Abstract
One of the most prevalent and influential assumptions in metaethics is that our conception of the relation between moral language and motivation provides strong support to internalism about moral judgments. In the present paper, I argue that this supposition is unfounded. Our responses to the type of thought experiments that internalists employ do not lend confirmation to this view to the extent they are assumed to do. In particular, they are as readily explained by an externalist view according to which there is a pragmatic and standardized connection between moral utterances and motivation. The pragmatic account I propose states that a person’s utterance of a sentence according to which she ought to ϕ conveys two things: the sentence expresses, in virtue of its conventional meaning, the belief that she ought to ϕ, and her utterance carries a generalized conversational implicature to the effect that she is motivated to ϕ. This view also makes it possible to defend cognitivism against a well-known internalist argument.
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Notes
I defend this view in more detail in Strandberg (forthcoming a), where I consider moral language more generally.
In this paper, I consider dimensions of MJI that are directly relevant to the various thought experiments to which internalists appeal. However, there are other important dimensions of this view. One concerns in what kind of moral judgement consist (beliefs, desires, or something else). Another concerns what it is about moral judgments that explains motivation (their being mental states of a certain type or their having certain propositional objects). It should further be noticed that both moral judgments and motivational states might be understood either as dispositional or as occurrent mental states. I will, in accordance with the literature, understand both in the latter way (but see below). Internalist claims also bring up intriguing issues as regards concept ascription that I cannot discuss here; see Greenberg (2009, pp. 137–164).
This should not be understood to entail that other kinds of moral judgments are necessarily connected specifically to motivation to perform actions (or not to perform actions). It means rather that what explains that moral judgments of the kind referred to in a generic formulation of MJI are necessarily connected to motivation to perform actions also explains the connection between other kinds of moral judgments and motivational states, such as motivation to assist others to perform actions. So on the assumption that it is the meaning of a certain moral term (e.g., “ought”) that ultimately explains the connection between the kind of moral judgments and motivation referred to in a generic formulation of MJI, the meaning of this term should also explain the connection between other kinds of ought judgments and motivational states.
This means that a moral judgment either consists in or entails (without consisting in) a motivational state. If the latter is the case, a moral judgment either consists in a complex of mental states of which a motivational state is part, or it somehow gives rise to a motivational state without this state being part of it. On a related alternative, a moral judgment by itself causes a motivational state. Cf. Tresan (2009a, pp. 54–57).
At least granted that certain requirements are fulfilled (see (iv) and (v) below).
In order to distinguish this view from an individual version of MJI (see (v)), we can add that this at least holds for a person who is member of a community in which a significant number of persons are motivated in accordance with their moral judgments. A few internalists can be understood to defend an unconditional version of MJI; see, e.g., Lenman (1999, pp. 441–457); and Joyce (2001, pp. 17–29). It is normally presumed that an unconditional version of MJI needs to be intrinsic, but for the possibility of an unconditional and extrinsic version, see Tresan (2009a, pp. 57–58).
On a weak extrinsic version of conditional MJI, it is the nature of a person’s moral judgment in conjunction with the fact that she fulfills C that explains her motivation to ϕ (see Smith 1994, Chap. 3). On a strong extrinsic version of conditional MJI, the nature of moral judgments does not play any part in such an explanation.
There is a complication that needs to be mentioned in this context. It is possible to combine a certain conditional version of MJI with a certain unconditional version of this view. The reason is that both “moral judgments” and “motivation” can be understood either as dispositional or occurrent mental states. Some expressivists accept the following version of conditional MJI: Necessarily, if a person judges that she ought to ϕ, in the sense of having a certain dispositional desire in relation to ϕing, then she is motivated to ϕ, in the sense of having a certain occurrent desire to ϕ, if she fulfills C. This view is possible to combine with a certain unconditional version of MJI: Necessarily, if a person judges that she ought to ϕ, in the sense of having a certain occurrent desire in relation to ϕ, then she is motivated to ϕ, in the sense of having a certain occurrent desire to ϕ. The basic idea is that a moral judgment, in the form of a dispositional desire, issues in an occurrent desire only if the person in question fulfills C. See Blackburn (1998, pp. 59–68), Björnsson (2003, pp. 327–344); and Gibbard (2003, pp. 152–154). I criticize this view in Strandberg (forthcoming b).
For examples of conditional MJI that specify C in terms of rationality, see Smith (1994, p. 61); Korsgaard (1996, pp. 315–317), and van Roojen (2010, pp. 495–525). For other readings of C, see, e.g., Dreier (1990, p. 11); and Gibbard (2003, pp. 154). I criticize conditional versions of MJI in Strandberg (forthcoming c). It has been shown difficult to spell out C in a way which does not trivialize MJI; see Lenman (1996, pp. 298–299); Sayre-McCord (1997, pp. 64–65); Svavarsdóttir (1999, pp. 164–165); Roskies (2003, p. 53); and Schroeter (2005, p. 4).
In order to distinguish this view from an unconditional version of MJI, we can add that that this at least holds for a person who satisfies C.
On a weak extrinsic version of communal MJI, it is the nature of a person’s moral judgment in conjunction with the fact that she is a member of a certain moral community which explains that she is motivated to ϕ; cf. Greenspan (1998, p. 111); and Tresan (2009b, p. 185). This might for example be the case if moral judgments are about moral communities. On a strong extrinsic version of communal MJI, this is not the case. For example, it might be that we classify a person’s judgment as a moral judgment only if she is part of such a community, cf. Tresan (2009a, p. 60).
That is, a belief does not consist in, entail, or by itself cause a motivational state.
However, if expressivism is not understood as a conceptual claim, this consideration does not apply. In any case, the internalist argument gives limited support to expressivism since it merely entails, as I have vaguely formulated it, that moral judgments “involve” desire-like states, not that they consist in such states. It is thus compatible with the view that moral judgments consist both in beliefs and desire-like states; see Ridge (2006a, pp. 302–336); Boisvert (2008, pp 169–203); and Eriksson (2009, pp. 8–35).
According to an influential version of conditional MJI, this further fact consists in the person being rational; see Smith (1994, Chap. 6).
However, it is possible to combine a conditional version of MJI with an unconditional version of this view, since moral judgments and motivation can be understood either as dispositional or occurrent mental states (see above). It might then be argued that the resulting version of MJI can function as a premise in the internalist argument. Some expressivists can be interpreted to embrace this view.
For some examples, see Stevenson (1944, pp. 16–17); Frankena (1976, p. 60); Dancy (1993, p. 4); Smith (1994, p. 60); Lockie (1998, p. 16); Finlay (2004, pp. 206, 212); Shafer-Landau (2003, p. 156); Railton (2006, p. 206); Ridge (2007, p. 51); Boisvert (2008, p. 169); Bedke (2009, pp. 189–190); and Francén (2010, pp. 119, 125). (Although these authors believe that our response to such cases supports MJI, not all of them ultimately embrace this view.) Many authors who write about MJI seem to presume that this view is so plausible that they need not provide any argument for it. It is reasonable to think that our assumed responses to cases such as C1 explain this presumption.
In what follows, I will assume that there are no indications that the moral utterances we are asked to contemplate are insincere. It is commonly presumed that the fact that a person sincerely utters a sentence entails that she holds the corresponding belief. However, it can be argued that a person might sincerely utter a sentence without entertaining the corresponding belief if she is mistaken about what she believes (Ridge 2006b, pp. 487–495). Whether this view is correct does not affect my arguments as they also apply to cases where a person explicitly is said to hold the moral judgment in question.
Cf. Frankena (1976, pp. 66–67).
According to a prevalent view, a sentence of the type “X or Y” carries a generalized conversational implicature which accounts for this fact; see, e.g., Grice (1989b, 44–47); Levinson (2000, pp. 75–111); and Soames (2003, pp. 206–210). However, the generalized conversational implicature in question is more complicated than I can do justice to here.
It might be objected that there are cases which provide support to an intrinsic version of MJI. This would be cases in which a person utters that she ought to ϕ, is motivated to ϕ, but her motivation is not explained by her moral judgment. Consider the following case: Anne and Bill are watching a TV programme about people suffering from famine. They start to talk about charity. Anne says to Bill “Actually, I ought to give some money to those who are starving.” There is no indication that her utterance is not sincere, e.g., that she is lying or is ironic. Anne is motivated to give money to charity. She is not motivated by what she regards as moral considerations but merely by what she regards as non-moral considerations. More precisely, she is only motivated to give money to charity so as to be admired by her friends (cf. Sneddon 2009, pp. 41–53). First, it is plausible to assume that we do not find these cases as puzzling as C1. One indication is that internalists never appeal to them when arguing for their view. Second, our response to these cases would merely indicate that a person’s moral judgment somehow is part of an explanation of her motivation to perform a certain action, not that the judgment by itself is sufficient for this motivation. Hence, it is compatible both with a conditional and a communal version of MJI. Finally, our response is compatible with a pragmatic and externalist account according to which we regularly are motivated in accordance with what we think we have moral reasons to do. I will return to this explanation in Sect. 6.
See Dreier (1990, pp. 13–14); Blackburn (1995, pp. 48, 52–53); Lenman (1999, pp. 445–446, 452–453); Joyce (2001, pp. 26–27); Bedke (2009, pp. 194–195); and Tresan (2009b, pp. 185–186). Cf. Hare (1952, pp. 148–149); and Blackburn (1998, pp. 61–65). These authors consider cases that vary in different respects, but I do not think these differences are relevant to my arguments.
We might also add: “Moreover, there is no indication that the people in this society generally suffer from mental conditions such as depression, apathy, emotional disturbances, or the like.”
That is, at least granted that she satisfies condition C.
Cf. Gert and Mele (2005, p. 281).
It would not help advocates of communal MJI to employ communal cases that concern moral judgments rather than moral utterances. The reason is that we can use the same manoeuvre as we used above when we compared our responses to C3 and C4. That is, we can set up a case like C8 but which concerns people’s beliefs that X or Y is the case rather than their utterances to this effect. We would presumably find such cases just as puzzling as their moral counterparts.
In fact, internalists seem to differ as regards their intuitions regarding certain central cases; see Francén (2010, pp. 117–148).
For other pragmatic accounts, see Copp (2001, pp. 1–43; 2009, pp. 167–202); Finlay (2004, pp. 205–223; 2005, pp. 1–20). In Strandberg (forthcoming a), I argue that the alternative proposed below has a number of significant advantages to these views. For other pragmatic suggestions, see Searle (1969, Chap. 6; 1979, pp. 32, 39–40); Ridge (2003, pp. 563–574); Railton (2006, pp. 212–215); and Cholbi (2009, 495–510).
Grice (1989a, pp. 26–27).
Cf. Grice (1989a, p. 29).
Grice (1989a, p. 26).
Cf. Brink (1992, pp. 1, 8–9); Smith (1994, pp. 95–96); and Shafer-Landau (2003, p. 166). It might be argued that there is a difference between “right” and “ought” as regards their relation to moral reasons. On this view, a sentence to the effect that it is morally right that a person ϕs entails that she has a moral reason to ϕ (in that situation), whereas a sentence to the effect that a person morally ought to ϕ entails that ϕing is what she has the strongest moral reason to do (in that situation). However, whether or not this is correct does not affect my arguments.
See, e.g., Scanlon (1998, p. 17).
Cf. Copp (2001, p. 32).
Grice (1989a, p. 28).
See, e.g., Blackburn (1998, pp. 1–4).
Grice (1989a, p. 26).
This holds only on the condition that the person does not make an additional utterance, or the context contains information, that cancels the implicature. It seems reasonable to think that a person’s utterance to the effect that she ought to ϕ usually conveys that she is motivated to ϕ to a significant extent, since it is difficult to see how such utterances could influence action in any substantial manner if this were not assumed to be the case. However, the fact that the person is motivated to ϕ is compatible with her being motivated not to ϕ and that she has stronger motivation to do something else. Additional utterances or contextual information can make clear that she is less motivated to ϕ than what normally is presumed to be the case. Thus, a person’s moral utterance can conversationally implicate different strengths of motivation depending on additional utterances or contextual information, and our responses to her moral utterance might vary accordingly. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for The Journal of Ethics for raising this point.
In Strandberg (forthcoming a), I discuss how the kind of GCI considered in this section can be calculated and cancelled.
Again, this only holds on the condition that the implicature in question is not cancelled.
Cf. Copp (2001, p. 32).
I provide a fuller explanation in Strandberg (forthcoming a). Cf. Grice (1989a, pp. 37–38).
According to one view, a person’s utterance of a truth-evaluable sentence carries a GCI to the effect that she asserts the sentence and, hence, entertains the corresponding belief. This is in turn explained in terms of the maxim of quality, which says “try to make your contribution one that is true” (Grice (1989a, p. 26).
According to the explanation above which refers to various background presumptions about moral utterances, it is only utterances of a moral sentence that entails moral reasons that have the relevant connection to motivation. A similar claim holds for our presumptions about moral judgments.
Thus, on DAA there are no grounds to think that the following types of utterances need to convey that the person in question is motivated to ϕ. First, utterances of sentences that do not entail that there is a moral reason to ϕ (such as conditionals and disjunctions). Second, utterances of sentences that do not entail, or indicate, that the person herself has a moral reason to ϕ. Third, utterances of sentences that do not entail that the person in question has a moral reason to ϕ now or in the future, e.g., utterances concerning her past behaviour. However, in the two latter cases, moral utterances might pragmatically convey other kinds of action-guiding states; see Strandberg (forthcoming a).
In Strandberg (2007, pp. 249–260), I propose the following externalist explanation of why a person who believes she ought to ϕ is motivated to ϕ. First, she believes that there are certain non-moral properties that make actions such that they ought to be performed. For example, she might think that helping people in need are among the properties that have this function. Second, she thinks that ϕing has (some of) these properties. Likewise, (some of) these properties presumably constitute what she takes to be her reason to ϕ. Third, she has a desire to perform actions that have these non-moral properties. As a consequence, she is motivated by a desire de re, not a desire de dicto, to ϕ.
See above for this kind of explanation.
Return to the externalist explanation of moral motivation above. A person’s mental condition might weaken, or even eliminate, her desire to perform actions that have the non-moral properties that, in her view, make actions such that they ought to be performed. For example, her mental condition might negatively influence her desire to help people in need.
Thus, the GCI in question can be cancelled if the context in question involves this information.
It is quite natural that we find a communal case, such as C7, more puzzling than an individual case, such as C1. In C1 it is only one single utterance that does not adhere to the second function of moral language, whereas in C7 no utterance adheres to this function. Given that a main function of moral language is to influence action, and this is an essentially social phenomenon, we find C7 more puzzling than C1.
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Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Gustaf Arrhenius, Gunnar Björnsson, John Eriksson, Sofia Jeppsson, Jens Johansson, Victor Moberger, Sven Nyholm, Ragnar Francén Olinder, Jonas Olson, Ingmar Persson, Karl Persson, Jussi Suikkanen and an anonymous referee for The Journal of Ethics for valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper.
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Strandberg, C. The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation. J Ethics 15, 341–369 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-011-9106-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-011-9106-2