

ings. This is the natural view of the sage, who seems blinkered on his (or our) virtue at the cost of our (or his) happiness, but again this moderation ignores the question whether cosmic kings and queens *can* be friends in the ordinary way, whether such friendships and feelings are not tied to enmity, possessiveness, partiality, and reasonableness rather than universal reason and respect. For the sage belongs to the high utopia not the low; it is we more ordinary types who need to be regulated by the natural laws of social emotion, property, family, state, and religion, habituated in our feelings, behaviors, beliefs, and values, we ordinary types who need to learn how to kill, or train our servants to learn to kill, to protect our natural goods from those who would take them away. We need more than wisdom; we need stoic warriors.

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The Roman Stoics: Self, Responsibility, and Affection. By Gretchen Reydam-Schils. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005. Pp. xi + 224. \$35 (cloth). ISBN 0-226-30837-5.

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This is a study of Roman adaptations of Stoic doctrine that seeks to portray a model of the self functioning as a mediator between philosophical and traditional values (1). The author's aim is 'to let the Roman Stoics' self arise out of a comprehensive analysis of their extant philosophical work and to conduct that analysis from the vantage point of the specific question of social embeddedness. Such an approach yields a Stoic self that is constituted by the encounter between challenges and normative expectations' (2). Overall, this aim is met. The Roman Stoics referred to are Seneca, Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, and to a lesser extent Hierocles, who 'all had to come to terms with the sociopolitical challenges of imperial Rome' (3). The tame thesis advanced is that the doctrine of these Roman Stoics 'shows a distinctive pattern of emphasizing social responsibility' (3). This social responsibility includes commitments to the political community, marriage, and parenthood. The book contains an introduction, five chapters, a thorough bibliography, an index of passages cited, and a skimpy general index.

The first chapter, 'The Self as Mediator', establishes the central theme of the book while laying the foundation for subsequent chapters. Reydam-Schils emphasizes that the Roman Stoic self is fundamentally embedded in a rational order at the cosmic level and at the level of the network of social relationships.

She asserts that ‘of all ancient models, Stoic theory has the strongest sense of selfhood’ (17). Her argument in support of this claim unfolds as follows. After making the unoriginal observation that the Roman Stoics urge self-examination and daily introspective monitoring of one’s own moral progress, she quickly rejects the notion that there is any theory of the self in Homer’s *Iliad* or Euripides’ *Medea*. In the *Republic* Plato offers more, she holds, but his theory of the self is a very rudimentary typology that leaves unanswered questions about free will and human agency. A brisk overview of Stoic psychology discussing the *hēgemonikon*, *phantasia*, impulse, assent, and reservation (ὑπεξαίρεσις, *exceptio*) generates a working definition of the Roman Stoic self as ‘the governing principle of the soul’ which ‘uses the faculty of assent’ and ‘is not merely generic but is an individual self as well because it creates a specific moral identity for each person’ (29). Reydams-Schils contends that the importance of time and memory has been overlooked in assessments of the Stoic idea of selfhood. A text from Seneca depicting time as a reversed cone, connecting ever widening concentric circles of social relationships in a linear progression is adduced to support her view that self, society, and time are inextricably interwoven by means of memory. The function of memory is thus existential, containing the lived experiences of doctrines, precepts, sayings, and the moral exempla from which we have learned. Since the wise person can draw on the moral exempla from past history and can calmly embrace the future, she has all of time at her fingertips. The Roman Stoic self is integrated, Reydams-Schils holds, in so far as it is autonomous in carrying moral injunctions internally, and since those injunctions derive from the divine reason of a universal order, they are objective in nature as well.

Chapter 1 ends with an examination of suicide. Suicide represents a decision that, for Cicero and Seneca, ought to be made in light of human relationships. Socrates’ views in Plato’s *Phaedo* provide a model that each of the Roman Stoics adapts differently in his own justifications of suicide. She reports that Epictetus construes the threat to have his beard shaved off as a slight to personal honor that could warrant taking leave of life. She rightly notes that the beard is a natural mark of masculinity for Epictetus, but she labels this position ‘quirky’ and opts to move on in lieu of attempting a penetrating analysis. Given Epictetus’ position on externals, including the body, how does depilation count as an intolerable loss of dignity rather than an indifferent event akin to going bald or losing a toe nail? Is the beard as intimately tied to masculinity as the genitals (see *Diss.* i 2.25–26)? Questions like these are not raised. Seneca’s postponement of suicide for the sake of his father and his wife fit much more neatly with the author’s emphasis on Roman Stoic commitments to others. Social duties are not merely general attitudes toward humanity but bear on communal relationships of friendship, parenthood, marriage, and kinship. Nor do such duties preclude genuine affection, kindness (*humanitas*), and joy (*gaudium*).

The thesis of chapter 2 is that many scholars have painted much too bleak a picture of the Stoic’s attitude toward human relationships (77). Reydams-Schils

considers to be a grave threat to her project the view that, for the Roman Stoics, loved ones are categorized as preferred indifferents. Consequently, she devotes the bulk of this chapter to arguing against this view. She observes that Seneca includes people in his ‘less technical’ lists of traditional goods (59). Some provocative texts from Epictetus (most notably *Ench.* 3, which likens wife and child to a breakable jug) do not sit comfortably with her emphasis on human affection and social bonds, so she carefully qualifies her position by stating that ‘people fall under the category of preferred indifferents only in certain, delineated aspects...only insofar as...relationships involve unpredictable outcomes and carry the potential for obstructing the exercise of virtue’ (69). In her portrait of the Roman Stoics on human bonding she leans heavily on the doxography attributed to Arius Didymus which puts friends under the heading of goods rather than indifferents. Cicero, on the other hand, she notes, classifies friends not as ‘constitutive’ of the good (*telika*), but ‘productive’ (*poietika*) of the good. Since Reydams-Schils seems determined to establish a unanimity of opinion among the Roman Stoics on this issue, at one point she offers a strange kind of compromise interpretation that ‘friends occupy a *position between* the good in the strictest Stoic sense, namely, virtue as the correct use of reason, and the indifferents’ (69, her emphasis). While perhaps politic in motivation, such an awkward view seems neither to admit the subtle yet clear disagreements on this point of doctrine nor does it resonate with the sharp and deliberately challenging dichotomies so common in Stoic authors, both Greek and Roman. Ultimately she is on better footing holding that even if in *some respects* other people fall under the category of preferred indifferents, ‘unlike other externals they are never *merely* the “material” for our exercise of virtue’ (75). Her judgment that the bonds between friends, between parent and child, and between spouses can become an expression of the life of philosophy that constitutes the life of virtue (78) is sound.

The Stoic approach to leisure, philosophical activity, and political involvement occupies chapter 3. Reydams-Schils explains that the traditional motivations for entering public life do not apply to the Stoic (86). Rather, politics must allow for progress toward the philosophical ideal. If it does, then the wise man should immerse himself in public life while acknowledging the risks and expecting only modest results. The Stoic moves within the given parameters of public life (not seeking to abolish slavery, for example), does not avoid trouble, but rises above it, refusing to internalize the values of public life and disregarding its judgments of his successes or failures. As for *otium*, Reydams-Schils believes that for the Roman Stoics withdrawal and leisure are not ends in themselves but only ‘modes of retreat that remain fundamentally oriented toward community’ (102). Musonius Rufus in particular won a glorious reputation for benefiting his community even in exile. Epictetus says that we should serve where we find ourselves through circumstances; one can never be banished from the cosmic community (105). She thinks the mediation between philosophical ideals and political activity never ends; Seneca merely ‘loans himself’ to his political affairs, while Emperor Marcus emphasizes reservation regarding what one may hope to

achieve.

Reydams-Schils begins chapter 4 briefly examining one of the pseudo-*Letters* of Socrates, Plato's *Phaedo*, and Xenophon's *Memorabilia* in order to paint a Platonist view of affection between parents and children as at best misguided and at worst a threat to the life of philosophical contemplation (118). The Roman Stoics, in contrast, are presented as much more sympathetic to parental affection. While Cicero is upheld as a proponent of the traditional Roman conception of familial *pietas*, Reydams-Schils contends that the Roman Stoics deny that affection for children can be reduced to self-interest, since it actually embodies a key transition from self to other via *oikeiōsis*. Seneca and Epictetus describe techniques of emotional cushioning that enable parents to protect themselves from the pain of bereavement. Here again Reydams-Schils sees the Roman Stoic self mediating between inevitable affection for children and philosophically recommended detachment from that bond (123). The Roman Stoics' account of parenthood is rooted in their views of procreation and embryology, with the physical generative aspect of human biology mirroring the divine, providential care of the whole cosmos. Reydams-Schils is at pains to highlight a contrast with Aristotelian biology: some evidence—though not all of it unambiguously—indicates that the Stoics hold that mothers do not function as passive matter, but rather play an active role in the process of procreation. Both parents contribute *pneuma* to form the offspring.

Perhaps the most fascinating discussion in this chapter is the controversy over breast-feeding. Whereas Marcus Aurelius employed wet nurses, Musonius Rufus and others enjoined women to breast-feed their babies themselves. Reydams-Schils interprets Musonius' stance as a response to the child-rearing practices described in Plato's *Republic* and to the social concerns of his own culture. Breast-feeding is desirable as an explicit expression of the mother-child bond as well as shaping both soul and body of the child. What for Plato is a danger, for Musonius is not intrinsically problematic, since the intimate mother-child bond can be integrated into the philosophical life (129). Nonetheless, four limitations of parenthood are identified: (1) it is far inferior to Zeus' fatherly providence for the universe, (2) parents and children do not select each other, (3) parent-child and child-parent obligations are circumstantial and contingent, not absolute, and (4) parent and child are not equals in their relationship. Reydams-Schils concludes this chapter by considering whether any Stoic could sanction moderate grief. Contra Cicero, Seneca defends grief in moderation as natural while rejecting excessive grief. The account offered here is largely consistent with recent work on grief in Seneca (see Amy Olberding, 'The "Stout Heart": Seneca's Strategy for Dispelling Grief' *Ancient Philosophy* 25 [Spring 2005]: 141–154).

Marriage and community are treated in the final chapter. Reydams-Schils argues reasonably enough that marriage can be a legitimate vehicle for the Stoic philosophical ideal. Musonius Rufus 'provides the key to this chapter' (147), though Antipater of Tarsus and Hierocles provide a bit of additional support. She argues that 'Musonius presents conjugal love as the highest form of *eros*' (159),

that, in contrast to Plato, ‘Musonius does not describe the choice of partners exclusively from the man’s perspective and persistently argues for the reciprocal character of the spousal bond’ (161), which is absent in the marriage of Porphyry and Marcella (164). Thus ‘Musonius Rufus radically transforms Platonic *eros*, granting it to women too and redeeming the marital relationship from a mere utilitarian outlook’ (163). Moreover, in Musonius’ ‘account of marriage we find the purest example of how the Stoic could transcend the distinction between philosophical ideal and so-called common morality’ (166).

While the case for this account of Musonius is persuasive, Reydams-Schils overreaches with the remark that *eros* can be retrieved by the doctrine of good emotions (*eupatheiai*) by distinguishing *eros* from *aphrodisia* (sex) and removing the former from the category of passions (147). No textual evidence from Musonius or other sources is presented to substantiate this claim. Epictetus, on the other hand, provides some opposing texts. Caesar cannot give us peace from fever, shipwreck, fire, earthquake, lightning, sorrow, envy, or *eros* (*Diss.* iii 13.10). Crates’ marriage arose from *eros*, Epictetus grants, but this was a special, uncommon circumstance, since Hipparchia too was a Cynic (*Diss.* iii 22.76). *Eros* enslaves you to your erotic partner when he or she commands you to do things you do not want to do (*Diss.* iv 1.15–23; see also iii 1.26–35). A man who, under the compulsion of *eros* and from weakness, acts contrary to his opinion deserves pity, because he is in the grip of something violent and, in a manner of speaking, divine (*Diss.* iv 1.147–148). These texts suggest that the *eros* of the marriage of Crates and Hipparchia did not compel either one to act unwillingly in order to please the other, and so their *eros* co-existed with virtue in a very special relationship. Yet the violence of this divine emotion is intrinsically dangerous, Epictetus believes, and so *eros* seems too volatile to be a safe ingredient in the marriage of most everyone else. The account of marriage Reydams-Schils extracts from Musonius is interesting, but her presentation does not show that his views on *eros* and marriage were dominant among the Roman Stoics.

The chapter concludes with a quite brief discussion of Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius. Reydams-Schils notes that Seneca held that women are generally weaker than men and have a different nature, though both have the potential for virtue (169). She thinks that Epictetus’ views that a beard is a god-given sign for differentiating the sexes and that threatening to cut off a philosopher’s beard can warrant suicide could be perceived as not being entirely in line with Stoic teaching (169). But the only support she offers for this suggestion is to cite, with approval, a text in Lucian’s *Demonax* in which a Cynic chides Epictetus for not having any daughters. For measuring the orthodoxy of Epictetus’ comments on beards and masculinity, Lucian’s vignette is a poor source indeed. A thoughtful examination of the context of *Diss.* i 2.25–29 as well as other relevant texts (e.g., iv 8.12–15) is needed here as it was in chapter 1. Also problematic is her claim that ‘Epictetus himself is a philosopher in exile’ (169). She considers Rome to be *so* much the center of sociopolitical activity and to comprise the ‘normal’ social milieu that she disregards the very possibility of the social dynamics at work in

the community of Epictetus' school itself. Surely the teacher-student rapport enacted daily in Nicopolis can be seen as a real community animated by its own relationships of care, concern, and mentoring. It is a pity that here Reydams-Schils focuses on marriage and parenthood in such a way as to banish the famously inspiring teacher Epictetus to the periphery when he has plenty to say about familial responsibilities, as she herself once touches on in chapter 4 (121). Her analysis of Seneca's suicide yields the judgment that the key difference between Socrates' death scene and Seneca's is the central presence of the spouse—Seneca's wife, Paulina. Reydams-Schils complains that although this point is missed by modern scholars, Christine de Pizan (c. 1405) realized its significance by rewriting the *Phaedo* account so as to include a devoted, heroic Xanthippe trying to tear the cup of poison from Socrates' lips and remaining at his side to the end.

In order to strengthen the case for some of the theses she defends, at times Reydams-Schils downplays disagreements among the Roman Stoics by presenting their divergent views as more convergent and harmonious than they are. Overall, however, her studious selection of texts and typically tenable interpretations warrant her emphasis on the social embeddedness of these philosophers. Therefore, this study offers a sound perspective on aspects of the Roman Stoics that are poorly understood by some.

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Les Kynica du stoïcisme. By Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé. Hermes Einzelschriften Band 89. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2003. Pp. 198. € 44. ISBN 3-515-08256-5.

R. Bracht Branham

School for Scandal: The Cynic Origins of Stoicism

Three large questions have always loomed over Cynicism as part of the history of philosophy: first, is it actually a philosophy or simply a way of life?¹ Second, how does it fit into the philosophical movements of the fourth century BCE? Should it be seen as an eccentric outgrowth of the Socratic tradition initiated by Antisthenes (a follower of Socrates), or did Diogenes of Sinope, who evidently lacked any philosophical pedigree except for anecdotes associating him with Antisthenes, introduce something fundamentally new to the philosophical culture

¹ See, *The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and its Legacy*, ed. R. Bracht Branham, Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé (Berkeley: University of California Press 1996) 21-27.