Abstract
Amalgamating evidence of different kinds for the same hypothesis into an overall confirmation is analogous, I argue, to amalgamating individuals’ preferences into a group preference. The latter faces well-known impossibility theorems, most famously “Arrow’s Theorem”. Once the analogy between amalgamating evidence and amalgamating preferences is tight, it is obvious that amalgamating evidence might face a theorem similar to Arrow’s. I prove that this is so, and end by discussing the plausibility of the axioms required for the theorem.
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Stegenga, J. An impossibility theorem for amalgamating evidence. Synthese 190, 2391–2411 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9973-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9973-x