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Logic and the Imperial Stoa (review)

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ing titles to books and chapters, Simpson has broken chapters into sections, which he also titles and briefly summarizes. The summaries allow Simpson to give indications as to the flow of Aristotle's thought without building them into the translation itself. The sections of the translation also correspond to the sections of Simpson's still newer *A Philosophical Commentary on the* Politics *of Aristotle* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998); notes to the translation also sometimes point to the line of argument in the commentary. Simpson also includes a translation of the last book of the *Nicomachean Ethics,* which many see as an introduction or transition to the *Politics,* a brief discussion of the translations of certain key terms, a glossary of significant terms, and an analytical outline of the argument of the *Politics.* The result is a welcome and useful translation and set of tools.

Two of Simpson's decisions in preparing his translation are regrettable. First, Simpson places the discussion of the best *polis* in books 7 and 8 between the discussion of the nature of the *polis* and its kinds in book 3 and the discussion of other sorts of *polis* in books 4–6, thus printing the books in the order 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 4, 5, 6. There are good reasons for believing that this is how Aristotle intended the *Politics* to be read. But in deciding the order in which to print the books, these reasons must be weighed against the inconvenience and confusion produced by departing from the normal, manuscript ordering of the books. In my view this is not even a close call. One can easily indicate one's belief about the correct order of the books, as Simpson does (xvi–xx), and avoid all inconvenience by printing the books in their manuscript order.

More to be regretted is Simpson's decision (made, I imagine, for aesthetic reasons) not to follow the increasingly common and laudable practice of printing Bekker numbers in the margins of translations of Aristotle. These numbers are a great convenience to readers, for they make it easy to locate specific passages in different translations and in the Greek original. Simpson does give the Bekker number of the beginning of each of his sections, and he may think that this is enough to allow readers to locate specific passages easily (he says as much in his *Commentary,* xiii). But Simpson's sections are sometimes as big as a Bekker page, and many of them are as many as ten to fifteen lines long; I speak from experience in reporting that it is more difficult and time-consuming to find one's way around Simpson's translation than it should be.

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Jonathan Barnes. *Logic and the Imperial Stoa.* Leiden: Brill, 1997. Pp xi + 165. Cloth, $66.00.

The author's aim in this quirky monograph is not to reconstruct all that can be surmised about Stoic logic in the first two centuries A.D. of the Roman Empire, but rather to concentrate on the three Stoic authors whose extant texts contain remarks on logic. These imperial Stoics, Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius, are known for their emphasis on ethics and not for their contributions in either logic or physics. So it comes as some surprise that Barnes can find much to say about what these philosophers thought about logic. As Barnes presents it (defying chronology), "Marcus introduces the comedy; Seneca features in the second act; and Epictetus is the hero" (ix).

In Chapter One, "The Decline of Logic," Barnes concedes that Marcus had no interest in logic whatsoever, and that Seneca and Epictetus cannot be claimed to have advanced Chrysippus' work in logic. Yet he refuses to concede that the ethical part of philosophy was the only part which was of any account in the social and intellectual debates of the time. Nor does he grant that after the second century B.C. Stoic logic was abandoned, neglected, or regarded as fossilized. Barnes concludes his short introduction by explaining that the Stoics divided 'logic' (λογική) into rhetoric and 'dialectic' (διαλεκτική). The latter was customarily divided into the study of 'signifiers' (including sound and voice) and the study of 'things signified,' which included sense impressions (φαντασίαι) and 'sayables' (λέκτα). Consequently, Barnes observes that when an ancient philosopher is said to have rejected 'logic,' it is unclear whether that philosopher was rejecting what we moderns understand as logic, or psychological and physiological matters, epistemological entities, or items of linguistic theory.

In the second chapter, Barnes reasonably interprets texts in which Seneca cautions his friend Lucilius against mere sophistical quibbling about logical trivialities as evidence of Lucilius' passion for logic. Seneca's reservations about logic prove to be more nuanced than a cursory reading of his letters and essays might reveal. Barnes shows that Seneca does not urge us to abstain from logic pure and simple, but to abjure "a petty interest in piffling puzzles" (14). Moreover, Barnes argues, Seneca sees logic in itself as neutral. He scorns treating syllogisms as playthings or pompously parading them, since these frivolous uses have no beneficial ethical effect. Used as concise expressions of philosophical insight or elements within protreptic sermons, however, they are serious, valuable tools. Readers of Seneca are often tempted to brand his scattered remarks on various topics as ultimately inconsistent, so Barnes' discernment of consistency in Seneca's comments on logic is appealing. Yet to label Seneca a logical utilitarian and so a philistine (21) is only to fault him for not being a philosopher Barnes happens to like.

The chapter on Epictetus, divided into ten sections, comprises seven tenths of the book. Yet Epictetus figures as a strange sort of hero here. Barnes tendentiously characterizes Epictetus as offering the world "a pin-striped cynicism, Diogenes without the barrel" (25). This judgment is at odds with his bold claim, based on very fragile evidence, that "Epictetus was a devotee of the physical part of philosophy" (27). If Epictetus *were* a 'pin-striped Cynic,' why would he bother with physics at all? Barnes discusses how fashionable interest in logic was at the time and Epictetus' objection to the widespread practice of exalting pure exegesis rather than discovering the truth and applying it to one's life. Treatment of Epictetus' view that, as rational beings, we are morally required to do logic, is followed by sections on logical analysis, hypothetical arguments, and changing arguments (λόγοι μεταπίπτοντες). Unfortunately, offhand quips pepper this generally meticulous study. For example, Barnes sympathizes with the view that non-philosophers have greater practical wisdom than philosophers (40). This seems to reflect his low regard for philosophers who are serious about ethics, which may help explain why he finds it "difficult to avoid the thought that the attitudes which he [Epictetus] recommended are both humanly impossible and morally disgusting" (25). Barnes avoids explaining *why* this thought is difficult to avoid. He offers no argument against the alternative judgment that Epictetan attitudes are tough-minded, personally challenging, and morally noble. Moreover, Barnes laments that the primary reason for the existence of the articles in today's journals is to advance the careers of their authors, because "they assuredly do not advance the subject" (52). Gibes like this are more distracting than the sundry stylistic idiosyncracies, but coupled with a host of type-setting errors, they make for bumpy reading.

Overall, Barnes makes an interesting case for his conclusion that Epictetus' consuming interest in moral precepts and ethical improvement was atypical among his contemporary Stoic teachers and Stoic pupils, who "gave themselves to logical matters with a passion, a single-mindedness, and no doubt a pedantry which galled Epictetus—as it had galled Seneca, and as it has galled so many earnest philosophers" (126). The most important Epictetan discourse bearing on logic (I. 7) is featured with the Greek text, an English translation, and a detailed commentary in an appendix. This is a useful study of logic *in* the imperial Stoa, yet it does little to illuminate the thought of Epictetus, or imperial Stoicism, as a whole.

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David Konstan. *Friendship in the Classical World.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Pp. xiv + 206. Paper, $18.95.

Despite its brevity, Konstan's history of friendship in classical antiquity speaks volumes. With admirable precision and economy of expression, Konstan cites and surveys scores of ancient authors—poets, playwrights, politicians, novelists and historians, sophists, satirists, philosophers, and theologians—from Homer's legendary portrait of Achilles and Patroclus to the Christian fusions of Venantius Fortunatus in the sixth century of the common era. An impressive array of anthropologists, philosophers, and classical scholars enter into the discussion at specific interstices connecting philology, textual interpretation, ancient history, and modern social psychology all together, so as to display an evolving array of ancient philosophies, faiths, and attitudes concerned with friendly relations of one sort or another. Konstan grounds this history in a richly informed context of exacting detail. Yet, he charitably leaves his reader with the feeling that so much more needs to be explored.

At the same time, what largely motivates this work is Konstan's demonstrable conviction that ancient friendship exhibits recognizable resemblances with its contemporary counterpart, notwithstanding all the varieties exhibited over the fifteen hundred years or so of ancient Greek and Roman practices. "Ideas of friendship were adapted to different practices, but the core sense of a private bond based on mutual affection, esteem, and liberality—within the capabilities of the respective partners—abided" (148). What is foreign in ancient human relations may be considerable, but it