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HUME, DIALOGUES AND HARMONY OF THE UNIVERSE¹

SUMMARY: This paper provides epistemological support for one of Hume's numerous critiques of the teleological arguments for God's existence. Hume explores the following question: can we explain the observed harmony of the universe without appealing to the work of an intelligent creator? The answer, presented through the character of Philo, appears to be positive. I will try to defend this position. Following Hume's theory of space, and exploring the relation between ideas of the whole and relation, I will show the universe can be seen as finite space with definite numbers of parts which are spatially and causally interconnected. Because all changes occur on the basis of Hume's principle of causation, we can say the harmony of the universe is established and maintained precisely because of the changes happening on the basis of causation. If this is the case, the role of the intelligent creator appears to be redundant.

KEY WORDS: teleological argument; theory of space; theory of ideas; causal relation; harmony of universe

Arguments for God's existence appear to be an inexhaustible source of inspiration for philosophers. Some of the most famous critiques of such arguments are provided by David Hume (1711-1776) in a well-known piece entitled *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* ([1779] 2013). Philo is one of three literary characters in the *Dialogues*. Philo, Demea, and Cleanthes discuss various philosophical arguments for God's existence. Philo is a skeptic, and some think he speaks for Hume himself.²

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 - 2 Whilst Vink in his paper assumes that Philo speaks for Hume (Vink 1989), Coleman supports the thesis that Philo represents Hume's view on natural religion (Coleman 1989).

Opinions on the efficacy of his argument are divided. Some philosophers maintain Hume's criticism spoken through Philo undermines theological arguments, but others disagree.³

In this paper, I use Philo's argumentation as a springboard to explore one of Hume's less-studied critiques of teleological arguments for God's existence. A teleological argument is an *a posteriori* argument that, following the empirical observation of the order of the universe, concludes the order can best be explained by the existence of an intelligent and powerful creator (Djurić 2011: 177). This type of conclusion is the target of a harsh critique in chapter VIII. Here, Philo asks the following question: can we explain the observed harmony of the universe without appealing to an intelligent creator? In what follows, I go beyond *Dialogues* to give a Humean response to this question. First, I present Philo's argument. Moving forward, to expand on Philo's theses, I turn to Hume's theory of space in *A Treatise of Human Nature* ([1739] 1960) and explore his ideas of space and extension to show we can state that space *is* extension. Next, I analyse Hume's ideas of the whole and relation. Hume argues it is *appropriate* to assert the existence of the whole when there is an *appropriate* relation between its parts, and he regards the universe as such a whole. He emphasizes the observation of relation between extended entities includes the perception of another relation – the one between different spatial parts. In other words, the universe can be regarded as a finite spatial whole composed of definite spatial parts whose causal functioning enables the creation and maintenance of equilibrium in the universe. In effect, the role of the intelligent creator appears to be redundant.

1. Philo's "old Epicurean hypothesis" and Hume's theory of space

Philo begins his argument by presenting a modified version of an "old Epicurean hypothesis." This hypothesis states matter is final and consists of a finite number of particles going through a definite number of changes: "whatever the causes are, the fact is certain, that matter is, and always has been in continual agitation, as far as human experience or tradition reaches" (Hume 2013: 251). Philo draws attention to the following question: is there a system or order by which matter can retain this continuous movement whilst still maintaining the system's established equilibrium? Philo answers in the affirmative:

For this is actually the case with the present world... And by its very nature, that order, when once established, supports itself, for many ages, if not to eternity. But

3 For example, Leon Pearl believes Hume did not undermine theological arguments of God's existence. However, he refers to Kemp Smith as an author who claims Philo's critiques are "final and complete" (Pearl 1970).

wherever matter is so poised, arranged, and adjusted as to continue in perpetual motion, and yet preserve a constancy in the forms, its situation must of necessity have all the same appearance of art and contrivance, which we observe at present. All the parts of each form must have a relation to each other, and to the whole: And the whole itself must have a relation to the other parts of the universe; to the element, in which the form subsists (Hume 2013: 252).

In such a system, there is no part of matter that is not subjected to change; “thus the universe goes on for many ages in a continued succession of chaos and disorder”, until the order, in which movement and action force are not lost, is established (Hume 2013: 253).

Through a detailed analysis of a few essential threads of Philo’s argument, I will seek to justify my main thesis – the universe is a finite space which, due to spatial and causal relations between its parts, creates and maintains its own order. Philo’s specific arguments are the following:

- 1) The universe is composed of *finite* matter made from a certain number of particles.
- 2) Every part of matter is subjected to changes that continuously occur in the universe.
- 3) The order of the universe can be established; all parts of matter must be mutually connected, and the universe must be connected to “other parts of the universe.”
- 4) Once established, the order can be maintained forever despite internal changes in the system.

The first thesis describes an idea of matter that seems similar to Hume’s idea of space, as this is expressed in *Treatise*. More specifically, Hume believes space, like matter, is finite, i.e. composed of a definite number of parts:

The capacity of the mind is not infinite; consequently no idea of extension or duration consists of an infinite number of parts or inferior ideas, but of a finite number, and these simple and indivisible; it is therefore possible for space and time to exist conformable to this idea: and if it be possible, it is certain they actually do exist conformable to it; since their infinite divisibility is utterly impossible and contradictory (Hume 1960: 39).

Hume thinks we cannot talk about the infinity of space for cognitive reasons (I present another reason in due course). Our limited mental capacity precludes the formation of an adequate notion of infinity: “’Tis universally allow’d, that the capacity of mind is limited, and can never attain a full and adequate conception of infinity” (Hume 1960: 26). In addition, what we perceive is not a space *per se*, but the extension of

different situated entities. Thus, we can say space *is* extension, and “being extended” means “to have parts lined up next to each other.” Accordingly, the idea of space is a general idea of simple entities arranged in a certain manner (Baxter 2016: 173). In other words, to understand Hume’s idea of space, we need to analyse his idea of extension.

Hume describes the process of forming the idea of extension as follows: “Upon opening my eyes, and turning them to the surrounding objects, I perceive many visible bodies; and upon shutting them again, and considering the distance betwixt these bodies, I acquire the idea of extension” (Hume 1960: 33). The explanation suggests the idea of extension is obtained with the perception of different objects and their mutual – spatial – position in the external environment (Hume 1960: 39). Further, it seems impossible to perceive the extension of entities without perceiving the objects that are extended, and Hume argues the perception of a table in front of him is sufficient to form the idea of extension: “The table before me is alone sufficient by its view to give me the idea of extension. This idea, then, is borrow’d from, and represents some impression, which this moment appears to the senses” (Hume 1960: 34). If perception of a table is sufficient to form the idea of extension, then the perception of *relation* between the table and another object, such as a bookshelf, is *sufficient* to perceive their spatial relation and form the idea of space.

As noted, Hume believes space is finite and provides a detailed critique of the infinity of space in *Treatise*. Namely, if space were infinite, it would consist of an infinite number of parts. Bearing in mind that space is extension, and the perception of finite entities (e.g., table and chair) includes the perception of their extension, Hume argues:

If therefore any finite extension be infinitely divisible, it can be no contradiction to suppose, that a finite extension contains an infinite number of parts; And *vice versa*, if it be a contradiction to suppose, that a finite extension contains an infinite number of parts, no finite extension can be infinitely divisible (Hume 1960: 29).

Thus, if the entities we perceive are finite, extension must also be finite because the perception of an entity cannot be separated from the perception of extension. And if the extension is finite, then space must also be finite simply because space *is* extension.

This leads to the second reason Hume believes we cannot talk about the infinity of space. It is a contradiction to assume the infinity of space and extension, simply because it would imply finite entities can possess an infinite number of parts. Hence, if the universe is to be considered as space, it has to be regarded as extended and finite. The idea of the universe is formed in the same manner as the idea of space: by observation of different entities in it and the analysis of their mutual spatial relation.

Hume considered himself the “Newton of moral science” and expressed exceptional respect for Newton. However, his theory of space is a direct criticism of Newton’s theory of absolute space. Newton notes:

Although time, space, place, and motion are very familiar to everyone, it must be noted that these quantities are popularly conceived solely with reference to the objects of sense perception. And this is the source of certain preconceptions; to eliminate them it is useful to distinguish these quantities into absolute and relative, true and apparent, mathematical and common (Newton 1999: 408).

Newton's notions of absolute and relative space are well-known today. Absolute space is infinite, and it remains similar and motionless, whilst relative space is "any movable measure or dimension of this absolute space; such a measure or dimension is determined by our senses from the situation of the space with respect to bodies and is popularly used for immovable space" (Newton 1999: 409). Accordingly, Newton argues philosophers (like Hume) speak of relative space and consider it finite, whilst overlooking that relative space is only a sensory dimension of absolute space.

I have already mentioned that in *Treatise* Hume points to the limits of our cognitive apparatus. Given these limits, we will never be able to create a complete and adequate idea of infinity. Thus, we can say Hume's theory of space was formulated as a critique of Newtonian absolute space. Hume was not alone in his criticism, and we find a similar understanding of space in Berkeley:

When I excite a motion in some part of my body, if it be free or without resistance, I say there is *space*; but if I find a resistance, then I say there is *body*; and in proportion as the resistance to motion is lesser or greater, I say the *space* is more or less *pure*. So that when I speak of pure or empty space, it is not to be supposed, that the word *space* stands for an idea distinct from, or conceivable without any body of motion (Berkeley 1999: 75-76).

In other words, Berkeley argues the idea of space is formed by associating tactile and visual stimuli. We cannot acquire knowledge of space otherwise than by perceiving entities and their motion. The existence and motion of entities requires the existence of space, but the perception of space requires the observation of entities and their motion. This is also Hume's conclusion. In addition, Berkeley believes the perceived space is *real space*; it is not Newton's relative space but the sensory dimension of real, absolute space. As noted, Hume also criticises Newtonian absolute, infinite space. Accordingly, we can say Hume's critique supports Berkeley's conclusion that there is no absolute space. Nevertheless, we should not overlook one significant difference between Hume and Berkeley. Hume stresses that we cannot observe space *per se*; all we perceive is the extension of entities. Hence, he defines space as extension. Berkeley makes a stronger claim: due to our perception of entities and movement, we are able to perceive space *per se*.

2. Matter, complexity of space and notion of the whole

To sum up: I have presented Hume's theory of space and explained why Hume believes space is finite. Analysing the relation between Hume's ideas of space and extension, I have explained that perceived space is not space *per se*, but an observed extension of different situated entities. Hence, space *is* extension. This represents the first step towards justification of my main thesis that the universe can be regarded as a finite space. To begin the second step, let us return to Philo's argument:

For this is actually the case with the present world... And by its very nature, that order, when once established, supports itself, for many ages, if not to eternity. But wherever matter is so poised, arranged, and adjusted as to continue in perpetual motion, and yet preserve a constancy in the forms, its situation must of necessity have all the same appearance of art and contrivance, which we observe at present. All the parts of each form must have a relation to each other, and to the whole: And the whole itself must have a relation to the other parts of the universe; to the element, in which the form subsists (Hume 2013: 252).

Notice we do not encounter the notion of space in this argument. Philo talks about *matter* and stresses that on the basis of *human experience*, we can state matter is in constant motion. I previously suggested Philo's idea of matter evokes Hume's idea of space: both ideas seem to indicate something definite and composed of a certain number of parts. However, Philo states that matter, as well as its motion, *can be observed*. In contrast, Hume believes space *per se* cannot be observed; all we perceive is the extension of different entities. This raises the following question: are ideas of matter and space really closely related?

We can presume our experience is abundant with impressions of distinct mobile entities: we observe the motion of a billiard ball or the movement of trees when a strong wind blows. It seems the idea of matter reflects such entities, and these entities represent the differently shaped matter of which the universe is composed. However, we equally encounter static entities; the observed table does not move in the same sense as the clock hands. Unless we move the table, it will continue to occupy the same space. Thus, it seems the motion of matter can be understood in another sense – *as a process of formation of various objects we perceive in our experience*. We can make the table by assembling several shaped pieces of wood; with their deconstruction, we create an unformed clump of matter. But in both cases, there is a process of movement of *extended matter*, and the location of one part can be determined by considering the location of other parts. Given that space is extension, we can state the *perception of distinctly shaped matter conveys us to the perception of one part of space*. In other words, the idea of matter *conveys us to the idea of space* because there is a *spatial*

relation amongst differently shaped parts of matter. Furthermore, if the system – universe – consists of differently shaped matter, it can be regarded as a finite space.

We should not overlook the fact that Hume’s notion of matter does not refer to Cartesian substance.⁴ Descartes distinguishes between mental and material substance, and he sees extension as an essential property of the material substance. In addition, he regards space and matter as identical (Koyré 1957: 102), and this is not the case for Hume. Philo states that matter consists of a finite number of particles (Hume 2013: 250), and he seems to aspire to offer a scientific hypothesis inspired by Newton’s theory. However, Hume’s “atoms” should not be equated to Newton’s solid particles connected by the force of attraction, simply because Newton believes we cannot observe the smallest corpuscles. Whilst Hume, as we shall see in due course, employs the terms “atom” and “corpuscle”, he is an adversary of atomism and emphasizes we *can observe* in experience every existing particle. Analysing the idea of extension in *Treatise*, Hume says:

For as the compound idea of extension, which is real, is compos’d of such ideas [compound parts]; were these so many non-entities, there would be a real existence compos’d of non-entities; which is absurd... Now such as the parts are, such is the whole (Hume 1960: 38-39).

Thus, it seems the *real* idea of extension requires all parts to be the same; compound ideas which form the idea of extension need to be real, i.e. observable: “That compound impression, which represents extension, consists of several lesser impressions, that are indivisible to the eye or feeling, and may be call’d impressions of atoms or corpuscles endow’d with colour and solidity” (Hume 1960: 38). Accordingly, ideas of atoms or corpuscles as finite parts of extended matter must refer to something that possesses a certain *medium* – quantity and quality:

It has often been maintain’d in the schools, that extension must be divisible, *in infinitum*, because the system of mathematical points is absurd; and the system is absurd, because a mathematical point is a non-entity, and consequently can never by its conjunction with others form a real existence. This wou’d be perfectly decisive, were there no medium betwixt the infinite divisibility of matter, and the non-entity of mathematical points. But there is evidently a medium, *viz.* the bestowing a colour or solidity on these points; and the absurdity of both the extremes is a demonstration of the truth and reality of this medium (Hume 1960: 40).

4 Hume argues we cannot find in experience the impression of an entity such as substance, and this is the reason we cannot talk about its properties. He concludes we have no idea of substance whatsoever (Hume 1960: 234).

If this is the case, it seems ideas of ultimate parts of matter must relate to something definite and available to our senses. Hence, we can say Hume's idea of matter is formed by ideas of solid, coloured, and ultimately indivisible particles.

So far I have shown the idea of matter conveys us to the idea of space. I now turn my attention to the following question: what *type* of idea is the idea of space? Is it simple or complex? Hume argues the idea of space is derived from visual and tactile impressions, and the impression of extension consists of several lesser impressions:

The idea of space is convey'd to the mind by two senses, the sight and touch; nor does any thing ever appear extended, that is not either visible or tangible. That compound impression, which represents extension, consists of several lesser impressions, that are indivisible to the eye or feeling, and may be call'd impressions of atoms or corpuscles endow'd with colour and solidity (Hume 1960: 38).

In other words, the impressions of extension and space are complex. Following Hume's general principle that all ideas are copies of the impressions from which they are derived (Hume 1960: 03), we can conclude ideas of extension and space are complex ideas. Yet Hume believes only simple entities exist (Baxter 2015: 45), and this creates a problem: the complexity of the idea of space indicates space *per se* is also a complex entity. And if this is the case, we cannot regard it as an existing entity.

Hume provides no reason for us to believe the structure of the idea of space really reflects the structure of space; to give such reasons would be contrary to the spirit of his philosophy of space. Nevertheless, two structures *should* resemble each other. Recall that in Hume's theory, we do not analyse entities themselves, but the *manner* in which those entities appear to us in our experience. Thus, we can say this idea of space is the best we have, and it is better to assume it reflects real space simply because we cannot observe space *per se*. The same applies to the idea of the universe.

However, if such an answer is not sufficient, the problem can be neutralised in another way. Hume argues it is sometimes *appropriate* to talk about the existence of the wholes (which represent complex entities) viz. twenty people. Whilst existence can never be attributed to a *number*, only to a *unity*, it can be attributed to the *number of units* of which the number consists (Hume 1960: 30). Hence, we can argue that a whole of twenty people exists only because twenty units exist – individuals amongst whom a certain relation is established: "For by the same rule these twenty men *may be consider'd as a unit*. The whole globe of the earth, nay the whole universe, *may be consider'd as a unit*" (Hume 1960: 30; emphasis added). We can argue in the same manner that space, i.e. the universe, exists. The universe can be regarded as the whole to which we attribute existence *because of* the existence of its parts – or units. We can understand such units in the spirit of the natural sciences and regard them as different natural spheres, so we can speak of celestial and terrestrial spheres, atmosphere, and even biosphere. However, this does not imply space and universe are something *above*

the sum of their parts or units. They simply present the *unity* of their own parts (Baxter 2016: 180).

3. Notion of relation, spatial points, and causal relation between spatial parts

At the beginning of this paper, I summarized four of Philo's main theses as the following:

- 1) The universe is composed of *finite* matter made from a certain number of particles.
- 2) Every part of matter is subjected to changes that continuously occur in the universe.
- 3) The order of the universe can be established; all parts of matter must be mutually connected, and the universe must be connected to "other parts of the universe."
- 4) Once established, the order can be maintained forever despite internal changes in the system.

My analysis has so far explained the first two. In previous sections, I analysed Hume's theory of space and explained how we should understand his notion of matter in order to regard the universe as a spatial whole infused with differently shaped matter. In addition, I emphasized the similarity between ideas of space and matter, suggesting both ideas imply these entities are finite and comprised of a definite number of parts. Finally, I explored how the idea of matter conveys to us the idea of space.

The third thesis is that order in the universe can be established, as all of its parts are interconnected. Hume's notion of the whole indicates the mutual relation amongst entities represents a necessary condition for formation of the idea of the whole and, in this instance, the idea of existing space. Arguably, the same can be said for parts of the universe, and I suggest mutual relations between parts of the universe are such that they represent something inherent to parts themselves. To make my case, I turn to Hume's thoughts on spatial points as articulated in *Treatise*.

Hume argues the idea of space is nothing more than the idea of a certain number of coloured points set up in a specific manner:

The table before me is alone sufficient by its view to give me the idea of extension. This idea, then, is borrow'd from, and represents some impression, which this moment appears to the senses. But my senses convey to me only the impressions of colour'd points, dispos'd in certain manner. If the eye is sensible of any thing farther, I desire it may be pointed out to me. But if it be impossible to shew any thing farther, we may conclude with certainty, that the idea of extension is nothing but a copy of these colour'd points, and of the manner of their appearance (Hume 1960: 34).

The phrase “dispos’d in a certain manner” suggests a certain relation between coloured points determines the manner in which the points appear to us, e.g., in the shape of circle. In other words, there is a specific relation between these points which is not a product of subjective perception, i.e., the manner in which we perceive them:

Suppose that in the extended object, or composition of colour’d points, from which we first receiv’d the idea of extension, the points were of a purple colour; it follows, that in every repetition of that idea we wou’d not only place the points in the same order with respect to each other, but also bestow on them the precise colour, with which alone we are acquainted (Hume 1960: 34).

Apparently, the relation between coloured points represents *something about points themselves* distributed in a certain manner (Inukai 2010: 189). Since the universe is a finite space, its parts (and parts of these parts) can be understood as Hume’s coloured points; we can say their mutual relation represents something about the specific parts of which the universe is composed. If so, the relation is a necessary condition for the formation of the idea of the universe.

Recall that the idea of space requires the observation of a relation amongst extended entities, and the perception of these objects is sufficient to observe their mutual relation. In addition to the two perceptions of table and chair, there will not be another – third – perception of their mutual relation. The same applies to spatial points: perception of two purple points will include the existing relation between these points; this relation will determine the manner in which the points appear to us. Accordingly, by perceiving parts of the universe, we simultaneously observe their mutual – spatial – relation. But is this sufficient to explain the creation and maintenance of order in the universe?

The spatial relation amongst parts of the universe can be understood as one pre-condition for establishing and maintaining its order. Philo emphasizes changes are constantly manifesting in the universe, and this can be regarded as a result of interactions between its parts. These interactions can be destructive. They can represent a conflict between parts, leading to a system disruption that “destroys the form” of the system. Furthermore, “the matter, of which it is composed, is again set loose, and is thrown into irregular motions and fermentations, till it unite itself to some other regular form” (Hume 2013: 252). As Philo states, “No particular order or position ever continues a moment unaltered” (Hume 2013: 253).

We cannot explain such changes by referring to spatial relation. However, we can explain them by referring to *causal relation*. Hume’s principle, “*Whatever has a beginning has also a cause of existence*” (Hume 1960: 78), essentially states that all changes happen according to the principle of causation. Any change in the present state of the entity can be regarded as the beginning of a following state, whilst its cause can be recognised in a previously existing state of affairs. Given that changes manifest themselves in parts of the universe, we can conclude there is a causal relation between these

parts. It is precisely this relation that is responsible for the creation and maintenance of order in the universe.

Nevertheless, we should not forget that established order, whatever it may be, is not *necessary*. In his well-known conclusion about the necessity of a causal relation in *Treatise*, Hume says:

The connexion of the ideas is not habitual after one experiment: but this connexion is comprehended under another principle, that is habitual; which brings us back to our hypothesis. In all cases we transfer our experience to instances, of which we have no experience, either *expressly* or *tacitly*, either *directly* or *indirectly* (Hume 1960: 105).

In other words, the necessity we attribute to the relation between cause and effect is a product of *habit*; after perceiving the cause, we expect the manifestation of a certain effect. Thus, we cannot speak of a necessary order of the universe that, due to the causal action of parts of the universe, necessarily leads to another order.

Some might argue the existence of a causal relation amongst parts of the universe does not neutralise the agency of an intelligent creator who could establish the causal relation between these parts and then retire from the scene. But such a criticism would ignore an important part of *Treatise* where Hume suggests relation is a property of objects as they appear in perceptions (Inukai 2010: 192). Analysing the causal relation, Hume stresses there is no relation which conveys the mind strongly from one idea to another, suggesting some ideas possess a certain property which simply conveys the mind to other ideas: “’Tis sufficient to observe, that there is no relation, which produces a stronger connection in the fancy, and makes one idea more readily recall another, than the relation of cause and effect betwixt their objects” (Hume 1960: 11). For example, we think of the idea of ice as conveying cold. However, this seems to be the case because of certain characteristics of ice we have previously observed; its intrinsic structure is such as to produce the sensation of coldness whenever we touch it. The same can be said for parts of the universe: their internal structure is such that it determines a certain way of behaving – to establish their mutual connection and interaction. This interaction can result in a chaotic state of the universe. Yet because matter is subjected to constant motion, this chaotic state can grow into ordered and maintained equilibrium. Philo stresses the extroversion of the universe and argues the necessity of its relation “to the other parts of the universe.” Because of a causal connection with “other parts”, the universe can independently establish order through various internal and external causal interactions. Consequently, the agency of the intelligent creator appears redundant.

It can be said that Hume, following Newton, aspired to provide scientific explanations for various natural phenomena. Newton’s theory enables us to mechanically observe the world and its origins. The world is simply a set of material particles

behaving in accordance with three Newtonian laws. Whilst Newton considered the occasional intervention of an intelligent creator was necessary, later researchers (like Laplace (1749-1827)) challenged the necessity of such intervention and claimed the universe is thoroughly guided by mechanical principles (Salmon 1978: 160). As mentioned previously, Hume aspired to be the “Newton of moral sciences” and sought to provide explanations based on the scientific method. This resulted in the abolition of teleological and religious principles from a philosophical and scientific understanding of nature.

However, we should not necessarily conclude the aim of *Dialogues* is to expel teleology and religion from a general understanding of nature and universe. We do not see Hume’s explicit affirmation or rejection of any of the presented hypothesis in *Dialogues*; rather, we find their critical evaluation. As an academic skeptic, Hume refrains from offering any conclusion about these hypotheses, even though in his critique, he highlights their defects. Accordingly, I do not wish to claim my analysis presents Hume’s cosmological view about the origin of the universe. Nor do I claim that Hume presented his views through Philo. My arguments are not directed at a philosophical defence of Hume’s specific position. Rather, I simply seek to provide epistemological support for one of Hume’s numerous critiques of the teleological arguments for God’s existence by looking beyond *Dialogues*. Arguably, various critiques of the theological arguments in *Dialogues* present Hume’s evaluation of his views outlined in *Treatise*. Such analysis exceeds the scope of this paper, but may guide another.

My main thesis is that in Humean view, the universe can be regarded as a finite space with a definite number of parts. These parts are mutually connected by a spatial and causal relation. Because of the causal relation, the mutual interaction of parts of the universe results in the creation of a specific order. Such an order may be disorganised, but because of constant changes in accordance with the principle of causation, it can become organised – presenting an existing order.

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Hjum, Dijalozi i harmonija univerzuma (Apstrakt)

Ovaj rad pruža epistemološku podršku jednoj od Hjumovih mnogobrojnih kritika teleoloških argumenata za postojanje Boga. Hjum razmatra sledeće pitanje: da li možemo objasniti opažljivu harmoniju univerzuma bez pozivanja na delovanje inteligentnog tvorca? Odgovor je predstavljen kroz lik Filona i on je, čini se, pozitivan. Pokušaću da odbranim ovaj stav. Razmatrajući Hjumovu teoriju prostora i analizirajući relaciju između ideja celine i relacije, pokazaću da se univerzum može posmatrati kao konačan prostor sa određenim, konačnim brojem delova koji su međusobno povezani prostornim i uzročnim relacijama. Ukoliko se sve promene dešavaju na osnovu Hjumovog principa uzročnosti, možemo reći da se harmonija univerzuma uspostavlja i održava upravo zahvaljujući promenama koje su bazirane na ovom principu. No, ako je to slučaj, uloga inteligentnog tvorca postaje suvišna.

KLJUČNE REČI: teleološki argument; teorija prostora; teorija ideja; uzročna relacija; harmonija univerzuma.