e will diminish steadily, the ratio between them will remain constant. When the straight line EY passes through A, points C and E will fall directly on A, and the straight lines c and e will vanish, they will become equal to zero. And yet, Leibniz says, even though c and e are now equal to zero, the relation of c to e is *not* equal to zero, since it remains a perfectly determinable relation that is still equal to the relation of x to y . Put differently, when the line EY passes through A, it is not the case that the triangle CEA has 'disappeared'; rather, the triangle CEA is still there, but it is only there 'virtually,' since the relation c/e continues to exist even when the terms have vanished. This is what the




Figure 6.1 An Algebraic Example of the Calculus.

term 'vanishing difference' means: it is when the relation continues even when the terms of the relation have disappeared. The differential relation can be said to be a *pure relation*, insofar as it is a relation that persists even when its terms have disappeared. The differential relation provides Deleuze with a mathematical formulations of a principle of pure difference, or what he calls *difference-in-itself*. Normally, we think of difference as a relation between two things that have a prior identity ('x is different from y'). With the notion of the differential relation, Deleuze takes the concept of difference to a properly transcendental level: the differential relation is not only *external* to its terms (which was Bertrand Russell's empiricist dictum), but it also *determines* its terms. In other words, difference here becomes *constitutive* of identity, that is, it becomes productive and genetic. This is what Deleuze means, in *Difference and Repetition*, when he says that relations such as identity, analogy, opposition, and resemblance are all secondary *effects* or results of prior relations of difference.

To give an example of how the differential relation functions as a *genetic* principle, consider the theory of perception that Leibniz developed in *The New Essays*. Leibniz had noted, famously, that we often perceive things of which we are not consciously aware, such as a dripping faucet at night. He concluded that our conscious perceptions are derived from the minute and unconscious perceptions of which they are composed, and which my conscious perception integrates. I can apprehend the noise of the ocean or the murmur of a group of people, for instance, but not necessarily the sound of each wave or the voice of each person that compose them. A conscious perception is produced when at least two of these minute and virtual perceptions – two waves, or two voices – enter into a *differential relation* that determines a *singularity* (another Deleuzian concept), an event that 'excels' over the others, and becomes conscious. Every conscious perception constitutes a constantly shifting threshold: the minute perceptions are like the obscure dust of the world, its background noise, what Maimon called the 'differentials of consciousness', which themselves constitute a *virtual multiplicity* (a third Deleuzian concept). Indeed, it was Maimon himself who drew out the consequences of such a psychic automatism of perception: it is the reciprocal determination of differentials (dx/dy) that produces the complete determination of the object as perception, and the determinability of space-time as condition. Space and time cease to be pure givens (as in Kant), but are engendered by the nexus of these differential relations in the subject; and objects cease to be empirical givens, but are the product of these relations in conscious perception. In Maimon, space,

time and objects are determined *genetically* through the mechanism of the differential relation.

Kant had already objected that Maimon, by returning to Leibniz, had thereby reintroduced the duality between finite understanding (consciousness) and infinite understanding (the divine) that the entire Kantian critique had attempted to eliminate.²⁰ Against Kant, however, Deleuze argues that the infinite here is only the presence of an *unconscious* in the finite understanding, an unthought in finite thought, a non-self in the finite self (whose presence Kant himself was forced to discover when he hollowed out the difference between a determining 'I' and a determinable 'me'). Indeed, Leibniz can be said to have developed one of the first theories of the unconscious, which is very different from the theory developed by Freud. Freud conceived of unconscious in a *conflictual* or *oppositional* relationship to consciousness, and not a *differential* relationship. In this sense, Freud was dependent on Kant, Hegel, and their successors, who explicitly oriented the unconscious in the direction of a conflict of will, and no longer a differential of perception. The theory of the unconscious proposed by Deleuze and Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus* is a differential and genetic unconscious, and thus thoroughly inspired by Leibniz.²¹

Conclusion

Were we to continue to follow Deleuze's deduction, we would have to show how, starting with this principle of difference, Deleuze on his own account systematically deduces his other metaphysical concepts: singularity, virtuality, multiplicity, convergent and divergent series, problematic, and so on. Our primary aim in this essay, however, has simply been to show how Deleuze derives a principle of difference starting from the purely formal statement of the principle of identity in Leibniz. (In *The Fold*, one could say that Deleuze's deduction moves in the opposite direction: from difference to identity, or, in the language of *The Fold*, from inflexion to inclusion.) But we can already see the broader consequences of reading Leibniz from a Maimonian or post-Kantian point of view. One of the aims of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* was to show that the Ideas of God, the World, and the Self or the Soul were transcendent illusions. To read Leibniz from a post-Kantian viewpoint would therefore amount to asking: What would Leibniz's philosophy look like *minus* the Ideas of the God, World and Self? Such a post-Kantian image of Leibniz would come close to a picture of Deleuze's philosophy. Its outlines can be found at the end of Deleuze's discussion of Whitehead's philosophy of the event (*TF* 81): (1) *God* would no longer be a transcendent being

who compares and chooses the richest compossible world, but would instead be an immanent Process (as in Whitehead) that affirms all impossibilities and divergences and passes through them. (2) The *World* would no longer be a continuous world defined by its pre-established harmony; instead, divergences, bifurcations, and impossibles must now be seen to belong to *one and the same universe*, a chaotic universe in which divergent series trace endlessly bifurcating paths, and give rise to violent discords and dissonances that are never resolved into a harmonic tonality: a 'chaosmos,' as Deleuze puts it (borrowing a portmanteau word from Joyce) and no longer a world. (Leibniz could only save the 'harmony' of *this* world by relegating discordances and disharmonies to *other* possible worlds – this was his theological slight of hand). (3) Finally, the *Self*, or the individual, rather than being closed upon the compossible and convergent world it expresses from within, would not be torn open, and kept open through the divergent series and impossible ensembles that continually pulls it outside of itself: the 'monadic' subject, as Deleuze puts it, would become the 'nomadic' subject. 'Instead of a certain number of predicates being excluded from a thing in virtue of the identity of its concept, each 'thing' opens itself up to the infinity of predicates through which it passes, as it loses its center, that is, its identity as concept or as self' (*LS* 174). The Leibnizian notion of *closure* would be replaced by the Deleuzian notion of *capture*. In the end, Deleuze does with Leibniz what he does with every figure in the history of philosophy: through an extraordinarily careful conceptual reading, Deleuze ultimately makes *use* of Leibniz's philosophy and Leibniz's concepts in the pursuit of his own philosophical aims.

Notes

1. Deleuze, for instance, applies this Maimonian formula at various instances to the work of Schelling, Bergson, Nietzsche, Foucault, and even Pasolini: (1) 'Thus it is not the conditions of all possible experience that must be reached, but the conditions of real experience. Schelling had already proposed this aim and defined his philosophy as a superior empiricism: this formulation also applies to Bergsonism' (*DI* 36). (2) 'The Nietzsche and the Kantian conceptions of critique are opposed on five main points: 1. Genetic and plastic principles that give an account of the sense and value of beliefs, interpretations and evaluations rather than transcendental principles which are simple conditions for so-called facts' (*NP* 93). (3) 'Foucault differs in certain fundamental respects from Kant: the conditions are those of real experience, and not of possible experience' (*F* 51, the final phrase of this sentence is inadvertently omitted from the English translation). (4) 'If it is worth making a philosophical comparison, Pasolini might be called post-Kantian (the conditions

- of legitimacy are the conditions of reality itself) while Metz and his followers remain Kantians (the falling back of principle upon fact)' (C2 276, translation modified).
2. Gueroult (1929); Vuillemin (1954). Gueroult's subsequent work on Fichte (1930) also contains an important discussion of Maimon in the introduction.
 3. See also *N* (145): 'Setting out a plane of immanence, tracing out a field of immanence is something all the authors I've worked on have done (even Kant – by denouncing any transcendent application of the syntheses of the imagination, even though he sticks to possible experience rather than real experience'. (translation modified) Albert Gualandi provides an insightful analysis of Deleuze's relation to Kant in his *Deleuze* (1998).
 4. See also *WP* (46): 'Beginning with Descartes, and then with Kant and Husserl, the cogito makes it possible to treat the plane of immanence as a field of consciousness. Immanence is supposed to be immanent to a pure consciousness, to a thinking subject. Kant will call this subject transcendental rather than transcendent, precisely because it is the subject of the field of immanence of all possible experience from which nothing, the external as well as the internal, escapes [...]. But in so doing Kant discovers the modern way of saving transcendence: this is no longer the transcendence of a Something, or of a One higher than everything (contemplation), but that of a Subject to which the field of immanence is only attributed by belonging to a Self that necessarily represents such a subject to itself (reflection)'.
 5. Maimon himself later renounced his 'Spinozism': 'I recognize that, in my first writing [the *Essay in Transcendental Philosophy*], I attempted this mortal leap and tried to reconcile the Kantian philosophy with Spinozism, but I am now completely persuaded that this undertaking is impracticable, and I believe it better to assure the synthesis of the Kantian philosophy with Hume's scepticism'. Maimon, *Magazin zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde* (1792), Teil (II, p. 143), cited in Gueroult (1929, p. 138).
 6. See Forster (1998, p. 162): 'Such supposed 'facts of consciousness' fall squarely within the domain of the skeptically dubitable'.
 7. Nietzsche (1967, Essay III, § 24, p. 153) (on truth); (Preface, § 6, p. 20) (on morality).
 8. See *LS* (105, 102): 'the question of knowing how the transcendental field is to be determined is very complex. [...]. We seek to determine an impersonal and pre-individual transcendental field' (Translation slightly modified).
 9. See *LS* (18–9 and 123) for Deleuze's statement of this exigency.
 10. Gueroult (1930, I, p. 126).
 11. See Hegel (1969, Vol. 1, Book 2, § 1, II), 'Determinations of Reflection' (Identity, Difference, Contradiction). Miguel de Beistegui has provided an important analysis of Deleuze's critiques of this section of Hegel's *Logic* in his chapter entitled 'Absolute Identity' (de Beistegui 2004, pp. 77–106).
 12. In the following section, I follow closely the deduction of principles that Deleuze presents in his 1980 seminars.
 13. See *TF* (41): 'If we call an "event" what happens to a thing, whether it undergoes the event or makes it happen, it can be said that sufficient reason includes the event as one of its predicates: the concept of the thing, or the notion. "Predicates or events", says Leibniz'.

14. See Couturat (1972, pp. 19–45). ‘The principle of identity states: every identity (analytic) proposition is true. The principle of reason affirms, on the contrary: every true proposition is an identity (analytic)’ (p. 22).
15. See Aristotle (1984, II, ii, 994b24).
16. See Mates (1986, p. 157): ‘To discover the reason for the truth of the essential proposition ‘A is B’ is to analyze the concept A far enough to reveal the concept B as contained in it’. Deleuze, however, would disagree with Mates’ statement that Leibniz ‘appears to use the terms ‘reason’ and ‘cause’ interchangeably’ (ibid., p. 158).
17. See *DR* (12): ‘According to the principle of sufficient reason, there is always one concept per particular thing. According to the reciprocal principle of the identity of indiscernibles, there is one and only one thing per concept. Together, these principles expound a theory of difference as conceptual difference, or develop the account of representation as mediation.’ See also *DR* (288): *difference* is always inscribed within the identity of the concept in general, and *repetition* is defined as ‘a difference without concept’, that is, in terms of the numerically distinct exemplars or individuals that are subsumed under the generality of the concept ($x^1, x^2, x^3, \dots x^n$), and which block further conceptual specification.
18. However, Deleuze will argue, against Leibniz himself, that the analysis of essences must itself be infinite, since it is inseparable from the infinity of God. See *TF* (42).
19. See *TF* (51): ‘In the area of existences, we cannot stop, because series are liable to be extended and must be so because inclusion cannot be localized’.
20. Letter to Marcus Herz, 26 May 1789, in Kant (1967, pp. 150–6).
21. See also *DR* (106–8), which contain Deleuze’s most explicit avocation of a differential unconscious (Leibniz, Fechner) over a conflictual unconscious (Freud).

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