Die Funktion der Dialogstruktur in Epiktets Diatriben. By Barbara Wehner. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2000. Pp. 301. 63.

Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic guide to life. By A.A. Long. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Pp. xiv + 310. $29.95.

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Wehner's book is a slightly modified version of her philosophy dissertation completed in 1998–99 at Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg. Typical of many (German) dissertations, and particularly true to its title, the book is highly structured. After the brief Foreword, there are eight main sections: a very useful survey of previous research, a brief section on her objective and method, an extended discussion of Arrian's part in the creation of Epictetus' *Discourses*, a substantial section on the dialogical character of the *Discourses*, an examination of the dialogues Epictetus has with one individual person, a mammoth section (over 170 pages)—replete with subsection upon subsection—on the function of the dialogue parts inserted in the didactic discussions, several pages on the dialogue structure in the *Encheiridion*, and a handy summary of the book. A superior bibliography, an index locorum, and an index of names and subjects are included. The Foreword explains that the origins of Wehner's book lie in the research area of transitions and fields of tension between orality and 'writtenness' (Schriftlichkeit) (7). The method of grouping texts based on formal resemblance and cataloguing the nuts and bolts of passages while eschewing probing conceptual analysis and robust philosophical interpretation of texts, which is generally characteristic of the work of her teacher and dissertation supervisor, Professor Wolfgang Kullmann, is employed here.

Wehner's goal is to reveal the function the complex dialogue structure of the *Discourses* serves in Epictetus' pedagogy. Wehner observes that Epictetus pursues the ethical development of his students in the practical experience of their lives as his pedagogical aim, and so she explores the question of how the dialogue structure relates to the practical experience of Epictetus' listeners. First Wehner investigates the authenticity of Epictetus' *Discourses*, focusing especially on the theses expounded by Theo Wirth ('Arrians Erinnerungen an Epiktet' *Museum Helveticum* 24 [1967] 149–189 and 197–216). Her conclusion is noncommittal: The authenticity of Epictetus' *Diatribes* cannot in the final analysis be determined unequivocally. Regarding the letter of dedication to Lucius Gellius that prefaces the *Discourses*, Wehner thinks that Arrian's assertion that he has dispensed with the literary revision of his written notes ought not be construed as a modest disclaimer, because it is altogether possible that Arrian had at his disposal stenographic knowledge and consequently had the skills needed for an authentic reproduction of Epictetus' didactic discussions. The supposed publi-

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cation of the written notes against his will, in contrast, she interprets as squarely in the *topos* of the proem. Analyses of particular diatribes reveal to her both signs of written creation and of verbatim reproduction. Thus she thinks Arrian's claim that he did not alter the notes he jotted down from Epictetus' own mouth is not to be understood literally. Wehner argues that Wirth exaggerates Arrian's share in the production of the *Discourses*, and thus regards Epictetus as its author.

The central focus in Wehner's examination of the dialogical character of the *Discourses* is Epictetus' direct addresses to his listeners. Her meticulous reporting disappoints, however, inasmuch as she offers the banal observation that Epictetus uses a wide array of forms of address for his manifold didactic purposes. She explains how Epictetus chooses the 'communicative we' when he includes himself in his criticisms of his listeners, thereby establishing a basis of trust from which he can address his appeals to the audience. Exhortations to action, in contrast, are predominantly phrased in the 'communicative you', so Epictetus can distance and disassociate himself from his public. Wehner explains how Epictetus often alternates his own questions and answers because such a technique is useful for lively and catchy presentation, and makes it possible to take up directly false lines of reasoning in the questions and clearly to repudiate them as unjustified in the answers. While this is unobjectionable as far as it goes, it seems a fairly shallow interpretation.

Wehner then turns to dialogues with particular persons. She notes that in so far as Epictetus knows the destination of the conversation from the beginning and leads his interlocutor along with questions geared to the interlocutor's level of knowledge, Epictetus' strategy is reminiscent of the Platonic-Socratic dialogue and is in keeping with the concept that Epictetus himself has of the Socratic method of disputation. Unlike Socrates' interlocutor, however, Wehner thinks Epictetus' interlocutor shows little personal initiative in the conversations. In other conversations with particular persons Epictetus is not the active questioner, but instead answers the questions of his counterpart. Wehner reasonably, but uninterestingly, observes that the method which Epictetus chooses in the discussion with particular persons presumably depends on the character and on the concern of the given visitor. She concludes that the short dialogues with students function as models for the dialogues of the student with himself. Had she pursued the similarities and differences between Epictetan dialectic and Platonic dialectic more thoroughly, as Long does, her inquiry may have netted sharper insights.

The significance of the inserted monologues, prayers, fictive dialogues with rulers and mythic heroes, the grappling with the interjections of a fictive interlocutor, and the quotations and anecdotes for Epictetus' didactic objectives exercises Wehner for much of the book. She convincingly argues that Epictetus exhausts all possibilities that the form of the dialogue offers for educating and directing the will of his audience. Wehner details the following functions of the various parts of the dialogue.

Epictetus formulates most of the monologues for his students as models for use in their own lives. The model-oriented monologues are useful primarily for self-

suggestion. These monologues consist predominantly of core propositions that the student should repeat to himself again and again in practice. A smaller group of the monologues intended for adoption gives instructions for self-reflection. These monologues contain mostly questions that the student should address to himself and can reply to differently according to his personal stage of development. Still other monologues have no direct reference to the practical lives of the students; instead they make possible the catchy illustration of both exemplary and reprehensible outlooks. Bad instances of self-persuasion become clear for didactic reasons by means of positive instances of self-reflection. In this way Epictetus shows his students how they can counter bad instances of self-persuasion.

Epictetus offers all prayers to his students as models for their personal, practical experience of life. Many prayers aim at self-assurance, but the chief function of the prayers, according to Wehner, as with the monologues, is self-suggestion for practicing freedom. Whereas in the monologue freedom is defined more positively, i.e., the realm of the human possibilities of action (*ta prohairetika*) is more strongly emphasized, in the prayers a negative definition of freedom occurs, in so far as the one who prays teaches himself the limits of his own sphere of influence and leaves to God the things that fall outside his realm of conduct (*ta aprohaireta*). In substance, Wehner suggests, monologues and prayers thus tend to stress two different aspects of freedom and so can be regarded as complementary aids in practice. In addition to the person's prayers to God, Epictetus also lets God speak to the human being on a fictive level. God encourages the individual to utilize fully his own scope of action. The fictive addresses of God to the human being thus represent a counterpart to the prayers and at the same time are useful for underpinning the model-oriented monologues, in which the possibilities of the person exerting his influence is also emphasized.

The exemplary fictive dialogues with rulers likewise promote the spiritualization of the fundamental *dihairesis* between one's own and another's sphere of control. In these exemplary dialogues with political powers, Wehner sees Epictetus deliberately turning to a concrete situation, that could well be directly relevant for his students, since in most cases they aspire to a political career. In the context of the dialogical creation of such an encounter, Epictetus shows how the correct distinction between one's own and another's sphere of control empowers the student to preserve his own inner freedom in the face of the ruler, so long as the student regards the threats of the autocrat as indifferent. The form of the dialogue makes it possible for the student to anticipate the future conversational moves of the interlocutor and to test the adequacy of his reactions to them. Since the fictive dialogues with rulers are tailored to the future real life situations of the students even more directly than the exemplary monologues and prayers, Wehner reads i 1.21 and following as indicating that Epictetus wants his students to use the exemplary monologues and prayers as general aids in practicing freedom *before* turning to the fictive dialogues with rulers.

Wehner reasonably interprets Epictetus' sharp rebukes of mythic heroes

(Agamemnon and Achilles) as ultimately attacks on his listeners whose conduct is comparable to that of the heroes. This type of indirect appeal serves to distance one's own actions from the actions of the heroes.

The rebuke of a fictive interlocutor also frequently represents a medium for grappling with the circle of recipients. This is especially the case when the fictive interlocutor puts into words potential thoughts, worries, and complaints of the circle of listeners, that we can suppose for most of the practice-oriented interjections. The fictive interlocutor thereby turns into the mouthpiece of the recipients. Wehner believes that Epictetus' criticism of the fictive interlocutor reaches the listeners in a more direct way than the rebuke of the mythic heroes. In contrast to grappling with mythic heroes, the confrontation with a fictive interlocutor never develops into a dialogue, since the fictive interlocutor whom Epictetus rebukes has nothing more to say in answer. Wehner thinks it can be assumed in individual cases, but not proven, that the rebuking of the fictive interlocutor, like the brief dialogues that he conducts with his students, is presented by Epictetus as a model for dealing with one's own apprehensions and hardships. Epictetus inserts the didactically effective means of the direct fictive interjection and his harsh rebuff of it only when practical questions of how to shape one's life are treated. In the realm of theoretical debates he largely dispenses with directly grappling with a fictive interlocutor.

The quotations that Epictetus intersperses in his *Discourses* fulfill various functions and are related in different degrees to the practical experience of life. Epictetus inserts quotations for rhetorical embellishment, which serves as a substitute for one's own expositions and as phrases for practice. Here again Wehner's observations seem superficial, as I will illustrate below, compared to Long's account of the presence of Socrates in the *Discourses*.

Out of thoroughness, Wehner examines the dialogue-structure in the *Encheiridion*. She contends that Arrian abridges the dialogue-structure of the *Discourses* by reducing the diversity of forms of address met with in it to the appeal addressed in the second person singular, and, in most cases, takes only the parts of the dialogue directly related to practice. This abridgement results on the one hand from the changed conditions of production and reception of the *Handbook*, but also explains its function as a compendium aimed at the practical organization of life even more than the *Discourses*. Epictetus' *Discourses* and Arrian's *Encheiridion* complement one another in so far as the complex dialogue-structure of the former aims at practicing philosophical patterns of thought and action, whereas the latter offers instructions for the practical transformation of the practiced attitude and, in contrast to the *Discourses*, mainly addresses advanced students.

When Wehner compares Epictetus to other representatives of the 'diatribe', she admits that his *Discourses* share the chief characteristic of the genre 'diatribe', but asserts that he affixed it with his own stamp. In contrast to the fictive interlocutors in Teles, Musonius, and Dio, fictive speakers in Epictetus present their own apprehensions and complaints out of personal dismay and thereby

often tap into the thoughts and feelings of the listeners. With respect to the form of the rebuke of the fictive interlocutor, Epictetus is again to be distinguished from other authors of the 'diatribe': Epictetus many times demonstrates an alternative concept of conduct and at times harshly puts the fictive speaker in his place. This distinction makes clear that in the fictive interjections Epictetus gives the reality of life of his onlookers more room than the other diatribists and tries more intensively to exert influence on the moral development of the listeners. The stronger inclusion of the listeners also becomes visible on the level of the forms of address to the onlookers. The frequent use of the 'communicative "you"' form of address of students creates a more personal tone for criticizing the learning community, just as Epictetus' use both of the 'personal "I"' when referring to himself and the 'communicative "we"' does. This more personal tone of intercourse, characteristic of Epictetus' *Diatribes*, is not, Wehner asserts, present to the same degree in other diatribists.

Wehner argues that Epictetus follows the tradition of ancient Greco-Roman psychagogy when he supplies monologues, prayers, and fictive dialogues with rulers to his students as aids in meditation. But she correctly observes that Epictetus is not constrained by these traditional forms of psychagogy, because he freely subordinates them to his own pedagogical intentions. Epictetus' originality manifests itself especially clearly, she thinks, in the fictive dialogues with rulers. These dialogues can be integrated into the tradition of the Hellenistic guidance of the mind, because they represent a form of the *praemeditatio malorum*, the intellectual anticipation of all possible misfortunes, that was very popular, especially with the Stoics. But the dialogical formation of a future confrontation with a ruler, as far as it can be determined, is met with for the first time in Epictetus.

The special achievement of Epictetus, Wehner suggests, is his adaptation of a form of meditation practicable in the Stoa to the concrete world of his listeners. As for the model-oriented monologues and prayers, Epictetus seems to emphasize the autosuggestive components more strongly than his predecessors by letting self-reflection recede into the background in the monologues, and letting self-suggestion recede into the background in the prayers. Wehner's judgment is that Epictetus is not only bound to a definite tradition of the education of the will, but shows himself years ahead in his variety of forms of ethical instruction.

While it may in a way be uncharitable to compare a modified doctoral dissertation with the work of an eminent senior scholar, it must be said that Long's approach to Epictetus is by design both more ambitious and more holistic than Wehner's. Long approaches Epictetus as author, stylist, educator, and thinker. His intended audience is thus considerably broader than Wehner's. Long engages modern readers with Epictetus' philosophical recipe for a free and satisfying life. Wehner walks scholars of Epictetus through the structural minutiae of his monologues, prayers, fictive dialogues, exemplary dialogues, quotations, and anecdotes. While the latter approach has its use, the former offers decidedly greater philosophical rewards.

Long's book consists of an introduction and nine chapters: 1. Epictetus in his

Time and Place; 2. The Discourses; 3. The Socratic Paradigm; 4. Philosophy and Pedagogy; 5. Reading Epictetus; 6. Natures: Divine, Human, Animal; 7. From Theology to Ethics; 8. Autonomy and Integrity; 9. Appropriate Actions and Feelings. Suggestions for further readings and scholarly notes are appended to the end of the introduction and to each chapter. An epilogue, a glossary of Greek terms, a 'Who's Who: Stoics and Others', references, an extensive index of passages cited, and a brief general index complete the volume.

Chapter 1 orients the reader to the world of Epictetus: his school, his students, and the influence of his teacher Musonius Rufus. Emphasis is on Epictetus' Socratism and his belief that human beings are equipped by nature with all the basic capacities necessary for understanding the world and correcting impediments to living well through right thinking and self-discipline. Long soundly suggests that Epictetus' focus on applied ethics and general truths about nature, and his reticence about technicalities of physics, plainly reflect his own judgment of the best of what Stoicism offers his students. The four unifying concepts of Epictetus' thought presented are freedom, judgment, volition (*prohairesis*), and integrity (which translates a cluster of Epictetan terms: shame, reverence, trustworthiness, conscience (*aidôs*), and decency (*euschêmosunê*)). Long explains that Epictetan freedom is entirely psychological and attitudinal. Happiness is thus freedom *from* impediment, turmoil, and worry. How free we are in our experience of the world and ourselves depends entirely on how we form our judgments.

Was Epictetus an original thinker like Plato or Aristotle? Long thinks not. But he thinks philosophical excellence has more to do with clarity of expression, provocative and imaginative discourse, and bending people's minds to reflect on life and the world in new ways. In this respect, Long judges Epictetus' voice to be fresh in formulation and distinctive in emphasis. Epictetus softens the harshness of Chrysippus' Stoa by advocating gentleness toward those who err and urging his students to concentrate on their own immediate progress rather than being engrossed with the remote ideal of the sage. Long thinks it likely that Epictetus' characterization of 'making correct use of *phantasiai*' is original, but his appropriation of the discourse and methodology of Plato's Socrates is Epictetus' most notable originality.

In Chapter 2 Long rejects Wirth's view that the *Discourses* were the product of Arrian's creative authorship, and defends a factual reading of Arrian's letter to Lucius Gellius prefacing the *Discourses*, in which Arrian explains that he 'kept notes' (*hupomnêmata*) of what Epictetus said. Wisely, I believe, Long also rejects Dobbin's view (Robert F. Dobbin, tr. *Epictetus*. Discourses *Book 1*. Oxford: Oxford University Press [1998]) that Epictetus himself wrote the discourses 'as we have them' as implausible (64). Long's view, that Epictetus' discourses are *not* Cynic 'diatribes' at all, since that generic description of his teaching style distracts attention from Epictetus' deliberate adoption of Socratic methodology, is more incisive than Wehner's discussion. Like Wehner, however, Long sees Epictetus speaking primarily for and to his own group of students and tailoring his 'dialectical lessons' to each discussant. Long offers the interesting

suggestion that Epictetus' curriculum probably included the study of some Platonic dialogues and supports this speculation with citations of eleven texts in the *Discourses*. Epictetus' pedagogical goals are usefully brought under six headings: theoretical, methodological, polemical, psychological, social, and educational/vocational. An insightful treatment of the protreptic, elenctic, and didactic (doctrinal) styles that Epictetus endorses follows. The protreptic style is explicated by exemplifying Plato's *Apology* and *Euthydemus* and citing Epictetus' own description of this style at *Disc.* iii 23.34-37. Long argues that Epictetus characterizes the protreptic style in virtually the same terms as the Socratic elenchus. A strong case is made that Epictetus positions himself within three pedagogical traditions: Stoic (Zeno as the doctrinal paragon), Cynic (the reproving protreptic paragon of the 'kingly' Diogenes), and Socratic (combining protreptic and elenctic).

Chapter 3 explains how Epictetus follows his Greek predecessors in aligning Stoic doctrines with Socrates and reminding his students of Socrates' equanimity at his trial, imprisonment, and death. Long demonstrates the strong imprint of Plato's *Gorgias* by detailing Epictetus' repeated endorsement of seven key Socratic ethical principles articulated in that dialogue. The reason Epictetus appropriated the Socratic *elenchus* is his fundamental belief that human beings are innately equipped with the motivation to seek their own good, and to choose whatever means they think will promote that good. Long illustrates Epictetus' insistence that it is the application of our innate preconceptions (*prolêpseis*) that requires relentless Stoic training. Epictetus shows his students how to practice the *elenchus* on themselves by reflecting on their use of impressions, thus appropriating the methodology of the Socratic *elenchus* for his own pedagogical purposes. Epictetus exhorts his students to know themselves, practice self-examination, and discover within themselves a source of goodness that is independent of outward contingencies and also capable of generating personal happiness and integrity. Long concludes that Epictetus' adaptation of the Socratic paradigm is the most creative appropriation of Socrates after the works of Plato and Xenophon.

Epictetus' optimistic rationalism is elucidated in chapter 4. Long's Epictetus is an empirical realist who emphatically rejected Academic Skepticism by holding that the basic concepts of value and the principles of a good life can be shown to be self-evident. Long identifies three conditions that Epictetus sees as necessary in order to benefit from his teaching: (a) confronting basic wants, (b) recognizing the implications of not knowing how to satisfy those wants, and (c) acknowledging that such satisfaction requires making exceedingly demanding commitments and choices. Three fields of study constitute his curriculum: (1) dealing with one's own desires and aversions, (2) developing appropriate positive and negative impulses in our relationships with others, and (3) advanced logic for those alone who have already progressed in the other two more urgent fields. The first field requires limiting one's desires and aversions exclusively to what one can actually 'will' and seek to carry out, and thus be unimpeded and undistressed.

Only such training of one's desires and aversions equips one with the right kind of disposition to care effectively about other people. Long sees recognition of the primacy of this field as key to grasping Epictetus' ethics: self-concern must come first and foremost if we are to be enabled properly to fulfill our social roles. Epictetus' Stoicism is an all-or-nothing practice for every waking moment of one's life.

A small disappointment lingers from the discussion of Epictetus' self-conception. Long cites i 2.29 where Epictetus announces that to the command 'Shave off your beard', he would reply 'If I am a philosopher, I will not do so'. Long says that Epictetus knows he *is* a philosopher, and that he is so regarded (122). A distinction between a capital 'P' Philosopher, who proudly displays erudition, and a lower case 'p' philosopher, who humbly seeks to be the Socrates of the Second Sophistic, is invoked. But such a distinction explains too little. If a beard is the symbol of a proud Philosopher, why would a humble philosopher refuse to shave his off? Long thinks that Epictetus disclaims being a Philosopher. But how would submitting to depilation constitute an affront to his dignity? Should not Epictetus the *humble* philosopher be as indifferent to the hair on his face as he is to his alienable leg (see 161)? Long thinks Epictetus' retort illustrates strength of character, but this leaves unexplained Epictetus' cagey 'if'.

The nuances of Epictetus' tone and technique are displayed in chapter 5. The way his tone and method shift registers—professorial then peremptory, hyperbolical then ironical, satirical then amused, encouraging then polemical—is ably demonstrated. The changing rhetorical styles of discourses i 20 'On how rationality is capable of studying itself' and iv 9 'On lapsing from integrity' are meticulously analyzed.

Chapter 6 contains an excellent account of Epictetus' theology. What distinguishes it from orthodox Stoicism, Long suggests, is how it grounds his moral psychology, and its warmly and urgently personalist tone. Long explains how Stoic philosophers accommodate a plurality of gods since the Stoic divinity is ubiquitous, how Epictetus' divinity makes the best of all possible worlds, and how Epictetus disregards theodicy since all badness pertains solely to human deficiencies. Epictetus asserts God's immanent presence throughout nature as a universal mind, emphasizing theism over pantheism. Thus Long labels him a 'panentheist'. Epictetus' theology is distinctive within the Stoic tradition because he defends divine providence in the face of our bodily and external vulnerability, and he emphasizes the divine gift of our mental autonomy. When he speaks of a personal *daimôn*, Long sees this as the normative self and the voice of correct reason, equivalent to God, that is available to everyone. Here again we hear the echo of Socrates and his 'divine sign'. And just as Zeus does the best he can with the materials at hand, he models for us how we can display the same virtues by drawing on our mental and moral resources to make the best possible use of the materials we get.

The argument that Epictetus' recourse to theology is not a betrayal of his Stoic rationalism and Socratic dialectic occupies chapter 7. Long maintains that

Epictetus saw theology as the best way to authorize the truth of Stoicism's hardest doctrine—that human flourishing depends entirely on excellence of mind and character. The early Stoics' 'bottom-up' approach—from the observable behavior of all animals to the divine laws that reason compels us to obey—is contrasted with Epictetus' 'top-down' approach—where the concept of *oikeiôsis* does not play a major role in justifying his main doctrines. The moral point of view is a God-given part of our nature from the outset, but due to our mistaken opinion that happiness results from acquiring material advantages, the moral point of view fails to develop. Long rightly insists that Epictetan happiness is an *achievement*, not a mere psychological reaction, that we must compete long and hard for by training ourselves to make the best, virtuous use of every circumstance.

The two closely related concepts of autonomy and integrity occupy chapter 8. Long observes that Epictetus is the only Stoic we know of who made *prohairesis* a key term in his philosophy. He suggests we take *prohairesis* in Epictetus to refer to just those mental capacities that are completely 'up to us' and free from external constraint. Since we do not exercise total autonomy over the occurrence of our sense impressions, the *prohairesis* is distinct from the *hêgemonikon*. Three traces of Aristotle's use of this term in Epictetus' thought are identified: (a) the idea that practical reason integrates thought and desire, (b) the restriction of this faculty to what is 'up to us', and (c) the link between *prohairesis* and moral character. Epictetus' chief motivation for adopting this term, Long contends, is the fact that our judgments and interpretations of the world are *the* critical factor in how we fare, and that they depend on nothing that is not 'up to us'. Long defends his novel translation of *prohairesis* as 'volition' by saying that this term best conveys Epictetus' view that the essence of the self is our decision-making, purposive, and evaluative disposition. While complete autonomy is the proper condition of *prohairesis*, 'volition' does not beg the question concerning the mind's autonomy. For Epictetus, a free will is not a birthright, but rather requires mastering Stoic philosophy. Furthermore, Long thinks that volition for Epictetus has an essential monitoring aspect that manifests itself in people's innate propensity to feel shame, respect others, and conform to social norms. This propensity can be developed into full-blown integrity.

Chapter 9 addresses the second of Epictetus' three fields of study identified in chapter 4—appropriate actions and feelings in our relationships with others. Long wisely emphasizes that Epictetus does not urge his students to be emotionally numb in their social relations, but rather that his insistence that what is appropriate is *not* being unmoved (*apathês*) like a statue is unparalleled in other Stoic authors. Long explains how Epictetus appeals to a normative conception of what human beings are in order to advance his argument that our social roles determine how *we* ought to behave in relation to others, whereas how they behave in relation to us is 'not up to us' and so irrelevant. The moral benefits that accrue to us, for example, in being considerate to our parents, siblings, fellow citizens, etc. vastly outweigh the value of any material items we concede to them. Each role a person finds himself occupying provides a setting for him to distin-

guish himself in. We should respect others for who they are, rather than pity them for their difficult material circumstances. Long could have added that as a teacher, Epictetus seemed to believe that the very *best* way to help others is to *teach them Stoicism* so that they can liberate themselves from material hardship. In any case, Long observes that Epictetus thinks we are no more justified in being angry with wrongdoers for their misdeeds than we are in being annoyed with the blind for what they fail to see. Epictetus maintains the Stoic will comfort the person gripped by grief by showing her sympathy without feeling that person's pain; the latter, after all, does no one any good.

The irony of the title of the epilogue, 'The Afterlife of Epictetus', will be appreciated by all who know that the Stoics did not countenance a disembodied afterlife of the soul. The epilogue shows how this pagan philosopher's moral seriousness and sharp observations compelled so many subsequent prominent thinkers. These include the Alexandrian Christians Clement and Origen, the Neoplatonist commentator Simplicius, Justus Lipsius in the Netherlands, the Frenchmen Guillaume du Vair, Pascal, and Descartes, and the Englishmen Anthony Ashley Cooper (the third Earl of Shaftesbury) and Bishop Joseph Butler. I would add Adam Smith (*The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, edited by D.D. Raphael and A.L. MacFie. Oxford: Oxford University Press, [1976]), Chair of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow, to Long's list of Epictetus' fans. Smith quotes or paraphrases Epictetus several times, mentions him alongside Zeno and Chrysippus, and contrasts him, as the 'independent and spirited, but often harsh' apostle of the fundamental Stoic doctrine of contempt of life and death, with 'the mild, the humane, the benevolent' Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (288). Long explains how, in North America, Epictetus' emphasis on autonomy and freedom won him fans like John Harvard, Thomas Jefferson, Emerson, Thoreau, Walt Whitman, and most recently, novelist Tom Wolfe.

These two substantial works will be most welcome to all serious scholars of the slave turned Stoic student turned Stoic teacher. Long's book promises to have even wider appeal. The contributions of Wehner and Long help to ensure that Epictetus will continue to enjoy an active 'afterlife'.

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