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Contractualism and radical pluralism[[1]](#footnote-1)

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I

An important issue in recent political philosophy has been how contractualist (or contractarian[[2]](#footnote-2)) accounts of justice and legitimacy should seek to accommodate and respond to the existence of *pluralism* within contemporary liberal states.[[3]](#footnote-3) Yet the kind of pluralism that has loomed large in these discussions is pretty tame. It is often restricted to those individuals and points of view that are reasonable and excludes those that are unreasonable. Sometimes it is even restricted to those who accept certain core liberal values. And while it involves disagreement at the level of fundamental moral convictions, it is often supposed to be compatible with agreement at the level of political principles and institutions.

By contrast, Ryan Muldoon’s aim in his impressive, refreshing, and thought-provoking book, *Social Contract Theory for a Diverse World*, is to consider the capacity of contractualism to accommodate and respond appropriately to the existence of a much more challenging form of pluralism that I shall call *radical pluralism*. Radical pluralism is characterised by widespread, persistent deep and intractable normative disagreement about the basic organisation of society. An important part of the reason why it is so deep and intractable is that it is the product, not merely of different beliefs and desires, but of what Muldoon calls different *perspectives* (p. 48). These explicitly include perspectives that are illiberal as well as liberal; and unreasonable as well as reasonable.

In considering whether contractualism is capable of responding plausibly to the existence of radical pluralism, Muldoon argues for both a negative thesis and a positive thesis. The negative thesis is that the dominant Kantian liberal model of contractualism is hopelessly ill equipped to respond appropriately to radical pluralism. As I read Muldoon, his objection is that the Kantian liberal faces a dilemma. Suppose, first, that she provides a specification of the contractual situation that tries to be *inclusive* of radical pluralism. In that case, Kantian contractualism will entail an *incomplete* and *ultra-minimal* account of justice. That’s because, it is unrealistic to expect that Kantian contractors will be able to agree on much, if anything in the face of radical pluralism. As Muldoon puts it, the existence of “diverse perspectives poses a significant challenge to the goal of political agreement” (p. 68).

Alternatively, suppose that the Kantian liberal provides a specification of the contractual situation that is *exclusive* of radical pluralism: that brackets, or eliminates, or assumes away deep and intractable political disagreement and that instead privileges certain liberal values. (According to Muldoon, this is true of at least the overwhelming majority of Kantian liberals.[[4]](#footnote-4)) In that case, the Kantian liberal is vulnerable to what I think we can usefully describe as a version of the so-called *conditional fallacy*.[[5]](#footnote-5) A counterfactual theory commits the conditional fallacy when certain respects in which the relevant counterfactual circumstances differ from the actual world make the relevant counterfactual theory give wrong verdicts in the actual world. A radical pluralism-exclusive interpretation of Kantian contractualism commits the conditional fallacy because the sorts of principles to which contractors would agree given their idealised non-pluralistic circumstances (liberal principles) are simply not plausible in circumstances of radical pluralism. Muldoon’s main argument for thinking they are not plausible is that a) particular principles are plausible candidates for principles of justice in circumstances C only insofar as they would be sufficiently *stable* in circumstances C (ch. 4), and that b) liberal principles are not going to be sufficiently stable in circumstances of radical pluralism. For one, members of non-liberal minorities will not abide by them and may even agitate to change them. For another, members of the liberal majority will be unwilling to support liberal principles to the extent that individuals whom they perceive to be outsiders are beneficiaries of the principles (ch. 5).

So much, then, for the negative thesis. The positive thesis (which takes up the overwhelming majority of the book) is that there is an alternative version of contractualism – what I shall call *Muldoonian contractualism* – that can do much better in accommodating radical pluralism. Muldoonian contractualism is a kind of Hobbesian contractualism (or contractarianism) rather than a kind of Kantian contractualism. Like other versions of Hobbesian contractualism, Muldoonian contractualism holds that justice and legitimacy are to be explained in terms of a mutually advantageous bargain (p. 66). But Muldoonian contractualism also differs in a number of important and interesting respects from other versions of Hobbesian contractualism, such as David Gauthier’s.[[6]](#footnote-6) First, Muldoon is quite explicit that the relevant justice-determining agreement is an *actual* agreement or bargain (an agreement that is supposed to actually happen) rather than a hypothetical agreement (an agreement that would or could or should happen under certain non-actual circumstances) (p. 120). Second, the relevant agreement is subject to *virtually no idealisations* or constraints. For example, there is no Lockean proviso and no assumption of mutual concern or unconcern or non-tuism or whatever. Third, the inputs to the agreement are, not merely beliefs and desires, but *perspectives* (pp. 80-84). Fourth, rather than a one-off agreement that is supposed to settle the substance and structure of justice once and for all, Muldoon holds that there will be *perpetual renegotiation* of the terms of the contract (pp. 6-7). Fifth, whereas Hobbesian contractualists typically construe the moral point of view as personal and partial (the view from somewhere), Muldoon construes the moral point of view more inclusively (indeed maximally inclusively) as *the view from everywhere* (pp. 45-57). Sixth, Muldoon claims that his contractors will come to appreciate the benefits of (and, hence, to actively embrace rather than merely tolerate) widespread diversity (ch. 5). Finally, there is a strong Millian flavour to Muldoon’s brand of Hobbesian contractualism. In particular, he emphasises, as few Hobbesian do, the importance of ongoing social experiments in living with regard to the organisation of the basic structure (ch. 2).

All this adds up to a highly distinctive and intriguing version of contractualism. It may also seem to be a version of contractualism that is particularly well placed to accommodate radical pluralism. The impossibility of reaching normative consensus, while fatal to Kantian versions of contractualism, is no impediment at all to reaching mutually beneficial bargains with one another. The fact that the justice-grounding bargains don’t require us to abandon our particular attitudes and indeed perspectives means that the distributive principles that constitute the output of the contractual situation will be acceptable to those with non-liberal perspectives. The fact that they are mutually beneficial means that we don’t need to worry about their failing to garner support because of widespread unwillingness to support perceived outsiders. Once all this becomes common knowledge, it does not seem outlandish to suppose that a shared motivation to embrace radical pluralism will ensue. Meanwhile, experiments in living can provide an outlet for radical pluralism that may culminate in novel and ingenious proposals for institutional design and reform.

II

Muldoon’s book is motivated by the descriptive claim that contemporary liberal democratic states like are own are characterised by radical pluralism. It is therefore worth pausing briefly to ask: Is this descriptive claim true?

What surely cannot be denied is that contemporary liberal democratic societies are characterised by *a lot of disagreement*. This is true even among those who share a culture, an ethnicity, a religion, and so on. It is all the greater given the fact that all contemporary liberal democratic societies are radically multicultural, multi-ethnic, and multi-religious. Citizens have different views about just about any issue you can think of. But Muldoon is saying more than that. He is saying that contemporary liberal democratic societies are characterised by what I have called radical pluralism. Recall that radical pluralism involves widespread, persistent deep and intractable normative disagreement about the basic organisation of society. So, is it true that contemporary liberal democratic societies are characterised by widespread persistent deep and intractable normative disagreement about the basic organisation of society? I confess that I have some doubts at each point.

First, is the widespread disagreement that exists in liberal societies (about protectionism, a carbon price, publically funded health care, and so on) *genuine normative* disagreement as opposed to merely *apparent* normative disagreement: i.e. *non-normative* disagreement in disguise?[[7]](#footnote-7) Not obviously. As Richard Boyd once famously put it, “careful philosophical examination will reveal, I believe, that agreement on non-moral [non-normative] issues would eliminate almost all disagreement about the sorts of issues which arise in ordinary moral [normative] practice.”[[8]](#footnote-8)

Second, is the widespread disagreement about the organization of a society’s *basic institutions*? One important reason why immigrants flock to liberal democratic states, I take it, is that, even if they have fundamental religious or moral disagreements with members of the majority (and continue to display a preference for their own cultural institutions), they believe that the *political* institutions of liberal democratic states are simply superior to, and offer them and their families better opportunities than, the political institutions of the states from which they emigrated. This is not to say that there won’t be political disagreements: disagreements about particular laws and policies. But these are pitched at a quite different level from a standard theory of justice; they are questions about sensible public policy, which are generally taken to posed against the backdrop of a certain institutional framework that is largely taken for granted.

Third, is the disagreement that exists regarding a society’s basic institutions (such as it is) *persistent*? In particular, is it persistent across generations? Even if first-generation immigrants stick to their normative guns, it doesn’t follow that their children and grandchildren will do so.

Fourth, is the disagreement *deep and intractable*? Muldoon’s main argument for the depth and intractability of disagreement is that we have irreconcilable perspectives. But it’s not obvious to me that irreconcilable perspectives pose an insurmountable impediment to reaching agreement. I am struck instead by the fact that we somehow manage to navigate these different perspectives. Here is a rather homely example. One of my best friends and I sometimes go to the cinema together (or at least we used to before I had children). We have, not merely different views about what are good and bad films, but fundamentally different perspectives about the nature, point and purpose of film (and indeed art in general, its relation to entertainment, and so on). Unsurprisingly, we almost inevitably disagree about which film we ought to do and see. The disagreements are intractable in one sense: neither of us is able to persuade the other that we ought to go and see our preferred film. But in the relevant sense the disagreement is perfectly tractable. We go (or at least used to go) to see lots of films together. There are at least two possible explanations as to what is going on. One explanation is that, while we disagree about what film we ought to see, we manage to agree about what we ought to do given that we disagree about what we ought to do; or perhaps how we ought to resolve the disagreement. Another explanation is that even insofar as we continue to disagree with one another about what we ought to do, we are capable of making decisions together. I have myself argued elsewhere, following Pamela Hieronymi,[[9]](#footnote-9) that decisions involve settling the question of what to do, which is distinct from the question of what we ought to do.[[10]](#footnote-10) This is true of collective decisions as well as individual decisions.

So, as I say, I have some doubts about the descriptive claim. I am not saying that the descriptive claim is necessarily false. I am certainly not saying that I have established that it is false. It may well be true. Nonetheless, Muldoon has not established that it is true. Moreover, doing so would be hard.

Nonetheless, I also don’t think it matters much whether the descriptive claim is true or false. To see this, suppose that the descriptive claim is false. Presumably, even if it’s false, it could be true (or come to be true). It seems reasonable to ask what a theory of justice entails in circumstances of radical pluralism even if these circumstances don’t (presently) obtain. Normative theories, to be plausible, must have a certain *modal robustness*: they must have plausible (or plausible enough) implications, not only in our actual circumstances, but in a range of non-actual circumstances. That isn’t to say that they must have implications we regard as plausible across *any* non-circumstances. There are limits to how modally robust we think a normative theory has to be. But circumstances where there is radical pluralism are surely among the circumstances in which it is legitimate to expect a theory of justice to deliver plausible implications. The only way to deny this, so far as I can tell, would be to insist that the absence of radical pluralism is among the circumstances of justice. But notice that this would entail that a theory of justice literally *fails to have application* in circumstances of radical pluralism and, hence, that we cannot make claims about justice in such circumstances that are true or false (or valid or invalid, if you are squeamish about normative truths). This seems to me to be a clear reductio.

For simplicity, I shall assume in what follows that the descriptive claim is true. But, even if it’s false, this doesn’t make Muldoon’s book any less interesting or important.

III

I now want to raise some questions about the capacity of Muldoonian contractualism to respond appropriately to radical pluralism. I shall begin by considering whether it is capable of avoiding the alleged problems with Kantian liberal versions of contractualism.

Recall that radical pluralism-inclusive interpretations of Kantian liberalism are supposed to entail an incomplete and ultra-minimal account of justice because it is supposed to be unrealistic to suppose that Kantian contractors will be capable of reaching agreement on (at least the full gamut of) principles of justice in the face of radical pluralism. Is there reason to suppose that Muldoonian contractors will succeed where their Kantian counterparts fail?

One reason to be sceptical is that the relevant justice-determining bargain is supposed to be an *actual agreement regarding the society’s basic structure*. The problem is that I just can’t see how there could be any such agreement in the actual world given familiar constraints. For one, how could there possibly be an agreement or bargain involving everyone? For another, even if there could be such an agreement, how could there be an actual bargain over the basic structure? There is simply no opportunity in the actual world for a bargain of this kind.

Nonetheless, I don’t want to push this line of objection too hard. That’s because I strongly suspect that, in spite of Muldoon’s insistence to the contrary, he is really a closet hypothetical contractualist. Certainly, it is important for Muldoon to resist heavy-duty idealisations and normative constraints in the specification of the contractual situation. But hypothetical agreements needn’t be subject to any idealisations or constraints. A hypothetical agreement is just an agreement that happens in some non-actual world.

Second, and more importantly, Muldoon’s ingenious and persuasive account of the mutual benefits of cross-perspectival bargains in circumstances of radical pluralism involves focusing on purely *economic* transactions (see pp. 96-102). It is unclear how it is supposed to extend to other domains. Let me put it this way: My willingness to engage in economic transactions with individuals with whom I have fundamental disagreements is pretty high. Thus, I might buy the cheese of someone who is a vocal supporter of Marine Le Pen if the cheese is good enough (though I hope I would feel guilty about it). I might sell my house to an evangelical creationist if the price is right. But that does not mean that I would be prepared to make bargains with the former about the structure of immigration policy, or with the latter about the design of a high school curriculum. Nor is it obvious what benefits I would gain by doing so. The point is that, while it seems very plausible to suppose that we might be moved to embrace radical pluralism in our economic transaction, I would like to hear much more about why it is plausible to suppose that this might credibly extend to a bargain over the basic structure of the society in which we live.

Next, let's consider *stability*. Recall that Muldoon takes it to be a necessary condition for the plausibility of principles of justice in circumstances C that they would be likely to be sufficiently stable in C. Suppose that we are persuaded that the above-mentioned impediments could be overcome and that the kinds of justice-determining bargains that Muldoon has in mind could occur. Do we have reason to believe that the resulting principles of justice would enjoy sufficient stability?

There are several features of Muldoonian contractualism that lead me to be concerned about its capacity to deliver sufficiently stable principles of justice as well. Let mention two. One is that it involves no Lockean proviso. The Lockean proviso is supposed to ensure that principles of justice don’t reflect differential bargain positions that are product of unjust past acquisitions and transfers. Part of the reason for doing so, I take it, is that principles that do reflect unjust past acquisitions and transfers are unlikely to be sufficiently stable. Even if it is advantageous for me, given my actual bargaining position, to agree to a principle p that puts me in a worse position than some alternative principle p’, it is far less obvious that I will enthusiastically embrace the principle. On the contrary, there is every reason to expect that I will be on the look out for opportunities to violate it when I can evade detection and to undermine it.

Another feature of Muldoonian contractualism that is rather troubling in this regard is the fact that, rather than agreements that are intended to bind for all time, Muldoon bargains are potentially subject to constant renegotiation. The rationale for making justice-determining agreements binding is not simply that doing so is necessary to vindicate the universality of moral claims. Arguably just as important is that it is supposed to provide agents with valuable assurance that they can use in order to engage in medium-term and long-term planning and decision-making. By contrast, the possibility that justice may be in a state of constant flux and change would seem to be potentially highly destabilising.

IV

I have been focusing on the capacity of Muldoonian contractualism to avoid the alleged problems with Kantian liberal contractualism. I now want to raise a very different concern.

Recall that radical pluralism-exclusive interpretations of Kantian liberal contractualism are supposed to be vulnerable to a version of the conditional fallacy. A contractualist theory commits the conditional fallacy when it gives wrong verdicts in the actual world due to the fact that the circumstances that characterise the contractual situation differ in certain troublesome respects from its circumstances of application (in the actual world). But a contractualist theory can also go wrong by committing what I have called elsewhere the *concessional fallacy*.[[11]](#footnote-11) A theory commits the concessional fallacy when it gives wrong verdicts in certain circumstances (in the actual world) due to the fact that the circumstances that characterise the contractual situation *resemble* in troublesome respects its circumstances of application (in the actual world). We know that the actual world is often unjust in certain respects. Tailoring the contractual situation to the circumstances that obtain in the actual world can often result in a theory that makes problematic and undue *concessions* to injustice.[[12]](#footnote-12)

I worry that Muldoonian contractualism, even insofar as it escapes the conditional fallacy that is supposed to afflict radical pluralism-exclusive interpretations of Kantian liberal contractualism, will end up succumbing to a version of the concessional fallacy.

There are two features of Muldoonian contractualism that make me especially worried. The first is its *aggregative* character (p. 45). Unlike *deliberative* views, which put agents’ attitudes under the microscope and submit them to critical scrutiny, aggregative views take the attitudes of actual agents as given. The problem is that almost all of us have many deeply stupid, prejudiced and irrational attitudes. These are the materials that are supposed to determine the character of Muldoonian bargains and, by implication, principles of justice.

Second, and even more troublingly, there is the central role played by *perspectives*. Like our attitudes, our perspectives will also be liable to enshrine stupidity, prejudice, irrationality, and so on. But if what Muldoon says about perspectives is right, perspectives are much more troubling than mere attitudes. For they are supposed to be by their nature immune to and insulated from external critique. The only way to engage with a perspective is from the inside. Muldoon is a great Millean. He is highly sensitive to the tyrannising force of public opinion. But perspectives seem to me to be positively autocratic.

The worry, then, is that by providing a specification of the contractual situation in which the full gamut of diverse perspectives is not merely present but insulated from critique and where bargaining on the basis of these perspectives is supposed to determine the content of principles of justice, Muldoonian contractualism seems virtually certain to deliver as an output principles of justice that make undue concessions to stupidity, prejudice and irrationality.

V

Let’s take stock. Muldoon has raised a truly formidable challenge for contractualism: how to respond appropriately to radical pluralism. He has raised a forceful objection to the dominant Kantian liberal version and proposed a genuinely novel kind of Hobbesian contractualism. But I have argued that Muldoonian contractualism also has problems. I want to conclude by proposing a very different kind of response to the problem of radical pluralism.

The key move is that we should embrace what I have called elsewhere an *advice model* of contractualism.[[13]](#footnote-13) This is structurally analogous to the advice model of the ideal observer theory famously proposed by Michael Smith.[[14]](#footnote-14) Roughly, the ideal observer theory (IOT) holds that:

(IOT) A ought to X iff A would desire to X if A were fully informed and fully rational.

Smith has argued that we can interpret (IOT) in two quite different ways. What he calls the *example model* (IOTex) says that

(IOTex) A ought to X iff if A were to be a fully informed and fully rational counterpart of herself, A\*, then A\* would desire that A\* Xs.

What he calls the *advice model* says that

(IOTadv) A ought to X iff if A were to be a fully informed and fully rational counterpart of herself, A\*, then A\* would desire that (actual, non-ideal) A Xs.

The crucial difference between the two models is just this: The example model says that the normative status of A’s actions is determined by the desires that her ideal, counterfactual counterpart A\* would have for *herself* (i.e. for A\*). The advice model says that the normative status of A’s actions is determined by the desires that A\* would have for *actual, non-ideal* A. Take Gary Watson’s famous example of the squash-player (let’s call him Anton), who is such a bad sport that he can’t go to shake hands with an opponent who has just beaten him without punching the opponent in the face.[[15]](#footnote-15) Surely a fully informed and fully rational counterpart of Anton, Anton\*, wouldn’t be a bad sport and hence would desire that he (Anton\*) go and shake his opponents hand. This means that the example model entails that Anton ought to go and shake his opponent’s hand, even though this means that his opponent will get smacked in the face. In contrast, it surely *isn’t* true that Anton\* would desire that (actual, non-ideal) Anton go and shake his opponent’s hand. That’s because Anton\*’s desires regarding Anton’s actions would obviously take into account the fact that Anton is such a bad sport that he will punch his opponent in the face if he goes to shake his opponent’s hand. This means that the advice model doesn’t imply that Anton ought to go and shake his opponent’s hand.

I suggest that the contractualist should appropriate Smith’s distinction. Unfortunately, there is a little problem. The problem is that for at least certain versions of contractualism the advice model seems to be conceptually incoherent.[[16]](#footnote-16) This is because it seems to be conceptually incoherent to suggest that our ideal counterparts agree that we (as we actually are) live by particular principles. Agreements are special kinds of collective *decisions*.[[17]](#footnote-17) And a counterpart of us cannot decide thatwe live by a principle.

But, as a matter of fact, we can solve this problem by understanding the contractors to be making special kinds of *conditional* decisions about the principles by which to live.[[18]](#footnote-18) Whereas the example model holds that justice depends on an agreement agreement to live by certain principles insofar as the contractors continue to possess *their* characteristics and occupy *their* circumstances, the advice model holds that justice depends on a (counterfactual) agreement to live by certain principles insofar as the contractors possess *our* characteristics and occupy *our* circumstances. A model of contractualism along these lines is structurally analogous to the advice model of the ideal observer theory. Moreover, it is perfectly coherent.

I suggest that such an advice model of contractualism offers the possibility of a powerful response to the problem of radical pluralism. It is natural to suppose that the contractualist faces a choice between characterising the contractual situation in a radical pluralism-sensitive or a radical pluralism-insensitive way. But the advice model shows that this is a false dichotomy. For there are two quite different ways in which the contractual situation might be radical pluralism-sensitive or -insensitive. First, the circumstances that describe the contractual situation itself may or may include radical pluralism. Second, the circumstances for which the contractors are seeking to find principles may or may include radical pluralism.

The kind of advice model I suggest we should embrace is radical pluralism-sensitive in the second way. That is to say that the relevant justice-determining agreements are agreements to live by certain principles insofar as the contractors occupy circumstances that may include radical pluralism. The sorts of principles that may make sense in circumstances where radical pluralism is present are not necessarily the same as the sorts of principles that may make sense in circumstances where radical pluralism is absent. I won’t try to say exactly what they might look like. But they will certainly pay attention to considerations such as stability. This means that, unlike the radical pluralism-exclusive interpretation of Kantian contractualism, it isn’t vulnerable to the conditional fallacy.

But it is radical pluralism-insensitive in the first way. To my mind, any plausible version of contractualism will involve stringent constraints that will make it the case that radical pluralism *within* the contractual situation will be at least substantially curtailed. For example, the version of contractualism that I myself favour – deliberative contractualism – holds that truths about justice are determined by perfectly *deliberatively rational* agreements concerning principles for the organisation of the basic structure.[[19]](#footnote-19) While contractors may arrive with all sorts of regrettable attitudes and perspectives, the relentless scrutiny to which they will be subject will mean that stupid, prejudiced, irrational attitudes and perspectives will be found out and abandoned. This means that, unlike radical pluralism-inclusive interpretations of Kantian liberalism, the advice model isn’t vulnerable to the charge of producing an incomplete and ultra-minimal account of justice. And it means that, unlike Muldoonian contractualism, the advice model is not vulnerable to the concessional fallacy.

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1. An earlier version of this essay was presented at a Symposium on Muldoon’s book at the 2017 Pacific APA. The essay has benefitted from discussion with many people including Sam Freeman, Gerry Gaus, Hélène Landemore, Philip Pettit, John Thrasher and, most especially, Ryan Muldoon. Research for the essay was supported by FT160100409 and DP140102468. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. By a “contractualist” (or “contractarian”) account of justice or legitimacy I mean any theory that holds that (certain) truths about justice or legitimacy are somehow dependent upon some special, privileged agreement within some special choice situation. See Southwood 2009; 2010. This is obviously broader than certain other characterizations of contractualism, such as Darwall’s (2003), which distinguishes contractualist and contractarian theories. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. See e.g. Rawls 1993; Gaus 2011; Quong 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. As he puts it, “the dominant philosophical approach to addressing these questions has been to assume ever more similarity among those who disagree” (p. 2). Or again, “agents with diverse comprehensive moral doctrines ... adopt some common [broadly liberal] view of themselves as citizens” (p. 8). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Shope 1978. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Gauthier 1986. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Apparent normative disagreements of this kind raise non-trivial challenges: e.g. how to establish certain matters of fact, disseminate information to the citizenry in a way that will alter their beliefs, and then make citizens display *modus ponens* rationality. (If you thought these were not real challenges, then I refer you to the recent US presidential election.) [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Boyd 1988, p. 213. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Hieronymi 2009. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Southwood 2016; forthcoming a; forthcoming b. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. See Southwood ms. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Cf. Estlund 2014. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Southwood ms. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Smith 1994; 1995. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Watson 1982, pp. 107-9; see also Smith 1994, p. 148; Smith 1995. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Southwood 2010, p. 136, n. 24. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Southwood 2010, p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Southwood ms. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Southwood 2010, ch. 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)