

Running-swiftly-to-the-right implies both *running-swiftly* and *running-to-the-right*. So Jones-running-to-the-right and Jones-running-swiftly are both parts of Jones-running-swiftly-to-the-right. Since God and you contribute causally to the parts, you each contribute causally to the whole.

In what sense, then, can a parent be said to have helped God in creating the parent's child? The parent does this by performing an act that is causally determined and is such that it falls under an act that is not causally determined. What might the causally undetermined act be? It could be an act determining, with respect to certain properties of the child, that the child will have those properties. An example might be the event of the child's weighing so-and-so many pounds at birth. A gardener could similarly help the Creator produce a plant. It is in such a fashion, we would say, that you might be able to help the deity.

God's help and our help

The way in which the deity helps us differs from the way contingent substances help us. For in the case of your being helped by another human being to bring about some event, it is not always the case that you help her to bring about that event—as we saw from the example of the scientist who unwittingly helped create a bomb, but who was not helped by anyone to create a bomb. Since God always knows what the results of His actions will be, He can never contribute “unwittingly” to the occurrence of any event.³ Thus, whenever He helps you to bring about some event, it is also true that *you help Him* to bring about that event.⁴

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NOTES

1. For accounts of God's conserving power, cf. Philip L. Quinn, “Divine Conservation, Secondary Causes, and Occasionalism”, and Jonathan L. Kvanvig and Hugh J. McCann, “Divine Conservation and the Persistence of the World”, in Thomas V. Morris (ed.) *Divine and Human Action* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 50-73 and 13-49.

2. Cf. Chisholm, *A Realistic Theory of Categories* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), ch. 10.

3. This leads to a familiar problem of theodicy: if God knowingly helps us bring about injustices and evils, can we avoid attributing actions to God which are themselves morally reprehensible? For discussion of this question, cf. William E. Mann, “God's Freedom, Human Freedom, and God's Responsibility for Sin” and Alfred J. Freddoso, “Medieval Aristotelianism and the Case against Secondary Causation in Nature”, in *Divine and Human Action*, pp. 182-210 and 74-118.

4. We thank Fred Freddoso and Phil Quinn for helpful comments and suggestions.

AN OBJECTION TO SWINBURNE'S
ARGUMENT FOR DUALISM

Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann

In various places Richard Swinburne has presented and defended an argument for Cartesian dualism.¹ His argument has been discussed extensively in the literature, and he has recently offered a defense of it against several of the published objections.² But we think that Swinburne's argument invites an objection that has not yet been raised in the literature and is fatal to the argument.³

Swinburne's argument was originally designed to prove the conclusion ‘I have a soul in 1984’, and we will leave it in that form to begin with. It uses four abbreviations:

- p = ‘I am a conscious person, and I exist in 1984’
- q = ‘My body is destroyed in the last instant of 1984’
- r = ‘I have a soul in 1984’
- s = ‘I exist in 1985’.

Let the variable x range over all consistent propositions that (a) are compatible with the conjunction of p and q and that (b) describe only 1984 states of affairs.⁴ Swinburne then offers these three premisses:

- 1. p
- 2. $(x) \diamond (p \ \& \ q \ \& \ x \ \& \ s)$
- 3. $\neg \diamond (p \ \& \ q \ \& \ \neg r \ \& \ s)$

From premisses 2 and 3, Swinburne says, it follows that -r is not within the range of x. But, since -r does describe only 1984 states of affairs and so satisfies restriction (b) on x, -r must violate restriction (a): -r must be incompatible with (p & q). Therefore, (p & q) entails r. “But the addition to p of q, which describes what happens to my body at the end of 1984[,] can hardly affect whether or not p entails r.” And so, Swinburne concludes, “p by itself entails r. Hence, from Premiss 1, r”—i.e., that I am a conscious person existing in 1984 entails that I have a soul in 1984. No argument for one's having a soul could look more elegant.

Many of the objections that have been raised against this argument have been fairly sophisticated complaints against premiss 2, claiming, for

FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
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p. 405-412



instance, that Swinburne equivocates between *de re* and *de dicto* readings of the premiss, a charge he vehemently denies. But we think premiss 2 presents a more fundamental problem that hasn't yet been recognized.

In the case presented by Swinburne's argument, a person who is conscious in 1984 has his body totally destroyed at the last instant of 1984 and nonetheless survives into 1985.⁶ Now according to Swinburne, "Premiss 2 says that it is possible that [s] I survive into 1985, given that [p] I am conscious in 1984, even if [q] my body is totally destroyed [in the last instant of 1984] and [x] whatever else might be the case in 1984, compatible with these last two suppositions."⁷

But *is* that possible? Consider, for instance, this substitution for x:

x1 = 'God destroys my soul at the last instant of 1984'.⁸

x1 certainly appears to meet the restrictions on x: (b) it describes only a 1984 state of affairs, and (a) it is compatible with (p & q). But, contrary to premiss 2, it is not possible that p and q and s and x1. And so it looks as if the introduction of x1 constitutes a counter-example to premiss 2. Furthermore, x1 is by no means unique.⁹ Any of the following examples, among others, would have the same result:

x2 = 'I cease to exist at the last instant of 1984'

x3 = 'The last instant of 1984 is the last instant of my existence'

x4 = 'The last instant of 1984 is the last instant of time'.

Consequently, premiss 2 looks false.

It might at first glance seem easy to protect premiss 2 against this sort of counter-example. x1 (like our other examples of substitutions for x that falsify the premiss) is compatible with (p & q) but not with s. So someone might suppose that the problem we're introducing could be easily solved by adding a third restriction on x: that (c) any substitution for x must also be compatible with s. Then, it seems, all destructive substitutions for x will be ruled out, and premiss 2 will have been protected against our kind of counter-example.

However, introducing restriction (c) renders Swinburne's argument invalid. With restriction (c) in force, when we recognize that -r isn't in the range of x, that will be because -r is incompatible with the conjunction of the *three* propositions p and q and s. So in that case it *won't* follow that -r is incompatible with just (p & q), and so it *won't* be the case that (p & q) entails r.

Consequently, either the argument is unsound because premiss 2 is false, or the argument is invalid.

Furthermore, although the argument's validity could be salvaged by reformulating it so that it maintains that -r is incompatible with (p & q & s), the reformulation would render the argument useless for Swinburne's purposes. A conclusion that p and q and s entail r, or that a world in which p, q, and s are all true is also a world in which r is true,¹⁰ would come as no news to philosophical readers, whether or not they would accept it. An argument to that conclusion would be an argument

for dualism that couldn't, or shouldn't, produce a qualm in even a very nervous materialist.

In correspondence with us Swinburne has responded to our objection by denying that x1 (or any proposition relevantly like it) meets his restrictions on substitutions for x: "Any proposition which affirms that something existed throughout 1984 and then ceased to exist, which is entailed by [your]... [x2] and... [x3], clearly involves an entailment about a hard fact in 1985, viz., that there is no such thing then. So [x2] and [x3] are ruled out as fillings for x."¹¹ And, of course, something similar can be said about x1: it, too, entails a hard fact about 1985. As for x4, Swinburne denies that it is logically possible for time to end, and so he takes x4 to be ruled out by his restricting substitutions for x to consistent propositions.

Not everyone would agree, of course, that it is *logically* impossible for time to end. Without a convincing argument to support this strong claim of his, premiss 2 is left vulnerable to a counter-example founded on x4. But because we don't want to discuss Swinburne's view about the necessity of endless time, we're going to leave x4 out of consideration.

But what about Swinburne's reason for rejecting x2 and x3 (and x1) as substitutions for x? He claims that these substitutions are ruled out by his original restrictions because each of them "involves an entailment about a hard fact in 1985, viz., that there is no such thing then"—i.e., that there is no such thing as me in 1985. So his defense against our counter-example amounts to this claim:

(RS) Any proposition that involves an entailment about a hard fact in 1985 violates restriction (b) on substitutions for x, that they describe only 1984 states of affairs.

The fact that Swinburne is committed to this claim helps explain why the sort of objection we're raising against premiss 2 didn't worry him as he was formulating his argument. All our counter-examples to premiss 2 are substitutions for x that are compatible with p and q but not with s. As we've said, such counter-examples might be warded off by adding restriction (c), that substitutions for x must be compatible also with s, but that move would vitiate the argument. If, however, claim (RS) is true, then restriction (c), which can't be added without vitiating the argument, is already in effect in restriction (b), that substitutions for x must describe only 1984 states of affairs. Any proposition that is incompatible with s must either describe 1985 states of affairs or entail a proposition that itself describes 1985 states of affairs, and all such propositions are ruled out by (RS). Part of the ingenuity of Swinburne's argument, then, consists precisely in his having intended restriction (b) in that way, which allows him to claim that premiss 2 is true without having expressly to admit the possibility that -r is not within the range of x just in virtue of -r's being incompatible with s.

But is claim (RS) true? Look again at x1: 'God destroys my soul at the last instant of 1984'. As we've said, it certainly appears to satisfy restriction (b). Swinburne, however, denies that any proposition such as x1

describes only 1984 states of affairs because, he says, it "involves an entailment about a hard fact in 1985", namely, that there is no such thing as me then.

It might be objected that if Swinburne is right about that entailment, then a claim about my death entails that there is time after my death, which seems absurd. But of course if, as Swinburne supposes, the persistence of time is logically necessary, this objection would be empty; and so we won't pursue it here.

Well, then, what about Swinburne's idea that any proposition that entails a proposition describing a hard fact about 1985 can't be only about 1984? We're inclined to think that this is a mistaken way of thinking about what it is for a proposition to be about some particular time only. It seems to many people that if F1, a fact about t1, depends on F2, some fact that obtains at t2, a later time, then a proposition describing F1 is not about t1 only. But it is not clearly the case that F1 depends on F2 whenever F1's obtaining at t1 entails that some contingent F2 obtains at t2.¹² We think, however, that we don't need to argue with Swinburne over the general point about what it is for a proposition to be about some particular time only. For it seems to us that Swinburne can apply claim (RS) to defend premiss 2 as he does only at the cost of invalidating his argument.

Swinburne's argument maintains that -r (= 'It is not the case that I have a soul in 1984') is not within the range of x. And the crux of his argument consists in his saying that since -r clearly does satisfy restriction (b), describing only 1984 states of affairs, it's because of its violation of restriction (a)—its being incompatible with (p & q)—that -r isn't in the range of x. So, given Swinburne's commitment to claim (RS), his argument requires him to say that -r involves no entailment about a hard fact in 1985.¹³

Unfortunately for Swinburne's argument, however, -r entails just the sort of fact about the post-1984 future that Swinburne himself gives as an example of an entailed hard fact about that future—"viz., that there is no such thing then"—since 'It is not the case that I have a soul in 1984' entails that there is no such thing as my soul in 1985. In the context of Swinburne's argument, the 'I' of -r is of course identical with the 'I' of p ('I am a conscious person, and I exist in 1984'). We also assume here that if something has a soul, it necessarily has a soul; but this assumption, or one relevantly like it, must underlie Swinburne's argument as well. Otherwise, God could give me a soul at the very instant at which my body is totally destroyed, and I could thus exist into 1985 even if my body is destroyed at the last instant of 1984 and I lacked a soul before then—in which case premiss 3 would be false.

Furthermore, even if we replaced the pronoun in -r and recast the argument using a proper name—e.g., 'Richard'—it would still be the case that -r entails a hard fact about the future. We think that 'It is not the case that Richard has a soul in 1984' entails

(D) Either (i) it is not the case that Richard has a soul in 1985, or (ii) in 1985 God causes Richard's soul to come into existence and to exist for some time, however short.

But for those who, unlike us, suppose that God is contingent and that souls can just pop into existence without being created, (D) can be rephrased as (D')

(D') Either (i) it is not the case that Richard has a soul in 1985, or (ii) in 1985 Richard's soul begins to exist and exists for some time, however short.

Neither (D) nor (D') is a necessary truth, since there are worlds (including the actual world, as Swinburne sees it) in which Richard has a soul in 1985, but it does not come into existence in 1985. Moreover, both disjuncts of both (D) and (D') describe 1985 states of affairs. Given Swinburne's view that -r is about 1984 only, he must also suppose that disjunct (i) of both (D) and (D') describes a hard fact about 1985. And, because we deny (RS), we can maintain that disjunct (i) describes a hard fact even if we also hold that -r (and propositions relevantly like it) entail propositions describing contingent facts about the future. Finally, it seems to us that both (Dii) and (D'ii) describe hard facts about 1985. Consequently, whether we suppose that -r entails (D) or only (D'), -r entails a proposition describing a hard fact about 1985. So, if (RS) is true, then, because -r entails a proposition describing a hard fact about 1985, -r is not only about 1984 states of affairs—contrary to Swinburne's claim.

In conversation, Swinburne has objected to this argument on the following grounds. First, on his view, God is contingent, and souls can pop into existence without being created, and so -r doesn't entail (D).

Second, although he doesn't deny that -r entails (D'), he does deny that (D') describes a hard fact, because of the nature of (D'ii). On Swinburne's view, (D'ii) describes a soft fact about 1985. Let the moment at which Richard's soul comes into existence be t. Then (D'ii) entails that immediately *before* t that person's soul did not exist. Now on Swinburne's view any fact about a time t is a soft fact if it entails a hard fact about any other time, *whether earlier or later* than t. His view therefore stipulates very stringent requirements for the status of hard fact, since a fact about t will be a soft fact not only if it entails that some fact about the future obtains, but even if it entails a fact about any time before t. Standard examples used to illustrate hard facts will not count as hard facts in line with these requirements—e.g., *Jones wakes up at 8 a.m.*, which entails that *before 8 a.m. Jones exists*; *Caesar dies at t1 on the steps of the Capitol*, which entails that *before t1 Caesar is alive*; *the sun rises in the east at t1*; which entails that *before t1 the sun does not have the position in the sky it has at t1*. Consequently, Swinburne's requirements for the status of hard fact strike us as very implausible. For that reason we reject his claim that (D'ii) describes a soft fact about 1985. And so, even if we recast Swinburne's argument, replacing the pronoun with a proper name, and even if we accept his views that God is contingent and that souls can come into existence without being created by God, on our view it is *nonetheless* true that -r entails a hard fact about the future—the one described by (D').

Therefore, if Swinburne is right in supposing that no proposition that entails a hard fact about 1985 is a proposition that satisfies restriction (b), describing only 1984 states of affairs, then -r's not being within the range of x is sufficiently explained just by its violating restriction (b): -r isn't about 1984 states of affairs only. In that case, it doesn't follow from premisses 1-3 that -r is incompatible with (p & q). And in that case Swinburne's argument is, again, invalid.

Therefore, viewed from more than one angle, either Swinburne's argument for dualism is unsound because premiss 2 is false, or it is invalid.

It is important to us to conclude by emphasizing the obvious: our arguments against Swinburne's argument don't constitute or even contribute to an argument against dualism generally; there may, of course, be other, perfectly acceptable arguments for dualism. What's more, Swinburne is arguing for a Cartesian sort of dualism; but that isn't the only sort that has been important in philosophy. Aquinas, for instance, developed a very different, non-Cartesian form of substance dualism.¹⁴ We're inclined to think that Aquinas's version is untouched by the sorts of objections we raise against Swinburne's argument and also avoids the standard objections to Cartesian dualism in the literature.¹⁵

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NOTES

1. Sydney Shoemaker and Richard Swinburne, *Personal Identity* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), Ch. 2, "The Dualist Theory"; Swinburne, *The Evolution of the Soul* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), Ch. 8 and Additional Note 2; Swinburne, "The Structure of the Soul" in A. Peacocke and G. Gillett, *Persons and Personality* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987); Swinburne, "Body and Soul" in R. Warner and T. Szubka, *The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate* (Oxford & Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1994), 311-316.

2. "Dualism Intact", *Faith and Philosophy* 13:1 (January 1996).

3. We don't mean to suggest that the argument has been or can be satisfactorily defended against the published objections, some of which strike us as successful.

4. Swinburne's own version of his second restriction on substitutions for x is simply "describing 1984 states of affairs", but it becomes clear that he really means 'describing *only* 1984 states of affairs', and so we're using (b) in that stricter form.

5. "Dualism Intact", p. 69.

6. Total destruction of the body isn't explicit in q, nor is existing in 1985 expressly construed as *surviving into* 1985 in s, but Swinburne's use of these expressions in his subsequent discussion of the argument shows that q and s are to be interpreted in those ways. See the passage quoted immediately below.

7. "Dualism Intact", p. 69.

8. It is a part of traditional Christian doctrine which Swinburne accepts that God can annihilate souls. For that reason our x1 does not violate restriction (a), that substitutions for x must be compatible with (p & q). Even on a Cartesian dualist account of the nature of a person, it is possible for a human person to cease entirely to exist.

9. In their article "Swinburne's Argument for Dualism" (*Faith and Philosophy* 11 [1994], 127-133), William Alston and Thomas Smythe consider -r itself as a candidate for a substitution for x that would falsify premiss 2. They acknowledge that "Swinburne thinks that... [-r is] incompatible with (p,q)", but they note that "that is the conclusion of the argument; it cannot be taken for granted in a premise" (p. 132). From Swinburne's point of view, using -r as Alston and Smythe do begs the question against him.

This controversy raises another worry about the argument, one that we won't pursue here. If assuming that -r is compatible with (p & q) begs the question against Swinburne, it seems also to beg the question against his opponent to assume that -r can't be a substitution for x just because it is incompatible with (p & q). Since materialists would think that -r is compatible with (p & q) and dualists wouldn't, there seems to be no stance other than *neutrality* regarding -r's compatibility with (p & q) that doesn't beg the question in the one direction or the other. If that's the case, then taking premiss 2 to be true is question-begging, too. (We owe this point to Robert Pasnau.)

10. If temporal gaps in personal existence are possible, then not every world in which p, q, and s are all true will be a world in which r is also true. But Swinburne, reasonably enough, denies the logical possibility of such gaps ("Dualism Intact", p. 73f.).

11. Letter of May 4, 1995.

12. The claims at issue here involve the distinction between hard and soft facts. For a good review and an excellent analysis of the distinction, see John Martin Fischer, "Hard-Type Soft Facts", *The Philosophical Review* 95 (1986), 591-601.

13. On Swinburne's own views it seems impossible for any proposition to satisfy restriction (b), to be only about 1984. If the persistence of time is logically necessary, then any proposition at all, including any proposition ostensibly about 1984 only, will entail that there is time after 1984; and that there is time after 1984 does seem to be or to include a hard fact about 1985. Swinburne's way of disarming this criticism is based on his view that all hard facts are contingent (as he has remarked in correspondence with us). In that case, (RS) is in effect this: Any proposition that involves an entailment about a hard (and hence contingent) fact in 1985 violates restriction (b) on substitutions for x, that they describe only 1984 states of affairs. It isn't clear, however, that it's open to Swinburne to claim that all hard facts are contingent. According to him, "A hard fact about a certain time is a fact, all of whose truth-conditions, the states of affairs which make it a fact, are states of affairs at that time" (*The Christian God*, p.132). But the proposition '1985 exists' seems to satisfy this definition, since all the states of affairs which make it a fact are states of affairs at that time—viz., 1985. Since, however, Swinburne holds that it is a necessary truth that time always exists,

which entails that there is time through 1985, it's hard to see how he can hold that '1985 exists' can be contingent. (We're grateful to Sydney Shoemaker for discussion of these points.)

14. See Eleonore Stump, "Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism Without Reductionism", *Faith and Philosophy* 12 (1995), 505-531.

15. For comments on and discussion of an earlier draft we are grateful to William Alston, Robert Pasnau, Alvin Plantinga, Sydney Shoemaker, Richard Swinburne, and Nicholas Wolterstorff.

REPLY TO STUMP AND KRETZMANN

Richard Swinburne

Stump and Kretzmann object to my argument for substance dualism on the ground that its statement involves an implausibly stringent understanding of a hard fact about a time as one whose truth conditions lie solely at that time. I am however entitled to my own definitions, and there is a simple reason why the "standard examples" of hard facts which they provide do not satisfy my definition - they all concern instants and not periods of time.

After alluding to various counter-arguments which they might produce against my modal argument for substance dualism; and generously conceding various assumptions of mine which they would like to challenge, all given infinite time, Stump and Kretzmann home in on one counter-argument which they regard as decisive. This depends crucially on their claim that (D'ii), "In 1985 Richard's soul begins to exist and exists for some time, however short", describes a hard fact about 1985. That, as they acknowledge, I deny, since it entails the non-existence of Richard's soul in 1984. I hold, in their words, that "any fact about a time *t* is a soft fact if it entails a hard fact about any other time, whether earlier or later than *t*." They then claim that this rules out many standard examples used to illustrate hard facts and consequently they find my "requirements for the status of hard fact" to be "very implausible". So they feel entitled to claim that (D'ii) describes a hard fact about 1985.

In my original statement of the argument, I wrote only of propositions which "describe only 1984 states of affairs." I later put this in terms of the sharper notions of describing "hard facts" about 1984. Philosophical notions introduced into the literature by one author for one purpose often need tightening up when they are used by other authors or for other purposes, and become part of the general philosophical currency. Since the argument being criticised is mine, I am entitled to my own way of tightening up terms, my own definitions. So even if certain "standard examples" of hard facts given by others don't count as hard facts on my definition, that is irrelevant to my argument which remains intact.

Note however that my requirements for the status of hard fact are not nearly as "stringent" as Stump and Kretzmann imply. Facts are not hard facts or soft facts *simpliciter*; they are hard facts or soft facts about a



time mentioned in the description of the fact. Now the facts which I discussed whose status as hard or soft was at stake were all facts about periods, i.e. intervals of some duration—1984 or 1985. And it is easy enough to give endless examples of hard facts about periods. Periods are bounded by durationless instants—1984 is bounded by midnight on 31 December 1983 and midnight on 31 December 1984. I have argued (in a chapter from which Stump and Kretzmann cite another view of mine about time¹) that all talk about events happening at instants is analyzable into talk about events happening over periods—e.g. an object being green at 2 pm, is it being green over a period which includes 2 pm. If that is correct, there will be no hard facts at all about instants. Of the three 'standard examples' which Stump and Kretzmann cite, one is explicitly about an instant and the other two contain dummy names which look as if they are names of instants. So it is not surprising that these are not hard facts—it is not an accidental or unwelcome consequence of my definition.

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NOTES

1. Richard Swinburne, *The Christian God*, Clarendon Press, 1994, pp72-4.

AVOIDABILITY AND LIBERTARIANISM: A RESPONSE TO FISCHER

David Widerker and Charlotte Katzoff

Recently, Widerker has attacked Fischer's contention that one could use Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities to show that even from a libertarian viewpoint an agent might be morally responsible for a decision that he could not have avoided. Fischer has responded by: (a) arguing that Widerker's criticism presupposes the falsity of Molinism and (b) presenting a version of libertarianism which avoids Widerker's criticism. Here we argue that: (i) Fischer's first response is unconvincing and undermines Molinism itself; (ii) the version of libertarianism he presents is fallacious, and (iii) even on the version of libertarianism he proposes, avoidability remains a necessary condition for moral responsibility.

John Fischer, in "Responsibility and Control," puts forth the suggestion that an agent might be morally responsible for a decision although he could not have avoided making it and further, that even a libertarian could agree to this.¹ To substantiate this claim, Fischer appeals to a version of Harry Frankfurt's well-known counterexample to the principle of alternative possibilities. In this example we are asked to imagine Jones deliberating whether to vote for Reagan or Carter, where he must decide to vote for either one or the other. If Jones shows an inclination to decide to vote for Carter, then a mechanism installed in his brain, upon detecting that inclination, intervenes and ensures that he decides to vote for Reagan nevertheless. If Jones decides on his own to vote for Reagan the mechanism remains dormant. Suppose that Jones, unaware of the presence of the mechanism, decides to vote for Reagan on his own. Fischer claims that in this situation Jones is morally responsible for his decision to vote for Reagan, even though he could not have decided otherwise.

Recently, Fischer has defended this claim against David Widerker's charge that the unavoidability of Jones' decision is, contrary to Fischer, secured by the decision's being causally determined, which would be incompatible with libertarianism.² The thrust of Widerker's objection is that in order for Fischer's example to be convincing, one must assume that

