the scandals Austria is so rich in, which Smith calls "one of the tragedies of Austrian philosophy". (20) Because he had married, Brentano was deprived of his professorship although he had left the priesthood before he had accepted his appointment at the University of Vienna. Brentano had been involved in the controversy over papal infallibility on the losing side. It was argued, by the enemies of Brentano, that since priests were not allowed to be married, Brentano had to be deprived of his professorship. Again ands again the faculty appealed unanimously to the emperor to reinstate him, but Franz Joseph continued to reject Brentano's reappointment. And that vacated, as Smith points out, a position for an "Ordinarius"-professor, a chair for "positivistic and atheistic movements". Ernst Mach and the Vienna Circle filled that vacancy. The section is concluded by a sketch of Brentano's disciples, and others around him that were to play an important academic role in the former Habsburg and later in the Anglo-American territory.

The chapters that follow the first, consist mostly of useful paraphrases of Brentano's philosophy, and the philosophies of his disciples, and of "value theory", then founded as a discipline, a discipline that is at its origin tied to what came to be called Austrian Economics. As the founder of "Austrian Economics" Smith discusses the work of Carl Menger (1840-1921). Smith's remark seems to summarize better than any other single statement the importance of Austrian Economics. "The school which [Menger] founded has been influential of late above all in virtue of its emphasis on the unsurveyable complexity of economic phenomena and on the consequent unfeasibility of economic planning." (300) Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, and others, including American Nobel prize winners have extended and developed these conceptions whose origin Smith sees in the tradition of the Austrian Catholic school-philosophy and the pre-Kantian, Leibnizian Popularphilosophie "that both Mach and the Brentanists share with Menger, the use of what we might call compositive method, consisting of the analysis of a given subject-matter into simple and basic elements together with an investigation of the systematic ways in which these elements may be combined together into wholes". (300)

<div style="text-align: right">*Kurt Rudolf Fischer*</div>

GUSTAV BERGMANN: *New Foundations of Ontology*, edited by William Heald, Foreword by Edwin B. Allaire, Madison and London: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1992.

The formal ontology here presented is what we might call a typed combinatorial Meinongian mereology. Its author seeks to formulate the laws, here called 'canons', regulating how entities can combine together in wholes of different sorts. The method, as in Bergmann's earlier works, involves the construction of an ideal language of such a sort that the analysis of complex wholes can be achieved by transforming our natural-language representations of reality into what we might think of as artificial characteristic maps or diagrams which allow the relevant on-

tological structures to be read off immediately from the symbolic representations which result. In former works Bergmann had held that the symbolic language of *Principia Mathematica* could serve as the appropriate diagrammatic device for such ontological purposes. Here, however, he moves away from the language of the standard first-order functional calculus and develops instead a new sort of diagrammatic language (though one which, as I have argued elsewhere, is still not fully adequate for the purposes in hand[1]).

Bergmann allows that the world is made or built up out of real constituent simples, which include, for him as for Russell, both particulars and universals. One central part of the ontologist's job is that of giving a list of the types of basic or fundamental elements and of their manners of combination. Where some might hold, idealistically, that such combination is always produced by thought or language (that talk of complex wholes is a mere *façons de parler* or a mere product of the economy of our thinking), Bergmann insists that there is real complexity, which implies in turn that, for him, not everything in reality can be accounted for exclusively in terms of simples.

Bergmann departs further from the earlier, Russellian tradition of formal ontology in rejecting logical atomism (or, equivalently, in denying that facts are the only sorts of complex wholes built up from simples). More precisely, Bergmann distinguishes two broad types of complex wholes: those involving what he now calls 'makers' (and had previously called 'ties'), and those that require no further element to hold their parts together. In some cases, in other words, the 'material' of a whole is in need of some additional ('unsaturated' or 'dependent') connector, a moment of unity in Husserl's terms, to bind its parts – for instance the so-called nexus of 'exemplification' in the case of a fact like *this is red*. In other cases – for instance in the case of the diversity of red and green – a whole is held by Bergmann to exist independently of any such binding moment. The formal theory of diads, of sheer diversity, and the theory of order constructed on its basis, is one of the most impressive contributions of the present volume.

In addition to facts, which involve makers, and circumstances – the sorts of complex wholes which exist in and of themselves – Bergmann recognizes a third type of complex whole, that of classes, which involve *selectors*, whose purpose is that of specifying which entities are to serve as elements of a given class. Finally, and not least importantly, the ontology here presented takes over the theory of intentionality developed by Bergmann in earlier writings. To provide a unified account of how thoughts intend their objects, Bergmann is constrained to adopt an ontology in which all thoughts possess objects appropriately tailored to fit; to this end he adopts a broadly Meinongian perspective, allowing that whatever is thinkable exists.[2] Existence, in its turn, he sees as coming in two modes, of either actuality or potentiality. Truth and falsehood he then defines in correspondence-theoretic terms, according to which a thought is true just in case the fact or circumstance it intends exists in the mode of actuality.

Out of these ingredients and via iteration and interrelation of the schemata here described the whole, subtle and powerful Bergmannian ontology is then

constructed. The text of the work is, it must be admitted, heavy going, though the reader is helped by a useful Introduction by the editor and by a Glossary of technical terms. One can understand why Bergmann himself felt unable to publish the work during his lifetime: it is often sketchy, and the diagrammatic goals he had set himself are far from being fully realized. The problems of genuine ontology are difficult indeed, and certainly Bergmann did not believe himself to have found, on all essential points, the definitive solution of these problems. Perhaps the most important thing in which the value of this work consists, however, is that it gives us a clear indication of just how much will have been achieved when these problems are indeed solved.

NOTES

1. See my "Characteristica Universalis", in K. Mulligan, ed., *Language, Truth and Ontology* (Philosophical Studies Series), Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer (1992), 50-81.
2. Meinong himself of course would have put the matter another way, preferring to regard the domain of existents as a sub-domain of the domain of entities in general: "the totality of what exists, including what has existed and what will exist, is infintely small in comparison with the totality of the Objects of knowledge." (*Über Gegenstandstheorie*, 1904)

Barry Smith

KURT BAIER: *The Rational and the Moral Order. The Social Roots of Reason and Morality*, Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1995.

Since the appearance of his *Moral Point of View* in 1958, Kurt Baier has been one of the main figures in the field of moral philosophy. He belongs to those philosophers in the analytical tradition who did not accept the verdict on moral judgements formulated by the early Logical Empiricists. Instead, he always walked the tightrope between untenable metaphysical claims about absolute values on the one hand and a noncognitivist position that maintains the meaninglessness of moral judgements, on the other. Thereby he tried to come to a theory of morals which enables us to distinguish between morally acceptable and morally inacceptable types of behaviour without having to maintain the existence of any nonnatural or supernatural facts.

In his recent book, *The Rational and the Moral Order*, Baier provides a comprehensive theory of morals, summarizing, unifying and carrying further the work of his life.

In the introduction, Baier acknowledges the fact that ethics did not and does not make a progress comparable to that of the natural sciences. This fact is then traced back to two internal difficulties of ethics. The *second* difficulty consists in