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The Immediate Object of Perception: A Sense-datum

by

Mika Suojanen

University of Turku

Finland

SERIES EDITORS

Olli Koistinen
Juha Räikkä

Department of Philosophy, Contemporary History and Political Science
Philosophy
University of Turku
FIN-20014 Turku
Finland

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Written by
LicSocSc Mika Suojanen
Doctoral Program of Social and Behavioural Sciences
Department of Philosophy, Contemporary History and Political Science
Faculty of Social Sciences
University of Turku, Finland

Supervised by
Professor Olli Koistinen
Department of Philosophy, Contemporary History and Political Science
University of Turku, Finland

Doctor Jari Kaukua
Department of Philosophy
University of Jyväskylä, Finland

Reviewed by
Doctor Markus Lammenranta
University of Helsinki, Finland
Doctor Paavo Pylkkänen
University of Helsinki, Finland; University of Skövde, Sweden

Opponent
Doctor Paavo Pylkkänen
University of Helsinki, Finland; University of Skövde, Sweden

Chairperson (custos)
Professor Olli Koistinen
Department of Philosophy, Contemporary History and Political Science
University of Turku, Finland

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During my Ph.D. studies, I have been participating in Research Network for Experience in Finland. I have also explored the Oxford Phenomenology Network at the Oxford Research Centre in the Humanities of University of Oxford. Collaborating with researchers across other disciplines and institutions has helped me to reconsider my philosophical assumptions and leave the narrow "box" of analytical philosophy—without rejecting it. However, I do not believe that the university environment does much to promote philosophical thinking. Everyone has to do it alone by themselves.

I am not in wonder of how much wisdom there is in the university system, but rather how much foolishness. Rather than seek to improve people's skills and encourage the creation of new exciting research projects, the teaching methods used at departments of philosophy include too much of what other people have said, and too much Finnish negativity and pessimism. New philosophy and social theories can be created in Finland as well, and that is what I mean to do. In my experience, there are too many leftist and conservative scholars and scientists at Finnish universities. They are not prone to independent thinking. In general, in contemporary philosophy, philosophers' language use shows that philosophy has become an institution: everyone should think in the same style. By strengthening their methodology, I feel that philosophical studies and humanities have the potential to provide solutions to people's problems instead of allowing economics to dominate policy, culture, and decision-making in general. I have concentrated on methods in this research. It is the only way to create a credible thesis that will survive a critical review.

M.S, somewhere, sometime

Abstract

The question of what we immediately perceive from the first-person point of view has been an issue of philosophizing since the beginning of Western philosophy. However, many philosophers have not considered all theoretical and practical consequences concerning identity and causation in perceptual experience between a perceiver and the external world. Despite their meritorious studies, philosophers have failed to completely understand how the causal series of events affects what we immediately experience. Using facts relating to perceivers, logical reasoning, introspection, and philosophical theories, the aim of this research is to show that objects of sense have been contradictorily and confusedly associated with several objects in philosophy of perception. The research problem is that of whether the entity external to a perceiver is identical to the immediate object of perceptual experience. The research starts from the basic beliefs that things appear in experience and that there is causality in perceptual experience. After presenting philosophical theories of perception, the concept 'sense-datum', a characterization of 'perception', and basic arguments for perceiving the inner private sense-datum, the study examines Bertrand Russell's and G. E Moore's arguments for a claim that we always perceive mind-internal sense-data. This claim is problematic if 'sense-datum' is considered as being under the category of substance. Nonetheless, evidence for a claim in direct realism and eliminative materialism that the immediate object of perception is an external entity leads to circularity and identity problems. Finally, by means of a demonstration based on understanding and facts in perceivers and perceptual phenomena, the research concludes that the external entity is not identical to the immediate object of perceptual experience. Perceptual experience does not directly reach the external world, and the objects of sense are not independent of the perceiver.

Keywords: perceptual experience, sense-datum, the external world, immediacy, the causal theory of perception, causation, identity.

Tiivistelmä

Kysymys siitä, mitä oikeastaan havaitsemme välittömästi 1. persoonan näkökulmasta, on ollut filosofoinnin kohteena länsimaisen filosofian alkuajoista lähtien. Kuitenkaan kaikkia teoreettisia ja käytännöllisiä seurauksia, jotka liittyvät identtisyyteen ja kausaalisuuteen havaintokokemuksessa havaitsijan ja ulkomaailman välillä, ei ole oivallettu. Huolimatta filosofien ansiokkaista tutkimuksista he eivät ole täysin ymmärtäneet kausaalisen tapahtumasarjan vaikutusta siihen, mitä koemme välittömästi. Käyttäen havaitsijoita koskevia faktoja, loogista päättelyä, introspektiota omakohtaisessa havaintotilanteessa ja filosofista aineistoa tämän tutkimuksen tarkoitus on osoittaa, että aistien objektit on yhdistetty ristiriitaisesti ja sekavasti useisiin eri kohteisiin havainnon filosofiassa. Tutkimusongelmana on, onko havaitsijan ulkopuolella oleva entiteetti identtinen välittömän havaintokokemuksen kohteen kanssa. Tutkimus lähtee perususkomuksista, että asioita ilmenee kokemuksessa ja että kausaalisuus on havaintokokemuksessa. Sen jälkeen kun on esitelty havainnon filosofian teorioita, aistinsisällön eli sense-datumin käsite, havainnon luonnehdinta ja perusargumentteja sisäisen, yksityisen objektin havaitsemisen puolesta, tutkimus käy läpi Bertrand Russellin ja G. E. Mooren todistuksia väitteelle, että havaitsemme aina mielensisäisiä objekteja. Tämä väite osoittautuu ongelmalliseksi, jos ”sense-datum” käsitetään substanssin kategoriassa. Seuraavaksi tutkimus näyttää suoran realismin ja eliminatiivisen materialismin perusteiden johtavan kehämäisyyteen ja identtisyysongelmiin. Lopuksi ymmärrykseen sekä havaitsijoihin ja havainnon ilmiöihin liittyviin faktoihin perustuvien todisteiden avulla tutkimus päätyy johtopäätelmään, että ulkoinen entiteetti ei ole identtinen välittömän havaintokokemuksen kohteen kanssa. Havaintokokemus ei suoraan tavoita ulkomaailman entiteettejä eivätkä aistien objektit ole havaitsijasta riippumattomia.

Avainsanat: havaintokokemus, sense-datum, ulkomaailma, välittömyys, kausaalinen havaintoteoria, kausaalisuus, identtisyys.

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THE IMMEDIATE OBJECT OF PERCEPTION: A SENSE-DATUM

1. INTRODUCTION

1. The Starting Point and the Problem

This work concerns the immediate object of perception and especially *sense-datum*. Perception has been said to both be and not be openness to the mind-independent external world. It is certain that the objects of sense—colors, figures, sounds, and the like—appear when perceiving, but their nature has been an enigma in philosophy for more than two thousand years. As a sense-datum, the object has been supposed to be distinct from the surfaces of physical objects located in the external world. The relationship between a perceiver and the external world, i.e., between the mind and the reality, will be examined with empirical instances of perceptual situations, introspective evidence, facts relating to perceivers, and reasoning. I take it for granted that I have information about myself. Some logical principles like the law of contradiction and data of sense of which I am aware in perception are indubitable. It is also clear that perceptual experience does not occur without causation. I will use not only philosophical arguments, but also science-based arguments. However, I do not assume that perceptual experience *is* the presentation of the external world to the perceiver[1]. This research helps address major issues and questions about what this thing is that I am immediately experiencing. Philosophers have not recognized all the consequences that arise when the perceptual situation is examined together with causation and identity: they do not discuss them in written documents.

In this introduction, I am going to discuss my starting point, the research subject and problem, and some basic claims in philosophical theories of perception. After stating what we cannot *directly* derive from perceptual experience, I will present the concept of 'sense-datum', which consists of a few standard philosophical arguments for the claim that we have the experience of sense-data when perceiving. I will provide a detailed exploration of problems in certain theories. I will then present the merits of my findings. Finally, I will clarify what I understand by the ‘external world'. In this phase, the nature of the immediate object of perception is a neutral issue. The second chapter will present the structure of the study,

[1] See Crane and French’s starting point (Crane and French, 2015).

the data, and why my way of doing philosophical research is better than that of mainstream philosophy. In the second section, I will describe causation in events and give reasons why causation is significant in perceptual experience in order to examine objects of sense, sense-datum theorists and their critics, direct realists, and eliminative materialists. I will present my evidence for *non-identity* between the immediate perceptual object and the external entity.

My starting point is a perceptual situation from the first-person point of view. For example, I experience colorful things that seem to be out there in the external environment. Therefore, I examine neither language nor the grammar of the mental verbs 'see' and 'think', but real phenomena, which is not a theory. The proposition "Something appears to my senses in perception" is objective, and by 'objectivity' I mean that a claim, an argument, or a view is based on the object that is examined, not on imagination, intuition, some way of thinking, or a world-view. A few basic principles of logic and metaphysics are assumed as indubitable[2]. Perceptual experience does not occur spontaneously without causes, and it requires the subject whose experience it is: the first-person point of view indicates that there is causation in perceptual experience. I will use the concepts 'spatiality', 'causality', and 'identity' in my reasoning concerning the perceptual situation and certain philosophers and their arguments. I will also examine those basic concepts with an assumption: substances belong to the entities of the external world. The mind is not filled with substances.

This starting point leads to significant research questions because I will argue that philosophers of mind like Ned Block, David Chalmers, Daniel Dennett, Michael Martin, Bence Nanay, John Searle, Michael Tye, and many others confuse the identity and the causation. It is not always clear which things are identical and which things are not in the context of perceptual experience. If perceptual experience is caused by many entities, then how does it directly reach mind-independent entities that would be identical with the objects of perceptual experience? Experiences are said to have "the phenomenal character" or "qualia" that is immaterial. These terms refer to how the experience with the object is from the sub-

[2] I name them in the appendix, on page 216.

ject's point of view. Perceptual experiences also possess qualia. What it feels like, experientially, to see a red rose is different from what it feels like to see a yellow rose. The phenomenal character has been reduced to representational content in philosophy of perception. If the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is caused by the brain, how is it identical with the features of the mind-independent entities that are not caused by the brain? The intense blue I am experiencing is a property of the experience, the perceiver's property (his or her mind is filled with blueness), or a property of the sky. An experience of the intense blue can be said to be identical with a brain state in philosophy of mind. However, this intense blue in experience is also said to be identical with the external entity in philosophy of perception. Moreover, if the object of perceptual experience is the product in a perceiver caused by external things, it could not be identical with one of its causes. Finally, the proximate cause of the object of perceptual experience can be the brain, not the external substance from the outside of a perceiver. The causation in perceptual experience cannot be denied. The way in which the perceiver's perceptual experience, its objects, and mind-independent external entities have become connected in philosophy of mind (the mind-body problem) and philosophy of perception (the mind-world problem) yields a confusing and contradictory picture about reality. The result is a significant observation in philosophy.

So, I take the existence of the states of consciousness and data of sense for granted, but it is not certain to what they should be attributed. On the one hand, the essential question is whether these phenomena in our minds have causes *external* to us. On the other hand, we can ask how we reach the mind-independent external world from the phenomena of consciousness. The best explanation for our phenomena of consciousness is that it is due to several external causes, such as thinking and perceiving, emotions, colors, and sounds, rather than a belief that phenomena of consciousness are from within us. If it is true that external entities cause the objects of perception, then this fact causes *identity* problems in direct, naive realism theory of perception and philosophy of mind. For example, if the external entity causes an object of perception before my mind, I cannot say that they are the same numerically. This external entity can be the brain. For direct realism, for Austin, Searle, Martin, Churchland, Feyerabend, and Rorty, what appears in perception before the mind are physical objects with their properties in the external world. They might argue that

how I perceive the physical object has many causes. What I directly perceive *is* the physical object, and their thought is not in contradiction with the complex causal chain between me and the physical object. However, so many great philosophers, like Aristotle, Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, Hume, Russell, and Chisholm, have claimed that what I perceive is the internal idea caused by external things (for Berkeley, God is the cause of ideas, and we directly perceive ideas). To my mind, many philosophers have not yet grasped all the theoretical and practical consequences concerning identity and causation in perceptual experience between a perceiver and the external world. Despite their meritorious studies, philosophers have not completely taken into account how the causal series of events affect what we immediately experience. Using empirical instances of perceptual situations, introspective evidence, facts relating to perceivers, reasoning, and philosophical sources, my aim is to show that objects of sense have been contradictorily and confusedly associated with several objects in philosophy of perception. The descriptive-interpretive method and analyses do not justify the argument that we are aware of physical external entities in perception, as direct realists and phenomenologists (except e.g., Husserl, Meinong, and maybe Brentano) tend to say, or that we are aware of sense-data in perception.

Perceptual experience involves the presentation of some objects to a subject. This fact leads us to the problem of whether perceptual experience is the presentation of mind-independent substances, as our awareness tends to indicate, or of an internal mind-dependent sense-datum (i.e., appearance) produced in the mind by the external entities. It is a fact that something appears or is given to the perceiver when she or he perceives. According to Bertrand Russell, matter is an inferred entity from the known sensible entities he called sense-data (Russell, 1914). This appearance/reality distinction has been connected to one of the most difficult problems in philosophy: do we perceive the external world? It has been claimed that the causal theory of perception leads to the position that material objects are unobservable (Grice, 1961: 121). According to Frank Jackson, if perceiving an object requires a causal process to accompany that object, then the information acquired in perceiving an object is indirect. He says that this is information directly about the perceptual experience, not about a substance located in the external world. Therefore, for Jackson, when something appears or looks red to me, I am acquainted with a red expanse (in my visual field) and I

have information about the experience. (Jackson, 1992: 445) There is then a veil of perception between a subject-in-itself and an object-in-itself. Jackson's other example is that of a straight stick that appears bent when half submerged in water. In this perceptual situation, I am perceiving or I am directly acquainted with a bent shape. This shape cannot be the stick, as it is straight, and thus, according to Jackson, it must be a mental item. In general, sense-data and mind-dependent appearances are the objects of direct perception. It appears to my senses that the world and its entities are continuous and colored. I perceive the external world by throwing a veil over it by means of my senses. Jackson asks what these colored expanses can be other than mental sense-data that I directly perceive. It is the veil I perceive. (Jackson, 1992: 446) The *causal processes* would imply the indirect perception of the external substances. I will claim that this implication requires more concrete evidence than arguments based on imagination and intuition.

I have found no satisfactory answer as to what *perception* is from philosophers' studies. The correct answer concerning the type of relation between a perceiver and the external world is missing. The *object* in perceiving can be an event or a property. It can also be a composition of properties, although many (visual) objects of perception appear to be substance-like complexes. On the other hand, neither perception nor introspection show what an experienced object is. I can perceive a sound, but I do not know *what* a sound is on the basis of having an experience of sound (e.g., I do not know whether the sound is physical movement in the air or some internal impression in consciousness). The problem can be presented as a claim: "Immediate object of perception is X". What is this 'X' that makes the claim true? And after all, what are we directly aware of in perception? The research question is:

Is an external entity, or the external world generally, identical to the object immediately perceived?

I am also going to consider the case of whether the properties that appear in perception are the properties of the external entity. If an external entity is not the object immediately perceived, but the object perceived is a sense-datum caused by a complex causal process, one consequence is that the identity statement between an external entity and the immediate object of perceptual experience is untrue.

What then is the nature of the object that is directly perceived? This question has led to different accounts of the relationship between perceptual experience and the objects being put forward by different theories of perception. There are at least four standard alternatives:

(1) **Direct realism** is a view that the objects of perception are mind-independent and external. In other words, these objects exist independently of any mind that may perceive them. It is assumed that perception depends on the object that is directly perceived, and it is an external mind-independent entity and its mind-independent properties. Direct realism is only 'direct' because there is no internal item, no sense-datum or mind-dependent appearance, which must first be perceived in order to perceive the object located in the external mind-independent world. Therefore, the information acquired in perceiving an object is direct and thus the observer does not need to infer the external mind-independent tree from the color and shape ideas that are caused in the observer by the real tree.

(2) **Representative realism** is a view that the objects of perception are mind-dependent and internal. The objects located in the external world independently of any mind cause appearing ideas or mind-dependent entities in the observer. These internal items of perceptual experience are directly perceived by the observer, and from the knowledge of these internal items she or he can derive knowledge of the objects located in the external mind-independent world. Representative realism assumes that appearing ideas are dependent on the observer. The observer perceives an object located in the external mind-independent world by perceiving the veil (the sense-data or the internal items of perceptual experience) causally related to and represented by that object. Therefore, the information acquired in perceiving an object is indirect and thus the observer must infer the external mind-independent tree from the color and shape ideas that are caused in the observer by the real tree.

(3) **Phenomenalism** is a view holding that representative realism leads to skepticism about the external world and that the objects of perception do not exist independently of any minds. The objects of perception must be perceived by at least one mind. Phenomenalism assumes that the objects of perception are mind-dependent. The object that is directly perceived is that mind-dependent mental item. Phenomenalism is 'direct' because perceiving an object means perceiving the mental item of perceptual experience. Therefore, the information acquired in perceiving an object is direct and thus the observer does not need to infer the external mind-independent tree from the color and shape ideas: the real tree is a bundle of ideas of color and shape. However, it does not deny the existence of the external world. According to Jonathan Dancy, for Berkeley, the world is real because it is independent of us. However, it is not independent of the mind, for the real world still consists entirely of ideas: they occur in the mind but are not caused by us. (Dancy, 1987: 62) Phenomenalism can also be presented as a view that propositions asserting the existence of physical objects are equivalent to propositions asserting that the observer has certain sensations. For example, for John Stuart Mill, matter is 'a permanent possibility of sensation', and these possibilities can be understood in terms of the entities of sensations.

(Fumerton, 1992: 338–339) I add to the comment of Fumerton: if these entities of sensations are assumed sense-data, then they are mind-dependent.

(4) **Adverbial theory** is an alternative to the act/object analysis seemingly included in the three theories above. According to the act/object analysis of experience, every experience with content involves an object of experience to which I am directly related by an act of awareness. However, for representative realism, I am indirectly related to an object of perception. For example, in the act/object analysis, I am aware of a bent shape. But according to the adverbial theory, the right way to analyze "I am experiencing a bent shape" is to say "I am experiencing (bent shape)-ly". The idea is that no bent shape exists. When I appear to sense a bent shape, the way things are is that I sense bent shape-ly. This is analyzing a mode of sensing, not a feature of the object, which gives the nature of the sensory experience. The adverbial theory is therefore the denial of the object of experience. When I speak of experiencing a bent shape, I say something about my experience in itself, according to the adverbial theory: I do not describe the object being bent and a shape which the experience is 'of'. I think that, for the adverbial theory, the information acquired in experiencing an object is directly about the experience, and thus the observer needs to infer the external mind-independent tree from the properties of the experience.

It is a matter of fact that I am perceiving something. These four views give us different answers to the question of what the nature of an object that is directly perceived is. It has also been said that they attempt to explain a "problem of perception" in different senses: How is a direct awareness of our environment and the things in it possible given that we experience hallucinations and illusions that do not involve a direct awareness of our environment and yet seem no different from our veridical experiences? (Crane and French, 2015; Nudds, 2011) These theories' different explanations of one and the same phenomenon cannot be all true. I do not understand how *their different claims* about knowing the perceptual phenomenon can be explained if not through *their different metaphysical assumptions*.

Perceptual experience reveals something anyway. When one perceives something having some property F, then there is something that has this property F. A "problem of perception" is also created by the phenomena of illusion and hallucination. In an illusion, the external entity does not have the property F (the coin is not elliptical). In hallucination, there is not even an external entity (there is no pink elephant dancing for me). In these cases, one experiences something internal, a sense-datum. According to direct, naive realism, when the

coin appears elliptical, there is nothing that *is* elliptical in perception. Instead, the coin has the property of *appearing elliptical*. For direct realism, the external entity has the property of *appearing a certain way*. However, when I have to describe what I perceive, it seems to me that *the property* appears to me, be it a sound, a movement, or certain patches of color. There are strong reasons to claim that 'looking red' is not a property *the table, the sum of molecules* or *the external substance* in general, *has* under normal conditions (I will explain in sections six and seven). Although perceptual experience reveals something, there are a great deal of different claims in Western philosophy about the *nature* of this something that we immediately perceive.

Direct realism is a view that physical external entities are immediately perceived in such a way that a perceiver does not need any type of inference from perceptual experience to be knowing physical things perceived. The general structure of the argument for the claim that a person knows perceiving the tree would be the following: A person perceives p; therefore, a person knows what she perceives. In the realist context, this means the person also knows the perceived p to be external because perceptual experience involves the presentation of mind-independent entities to the perceiver (Crane and French, 2015). Direct realism makes no mention of the fact that the senses, consciousness, and the brain are preconditions for the occurrence of objects of sense—but direct realists do not say much about the effect of the perceiver's properties on what perceptual experience reaches. Next, let us see what direct realists cannot derive from perceptual experience.

1. Problems in Direct Realism

In fact, according to direct realism, perceiving depends on an object. If I really see a tree, then there must be a tree. This tree makes me perceive it, even if there would be a complex causal chain between my mind and the tree. Thus, the object perceived justifies a statement of external things without any act of inference from perceptual experience to the external world. However, on the grounds of the causal theory of perception, a material entity causes a mind-dependent appearance (sense-datum, idea), and one has an experience of the mind-

dependent entity.[3] These theories are both realism presupposing the external mind-independent world. I argue that they should also presuppose the anatomy and physiology of the human body due to their realism being necessary to perceive an object. Therefore, the existence of a tree may be a necessary condition for perceiving the tree. However, the existence of a tree is not a sufficient condition for perceiving the tree: the best, the most likely explanation for there being perceiving of the object can be the brain, the senses, and consciousness because they are preconditions for perceiving something (a condition that must be fulfilled before other things can happen). This fact *may* imply the indirect perception of the tree and the difference between the immediate object and an external entity. Outer entities are constant, but different perceivers may have different objects of perceptual experience because of dependence on different sensory systems. Experience as a source of knowledge becomes suspicious.

Scientific claims are said to be reliable because they are based on experience. A claim becomes knowledge after testing: a claim must be testable if it is scientific. However, we do not have tests that could reveal whether the object we directly perceive is external or internal. Of course, there are many cases proving that experience can mislead us. Nevertheless, the main issue is that of whether experience *always* distorts our views about reality. For example, if I state that "I feel a headache, perceive a red round dot, and grasp four is more than two" and someone asks how I know these things, then I may answer that I, by introspection, know my inner mental states, by external sensing I know the outer beings of an external world, and by intellect I know abstract universal truths. Cognition and experience would justify our claims of reality. But do they *directly* justify these claims? I doubt the existence of a direct link between the internal phenomena of consciousness and the objective, external world. By perceptual experience in itself, one is not able to distinguish the internal from the external entity. For example, one cannot say that this pink patch is mind-dependent and that shape is the property of an external substance while being aware of the

[3] This type of understanding of the causality in perceptual experience cannot be true. Perceptual experience is a very complex phenomenon, and, for example, a tree in itself is not *the* cause of my perceptual experience. A passive substance is not the cause of an event. Many causes affect a perception case, and this can prevent direct perception about the external entity.

whole rich content of experience. Understanding a perceptual case requires some background assumptions about connecting regularities that might be gained by inductive inference from past observations, the memory system, and general knowledge of how the world works.

The data of sense and consciousness are direct and immediate. If considering a claim that I perceive something, someone may wonder what my justification is for such a claim. My justification for thinking that I know that I perceive something is the fact that I do perceiving something.[4] The fact that I am perceiving something is directly obvious. I do not need other extra evidence in support of my claim "I perceive something". I immediately know that I perceive something although perception does not show what the nature of this something is.[5] The statement "I perceive something" implies that perception can be described as a two-place predicate "x-P-y". Based on "x-P-y", I understand that there are two entities and one act of mind and that the perceiver x has immediate access to the entity y. In the same way, the direct and immediate access to the external world is not obvious, and this is a problem for direct realism.

"Openness to the world" does not demonstrate direct perception of the external world in the arguments of direct realism. From the fact that it is directly obvious I am perceiving something, I *cannot* deductively infer that facts of the external world are *directly* obvious or evident to me in a similar way. I need "something more" in order to judge the facts of the external world.

If I claim to know some facts of the external world, I may refer to "sources" of knowledge that support my claim. That is, I would know facts that are independent of my thought and experience, facts located in the world outside of my conscious states. Thomas Reid (1785/2002) and Roderick M. Chisholm (1966) have said that there are four sources of

[4] Chisholm points out that we have arrived at a kind of stopping point. See his *Theory of Knowledge*, 1966, p. 2.
[5] For instance, perception does not demonstrate if I have an experience of *a friend* or *an enemy* close to me.

knowledge: memory, reason, introspection, and outer perception. Let us first consider that of memory.

I bring back into my mind that I was in Glasgow; therefore, I was in Glasgow.

The argument "I recall so; therefore, it is so" is invalid. If I recall that I was in Glasgow, the deductive conclusion cannot be "I was in Glasgow". In this case, the deductive conclusion must be other statements about my states because the conclusion in a deductive argument cannot refer to entities that are not in the premises. And although I bring back into my mind 50 times that I was in Glasgow, I cannot conclude from them the factual statement "I was in Glasgow". The premise does not include any statements of the physical mind-independent world. I could conclude that I will also bring back into my mind tomorrow that I was in Glasgow. I am speaking about personal states that are directly obvious to me. I am not directly aware of the past event, but of my internal images. I bring to my mind an awareness of being in Glasgow that I have experienced in the past.

A similar fallacy occurs in the following arguments:

I understand that honesty is a virtue; therefore, honesty is a virtue (understanding does not imply the existence of an abstract fact).

and

I have an experience that thoughts, images, emotions, and other mental entities exist; therefore, mental entities exist.

The truth of the premise guarantees the truth of the conclusion in a deductive argument. However, "Honesty is a virtue" and "Mental entities exist" both consist of entities that are not in the premises. The two arguments above are not deductively valid. A similar phenomenon occurs in the inductive argument: if understanding many times that honesty is a virtue, or if having the experience that thoughts and other inner entities occur, I can conclude that

I will understand or have an experience of them at other times as well. In sum, factual statements do not deductively or inductively follow from statements of psychological states. The factual statements are *indirectly* evident or justified to me. It seems that I am directly aware of internal objects, of data of sense like emotions and impressions, but I am not directly aware of abstract entities (if they even exist).

Abductive reasoning might be more reliable. From the memory that I was in Glasgow, I can derive that I was in Glasgow. Moreover, the best explanation is that I was in Glasgow: this fact is the reason why I remember it now. Abductive reasoning means that B can be inferred from A, and B is sufficient for A. For example, if streets are wet in the morning, one can infer that it was raining that night. Raining is a sufficient reason for there being wet streets. One problem with abductive reasoning is that it can lead to a false conclusion.[6] This type of reasoning is not direct, self-evident, or obvious. I am directly aware of *perceptual phenomena,* but what is the best explanation for their existence? Is it the external entity, the perceiver's body, the brain, the external entity together with the brain, a bad neuroscientist, or even God? However, the external entities are not directly obvious or open to the perceiver.

I hope that the reader considers the following argument carefully. Whatever perception is, the following argument is not deductively valid:

1) I perceive rough sounds and feel softness.
2) Therefore, the external thing that exists is physical.

This is not deductively valid because the conclusion consists of entities that are not in the premise. The deductive conclusion must be other statements of my perceptual phenomena. Perceptual experience itself does not indicate that we perceive mind-independent entities (or mind-dependent entities), although direct, naive realism claims that this is so. The arguments above show that the perceiver does not immediately reach the external world via internal states. In philosophy, we do have knowledge about the reality: it is knowledge about

[6] I return to these problems in section four.

inferences concerning real things that are invalid. This argument is a problem for direct, naive realism.

Perception cannot directly lead to the external world. Would "the existence of the external world" be the best explanation or hypothesis for what I perceive?[7] Of course, no philosophers[8] have claimed only on grounds of perception or introspection that the immediate object of perception is a sense-datum. They have used reasoning, logic, facts, and evidence from other sciences. If we somehow discover "X" in the claim "The immediate object of perception is X", we can form a new argument that is valid instead of the argument above—I perceive rough sounds and feel softness; therefore, something physical exists. In what follows, I will present some views that take the immediacy of perception to be something in the mind.

2. Sense-datum and Standard Arguments

Although I will present standard *philosophical* arguments in this chapter, I also use *science-based* arguments in this research. Sense-data are successors to the empiricists' concepts of ideas of sense that were introduced by Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore in the early twentieth-century. The term 'sense-data' refers to the immediate non-physical objects of perceptual experience, such as color patches, sounds, and tastes. (Goldman, 1992: 475) John Locke defined 'idea' as 'whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks' (Locke, 1690/1975: 1.1.8). For Locke, the term 'idea' also includes objects of the senses. Although 'idea' and 'sense-datum' are not exactly synonymous, they both refer to inner entities being located in a person's consciousness. They have not been thought to have existence continued and distinct from a perceiver (Hume, 1969: I, IV, II). For example, when hearing sounds, sounds are supposed to be distinct from external physical entities outside the mind. Sound

[7] The meaning of 'perception' will be clarified in the second section of chapter six. I return to this topic in sections five, six, and seven when more precisely examining the relationship between perceptual claims and claims concerning the external world.

[8] I have in fact heard many philosophers in Finland, such as Joseph Almog, Jani Hakkarainen, Valtteri Arstila, Arto Repo, Tapio Korte, Hemmo Laiho, Anssi Korhonen, Olli Lagerspetz, Mikael Melan, Valtteri Viljanen, Roosa Rantanen, Jani Sinokki, Tuomas E. Tahko, Markku Keinänen, and many others, argue on grounds of perception what they *really* perceive.

perception is more relative to conditions, too immediate to be in contact with constant physical entities. The intentional object, a sound towards which we are directed, would be part of the psychological act. Alan H. Goldman (1992: 475) explains that *sense-data* are objects that change in our perceptual fields when conditions of perception change and external physical entities remain constant.

Sense-data can be analyzed using the act/object analysis created by Bertrand Russell. According to the act/object analysis of experience, every experience has an object to which the subject, whether it be a person or an animal, is related by an act of experience (the event of experiencing that object) (Pendlebury, 1992: 9). Some might feel it natural to think that an object of perception can be distinguished from an object of experience, like hallucinations and dream experiences, because the object of perception can be supposed to be an external material entity. However, the sense-datum theory involves an object in perception that is the internal object in the same way as the object of hallucination. These experiences refer to something private and internal: we are immediately aware of private internal objects in mind, and thus objects of perception are never distinct from objects of experience. Perception, hallucination, and dream are different acts, but their objects would be in the same place on the threshold between the mind and the world. Russell, for example, described the act/object distinction in his *The Problems of Philosophy* as follows:

> "Let us give the name of 'sense-data' to the things that are immediately known in sensation: such things as colours, sounds, smells, hardnesses, roughnesses, and so on. We shall give the name 'sensation' to the experience of being immediately aware of these things. Thus, whenever we see a colour, we have a sensation *of* the colour, but the colour itself is a sense-datum, not a sensation. The colour is that *of* which we are immediately aware, and the awareness itself is the sensation. (Russell, 1912: 4)

The sense-datum theory is the internal object theory of perception. This also includes the *Phenomenal Principle*, which is the creation of Howard Robinson (1994: 32). The principle states that one can doubt whether one has an experience of a material thing, a hallucination, or a dream, but one cannot doubt that one has an experience of something. For example, if I hear a sound, I can doubt its external existence. However, I cannot doubt that I am aware of some entity.

The standard arguments for a claim that the immediate object of perception is an internal private entity (a sense-datum) in mind have been 1) the argument from illusion, 2) the argument from hallucination, 3) the argument from the perceptual relativity, and 4) the time-gap argument (see e.g., Crane & French, 2015). The claim is "We never immediately perceive external physical entities". The immediate object of perception is a sense-datum, which differs entirely from an external "real" entity. The character of perceptual experience itself involves the presentation (as) of sense-data because the character of experience in general, or the 'qualia', is data of sense—private non-physical objects dependent upon the perceiver that cannot be described or explained in terms of physical things (Crane and French assume otherwise, 2015; see pp. 2−3 about the characterization of the 'qualia'). Representationism says that this character is reducible to a representational content because experiences would have no such characters: the experience that you have is not "red" when seeing a red thing (Block, 1998: 663). Representation is the indirect mental content of the real thing in mind and implies internal entities like a childhood memory.

First, the argument from illusion suggests that one can have an experience of perceiving a property even though nothing has that property. In this case, there must be something one experiences that has the property in question. Thus, one has an experience of the internal private entity in one's own mind. And since, in the illusion, the experience consists of awareness of the internal entity, or the sense-datum, the same must be true of the experience in the case of genuine perception. For example a wall looks yellow in yellow light, but one does not believe that the wall really is yellow, but white. When one is subject to an illusion, it appears to one that the wall has the quality of "being yellow" which the real ordinary wall supposedly being perceived does not actually have. However, when one has a genuine perception of the wall, one has an experience of whiteness directly and of the wall indirectly. From the point of view of the subject of an experience, there is no non-arbitrary way to distinguish between perception and illusion.

Second, the argument from hallucination is similar to the argument from illusion. However, when one is subject to a hallucination, there is no external substance at all. One is having

an experience of something. It seems possible for someone to have an experience—a hallucination—which is subjectively indistinguishable from a genuine perception except that there is no mind-independent entity being perceived. That is, the perception and the subjectively indistinguishable hallucination are essentially *experiences* of the same kind. In sum, in perception and hallucination, one is aware of some kind of internal entity. Let us consider, for example, a person who suffers from auditory hallucinations and hears voices. The person does not genuinely hear voices because there is nothing there for him or her to hear. The person is therefore aware of something that only he or she can sense in his or her mind. He or she hears internal entities called "voices". But when comparing a delusory experience with a normal experience of hearing sounds, the two can be exactly alike. Because a hallucination and a real case of hearing sounds can seem exactly alike from the inside of the person, it is possible to mistake one for the other. If the auditory experience in the real case of hearing a voice can be exactly the same as the experience in the case of hallucinating one, then it is natural to suppose that the account of what is experientially involved in the two cases should be the same. Both experiences consist of awareness of the internal entity, that is, sense-datum.

Third, the perceiver's qualities, mind/brain, the senses and consciousness, and the perceptual circumstances imply the fallibility of perceptual beliefs: one's belief that one perceives external mind-independent entities may be untrue. What is perceived to be and what really is are different. This is the main message of the argument from the perceptual relativity. This argument suggests that there is an ontological difference between reality and appearance because the properties we perceive are sense-data and not the properties of the external entities themselves. Under certain circumstances and conditions (of the perceiver), the same thing appears to be different than it really is. For example, the mouth of a cup looks elliptical due to a certain angle of vision. Moreover, things seem to be colorless to the observer due to the absence of lighting. Furthermore, if two things, like a human person and an animal have different sense systems, then the way things appear to them is not the way that the world of things really is. The appearance/reality distinction remains in this case because there are no reasons to favor a human person over any other animal.

Fourth, the time-lag argument for a claim that the object of perception is always internal means that it denies the immediacy of perception and claims that perception is concerned only with the immediate objects in the present. Science proves that light travels at a finite speed, with a time-lag between the transmission of light from an external substance and the perception of the object. The light of the sun that strikes our eyes has taken a long time to reach us, so the sun that we see now is actually the sun that existed some time ago and may have since ceased to exist. Although its current non-existence would not affect the fact that we see it now, the immediate object of our visual experience is not actually identical with the sun that is being seen. The same case is applied to hearing. If a gun is fired some distance from us, we first see the flash with a small time-lag, and then hear the sound with a greater time-lag. Because there is time-lag in all perceptions, perception is not a direct confrontation, but a process. Therefore, the object of perceptual experience is always internal. It is in this way that Bertrand Russell argued in *Human Knowledge*. (Bunnin & Yu, 2004)

These four standard arguments all assert the conclusion that *the immediate object of perception* is a sense-datum, an internal private entity in a perceiver's mind. They are all based on the general assumption "If I perceive something having some F, there really is something having some F". I suggest the alternative interpretation: it could be that I perceive something *being* some property F. Therefore, something perceived *is identical to* some property F, or the substance-like bundle of properties, and there are no two entities 1) a thing and 2) some property F. That is, today it is thought that a sense-datum is a thing that has sensory properties, but I will argue that the property can be a sense-datum. However, to my mind, it is incorrect to infer from *a case* or *cases* of illusion or hallucination that the case of perception *in general* is invalid: we cannot infer from a *few* objects of illusion or hallucination that perception is *generally* of sense-data (to make the leap from a few cases are sometimes such and such to all cases are always such and such). Such cases are usable against direct realism. If someone claims that we always perceive mind-independent entities and their properties, it has been easy to point to examples in which we do not perceive mind-independent things. Ever since the days of Plato, these examples have been the four standard arguments discussed above. If this *inner object theory of perception* is true, then the perceiver is not in

direct connection with the external world. But how then does the perceiver know that there is an external world independent of his or her phenomena of consciousness?

In philosophy, the problem of the external world is simply the question of why we should admit the existence of a world other than ourselves and our minds. What justifies our belief that there is anything behind the veil causally related to the real tree if we perceive a tree by throwing a veil of *experiences* over it, and in virtue of doing so perceive the mind-dependent sense-data? This raises the possibility of living a perpetual dream. A natural reason to believe that there is something behind the veil is that we seem to perceive the tree *as it is*. This would mean that *perceptual experience* is our justification to admit a world other than ourselves and our minds. Moreover, if the objects and events of the external world partly cause our perceptual experiences about objects, and I do not cause my perceptual experiences, then of course the external world exists. Therefore, there exists something other than me and my mind, and solipsism collapses (a thesis that only my mind and its states exist).

In answering the question "Are objects of sense external?" the response has often been given that there is no exact demonstration for their externality (Russell, 1900: 72). The response "I am perceiving a real tree" can be untrue. I appear to perceive trees in the park. However, I am sleeping, and thus these trees are not real. For example, René Descartes described in his first meditation that an observer cannot infer from the objects of experience whether these things are external mind-independent entities or products of the mind and imagination (Descartes, 1647: 12–14). We need other criteria than "an openness to many," "the presentation of something," or "to be immediately experienced or is given"[9]. According to Bertrand Russell in his Leibniz-study, we know the visible world is real, and thus the existence of the material objects, when we know that something other than us is the cause of our perception[10] (Russell, 1900: 74). I consider this whole problem as a result of the impossibility of verifying the nature of objects *outside of* perceptual experience. I cannot verify that the objects I directly perceive are the external mind-independent bodies or

[9] This criterion is what Searle argues in his new presentational theory of perception, which I will evaluate in section five.
[10] Berkeley considered the cause of perception as God, and thus we would not know whether some mind-independent material substances exist.

events. I am not able to demonstrate that the external world really is as my mind presents it to be in perceiving. Richard Fumerton, for example, argues that to establish that sensations are signs of physical objects one would have to *observe* a correlation between sensations and the existence of certain physical objects. He continues to state that to observe such a correlation in order to establish a connection, one would need independent access to physical objects. This one cannot have if all one knows directly is that certain sensations occur. (Fumerton: 1992: 339) Fumerton's argument leads to the problems in perception.

In what follows, I will focus on more details and problems of the sense-datum theory of perception (which may be a representative realism[11]), direct realism, and eliminative materialism. The most serious problem in the sense-datum theory is to consider appearance or sense-datum as being under the category of substance. The sense-datum would then be a thing that has properties. This leads to the sense-datum fallacy, according to which there would be an external substance and its appearance, both of which are green and solid, for instance (I will discuss this problem in Chapters 4.1−4.6). Direct realism's way of describing what one perceives does not show the nature of the object of perceptual experience. The descriptive method is circular and unconvincing. Causation in the acts and states of mind causes identity problems for both direct realism and eliminative realism. Do direct, naive realists, for example, deny that brain damage affects our internal states, cognitive activities, and the content of our experiences? It is challenging to reject the existence of objects and data of sense that are *caused*, like figures, colors, mental images, sounds, emotions, and thoughts. We are immediately aware of their changing form without inferences. Eliminative materialists, like Paul Churchland, Paul Feyerabend, and Richard Rorty, have claimed that there is no such thing as mental phenomenon and thus the "problems of perception" and sense-datum do not exist. Neurological events are going on within a perceiver. Nevertheless, it is an open question how the brain *directly* informs a person about the facts of the external world outside the brain or how the brain states directly reach the external world.

[11] See Fiona Macpherson's (2014) view of whether the sense-datum theory of perception is a representative realism.

My theoretical insights will solve these problems in sections six and seven. The sense-data are not substances. If I have to say what I am aware of, I say that they are properties like a color green or a substance-like bundle of properties. The color green that I am seeing is not a substance. If I can name even one property that an external substance lacks, but the immediate object of perceptual experience has, then the phenomenon that I am immediately seeing and the external substance cannot be identical as direct realism claims. I will name many such properties. Moreover, if the senses, consciousness, and the brain are preconditions for *the existence of data of sense*, then it is very probable that they are internal and in the perceiver. This is the best hypothesis. I would like to note that most of my arguments are based on understanding and reasoning but arise from the introspective empirical evidence of data of which I am directly aware. Causal relation is a transitive relation: whenever A causes B and B causes C, then A also causes C. In sections six and seven, I will show that any view about the immediate object of perceptual experience is contradictory if the immediate object is caused in a perceiver by many external causes (a causal transitive relation "A causes B and B causes C, etc." does not imply "A is identical to C" although A can be a cause of C). In fact, the present discussion refers to the phenomenal character of perceptual experience, which physicalist theories of mind could not explain. However, if this phenomenal character exists and the mind/body problem of philosophy of mind is combined with the problem of perception in philosophy of perception, then the perceptual situation does not seem only inconsistent and contradictory, but also confused. The perceptual situation becomes confused because we do not know where to connect entities which are given to the senses. The phenomenal character can be identical with 1) the brain state, 2) the represented content in philosophy of mind, or 3) the property of the external substance outside the perceiver in philosophy of perception. The phenomenal character is not all of these. I will give three simple arguments in order to show that a judgment concerning an external entity is not based directly on the external entity, but on perceptual experience. Although the natures of a mental image and a perceptual object are difficult to confirm empirically, there is evidence that they are similar entities located in a person and that they are caused by external things. From this evidence, one of the main theses follows: the external entity is not an object immediately perceived. This result implies the perceiver does not directly perceive the external world.

When considering what I perceive of, four concepts are essential. They are: (1) subject, (2) perception, (3) appearance, and (4) substance—object is not relevant because it is not clear whether the perceptual object is appearance, substance, or something else. I think that substance/attribute metaphysics is also fruitful in locating the perceptual entity. Substances belong to the entities of the external world: the mind is not filled with substances. Substance-attribute metaphysics is consistent with my view that sense-data are properties, not a substance having properties. I will argue that sense-data as properties depends on the perceiver, and therefore, the perceiver has sense-data (see e.g., p. 115). The perceiver as a perceiving organism is a substance and sense-data are its attributes like the perceiver has thoughts, emotions, and images. For example, I am seeing a red shape. However, I am not certain whether the directly seen redness and the shape are (1) one individual thing or (2) many individual things of redness and shapeness in the mind-independent external substance, or whether my mind is filled with private, internal entities and a substance-like composition of properties. Although a subject and the substance are included in theories of perception, the focus is on a situation in which *I* perceive *something*[12]. The situation in which it appears to me while I am perceiving the loud red shape can be pinpointed to the spatial structure in the mind: it appears that I and the loud red shape are in different places. Therefore, there seems to be a distance between the perceiver and the substance. Moreover, this spatial structure can be considered part of the more general structure of the ontological categories by means of reasoning. *The research question* then follows: is something that is directly perceived identical to the external substance, in particular to the entity that has a shape and is loud and red? It can be argued that all objects of perceptual experience are properties and they only look like substance-like phenomenon. Substance escapes our perceptual experience, and therefore we would not have direct experiences of external substances. Finally**,** I now want to clarify what I understand by the term 'the external world'.

Here ‘externality’ means some kind of spatial relation between things that have no common parts. Things that have no common parts are in different spatial places. If x is external to y,

[12] It seems to me that I perceive properties with a substance-like complex, not a substance. And act/object theorists may differ the nature of objects of experience according to Michael Pendlebury (1992: 9).

the characterization of ‘externality’ is that x and y have no parts in common—the real characterization concerns the phenomenon, not the words. If the world is external to a mind, then it does not have a common part with a mind. If a mind and the world have no common parts, they must be distinct entities: the world is not in a mind. The world is independent of a mind to which its objects appear to be *in a distinct place* with relation to each other and the mind. ‘Externality’ then means ‘partlessness’ or ‘distinctness’. This kind of characterization of ‘externality’ may be questioned, however.

The external world is independent of a mind. Nevertheless, I would not say that ‘externality’ is ‘independence’. It is pretty certain that the definition of ‘independence’ is not ‘externality’. Two things can be external while being dependent on each other. For example, the existence of a work of art is external to the artist inventing it. However, the existence of the work of art is not independent of the artist, because without the artist there would not be that work of art even though the artist is not a cause of the continuing existence of the created work of art. Someone may say that minds are non-spatial, and they are distinct, and my characterization states that two minds are external to each other. However, this is inconsistent with spatial relation. This objection does not disprove my characterization of ‘externality’ because the relation between a subject perceiving and the external world is spatial. Therefore, the objection is irrelevant. In addition, I can say that a mind is external to another mind without referring to spatiality because two minds are not together. In brief, there is the perceiver and the external world, and the external world is not his or her mind, but is independent of the perceiver’s mind.

‘The external world’ is usually defined by cognitive scientists as the world that is outside of a person's body, and thus ‘the internal world’ would mean ‘the inside of a person's body’. Nevertheless, in philosophy, the term refers to the outer reality which may be situated outside of the perceiver’s mind; this is the reality independent of human perception and thought. The external world therefore includes all substances and events that exist independent of a perceiving and thinking person: a city with its buildings is an entity of the external world; and a traffic jam in a city is an event occurring in the external world. They exist independent of the perceiver because they do not have common parts with his or her

mind. The perceiver may be part of the traffic jam external to the mind. However, the question is whether he or she directly perceives the traffic jam outside of his or her mind if the traffic jam is not within his or her mind. Furthermore, for one person, other men and women are also entities of the external world outside of a person's mind. Other people are not parts of the perceiver's mind. The entities of the external world are not within the perceiver's mind. Therefore, the characterization of 'the external world' is:

The physical reality without any common parts with the perceiver's mind.

The external world includes the perceiver's own body. For example, when perceiving his own shape movements, they are present to Jack, and are as sensible as any other immediate object of perception appears to him. Therefore, the external world includes Jack's body. However, 'the external world' does not mean a reality of objects and events independent of the human community whose members perceive it outside themselves. Rather, the external world includes the human communities regarding them from the first-person perspective.[13] The external world includes other people and cultural things. If two people consider whether or not they perceive the external cup, it does not make sense to simultaneously conclude that the one person directly sees the other who is external. Otherwise, the problem of the external world and that of perception have been solved.

2. The Structure of the Work

This research is philosophy based on everyday life. It is not conceptual as such, it is not about how we use the concept 'perception' or about the grammar of the mental verbs 'see' and 'think'. I abandon some extreme forms of analytic philosophy like logical positivism and linguistic turn which assert that philosophical problems could be dissolved by some kind of careful attention to language or can be eliminated by some magic bullet of "linguistic analysis" (see Chapter 10, pp. 213−5). I bring philosophy to life. By this, I mean that I do not examine a theory, but I examine a problem and use some methods to find answers. This thesis is a serious scholar's research project: after becoming familiar with previous

[13] Although social perception is said to differ from object perception because of empathy or hatred, other humans are after all others. They are distinct from the point of view of one person. They seem to be external to the mind perceiving them. See also for example Pappas, 1992: 381.

studies, framing a significant problem, critically thinking through the methodology and analyzing the data, I write a research report. This is like academic studies in history, psychology, education, literature, or economics. First, I have a starting point leading to the problem that I examine in some theoretical framework (the causal theory of perception). The data already exist [entities of perceptual experience and awareness, Russell's (1900, 1902, 1905a, 1905b, 1910, 1911a, 1911b, 1912a, 1912b, 1913a, 1913b, 1913c, 1914, 1915a, 1915b, 1918, 1921, 1922, 1924, 1955) and Moore's (1913-14, 1953) studies, Chisholm's (1942, 1948, 1966, 1995) and Prichard's (1938) critiques, Austin's (1946, 1962), Searle's (2012) and Martin's (2002) direct realism and Churchland's (1981, 1984, 1985, 1988, 1992), Feyerabend's (1963a, 1963b, 1969) and Rorty's (1965, 1970) eliminative materialism, which is also direct realism]. I analyze the data by means of the theoretical framework and some basic concepts (spatiality, causality, and identity) and present my solutions to the problem. By means of basic proposition and predicate logics, we can examine the validity of the inferences made by the philosophers researched here. Their claims of the immediate object of perception must be compared with our experiences. Valid logical arguments are often based on the reasoner's imagination: they do not prove how things are in the reality. My aim is to give evidence based on everyday empirical phenomena.

This research is more reliable than the mainstream academic philosophy of today. It seems to me that philosophers make many claims, but do not provide sufficient evidence to support them. They appeal to a theory or school of thought. Most philosophical studies lack a clear subject, and they do not say a word about the methodology (everyone can confirm this by examining philosophy articles and Ph.D. dissertations). I consider researching to be the first point, and after researching, the second point is to write a report about the research. Academic philosophers do not care for research ethics. If they examine theories, they do not have a theory about theories, which would be desirable. Moreover, this also concerns branches of philosophy other than those of the analytic tradition like continental philosophy and comparative philosophy. In fact, this disregard for research ethics concerns all humanities because research is performed using theories and language to prove a presupposed reality. Using a theory, a scholar interprets an empirical phenomenon leading to claims not

supported by the phenomenon examined. Theories do not justify an interpretation or a description about the phenomenon. The phenomenon must be discovered by means of something that justifies the interpretation or the description. For example, Durkheim, Quine, and Foucault showed more than half a century ago how perception, perceptual reports, and claims can be biased towards the given theory due to the perceiver's background beliefs, theories, and values. However, philosophers continue as if nothing has happened[14]. The structure of this thesis is more convincing (you have the experience of the text in front of you). My way of doing philosophical study is more scholarly than that of mainstream philosophy because it is qualitative research. I became independently acquainted with qualitative research methods in order to make philosophy more credible. We can replicate the inferences of this thesis and evaluate them and compare different claims to our own experience.

I hope that readers notice the structure of my research. The structure is like a huge argument. Starting from *section three* I will present a claim and its critique, an objection, and objections to the objection. I can also present the form in the following way in relation to the picture below:

1) **(i)** Russell's and Moore's sense-datum theories and some contemporary views (section three),

2) **(i)** Chisholm's and Prichard's critiques (section four),

3) **(ii)** Austin's, Searle's, and Martin's direct, naive realism and Churchland's, Feyerabend's, and Rorty's eliminative materialism (section five),

4) **(iii)** My replies and justifications (sections six and seven),

5) Results and conclusion (sections eight and nine).

Of course, these sections also contain my own interpretations and chapters.

[14] See for example Brogaard and Chomanski (2015); Lyons (2011); Macpherson (2012); Siegel (2012); Stokes (2013).



In the next section, a general overview of theoretical ideas and the characterization of 'perception' used in this work will be presented with more exactitude. First, I will shortly describe 1) what causation in general might require and 2) what causation would involve in the perceptual situation. Second, I will discuss some reasons why causality in perceptual experience is more convincing than the denial of causal factors. The content includes a theoretical framework, which is a causal theory of perception, and an analysis of the theoretical framework by means of substance-attribute metaphysics. From the first-person point of view, it seems that the content of perceptual experience, a color green, a voice speaking, a taste of sweetness, or a movement, arises from outside of me. It has external causes. Therefore, causal theory of perception is linked to the first-person point of view, in which there really is a perceiver, and to the research problem. If the external object causes the idea in mind, then this fact leads to having the information directly about the mind-dependent idea. The objects of perception must be located in the observer: in perception, one, self, or mind is directed towards something, not towards perception. H. P Grice's examples clarify what the causal theory of perception has been assumed to imply by many great philosophers. According to him, perception and sense-datum are linked. This section only deals with the question of whether or not there are causal events in perceptual experience. The research part will start in section three.

Section three starts with a review and examples of previous philosophical studies about dualism and arguments for the claim that the immediate object of perception is internal. First, I will evaluate how perception is proof of indirect connection with the external world. This is why perceiving in itself cannot demonstrate that we know the nature of the object directly perceived. Textual evidence shows that perception has not been clearly explained by earlier philosophers. Second, I will focus on Bertrand Russell's and George Moore's

sense-datum theory of perception. I will examine what sense-datum is, their arguments for why we are directly aware of sense-data, and some contemporary understanding about sense-datum/appearance. We will see that the sense-data do not necessarily represent external entities in Russell's and Moore's theories.

In section four, I will continue clarifying the meaning of ‘sense-datum’ or ‘appearance’. The general meaning of the term ‘appearance’ is close to those of ‘phenomenon’, ‘sensory idea’, ‘sense-datum’, or ‘mental representation’. On the other hand, the term ‘appearance’ can also mean ‘apparition’, ‘seeming’, ‘deception’, or ‘falsehood’. Its meaning is ambiguous. The essential question is that of how to discover appearance if one is directly aware of it in a perceptual situation. Perception is directed at something in any case. This part of the thesis includes Roderick M. Chisholm’s and H. A. Prichard’s critiques of the sense-datum theory. I will show that being aware of color or shape appearance in perception does not mean that the property of “appearing red” or “appearing oval” is identical to a property of the external entity, such as a red round thing.

In section five, I evaluate arguments of direct, naive realism and eliminative materialism that have been made against the perceiving of non-material internal sense-data formed by J. L Austin, John Searle, M. G. F. Martin, Paul M. Churchland, Paul Feyerabend, and Richard Rorty. I will also analyze how perception as a brain process justifies perceiving the external world. According to eliminative materialism, there is no problem of perception due to the non-existence of mental phenomena. I will argue that this problem of perception is indeed present. There must be *an inference* or *a process* between the brain event and the external world, and direct, naive realism does not address this. An argument defending the claim that an object in perception is not always a sense-datum will be given at the end of this section. However, direct, naive realism includes serious problems, only one of which is the lack of any reliable definition for ‘perception’. In fact, direct, naive realism seems to be a *circle in proving* fallacy, or based on circularity in its arguments.

In section six, I will use three simple arguments to refute the thesis that I directly perceive a mind-independent external entity. The visual object of imagination and the object of ex-

perience are both in the perceiver. They also share common qualities such as content, subjectivity, change in virtue of conditions of observers, and the like. This leads to the conclusion that both a tree-image and a tree-experience are distinct from the supposed material tree. Perceiving is caused by human nature, yet sense-organs and the brain may prevent direct perception about the external world. The strongest objection to this consequence is that there exists no extra entity called sense-datum, no appearance between a subject-in-itself and a real external thing-in-itself. That is, we see books, not book-images. A possible reply to this objection would be that a person is not directly connected with the external things, but indirectly connected through perceptual experience. In perception through technology, we are not directly aware of the external entities and their properties. So, why would we be directly aware of the external world in perception through sense-organs?

Finally, in section seven, I will argue that the real external entity is not identical to the immediate object of perception because the two have distinct properties. I will show that identity and causality are mutually exclusive in "S perceives x". This conclusion implies that the notions "object of perception" and "external entity" do not have the same reference.

The concluding sections will demonstrate the relevance of my findings. The appendix concerns the methodology and methods used in this research.

2. THE THEORETICAL MODEL

1. Causation in the Events of the Mind and the External World

I will shortly describe 1) what causation in general might require and 2) what causation would involve in the perceptual situation. It seems clear that there are events and that, sometimes, some of them are connected in a way that some events are called "causes" and others are called "effects". However, I will not consider here whether it is possible for causation to occur between mental states or if mental states are causally effective. That issue is more about mental causation and metaphysics of mind and is not relevant here. I will also not consider whether causal relations are in the mind (i.e., if I recognize the cause of an event which David Hume (1739−40) unsuccessfully tried to find) or if causation occurs in the objects. What is relevant here is the question about the immediate object of perception, the

direct perceptual experience caused in one location by the substance-at-distance in another. The impossibility of adding identity between different events, or between events and substance, is also relevant for this thesis. I will examine causation with identity: we will clearly see that causation in perceptual experience and its objects leads to identity problems.

There seem to be events such as hitting a nail, dazzling light, the movements of a star, and the like. Some of them seem to be *causally* linked. A carpenter hits a nail with a hammer, causing it to penetrate the wood. The movement of a star is caused by a planet in orbit around it. Finally, the sound of the alarm clock caused you to wake up and get out of bed; turning it off caused the sound to stop. (Salmon, 2002: 19) In fact, an effect can be caused by a number of events in *transitive* relation: whenever A causes B and B causes C and C causes D, then it is also true that A causes D. However, I consider there to be many things A, B, C, D, and so on, which cause both perceptual experience and the phenomenal character of experience, such as the distinctive phenomenal aspects between greenness and the sweet taste of wine. The examples presented by Wesley C. Salmon (2002: 19−42) in his article "Causation" do not support the idea of identity of events in causal relations. Causation could be described as interactive connections between events (processes) if Salmon's conditions for causation "in the objects" are correct.

Salmon (2002: 28) defines process as something that "goes on continuously over a span of time". It also transpires over a spatial distance. Sound waves, material objects such as billiard balls, a tree and a bird, lights and shadows, these are all processes. Salmon then distinguishes between causal processes and pseudo-processes. Causal processes transmit causal influence, but pseudo-processes do not. For example, a car and its shadow are processes, but the car is a causal process and the shadow is a pseudo-process. If the shadow meets a stone pillar along the road, it is temporarily distorted, but as it passes by the pillar it resumes its former shape as if nothing had happened. If, however, our car collides with a stone pillar, it will bear the marks of the encounter long after it has moved past the pillar (assuming that it is capable of continuing on). In sum, the causal process can transmit the marks of the collision beyond the place where it occurred, whereas the pseudo-process cannot, describes Salmon. (Salmon, 2002: 29)

Causation in the objects requires interactions. When two processes intersect, they should interact with one another if the interaction is a *causal* interaction. Processes must therefore be *causal* – pseudo-processes are not causal processes and they do not interact. (Salmon, 2002: 31) Causal interactions produce changes; such changes are propagated by causal processes (Salmon, 2002: 33). One example he gives is the following:

"As a second example, consider two airplanes that are flying on intersecting courses at different altitudes on a sunny day. Their shadows will intersect on the ground below, but no alteration of the shape will persist beyond the intersection. The shadows are pseudo-processes; they cannot interact with one another. A genuine causal interaction requires causal processes. If the airplanes were travelling at the same altitude, the result would be a mid-air collision, and both planes would be altered – perhaps disastrously – in lasting ways." (Salmon, 2002: 31)

It is obvious that the interaction between two airplanes produces changes. Moreover, because shadows cannot interact, their intersection produces no changes. Causal processes, describes Salmon, are the means by which causal influence is transmitted from one place and time to another. (Salmon, 2002: 31) The substance-at-distance (the tree) does not intersect or interact with a mental act (perceiving), a mental state (a thought), a content, or an object of perceptual experience (the surface or a shape, the color). Furthermore, and this is important, the tree is a causal process, but the internal entities of mind are dependent upon the subject having these processes although they are not necessarily pseudo-processes (when I apply Salmon's examples to conscious states and its objects; see also pp. 20−21). Therefore, these pseudo-processes cannot interact with one another. And although the internal entities would be physical entities, they cannot directly interact with the tree outside the perceiver (his or her *body* can interact with an external substance in the sense of taste and tactile sensation). If we have the following causal process "the tree – perceptual experience – a desire to fell – body movements – tree falling", then perceptual experience and desire could not be pseudo-processes because they are parts of the chain. The parts cannot be identical with each other. I would claim that mental acts do not directly influence the external entities: I am not able to fell trees with the power of thought and the external world

does not change according to my desire. The internal entities of mind may nonetheless be causally effective. We cannot add identity to the parts of the causal chain above.

In contrast with pseudo-processes, causal processes can transmit a mark (information), but also energy, momentum, electric charge, and the like. They also transmit causal influence. Salmon asks us to think of a bullet shot from a gun. When the bullet leaves the gun, marks are made upon it that enable experts to identify the gun from which the bullet was shot. The moving bullet is a causal process; the marks are transmitted. Also, the bullet transmits mass, a conserved quantity. Salmon continues that it also transmits causal influence: "If the bullet strikes a person, it will produce a wound – a possibly fatal wound." (Salmon, 2002: 35) Transmission of causal processes requires interaction: "Once the marks have been imposed by the interaction of the bullet with the gun, they remain on the bullet as it travels" (Salmon, 2002: 35). We must realize that a causal process is a process that persists on its own, without contributions from any outside source. When the bullet leaves the gun, it travels without any external influence. In contrast, the continued existence of pseudo-processes, such as the electric light, depend upon something supplied from an external source. (Salmon, 2002: 31)

If we want to give an objective causal account of any spatiotemporal region of the universe, we must take account of all the causal processes in that region and all the interactions among them. (Salmon, 2002: 35) There can be a great number of causal processes and interactions for one account (Salmon, 2002: 36−37). But what do interaction, transmission, and process mean for perceptual experience and its objects? They mean very much if we want objective answers to questions about the *causes* of what we directly perceive.

To claim that one single external entity causes a mental state of the direct perceptual experience about it is unfounded[15]. For example, it is unfounded to say that if Jack is genuinely to see the cat, the cat must cause Jack to have certain visual experiences. If intersection, interaction, and transmission are conditions for causal effects, then the substance-at-distance does not fulfill the conditions. The substance-at-distance, which is located outside the

[15] Direct realists do not say much about this issue. Thus, I do not know what they think about causation in perceptual experience. See, for example, Fish, 2009, Haddock and Macpherson, 2008 and Soteriou, 2016.

perceiver, can cause neither a mental state nor an object of sense (which is not a substance) the perceiver attends to. In relation to Salmon's view of causation (causation requires interaction), it is impossible, for example, that the tree is the only cause of the direct perceptual experience about it or the surface, shape, and figure of experience that we think to be the tree's properties. Because the tree and the substance-like figure of perceptual experience do not interact, the tree does not directly cause the perceptual experience of it or the objects of experience.

Let us imagine a perceptual case in which we would be directly aware of a facing surface. In other words, the substance-like facing surface that we directly see is an object of sense. Then let us imagine the substance-at-distance, the tree in the park. This tree in the park is a causal process. It seems that the substance-at-distance (the tree) does not intersect or interact with a mental act (perceiving), a mental state (an experience), or a content, which is an object of sense (the facing surface, a shape, or a color). Furthermore, and importantly, the tree is a causal process, but the internal entities of mind are dependent upon the subject who owns them. For example, my visual perception does not hew down a tree, nor can I move my pen with the power of thought. Therefore, the tree and the internal entity of mind cannot interact with one another. And if the internal entities were physical, they could not interact with the tree outside the perceiver (his or her body can interact with an external substance in the sense of taste and tactile sensation).[16] But the argument continues by maintaining that the internal entities of mind require an external source. The object of sense, the surface seen, might depend upon the brain process, which is a causal process and has causal influence (notice that the brain process and the tree process taking place in the park do not interact). The object of sense created by the brain process may vanish immediately when the brain process ceases to be, just as the electric light vanishes when a flashlight in the park goes out, although the tree in the park remains. Therefore, we cannot say that the substance-at-distance causes the direct perceptual experience about it, nor can we say that it causes the

[16] Someone may argue that desire is causally effective in the sense that my desire will cause my hand movements, such as someone turning a light switch on and the light finally turning on. However, I think of this in the context of identity: my desire and the light turning on are not identical, and they are not directly in causal connection. Why one would claim object of sense and the external entity to be identical or in direct connection is a mystery to me because such a claim is so inconsistent.

facing surface of experience that we think to be the tree's properties, like Smith and Jones do. They claim, for example, in their *The Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction* (1986: 85) that "If Jack is genuinely to see the cat, the cat must causally affect the way things look to him, i.e., the cat must cause Jack to have certain visual experiences". Although they say nothing about causal processes or the brain, this claim cannot be correct because, based on Salmon's criteria, there is no causation "in the objects" between the mind and the external world. Substances belong to the entities of the external world: the mind is not filled with substances. There can be a transitive relation in which a great number of causes cause not only perceptual experience, but also the appearance of greenness and the object of sense. The tree in the park is then a cause. However, this chain of causes refutes identity: the tree is not dependent upon the brain and perceptual experience, the character of experience (greenness) and the object of sense (the facing surface) is dependent upon the brain (according to neuroscientists, the brain produces consciousness and states of consciousness). In sum, the tree in the park cannot be identical with the character of experience and the object of sense on the basis of Salmon's criteria.

One possibility is as follows. The mind reaches the tree in the park, even though the complex causal chain connects the perceiver and the external object. However, because of the complex causal chain and the perceiver's structure, the mind or perceptual experience is not in direct connection with the tree in the park. What appears to different perceivers is not the same as the tree in the park because the perceivers' structure influence how things appear (e.g., smart phone screens, animals and human persons have different phenomena *within* them and the tree is *without* their phenomena). In principle, this is testable by manipulating perceivers' detection systems. Furthermore, identity does not fit in between the parts of the causal chain. Therefore, the mind's phenomena are neither in direct connection with nor identical to the external object. If the tree in the park is not able to cause the mind's reaching, then based on Salmon's criteria, the mind's reaching experience is not directly about the tree in the park. Causation in perceptual experience and its objects leads to identity problems for direct, naive realism.

The existence of the objects of sense can be taken as a given. However, this acceptance has led to a confusing view regarding what the object of sense is and what causes it. The object of sense, e.g., a red surface of which one is aware when perceiving, has been claimed to be 1) a brain state (Place, 1956; Smart, 1959), 2) a property of mind (Hume, 1969; Nagel 1974; Block, 1990), 3) a property of the perceiver (Chisholm, 1995; Suojanen, 2015a), 4) a property of physical energy like that of light (Churchland, 1985, 1992), 5) a property of the external substance (Byrne and Hilbert, 2003; McLaughlin, 2003), or 6) the external substance itself like the bush (Martin, 2002; McDowell, 1994). It cannot be all of these. Furthermore, if we do not cause our perceptual experiences, then what are their causes? Science teaches us that the cause of perceptual experience is the brain. Moreover, is there a state of affairs in reality in which the external entity causes the idea, that is, the given appearance to the mind, and the perceiver directly perceives the idea? If the phenomenal character, the represented content—the surface—of experience exists, what is its cause? There are many causes that are inconsistent with each other in philosophy of mind and philosophy of perception: the cause is 1) the brain, 2) the physical energy, 3) the external substance, or 4) God. There are even philosophers, like Martin (2002) and Tye (2002), who claim that the phenomenal character is merely a property of the external mind-independent object. However, many philosophers, like Jackson (1982, 1986) and Nagel (1974), have called it an entity that cannot be explained by physicalist theories of consciousness. The characters of experience have always been thought to be in consciousness (in the brain) (Smith, 2013: 13−17). In Martin's and Tye's theories, no causes affect the object of experience, and experience represents the facts of the external world and does so without causation.[17] Causation in the events of both the mind and the external world leads to identity problems and a confused picture of what we directly perceive.

The perceiving of an object caused by a number of events does not necessarily imply the internal object. In the next chapter, I will explain why I use a causal theory of perception and why causation in perceptual experience must be accepted.

[17] For me, it is a mystery why contemporary philosophers of perception remain silent about causation. A good document about this is Crane and French, 2015. By theorizing, they try to solve the "Problem of Perception".

2. A Causal Theory of Perception

In the following sections, I am going to examine philosophers' views of the topics discussed in those sections. I will also examine the research subject using a causal theory of perception to which I commit myself. I start the discussion by addressing some reasons why causality in perceptual experience is more convincing than remaining silent regarding causal factors. This is now the case of whether or not there is causality in perceptual experience. After presenting the theoretical model combined with the problem, I will deepen understanding of the perceptual situation and what its components are. H. P Grice's examples clarify what the causal theory of perception has been assumed to imply by many great philosophers. I will then evaluate the plausibility of my model by classifying its components. In the end of this section, I will address the concept 'perception'. My aim is just to understand the whole perceptual situation.

The fact is that direct, naive realists do not make much mention of the cause and the effect relation in their theories and analyses. They criticize it.[18] A claim that the acts and the states of consciousness and the data of sense are *uncaused* is really inconsistent with other sciences and our everyday experience. Our internal states change all the time, and it is more probable that some things from the outside affect us than that they arise from nothing or we cause them. If realists believe in the material world and their own body, they must be certain that their internal states can be affected by other people or that they themselves can change other people's internal states. Furthermore, of course, people are able to affect their own minds by drinking wine, for instance, or by staying awake two nights in a row. Brain injuries are likely to alter how sensory properties and perceptual objects appear to those who suffer them. And if education, advertising, and propaganda did not influence the human mind, then why would they be used so extensively in a way that *causes* an impairment of autonomy and an inability to think independently? However, what is going on in my mind does

[18] Many introductory learning materials for disjunctivism, for example, demonstrate this to be the case (see Fish, 2009; Haddock and Macpherson, 2008; Soteriou, 2016). We can also verify that papers on 'Transparency of Experience' do not make much reference to causality in perceptual experience (see, for example, Crane, 2000; Martin, 2002; Tye, 2002; Kind, 2003; Gennaro, 2008). Direct realists do not explain how they perceive, but they describe what they seem to perceive. Snowden (1980-1) argues that causation is not necessary in perception.

not necessarily have anything to do with the outside world. It is, then, more plausible to acknowledge causality than not mention it or even deny it in the perceptual experience. However, I am not now claiming that this choice justifies the truth "External things cause an idea, i.e., a sense-datum, and a perceiver is aware of this internal object in his or her mind". A causal theory of perception does not automatically imply the correct answer to the research question: is the external entity the direct object of perceptual experience? This section only deals with the question of whether or not there are causal events in perceptual experience.

It seems obvious that perceptions and their contents are not our own achievements. The causal theory of perception is plausible when S perceives x because perceiving an object x is likely dependent on the circumstances, the perceiver's psychological states, the lighting, the angle of vision, and other factors that affect the perceiver. One description of how perceptual experience occurs is as follows. Under certain circumstances, a tree causes its sensory idea before my mind's eye. I am directly aware of this idea of the tree, that is, the mind-dependent sense-datum. However, this description may *not* be the best explanation for a cause of perception (see 2.1, pp. 28−33). In fact, if the whole perception has a cause, then what is it? Perception begins with the stimulus when a sense receives sensory inputs from the outside. The best explanation can be that a perceiver's own qualities, such as mind and consciousness, are necessary for there being the perceiving of an object. Science teaches that the cause of perception is the brain. When S perceives x, the best explanation is that my brain causes perception about x that is given to me. This x, a patch of color or a sound for example, which appears to me in perception is not a substance, but is also not more than a substance-like entity. This type of process occurs in the *internal* realm while originating in the *external* world where substances are located. This is an inference of the best explanation. It implies causes to the perceptual experience because the perceptual experience does not happen by itself without causes.

The causal theory of perception is not open to question. Perceptual experience is an event having certain causes. However, this belief does not necessarily imply a belief that the im-

mediate object of perception is a sense-datum. I do not commit myself H. P. Grice's definition of 'perception' (see p. 39). I have knowledge of myself. Introspection shows that I am aware of entities in perception that I do not create. (Chapter 1.1, pp. 1−3) These empirical entities come into existence, last, and disappear. I have experience of them, but they seem to come from the outside. I seem to be *the object* affected by the external causes: lights, sounds, touches, tastes, and odors "bombard" me. Most people call these empirical entities the objects of the external world. However, the entities that I am aware of lack something.

Color-phenomena, sounds, and a picture-like tree lack wooden nature, mass, and size. They may occur in a substance named a 'perceiver'. A red color is never invisible, but always visible. A cue—evidence of my awareness (1.1, pp. 10−13)—for the causal theory of perception is a change when one has an experience of something. Colors, sounds, shapes, and sizes of trees appear to a subject, and they constantly change on grounds of introspective evidence. Changes are events, and nothing occurs without causes. Therefore, appearances do not occur without causes. The causal theory of perception is sound.

The following is a model of this:

[A subject → an object-appearance] ← [an object]

This model means that the external substance along with other factors causes the appearance, and the subject is directly aware of the appearance in his or her mind. The model above is true if and only if there are facts making the model true. For example, the fact can be, for instance, that the existence of the tree with energy inputs causes Mrs. Smith's having a sense-datum or an appearance of it in her mind. But the existence of the external tree is not sufficient reason for Smith's internal picture of the tree. (2.1, pp. 28−33) Her own qualities, mind and consciousness, the whole sensory system, affect perceptual experience. She might directly be aware of a sense-datum or a substance-like, mind-dependent appearance and have *indirect* information about the tree based on the sense-datum's phenomenon.

If S perceives x and this x is the internal idea caused by the external entity, then this x is not identical to the external entity. They have different properties and spatial locations. (See 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, pp. 181−191)

A model in general is conceptual formation that may refer to particular contingent instances and aspects of the external world[19]. My model—subject-appearance-object—follows from the more general proposition "A subject has connection with an object":

a subject THE CONNECTION an object

perception

interaction

action

speech

exchange, etc.

The explication is now completely in the relationships between concepts. We do not consider what the natures of subject and object are or whether the real entities corresponding with these concepts exist. It is relating a concept with parallel concepts. Nonetheless, when being aware of these entities, of speech and action, it seems that they arise from outside of the mind. This fact is immediate for my introspection: I hear voices that seem to come from the external world. In chapter six (pp. 51−56), the passive and active aspects of the perception will be distinguished. Philosophical theories of perception explicate the nature of the object of perception, but cognitive science's theories of perception are about perceiving. Cognitive science distinguishes perceiving from mere sensing: first, sensory data arise from

[19] According to Professor emeritus Mikael Leiman, *theories* are semiotic formations that refer to aspects of the material world: they do not mirror the reality and they are not representations. However, abstract terms cannot refer to the material world, and every theory includes terms that are not empirical, such as 'necessity' and 'relation'. He presented his views on theoretical research and theories in a workshop at University of Helsinki in 2010. The workshop was organized by the National Doctoral Program of Psychology in Finland. PowerPoint slides are in the author's possession.

the stimulus and, second, selective attention is carried out (McLeod, 2007; Neisser, 1976). The *passive receiving* of feeling physical pressure or the brightening morning towards which we are directed occurs in the perceiver. After receiving, perceiving is active processing (sizing up what appears). If the brain is the cause of the perceiving, then the perceiver *can* directly be aware of the inner object, of the feeling or the brightening, in his or her mind. The mind is not filled with substances. (Chapter 1.1.2, pp. 20−21) It is not an impossible idea that the perceiver's properties affect the objects of perception in the sense that the *objects* of perception are not identical to features the external world has. I do not assume the model to be true, but give evidence, reasons, and justification for it; the model may also prove to be misleading.

Perceptual experience has causes. We have evidence of our awareness (somehow our senses have a role in producing visual, auditory, tactile, flavor, odor, and thermal perception). If a cause of perception is the brain, the immediate object of perception might be identical to a brain state or caused by the brain. If the brain constructs a representation, it represents the external world and its states, or so we believe, and not the brain in itself. The representation refers to something, it is *of* something, of a tree or of a woman, something outside the brain. The question is now about if *the perceiver's structure* or *the perceiver's way to be somewhere* alter the perceptual experience and its objects produced by the causal chain in the sense that the perceiver has an indirect and reproduced substance-like panorama about the external world. What does the causal chain cause? Does it cause the perceptual experience? However, philosophers like H. P. Grice seem ignorant of such questions. They do not refer to the brain when analyzing the relationship between perception and its object.

H. P. Grice uses a causal explanation in his *The Causal Theory of Perception* in 1961. For him, the meaning of "perceive" is that "I am perceiving M", which is equivalent to "I am having (or sensing) a sense-datum which is caused by M" (Grice, 1961: 122). As a consequence, says Grice, the causal theory of perception has been assumed to involve the proposition "The material objects are unobservable" (Grice, 1961: 121). The notion of perceiving a material object can be reconstructed by some concept more appropriate to an ideal or scientific language: for Searle, this would be a task for a philosopher of perception (Grice,

1961: 121–2). Grice does not consider cognitive science, but rather one possible interpretation of Locke: an object would, in certain standard conditions, cause an observer to have certain sorts of ideas or impressions (Grice, 1961: 122).

Although perceiving would involve having or sensing a sense-datum, Grice says that giving a satisfactory explanation of the meaning of the technical term 'sense-datum' is the primary difficulty (Grice, 1961: 123). Grice suggests that the expression 'sense-datum' can (and should) be defined by reference to such standard locutions as 'So-and-so looks Φ (e.g., blue) to me', 'I seem to see something Φ', and so on (Grice, 1961: 123). Let us then consider the expressions 'looks', 'seems', etc. Grice asks whether the sentence "It looks indigestible to me" should change into the sense-datum sentence "I am having an indigestible visual sense-datum" (Grice, 1961: 124).

Grice's equivalence is "I am perceiving M if and only if I am having (or sensing) a sense-datum which is caused by M" (under Salmon's criteria, this M cannot cause a sense-datum, see pp. 28−30). This claim does not provide evidence for the idea that the direct object of perception is M. It is possible that I am *indirectly* perceiving M because of my sensing of a sense-datum. X's sense-impression should be causally dependent on some state of affairs assuming that M is a condition of X perceives M. However, did Grice say that X perceives M directly or not? Grice firstly enquires whether the condition is necessary. He says that the suggested condition is necessary. Although the existence of a clock on the shelf is required for it to be true to say that X sees a clock on the shelf, this does not seem to be enough for Grice. There may be some method by which an expert could make it look to X as if there were a clock on the shelf on occasions when the shelf was empty. Or it might be, describes Grice, that it looked to me as if there were a certain sort of pillar in a certain direction at a certain distance, and there might actually be such a pillar in that place. But, Grice continues, let us suppose that there was a mirror interposed between myself and the pillar, and this mirror reflected a numerically different though similar pillar. It would then certainly be incorrect to say that I saw the first pillar, and correct to say that I saw the second. (Grice, 1961: 142) The condition therefore seems to be necessary, but it can hardly be sufficient.

The causal chain might alter the perceiver's internal states so that the perceiver has an indirect and reproduced sense-datum about M, about the clock, or about the pillar. Grice did not say much about how causation affects perceptual experience.

Grice suggests that the best procedure for the causal theorist is to indicate the mode of causal connection by examples. He suggests saying that for an object to be perceived by X, it is sufficient that it should be causally involved in the generation of some sense-impression by X in a way in which, for example, when I look at my hand in good lighting, my hand is causally responsible for its looking to me as if there were a hand before me. (Grice, 1961: 143)[20] Grice's claim indicates his thought to be that an object is *directly* perceived by X (but I am not certain that this is his thought). Nonetheless, Grice seems to consider the object alone as sufficient condition for perceptual experience although he also refers to "the effect of the presence of an object upon the observer's sense-organ and nervous system" (Grice, 1961: 121–122).

Finally, he examines whether the causal theory of perception implies material objects as being unobservable. If we do not directly observe material objects, then we can infer their existence from our internal states. Therefore, the causal theory of perception implies that the existence of particular material objects can only be objects of inference: "perceptual consciousness is fundamentally an inference from effect to cause" (Grice, 1961: 146, 147). If appearance is the only guide to reality, the causal theory of perception is then designed to solve this problem; the existence of material objects is a matter of causal inference from the occurrence of the sense-impressions. But Grice claims that such inferences cannot be rationally justified:

"Now a model case of causal inference would be an inference from smoke to fire; the acceptability of such inference involves the possibility of establishing a correlation between occurrences of smoke and occurrences of fire, and this is only possible because there is a way of establishing the occurrence of a fire otherwise than by a causal inference. But there is supposed to be no way of establishing the existence of particular material

[20] I do not believe that the cause of my perception of something is a hand affecting a property of "looking like a hand" in my awareness. My hand can only be a causal factor, not *the* cause of perceptual experience about something being a hand-looking thing in an external environment.

objects except by a causal inference from sense-impressions; so such inferences cannot be rationally justified" (Grice, 1961: 149).

Why is it impossible to establish the occurrence of particular material objects otherwise than by a causal inference? Maybe the smoke-fire model is not analogous to the sense-datum-matter model, and the smoke-fire model should be rejected (Grice, 1961: 149, 151). Nevertheless, Grice concludes that some version of the causal theory of perception may be acceptable:

"(1) It is true that X perceives M if, and only if, some present-tense sense-datum statement is true of X which reports a state of affairs for which M, in a way to be indicated by example, is causally responsible, and (2) a claim on the part of X to perceive M, if it needs to be justified at all, is justified by showing that the existence of M is required if the circumstances reported by certain true sense-datum statements, some of which may be about persons other than X, are to be causally accounted for." (Grice, 1961: 151–2)

What is this "X" in Grice's analysis? I think that a person or a perceiver is also a necessary factor in perceiving an object M. The immediate object dependent upon the properties of the perceiver implies that it directly has an experience of a sense-datum, and thus the perceiver indirectly perceives the object M. That is, if a perceiver does not exist, then an act of perception does not occur. Having a sense-datum of the red shape cannot exist without a person. Although Grice accepted the causal theory of perception, it does not mean that he also accepted the *indirect* perception of the object M. To my mind, this leads to a reconsideration of the relationship between the sense-datum and the external object. Sense-datum cannot be identical with the real thing independent of the mind if sense-datum is identical with the brain processes, or if its existence is dependent upon the perceiver in general. However, a person is not a brain process, or so I reason. Roderick M. Chisholm understood this issue in a similar way.

Grice's justification overlooks the person. It seems to me that this is because he considered a mind-external object M a sufficient, not only necessary, cause for having a sense-datum: "The existence of M is required if the circumstances reported by certain true sense-datum statements are to be causally accounted for". The external entity is not the only necessary factor because a perceiver in which the sense-data occur is just as necessary. A person's

own properties are a necessary factor in having an appearance called "a sense-datum", if admitting the existence of mind-dependent appearances. A person's own properties may really influence the way the person directly perceives the external object M. Chisholm's discussion about the identity theory of appearances and brain processes in his *Theory of Knowledge* underlines the role of a person in formulating the identity theory:

"In formulating the theory, we presuppose that there is such an entity as the person who is being appeared to; the process that the identity theory would identify with a neurological process is, in our particular example, that of Jones' being appeared to redly. What is directly evident to Jones, it will be recalled, is the fact that he is being appeared to redly. The identity theory does not itself imply that Jones is identical with any physical body or with any property, state, or process of any physical body." (Chisholm, 1966: 102)

I could conclude, however, that Grice did not clearly state whether the perception is directly about the material things. If I am sensing a sense-datum caused by M, then am I or am I not directly perceiving M? In any case, there is a causal connection between the perceiver and a real entity that allows her to be able to sense anything at all.

The model (which I presented earlier in this chapter) and the connection form can be understood more generally under the categories of substance, attribute, and relation. This is a substance-attribute [s – A] metaphysics that is suitable for an analysis of the perceptual situation (1.1, pp. 20−21). In section four, we will see that it does not make sense to call the sense-datum or what one immediately senses a substance because doing so may lead to 'the sense-datum fallacy'. It just seems to be a substance-like entity like a picture, but substances belong to the external world. These categories will be used with the concepts *spatiality*, *identity*, and *causality*.

3. The Analysis Framework: Three Categories

Three basic categories are (1) substance, (2) attribute or property, and (3) relation. Using these categories, I will evaluate my model and the connection between the perceiver and the external entity on a more general level. I will evaluate the plausibility of my model by classifying its components. I do so because we must distinguish property from substance. What we experience can be a property of experience, our property, or the property of an external substance. In fact, the things that I perceive seem to be properties: shapes, colors,

sounds, and the like, from which an object emerges into mind. We want to understand *the perceptual situation*: what is in the perceiver, what substance and attribute are, and where a perceptual property is and where it cannot be are important issues. If we discover *where* the immediate object of perception is, we will improve our understanding of what the object of awareness in perception possibly is.

I assume two things: 1) substances belong to the external world and 2) the mind is not filled with substances (1.1, pp. 21). The model presented in last chapter (p. 37) is divided into three parts by these three categories because it presents 1) two relations, 2) two substances, and 3) attributes. In fact, the model presents extra-entities between the perceiver and the external world, and these may prevent direct perception of the external world. For example, perception is an attribute because it is an accident, and an accident is an attribute of a substance. Therefore, perception is an attribute of the perceiver who is a substance. A disposition to activate the senses is also an attribute because it is an attribute of a substance. For example, the disposition of the substance to activate a perceiver's senses is an attribute of the substance because the external substance might be able to change the perceiver's states. Air and light are candidates for such substances.

In a perceptual situation, the model means that:

1) A subject x perceives an object y because x's perception is causally dependent on the existence of y's and x's own properties.

2) An object y is a cause for a subject x's perception about y. However,

3) The existence of y is not sufficient cause for perception about y: if an appearance does not occur within a subject x, neither does a conscious perception. Brain damage, for example, can prevent such perception. Moreover, when I perceive the city of New York, I may actually be perceiving the inner content that is part of my act of perceiving, and not the actual city.

The philosophical problem has dealt with what this object y of perception is. Is it a sense-datum, a mind-dependent appearance, a substance, or a property of the external substance? What is perceived to be and what really is can be different. For example, my angle of vision affects perceptual experience: I perceive the elliptical shape, although the real shape of the

thing I am looking at is round. I am directly aware of the elliptical shape and the whole background in perception, and I may be indirectly aware of the property of the external entity. This immediate shape object is caused by external causes, but the real external substance is not *the* external cause of the immediate shape of perception (it is a physical impossibility, supposing that Salmon's criteria for causation in the objects are sound; see pp. 28−30). The model is at least possibly true and rational, if not empirically confirmed.

In the next chapter, I will specify what substance is.

4. Criteria of Substance

The subject of this chapter is that of how to distinguish substance from other categories. The idea is that events, properties, and relations do not exist without a more fundamental entity. What is in the perceiver cannot be in other things, for example. We will see that the direct object in perception is not necessarily substance, as Hume also argued.

The concept 'substance' is not as strange as it may lead you to believe. We are in the habit of associating predicates with one and the same subject; e.g., speech is associated with Sam and perception with Jill because Sam (not a stone) is speaking and Jill (not a table) perceives. When telling our own life story, we consider it a given that we will talk about ourselves even though our story would be connected to other people; the elimination of ourselves seems to be paradoxical and irrational in spite of the vague meaning of the notion 'self'. Selves are substances. My idea is that events, properties, and relations do not exist without some fundament, without the basis for them. That which is in the perceiver is not located in another thing. In sum, that which is one substance is not another substance. (See also Chapter 3.4, pp. 87−89) The object, or the figure, in immediate perception is not a substance because its existence is dependent upon another entity and because it may be in another substance, i.e., in the perceiver.

Identity despite change has been a condition for substance. A thing's essence remains although it changes. Change, as Bertrand Russell correctly states, implies a subject which preserves its identity while qualities are changing (Russell, 1900: 42). For example, if I am the same person that I was, it implies that my present and past attributes are the predicates of

the same subject (Russell, 1900: 42). Likewise, when one saw someone in the garden a moment ago and now looks at a book, mental states connected with this seeing and looking do not make one think that one is now a different person than the person in the past, a moment ago.

One criterion of a substance is then:

1) A subject of change.

It is obvious that I have an experience of objects that change. The objects in my perception are not unchangeable. Introspection proves that the immediate figure of perception changes without my will, and thus the immediate figure of perception is not a substance. Furthermore, the external entity can be constant, and I can change and manipulate the immediate figure of my perception by myself. For example, I am able to affect my visual field by drinking or abusing some other substance, which changes the content of the visual field. This manipulation does not mean that the *ways* to perceive external entities have changed because there are not many different ways of perception. Nor does it mean that the external entity's ways to appear have changed: *the external entity* would not appear differently. The contents of perceptual experience have changed. The immediate object of perception is not a subject of change because it changes (introspection shows this): the immediate object of perception is not a substance, although the external entity is (1.1, pp. 21)

Substance corresponds with a subject because it is not a predicate as qualities and relations are. That is, substance is an independent entity. This does not mean that a substance is independent of other substances, but it is not an attribute of other substances. We do not, for example, predicate a man to a tiger but perception to a woman, a roof to a building, or *in front of* to an observer and a perceived object. To point a gun is a predicate, not a substance, because pointing a gun at the crowd refers to a person x who has people in his or her sights, and thus pointing a gun is an attribute of the person x. Then we get further details that another person y coerced the person x into pointing a gun. However, no one would connect one person x with another person y such that one person x is another person y's property or attribute (a quality or feature regarded as a characteristic or inherent part of someone).

The second criterion of a substance is then:

2) A substance has attributes but is in itself an attribute of nothing.

If the immediate object of perception is *an effect*, an idea, realized by causes and one cause is an external entity like an external event, the immediate figure of perception is not the external entity. The immediate object of perception is an attribute rather than a substance. The immediate object of perception is attributed to the perceiver, not to the external entity, because the perceiver *has* the immediate object of perception. It is possible, and this is a theoretical assumption, that the immediate object of perception is a relational attribute of two substances, of a perceiver and the external entity. The figure of which I am aware in perception may represent the external entity. It is a copy of the external entity in mind (Neuroscientists think that the brain produces consciousness, which implies consciousness must be in the perceiver, and furthermore, is dependent upon the perceiver, see pp. 28−30 and an argument in p. 181).

I am justified in my conclusion that the immediate object of perception is not a substance, and this is important knowledge. Compare this conclusion with Hume's argument regarding physical substance. PHYSICAL SUBSTANCE is the idea of a physical object as something that exists independently of our experience in its own right. Hume asks how we could have an impression of such a thing. How can experience show us that something exists independently of experience? I see my desk; a few moments later, I see it again. If my two experiences are of one and the same desk, then the desk existed when I was not looking at it. But I cannot know that my two experiences are of one and the same desk; I can only know that the two experiences are very similar. In coming up with the idea of physical substance that exists independently of my experiences, I have confused similarity with identity. According to Hume, the origin of the idea of identity—and with it, the idea of something that exists between and independent of perceptions—is the imagination. In creating the idea of identity, imagination works with the ideas of similarity and unity (the idea of an individual thing, being ‘one’), both of which can derive from experience. In sum, what I perceive is not a substance that exists independently of my experiences. (Hume, 1969: I.IV.II; Lacewing, 2010: 13–14)

Next, I will analyze how the category of substance differs from those of attributes and relations.

5. Comparison of Substance to Categories of Attribute and Relation

Attributes and relations do not meet the criteria of substance mentioned in the previous chapter: 1) a subject of change and 2) an attribute of nothing. In this chapter, I am going to focus on the relationship between the perceiver's experience and the external entity.

Perceptual experience is a cognitive phenomenon related to the senses. It is always someone's perception, and thus it is an attribute of the more fundamental entity. If the best explanation for perceptual experience is the brain and perceptual experience is representing, then the representing content of perceptual experience might be within the perceiver. The content of which I am directly aware represents an external fact.[21] Nonetheless, the perceiver's identity remains even though the contents change. Thus, perceptual experience is not a substance, but an attribute or a relation. Attributes do not meet the two above-mentioned conditions of substance:

1) Attributes of a substance can change.

2) Attributes can be predicated to other entities, like a sense of 'attribute' implies.

3) Therefore, attributes are not substances although both are entities.

However, is the object of perceptual experience an attribute? If it is an attribute, is it the property of the external entity or a property of the perceiver? Let us consider a taste of sweetness. From the first-person point of view, it is directly evident that I have the experience of sweetness. The immediate object of my perception is then a taste of sweetness. Our question is now: Is sugar sweet or not? Does sugar have the quality "sweetness" that I am able to immediately perceive? Is the immediate sweetness of perception attributed to sugar or to the perceiver? Is a taste of sweetness part of a psychological act? If the immediate

[21] See for example Ned Block, 1998.

objects of perception are psychological, as is a phenomenal content or character, they are neither the external entities nor the attributes of them. Sugar has no psychological properties. If a taste of sweetness has its physiological foundation in the perceiver, then it cannot be the attribute of sugar (see Chapter 3.4, pp. 87−89). Sugar, on the other hand, may reflect light and be $C_{12}H_{22}O_{11}$. However, the immediate sweetness of perception (that is, the sweetness sensation) does not have the properties "reflecting light" and "being $C_{12}H_{22}O_{11}$". I taste sugar sweet only when I feel sugar in my mouth. Because I experience sweet only if something is in contact with me, the sweetness does not seem to be an attribute of the external entity called "sugar".

Before and *after*, and *distance* and *externality* are temporal and spatial relations. However, they have no corresponding particulars about which we would have a perception; for example, we cannot name an empirical object that is *after* or *externality*. As words, relations are two-place or multi-place predicates; as things, they are non-empirical ideal entities. We do not perceive the externality, but there are x and y and x is external to y; for example, that woman is not in my mind but seems to be external to me. Relations can be attributed to other entities, and that is the reason why they are not substances. I am not the woman's predicate.

Relations as ideal universals do not change. Nevertheless, the relation statements formed from subjects do not maintain their truth values over time; for example, A can be smaller than B in t1, but while growing, A becomes bigger than B in t2, and thus a relation statement 'A is smaller than B' has changed and is now untrue because of the change of a quantity of A in relation to B. Nonetheless, the identities of A and B can endure.

Therefore, it is also clear that relations do not meet the two criteria of substance:

1) Relations between substances or attributes can change when subjects' attributes change.

2) Relations can be attributed to some other entities.

3) Therefore, relations are not substances.

Finally, let us consider the causal theory of perception. The characterization of the concept 'perception' has been analyzed as a two-place predicate. However, this characterization only demonstrates the nature of the notion because the phenomenon 'perception' is not a two-place predicate, but a cognition in human persons or living creatures. Thus, the arising of perceptual experience from external causes is a real event. The brain may be the best explanation of perceptual experience. Secondly, no causal chain of events which produces a perceptual object arises if a perceiving subject and the external entity do not exist. Thirdly, a subject has qualities making perception possible; for example, if one has neither consciousness nor the senses which would respond to a stimulus, then a conscious perception does not occur. My perceptual experience represents myself and other entities at a distance from myself and from each other. If an external entity outside of the perceiver cannot by itself cause perceptual experience—as chapter 2.1 and 2.2 suggest—then the relationship between the perceiver and the external entity (say, the tree) is not immediate.

My model (pp. 37−38) involves two substances: a subject and an object. They are not predicated to each other. If the perceived object disappears, this does not imply that the perceiving subject and the external entity do. On the one hand, if I am Jack, then Jack can be predicated to a self. However, Jack seems not to perceive himself. And if Jack can perceive his body and Jack is his body, it yields the conclusion that a subject and an object are one and the same entity. On the other hand, the immediate object of perception that is the shape implies the immediate parts of the shape of which I am directly aware. These parts of perception appear to me creating a substance-like constitution from which I cannot directly deduce the external entities such as hands or legs (Chapter 1.1, pp. 10−13). The immediate shape of perception would be a quality of the perceiver because perceptual experience is an attribute of the perceiver. I have in my mind a certain yellow shape. The immediate shape object of perception would not be identical to the external substance, but rather to my content of perceptual experience[22]. As a result, my model includes two substances.

[22] Direct realists connect them. They argue that it is open to many observers and that they are the same entity of two notions.

In this chapter, I have analyzed certain categories and their mutual relations. Nevertheless, it is an absolutely different thing whether a theory of perception predicts a future situation where a perceiver will start perceiving something. One function of scientific theories is to predict future phenomena. In chapter six, the passive and active aspects of perception will be distinguished.

6. Activity and Passivity in Perception

Every research endeavor needs a general conception about the research subject. My research about perceptual experience also requires it. What are we talking about when discussing *the phenomenon* called "perceptual experience"? If the researcher has no characterization, no general description of the distinctive nature or features of the research subject, he or she may possibly examine something which is merely similar to it. He or she may also arrive at a false conclusion due to this ambiguous characterization. On the other hand, the fact is that there are many inconsistent characterizations of perceptual experience. Most philosophers, if not all, accept that perceptual experience involves the object to which we attend. We have very good reasons to assume that perceptual experience does not occur without causation. But now we have to concentrate on a question: Does the perceiver's structure alter in some fundamental way his or her perceptual experience caused by the causal chain so that said perceptual experience is not *directly* about the external environment? Or is the perceiver a passive receiver?

Experience and its objects seem to be passive. First, we do nothing in order to have objects of experience, although we are able to change our own mental states. We change our own mental states by closing our eyes, moving our arms close to our eyes, or pinching our own cheek. The perceiver does not create objects of experience by force of will, but receives them. In fact, he or she is not able to change the contents of experience by force of will.[23] In perception, a passive receiver will not change the appearance of a book to that of a cat, even if she or he would want to change it by force of will. Instead of the perceiver causing

[23] Experience may be changed by learning to recognize. Learning to recognize pine trees changes our experience of them (Block, 2014: 3) See Siegel, 2010.

objects of perception, he or she passively receives the external causes from which something will be at the center of attention and he and she possibly recognizes it (it appears so based on my introspection and feelings). In sum, the perceiver is a passive center of the external causes: she or he does not conduce to what appears to the senses and how they have arisen (think, for example, if someone hits you). An assumption is that prior knowledge and past experiences do not influence perceptual experience that has emerged from the brain (provided that the brain produces perceptual experience). Prior knowledge and past experience would not influence the immediate object of perception, but it would influence perceptual reports and present perception. Concept, word, or other theories do not change the immediate object of perceptual experience (Introspection proves this, and I believe that if other perceivers try to change, they will notice that they cannot do so). I am able to use whatever word I wish about the object of which I am directly aware, and I can predicate whatever attributes I want to *the word*. However, the object does not change by changing the word "table" to "pineapple" or the word "oval" to "meowing". The objects of experience exist independent of language use and the perceiver's will, but they do not occur without the perceiver. The problem of perception does not arise from language.

So, the perceiver is a passive receiver in some sense. Passivity does not however imply the direct perceptual experience of the external environment. For example, a human being's and some other animals' structure may alter their perceptual experience caused by the causal chain in a way that they have different appearances (conscious representations) about the external environment. Causality might reject identity between the immediate object and the external entity. If the best explanation of perceptual experience is the brain and if perceptual experience is representing, then the perceiver is aware of the inner object in perception. A tree does not appear because the tree is not the cause of the rich content of awareness. What I am aware of in perception is not identical to a tree because early visual perception is highly influenced by contours in ambiguous object-ground view. If the perceiver is not able to separate the contour of a tree from the contours of other objects and the ground, he or she does not see the tree. In order to see the tree, the perceiver must have an experience of features, color, shape, and texture. (Block, 2014: 1−7) An external entity like a tree is unable to rise to perceptual experience (Chapter 2.1, pp. 28−30; If the eyes are damaged, visual

experience does not exist, but external objects would remain. Visual experience is then caused by the perceiver's properties, which is an understanding-based thought).

Second, imagination is more active than perception because imagination requires background knowledge and the memory system[24]. For example, the observer produces the mind-dependent phenomenon of a centaur of which he or she is aware in visualization. Without background knowledge about centaurs, he or she is not able to produce the image of the centaur. There is no instance in perception corresponding with the conscious phenomenon of the centaur because that image is not located in the visual field. In general, nobody claims to see the centaur, although the hallucination is an exception: the person who hallucinates can claim to see a centaur. Imagination depends much more on a person than perception, which is a bottom-up process or a causal process from reality to mind. Perceiving is not imagining.

These two examples suggest:

1) Perception occurs here and now and is dependent on the external world affecting the body.

2) Imagination is more active, includes past experience and future anticipation, and depends on the body of a person.

We can also see differences between perception and imagination from a physiological point of view. Visualization is a cognition, as is perception. Perception requires external stimuli, such as light energy and material substances (this is based on empirical science). Nevertheless, the visualized x and the perceived x may have similar contents, such as the experience of the Statue of Liberty, for example, but they represent the same existing entity: the real Statue of Liberty. Both instances are similar, but the real statue is not like these two instances (see Chapters 6.1−6.3). On the other hand, perception and imagination can be simultaneous and parallel processes: one focusing one's attention on the details of the substance-like figure of perception, which looks like Marilyn Monroe's face, and, at the same time, one imagining how her profile looks. Visualization can then refer to a future situation

[24] In fact, perceptual experience requires the memory. Without memory, the perceiver does not perceive the continuity of a phenomenon. That is, he or she does not perceive the same phenomenon without memory.

about which a statement would be ‘If I were in that place, I would have a perceptual experience of the immediate profile from my perspective’. The concepts of *perception* and *imagination* involve meanings in which the origins of these *internal* phenomena are different. That is, they are the ultimate effects of the different series of events. (I will return to this matter in chapter 6.1, pp. 179–181)

It has traditionally been thought that *a concrete particular* exists in two different ways: (1) as a bare form in mind or (2) as a real substance, i.e., as a material entity in the material reality based on Aristotle's distinction. Substances then belong to the external world, not to the mind. The visualized tree x1 and the existing tree x2 are two distinct entities, although x1 would be about x2. For example, the tree one imagines in one's mind is less real because it has fewer qualities. The imagined tree has no place in the external world because it presents as some kind of form, as a picture of consciousness in one's mind. Therefore, the tree existing in the external world as a material substance has more qualities, and is thus more real than the internal mind-dependent form. From these examples follows a problem:

If the imagined x and the existing x are two essentially different entities, which set is the perceived x included in? Is it the inner object of consciousness, or the outer entity of the external world?

It follows logically from the questions that the perceived x is not included in both categories. By understanding, I assume that the immediate object of perception is not the external entity, although Michael Pendlebury (1992: 9), for example, claims that it is. In perception, the immediate composition of properties appears to me as a substance, not the external somewhat substratum. I would be aware of inner objects because *perceptual processing*, or *interpreting data of experience*, has emerged from many causes, not one (Chapter 2.1). For example, it is possible that a figure-ground stimulus contains features, like colors or texture, which the brain produces (they depend on the brain). The perceiver perceives this F (Block, 2014: 1), and the F represents a property of the external entity[25]. Therefore, the perceived F is not included in the category of the existing x of the external world.

[25] Block does not say that the F represents a property in the environment.

There are both passive and active elements in perception. Although things appear in the senses passively, perceptions are neither pictures arising in the eyes nor tactile sensations in fingers. Perceiving is active, and this claim is based on introspection and our own awareness: we run our sight over the details and properties of a perceiving entity, or so it seems. If I do not want to perceive you, I am able to stop my perception (for example, by turning my back to you). Our basic belief is—as introduced in pp. 9−10—that the fact that I am perceiving something is directly obvious. I do not need another proposition supporting my claim "I am perceiving something". In the same way, it is directly obvious that I am running my eyes over and attending to the object when perceiving. To recognize the entity requires perception of properties (*later* cognition, memories, background knowledge, biases, and emotions will influence perception). We run our eyes or hands over that which is seen or felt and we perceive it. Perceiving is like 'sniffing' or 'measuring' what is present and interpreting it (from my own awareness of what I am doing with my senses). This produces the process-based theory of perception:

For a subject to perceive x is for a subject to process, to spot and interpret x that is present to a subject.

We perceive x when processing, running our eyes over, or attending to the details of the object of experience. It requires having a sensation and interpreting a constituent of the sensation. That is, to process what appears to the senses *necessarily* leads to one having their attention on the object of perception. Because if nothing appears to us, and then we turn our attention on it, we are unable to perceive it. In such a situation, we do not spot or start interpreting any figure. But when interpreting what we see, hear, or touch, we really focus on and perceive some phenomenon p. For example, when the perceiver is reading the text, he or she attends to and runs his or her eyes over the groups of letters, and, therefore, he or she perceives. If the perceiver knows the language of the text, he or she may obtain some information from it by means of perception. (Neisser, 1976) In sum, if one processes what is seen or heard, one does not fail to perceive. This data processing is *not* preconditioned by concepts because other animals are able to perceive or process what is given to their senses.

There is no one universally accepted characterization of “perception”, but rather there is a great deal of various views which are inconsistent with each other. Furthermore, because there are various views on perception, we do not exactly know what perception is and how it occurs (and this thought has nothing do with radical skepticism). And because we do not know what conscious perception is, we do not know what that thing we are aware of in perception is. We do not know the nature of the immediate object of perception. At least perception has been characterized as ‘information pick up’ by Gibson (1966 and 1979), ‘information processing’ by Neisser (1976), ‘hypothesis forming’ by Gregory (1980), ‘belief forming’ by Armstrong (1961), ‘becoming aware of something which is given’ by Husserl (1913/1931), ‘empirical consciousness of appearances’ by Kant (1787), and ‘being aware of bodily things through the senses’ by Descartes (1647/1996, the second meditation). Sensation, however, is a subjective sensory experience. According to cognitive science, it is perception without interpretation (McLeod, 2007; 152. Psychlopedia. “Sensation & Perception.”).

In this research, I understand perception as follows:

Perception is characterized by empirical data processing. For example, I measure and interpret the observation object I spot by means of my senses.

If perception is the processing of a sensible object, sensation is having a sensible object without actively processing it. Sensation temporally precedes perception. For example, a flash of light at 1 second is just a visual sensation arising from the activation of vision. If the activation of vision does not occur, neither does visual perception. The perceiver has an experience of the flash of light at 1 second, but this occurs on the basis of the sensation of its features because there is no time for thinking. Not having a sensation of Marilyn Monroe's face implies not perceiving an image of Marilyn Monroe's face. Perception requires sensation, although they are not the same phenomenon.

It would be good to take note of the theoretical assumptions that have emerged:

1) Perception is more active than just having a conscious appearance of something.

2) Damage to perception prevents one from perceiving even though the external entity still exists.

Prior knowledge and past perceptions may affect *present perception* about x. This means, for example, that if one has never perceived Marilyn Monroe, one does not recognize Marilyn Monroe's face on the picture. A person does not perceive Marilyn Monroe in the picture. It is possible that one does not even perceive the face because of face-blindness. The passive object of perception appears, but the perceiver does not recognize the intentional object based on prior knowledge or past perceptions.

Perceiving as spotting something sensible and processing the given sensible thing cannot occur without the perceiver's properties. The causal chain of events from the external environment to conscious perceptual experience may alter and distort perception. For example, visual perception seems to refer to some part of my body and my eyes: the content of my visual field originates in my eyes. My visual field is very narrow, and I can reason that the external environment must be much wider (or then the world is very strange). The traditional philosophical theories of perception do not give much consideration to the roles of the perceiver and the environment in perceptual experience (although direct realists acknowledge the existence of the external environment and its objects, some of them, like Alva Noë [2004] and Shaun Gallagher [2005, 2014], do not care much about the traditional problems of philosophy: they know their bodies and other physical and neural things absolutely).

To discover the nature of perception is a challenge. If the best explanation of perceptual experience is the brain, perceptual experience might be representing. If it is representing, this leads to the conclusion "Perceptual experience is indirectly linked to the external world". Representation implies indirectness. The content of perceptual experience would represent an external entity. Some features of the content, like sounds, blue sky, sweetness, and the like, may not be in the external environment. Right now, our only facts are: I am perceiving something, and perceptual experience does not occur without causation. I realize that my characterization of 'perception' does not immediately solve the research problem in favor of my theory, which I will argue for in sections six and seven. Perceptual experience

does not reveal *the nature* of the object: is this nature internal or external, mental or physical, or non-physical and non-mental?

Next, I will demonstrate how *perception* has been an argument for dualism and proof of indirect connection with the external world. Textual evidence shows that *perception* has not been clearly explained by earlier pre-analytic philosophers.

3. THE IMMEDIATE OBJECT OF PERCEPTION IS AN INTERNAL ENTITY

1. The Pre-analytic Philosophy

1. Dualism

In this chapter, I only strive to present some dualist *examples*. These examples argue that what we perceive is not the external world, but appearance. In Western philosophy, it has often been thought that the world of perception is not the real world, and that perceptual knowledge is of the flow of ideas. This argumentation is based on a superficial view of perception because many great philosophers have not said much about perception as such.

The first point is that, here, I understand 'dualism' as a view that we do not directly perceive the real external world, but a mental copy of it in our mind. Therefore, according to dualism, there would be two different entities: the mind-independent external world and the mind-dependent internal realm of the mind. *Critical realism,* or in other words *epistemological dualism,* is the belief that the object "out there" and the idea "in the mind" are two entirely different things. We have all sorts of erroneous beliefs about the world because our ability to perceive the world is inadequate for the task. One believes that the immediate objects of perceptual experience depict external entities in a way that allows one to infer the existence of the corresponding “external” entities from such experience. The second point is 1) that the external entities are not the immediate objects of perception and 2) knowledge about the external world is always indirect. Dualism accepts these two theses. These 1) and 2) should be distinguished from one another. In pre-analytic philosophy and dualism, *perception* is a justification for the idea that one does not directly perceive the external world due to the distortion of the senses. Our ability to perceive the world is inadequate and fallible:

1. Under different circumstances and conditions of the observer, the immediate perceptual objects appear to be different.
2. Therefore, what is perceived to be and what really is are not the same.

Perception does not give us an adequate picture of the external world due to the ontological difference between reality and appearance, between the internal consciousness and the external world, which the brain and its states do not disprove.

Plato claimed that perception of the world is distorted. Perception could not reveal the external world as it is. The most famous example is Plato's great cave allegory, according to which a human being's determined position is to perceive changed phenomena of the senses that he or she tends to believe is the real world. For Plato, they are shadows of the real things:

"The visible realm should be likened to the prison dwelling, and the light of the fire inside it to the power of the sun." (Plato, 1997:1135, Book VII 517b)

Plato means that

"Sight may be present in the eyes, and the one who has it may try to use it, and colors may be present in things, but unless a third kind of thing is present, which is naturally adapted for this purpose, you know that sight will see nothing, and the colors will remain unseen. What kind of thing do you mean? I mean what you call light." (Plato, 1997:1128, Book VI 507e)

This "light" does not show us the real things, but their copies: the shadows of the real things on the cave wall. These "shadows" are sense-data in a perceptual situation.

The antique skeptics formed the distinction between the realm of the senses and the real external world. They argue that it is wrong to assert that the appearances of the senses are reality. For example, what I perceive to be and what really is are different. A round table appears to me, but I appear to perceive an elliptical shape. I directly have an experience of

features. A round table is not elliptical. The object of perception, an elliptical shape, is dependent on my position. Sextus Empiricus considers his own perception, not the concept 'perception':

'For, as we stated above, we do not reject the things that lead us involuntarily to assent in accord with a passively received *phantasia*, and these are appearances. And when we question whether the external object is such as it appears, we grant that it does appear, and we are not raising a question about the appearance but rather about what is said about the appearance...'. (Sextus Empiricus, 1996: 91–92)

And he continues:

'Thus nobody, I think, disputes about whether the external object appears this way or that, but rather about whether it is such as it appears to be.' (Sextus Empiricus, 1996: 92)

The latter quotation might be interpreted to mean that Sextus Empiricus assumes that the external object appears. That the external object appears, however, does mean that the external object is like the appearance given immediately in perception. The external object can appear, but it is not what appears to me.

In his philosophy of perception, Thomas Aquinas differentiated between mental appearances and real things. He criticized the skeptics, saying that we would perceive appearances of external things, not the real things of the external world, trees, birds, or buildings. We perceive them *via appearances*:

'[What we see is not the images in our eyes, but the things they image.] In the same way, what we know is not the abstracted species in our mind. If we did, all science would be about ideas, not about real things outside the mind; and (as some ancient philosophers wrongly thought) all appearances would be true. Rather the abstracted species is the means by which we know what we know. Just as the form that makes a natural thing externally active reproduces itself in an effect (heat producing heat), so the form that makes a thing interiorly active represents its object. By the image in the eye we see the thing it represents; and by the abstracted species imaging things in the mind we understand the things it images.' (Aquinas, 1989: 134)

In fact, Aquinas argues that (1) the external things affect our particular images and (2) we perceive the external things through the images. However, we do not perceive the images or the appearances as the Greek philosophers Plato and Sextus Empiricus claimed earlier.

Therefore, Aquinas' view seems to be that one sees the sun because the sun causes their seeing of it via the image of the sun. His proposition must be based on reasoning and understanding rather than perception in itself. (Aquinas, 1989: 3, 41, 109, 122, 131–138, 201)

In contrast to Aquinas, René Descartes argues in his "Meditations" that we cannot decide now, *on grounds of perception,* whether we have an experience of the real things outside us or of mental entities within us:

'As I think about this more carefully, I see plainly that there are never any sure signs by means of which being awake can be distinguished from being asleep.' (Descartes, 1647/1996: 12)

He should also see that there are no signs by means of which to demonstrate that the objects of sense are really external. He does not seem to consider the possibility that we would not even discover these perceptual objects while being awake: we do not certainly discover by means of the senses whether an object of perception is an inner object or a mind-independent material entity. Descartes argues that "They [corporeal things] may not all exist in a way that exactly corresponds with my sensory grasp of them, for in many cases the grasp of the senses is very obscure and confused" (Descartes, 1647/1996: 55). Here, his judgment refers to understanding rather than to sense perception.

The attitude of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz well describes the view of many classical philosophers:

"For, at bottom, all our experience assures us of only two things, namely, that there is a connection among our appearances which provides us the means to predict future appearances with success, and that this connection must have a constant cause. But it does not strictly follow from all this that matter or bodies exist, but only that there is something that presents well-sequenced appearances to us. For if an invisible power took pleasure in giving us dreams that are well connected with our preceding life and in conformity among themselves, could we distinguish them from realities before having been awakened? And what prevents the course of our life from being a long well-ordered dream, a dream from which we could be awakened in a moment." (Leibniz, 1675: 3–4)

The problem is that it is only in his or her thoughts and imagination that the subject is able to compare these two realities of his or her own mind and the external world. By imagining,

she or he realizes that what occurs inside the mind and what occurs in the external world are two distinct things. For example, one can easily realize that the tree of imagination is dependent upon one's mind but that the existence of the real tree is not. Perception is therefore a process in which it[26] produces a distorted copy from the external causes. According to David Hume, we do not know the existence of the external entities, but impressions (Hume, 1739-1740/1969: 116). Furthermore, we do not know the causes which affect our impressions (Hume, 1739-1740/1969: 116).

What are then the *reasons* for philosophers' claim that *perception* is directed towards mind-dependent appearances? Dualism as a concept involves both the human internal life and the external world. According to dualists, *one reason* is that the perceiver does not *directly* perceive the external world, even though the perceiver's judgments inform them about it. For example, the judgment "I perceive the sun" indicates the object of the external world, the sun. However, the perceiver cannot justify the claim "I perceive the sun" by perception: I perceive the sun because I perceive. This inference is a circle in proving fallacy. Locke and many later empiricists have claimed that in perceiving an object the external entity causes a sense-datum to our minds, and this sensory idea is the thing of which we are aware in perception. Furthermore, *the second reason* is that if the *causality* is associated with the perceptual experience and the external world, then the external world is the cause of perception of the external world. However, this consequence is too simple, as we have seen in chapters 2.1 and 2.2. Perceptual experience is dependent on a human person's own qualities and perceptual circumstances. Dualism includes a claim that appearances can hide the real nature of the external world and their entities. This interpretation has found some support in philosophers' theories because *they associate appearances with senses or objects of perception*. They do conceive of the causal connection between the external entity and an idea, and that is why they do not accept this thesis:

[26] I tend to claim that this 'it' must be the brain which produces consciousness and conscious perceptions. This claim's probability is high, I believe. The causal chain of events from the external environment to conscious perceptual experience may alter and distort perception. However, I cannot observe this chain from the first-person point of view and I have no machine which reveals the difference, similarity, or identity between the external environment and the conscious perceptual states. See pp. 35, 36−9, 47, 52.

If the external substance does not cause its appearance, the mind causes its own perceptions.[27]

By reasoning and *thinking* when they perceive, they have arrived at the conclusion that the external entity causes our perception of it. If dualists are correct, dualism or representative realism implies indirectness and an ontological difference between the external world and mental phenomena. Because substances belong to the external world, the perceptual appearance is not a substance (Chapter 1.1, pp. 21). Furthermore, a person cannot perceive the causal connection between an external entity and the idea (this is an obvious fact). One thing is certain: the external entity, a tree for instance, is not *the* cause of perceptual experience. The brain and physical energy such as light or pressure are more probable causes. The external entity is only one passive cause in the causal chain from the external environment to the conscious state.[28] We cannot add identity to the different causes in a transitive relation (causation is a transitive relation). If A causes B and B causes C and C causes D, then A is also one cause of D, but D is not identical with B or A in the perceptual situation (see Chapter 2.1, pp. 28–30).

The third reason might be that the intentional object towards which we are directed is part of the psychological act. What the perceiver perceives is a part of experience. The immediate object of perception would be in the mind. This theory suggests that the intentional object *is not identical with* the real external entity. Next to the real, physical entity, which is perceived, remembered, thought of, etc., we have an internal, intentional object towards which the act is actually directed. (Chapter 1.1, pp. 21, 2.4, p. 47) Franz Brentano's intentionality thesis resembles the examples above. On the other hand, he might distinguish between the act and the intentional object, and say that the existence of the latter does not depend on our being directed towards it. (Huemer, 2014) The immediate object of perception is immanent to the perception, or it is not immanent.

[27] Berkeley argued that God causes ideas that a mind perceives. However, this thought requires the existence of God in the reality, of course.
[28] When comparing different causal possibilities with direct realism, we may wonder why direct realists do not address causation in perception and the possible implications thereof.

Bertrand Russell in particular advanced the idea of *an object* of perception based on the physiology of the human body. For example, he writes in a letter from 1915:

'..., for I hold strongly that the sense-datum is *not* mental – indeed my whole philosophy of physics rests upon the view that the sense-datum is purely physical. The fact of being datum is mental, but a particular which is a datum is not logically dependent upon being a datum. A particular which is a datum does, however, appear to be causally dependent upon sense-organs and nerves and brain.' (Russell, 1915/1986: 88)

It is not certain whether Russell believed that he could directly see his own head, for example. If he accepted that we have acquaintance with sense-data, as we will see in the next chapter, then he should not have believed so.

Many classic philosophers' descriptions of *perception* are ambiguous, which weakens the reliability of their arguments: their meaning of 'perception' is unclear. If we do not exactly know the nature of perceptual experience, how do we know what *that* is that we perceive? Can we or can we not directly obtain information of the external world by perceiving? Russell, for example, *thought* and *reasoned* that a sense-datum is something physical due to its dependence on the observer's physiology. He did not *perceive* physicality of colors or sounds. He inferred the physical nature of sense-data.

It has been claimed that the two worlds theory, or dualism, yields external world skepticism, although this does not seem to be what the antique skeptics had in mind; the antique skeptics did not deny that the external world appears. No philosophers have claimed that we sense nothing. We know perceiving things, although the perceived things would not be in the absolute reality independent of experience and reason. But if we are perceiving sense-data, then this phenomenon would prevent us from perceiving the entities located in the external environment. This is the subject of the next chapter.

2. Russell and Moore on the Nature of a Sense-datum

This chapter concerns what sense-data are in Russell's and Moore's philosophy and how they argued for the existence of sense-data. I especially concentrate on what Russell meant when he said "Matter is a logical construction of sense-data". It can be a dualistic idea. I will also examine Russell's method of "scientific philosophy" and its utility in philosophical

studies. The sense-datum theory of perception is intimately linked to the causal theory of perception and the first-person point of view. External entities cause internal sense-data in our minds. The perceiver would then experience the appearance of the external substance. These internal mind-dependent sense-data stand like a veil, as intermediaries, between external entities and the conscious subjects. As described by Frank Jackson, I perceive external things by throwing a veil over them by means of my senses. Jackson then asks what these colored expanses can be other than mental sense-data that I directly perceive. It is the veil I perceive. (Jackson, 1992: 446) Colors, sounds, and shapes produced in our minds by external mind-independent light, air, trees, and sense-organs hide these outer entities in the external world.

In 1902, in a posthumously published paper, Russell asserted that psychical states have position in space. He argues for the idea "If particular psychical states, then, are to be associated with particular bits of matter in some causal or quasi-causal manner, it follows that psychical states have some connection with positions in space" (Russell, 1902: 544). If psychical states have connection with positions in space, then they must have places in space, I would argue. The place of subjective states is in the perceiver (Russell, 1902: 545, 546, 547, 548). According to Russell, it is difficult to conceive of any reason to regard two exactly simultaneous thoughts as being two thoughts except for a difference in spatial position (Russell, 1902: 548).

Russell[29] argues that *truth* does not lie in the correspondence of our claims with facts, but in the fact itself. For example, if we conceive *that sense-data exist*, and *sense-data are facts*, we conceive incorrectly: the fact is sense-data's existence. (Russell, 1905: 492) If "Object of perception is a sense-datum" is true, there must a fact in reality. However, said Russell, we cannot define a thing as true because we do not know the difference between a thing's having a property 'corresponding with reality' and not having it. (Russell, 1905: 494) My belief *that there are sense-data* has an object. The object of my belief is the proposition "There are sense-data". It is this thing, the object or the fact, to which Russell ascribed truth or falsehood. (Russell, 1905: 494) If I say "My idea of 'There are sense-data'", it is not my

[29] Here, Russell did not consider sense-data, but other examples.

idea of the sense-data that must be considered, but the sense-data themselves (Russell, 1905: 494). I am not certain that there is a fact of sense-data's existence, if they are internal mind-dependent entities. However, *my belief* or *my claim* about whether or not I am perceiving sense-data is not a research subject, but a question of *what* I am perceiving when I am perceiving, for example, a sound.

Russell considered sense-data as *physical* subjective *particulars* (Russell, 1914: 8, 10), which are similar to substances since they never appear as *predicates* or *relations* in propositions[30] (Russell, 1911a: 133). In 1911, he argued that sense-data exist only when they are perceived. Therefore, the physical world is *not* identical with the sensible world, and we believe there is a physical world only for inductive reasons. (Russell, 1911a: 133, 136; 1912, 83; 1913: 187, 188) Russell's inference that sense-data are subjective "in so far as their existence depends partly on us" (Russell, 1911a: 136; 1913: 187, 188) is correct only if there are sense-data. It is correct because the external entities do not depend on us. (See also Chapter 3.4, pp. 87−89)

In his *Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description*, Russell presented the cognitive relation 'acquaintance'. He said that I am acquainted with an object when I have a direct cognitive relation to that object, i.e., when I am directly aware of the object itself. (Russell, 1911b: 148; 1913: 184) Concerning the issue of subject, he argued that "I prefer the word acquaintance, because it emphasizes the need of the subject which is acquainted" (Russell, 1911b: 148). Russell gave the examples of a color or a noise: When I see a color or hear a noise, I have a direct acquaintance with the color or the noise (Russell, 1911b: 148, 149; 1913: 184). Sense-data are the direct sensible objects and particular existents (Russell, 1911b: 149). However, physical external objects (as opposed to sense-data) and other people's minds are not included among the objects with which we are acquainted (Russell, 1911b: 151). I am not aware of the relation *difference* or *resemblance* between sense-data and physical things. One problem is that of how I discover that the object of perception that I have a direct acquaintance with *is* an inner mind-dependent appearance and *is not* an external physical entity. Russell's principle expresses that "whenever a relation

[30] Compare Russell's analysis with my three categories on pages 43−50.

of supposing or judging occurs, the terms to which the supposing or judging mind related by the relation of supposing or judging must be terms with which the mind in question is acquainted" (Russell; 1911b: 155). For example, I am aware of or acquainted with a noise in perceiving and making a judgment about the noise. I must know what it is that I am making my judgment about. But do I discover *that* that noise is an internal mind-dependent entity? Russell might answer that I have descriptive knowledge of a substance, of matter, when I spot (become aware by introspection) that it is the object having some property or properties with which I am acquainted. However, the object before me is a sense-datum. I am not aware of whether the object has the property "inner" and "mind-dependent", or "outer" and "mind-independent". (Russell, 1911b: 161)

For Russell, sense-data are not mental due to their dependence on the sense organs, nerves, and the brain:

"I regard sense-data as not mental, and as being, in fact, part of the actual subject-matter of physics. There are arguments, shortly to be examined, for their subjectivity, but these arguments seem to me only to prove physiological subjectivity, i.e. causal dependence on the sense organs, nerves, and brain. The appearance which a thing presents to us is causally dependent upon these, in exactly the same way as it is dependent upon intervening fog or smoke or coloured glass". (Russell, 1914: 7)

Moreover, remember his letter from 1915:

'..., for I hold strongly that the sense-datum is not mental – indeed my whole philosophy of physics rests upon the view that the sense-datum is purely physical. The fact of being datum is mental, but a particular which is a datum is not logically dependent upon being a datum. A particular which is a datum does, however, appear to be causally dependent upon sense-organs and nerves and brain.' (Russell, 1915/1986: 88)

I realize that this dependence involves the distinction between sense-data and the external entities because the external entities cannot depend on the brain (Chapters 1.1, pp. 21, 2.4, pp. 45−47). Russell's version of causation differs from that of Grice because Grice argued for sensing a sense-datum caused by a material thing. However, I do not claim the absence of the external entities in the causal chain in Russell's understanding, although the external entities are not dependent on the brain. (See about this in chapters 2.1, pp. 28−29, and 2.2, pp. 35−37)

According to Russell, belief in external things is a speculative hypothesis. In other words, one has the experience of entities that Russell called 'sense-data'. He used the name ‘particular’ for them. (Russell, 1914: 5, 6, 7, 8, 9)

“When I speak of a 'sense-datum', I do not mean the whole of what is given in sense at one time. I mean rather such a part of the whole as might be singled out by attention: particular patches of colour, particular noises, and so on” (Russell, 1914: 6).

More exactly, he meant as follows:

“Logically a sense-datum is an object, a particular of which the subject is aware” (Russell, 1914: 9).

One *infers* from sense-data to the external material world (if there is any), although most people believe in describing the external material world with words (Russell, 1912: 80, 83; 1914: 5, 6). However, Russell did suggest the identification of appearances with the real thing on grounds of economy or the principle of Occam’s razor: “We should identify the thing with the class of its appearances” (Russell, 1914: 9, 10, 11). From the first-person point of view, the interesting point is a belief, which is not Russell’s, that *the room* is the appearance, but *other people* in the room are not: “If a man were to sit down between two others, the appearance which the room would present to him…” (Russell, 1914: 10). I consider the two others to also be appearances from the first-person point of view. Moreover, a man is the appearance to two others from their own points of view because the whole room with other people is the appearance.[31] It is contradictory to claim that I am directly aware of another person in perception, but am not directly aware of the red shape next to her. The red shape looks to be a table. Both are sense-data which I am aware of. From this fact that it is directly obvious I am aware of something I cannot deductively infer that facts of the external world are directly obvious or evident to me in a similar way. (Chapter 1.1, pp 10−13)

These sensible entities may be causally related to the external material entities. Here is Russell's example:

[31] In fact, in 1912, Russell knew well that other observers can only be inferred from our sense-data. See Russell, 1912: 86.

"… the moon, as the astronomer means it, is a piece of matter, whereas the sense-data by which he comes to know about the moon are not matter." (Russell, 1912: 83)

He saw the appearance of a thing and a material entity as distinct entities: that is, as being connected with each other, he saw the object as *corresponding* to the sense-datum, but *not as identical* (Russell, 1912: 83, 92, 93; 1913: 187, 188). Colors, noises, touches, odors, and tastes that we see, hear, feel, smell, and taste are natural signs that inform us and refer to mind-independent entities:

"Tables and chairs, though they may not be exactly what is given in sight, are, we feel sure, *something*, and something which is still there when we shut our eyes. It is therefore possible to suggest, with Meinong, that it is known à priori that sense-data are signs of things other than themselves, whose *esse* is not *percipi*. (Russell, 1912: 92, 93)

Russell's view might be that the conscious sense-data and material bodies are located in the same actual reality, though they are distinct entities. Russell wrote in his posthumously published work as follows:

"All the knowledge we possess as to what exists rests upon two kinds of foundations: (1) immediate acquaintance, which assures us of the existence of thoughts and feelings and sense-data, both those which we have at the moment and those which we remember; (2) general principles, according to which the existence of one thing can be inferred from that of another." (Russell, 1912: 80)

Russell described the immediate acquaintance as follows:

"When I see a colour or hear a noise, I have direct acquaintance with the colour or the noise." (Russell, 1911: 148–9)

He continued in the same way:

"In the first place, our sense-data are only known to exist while our sensations last. The colour which I see when I look at an object is not known to be still then when I shut my eyes." (Russell, 1912: 85)

Russell continued that matter cannot simply be identified with sense-data because sense-data apparently change in ways which *we must attribute to ourselves* rather than to the object (Russell, 1912: 85, 86). For Russell, the object of presentation, that is, the object of sensible presentation or sense-datum, *is* what it is, "and there is an end of the matter" (Russell, 1913: 186). Russell's words indicate that sense-data are not identical to external entities. Because I am perceiving a sense-datum, the immediate object of perception is not identical to the external entity in Russell's theory.

The methods that Russell used are obviously reasoning and introspection. These methods can be easily recognized in the first chapter of *The Problems of Philosophy*. Russell used the argument from illusion and perceptual relativity to argue for the distinction between internal sense-data and material external things. (Russell: 1912: 1−6)

Russell's most important evidence for the existence of sense-data is a causal dependence. Sense-data are physical particulars located within a perceiver who is immediately acquainted with them. But why did Russell claim matter to be a logical construction of sense-data, and didn't he infer material entities, tables and trees, from sense-data? Why did Russell change from the inferential to the constructional approach (the inference from objects of sense to external things, which direct realists think unnecessary)?

Russell's supreme maxim in scientific philosophizing is this: "Wherever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities" (Russell, 1914: 11).[32] However, what is a logical construction? It is a function, an incomplete symbol like 'x + 2', which substitutes constructions for the supposed inferred entities. For example, inferred entities are *matter*, material things, and *time*, and supposed external entities are constructed from acquainted entities, like a color or a noise. Russell's description of this method is the following:

"Given a set of propositions nominally dealing with the supposed inferred entities, we observe the properties which are required of the supposed entities in order to make these propositions true. By dint of a little logical

[32] Many previous studies about Russell's view of logical constructions did not clearly attain the function of constructions in Russell's theory of sense-data. See for example Wisdom, 1931; Irvine, 1999; Grayling, 2003; Nasim, 2012; Linsky, 2013, 2014. I think that the most useful study is Jager, 1972.

ingenuity, we then construct some logical function of less hypothetical entities which has the requisite properties. This constructed function we substitute for the supposed inferred entities, and thereby obtain a new and less doubtful interpretation of the body of propositions in question." (Russell, 1914: 12)

This method gives us two different sets of propositions: the body of propositions in question, and the propositions of the constructed function. Russell's one example is the appearance of sense-data (less hypothetical entities) as functions of physical substances (the supposed external entities): When such-and-such waves impinge upon the eyes, we see such-and-such colors, and so on (Russell, 1914: 5). Russell's view indicates the distinction and non-identity between substances in the external world and data of sense in awareness (Chapters 1.1, pp. 21, 2.4, p. 47).

The logical construction seems to be some kind of "empirical acquaintance claim" in which one "descriptive" concept, e.g., "such-and-such waves", is suitable. This concept is in a logical connection with another concept. However, this other concept does not make the logical construction true. The empirical or acquainted concept "such-and-such color" is the truth-maker of the logical construction. These descriptive concepts are confusing and unclear. It is clear that Russell did not consider these two types of concepts identical. They are not interchangeable *salva veritate*. For example, the perceiver is in acquainted-relation to the sense-datum red color because he or she is immediately aware of the red color. According to Russell, this color sense-datum is dependent on the perceiver's sense-organs and brain. However, the perceiver is not in acquainted-relation to light waves and, furthermore, light waves are not dependent on the perceiver's properties. Therefore, the perceiver is not immediately aware of light waves if we follow Russell's distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. For some philosophers, Russell's view has meant that if material entities can be reduced to sense-data, then material entities can be constructed out of sense-data. Otherwise, we must know the existence of material entities by indirect inference. (See for example, Steen, Irem Kurstal: *Russell on Matter and Our Knowledge of the External World*, 2004; Chapter 1.1, pp. 10−13) For Russell, sense-data, e.g., certain patches of color or sounds, must have some kind of correlation with physical things, e.g., with molecules having no color or atoms making no noise. These correlated

entities must be constantly found together. However, according to Russell, only the perceiving entity, i.e., the sense-datum, is ever found. (Russell, 1917: 108) The controversial question is whether this found entity is known to be certain, infallible, or non-inferential in Russell's thought. It seems to me that sense-data are non-inferential for Russell because the perceiver is immediately aware of them, i.e., acquainted with sense-data. Russell argued that matter "must have some kind of correlation with sense-data, and must be verifiable through their correlation alone" (Russell, 1917: 108). Based on these examples, I would claim that acquaintance, dependence, and correlation imply the distinction between material entities and sense-data in Russell's theory of logical construction. Russell did not claim that the perceiver is acquainted with a material entity, and this entity can depend on his or her properties (trees are not in his or her mind). Moreover, Russell would never say that correlation implies one entity. This interpretation leads to the claim that Russell believed the external world not to be the direct object of perception. (Chapter 2.2, pp. 35−36, 38)

Russell did not use singular statements, but general statements in a hypothesis of logical constructions. As I mentioned above, his methodological principle, for example, was in the general form in his writing *The Relation of Sense-data to Physics*: "Wherever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities" (Russell, 1914: 11). Russell's idea started from a recognition. Many concepts are unclear and puzzling:

"The most important part, to my mind, consists in criticizing and clarifying notions which are apt to be regarded as fundamental and accepted uncritically. As instances I might mention: mind, matter, consciousness, knowledge, experience, causality, will, time. I believe all these notions to be inexact and approximate, essentially infected with vagueness, incapable of forming part of any exact science." (Russell, 1924: 147–148)

These concepts must be constructed from concepts that are not vague. I understand that the "clear" concepts, or most of them, are empirical: one is immediately aware of their referents.

According to Russell, the logical construction for all members of the *known* entity is true if a statement of the *unknown* entity is true. They are not equivalent, and the unknown entity cannot be substituted for logical constructions. Constructions are *fictions* as entities, and *incomplete symbols* as phrases. The *inferred* entities are matter and other minds, *constructions* are functions and incomplete symbols like the function 'x + 2', and *less hypothetical*

entities are sense-data. Matter as an inferred entity is similar to those entities whose existence is given to the senses through inference (Russell, 1914: 12). Russell states that "the method which substitutes constructions for inferences would exhibit matter wholly in terms of sense-data" (Russell, 1914: 12). That is, the sense-data of a single person. Let us consider an example. One thing should not be inferred from another. Rather, one should define one thing as another thing by constructing it logically from another thing, like a material tree from sense-data or the time course from events. For example, matter is constructed in terms of sense-data, not in terms of the inferred matter of sense-data. The existence of matter does not remain in doubt, according to Russell. (Russell, 1914: 11) However, to my mind, it is not justified to add *the identity* between properties of matter and sense-data because the appearance of the material thing can be altered whereas the material things remain constant. It is not only the way one senses that changes, but also the substance-like object of sense which one senses directly. The external substances do not change in this case. The identity cannot be added if atoms or molecules have no colors and some sense-data are certain patches of color caused by the perceiver's properties (Russell, 1917: 108).

Matter is *not* the class of its appearances. The following statement *must* be based on Russell's *reasoning*:

"The appearance of a thing in a given perspective is a function of the matter composing the thing and of the intervening matter. The appearance of a thing is altered by intervening smoke or mist, by blue spectacles or by alterations in the sense-organs or nerves of the percipient". (Russell, 1914: 17)

This reasoning really means that identity does not occur between the appearance and a thing (Russell, 1914: 20, 21, 22). There are causal connections between them. Dreams, illusions, and hallucinations lack these causal connections. The lack of causal connections is a reason why dreams, illusions, and hallucinations differ from normal sense-data. (Russell, 1914: 24, 25, 26) Can we then conclude that Russell thought that what we directly perceive is the sense-datum or the appearance? I think that we can answer 'Yes' to that question (Russell, 1912: 21, 30, 46; Miah, 2006: 87).

Before moving on to G. E. Moore's theory of sense-data, I would like to say one thing about Russell's method. I do not believe that Russell's method of "scientific philosophy" leads to

knowledge of the ultimate nature of reality. Russell does not know the nature of matter, time, or other minds by means of the construction of the sensible properties of the acquainted particulars. However, it was probably not his aim to discover the real nature of matter, time, or other minds, but to discover means by which to know the existence of these entities or what they are. The nature of matter, time, or other minds cannot be known by thinking. This is analogous with the fact that, based solely on thinking, you could never know that the characters 'H2O' and 'water' refer to the same thing. Maybe it is reasonable to say that Russell's aim was to discover knowledge of the external world and material objects, other minds, one's own body, or abstract objects. Do we even have knowledge of the existence of these entities? Are they real, or are they the products of mind? The question is whether we have *direct* knowledge of water or other physical phenomena at all *by perceptual experience*. Therefore, the goal of philosophers is not to explain the nature and structure of physical phenomena (See Chapter 1.1, pp. 10−13, where, for example, Chisholm argued that physical entities are not directly evident).

In his *Sense-data* in *Some Main Problems of Philosophy,* G. E. Moore (1953: 28) examined whether we know of the existence of material objects *by means of the senses*: "the knowledge which we have, for instance, by seeing and feeling, as when we feel an object over with our hands." He referred to only one sense, the sense of sight: "I shall use what happens when we *see,* as an illustration of what happens in sense-perception generally" (Moore, 1953: 29). By *'seeing'* he meant the mental occurrence—the act of consciousness—which occurs (as is supposed) as a consequence or accompaniment of these bodily processes:

> "This mental occurrence, which I call 'seeing', is known to us in a much more simple and direct way, than are the complicated physiological processes which go on in our eyes and nerves and brains. A man cannot directly observe the minute processes which go on in his own eyes and nerves and brain when he sees; but all of us who are not blind can directly observe this mental occurrence, which we mean by seeing." (Moore, 1953: 29)

Moore proposed holding up an envelope and asked us to consider what it is that happens when we see it. We all saw that envelope, we all saw it, the same envelope. He concluded

that “We all saw the same object.” It was at some *one* definite place in space. (Moore, 1953: 30). However, he continued:

“But now, what happened to each of us, when we saw that envelope? I will begin by describing part of what happened to me. I saw a patch of a particular whitish colour, having a certain size, and a certain shape, a shape with rather sharp angles or corners and bounded by fairly straight lines. These things: this patch of a whitish colour, and its size and shape I did actually see.” (Moore, 1953: 30)

He called 'a sense-datum', color, size, and shape, as “these things, the colour and size and shape, sense-data things given or presented by the senses—given, in this case, by my sense of sight.” (Moore, 1953: 30) In particular, Moore stated that “What I certainly did have is the experience which consisted in my seeing the colour and the patch” (Moore, 1953: 31). Nevertheless, he conceived that some sense-data is really on the surface of the material thing and that his seeing is in another place, somewhere within his body. (Moore, 1953: 31) The sense-data and my seeing of them are two different entities. More generally, he claimed something about the seeing of sense-data “if I want a term which will apply equally to all the senses, I shall speak of the direct apprehension of sense-data” (Moore, 1953: 32). In fact, considering what happened to him when we all saw the same envelope, he seems to know that he saw certain sense-data. You also saw *similar* sense-data, although we did not see *the same sense-data*. (Moore, 1953: 32) However, according to Moore, we saw *the same envelope*:

“That you did all see the same envelope, would, indeed, be accepted in ordinary life as a certainty of the strongest kind. Had you all seen me commit a murder, as clearly as you all saw this envelope, your evidence would be accepted by any jury as sufficient to hang me.” (Moore, 1953: 33)

However, this fact, if it is a fact, is not proof that the envelope and the sense-data are actually identical (Moore, 1953: 33). Moore’s judgment is not philosophical, but similar to laymen’s beliefs: we should accept what we see. *This knowledge is based on reason*. But the same problem appears with Moore as with Grice: what is the relationship between the sense-datum and the envelope? If I have direct apprehension of the sense-datum, then this fact may indicate that I indirectly see the envelope. Our direct seeing of sense-data implies the

indirect seeing of the same envelope. (Compare with Chapters 1.1, pp. 10−13, 21, 2.2, pp. 35−38, 2.4, p. 47) From the first-person point of view, I cannot directly observe the physiological processes which go on in my eyes, nerves, and brain. However, it is not clear that Moore thought that "a man cannot directly see the external entity outside of his or her body". In fact, it seems that the indirect seeing of the external entity is maintained in Moore's view.

Moore did *not* consider *sense-data* part of *mind-independent material* things (and this is very important), which would be a one object theory. According to him, sense-data are *inner* objects of some sort being something quite different from the material things. (Moore, 1953: 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 43, 45, 48, 50, 51) The sense-data exist only in the mind of the person who apprehends them (Moore, 1953: 43, 44, 45, 48, 49, 50). Moore described, for example, as follows:

"The seeing of a material object—or the perceiving one by any other sense—would therefore, on this view, be something quite different from the seeing of sense-data. The seeing of sense-data consists in directly apprehending them. But the seeing of a material object does not consist in directly apprehending it. It consists, partly in directly apprehending certain sense-data, but partly also in knowing, besides and at the same time, that there exists something other than these sense-data." (Moore, 1953: 51)

I say only one thing about Moore's inference: the direct inference of mind-independent material things from sense-data is not sound (Chapter 1.1, pp. 10−13).

In his paper *The Status of Sense-Data* with G. F Stout, Moore (1913: 368, 369) interestingly thought the same way as Russell regarding the nature of sense-data[33]. For Moore, all sensibles, in spite of the great differences between them, have some common intrinsic property which we recognize, but which is unanalyzable. This intrinsic property is 'sensory'. He first considered how the sensibles are related to our minds. He distinguishes sense-data that we actually experience from sense-data that we remember or think of:

[33] Here also, Moore (1913: 357) used 'sensibles' in place of 'sense-data'.

"I shall express this relation, which I certainly do have to a sensible when I actually see or hear it, and most certainly do not have to it, when I only think of or remember it, by saying that there is in my mind a *direct apprehension* of it" (Moore, 1913: 360).

In fact, Moore thought *this relation* to be that "in which sensibles of all sorts do sometimes stand to our minds, is the relation constituted by the fact that we directly apprehend them" (Moore, 1913: 363). We then directly apprehend the sense-data, but not the external entities. If perceiving the external material object, we must first directly apprehend the sense-data, Moore may argue here.

The foundation of sense-data is the brain, and this implies that they have their spatial location within the perceiver. However, Moore (1913: 368, 369; 1953: 29) did not suggest "that the existence of sensibles [sense-data] always depends upon the condition of our nervous system". He argued that

"according as the condition of the nervous system changes, different sensibles are experienced, even where other conditions are the same. But obviously the fact that our experience of a given sensible depends upon the condition of our nervous system does not directly show that the existence of the sensible experienced always also so depends." (Moore, 1913: 369)

His example is that the fact *I am now experiencing a black sense-datum* is different from the fact *this black sense-datum now exists*. These facts do not involve a reason to claim that the former fact would not have occurred if my nervous system had been in a different condition. Furthermore, if my nervous system had been in a different condition, this has no tendency to show that the latter fact would not have occurred either. (Moore, 1913: 369) In addition to the fact that we experience sensibles, Moore thought that there may be other reasons to believe that the very existence of the sensibles which we experience *always* depends upon the condition of our nervous systems. However, he seemed to consider this while being certain that thought constitutes no such reason. (Moore, 1913: 369) Moore's argument above is, I believe, "Because the appearances, or the sense-data or the sensibles, can be changed by the conditions of the observer while the material substances in the external environment simultaneously remain constant, it follows that our experiences are of the

appearances". What is certain is that the external material substances never depend upon the condition of one's nervous systems. The mind-independent substance is not mind-dependent. (Chapters 1.1, pp. 21, 2.4, p. 47) Moore may admit that the perceiver's structure alters his or her perceptual experience (caused by the causal chain) in some fundamental way if "according as the condition of the nervous system changes, different sensibles are experienced…" (Moore, 1913: 369). Perceptual experience does not directly present the external environment. (Chapter 2.6, pp. 51−52, 54−56)

It is a contradiction to think that an object in front of me may be mind-dependent, and a person next to me is not. We perceive everything directly or indirectly. If we claim again that something is open to most observers in perception, it does not refute the former claim. The presence of other people is not proof that the perceiver is immediately aware of mind-independent entities. Moore would perceive other persons as sense-data, and, furthermore, these assumed persons directly perceive or apprehend nothing but sense-data (if there is anyone, although Moore took other minds for granted: they have perceptual experiences similar to ours). The concept "the external world" includes all other people, events, and physical things (Chapter 1.1, p. 21−23). Moore seems to think that we really perceive the other people whom we ask what we immediately perceive (Moore, 1913: 363, 364, 365, 367, 369, 372, 373, 380; 1953: 30, 32, 33, 34, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46). I cannot say that I see the person next to me as she really is in reality, but I indirectly see the table as sense-data. Here is an example of this way of thinking:

"We must, for instance, suppose that the sensibles which I should see now, if I were at the other end of the room, or if I were looking under the table, exist at this moment, though they are not being experienced. And similarly we must suppose that the sensibles which you would see, if you were in the position in which I am now, exist at this moment, in spite of the fact that they may be more or less different from those which I see, owing to the different constitution of your bodies." (Moore, 1913: 367)

And moreover,

"But what I think it does follow from is the fact that another person may be seeing the upper side of the coin in exactly the same sense in which I am seeing it, and yet his sensible be certainly different from mine. From

this it follows absolutely that the upper side of the coin cannot be identical with both sensibles, since they are not identical with one another. (Moore, 1913: 372)

In addition, in his 1953 theory,

"We know of others again, which we ourselves have never perceived by our senses and cannot therefore remember, by the testimony of other persons who have perceived them by their senses" (Moore, 1953: 28).

And

"These philosophers would not deny, indeed, that there may still be in the Universe a patch of colour exactly like that which I saw. For instance, some one else might at this moment be seeing a patch of colour exactly like it. But this other patch of colour, though exactly like, they would say, is certainly not the same: they may be exactly the same in quality, but they are not numerically the same." (Moore, 1953: 40)

This kind of thinking is incorrect. When seeing another person, Moore did not intend to directly apprehend a visual sensible. However, it is obvious that Moore *in 1913* did not hold a sensible to be identical with a physical thing: "And the natural view to take as to the status of sensibles generally, relatively to physical objects, would be that none of them, whether experienced or not, were ever in the same place as any physical object" (Moore, 1913: 379). In other words, if A and B are not in the same place simultaneously, then A and B are not identical. For example, the right thumb is not in the same place as the left thumb, or so I experience, and, therefore, the right thumb is not the left thumb. Moreover, if the visual sense-datum is within the observer and the physical substance is outside of the observer, then they are not numerically identical. As Moore says, "none of them were ever in the same place". If the sense-datum or the qualia exists, it is a mystery why it would be outside of the perceiver, in another person, in the sky, or in the trees, as Crane, Martin, and Tye fancifully believe. The sense-datum or the qualia is the perceiver's property because it occurs within him or her. (Smith, 2013: 16−17; Chapters 2.2, pp. 35−38, 2.5, pp. 47−48, 50, 3.4, pp. 87−89, 5.3, pp. 143−144) My empirical judgments are always about the objects of sense or about "the sensory sensibles", and therefore my perception would be indirect, even though something is open to most observers in perception and we have something to share.

Russell's and Moore's sense-datum theories of perception are consistent with radical empiricism. To my mind, one and the same substance causes similar sense-data to different perceivers. The present yellow-butterfly-sense-datum is independent of past ones. Furthermore, a person's background knowledge and bias do not influence the present empirical sense-datum. Therefore, the present perceptual sense-datum is about an external entity, and the interpretation "a yellow butterfly" is about the content of the sense-datum:

The interpretation of the sense-datum → a sense-datum of the object → the object.

This model would clearly indicate that a *direct* description or interpretation of the external object, such as a yellow butterfly, is impossible. It is always *indirect* and *mediated*. "The external world" is a mere hypothesis. For Russell and Moore, "the external world" is the best hypothesis to explain the course of perceptual experience.

I would like to summarize a little what Russell and Moore have claimed of sense-data thus far. Russell and Moore do *not* seem to argue that sense-datum I am directly aware of represents either an external entity or some property F inhering in the external entity. According to Russell and Moore, the existence of sense-data is dependent upon the brain and the sense-organs (which is plausible), but the external entities outside of the perceiver are not. In Russell's case, we have to remember that he spoke about the correlation between external entities and sense-data. Moreover, according to Russell, we only have acquaintance-relation with sense-data. We are not, thus, acquainted with external entities like tables and trees. This might mean that, for Russell, the 'logical construction' is not identity but, and this is uncertain, correspondence. In my opinion, the causal explanation in Russell's and Moore's theories of perception is worth preserving. Both seem to think that perception is indirect. It is problematic, however, that they call sense-datum a particular or a thing that has properties. We will see why in section four.

3. Some Contemporary Views on Sense-data

Contemporary philosophy of perception does not produce much in the way of new ideas about the nature of sense-data. It has been more productive of criticism against sense-datum

theorists. The phenomenal principle created by Howard Robinson (1994) has some explanatory power regarding sense-data. I shortly present why the phenomenal principle is founded and what it does *not* imply.

The phenomenal principle states when it seems to one that something has a quality, F, then there is something of which one is aware which does have this quality (French and Walters, 2015: 6). Howard Robinson put it like this: "If there sensibly appears to a subject to be something which possesses a particular sensible quality then there is something of which the subject is aware which does possess that sensible quality" (Robinson, 1994: 32). The perceiver can doubt whether something that has a quality, F, is the real thing, a dream, or an illusion, but he or she cannot doubt whether or not there is something. Introspection demonstrates that there is something of which she or he is aware. It is directly obvious or evident, as Chisholm said (Chapter 1.1, pp. 1−3, 5, 10−13). I am directly acquainted with the actual instance of greenness, loudness, or hardness, for instance. The problem is that of whether I am directly acquainted with the sense-datum that is green, or with the real lawn outside of me *in perception* (in illusion and in hallucination, one is aware of an F thing, but the ordinary object supposedly being perceived is not F, and therefore, the F thing and the ordinary object are non-identical [Crane and French, 2015]). The phenomenal principle summarizes Russell's and Moore's ideas of sense-data, but different theories of perception do not justify interpretations of what there is of which the subject is aware *in perception*. (Crane and French, 2015)

Indirect realism is a sense-datum theory of perception. However, sense-datum does not necessarily *represent* an external entity of the external world. This change in the meaning of 'sense-datum' is obvious when compared with its traditional meaning, although a sense-datum theory of perception is not necessarily *representational*. (Jackson, 1977; Jackson, 1992: 445−448; Jackson, 2000; Macpherson, 2014) According to the sense-datum theory of perception, a sense-datum is a thing that bears sensible qualities of which one is directly aware. The character of experience, such as the appearance of greenness, is dependent upon the sense-datum. Because, in perceptual experience, the perceiver is directly aware of non-ordinary sense-data, the sense-datum theory of perception is indirect realism and therefore

representative. Being directly aware of non-ordinary sense-data implies indirect awareness, but *not* openness of ordinary mind-independent objects to a subject. (Crane and French, 2015) The most important thing to keep in mind now is that the characters of experience have always been thought to be in consciousness (or in the brain) (Smith, 2013: 13−17). The existence of the character of a mental state consists of a certain form of inner awareness, i.e., introspection of that character, which has posed a challenge to reductive materialism and functionalism in theory of mind, *not* in theory of perception (Smith, 2013: 16).

Contemporary Anglo-American philosophers, such as Bermúdez (2000), Casullo (1987), Chrucky (1992), Firth (1958), Garcia-Carpintero (2001), Hilbert (2004), O'Shaughnessy (2003), and Smythies (2003), do not produce much of anything new about the nature of sense-data. To introspect or to take an internal look at what occurs when having an experience involves the awareness of some sort of internal object in one's mind. The sense-datum is this internal object immediately perceived. (Smith & Jones, 1986: 87; Casullo, 1987: 46; Firth, 1958: 434, 436–9; Garcia-Carpintero, 2001: 18, 22, 23; Hilbert, 2004: 186; Smythies, 2003: 48, 49) Hearing a sound involves being aware of something other than a bird's song; it is being aware of some internal sense-datum. One is immediately aware of *this* internal object in perception. Every claim uttered by a person *always* deals with an internal object within that person's mind. On the other hand, Bermúdez insists that a sense-datum is part of the facing surface of physical objects. He often focuses on the immediate object of *visual* perception. (Bermúdez, 2000: 353) One issue is that of whether this internal "object" is an individual thing, a property, or an event (Chapters 2.4 and 2.5). Another issue is that of whether the sense-datum is really perceived. The phenomenal principle does not entail the sense-datum of perception: it does not reveal the *nature* of the directly perceived object.

Mental images can be examples of sense-data. If I recall the city of Glasgow, I am immediately aware of images within my mind occurring after I recall them. As with sense-data, they are what they are, and they cannot be untrue. If they are said to represent some external matters of fact, they may be untrue. (Macpherson, 2014: 382, 385−6) Thus, the external matter of fact is not as a sense-datum presents it to be. The image thing and the external matter of fact object are non-identical. In perception, there is something that is open to

many, but this openness does not refute the existence of sense-data. Perceptual experience appears to be openness to the external world, but perceptual experience does not demonstrate that this is really so. Leibniz realized this: "There is no exact demonstration the objects of sense are external" (Russell, 1900: 72).

A justification for the existence of sense-data does not only seem to be illusion-based, but also brain-based, as Russell and Moore assumed (Chisholm, 1966: 91–2, 99–101; 1995: 29, 36–38; Smythies, 2003: 48−50). A yellow dot sense-datum is dependent upon the brain process. I would say that the brain causes a yellow dot sense-datum (on the condition that sense-data exist). Nonetheless, brain based sense-datum implies the distinction of a sense-datum from the external thing outside the brain. The color phenomenal character of experience caused by the brain and located in the perceiver *cannot be* on the surface of the real butterfly in the external world. The color caused by the brain *is not identical to* a property of the real butterfly if the perceiver *represents* the color as a property of the butterfly. This conclusion is true on grounds of causality. (Chapters 2.1, pp. 28−30, 2.2, pp. 35−39, 2.5, p. 48, 50, 2.6, pp. 51−52, 54−57)

Russell and Moore assumed the existence of sense-data. And introspection shows that there are internal objects of which only I am aware. However, the internal objects and their relation to external entities are open to doubt.

4. Internal Entities: What Are They?[34]

It is important to be clear about what we mean when we talk about experience or perceptual experience. It is not easy to say exactly what experience is, to point to it and say, "this is experience". We are conscious and just have experiences (Strawson, 2016). In this chapter, I will demonstrate that there are sound justifications in support of Russell's and Moore's theories of the existence of sense-data. Nevertheless, the existence of data of sense and phenomenal character require causal chains of events (Chapter 2.2, pp. 35−36) which so many contemporary philosophers of mind, such as Martin, Crane, and Tye, do not address.

[34] I examine the relationship of empirical knowledge to experience in Suojanen, 2014. Its basic claim is that if empirical knowledge is based on experience, then the phenomenon 'experience' must exist.

When we add causality to the relationships between mind and body *and* between the perceiver and the external world, we will see that identity problems follow.

I understand internal entities to be things such as 1) mind, soul, and consciousness, 2) perception, thought, and understanding, and 3) mind-dependent sense-data like colors, shapes, sounds, mental pictures, hallucination and illusion, dreams, odors, tastes, and touches. If internal entities exist, they must be dependent on a subject who possesses them. (Chapters 2.4, pp. 45−46, 2.5, p. 48) Many believe in the existence of mental entities. Next, I want to examine what kind of entities experience and objects of experience are. Human persons have experiences, and they reveal objects.

We rely on scientific claims because of their basis in experience. A claim for the existence of experiences may follow from a claim that a complete account of the physiology of human persons omits their subjective experiences and phenomenal properties (qualia). These entities cannot be explained via a physical account of brain structure or brain function. That consciousness seems to have properties of its own is an introspection-based claim. (Nagel, 1974; Jackson, 1986; Smith, 2013: 14−17) The argument for the existence of phenomenal properties of experience may be presented as follows.

1) I directly know phenomenal entities which appear in experiencing them.
2) I do not directly know material processes.
3) Knowledge is not a material process.
4) Therefore, based on Leibniz's law, to know phenomenal entities which appear in experiencing them is not a material process (from 1, 2, 3). (This may be a masked man fallacy, even though the 3rd premise is true. The premises are true, but the conclusion is untrue if phenomenal entities are material processes and I do not know this fact. On the other hand, if the cause of phenomenal entities is material processes, then they are not identical, and the conclusion is true.)

What I discover is the existence of these phenomenal properties in my mind by means of introspection (Chapter 1.1, pp. 1−3, 5, 10−13). That is, I have true beliefs about the flow of thoughts and about the flow of sensations, both of which are subjective experiences. It is essential to notice one thing. If the brain causes acts and states of consciousness, subjective experiences, and the phenomenal characters of subjective experiences, then the brain does

not exclude the human person's internal world (Chapters 2.1, pp. 28−30, 3.1.1, pp. 58−61, 3.2, pp. 65−66, 67−68, 70−73, 77, 3.3, pp. 80−82). My conscious experience reveals my own private lived objects by living through them and by interpreting them from the inside. They are not uncaused.

Experience and experienced objects are in causal connection. A counter-factual analysis shows this. If a person has never dived or gone to the theater, he or she has no diving or theater experiences. However, different persons can have different experiences about the same action. In fact, the different experiences are based on interaction with the environment. Therefore, if this assumption is true, experiences are not only the products of brain processes. Experiences have social and cultural conditions. An experience of homelessness, injustice, or racism does not arise without states of affairs, unless experience is delusional thinking (can experience indicate one's point of view that an environment has a certain feature, such that it is racist, biased, unfair, and the like?)

Every experience is dependent on the subject who feels it. An experience in particular cannot exist without a subject, but the subject can exist without a certain experience. For example, if an experience E does not exist, it does not follow that there is not a subject S. For example, Jack feels no headache now, but the absence of a headache does not yield the absence of Jack. However, Jack's headache implies the existence of a subject who feels that headache, and that subject is necessarily Jack. That is, Jane cannot have Jack's headache because they are two distinct persons, a woman and a man: the same experience cannot move from one subject to another. Nevertheless, it is possible to give some sort of characterization of experience: it is an internal feeling of something happening to the subject, i.e., an internal awareness of some immediate entity within the subject. For example, when one feels warm in the sunshine, it seems as if the sun is the cause of feeling the warmth and the cause of the visual content 'sun-experience' in one's mind. Because we have experience of sunshine, we believe the claims "The sun exists" and "The sun is a light source". However, the immediate feeling 'warmth' and the light figure in perception occur in the perceiver. The sun is not a psychological phenomenon. The feeling and the figure appear from my internal perspective because they are the products of the brain, according to neuroscience.

The examples above suggest that the data of sense, the phenomenal characters of experience, do not exist without the experience and the subject who experiences. The conscious experience as a caused phenomenon implies the indirectness of the external environment (Chapters 1.1, pp. 10−13, 2.1, pp. 28−30, 2.2, pp. 35−38, 2.6, pp. 51−52, 54−57, 3.2, pp. 65−66, 67−68, 70−74, 77, 3.3, 80−82).

We can individuate an experience by mentioning its modality and content. Senses like vision or hearing are modalities of perceptual experience; the content of experience is the object of awareness that is experienced, such as, for example, a visual experience (modality) of the sun (content) (Dancy & Sosa, 1992: 125–127; Leon, 1987). But that individuation is very loose because it is a *type* of mental state: it must be *someone's* vision about the sun, *Jack's* or *Jill's*, and thus it would become a *particular* mental state. In sum, content requires the experience and the owner of the experience.

Flows of visual sensations, pains, and thoughts exist. One objection to this statement is that they do not exist because they are nothing but material processes. Both judgments cannot be true. If a human body is studied and only physiological events are discovered in it, it can be stated that there are no subjective (mental) experiences and no objects of such experiences in a living body. Nevertheless, a question arises: what is this finding based on? The finding is justified only by the researchers' flow of sensations. However, it then follows logically that the claim "Experiences and their objects do not exist" is based on the researchers' flow of experiences, which also contradicts their findings. It is a contradiction to make the judgment "There are no subjective experiences and their objects" based on subjective experience. The implication, "Empirical knowledge about the external world grounded on experience necessarily implies the existence of experience", is true. *A researcher's* flow of sensations cannot be *a research subject's* flow of sensations. One person's flow of sensations cannot be another person's brain processes. An internal phenomenon is experienced from the first-person point of view, but it is not an internal phenomenon: something is A and not-A, which is absurd. The conscious experience seems to exist and be caused. If its objects, i.e., data of sense, are caused by the brain as Russell and Moore admitted, then this

factual situation naturally leads to identity problems. What we experience and what the world would be are non-identical. Let us continue on to the nature of experience.

To discover what experiences are and to discover via experiences are two distinct things. Experiences must exist in order to discover via experiences. As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, experience has content and phenomenal properties. For example, the content of the yellow dot-experience is a yellow dot, and one may find it stimulating. It also has a limited duration and changes over time when remaining in sight. We do not give descriptions in material terms. We do not say things like "Part c of my brain is activating", and find that the listener understands what we are talking about. We speak about the contents of our dreams, images, visual sensations, and the like.

Let us now consider two sets of beings. Two contrary properties cannot both be true. It cannot be true that "all S are P" and "all S are non-P." The truth of one of these contrary propositions excludes the truth of the other. For example, no entity is both material and non-material. Some entity could be material and mental, but one cannot call it material because it also is material. Materiality and mentality, however, are not contrary properties because non-materiality is not necessarily the same as mentality. Abstractness and conceptuality are also non-material properties. Mentality and non-mentality are contrary properties, I assume. Furthermore, something is both circular and yellow, but one cannot then call it non-circular because it is circular and it would be a contradiction. Circularity and yellowness are not contrary properties but, for example, being colored and being colorless are, and contrary properties cannot coincide in one and the same subject. Is it then impossible that a substance is both A and non-A (the contrary)? For example, let us say that one set includes non-material entities, and other set material entities. Could we, then, give an example in which one thing yellow dot-experience is both non-material and material? There is an entity present in both sets, and thus these sets would intersect. Therefore, the question "What is a yellow dot-experience?" would produce the answer "A yellow dot-experience is a material entity", which is an identity statement. However, if we form the objection "A yellow dot-experience is a non-material entity", it would be untrue and contradictory because "A material entity is a non-material entity" is untrue and contradictory. Nevertheless, for some philosophers, the

statement “A yellow dot-experience is a material entity” does not seem to be a true identity statement because a yellow dot-experience cannot be described in a materialistic way. The statement “A yellow dot-experience is a non-material entity” would be true—although it is not clear whether Nagel and Jackson would consider said experience entirely *non-material*. (Nagel, 1974; Jackson, 1986; Smith, 2013: 14−17) Therefore, sets of non-material entities and sets of material entities do not intersect. It seems that *experience* and *the content of experience* are *not* both non-material and material because contrary properties cannot coincide in one and the same subject simultaneously. But let us consider double-aspect theory: a thing, a yellow dot-experience is both mental and material. The claim is that a yellow dot-experience either cannot be described in a materialistic way, or it is not material. Because mentality is not non-materiality, a mental-material thing does not imply non-materiality. Therefore, it implies materiality, and thus a yellow dot-experience *can* be described in a materialistic way. This would mean that it is material because it is not both non-material and material: contrary properties cannot coincide in one and the same subject simultaneously. Now we must remember that it is also mental because a yellow dot-experience is both mental and material. According to double-aspect theory, a yellow dot-experience is an example of a thing that is both non-material and material because it is a mental-material thing. However, material and mental are not necessarily contrary properties. A mental-material thing cannot be non-mental and/or non-material because this is the opposite of the mental-material thing. This example does not prove that a yellow dot-experience does not have something that *cannot* be described in a materialistic way. Perhaps Nagel and Jackson are not quite right in claiming experience as completely mental. Experience and the content of experience have mental and mind-dependent characters. This conclusion does not mean that *the persons* cannot have material and mental properties (we now have different things that have properties: experience and a person). If Peter has both material and mental properties, you cannot deny that he has material properties because of mental properties. This conclusion leads us to consider why the immediate object of perception would be both internal *and* external or be dependent on *and* independent of the perceiver who has it (I will consider this question in sections six and seven).

Experience has an interesting role in human knowledge. If we lack experience, we miss some essential part of a phenomenon, and thus we do not know exactly what the phenomenon is. We know more when experiencing (which is a subjective character of experience), argues Frank Jackson (1986). Experience involves the things around us: without experience I would only be aware of myself. It seems clear that knowing is based on having a mental state (Chapter 1.1, pp. 9−10). One knows what a rainbow looks like because one has seen it: one has past visual experiences about rainbows. A video camera is able to record the rainbow effect, but it is not able to focus its attention on something and perceive it *as* a rainbow. In the same way, a camcorder has no ability to experience, nor is it conscious of what is going on in the environment. Experiencing is not recording. Let us think next, for example, about kissing. We can describe kissing when seeing an action that is called "kissing". That is, what a couple is doing is kissing. However, we do not know everything about the kissing action if we have not had our *own* experience about it: if we have never kissed or seen such an action, we do not know what kissing is. Furthermore, to describe what other people are doing or what is going on in another person's body is not possible without experiencing. Knowledge and statement formation about other people's action or another person's bodily events are based on the observer's own subjective states. Hence, to describe what other people are doing or what is going on in another person's body is based on describing the observer's own subjective state. In conclusion, for humans to access what is going on in the external environment requires one's own experience, although humans can live without some source of experience, such as without visual experience. The observer is thus not directly connected to the outside world except through experience (Chapter 2.2, p. 35−37).

Experiences can be distinguished in different ways. Nevertheless, *introspection* is not a very accurate method of interpreting the *nature* of subjective experiences and its contents, but it does reveal them. Nonetheless, to my mind, introspection makes us believe that our internal phenomena have at least some phenomenal characters, such as sentimental or emotional ones. If they do, there is something psychic in the nature. Such experiences have temporal duration. If these characters have a spatial position, they must be located in the perceiver. And if an internal entity, experiencing or a sound phenomenon, is identical to a brain state

or is caused by the brain, it cannot simultaneously be located externally to the perceiver. Experiences are caused, which leads to identity problems.

The entire next section is a critique of the traditional theory of sense-datum. The critique focuses on the sense-datum fallacies. To consider appearance or sense-datum as belonging under the category of substance leads to the sense-datum fallacy. In the section five, I will show how direct realism and eliminative materialism try to refute the existence of internal data of sense between the conscious perceiver and the external world. Finally, in sections six and seven, I will argue for a sense-datum theory: something other than the real thing appears in perception.

4. THE MEANING OF 'APPEARANCE': CRITIQUES AGAINST SENSE-DATA

1. How Can We Discover what the Perceptual Appearance Is?

I start examining *appearance,* which I consider sense-datum or phenomenon, by showing what traditional philosophical theories of perception claim we perceive of in relation to Russell's and Moore' theories of sense-datum. We will see that a common-sense picture about what the man and the woman in the street say that they perceive might be untrue.

Perceptual experience seems to be openness to *something* involving the presentation of that something to the perceiver. Because this something appears when perceiving, we can call it "appearance". (Chapter 1.1, pp. 1−2) Different theories of perceptual experience then interpret and explain the nature of the "appearance", often justifying their accounts with introspection. (Crane and French, 2015; Chapter 1.1, pp. 6−8) The appearance/reality distinction implies that appearance is somehow false. In other words, it is not real. The appearance/reality distinction means that there is the real entity and the phenomenon, a real table and its phenomenon, as dualism or critical realism provides. The perceiver would have the immediate experience of private internal phenomenon. Direct realism denies the two object theory and claims that perceptual experience is openness to the external world. The perceiver perceives the real thing that appears to him or her. Phenomenalism is a theory that reduces real external entities to private internal phenomena. The internal phenomenon is a sense-datum, an appearance, because it is not the real entity independent of the perceiver,

but vice versa. The real external entity is an appearance. The objects experienced are then apparent. However, I would not say that Russell's theory of logical constructions is a phenomenalism because he clearly reasoned that there is correlation between the external entity and sense-data. He did not reduce material things to sense-data, because we are only acquainted with sense-data that depend on our brains and sense-organs. (Chapter 3.2, pp. 65−73) The appearance/reality distinction involves representative realism. We have to be careful now, because 'representation' has been given a meaning that is open to doubt (Crane and French, 2015). Perceptual experience directly represents the external physical world facts for theorists arguing for "openness to the world" and "transparency of experience" like Martin, Tye, and Crane (see Chapters 2.1, p. 30−34, 3.3, p. 80−82, 5.3, pp. 140, 142−146, 5.6, pp. 171−2).

Representative realism is indirect realism. Because the perceiver is directly aware of non-ordinary sense-data, i.e., appearances, in perceptual experience, a sense-datum theory of perception is indirect realism and thus representative. (Chapter 3.3, p. 80−82) I perceive the elliptical mat as having some size with a green surface. However, what I perceive to be and what the entity really is might be different. I understand that the real shape of the external entity is not elliptical and the size of the immediate object in perception is smaller than the external thing really is. The object given in perception must be influenced by my situation and my angle of vision. The shape and size of perception are dependent on my perception of them. They are produced in my mind by my perceptual system, possibly by the external mind-independent mat and the spatial relationship between me and the mat. (Chapter 2.1, pp. 28−30, 2.2, pp. 35−38, 2.6, pp. 51−52, 54−57) This kind of an argument is the consequence of representative realism if the immediate object of perception is an internal object *representing* some sort of external entity in the external world. According to representative realism, the meaning of 'appearance' is 'mental item being between a conscious perceiver and the external world'. This 'mental item' represents the external world. It is a copy of the architype, as the *re*-prefix indicates.

Russell and Moore argued in a way similar to representative realism. However, for them, sense-datum does not seem to be a representation of the real thing in mind, nor or a copy of

the architype. They do not use perception or introspection in order to discover the *nature* of the appearance they are immediately aware of in perception. They use an argument of illusion, perceptual relativity, and causal connections. That is, they use the methods of reason. What is remarkable is the fact that they call sense-datum *a particular thing*. (See Chapter 3.2, pp. 65−68, 70−77)

Are we then not certain that particular things appear when perceiving? For example, the existence of a particular squareness-experience is discovered when one is aware of squareness in vision. One tends to use appearance-phrases on the basis of perceptual experience: when something square is given, we say "Squareness appears to me". Phrases like "it appears that", "it looks like", "it sounds as if", "it feels like", "it tastes like", and "it smells like" are subjective and relative to the perceiver. However, the belief that appearing entities are mind-dependent or mind-independent are not reliable if the belief is the product of introspection. One theory of appearance is the substantival theory of appearance which provides the proposition "A tree's appearance is a substance". The appearance, or the sense-datum, is a thing that bears sensible qualities of which one is directly aware (Chapter 3.3, p. 80−82). There would be two substances, the tree and the appearance of the tree. Sense-datum theory of perception's claim "What the perceiver directly perceives is the sense-datum" yields strange consequences: the external entity and its appearance share common properties. For example, the tree and its sense-datum/appearance have a certain weight.[35] This finding, which dates from before the 1950s, is one piece of evidence against Russell's and Moore's theories of sense-datum, but let us talk of this a little later (Chapter 3.2, pp. 65−68, 70−73, 75−79).

Openness to the world, however, is self-evident for many without the necessary justification. In contrast to Russell's and Moore's positions—what I have heard and seen proves this claim—most people insist that they are directly connected with the material world and its particular things when they perceive. For example, Jill sees the book, or a material mind-independent particular outside her. Nevertheless, according to representative realism and

[35] Maybe it would be better to say that the tree is a substance and its appearances are not substances, but properties which can form a substance-like object or a coherent whole. Moreover, the perceiver is the substance that has these properties.

critical realism, Jill's judgment about what she perceives can be untrue if the existence of the book causes a sense-datum of the book to Jill's mind through her body (Chapters 2.1, pp. 28−30, 2.2, pp. 35−37, 2.6, pp. 51−52, 54−57, 3.4, pp. 83−88). What is present in her perception could be a mind-dependent appearance rather than the mind-independent particular substance. Jill eyes, or measures, the mental item dependent on her mind. Thus, perceptual judgments would be of mind-dependent appearances. The previous examples include the possibility that a common-sense picture about what people claim to perceive can be untrue. If *perceiving an object* is dependent on the circumstances, a perceiver's physiological, and his or her psychological states, the possibility that we do not *directly* perceive the external world then follows. What appears to us are sense-data. This last statement is consistent with the model (Chapter 2.2, pp, 35−37).

We examine the characterization of 'appearance' when asking what the nature of appearance is. More exactly, the characterization of 'appearance' is the necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be an appearance. I am also asking what the appearing property is, such as what the appearing property of redness is when I perceive something to appear to be red. *Is the appearing property of redness identical to a property of the external entity?* Traditionally, Locke and later empiricists have claimed 'appearance' to be a sensory idea or mind-dependent impression that is produced in our minds by external things. A figure immediately experienced, which looks like a tree, exists only as a conscious, intentional, and internal object. The claims of Locke and later empiricists do not show that what appears to us is a thing that bears sensible qualities. Russell's and Moore's examples of appearances indicate that they are properties which do not always form a coherent whole (Chapter 3.2, pp. 65−68, 70−73, 75−79). But when I perceive something, properties appear to me: sounds being heard and an impression of shades of colors being seen. However, to interpret 'appearance' and 'sense-datum' as belonging to the categories 'substance' or 'quality' can mislead us. Would it be more plausible to consider an appearance as an event occurring within a subject? The red figure of appearance *occurs*, or a red figure *appears* in relation to, and within, the subject who perceives it. I will get back to this question later when I present the 'sense-datum fallacy'.

The final question in the previous paragraph is justified because introspection demonstrates that 1) perceiving data of sense has a limited temporal duration (that is, they become into existence, last, and vanish) and 2) perception of data of sense changes over time. If *what* one senses becomes into existence and if *it* changes, this process must be an event-like entity dependent on the subject. Furthermore, this event implies causes that actualize the event in a more fundamental entity: in the subject. We can imagine that external and distinct substances also become into existence and change. However, we do not think that their becoming and change are dependent on us like data of sense are. (See Chapters 1.1, pp. 21, 2.4, p. 47, 3.4, pp. 87−89) Appearances, data of sense which are given in perception, change. The change has its causes. What I will argue is that if the appearances change when the brain states change, then an appearance is not an external entity outside the brain. Therefore, if the appearance is an internal event, it must have causes and occur within another thing. In perceiving, the immediate object appears to the perceiver, and that appearance is an event rather than a substance. The appearance inheres in that other thing. That other thing is a human person or an animal (if there are any) who is aware of appearances. They change and have limited duration. If appearances are dependent upon the brain, they are then caused and cannot be located in the external environment outside the perceiver. (Chapters 2.2, pp. 35−36, 2.4, pp. 45−47, 3.4, pp. 83−88) These findings are obtained by using the method of reason. They are in line with Russell's and Moore's reasoning (Chapter 3.2, pp. 65−68, 70−73, 75−79).

Let us now discuss what introspection does not demonstrate about data of sense. The introspective evidence available to me is not sufficient to justify my belief "A book is blue" because my belief is not the product of reliable cognitive processes. Introspection does not show how appearing data arise from outside the perceiver. According to David Hume, perception is not sufficient to justify my belief about the book, at least not in the sense that my belief concerns the external substance that has a blue feature. Perception is not introspective and may produce a reliable belief about the book. However, this fact does not imply that the act of perceiving is directly about the book, but rather it implies that it is about the impression. (Hume, 1969: I, IV, II) From the methodological point of view, we can describe and interpret the content of experience. However, there is a great deal of different judgments

about the same phenomenon. Hence, introspection is not a reliable method to discover our data of experience (although, above, the different philosophical theories of perception try to argue otherwise). Introspection and perceptual experience reveal the existence of something empirical and possible to sense in spite of the terms we use, such as ‘appearance’, ‘idea’, ‘matter’, and the like. The problem is that of whether the appearing entity is a natural phenomenon located in the external world or a mind-dependent object within the perceiver.

Although the existence of appearance is self-evident since something appears in perception, there are many hypotheses about its nature which are inconsistent with each other. Appearance is 1) a material entity, 2) a sense-datum, a sensory idea, or an impression to which a material entity is reduced, or 3) a mind-dependent sensible object that represents the properties of the external material substance. The first hypothesis of *direct realism* makes us claim that we directly perceive the material entity external to us when perceiving the book. The second hypothesis of *phenomenalism* holds that we perceive the sense-datum or the mind-dependent appearance that exists as some kind of part of perceptual experience, and the material entity is identical with this appearance. For example, analytic phenomenalism means that the concepts relating to material things can be converted into concepts expressing sense-data. They have the same meaning: 'material entity' means 'sensible perceptual datum'. The third hypothesis of *representative realism* assumes that we indirectly perceive the mind-independent material book via the mind-dependent appearance that is a mental representation of the external entity 'book' in mind, and thus we would immediately be aware of mind-dependent representational appearances. These examples suggest that the reference of the concept ‘appearance’ is not known because they cannot all be true. I can conclude two things from the hypotheses: 1) ‘appearance’ is interpreted as ‘substance’ rather than as ‘attribute’ like as ‘appearing’, and 2) for phenomenalism and representative realism, ‘appearance’ is an internal entity, a sense-datum, or an idea in mind. Russell and Moore would accept that the immediate object of perception is an internal item of which one is directly aware: perceiving the object is perceiving the sense-datum. Russell did not explain sense-datum as a mental particular, but as a physical particular, and understood it to belong under the category ‘substance’, not under ‘attribute’. (Chapter 3.2, pp. 65−68, 70−79)

If we want to find out of what we really perceive or what appears in perception, we must be aware of what perceptual experience is in general. Because one "source" of knowledge about the external world is said to be perception, we must focus on perception and how it occurs when we are in such a mental state. (2.6, pp. 55−57) The nature of the immediate object of perception cannot be shown by perception itself. The object can be dependent on the circumstances of the perceiver's location. A perceiver's own qualities are necessary for perceiving an object. For example, I am in certain circumstances and my perceptual system is "on". In perceiving, different changing shades of colors appear to me, but this fact does not imply that *the world* appears colorful. I am perceiving colors, and these colors are not necessarily the properties of the world. It is clear that Russell and Moore argued in these ways in the early 1900s, by using reason rather than descriptive methods. If most people's common-sense belief is that the colors perceived are the world's colors, they must have facts about perception in itself. They must have general knowledge about perception, knowledge which so many philosophers such as Austin, Ayer, Crane, Martin, and Searle lack. If we do not know what *perception* is, then how can we know what is perceived? If I claim to perceive printed matter, I cannot justify this claim by perception because then I beg the question. It is a vicious circle. And from the common-sense belief that we directly perceive the external world the conclusion that we directly perceive the external world does not follow. Simply because billions of people believe that they perceive the material world, it is not valid to infer that they actually do perceive the material world (an *argumentum ad populum*).

I conclude this chapter with the mention that perceptual experience seems to be openness to something. However, it is not easy to discover the *nature* of this something that immediately appears to us in perception. The traditional philosophical theories of perception cannot justify its nature. We are not able to discover what the immediate object of perception is relying on them alone: some *empirical fact* should verify or exclude one of these theories. However, perception, introspection, and descriptive methods are not sufficient to demonstrate the nature of the direct object of perception. Less certain is the question of whether appearance or sense-datum would be more plausibly considered an event. If *the perceptual object* is the flow of the experience of the world and not the entity of the external world,

then what is it and how can it be distinguished from other appearances, such as imagination, dreams, and hallucinations? These questions are considered in the next chapter.

2. The Internal and External Appearances

The previous chapter concerned how to discover what appearance is. Theories and descriptive methods do not do much to help explain what appears to us. We should distinguish internal phenomena from external phenomena about the external environment and locate data of sense on the relational line of mind and the external world. I am going to define what distinguishes internal appearances from external ones (since there are both entities) and discuss how to do so. We will see that the *spatial relations* of external appearances distinguish them from internal appearances.

One characterization of an external appearance or a sense-datum is that it is more lively and powerful than an internal one (it can be about the real object that is open to many observers). For example, a representational content of experience about an angry person is a much more lively and powerful experience than a mental image about an aggressive person. (Hume, 1739/1969: 49–50; Locke, 1704/1975: 104–106, 119, 121) On the other hand, a dream or a hallucination is often as lively and powerful as sense perception (Descartes, 1647/1996: 12–14). This characterization does not then give a reliable criterion with which to distinguish an internal appearance from an external one.

Another characterization has provided ways to distinguish between the two. The basic conditions have been 1) contradiction and 2) non-predictability. For example, a hallucination of a flying book is in contradiction with perceptions presenting simultaneously, and thus it would be internal. The flying book is in contradiction with previous experiences of books: they do not fly, but this book appears to fly. Likewise, a prediction made on the basis of dreamed flying books about a future perceptual situation in which one will see the flying figure will probably not occur. Similarly, a decision to act on grounds of hallucination may yield fatal consequences: for example, from the belief ‘I have wings’ to the action ‘Jumping from a bridge’. (Descartes, 1647/1996: 61–62; Leibniz, ca. 1676 cited in Russell, 1900: 224–225; Russell, 1900: 72) Even if a perception seems to be about an external entity and is consistent with prior perceptions and successful in prediction, these two conditions are

not sufficient to verify whether *something* appearing to us right now is the external entity or the internal sense-datum. Russell, on the other hand, distinguished hallucination from perception by way of causal connections (Chapter 3.2, p. 73). In veridical perception, there is a causal connection, and, therefore, the perceived appearance is about the external entity. But hallucination lacks causal connection with the real thing of the external environment, and therefore hallucination is internal (it can be caused by the physiology of the perceiver).

An external appearance can be the real entity because it is distinct from the perceiver who perceives it. Two entities are distinct if and only if x and y do not share any common parts. Therefore, two entities, x and y, are situated in different places. If the condition is realized, the perceived x which appears to us is external because x is situated in a different place than us. (Chapters 1.1, pp. 21−23, 2.2, p. 35−36) We are not joined with x and have no parts that would be a part of x. In sum, the perceptual object seems to be external because our attention is connected with something that appears to be outside of us. From this judgment, it is possible to form the attention-based theory of perception:

For a subject to perceive x is for a subject to focus attention on x which appears to a subject.

One sign of perception is the focusing of one's attention on something which appears to the senses. Another sign of perception is that something turns one's attention on itself: the immediate light effect experience automatically forces one to direct his or her attention to the light effect. It attracts one's attention because it causes a sensation to come to one’s attention. Perception includes attention. However, hallucination also includes attention. Hallucinations are of entities that are not situated in different places than the observer's mind. If perceptual experience *represents* phenomena as if they are external, then the perceiver does not pay attention to something real and external. The perceiver focuses his or her attention on the internal objects that are parts of the perceptual experience. Attention does not seem to sufficiently distinguish between external and internal appearances. It is possible for something to appear to the senses without the subject it appears to being aware of it or paying attention to it. Such unawareness means that one does not perceive what is going on. Well-known examples are those of change and inattentional blindness: we may fail to see a

change in the visual field or even an unexpected object in front of us (Simons & Levin, 1998: 644–649; Simons & Chabris, 1999: 1059–1074). Therefore, focused attention is not sufficient for distinguishing internal appearances from external ones.

On the other hand, the internal appearance phenomenon is described as being inside a subject and having no spatial position. The internal phenomenon lacks a spatially positioned present correspondent in the external environment. It is 'inside of' some other entity or 'a part' of something else. Nevertheless, when I say that inner appearance is in mind, it does not mean that mind is an empty space or 'a box' filled with psychological entities; i.e., mind and its states are neither bodies nor spatial, although they do have a physiological foundation. They should be explained as temporal entities:

If mind exists, mind's constituents have only a temporal dimension and no spatial one.

Mind continues temporally, but so do bodies and waves. This subjective phenomenon appears now, and another phenomenon appears shortly afterwards: the subject has different mental states in different times. She or he also has the ability to report that she or he is aware of a thought about New York, a feeling of joy, or an image of a centaur, but is not able to report information about the processes that produce these appearances. The internal phenomena do not seem to be distant from each other, but they are mind-dependent. (Chapter 1.1, pp. 10−13).

The general feature of phenomena of which the perceiver is aware is their temporal limited scope, i.e., they last a limited time (from introspection). External appearances are supposed to differ from the entities of the external world because these mind-independent entities remain after perception via the senses. I measure the details of a figure from the inside, and this perceptual measurement is an obvious fact. However, the immediate figure of perception has no existence distinct from my perception. It would be a part of my psychological act. Therefore, the identity statement "The external entity is the immediate figure of my perception" cannot simply be deduced from my perception about the figure. (Chapter 1.1, pp. 10−13) Although no immediate objects of perception appear, the mind-independent entities endure. However, external appearances are distinguishable from internal phenomena

because internal appearances have neither possession in space nor impenetrability and solidness, and they simultaneously lack the corresponding entities in the external world. It is possible to suppose appearance to be generally mind-dependent and psychological, and thus a false impression of the reality.

Let us suppose then that the *external* appearance in perception is a spatially organized picture which is not a body due to mind-dependency. The experience of being aware of an appearance with psychical properties is neither a material body nor a state of the brain. For example, the appearance of a table has neither weight nor the essence of metal, but the table does. The visual sense-datum or the external appearance would be like a three-dimensional substance-like picture. The external appearance presents properties in places different from one another and from us: there seem to be colors, shapes, sounds, and touches in different places and in my visual field of sense experience. These colors, shapes, etc. are contents. The entities of the internal appearance are within and dependent on us. The essential questions are now:

> How can we discover whether or not the external appearances are mind-independent if they are not bodies and exist only when given to the senses? And are they only included in the temporal dimension with other subjective phenomena? (Chapters 2.6, pp. 51−52, 4.1, pp. 90−92, 10.)

These are very important questions because people's common-sense hypothesis is that the object that is directly perceived is an external entity. For example, the tree in an object perception is an external entity; the object of perception is generally an external entity. The philosophical problem is now how to verify that the external appearance really is a mind-independent entity in the physical world. The reply cannot be based on introspection by saying "Because we introspect so". Most plain people hold that this is a truth and everyone who disagrees is simply wrong. (The *argumentum ad populum*, or appeal to the masses, is fallacious in stating "If many believe so, it is so".) One cannot deduce the external entities outside of one's mind based only on the existing data of what one senses (Chapter 1.1, pp.

10−13). In brief, we need reasons, evidence, and justification for the claim that the appearance of my experiential state *is identical to* the external entity outside of my mind.[36]

According to Immanuel Kant, internal and external appearances differ from each other because internal ones are in temporal relations and external ones are in temporal and spatial relations. On the other hand, for Kant, internal and external appearances are both internal objects of sense because both are produced by the external "things in-itselves". The "thing in-itself" may produce internal and external phenomena. Nevertheless, I do not have the experience of the "thing in-itself" that produces phenomena. If I should describe it as substance, I should intuit it, according to Kant:

'But all thought must, directly or indirectly, by way of certain characteristics, refer ultimately to intuitions, and therefore, with us, to sensibility, because in no other way can any object be given to us.' (Kant, 1787: 59)

Kant also used the concepts 'outer sense' and 'inner sense'. The former means a property by which we represent objects to ourselves as outside of us, i.e., in space. The latter means that we intuit our inner states and ourselves represented by them in relations of time. (Kant, 1787: 61) For Kant, time and space are not objects that are given to us in perceiving.

Kant seemed to consider the undetermined empirical object as appearance. And intuition is one way the mind refers to objects in the senses when the mind is affected by objects. (Kant, 1787: 59) His example explains: after something appears to mind without determination, the representation of a body is distinguished to define what belongs to sensation and what understanding thinks about it; the former is included in impenetrability, hardness, and color, and the latter is included in substance, force, and divisibility. (Kant, 1787: 60) Appearance is clearly localized by Kant to the subject in whom appearance occurs (Kant, 1787: 59, 75, 81). If the external appearance is the appearance of a tree and it is a tree's appearance that one perceives, it is clear that there are two entities, (1) a tree and (2) its appearance, not one.[37]

[36] See how the mind/brain identity theory deals with *the identity* in J. J. C. Smart (2007).
[37] Nicholas F. Stang (2013) uses different spatiotemporal and modal properties to argue against the identity of appearances and things in themselves, or the 'One Object' view in Kant's Idealism. Stang argues that the distinction between the appearance and the thing in itself is a distinction between two objects, not between

I have tried to discover criteria for distinguishing the internal appearance from the external one and tried to place the data of sense on the relational line of mind and the external world. It seems that the *spatial relations* of external appearances distinguish them from the internal appearance and distinguish appearance from the external entity. Experience is not responsible for thoughts and feelings of joy, but it is responsible for the voice that comes from the right side of the person, and that voice is caused by the perceiver's properties. The voice does not occur in the sky without the perceiver. Nonetheless, the concept 'appearance' seems to have two different meanings that must be clarified. In this, Russell's and Moore's views of sense-datum appear controversial.

3. Chisholm on Two Meanings of 'Appearance'

If Russell's and Moore's theories of sense-datum are arguable, and if the direct object of perception is even a particular thing, it might lead to a fallacy. There would be a sense-datum that has properties, and an external substance which has common properties with the sense-datum. The following three chapters comprise of criticism brought against the traditional theory of sense-datum.

Substance is distinct from property and, furthermore, the appearance of substance is distinct from the appearance of property. Substance and property must be defined[38]. (Chapters 1.1, pp. 21, 2.4, pp. 45−47, 2.5, pp. 48, 50) The claim 'A feature appears to someone' differs from 'A thing appears to be something'. For example, the statements 'A color redness of perception appears to me' and 'That book appears to be old' have different meanings. The colors, shapes, and movements of perception, its buzz and its roar, its softness and coarseness, all these require the senses. When saying that the book appears, seems, or looks old, we believe that we have immediately arrived at a fact of the external world. Nevertheless, what we said may be untrue. The color red of perception appears in the visual field, but the claims about the color red may be untrue:

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two ways of considering one and the same object. However, his arguments seem to stay on the logical level without relation to empirical phenomena.

[38] We must be capable of distinguishing property from substance when we perceive. The perceived color-shape is not a substance although it can be a substance-like whole. Similarly, event and substance must be generally distinguished in the mind.

1) F appears to a subject.
2) A thing g appears to be F.

These are different kinds of claims. What comes to light in perception is the properties, the aspect of the assumed external entity (from introspection). Let us consider, for example, a visual object of perception. I see the aspect of a shape and the color of part of its surface rather than the whole supposed external entity and its innermost properties. When visually perceiving the colorful shape, I do not asses the whole entity, nor am I aware of the whole entity, for I am aware of but *a part* of the immediate object of perception in the visual field. The immediate objects of perception are properties such as a colorful shape. Susanna Schellenberg has creditably shown that the subject always perceives from a place and a side. This is one reason why the *aspect* of the object appears to the senses, not the whole substance (Schellenberg, 2007 and 2008).

Roderick M. Chisholm, on the other hand, considered things to appear to the senses, but then criticized the possibility that the appearance would be white or a body and have a backside and bottom (talking about the substantial content of experience is different than talking about experience or its content as substance). He argued, for example, that the appearance of a thing and a material substance do not share every quality. It seems that he considered the appearance or the content of experience as substance, but he did not in 1966. Because a substance of the external world causes an appearance of the substance, it can be said, by playing with concepts, that a material substance and the appearance of the substance are green. (Chisholm, 1966: 94–95) In fact, Chisholm considered it erroneous to classify appearance or sense-datum under the category of substance. It leads to the sense-datum fallacy, which is the result of mistaken inferences between things and their appearances. The sense-datum fallacy results from the thought that sense-datum/appearance is a thing or a substance that has properties, although the direct object of perception may be a substance-like whole of the properties (Chapter 3.3, pp. 80−82).

Chisholm proposed that in general "... the inference from 'Something appears F' to 'Something presents an appearance that is F' is not generally valid". His example is:

“From 'The man appears tubercular,' we may not infer 'The man presents an appearance which is tubercular,' and from 'The books appear worn and dusty and more than two hundred years old,' we may not infer 'The books present appearances which are worn and dusty and more than two hundred years old'. (Chisholm, 1966: 95)

Chisholm’s inferences are valid. Nevertheless, in the thoughts of Russell, Moore, and Chisholm, to claim that appearance is a substance having properties is very controversial (Chapter 3.3, pp. 80−82; Crane and French, 2015). An appearance of something is present only if somebody is aware of what appears and conceives of it. Therefore, the appearance depends on the subject. The appearance would occur in the subject, not in a real something external to the subject. (Chapters 2.1, pp. 28−30, 2.2, pp. 35−39, 2.5, p. 48, 3.2, pp. 65−68, 70−79, 3.4, 83−88) If appearance is caused, then the external entity and its appearance are not identical (Chapters 3.4, pp. 83−88, 4.1, pp. 90−93). “Appearance” refers to properties, to instances of redness and roundness, when we are sensing, and these properties are in us. If the appearing properties of redness and roundness do not belong to the external substance, then the external substance does not appear to be red and round. That is, these properties appear to me. I mean that internal properties appear; the external substances and their properties never appear directly. (Chapters 1.1, pp. 21, 2.4, p. 47, 3.4, pp. 87−89) The present philosophy of mind tends to claim that redness and roundness are the properties of experience, the phenomenal characters of experience (see Chapters 3.3 and 5.3). I would claim that they are properties of *the perceiver*: he or she *has* the red and round phenomena. His or her body is not red and round outside. The whole man is an appearance in Chisholm’s example.

But how, after all, does Chisholm justify that appearance corresponds one-to-one with something external causing its appearance in the perceiver's mind? Introspection demonstrates that sensible properties appear to observers in perception, such as colors, shapes, movements, sounds, hardness, and wetness. They are the data of sense that exist. Using Chisholm's concepts, and he did not think of appearances as substances, appearance may be a concrete substance. However, to claim that an appearance is a concrete substance on grounds of reflecting upon something can mislead us, and, in fact, this is also Chisholm’s criticism against the substantival theory of appearance. As I have said, substances do not

appear in perception, but properties constitute the appearances of a coherent substance-like whole. For example, something appears F, i.e., it appears as a round shape that would be a part of the surface of the external substance. Nevertheless, the F or the round shape appears. It does not appear as a thing being round and a shape: being the F and being a round shape are properties. These statements lead to the conclusion that sensible properties appear in perception. On the other hand, Chisholm changed his views about perception later in the 1990s and returned to the causal theory of perception and this substantival theory of appearance. (Chisholm, 1995: 35, 36, 37, 38, 39)

Finally, it is possible that the statement "An object appears to be outside of me" is untrue if the object appearing in perception is part of the rich content of perceptual experience. The object of perception is a product of the brain process and the brain causes experiencing. The existence of the real substance would be somehow causally responsible for there being a sense impression of an appearing object, and the object appears to be external. Thus, the claim "I see a book being external to me" can be untrue because the way a book is perceived is not the way a book really is. It is the mind-internal appearance of a book that I see. Furthermore, it is a mystery how identity would be between appearance and the external substance if appearance is the product of the brain and the external substance. Lines of argumentation like this have been thought to lead to the sense-datum fallacy. In the next chapter, I concentrate on criticism asserting that sense-data is not necessarily the infallible foundation of empirical knowledge.

4. Chisholm and Prichard on Sense-datum Fallacies

Sense-datum fallacies, which are mistaken inferences between things and their appearances, relate to the foundation of empirical knowledge and the object of perception. In the 1930s, H. A. Prichard, and later, Roderick M. Chisholm, doubted that sense-data are the infallible foundation of empirical knowledge, and suspected that sense-data or appearances are objects of perception. Because judgments concerning material things are unreliable sources of empirical knowledge, it must be judgments concerning sense-data (that given to the senses and of which the observer is directly aware) which provide a certain base for empirical knowledge. This was Russell's, Moore's, and Alfred J. Ayer's thought in the early 20th

century. Prichard and Chisholm raised doubts about Russell's and Moore's views of sense-datum on the basis that their views lead to fallacies in which sense-datum has been considered a thing having the same properties as the external substance.

First, our assumption is that sense-datum is caused, and the perceiver's statements are about the sense-datum of which he or she is directly aware. For instance, a real tree causes its sense-datum in my mind via my body, and that which I describe is the sense-datum or the mind-dependent appearance. (Chapters 1.1, pp. 1−3, 5, 10−13, 2.1, pp. 28−30, 2.2, 35−36, 37, 39, 2.5, p. 48, 2.6, pp. 51−52, 54−57, 3.3, 80−82, 3.4, pp. 83−89, 4.1, pp. 90−93, 4.2, pp. 96−99, 100−101, 4.3, p.102−105) My perceptual statement is not about the real tree even though I may it assume to be. For Russell and Moore, the idea was that I cannot doubt what 'the presence of the immediate' is, and my statement of it is reliable on grounds of introspection (3.2, pp. 65−68, 70−79). However, in his 1942 article *The Problem of the Speckled Hen,* Chisholm claimed that our statements concerning sense-data can be also mistaken.

Chisholm said that "at least one type of basic proposition—that which is enumerative—is quite capable of being believed erroneously and, in consequence, is not incorrigible" (Chisholm, 1942: 368). He asked us to consider the visual sense-datum yielded by a single glance at a speckled hen. After asking how many speckles the datum comprises, he gave us a reply. Chisholm assured us that our judgment that there are forty-eight might very well be mistaken. Therefore, our statements about the sense-data may be untrue, though the theory of the given assumes otherwise. It must be sense-data which provides a strong base for empirical knowledge. Chisholm did not mean that there are neither sense-data nor sensory appearances. He meant that the basic propositions of mind-dependent sense-data are as vague and unprecise as the perceptual propositions of the mind-independent physical entities. (Chisholm, 1942: 369, 373) I think that Chisholm is correct in his 1942 article.

In his *Theory of Knowledge*, in 1966, Chisholm gave some examples about the mistaken inferences of appearances. He started from a fact that perceiving an object is the result of a complex physiological and psychological process. The ultimate product of this process is a conscious sensation. By 'sensation' Chisholm meant the same thing as that referred to by

the concepts ‘sense impression’, ‘appearance’, ‘idea’, and the like. Sensation is some sort of mind-dependent entity. He continued on to say that this entity depends upon the condition of a perceiving subject. In fact, according to Chisholm, the ways in which things appear to us when we perceive them depend in part upon our own psychological and physiological condition, or upon the condition of our brains. (Chisholm, 1966: 91). If Chisholm’s claims are true, then identity does not fit between appearance and the external entity (recall the research problem in chapter 1.1, p. 5).

He then explained that perception of the tree dependent on the condition of the brain of a perceiving subject implies two things which he referred to as Democritus’s inferences. It implies (1) that we do not perceive what we think we perceive and (2) that external entities are not what we tend to believe that they are (Chisholm: 1966: 91). Chisholm followed Aristotle in separating the ways of appearing from the properties of physical things: terms such as ‘white’, ‘yellow’, ‘bitter’, and ‘sweet’ refer to these properties a physical thing has if *it* will appear white or yellow to the observer because the physical thing is white or yellow. I say that, for Chisholm, the appearing white or yellow is identical to the property “white” or “yellow” of the physical thing. These terms refer to ways of appearing if the *ways* in which things appear to the observer are white or yellow. For instance, if *a tree* is *green*, it has properties or dispositions in virtue of which the tree appears green (and as tree) to the observer under favorable lighting conditions. (Chisholm, 1966: 93). Then he gave some examples about mistaken inferences between things and their appearances.[39]

Now Chisholm considered both external entities and appearances as substances. As I stated in section two (Chapters 2.4 and 2.5), I consider there to be two substances: the observer and a possible mind-independent lump, say, a tree, and their attributes. Let us look at Chisholm’s good examples. One mistake is to infer that because the appearing whiteness of a thing depends upon the condition of the observer, then that thing’s being white is also dependent upon the condition of the observer (Chisholm, 1966: 94). As I understand it,

[39] But is a tree green or not green, or is sugar sweet or not sweet on the condition of favorable circumstances? This is the real philosophical problem I need to answer. A tree’s greenness does not necessarily make a tree appear green, but it is rather favorable lighting along with the tree’s primary properties and the perceiver's visual system that make it appear green.

appearing white and being white are different things for Chisholm because the thing's properties do not depend upon the condition of the observer.

Second, according to Chisholm, it is possible to err in the other direction. With respect to certain truths about things that appear to me, one can suppose that these truths also hold for appearances. One such incorrect inference is that if I perceive the tree then I also perceive the tree's appearance. Chisholm argued that when a tree as a stimulus object has acted upon my sense organs, I perceive the tree, and thereby it causes me *to be appeared to*. However, he said, the appearances of things are not stimulus objects that affect our sense organs. Chisholm therefore inferred that the appearances themselves are not something we perceive (Chisholm, 1966: 94).

Remember that the appearances are now considered substances by Chisholm, and this is the basis of his criticism: "When we say 'The appearance of the thing is white,' our language suggests that we are attributing a certain property to a substance" (Chisholm, 1996: 95). The third mistake is that of inferring from the fact that a physical thing appears white that the thing presents an appearance which is white (Chisholm, 1966: 94). I would suggest that the thing presents *an appearance of whiteness* to the observer, not a double substance of the thing that is white. I am not certain that the external tree has a color green in its surface even if the lighting conditions of observation are favorable. The color green appears to me, but there is or is not an entity that has the property "green" being identical to *the green appeared* to me. Aristotle could argue for the formal identity located between the appearance and the external substance corresponding with it. For example, the golden ring and its copy in wax and the real green and its perceived appearance share the same form, i.e., the ring and the color shape. However, I do not believe that Aristotle would claim the ring and its copy in wax to be numerically identical.

But I do agree with Chisholm when he says that "the inference from 'Something appears F' to 'Something presents an appearance that is F' is not in general valid' (Chisholm, 1966: 94–5). There are adjectives which are such that if we replace "F" with any of those adjectives, then, according to Chisholm, the statement "Something appears F" will be true and "Something presents an appearance which is F" will be false. His example is such that from

“The books appear worn and dusty and more than two hundred years old” we may not infer “The books present appearances which are worn and dusty and more than two hundred years.” (Chisholm, 1966: 95) I think that Chisholm is correct in his inferences. Chisholm asks that if the appearance can be white in the sense in which a rose can be white, then does it also have a certain weight, an inside, and a backside? Being aware of the image of a house, nobody thinks that the mental image of the house has a form of glass, wood, and concrete. The image is like a portrait of a landscape that mimics the river Seine and the buildings by it. The river in the portrait is not wet. Moreover, when I appear to perceive the small tree, the size that I perceive to be small is different than the real size of the tree. I do not say that the tree’s impression is small, but I am indeed directly aware of the appearance of smallness. In response to Chisholm's question of whether an appearance can be white, the answer is that it cannot, and this is a general view of perceptual sense-data. An affirmative response would require a thing and its properties in accordance with the traditional view of sense data. (Chapters 1.1, pp. 10−13, 3.3, pp. 80−82) What actually happens, is that the color white appears to me, not the appearance that is white. Whiteness is an appearance. Appearance is not under the category of substance because substances are entities of the external world. This seems to be the point of Chisholm’s critique (Chisholm, 1966: 94–5; Chapters 1.1, pp. 21, 2.4, p. 47, 3.4, pp. 87−89). Although a white sense-datum would appear to me in perception, Harald Arthur Prichard argued that there is no sense-data.

In his *The Sense-datum Fallacy* from 1938, H. A. Prichard’s main thesis is that there is no sense-datum in the sense that Bertrand Russell and H. H. Price used the term (Prichard, 1938: 210–211). According to Prichard, Russell and Price are begging the question (Prichard, 1938: 213). The article’s main theme is the nature of objects that we perceive and the possibility that perception is a kind of knowing. Prichard started from Berkeley’s assertion that things which we perceive depend on our perception of them (Prichard, 1938: 200). By ‘perception’ Prichard simply meant

“that from which in recent times the term ‘sense’ is sometimes substituted, i.e. the sense in which it is used to stand for a certain generic mental activity or state of which, when we reflect, we think seeing, feeling, or touching, hearing, tasting, and smelling to be species” (Prichard, 1938: 200).

In arguing against the thesis of naïve realism which holds that the object of perception is a material substance, Prichard also admitted along with Berkeley and many others that we perceive secondary qualities. That quality, like a color red or a sound, is not a sensation, but a sense-datum (Prichard, 1938: 201). These qualities must be dependent on our perception of them. Prichard's aim is to show that the independent nature of these qualities leads to the absence of sense-data.

In opposition to the sensation interpretation of objects of perception, Prichard made an important separation from N. Kemp Smith. 'Sensation' can be interpreted as a process of apprehension and, second, as an object apprehended. Therefore, for Smith, if sensation is a mental process, it is then subjective. But sensation cannot be regarded as a subjective entity if it is an object revealed in and through such mental processes: "Though red is known only as sensation, it is undoubtedly an objective content. It is not a state of the subject, but an object to the subject" (Prichard, 1938: 202). Prichard tried to argue that the existence of red, a sound, or an odor is an object independent of any mental processes: an object cannot be subjective, it cannot be the state of a subject, for instance. In other words, the perceived object is not part of a mental process.

Following G. E. Moore and N. Kemp Smith, Prichard considered perceiving as a species of knowing: having a sensation of a blue color is a kind of knowing that color. 'Knowing' is 'being aware of', 'experiencing', or 'apprehending' a color or sound. (Prichard, 1938: 203–5) Prichard's idea is based on the conception that if to perceive something is to know something, then the perceived object is independent of our perceiving.[40] However, according to Berkeley, each kind of perception is about a secondary quality, and the various secondary qualities which we perceive are by their very nature dependent on our perceiving. Consequently, to perceive something cannot be to know it. (Prichard, 1938: 207–8) Prichard referred to Bertrand Russell's sharp distinction between sense-data and sensation in *Problems of Philosophy*.

[40] It would be good to compare Prichard's description with Martin's description of the represented content of experience. The two descriptions are inconsistent. See Chapter 5.3.

Prichard (1938: 210) claimed that what we perceive is not a material body, but rather a secondary quality, and this is Russell's view. He also believed that, for Russell, perceiving is a special kind of knowing. According to Prichard, Russell gave 'the sense-data' the meaning of 'things immediately known in sensation'. Prichard also maintains that perceiving is a source of knowing the existence of things immediately known in sensation. Perceiving is knowing the existence of sense-data. (Prichard, 1938: 210)

Prichard argued that there cannot be things immediately known in sensation, that which Russell called the sense-data. Prichard argued that it is merely verbal to speak of something as sense-datum which is being apprehended. To *be being apprehended* is not a character of anything. His analogous example is that if I am eating a number of things, such as some cheese, some bread, and some salt, they together form a certain numerical group. But their membership in this group is not defined by the things having a certain common character like 'things which are being eaten by me'. To be being eaten by me is not a character of some cheese, some bread, and some salt. Similarly, if I am apprehending in the form of perceiving a particular color, a particular sound, and a particular feeling of roughness, none of these has the property of *being apprehended by me*. Thus, Russell's idea concerning the sense-datum about the color that I am seeing *is not about the color* by means of my perceiving about the color. That is, the term 'sense-datum' refers to something that is independent of perceiving and thus known in a special kind of way. (Prichard, 1938: 211–3) This is Prichard's version of the sense-datum fallacy.

I would call our attention to one thing, however. It is not only secondary qualities which appear in perceptual experience, but also primary qualities, size, shape, and duration. In fact, it is obvious that I perceive not only secondary qualities but also primary qualities (from introspection). I appear to perceive loudness and solidness, size and shape. Prichard might say that primary qualities are independent of perceiving them. Primary qualities are not parts of a psychological act. I say that such a judgment is not generally true. Let us examine a round shape. I appear to perceive an oval shape due to a certain angle of vision. The object of my perception is the oval shape that I directly perceive. This oval shape is dependent on my position, on the perceiver. What I perceive is the oval shape and what

really is the round shape. This oval shape cannot be the entity, as the entity is the round shape. These shapes must be two different entities, and the oval shape is an internal item dependent on my perceiving it. This inference from reason suggests that the round shape does not appear oval. Without evidence, we cannot argue as follows: the statement "Something looks oval when it is round" implies the statement "We perceive the 'looks' property of *the external entity*. The claim 'It looks like the round thing is elliptical' is contradictory". The problem is that of what I really perceive. I am perceiving a bicycle. But is that which I am immediately perceiving the inner or outer entity?

5. Chisholm on the Status of Appearances

Starting in the 1940s, Roderick M. Chisholm evaluated the foundation of the sense-datum theory and its use as a strong base for empirical knowledge. I have already presented Chisholm's 1942 article *The Problem of the Speckled Hen*, and I now continue to the article *The Problem of Empiricism*, written in 1948, in which Chisholm examined the relationship between ordinary thing statements and sense-datum statements. Chisholm referred to C. I. Lewis' thesis that any statement which refers to a material thing may be fully conveyed in statements which refer to sense-data or the sensible appearances of things. For example, according to Lewis, the ordinary thing statement "That is a doorknob" will show that the statement entails an unlimited number of statements referring to sense-data. Chisholm continued that sense-datum statements are the "analytic consequences" of an ordinary thing statement (Chisholm, 1948: 512). The problem, said Chisholm, is that of showing *this relation* between ordinary thing statements and sense-datum statements, and the roots of this problem are in the relativity of sense perception (Chisholm, 1948: 512).

According to Chisholm, a red appearance or sense-datum depends partly on the thing and partly on the conditions under which it is observed, and a material thing will never be present. For example, said Chisholm, if one knew that the thing was red and that the lighting conditions were normal, one could predict that the thing would present a red appearance. And if one knew that the lights were out, or that the observer had a certain type of color blindness, one could predict that the thing would present some other appearance. In sum, it

is the thing perceived and the observation-conditions working jointly which determine what is to appear. (Chisholm, 1948: 512–3)

According to Chisholm, the facts of perceptual relativity suggest that the claim "This thing is red" does not entail any statement of sense-data. The facts suggest that a sense-datum statement is entailed only when "This thing is red" is taken *in conjunction with another thing statement* referring to observation-conditions. Lewis' translatability thesis requires that both observation-conditions and things-perceived be definable in terms of what might appear. However, Chisholm argued that the facts of perceptual relativity indicate that it is the joint operation of things-perceived and observation-conditions which determines what is to appear. (Chisholm, 1948: 513)

Chisholm gave two examples that show that "This is red" (P) is not an analytic consequence of "Redness will appear" (R): P does not entail R. With some other thing statements, referring to observation-conditions, P does not entail R, but not-R. So, if "This is red" and "This is observed under conditions which are normal except for the presence of blue lights; and if this is red and is observed under conditions which are normal except for the presence of blue lights, redness will not appear", then "Redness will appear" does not follow. If P and S entail not-R, then it is impossible that P entails R. He concluded that "This is red" (P) does not entail "Redness will appear" (R). (Chisholm, 1948: 513–4)

At this point, Chisholm discussed how sense experience can justify the knowledge of things. The translatability thesis, i.e., the translation of thing statements into sense-datum statements, does not seem to be valid because it multiplies thing statements and presents old difficulties again. (Chisholm, 1948: 514) The relativity of perception may make information about external things indirect and fallible. For example, how things appear to me depends on my brain and my angle of vision, and thus I have information about oval and small objects of perceptual experience even if the possible external things are not really oval and small. However, Chisholm (1948: 517) does not say much in the article about whether or not sense-data are a strong foundation for empirical knowledge. On the other hand, we cannot deduce ordinary external things and observation conditions from sense-data: the data of

sense are given to the perceiver, and this is directly obvious (Chapters 1.1, pp. 10−13, 3.3, pp. 80−82, 3.4, pp. 83−89).

Perceptual relativity implies the *mind-dependent* status of the red appearance, although Chisholm did not examine the nature of perceptual appearances in this article. What are these sense-data (the sensible appearances of things) if they are the objects of experience in awareness?

In his *Theory of Knowledge,* Chisholm considered the possibility that they are brain states. Appearances or mind-dependent data of sense about external entities can be added to the category of that which is physical if they are identified with entities located in the brain of a person. If the data of sense and such phenomena are entities within the perceiver, then it is clear that they are not identified with the entities of the external world. (Chapters 1.1, pp. 5, 10−13, 2.1, pp. 28−30, 2.2, pp. 35−39, 2.5, p. 48, 2.6, pp. 51−52, 54−57, 3.3, pp. 80−82, 3.4, pp. 83−89, 4.1, pp. 90−93, 4.3, p. 102−105) This kind of "identity theory" can be defended, argued Chisholm, on the grounds (1)

"that there is known to be least a close correlation between appearances and what is cerebral or neurological, and (2) that in order not to multiply entities beyond necessity it is reasonable to suppose that a strict identity is involved rather than a mere correlation between entities that are distinct". (Chisholm, 1966: 99)

If the identity theory can be proven true, we should *not* assume the existence of any entities other than physical things and their properties and states in the contingent world (Chisholm, 1966: 99). I say the "contingent world" because *the reality* may also include abstract entities.

According to Chisholm, the identity theory is better suited for a substantival theory of appearances than the adverbial theory of appearing. He said that the sentence "Jones experiences a red appearance" could be said as "Jones eats a red tomato". This statement expresses an intimate relation between Jones and some other substance. In a similar way, he continued to state that appearances are parts of the brain – chunks of grey matter, cells, or strips of nervous tissue. People would then perceive appearances. That is, they perceive the insides

of their own bodies. (Chisholm, 1966: 99–100) Chisholm then quotes Thomas Case, a nineteenth century advocate of physical realism.

Chisholm (1966: 100) argued that Case "seems to have committed the 'sense-datum fallacy'". Chisholm evaluated Case's inference "From the hot within we infer a fire without". This means, according to Chisholm, that Case assumed that when the "fire without" appears hot, then there is an appearance "within the perceiver" having the property that the fire appears to have. Chisholm referred to Aristotle's distinction between the sensible and dispositional uses of property words. According to Chisholm, Case assumed that the process we ordinarily call perceiving is really just a matter of framing hypotheses and making inferences, and thus Case was able to conclude that we come to know external entities by first examining the inside of our heads. (Chisholm, 1966: 100) This is a substantival theory of appearances. Chisholm criticized the assertion that the claim "An appearance of fire is hot" is true. I do not think that Chisholm words are the whole truth, however.

The immediate object of perception can be dependent on a perceiver's brain and perceptual situation, and this can lead to the claim that one perceives the internal item or the sensible appearance of a thing. That is to say, one is directly aware of something that cannot be the property of the external entity. For instance, a round table cannot be elliptical, but the elliptical shape really is what I see. The round table may be claimed to have the property of "looking elliptical" that *it* has in relation to being perceived. The claim is that the table is round and looks elliptical. However, does the table have the property of "looking elliptical"? I tend to claim it does not because these appearing properties exist only after something occurs within the perceiver. How can colors, sounds, and tastes be in external entities if their existence necessarily requires the perceiver and his or her consciousness and brain? Chisholm claimed to know that a colorful entity causes a certain color appearance in the perceiver. *I object.* Color perception does not occur in the way Chisholm describes. All properties in perceptual experience are not the properties possessed by trees or tables, and the "appears" properties are the properties external entities do not have because the complex nature of causal processes denies the identity between the property of "appearing F" and the property G of the external entity. As Chisholm himself says, the property of appearing

F might be a part of the brain, and, therefore, the property G of the external entity is not a part of the brain. Examined under the category of causality and the category of identity, the perceptual situation leads to distinct conclusions. (Chapters 1.1, pp. 5, 20−21, 2.1, pp. 28−30, 2.2, pp. 35−36, 37, 39, 2.4, p. 47, 2.5, p. 48, 50, 2.6, pp. 51−52, 54−57, 3.4, pp. 83−89, 4.3, p. 102−105)

One alternative is to interpret 'appearance' as the process of *appearing* or as *event* rather than as certain substances called 'appearances'. This version of the "identity theory" would express that that process which is Jones' being appeared to redly is really something that is to be found in her brain. (Chisholm, 1966: 101) The theory would recount a physical account of that process which is Jones' being appeared to: (1) there is a certain process—some kind of vibration—going on in Jones' head, and (2) this neurological process is the very same process as that which we are now describing as Jones' being appeared to redly (Chisholm, 1966: 101). Finally, Chisholm made five general points about this version of the identity theory, which states, for example, that the elliptical appearance is a physiological event in the perceiver and thus cannot be an external entity independent of the perceiver (Chapters 1.1, p. 5, 20−21, 2.1, pp. 28−30, 2.2, pp. 35−39, 2.4, p. 47, 2.5, p. 48, 2.6, pp. 51−52, 54−57, pp. 3.3, pp. 80−82, 3.4, pp. 87−89, 4.2, p. 96−99, 4.3, p. 102−105).

One of Chisholm's points challenges the supposition that there are two processes—that of being appeared to and a certain neurological process—by contending that there is only one. The identity theory "explains away" the need for supposing two processes. (Chisholm, 1966: 102) Chisholm's second point is important: "If we knew that the theory was true, we would know something about certain neurological processes that no-one knows now, namely, that they take place redly" (Chisholm, 1966: 102). Finally, Chisholm pointed out that in formulating the theory we presuppose *an entity* being a person who is being appeared to. However, the theory does not imply that Jones is identical with any physical body or with any property, state, or process of any physical body. What is directly evident to Jones is the fact that he is being appeared to redly. (Chisholm, 1966: 102) In his later years, Chisholm changed his mind.

Chisholm (1995: 35) wrote in 1995:

"In writing about the theory of knowledge, I for many years defended the view that what philosophers call 'appearances' are not individual things but are ways of sensing. I had said that, under certain circumstances, ways of appearing could be called 'ways of being appeared to'. But in later years, after I turned to ontology and to the theory of categories, I came to see that appearances can only be individual things."

According to Chisholm, appearances can be identified by varying the conditions under which the external physical entity is perceived. Therefore, one may vary the appearances without any need to introduce changes in the thing itself. His examples are the stick that is made to look bent by immersing it in water and the white cloth that is made to appear pink by looking at it through rose-colored glasses. (Chisholm, 1995: 35) Chisholm's view seems to be representative realism. Let us see if I am right.

Does the falling tree make any noise when there's no one in the forest to hear it? Concerning this traditional question, Chisholm points out two things following Aristotle. The experiencing subject's property of sensing a noise is not a dispositional property of an external substance, or a tree, but the subject's property. The dispositional property of an external substance may give rise to the appearance of a tree. (Chisholm, 1995: 36)

He continued with the fact that there are truths of the following sorts: "I sense an appearance which consists of a triangular red thing being to the left of a circular blue thing." After the example, he asked us to consider the hypothesis that the objects of visual sensing are surfaces within the subject's own body. This hypothesis also implies that the subject needs a body in order to sense. This hypothesis enables us to easily deal with the example of the spatial nature of sensing. Chisholm said that what the subject is sensing contains a red triangle being at the left of a blue circle. (Chisholm, 1995: 36) He concluded that the objects of visual sensing are certainly spatial (Chisholm, 1995: 37).

Chisholm then defended the hypothesis that all objects of sensing are individual things. He did so by examining the relation between sensing and perceiving. (Chisholm, 1995: 37) By sensing, Chisholm meant as follows:

"D1 S senses an appearance of x = Df. S senses an individual thing and does so in such a way that his sensing is a function of a process external to S's body; i.e., systematic variations of such a process will produce systematic variations in a way in which S is sensing."

And by perceiving:

"D2 S veridically perceives x to be F = Df. S senses an appearance that is F; and the appearance that S senses is an appearance of something that is F." (Chisholm, 1995: 37)

The first occurrence of the schematic letter "F" refers to a dispositional property of the external thing x. The "F" in "appears to F" should refer to a nondispositional property of the subject S. (Chisholm, 1995: 37) But how does sensing a nondispositional property of the subject enable him to know something about the external thing? Chisholm's general definition of perceiving is as follows:

"D4 S perceives x = Df. S senses an appearance of x." (Chisholm, 1995: 38)

Chisholm argued that sensing is pre-eminently qualitative. "Our qualitative experience—what we have called 'sensing' (or 'appearing')—is 'subjective' in being dependent for its existence upon the existence of the sensing subject experience." (Chisholm, 1995: 38) He added that the existence of sentient beings having such qualitative experiences is a fact, an objective fact, about the nature of this world (Chisholm, 1995: 38).

In earlier years, Chisholm defended the adverbial theory of appearing, and now, as did Russell and Moore, he defends a theory that appearances are individual things (Chapter 3.2, pp. 65−68, 70−79). His two general epistemic principles are now:

"(1) For every x, if x senses an appearance that is red, then it is evident to x that he or she senses an appearance that is red."

"(2) Being appeared to in a way that is red tends to make probable (confirms) that one is sensing an appearance of an external physical thing that is red." (Chisholm, 1995: 39; see also 1.1, pp. 7−10)

The redness of the external physical thing is dispositional, and that of the appearance is non-dispositional (1995: 39). The remarkable point is that Chisholm now admits that which he denied in 1966. That is, that an external substance and its appearance in the subject can both be red. The second point that I would like to emphasize is that there are two different things in Chisholm's later theory: a tree and its appearance, and these are two distinct entities because the former is in the external world and the latter in the subject who senses the

appearance. My theory resembles that of Chisholm. However, Chisholm's belief that an external entity is red is not directly evident: he cannot use evidence of perception that is directly evident in order to know what is going on in the external environment (Chapter 1.1, pp. 10−13). I am aware of a great variation of entities in my visual field. Moreover, I am certain that my visual field is in my eyes. Therefore, it is not at all certain that the content of my visual field is identical to the entities of the external world or that the content of my visual field is like the external world. My visual field cannot be the "appears" property of the external world. *The inference* from perceptual experience to the conclusion of the external entities *is not valid* because we cannot deduce the conclusion "There is y that is external" from "x perceives y" (see introduction pages 10−13 for why this is not a valid inference).

Next, I will briefly present what kind of theory the adverbial theory of appearing is. Its basic thesis is that we do not perceive mind-dependent appearances or sense-data that are individual objects. We experience in some way.

6. The Adverbial Theory of Object of Experience

The adverbial theory is the alternative to the act/object analysis of object of experience. Some may want to separate object of experience from object of perception. I am not sure that this separation is meaningful, however. The idea of the adverbial theory is simple. If I say "I am experiencing the red dot", then I really do experience it. However, I should not say that I experience the object, the existence of sense-data. I should say that I experience red dot-ly, which means that the red dot is a modification of my experience, not a red substance at all. (Chapter 3.3, pp. 80−82) This is not to say that the experience is red or a dot, but rather that the experience is modified in a certain way (Crane and French, 2015). Therefore, when I am overcome by hallucination, illusion, or dreams, I do not need to claim that I perceive a red demon because such a substance does not exist. I experience rather red demon-ly.

Furthermore, if I walk slowly, this *slowly* designates my motion, or an event, not a slow cat that I see. And if I see the red thing, according to the adverbial theory, I see redly and this redly designates my mental act, not the red property belonging to the external substance.

Therefore, one property is attributed to another property, not to the external substance. The conclusion would be: by experiencing, the information I get is of experiencing. This conclusion is controversial, however.

According to Michael Pendlebury, the core of the adverbial theory consists in the denial of objects of experience. (Pendlebury, 1992: 10) The adverbial theory of experience proposes that the grammatical object of a statement attributing an experience to someone be analyzed as an adverb. For example, "Rod is experiencing a pink square" is rewritten as "Rod is experiencing (pink square)-ly". (Pendlebury, 1992: 9) The act/object analysis, however, holds that the truth of a statement requires the existence of an object of experience corresponding to its grammatical object. This kind of analysis accepts the existence of a pink square in the statement "Rod is experiencing a pink square".

It is unclear to me, however, if the adverbial theory can avoid the sense-datum fallacy. The substantival theory of appearance states that I experience the appearance of a green tree, but the adverbial theory does not have the resources to distinguish between (1) "A green tree appears to me" and (2) "I have an experience of an appearing green and an appearing tree". The second statement expresses that there are two mental events, experiencing and appearing, and two objects, one green and the other tree, and this is implausible (Pendlebury, 1992: 128–9; Chisholm, 1966: 100). The 'many-property problem' is not entailed by (1): a green tree appears to me. The act/object analysis can easily claim that the truth of (1) requires a single object which is both green and tree, while that of (2) allows for the possibility of two objects, one green and the other tree (Pendlebury, 1992: 128–9). The adverbial theory has to say either "It appears (green tree)-ly to me" or "I have the experience greenly and (tree)-ly", which are inconsistent. Actually, a problem of adverbialism concerns what the object which we experience is: is it internal, or not? In fact, we would not experience the object at all if the adverbial theory is correct. If the green phenomenon is the modification of the experience, then this indicates the indirect perceptual experience about the external environment because, in the adverbial theory, the green phenomenon is not experienced as a property of the environment. Together, Greenly and (tree)-ly are regarded as a characteristic

or inherent part of experience, not of the external environment: they can however be attributes of one experience or of experiences. This observation, however, does not support a theory of experience *without* objects.

Perceptual experience appears to be a presentation of some *thing* rather than some *way*. However, simply stating what we are aware of in perception does not justify claims concerning the issue of how we know perceptual experience to be the presentation of mind-independent things (see Crane and French, 2015, and how certain they are about what we perceive).

Finally, it is worth considering a little what 'object' is in the phrase 'perceiving an object' which we will see in next section. An experience of perceiving objects might relate to the external entities being perceived rather than the internal psychological entities of the perceiver. This assumption leads us to direct, naive realism in philosophy of perception. But first, I would summarize what we have understood of sense-data thus far.

7. A Summary of the Third and Fourth Sections

I would like to summarize a little what Russell, Moore, Prichard, and Chisholm have claimed of sense-data thus far. After summarizing, I will examine the direct, naive realism of Austin, Searle, Martin, and eliminative materialists. Russell and Moore did not seem to mean that a particular called "sense-datum" of which I am directly aware represents either an external entity or some property F inhering in the external entity. According to Russell and Moore, the existence of sense-data is dependent upon the brain and the sense organs. Nevertheless, Chisholm and Prichard thought differently. The external entity is either like an appearance/sense-datum, or the external entity has some property F that is exactly like what appears to me. That is, either 1) there are two similar entities, or 2) there is one entity having a property F that is identical to an appearance. Prichard's main claim argued that the object of perception is independent of perceiving of it. On the other hand, in the 1990s Chisholm returned to the causal theory of perception which he earlier criticized. There are two different things in Chisholm's later theory: a tree and the appearance of the tree, and these are two distinct entities because the former is in the external world and the latter in

the subject who senses the appearance. However, direct realism suggests that it is very counter-intuitive to think that what we perceive are sense-data. In perception, the physical world is open to us. But what are we aware of in perception? What I need from direct realists is strong reasons and evidence for the claim that *the physical world* appears in perception.

5. PERCEIVING WITHOUT SENSE-DATA: THE CRITIQUE OF DIRECT REALISM AND ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM

By mental entities I mean the following things: 1) mind, soul, and consciousness, 2) perception, thought, and understanding, and 3) mind-dependent beings, colors, shapes, sounds, mental pictures, hallucination and illusion, dreams, odors, flavors, and touches. Direct, naive realism is the view that one directly perceives the physical mind-independent environment. In J. L. Austin's words, perception puts the perceiver in contact with that external environment, and does not restrict the capacity of experience to *sense-data*. (Austin, 1946: 86–97, 1962: 10) John Searle and Michael Martin share Austin's words. Eliminative materialism insists that mental things do not exist. According to eliminative materialism, this is why mental things cannot be reduced to brain states or the external entities outside the perceiver and why there is no "problem of perception". In this section, I evaluate their arguments for why we do *not* immediately perceive sense-data or internal objects. The problem is as follows: if these two theories are correct, and perceptual statements are formed by the inner experiences of the perceiver or the inner states and processes of the brain, how have they discovered that which is perceived of? The starting point of eliminative materialism is an acknowledgement of the explanatory, predictive, and manipulative failures of folk psychology to explain our inner activities and outer behavior (Churchland, 1984: 43–46; 1992: 419–420). Along with direct, naive realism, eliminative materialism accepts the external world perception and denies the internal *mental* character of experience. It is a puzzle how direct realism in philosophy of perception can successfully explain our perception and its objects by relying on the force of experience and concept analysis. The theory may lead direct, naive realists to interpret the perceived object circularly. Because the problem regards that which has immediately appeared, the justification cannot be the same appearance.

First, they *claim* to perceive external entities, and second, they justify this claim with the same perception.[41]

Eliminative materialism is a theory arguing that there are no mental entities like sense-data, but only brain states. Advanced neuroscience might predict that there will be no need for basic psychological concepts in the near future. There will be because perception, sensation, memory, belief, fear, and other such things do not exist and do not explain our behavior. They are only *words*; the "problems of perception" are pseudo-problems.

1. J. L. Austin against the Perception of the Sense-data

In this chapter, I will discuss how J. L. Austin argues for the perception of the external physical objects. According to him, our perceptual-based claims are of material things. Austin's objective is not to answer the question "What are the objects of perception?" but rather to clarify the meaning of words such as 'sense perception', 'real', 'look', 'appear', and 'seem'. I will then evaluate Guy Longworth's interpretations concerning veridical perception and hallucination/illusion in Austin's *Sense and Sensibilia*. Finally, I will argue what I believe to be the key point in Austin's arguments.

The debate about arguments concerning hallucination and illusion are central to contemporary philosophy of perception, although the debate does not much clarify what an experience of perceiving something is (see also Chapter 1.1, pp. 10−14). If illusion and hallucination are possible, how can perception be what we ordinarily understand it to be, an openness to and awareness of the external world? The problem of perception is that if illusions and hallucinations are possible, then perception, as we ordinarily understand it, is impossible. (Crane and French, 2015) Austin challenged the claim that abnormal, illusory perceptions do *not* differ from normal, veridical ones in terms of quality (in both cases sense-data are perceived). The arguments from illusion and hallucination can be presented in the following way:

1. We directly perceive non-physical objects in cases of hallucination and illusion.

[41] For many Finnish philosophers, perception is sufficient for justifying *what* they perceive (this claim is based on my experiences). See also Crane and French, 2015.

2. There is an indistinguishable erroneous perception for any veridical perception.
3. If two experiences are indistinguishable, they have the same kind of objects.
4. Therefore, we directly perceive non-physical objects in veridical perception (from 1, 2, and 3). (Hopp, 2012: 2)

When the senses present something, the crucial question is *how* one knows that one really currently perceives external entities (Descartes and Leibniz thought that there is no reliable criterion). It has often been thought that anything that is known must satisfy certain criteria in addition to being real. Bruce Hunter (1992: 82) mentions some traditional suggestions: "Whatever we are immediately conscious of in thought or experience, e.g. that we seem to see red, is evident". Whether a criterion is some irreducible necessary truth or a matter of brute metaphysics, *its correctness* is not self-evident, although criteria should make a thesis directly evident. So, the question is about whether perceptual experience itself as a reliable criterion would make some propositions about external entities directly evident (this would be impossible: Chapter 1.1, pp. 5, 10−13). According to Descartes and Leibniz, we would need criteria for the claim that we are really perceiving, not dreaming. (Hunter, 1992: 82–83) This is *the problem of the Criterion*: if we know something, we must first have a method or criterion for distinguishing real cases from cases that are not real. This would mean that there is some 'that' or criterion 'C' that indicates perception of an external entity, for example. It is criterion to confirm that I am really perceiving an external entity. When 'that' is absent, it indicates that I do not perceive, but rather, that I dream or imagine an unreal object. Unfortunately, this kind of question is not considered necessary or useful in Austin's thought or philosophy of perception.

Evidence of this supposed lack of necessity and usefulness can be seen in a "certain" belief that perception reveals the mind-independent external environment. The character of the external entity determines the character of the perceptual experience and does so *without a causal connection* (Chapters 2.1, pp. 28−30, 2.2, pp. 35−39, 2.5, p. 48, 2.6, pp. 51−52, 54−57). Laurence Bonjour (2016: 23) writes that these external characters would be determined *constitutively* according to disjunctivism (direct realism includes disjunctivism). Matthew Soteriou describes Martin's naive realism and disjunctivism in such a way that the

visual experience of an apple seems to its subject to be *constitutively* dependent on the presence of the apple[42]. Direct, naive realists may think that the perceiver or genuine perception constitutively reaches the external entity, even if a causal connection exists between the perceiver and the external entity. (Nicholas of Cusa considered this view to be in contradiction with identity between several things in the causal chain because there cannot be several things that are exactly the same, for in that case there would not be several things, but the same thing itself [De Venatione Sapientiae, Chapter 23]. The perceiver's structure affects how things appear, thus refuting directness and identity: as stated, this fact refutes the idea that the perceiver would directly reach the external entity and that appearing phenomena would be identical to the external entity.) Moreover, because it is a fact that hallucination and veridical perception are two fundamentally different entities, it follows that they would directly refer to two different kinds of objects and differ in terms of quality. Hallucination would be about the internal particular and veridical perception would be about the material thing. For direct realism, the content of hallucination and the content of perception are *not* indistinguishable.

Direct realism is the position that we perceive the mind-independent external entities. Most people claim to perceive trees, buildings, people, and the properties of these things. They claim to perceive material things. J. L. Austin shared direct realism's view and criticized as unconvincing at best some standard forms of arguments which held that perception cannot put the perceiver in the required type of contact with their environment (Longworth, 2012:). Austin argued in *Sense and Sensibilia* that 'sense-datum', 'material thing', and 'sense perception' are not really understood or correctly described, and perception, illusion, and hallucination are different mental states (Austin, 1962: 3, 4, 8, 22, 23, 24, 25). On the other hand, he seems to focus on how people use the notion 'perceiving'. This indicates an *ad hoc* modification because he did not research how the term is used, but rather made excessive assumptions.[43] Furthermore, he did not define 'perception' in *Sense and Sensibilia*, even

[42] Soteriou, 2014.

[43] Austin did not know how women use the notion 'perceiving', and maybe he did not even care. Austin's philosophy seems to be typical male-philosophy as evidenced by his use of the *he* personal pronoun which shows contrast of person and gender in English. On the other hand, he tried to make clear that our ordinary words are much subtler in their uses than philosophers have realized (Austin, 1962: 3).

though he criticized Ayer for the same thing (Austin, 1962: 47, 53, 54, 55). He was not seeking to answer the question about what kind of thing we perceive, but sought to rid us of such illusions as 'the argument of illusion', and thus *the question* Austin analyzed differs from the question I examine (Austin, 1962: 4). He focused more on what the ordinary man and philosophers *say* that they directly or falsely perceive (Austin, 1962: 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15, 16, 17). At the same time, his own beliefs on perception came into view.

Austin (1962: 19) claims that philosophers' use of 'directly perceive' is not the ordinary use because, in that use, it is not only false but simply absurd to say that pens or cigarettes are never perceived directly.[44] He claims

"if we are to be seriously inclined to speak of something as being perceived indirectly, it seems that it has to be the kind of thing which we (sometimes at least) just perceive, or could perceive, or which—like the backs of our own heads—others could perceive. For otherwise we don't want to say that we perceive the thing at all, even indirectly" (Austin, 1962: 18).

Austin's (1962: 14, 15, 16, 17) examples of 'indirect perception' are metaphors in philosophy of perception. For example,

"We might, for example, contrast the man who saw the procession directly with the man who saw it through a periscope', or we might contrast the place from which you can watch the door directly with the place from which you can see it only in the mirror." (Austin, 1962: 15)

or

"But do I hear a shout indirectly, when I hear the echo?" (Austin, 1962: 16).

The focus should be on psychology of perception because Austin's examples do not demonstrate much: I indirectly see a procession through a periscope, but I directly see the periscope. We should ask what one perceives of when perception occurs due to psychological and physiological processes. Does one then perceive the external world, or something internal? Direct realists cannot deny the role of their own body and the brain in perceptual

[44] I consider us to be searching for truth rather than living in our dreams and beliefs. Previous philosophers have wanted to tell the truth about perception: you do not perceive the external world.

experience without eventually encountering contradiction. (Chapters 2.1, pp. 28−30, 2.2, pp. 35−36, 37, 39, 2.5, p. 48, 2.6, pp. 51−52, 54−57, 3.2, pp. 65−68, 70−79, 3.4, pp. 83−88, 4.3, p.102−105) Most of the time, however, Austin concentrated on a critique against the argument of illusion, Ayer, and Price without giving affirmative reasons for why he perceives material things. Austin really seems to believe that *language use* determines the reality, as if human beings govern the reality using language (Austin, 1962: 33–43).[45] Because Austin denied the sense-data of experience, it is unclear what the ordinary use of 'directly' or 'indirectly' is in cases of perception, illusion, and hallucination.

Austin doubted that a man who senses a mirage or sees a real oasis has two experiences that are similar in character. He asked, "For is it at all likely, really, to be very similar?". (Austin, 1962: 32) In the mirage case, the man is not seeing a material thing. However, Austin would not even say that the man is experiencing sense-data (Austin, 1962: 32). Austin thought that if an entity can be photographed or seen by any number of people, such as a mirror-image or a church camouflaged to look like a barn, then the entity is not a sense-datum (Austin, 1962: 30, 31).

Austin (1962: 44, 47, 52) interpreted the argument from illusion to mean that, first, in some abnormal situations, what we perceive is a sense-datum. From this he inferred the statement "what we (directly) perceive is always a sense-datum, even in the normal, unexceptional case" in the second stage. This inference is not the inference of indirect realism. Indirect realists believe that one does not *directly* perceive the external world based on introspection, understanding, and reasoning. They have a general belief or assumption, which is not a general conclusion based on particular instances of illusion, hallucination, perceptual relativity, effects, and science (Chapters 1.1, pp. 10−14, 3.3, pp. 80−82). Instead, these particular cases confirm this general assumption or statement: they are like tests for the general statement that one does not *directly* perceive the external world. Austin did not focus on the use of 'directly' and 'indirectly' here in the context of veridical and delusive perceptual experiences (3.4, pp. 87−88).

[45] I think that most ordinary language users are more or less indoctrinated by culture, history, and tradition.

According to Austin, Ayer and Price presented an argument that there is no intrinsic difference in kind between perceptions veridical in their presentation of material things and those that are delusive (Austin, 1962: 44). That is, for Ayer and Price, there exists no criterion to distinguish a perception of sense-datum from that of a material thing (Austin, 1962: 45). Austin blamed the circularity of Ayer's argument:

"But in Ayer's exposition the argument *is* put forward as a ground for the conclusion that what we are (directly) aware of in perception is always a sense-datum; and if so, it seems a rather serious defect that this conclusion is practically assumed from the very first sentence of the statement of the argument itself. In that sentence Ayer uses, not indeed for the first time, the term 'perceptions' (which incidentally has never been defined or explained), and takes it for granted, here and throughout, that there is at any rate some kind of entities of which we are aware in absolutely all cases— namely, 'perceptions', delusive or veridical." (Austin, 1962: 47)

On the other hand, Austin did not define 'sense perception', but used it in his own way. However, Austin was correct in his claim that seeing of, having an illusion of, or having a hallucination of *are not* exactly alike (their objects may be). Delusive and veridical experiences are distinguishable. (Austin: 1962: 49–50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 57)

Nonetheless, Austin then presented the difference between normal sense-data and abnormal sense-data. He asked, "Is it the case that 'delusive and veridical experiences' are not 'qualitatively different'?" and then gave examples. They are examples of *mental states*, however, *not* examples of sense-data or the objects of mental states. Dreaming and being awake, seeing and visualizing are or course different mental states, and in fact the circumstances in which a subject experiences these different states are different. Austin was incorrect in thinking that Descartes' thoughts in his first *Meditations* refer to the same issue as the considerations of Leibniz and Russell. For example, Descartes considered the whole content of experience regardless of whether he dreams or is awake. Russell stated the same thing in his Leibniz-study: "Why admit a world other than ourselves?" (Russell, 1900/1992: 72). What terms Austin (1962: 49, 59) uses to characterize dreaming or being awake is irrelevant because one can use whatever terms one wants in order to describe what one experiences. What one describes can be incorrect. Language does not solve the "problem of perception" because language does not produce it—it is implausible that this problem is caused by the

use of the word 'perceiving' and, therefore, we should not bother our minds with it. (Chapters 1.2 and 10) The "problem of perception" is caused by our way of sensing, our position, and our ability to question and understand things (see also Crane and French, 2015). We cannot verify whether the external world is as we experience. Philosophers should describe what really occurs when a subject sees a blue wall as opposed to when a subject has the experience of a blue wall because of seeing a white wall through blue spectacles (Austin, 1962: 49, 53, 54). Next, I am going to present Guy Longworth's interpretations about the veridical perception and hallucination/illusion in Austin's *Sense and Sensibilia*.

According to Austin, to make perception-based judgments so as *to sustain knowledge about* the external world, perception must put the perceiver in *direct* contact with that world. Perception-based judgments and perception are not about the internal objects of the mind. If Austin is correct, then not only are veridical perception and hallucination/illusion distinguishable, but the same is also true of their objects. (Longworth, 2015) These two experiences are directed towards different kinds of intentional objects because we have experiences with different kinds of objects that we cannot discriminate on the basis of introspection. For instance, we might experience a bar of soap that looks just like a lemon, and be in a position in which we could not discriminate the soap from the lemon on the basis of introspection. Nonetheless, we would hold that the two experiences have different kinds of objects (Longworth, 2015; Austin, 1962: 50–52)[46]. This description would concur with a belief that, in hallucination and illusion, the intentional object is a part of the psychological act. In veridical perception, the intentional object is external to and independent of the psychological act, which is an experience of perceiving. Following Austin, experience-based judgments in perception and in hallucination/illusion have different referents and meanings. (Chapter 3.4, pp. 87−88)

However, indirect realism means something other than the ability to discriminate things. The object of illusion/hallucination and the object of perceptual experience are similar in the sense that they belong to the same general category of idea. They are not similar with

[46] However, Austin does not seem to say that there are different kinds of *intentional objects* as I have presented above.

matter that belongs to the category of different. (Chapter 3.4, pp. 87−88) What I say means the same *nature* of *objects* of illusion/hallucination and perceptual experience. Austin's example is irrelevant, although he is correct concerning the invalidity of the argument "If we cannot discriminate the objects of two experiences on the basis of introspection, then those experiences must have objects of the same sort." (Longworth, 2015)

According to Austin, perception puts the perceiver in direct contact with external things and thus, on the basis of experiences, the object of perception is an external thing. In order to exploit the bird's head and shape as the basis for a judgment that the bird is a goldfinch, it is arguable that the perceiver must be able to see and feel the bird and its shape (Longworth, 2012:). Austin (1962: 2) argued *against* the doctrine that we never *directly* perceive or sense material objects (or material things), but only sense-data (or our own ideas). He believed material things to be the immediate objects of perception. I consider Austin's main argument to be: they are available to other perceivers as well and might be recorded in a photograph (Austin, 1962: 31). However, perceptual experience does not show what kind of thing is open to many perceivers even though perceiving seems to imply objects. Perceptual experience is not sufficient evidence of directness. (Chapters 1.1, pp. 1−3, 7−13, 3.3, pp. 80−82, 4.1, pp. 90−93)

I claim that Longworth is ambiguous when he presents Austin's version of the argument of illusion and says, "(ii) In those cases [cases of illusion], there must be something we experience that has the features in question. Call the things we experience in such cases *sense-data*." This statement can be interpreted in at least two ways: 1) there is a thing that *has* a property red, or two entities, and 2) there is a thing that *is* a property red, or one entity. Longworth understands sense-data as substances that have the properties in the quotation above. There is obviously a great deal of difference in *having* a property F and *being* a property F. (Chapters 3.3, 80−82, 3.4, pp. 87−88)

For Austin, perceptual experience involves elements that really are present in the perceiver's environment, thus leading to *true* perceptual experience-based judgments of the external environment. However, delusory or illusory experience involves something other than the elements present in the deluded or illusive perceiver's environment. A judgment

based on delusory or illusory experience is untrue if it is about the external environment because there are no features in the perceiver's environment that the delusory and illusory experiences appear to present there. Features are parts of delusory and illusory experiences. A particular delusory or illusory judgment may be based upon veridical perceptual experience because some cases of delusion or illusion involve dysfunctional judgmental responses to what is seen or heard. For example, an alcoholic person judges that pink rats are visible when in fact there are none. (Longworth, 2015) According to Longworth (2015), Austin stated that some things really do *look* the way they are sometimes taken to be—the stick looks bent even though it is not. But Austin held that those looks are not private features of the individual's experience: they are available to other perceivers and might be recorded in a photograph. In Austin's way of thinking, distinguishing veridical objects from delusory and illusory objects might be based on a larger context of perceptual experience including verification by comparing other perceiver's experiences and their own perceptual reports. A veridical object of perceptual experience is open and available to other perceivers. The way the stick looks can be the basis for perceptual judgments, as can other features like the straightness of the stick.

I feel that I should once again state what indirect realism, or critical realism, *is not*. It does not make sense to claim that colors in my visual field are internal objects and the water-content in the same visual field is the real water in the external world (Chapter 3.4, pp. 87−88). Instead, indirect realism is a view which holds that the whole sensible manifold that I immediately perceive appears to me. The sensible manifold, i.e., everything that I sense, is caused by the external world which includes the brain. Therefore, the content of water in my experience and the real water outside my mind are two distinct entities, and I speak only about my experience. Austin and Longworth speak about how *a stick* looks bent or straight or how *the water* looks in these circumstances. Using their methods, how *colors*, *shapes*, or *figures* look is the correct use of words. This is too human-centered.

How humans experience differs in appearance from how some animal species such as flies experience (from reason). Therefore, it is probable that how things look is so different that elements of experience might not be present in the perceiver's environment. The real and

illusory objects cannot be distinguished by their availability to other perceivers or recorded in a photograph. Different perceivers' systems of sense are so different and, therefore, panoramas (views of the whole region surrounding the perceivers) differ from their rich contents. We have no reasons to favor human perceivers. (Chapter 2.6, pp. 51−52, 54−57)

As far as I am concerned, the key point in Austin's arguments is now that there exists 1) the perceptual claim and 2) the immediate object of perception. The perceptual claim is based on an immediate object of perception that *is* or *is not* distinguishable from the immediate object of hallucination or illusion. Let us consider an example: I have an experience of something. What is the distinguishing mark or criterion by which I am able to tell if I perceive the external world or am having a delusory or illusory experience? What is that mark? Am I currently a perceiving subject, or a deluded and illusive subject? Austin believed the mark to be the possibility of being photographed or seen by any number of people, and so on.

2. Searle's Presentational Theory of Perception: Seeing Things as They Are

Searle has been focusing on the intentionality of perceptual experience. His main claim is that perceptual experience is presentational, not representational[47]. The intentional object of perceptual experience is a physical thing, like a car or a dog. I will show 1) what Searle denies and 2) how he argues for his claim that an experience of *seeing* is directed towards the physical thing. We do not see sense-data, those ideas in our minds that are representations of a real world, as representative realism claims we do (Searle, 2012: 9).

First, Searle demonstrates why the traditional dualism of Locke, Hume, Descartes, Kant, Leibniz, and even Mill and Russell is a false description of our perceptual situation. In a typical perceptual experience, says Searle, we are directly aware of objects and states of affairs around us. By "directly" he means that the relationship is unmediated. Looking at the desk in front of me is not like seeing the desk on television or reflected in a mirror. In

[47] There is a confusing use of 'representational' in contemporary philosophy of mind. On the one hand, perceptual experience represents how things really are in the external world. On the other hand, 'representational' is used to refer to a case where "all introspection can reveal are represented facts about the object of experience". Perceptual experience is representational. See Crane (2000) and Martin (2002), for instance.

those two cases I do not see the desk directly; right now I see it directly, insists Searle (2012: 9). But why has direct realism been denied? Searle replies that direct realism is consistent with both our experience and common sense. (Searle, 2012: 9)

Searle begins justification of his account's realism by criticizing the classical theories of perception and identifies a single fallacy, which he calls *the Bad Argument*. Searle's version might be reconstructed as follows. According to Searle, the standard argument against direct realism is called the Argument from Illusion:

"And here is how it goes: I said that I see the desk in front of me, but suppose I were having a hallucination. I could be having an experience exactly like this, completely indiscriminable from this one with exactly the same content as this one, and be having a total hallucination. You could have the same experience without there being a desk on the other end of the experience." (Searle, 2012: 10)

In the following step, he says that the argument from illusion/hallucination remains valid:

"The character of the experience in the hallucination case and the character in the veridical case, the bad case and the good case respectively, is the same; so any analysis of one has to be applied to the other." (Searle, 2012: 10)

In hallucination and veridical perception, there is something of which a subject is aware. In some sense, a subject "sees" something in both cases. That something cannot be the material entity, the desk, as there is no material entity in the case of hallucination. I can be aware of something between me and another material entity, such as a door. I have the experience of an inner object, a sense-datum of the desk. A sense datum is an entirely mind-dependent, ontologically subjective entity. (Searle, 2012: 10) And then Searle argues:

"Now, by the principle that both the good case and the bad case should receive the same analysis, it follows that in the good case I am not aware of a material object but only of sense data. But now it seems to follow that in all experiences I am aware only of sense data, not of mind independent material objects.[48]" (Searle, 2012: 10)

[48] I notice that this conclusion cannot be deduced from the previous statement: From some cases, I would infer that it is invalid for all cases.

Searle concludes, however, that there is something wrong with the argument. He says that it rests on *a simple fallacy of ambiguity*. (Searle, 2012: 10)

According to Searle, the Argument from Illusion/Hallucination is a fallacy. The notions "aware of", "conscious of", and even "sees" are ambiguous. The perceiver can be aware of two distinct entities in which one is intentional and the other is not. By intentionality, Searle means the experience or the awareness, and the thing the perceiver experiences or is aware of are not identical. He uses a simple example: "If I push my hand very hard against the top of the desk, I am aware of the surface of the desk." (Searle, 2012: 10, 11) This is the intentionality sense of "aware of" which has the desk as the intentional object. (Searle, 2012: 10) Here, according to Searle, the desk is the intentional object because it is not identical to his awareness. In the second sense of "aware of", he is also aware of a painful sensation leading to a situation that is not intentional: the awareness and the painful sensation, or the object, are identical. (Searle. 2012: 10, 11) *Of course*, Searle's claim is now that in illusion and in hallucination, the act and the object *are* identical, and, in perceptual experience, the experience and the object that the perceiver perceives *are not* identical. (Searle, 2012: 10, 11)[49]:

"In every case there is an ambiguity in the crucial phrases "aware of" or "conscious of"; because in the intentionality sense in which I am aware of something when I see it, in the case of the hallucination I am not aware of anything. I have a conscious experience, but that conscious experience is not itself the object of the experience; it is identical with the experience." (Searle, 2012: 11)

He considers that one perceives the world, or one perceives it directly: One does not perceive the contents of one's own mind (Searle, 2012: 11). The argument from illusion/hallucination above, the conclusion of which is the denial of direct realism, is *invalid* because it rests on a fallacy of ambiguity, although *the first premise is true*. The hallucination case and the veridical case have exactly the same content. Searle claims however that we do not need to deny the first premise, as disjunctivists suggest, in order to save naïve realism. (Searle,

[49] One can wonder if one's imagination and the object of imagination *are identical*. For example, if I imagine a centaur, it seems that the centaur is *not* identical to my awareness or my imagination. A centaur is a Meinongian object, a subsistence.

2012: 11, 12) I accept Searle's critique that we should deny the first premise "The hallucination case and the veridical case have exactly the same content" and then "The character of the experience in the hallucination case and the character in the veridical case, the bad case and the good case respectively, is the same; so any analysis of one has to be applied to the other". However, I deny that indirect realism would argue for the belief "The perceptual experience itself is the object of perceptual experience" (Searle, 2012: 13).

Searle also denies the Argument of Science as the same single fallacy. He states that the fact that one can give a causal account of how a conscious experience occurs does not show that one does not see the external objects and states of affairs on the other end of the conscious experience (Searle, 2012: 12−13). He argues that to suppose that one does not see is to suppose that the experience itself is the object of perception. Therefore, concludes Searle, that is the Bad Argument all over again (Searle, 2012: 13). Here, Searle does not deny causality in perceptual experience. What he denies is the object of sense caused by the external events. He seems to accept that the conscious experience is "embodied", but he appears to deny that we are aware of the experience in perception. However, the question now is whether various events cause the idea (the sense-datum), and whether this idea would be the immediate object of perceptual experience. (Searle, 2012: 13; Chapters 2.1, pp. 28−30, 2.2, pp. 37−39, 2.5, p. 48, 2.6, pp. 51−52, 54−57, 3.4, pp. 87−88, 4.2, p. 99, 4.5, pp. 112−115, 117−118)

Next, Searle wishes to provide conditions of satisfaction for perceptual experience. Mental states are representations. However, Searle points out that perceptual experience is not a representation: it is presentational. Perception has intentional meaning, says Searle, the directedness or the aboutness of the mind. Searle's claim simply is: when I see something, I do not have a representation, but rather a direct presentation of the object. My beliefs and desires are typically representations of objects and states of affairs in the world. The perceptual experience is a presentation and not just a representation. (Searle, 2012: 14) What does it mean exactly to say that the perceptual experience is a presentation?

According to Searle, the most immediate and obvious feature of perceptual *presentations* is that they are directly caused by the object itself.[50] "Caused by the object" is Searle's conditions of satisfaction for perceptual experience:

"The present features of the object I am seeing are the conditions of satisfaction – what makes the visual experience "veridical" – but they are experienced immediately, and they are experienced as causing the very perceptual experience that has the object and the features as the rest of the conditions of satisfaction." (Searle, 2012: 15)

We must be careful, because Searle says that "the object or state of affair seen causes the experience itself…" (Searle, 2012: 15). The object would cause the experience of it. However, this is not what other philosophers, such as Hume and Locke for instance, said about the situation: they claimed that the external substance causes the idea, the impression, or the appearance in mind, and thus the perceiver immediately sees the idea of the substance. We must be speaking about the same thing. The perceptual experience is caused, but the present features of the external entity do not cause it. The perceiver's features cause the perceptual experience even though the external entity outside the perceiver can be *a cause* in the transitive relation. However, identity cannot be added to causation between the perceptual experience and the external entity. (Chapters 1.1, p. 5, 2.1, pp. 28−30, 2.2, pp. 35−39, 2.5, p. 48, 3.2, pp. 65−68, 70−79, 3.4, pp. 84−88, 4.2, p. 96−99, 4.4, p. 106−108, 4.5, pp. 112−115, 117−118, 5.1, pp. 122−125)

Perceptual experience also occurs in the present situation, here and now, which is the second feature of presentational intentionality. Everything I see I am seeing right here and right now. (Searle, 2012: 15) The third feature of perceptual experience is that it is not detachable from the conditions of satisfaction. I cannot shuffle perceptual experience around as I can other sorts of mental representations:

[50] I absolutely disagree with this claim. The table or its feature is not *the* cause of perception. Perception is a much more complex phenomenon. The table does not affect the perceiver, but the light or the pressure does. See Chapter 2.1 and consider it carefully.

"If I close my eyes and think about objects, I experience certain representations of these objects and I can shuffle them around at will. But if I open my eyes and look directly at objects in front of me, I cannot shuffle my experiences around at will. They are experienced as directly connected to the object that I am seeing, and this is a feature of the phenomenology that holds even for hallucinations" (Searle, 2012: 15, 16)

In sum, according to Searle, presentational intentionality differs from such things as beliefs and desires in at least these three crucial respects (Searle, 2012: 16). I deny the first, and accept the second and the third features.

Searle claims that we, or at least human persons I suppose, have a subjective and objective visual field. He argues for this objectivity by asserting that it is "perceivable by any similarly endowed and similarly situated person" and "because it is accessible to anyone equally" (Searle, 2012: 16, 17)[51]. Because I, you, and they have an experience of similar content of the visual field it must be objective, neutral, and impersonal. If I close my eyes and put my hand over my eyes, I will have an experience which is something like seeing a black area with yellow patches in it. This area would be *the subjective visual field*. By opening my eyes, the subjective field is filled with the objects and states of affairs that are visible from my point of view: I am aware of my *objective visual field*. (Searle, 2012: 16, 17) Referring to the objective field, Searle says, "Now open your eyes and the subjective visual field is suddenly filled with everything that constitutes your conscious awareness of the objects and states of affairs in your vicinity" (Searle, 2012: 16). My question is now whether "this everything", the objects and the states of affairs, is outside of the perceiver. Searle argues that it is "because it is accessible to anyone equally" (Searle, 2012: 17).

Searle now claims that I cannot see anything in the subjective visual field. In addition, objects in the objective visual field are *not* internal objects of my mind, as the inner object theory of perception presupposes. According to Searle,

[51] This is exactly what I have said about 'the external world': from my point of view, other peoples are external entities. The term does not mean 'the world external to human community'. See Chapters 1.1, pp. 1−2, 21−23, 3.3, pp. 80−82, 5.1, pp. 123−127, 130−132.

"The idea that the entities in the subjective visual field are themselves seen is the basis of the Bad Argument. The awareness itself is erected into the object of awareness; and this denies the intentionality of perception, because the experience is not the intentional object of the experience, it is the experience itself." (Searle, 2012: 17)

After saying that everything can be seen in the objective visual field, Searle asks what *fact* about my subjective experiences makes it true that I am seeing specific types of objects and states of affairs in the objective visual field. According to Searle, *resemblance* and *causation* both fail. It cannot be that the experience resembles the object, or that I see redness because my seeing is red. The perceptual experience is not perceivable. Also, it cannot be that the experience of red has a red character because the experience of red is caused by red things. It cannot be because causation by itself does not carry any intentional content. (Searle, 2012: 17−18)

It is Searle's intuition-based judgment that perception is hierarchically structured in that the top level depends on our ability to see the bottom level, until one finally gets down to the basic level of things that you can see without seeing anything else by which you can see them (Searle, 2012: 18). He argues that a basic perceptual feature, a color or a shape, is one you can see without seeing that thing by way of which you see the basic thing:

"So, take an example, I do not just see colors and shapes, but I see cars, trees, houses; and indeed I do not just see any cars, trees, and houses, I see my car in the parking lot, or my house. The point about the hierarchical structure is this: in order to see that it is my car, I have to see that it is a car of a certain make and age; but in order to see that it is a car of a certain make and age, I have to see that it is a car at all; and in order to see that it is a car at all, I have to see that it has certain color and shape. Color and shape are basic relative to the other features, so being my car is less basic than being a car of a certain type; being a car of a certain in type is less basic than being a car; and you go down until you finally reach basic perceptual features, such as color, shape, movement, etc." (Searle, 2012: 18)

Color or shape are external entities appearing to the perceiver in a way similar to that by which a color of imagination appears to him or her: "ontologically objective features of the

world that are perceivable"[52] (Searle, 2012: 18, 19). To answer the question above, he proposes that we "emphasize the fact that our perceptual relations to the external world are causal and experienced as causal throughout" (Searle, 2012: 19). Thus, Searle really claims to see causation or necessary connections everywhere:

"Hume taught us we cannot experience necessary connection. I think we experience it pretty much all day long. Wherever we consciously perceive or engage in action we experience objects causing perceptual experiences in us and ourselves causing bodily movements and other sorts of changes in the world. Causation, to repeat, is everywhere." (Searle, 2012: 19)

Searle's claim must be mistaken because I have never been perceiving relations as empirical objects. Relations, such as causation, after, or friendship, are not experienced as properties of the external world (see Chapter 2.1). I am seeing books, screens, hands, and the like, but I am not seeing any relations between them, not even temporal or spatial relations such as "x occurs after y" or "y is behind z". I do not perceive that red causes my experience of red, although Searle believes that he perceives this causal relation. (Searle, 2012: 20) Searle concludes that the essential feature of colors is this ability to cause these sorts of experiences. It is due to the very essence of something being red that red consists in the ability to cause this sort of experience. (Searle, 2012: 19, 20, 22) The fact is that Searle does not know how object perception, event perception, or color perception occur: they require the brain and physical energy like light. Realists should admit this and attach it to their theories as Russell and Chisholm did (Chapters 2.1, pp. 28−30, 2.2, pp. 35−39, 2.6, 51−52, 54−57, 3.2, pp. 65−68, 4.3, pp. 102−105, 4.4, pp. 106−108, 4.5, pp. 112−118, 5.1, pp. 124−125, 130−132)

Finally, I will say just one thing about Searle's theory of what we really see. His claim about *the causation of experience* is dubious. Searle claims that we experience objects causing perceptual experiences. However, the traditional claim is that external objects cause the ideas of which we are immediately aware in perception. Furthermore, my hand does not

[52] Searle does not explain *how* he recognizes his car, or an object as a car in general. Perceiving my car requires memory activation and background information. This view of Searle's has nothing to do with scientific research. See his view on *recognition* on pages 21 and 22.

cause my perceptual experience of *something* that appears to be *my hand* because there might be a great deal of events before the occurrence of perceptual experience. There is no *one* event <xPy> meaning that x perceives y and y is the cause of perception of y.

3. Martin on Perceiving the External Substances through Experience

Experience is argued to be 'transparent' in the sense that we 'perceive' the object of experience through it. When we immediately try to attend to our experience, we fail to do so because we can do nothing but attend immediately to the object of that experience. Moreover, the phenomenal character, i.e., qualia, would then be the intentional content of experience, not a non-material feature of experience (3.4, pp. 87−88). In his impressive 2002 article "Transparency of Experience", M.G.F. Martin argues that sense-datum theories cannot give an adequate account of the fact that introspection indicates that our sense experience is transparent to the world. Of course, for Martin, introspection indicates that our sensory experiences are directed on the mind–independent entities in the world around us. He says, "The claim is that one's experience is, so to speak, diaphanous or transparent to the objects of perception, at least as revealed to introspection. This observation is used in support of intentional views of perception, which ascribe to it representational properties and against purely sense-datum views of experience, which would take it to be purely subjective." (Martin, 2002: 376, 377, 378) In this chapter, I will first examine what *reasons* Martin has for the claim that we see the mind-independent substance through *experience*. Therefore, the mind-independent substance would be the object of experience. My question is how the perceiver "sees" through visual experience, and we will see that Martin's thinking is contradictory. Second, I will finally discuss how the phenomenon is explained in certain sorts of terms from the methodological perspective. When discussing philosophical theories, Martin makes extensive use of the words 'to explain experience in terms of', as is common in contemporary philosophy. Here, I do not think Martin is a philosopher who only argues for the intentional theory of perception. He also is a naive realist when considering the theory of perception (see e.g. 2004).

Introspection reveals F that is a represented fact about the external world. The external real thing is F, like the sky is blue. For example, my experience represents the street as white—

and thus also represents the street. My sense experience is not white or the street (for Russell, there exist experience and its objects whose sense-data is not represented). It is not by introspection that I attain the sense experience of whiteness or the street, but rather I see right through the sense experience and see the real white snowy street. In this sense, or so goes the argument, the experience is transparent based on the introspective evidence. (Introspection, however, does not show whether or not the object of sense is external, but it does show that there are many things that appear. See about this: Chapters 1.1, pp. 1−2, 4.1, pp. 90−93, 5.1, pp. 123−125)

Martin's article is about the experience, the nature of appearances, i.e., how things seem to one, and claims about what is obvious. The claims about what is obvious are taken to rest on introspective reflection. (Martin, 2002: 376−377, 389−390) There are two opposing camps debating the nature of experience: on one extreme is the view that experience is entirely subjective in character, that it involves awareness of certain non-physical or mind-dependent entities. On the other side of the debate is the view that our experience is the presentation of a mind-independent world and nothing else, and that it can be so only in virtue of our experience being representational or intentional in character. (Martin, 2002: 377, 396−7) Martin notes that it has become common in recent discussions to reject the first extreme, as reflected in pure sense-datum theories of perception, and claim instead that one's experience is of a mind-independent world, and that in order for it to be so, one's experience must be representational (Martin, 2002: 377). He suggests that there are reasons to think that one's experience relates one to the mind-independent world, and yet does so in a non-representational manner. These reasons come from reflection on appearances—that is, on what our sensory experiences are like—and how these relate to sensory imagination (Martin, 2002: 378).[53]

Martin's "transparency objection against sense-data" is clearly pure *interpretation* and *description* of what seems to be from his point of view. He perceptually attends to the bush

[53] Martin speaks frequently about "reports of introspection" and "introspective data" as if they demonstrated what the perceiver's experiences are of. However, introspective reports have been considered unreliable since the late 1800s. This was one reason why empirical psychology came about and split off from philosophy.

itself while at the same time reflecting on what he is doing. He then concludes that "it does not seem to me as if there is any object apart from the bush for me to be attending to or reflecting on while doing this". (Martin, 2002: 381−2, 383, 389−390) These observations have prompted an argument against sense-datum theories:

> "When I stare at the straggling lavender bush at the end of my street, I can attend to the variegated colours and shapes of leaves and branches, and over time I may notice how they alter with the seasons. But I can also reflect on what it is like for me now to be staring at the bush, and in doing so I can reflect on particular aspects of the visual situation: for example that at this distance of fifty metres the bush appears more flattened than the rose bush which forms the boundary of my house with the street. When my attention is directed out at the world, the lavender bush and its features occupy centre stage. It is also notable that when my attention is turned inwards instead to my experience, the bush is not replaced by some other entity belonging to the inner realm of the mind in contrast to the dilapidated street in which I live." (Martin, 2002: 381)

No non-physical sense-data replaced the lavender bush for Martin as he directed his attention inwards to his own state of mind. The charge here is that qualia (or equally, sense-data) are absent from any introspective search of the mind. (Martin, 2002: 381−2, 383, 396−7)

The immediate objects of awareness are not sense-data according to Martin. He claims that introspection reveals something else. First, there does *not* seem to be some internal object corresponding to each substance of perception, nor an internal feature to correspond to the properties of the external substances. Secondly, there is *more* to the character of experience than a pure sense-datum or qualia-based view assumes. (Martin, 2002: 383−4, 389−390) Rather, there is evidence "for an explanation of how mind-independent objects can feature in an account of what experience is like" (Martin, 2002: 384). The intentional theorist appeals to an analogy with belief or judgment: Martin's belief is that the belief is a representational state about how things are in the world, and this belief represents something other than physical entities in the world. If Mary believes that a package contains sweets even when it only contains pencils, we are not inclined to suppose that her belief must have been about some non-physical entities. (Martin, 2002: 384−5, 386−7) This is the shared element between intentional theorists and datum theorists: a concern with illusions or hallucinations

(Martin, 2002: 384). I do not believe that Martin's beliefs, which are theoretical considerations, are true. I would say that one does not form beliefs about the world without sensing and experiencing. Martin's analogy at least partly fails because we do not have empirical beliefs without experiencing. Martin does not have a belief about the bush without staring at something and experiencing colors and shapes. A belief about how things are in the external world is based on experience, and experience is an internal conscious state. (Martin, 2002: 381−2, 383, 384−5, 386−7, 389−390)

Martin (2002: 385) applies this analogy to the case of hallucination, and at the same time, he shows his stance: the experience represents how the mind-independent environment is (the represented is an external substance, not a sense-datum as Russell thought, and experience is representation, not an appearance that would represent the external substance). Because the phenomenal character of the experience is determined by how the experience represents the environment to be, "his experience can have the same phenomenological character in a case of hallucination as in a case of perception, and in both cases that character involves an actual or possible state of affairs in the mind-independent environment." (Martin, 2002: 385) For example, Michael Tye's experience is of a blue expanse even when he has a hallucination. Martin (2002: 385) argues that "his experience represents the presence of a blue expanse of water in his environment." It can represent this state of affairs even if it does not obtain, concludes Martin (2002: 385). The *intentional theory* insists that mind-independent objects and qualities can be presented to the perceiver in experience although they do not actually exist and are not instantiated (Martin, 2002: 385).

By appealing to the phenomenal transparency of experience, the intentional theory first highlights the lack of manifest presence of nonphysical objects and qualities and, secondly, emphasizes that mind-independent objects seem to be aspects of our experience when one's attention is directed inward (Martin, 2002: 386). The *representational* or *intentional content* is an answer to the question of how "mind-independent objects could feature in the phenomenological character of experience given the argument from illusion" (Martin, 2002: 386).

According to Martin, perceptual experiences "involve taking the world to be the way that the content of experience represents them to be" (Martin, 2002: 387, 388, 393). But then, the skeptical mind might ask whether the panorama content of experience is the same as the mind-independent environment and its state of affairs. If such panorama content is mind-dependent, it cannot be mind-independent because the content of experience is not both mind-dependent and mind-independent (3.4, pp. 87−88). Martin points out and accepts that "the representational properties of the experience are properties of the experience, and hence not to be identified with the ocean or any of its properties. They must rather be the properties the experience has of representing things to be a certain way." (Martin, 2002: 387) These claims indicate that Martin's beliefs are contradictory. The content of experience is not *identical* to the mind-independent environment if it is representational.[54] In contrast, no non-physical sense-data replaced Martin's lavender bush as he directed his attention inwards to his own state of mind. The charge here is that qualia (or equally, sense-data) are absent from any introspective search of the mind, as I presented above. (Martin, 2002: 381−2, 383, 396−7)

In the end, it seems that Martin just has to rely on beliefs about how things are in the external world. He cannot inspect them from the outside. A subject's perceptual experience fixes his beliefs about his environment. Martin refers to Austin's example. When Austin's pig comes into full view, this settles the question of whether or not there is a pig around. (Martin, 2002: 389)

"From Austin's own perspective, introspection of his situation just reveals what attention to the yard had already shown: the presence, or putative presence of a pig. From Austin's perspective, matters are not neutral about porcine presence. For him, one might suggest, the reason for thinking that there is a pig there is simply the pig itself." (Martin, 2002: 390)

According to Martin, introspection justifies what the perceiver believes even if the subject believes himself to be suffering an illusion or hallucination. Martin (2002: 390) argues that

[54] See what Martin says about naïve realism if we have a case in which "we should explain the phenomenal transparency in terms of the objects of perception, and not in terms of the experience's representational content". (Martin, 2002: 393−4)

"the belief that one is suffering a hallucination need bring about no alteration in what one's experience is like". What changes is one's response to the situation (Martin, 2002: 390). I think that Martin should give a condition that allows for the distinction between hallucination and perception. Or he should give a condition that allows us to distinguish whether *the object of introspection* is internal or external, mind-dependent or mind-independent. It cannot have contrary properties. (Chapter 3.4, pp. 87−88) However, Martin does not provide this condition. Therefore, all he has to rely on are his beliefs of how things are in the external world. He insists that there is a rational link between *the phenomenal character of one's experience* and *the beliefs* one can form about the subject matter so presented (Martin, 2002: 391). This link, claims Martin, is the fact that one can have a perceptual experience with a certain content which is manifested to a subject through his awareness of the seeming presence of the objects of experience (Martin, 2002: 391). I see the situation as follows. If the phenomenal character of one's experience is caused by the brain, then identity cannot be added between the present external thing and the phenomenal character. What is in the perceiver is not outside the perceiver, which is obvious. Beliefs are therefore based on data of consciousness. (Chapters 1.1, pp. 1−2, 5, 2.1, pp. 28−30, 2.6, pp. 51−52, 54−57, 3.3, pp. 80−82, 3.4, pp. 87−88, 4.4, pp. 106−108, 4.5, pp. 112−115, 117−118, 5.1, pp. 123−125, 5.2, pp. 133−136)

However, instead of our beliefs, Martin guarantees that

> "There is a negative charge against sense-datum theories, that introspection provides no direct evidence for the presence of non-physical entities or qualities of the sort that such theories posit, but the deeper concern is rather the demand for a positive explanation of what introspection does find. This grounds the claims of the intentional theory to be the obviously correct account of perceptual experience. This is why it has no need to assume that it is simply evident to us in introspection that our experience has representational properties. What is obvious to us, according to this line of argument, is that our experience is of mind-independent objects." (Martin, 2002: 392)

However, this does not seem to be the ultimate truth, as we will see later. If experience is representing, then it cannot be *directly* of mind-independent objects even though these objects would be the *represented*. Furthermore, if the experience is indirect, then it is not direct

because contrary properties cannot simultaneously coincide in one and the same subject. (Chapter 3.4, pp. 87−88)

Finally, I would like to discuss the second chapter of Martin's article from the methodological point of view. He speaks at length about how *experience* is explained *in certain terms* under different philosophical theories. It then seems to me that the perceiver cannot observe how things and states of affairs really are external to his or her experiences. Otherwise, we would know that the world is exactly as we sense. From the methodological point of view, explaining the phenomenon using terms or certain vocabulary raises doubts. One problem can be that the explanation is based on a theory (or an ideology) rather than the phenomenon we wish to explain. The second point is that we can use any terms we like about the data of sense, but the terms do not verify whether or not the object that is immediately given is external. Our ways of thinking and world views then color our perception-based claims. The real situation on the other side of the veil of perception should be disclosed. (Chapters 1.1, pp. 1−2, 1.2, 3.4, pp. 83−88, 5.1, pp. 123−125, 10)

Martin's intentional theory of perceptual experience differs from naïve realism. The intentional theorist explains phenomenological character by reference to the representational content of experience. But the naïve realist may claim that we should explain the phenomenal transparency in terms of the objects of perception, and not in terms of the experience's representational content. (Martin, 2002: 393) In a case of veridical perception, one is presented with a mind-independent object, such as a lavender bush, and the state of mind one has involves a relation between oneself and the lavender bush one sees; the lavender bush and its salient features are partly *constitutive* of the experience one has. If these things are constitutive of the experience, then one could not be having such an experience if they did not exist. (Martin, 2002: 394−5) As presented above, both sense-datum views and intentionalism assume that perceptual experiences form a common kind of mental state among cases of veridical perception, illusion, and hallucination (Martin, 2002: 393). A familiar objection to sense-datum theories of perception is that they introduce entities which act as a 'veil of perception' between us and the external world; and it is often suggested that the

putative presence of such a veil would lead to insuperable skeptical problems. The complaint that such views introduce intermediaries into our experience of the world seems to be a variant of the 'veil of perception' objection. If so, then the best way of cashing out this metaphorical worry is in terms of the phenomenal transparency objection discussed above. (Martin, 2002: 396) A sense-datum view which seeks to explain experience purely in *terms* of the awareness of non-physical sense-data thereby seeks to replace the putative mind-independent objects of awareness with these non-physical sense-data, and hence threatens to undermine this feeling of justification we have for our beliefs. (Martin, 2002: 396−7) According to the disjunctivist, veridical perceptions must be such that the occurrence of such experiences guarantees the presence of the objects of perception. On the intentionalist conception of experience, no such guarantee obtains. (Martin, 2002: 398) One of the aims of judgment is that one's judgments are true. If it manifests to a subject that something is the case, then given the aim of judgment, ceteris paribus, the subject ought to make the judgment that matches what is manifest to him. So, in a situation in which a subject is perceiving veridically, and in no way distrusts his experience, he will feel compelled to judge that things are that way. To borrow Austin's phrase, 'the question is settled' for him. In the case of veridical perception taken at face value, the immediacy or vivacity of experience reflects the character of the situation, which is that a certain fact obtains in the subject's environment and that fact has been made apparent to him. (Martin, 2002: 399) But for the intentional theorist, the same kind of state is present in all three situations, and this state has two properties which offer a common explanation. First, the experience has a representational content which is only correct in the case that the environment contains such objects. This situation obtains when one is veridically perceiving, but it can obtain even if one is not perceiving or experiencing at all. Second, a state with such content is a certain kind of attitude, a sensory experiencing, which involves a default inclination to commit to things being so. This state can be present in any of the three situations. (Martin, 2002: 401) According to the intentional approach, we should not suppose that we have to understand the phenomenological character of perceptual experience in relational terms (Martin, 2002: 402).

Neither theories nor terms demonstrate whether or not the object that appears to us in perception is external. When using certain terms in order to explain the immediate object of

perception, the researcher has committed him or herself to a view of the nature of reality or dogmatism, without consideration of evidence or the opinions of others. (Chapters 1.1, pp. 1−3, 5, 1.2, 23−25, 5.1, 123−125, 10, pp. 212−218)

4. Objects of Experience in Eliminative Materialism

According to Patricia S. Churchland, neurophilosophy means that mind and its entities, such as sense-data, fears, and thoughts, are explicated from the point of view of the brain. According to her, mind is brain. Paul M. Churchland's arguments against the existence of mental entities are based on the view that our conceptual frameworks lead to a false understanding of human beings and the nature of mind and cognition. "Theories" of folk psychology make us suppose the existence of mind and its entities and "see" states of affairs incorrectly, just as political ideologies make us "see" society incorrectly. Eliminative materialism questions the mentality of our inner states and the use of non-material psychological concepts (not their *physiological* nature) because of "the failings of current folk psychology" (Churchland, 1984: 43–46; 1992: 420). For eliminative materialism, the "problem of perception" does not exist. I will argue otherwise. However, the recent discussion in philosophy of mind and philosophy of perception acknowledges the phenomenological character of experience, that is, the representational content, which escapes physical theory (Smith, 2013: 13−17). If the *represented* is closely tied to the brain or it is identical with a token of brain state and if it is linked with the perceptual situation, the identity problems appear (Chapters 1.1, pp. 1−2, 2.1, pp. 28−30, 2.5, p. 48, 3.4, pp. 87−89, 4.2, p. 96−99, 5.2, pp. 134−136, 5.3, pp. 140−145). It is from this causal and identical perspective that I will examine eliminative materialism.

I classify eliminative materialism as belonging to direct realism. For example, in neuroscience, which eliminativists support, James Gibson (1966) argues that perception is direct. There is enough information in our environment to make sense of the world in a direct way. If by "observation" and "perception" eliminativists mean the same as Gibsonian direct realism or biological psychology of perception, i.e., brain processing carried out in one direction from the retina to the visual cortex, then clearly 'picking up directly the information of

the external world' (Gibson, 1967, 1968-9) refutes the “problems of perception” in the philosophical sense. It is then justified to classify eliminative materialism as belonging to direct realism. In fact, I will show that eliminativists did not give much contemplation to the problem of whether or not they directly observe the physical things of the external world (Churchland, 1984: 133–155). For example, Feyerabend defended a realism according to which “the interpretation of a scientific theory depends upon nothing but the state of affairs it describes” (Feyerabend, 1981: 42; Butts, 1966: 384). According to Feyerabend, observation statements are of physical objects, not of internal psychological events or sense-data (Oberheim, 2006: 233; Zahar, 1982: 401). Sense-datum is an internal appearance, and this is generally what eliminative materialists have “eliminated”.

Paul M. Churchland generally argues *against* the existence of mentality and the theoretical neutrality of *observation*. Although he does not mention the “problem of perception”, he is also forced to deny it. He may distinguish perception from hallucination and illusion simply on the grounds of the different physiological processes that do not have mind-dependent entities as objects. Furthermore, he clearly thinks of the *observed* as external. However, the perceptual processing and the different observation reports about the *observed* are theory-laden, although they are of the physical objects. (See, for example, Churchland, 1984: 44−45, 47−48, 79−80, 115−116; 1988: 169, 171, 172, 174, 176, 180, 182, 185; 1992: 423)

One of the most powerful pieces of evidence of the existence of mental entities is introspection. It reveals our inner mental realm in the same way as external perception reveals a mind-independent external world (Martin, 2002; McDowell, 2007). By investigating one’s inner mind, one is conscious of mental entities, such as objects of perceptual experience, emotions, desires and thoughts, and understanding. Churchland (1984: 47–48) tends to show that the argument from introspection is mistaken. This begs the question.

Churchland argues that we must presuppose the existence of mental entities in order to consider our introspection as disclosing them: the doctrine of folk psychology makes us assume that introspection is direct evidence of mental entities. That is, introspection makes

us assume that the introspection premise leads to the conclusion that mental entities exist. The argument that Churchland constructs is:

1) Introspection directly reveals pains, beliefs, desires, fears, sense-data, experiences, and so forth.
2) Therefore, pains, desires, fears, sense-data, experiences exist. (Churchland, 1984: 47)

A conceptual framework in which an introspection statement is expressed presupposes a conclusion: the existence of mental entities. According to Churchland, all observation occurs within some systems of concepts. Observation-based statements are always expressed in a conceptual framework. This thesis would include the "problem of perception" in which the objects of experience are mind-dependent sense-data, which Churchland does not mention. (Churchland, 1984: 47–48; 1988: 167−168, 181−182) However, he cannot say that observation-based statements are of sense-data or internal psychological things, as I have characterized sense-datum in section one (1.1.2, pp. 13−15), because he has never argued for a sense-datum system of concepts (Churchland, 1984: 133–155). Churchland may be correct that the argument from introspection begs the question.

Paul M. Churchland's second argument against the existence of mental entities contends that the new and superior theory dismisses mental entities because mental concepts lack reference. We will perceive the *internal states of consciousness with new eyes*. Churchland (1984: 43, 45) understands that the concepts of folk psychology cannot be reduced to the concepts of neuroscience because a traditional "psychological framework is a false and radically misleading conception of the causes of human behaviour and the nature of cognitive activity". His idea seems to be that the old theory A includes presuppositions that there are such and such entities p, q, and s. Theory A makes one form the judgment "I experience the phenomenon p" and one experiences that the phenomenon is p. However, the new theory B is realized by arguing that entities p, q, and s do not exist. The presuppositions of the old theory A that there are entities p, q, and s cannot be reduced to the new theory B. The entities p, q, and s are eliminated from the new theory B. People will experience the phenomenon with new eyes under the new and superior theory B which has replaced the old theory A with theory B over time. One experiences the phenomenon f under theory B. (Churchland,

1981: 67, 72, 84–85; 1984: 43–47; 1985: 9–12, 16, 17; 1988: 169, 171, 172, 174, 176, 180, 182, 185) Churchland's argument may be reconstructed as follows.

1) A previous theory A implies p.
2) The theory A is replaced with a superior theory B.
3) The theory B does not contain p reduced from A.
4) Therefore, the superior theory B does not imply p.

One of Churchland's examples is that of the turning sphere. His idea is simple— perception is theory-laden. Theoretical frameworks affect one's perceptual process, even in early processing. That is to say, perception is under the higher cognitive process and it affects what one perceives. Ancient or medieval people, says Churchland, would insist that they could see the starry sphere of the heavens and how it turns around an axis through Polaris. How does anybody doubt the existence of what everyone can observe with their own eyes? Churchland replies: "In the end, however, we learned to reinterpret our visual experience of the night sky within a very different conceptual framework, and the turning sphere evaporated". The same occurred to witches, and according to Churchland, the concepts of folk psychology await a similar fate. (Churchland, 1984: 44, 47) I would say that ancient and modern persons did not deny the existence of celestial bodies, but rather explained the behavior of these bodies differently. In Churchland's view, the observing phenomenon is an entity of the external world, but ancient and modern people have different perceptual reports of the phenomenon because of the different conceptual frameworks (Churchland, 1984: 44−45, 47−48, 79−80, 115−116; 1988: 169, 171, 172, 174, 176, 180, 182, 185; 1992: 423). To my mind, there are no "problems of perception" in Churchland's eliminativism.

In Churchland's words, I would not form sense-data reports about my visual experience if I learned to reinterpret my visual experience of the night sky within a very different conceptual framework than the sense-datum theory of perception. I would not claim to see the internal mind-dependent panorama of the night sky in order to indirectly see the real external night sky. The framework of eliminative materialism then invalidates the "problem of perception".

Nonetheless, Churchland (1984: 44–45) thinks about different things. The progress of neuroscience predicts that concepts of mental entities – sensation, fear, memory, perception, sense-data, sleep, etc. – will disappear from scientific vocabulary (Churchland, 1984: 43−45, 48−49, 179−180 1988: 168, 170, 171, 180, 182; 1992: 421−422). A consequence of Churchland's theory is then that *empirical knowledge* does not imply *experience* as a mental state because mental entities do not exist. This consequence indicates that the meaning of 'empirical knowledge' is something other than "knowledge based on experience". But now this may raise a question about how the neural events of the brain informs the perceiver of what really happens in the external environment. Next, I ask whether the brain states imply the direct perception of the external world in Churchland's eliminativism.

We tend to share a common belief that experience informs us about objects and events of the external environment independent of our intellect and senses. Experience is evidence of and justifies our belief and reports that there is a moon in the sky. The true belief that experience informs one about the external entity p implies presenting true claims about p. The phrase "p because of q" is a consequence of Churchland's theory because the brain state q is required in order to discover p. I would interpret his theory as involving at least indirect realism if the brain states represent how the external environment is, or if they represent the occurrence of p. On the other hand, I could also come to the conclusion that, for Churchland, it is sufficient for perceptual experience to be a causal process between the external entity and the perceiving organism, but this seems to indicate an indirect connection. The brain's sensory system represents. (Compare this idea with Martin's claim that experience represents how the mind-independent environment is. See Chapter 5.3, pp. 140−145). I do not share Churchland's interpretations because he really assumes that the direct object of observation is the world even though "perceptual processing does not secure a theory-neutral foundation for knowledge" (Churchland, 1988: 167). If the brain represents the world, then the perceptual situation may change because representing implies indirectness (Churchland, 1984: 146−150; 1992: 421−422). In fact, this is what Churchland claims in *Matter and Consciousness* in 1984. The brain represents external features and these features are the represented: "How does the brain represent the color of a sunset? The smell of a rose? The taste of a peach? Or the face of a loved one? There is a simple technique for representing,

or *coding*, external features that is surprisingly effective," (Churchland, 1984: 146). He then mentions neural channels and sensory pathways that convey information from the organs to the rest of the brain and says that "stimulation vectors are a beautifully effective means of representing things as various as tastes, faces, and complex limb positions" (Churchland, 1984: 151).

The representational content of experience, e.g., yellowness of sense, might be distinguished from the external entity, although Churchland objects. It might be distinguished if the representational content is a token of brain state or if a token of brain state causes it (Chapters 2.1, pp. 28−30, 2.2, pp. 35−39, 2.5, p. 48, 2.6, pp. 51−52, 54−57, 3.3, pp. 80−82, 3.4, 87−89, 4.4, p. 106, 4.5, pp. 112−115, 117−118, 5.1, pp. 123−127, 5.2, pp. 133−136, 5.3, pp. 140−145). If there is no datum of sense, then an argument for the difference between a flow of sensations and the object in the external world can be formulated as follows:

1) 1) [(x) (Mx and P1x → Mx and ~P2x)], where 'P' is 'in a place' and 'M' is 'being a brain process'.
2) If x occurs in a place 1, then x does not occur in a place 2.
3) If mental entities, which are the brain processes, occur in a living organism, then they do not occur as external to a living organism.
4) A sensation-of-yellow occurs in the brain of a living organism.
5) Therefore, a sensation-of-yellow does not occur on the wall.[55]

This argument necessitates that sensations not be identified with both brain processes *and* events of the external world, as this would make eliminative materialism an incoherent theory. Nevertheless, of course, a flow of sensations-of-yellow can be in the representational relation to the real wall and the reflection of light, but they are not all brain processes. However, in Churchland's theory, the brain processes represent not only the real world and reflection of light, but also the color of the sunset and the smell of a rose. (Churchland, 1984: 146−150; 1992: 420–422)

[55] This is a new form of argument. It proceeds from the general to individual cases such that the first premise includes other premises and the conclusion. If the first premise is true or irrefutable, other constituents cannot be refuted.

Because of representation, the perceiver *indirectly* obtains information about the facts of the external world through perceptual experience. For example, the moon is like the content of a moon-experience, where the moon *in experience* is the content representing moon *in the sky*. Churchland's theory denies the existence of an object-experience and the argument above. There would be neither the traditional distinction of appearance and reality, nor two distinct categories of objects of consciousness and objects of reality. In fact, there would be no "problem of perception" at all. The perceiver observes the objects of the world via brain states (Churchland, 1984: 44−45, 47−48, 79−80, 115−116; 1988: 169, 171, 172, 174, 176, 180, 182, 185; 1992: 423). Why then would a fact of the external world be *directly* represented via brain states if *experience* is eliminated? I would like to know how the brain or any material thing represents something else. There is nothing that can be represented in pure matter.

Churchland's theory implies two theses: 1) the meaning of 'empirical knowledge' is not 'subjective non-physical experience', and 2) the facts of reality are externally represented by the states of the brain. First, because experience and its non-physical sense-data do not exist, brain states must be the basis of perceptual knowledge claims. Vision is a process in the optic nerves and visual cortex which represents the facts of the external world. In particular, one knows p if a vision q informs about p. Therefore, one presents true claims about p based on vision q. For Churchland, a vision q or an entity p is not at all a sense-datum (Churchland, 1984: 44−45, 47−48, 79−80, 115−116; 1988: 169, 171, 172, 174, 176, 180, 182, 185; 1992: 423).

Second, a brain state and a fact of the external world are two distinct entities because they are located in distinct places—the former in a living body and the latter at some distance from the body, for example. If the fact of the external world is the revolution of the Moon around the Earth, then this fact is not like the neural cells process. The neural events do not seem to be the facts external to the perceiver. That is, they do not disclose the external world, but represent it somehow. (Chapters 1.1, pp. 1−3, 2.2, pp. 35−39, 3.3, pp. 80−82, 3.4, pp. 87−89, 4.1, p. 90, 4.4, p. 106, 5.1, pp. 124−126, 5.3, pp. 142−145)

In his *Reduction, Qualia, and the Direct Introspection of Brain States* from1985, Churchland argues that the perceived object or a phenomenological feature of sensation is not identical with a property of the external substance, but with some other physical thing. For example, the immediate object of my perception is not the objective redness of the apple, the warmth of the coffee cup, or the pitch of the sound. Instead, what I immediately perceive, argues Churchland, is redness that *is identical with* a certain wavelength triplet of electromagnetic reflectance efficiencies. Then, I could infer, warmth is identical with the mean level of the objects' microscopically embodied energies. (Russell claimed there is a correlation between them: Chapter 3.2, pp. 71−73.) Furthermore, pitch is identical with its oscillatory frequency. Therefore, according to Churchland, these phenomenal properties are not the properties of experience, but are out there in the objective world. These micro-physical and electromagnetic properties can be felt, heard, and seen. They can be reduced to outside the human observer, concludes Churchland. (Churchland, 1985: 17, 18, 19; compare this with 1984: 146−150) Churchland's arguments mean that the "problem of perception" does not exist. The redness, warmth, pitch, or sweetness that I experience can be identical with, or caused by, a brain state, and Churchland did not mention this in his theory in 1985. (Chapters 2.1, pp. 28−30, 3.3, pp. 80−82, 5.2, pp. 133−136, 5.3, pp. 140−145)

Finally, the certain assumption was: if something is proved to be such and such by experience, then experience must also exist. Churchland's objection is that there is no non-physical experience. Furthermore, the basis of our piece of knowledge concerning a fact of the external world is a representation of the brain. Is it possible to reply to his objection? When one has the hallucination of a flying dagger and then there is nothing in the air, one is however still aware of some sort of sensory object, a private object. It is the sense-datum, though it would be reduced to the brain state. Furthermore, one experiences a flying dagger with other spatial things although it is not real. One does not experience the physiological brain process, but the flying dagger. One cannot deny that experience reveals that object. It does, and thus it would reveal at least one experience: the flying-dagger-experience. I can imagine that Churchland would say the old theoretical framework makes me see things that do not exist. However, it seems to me that it neither explains nor predicts away the *hallucination flying dagger experience*. Something is given to us: we cannot say that nothing appears

because something really appears. I do not even understand how science *without* experience could be possible because scientific research is based on experience.

However, could it be possible to know things without experience, things like objects of hallucination and experience? Paul Feyerabend considered this alternative in 1969. Feyerabend also aimed to refute the whole mentality including experience and sense-data. He considered the external world to be directly observed while ignoring the whole field of the "problems of perception". I will examine if there is evidence to support this thought. However, the problem is then that of how brain activity *directly* accesses what happens outside in the environment.

In the article "Science without Experience", Paul Feyerabend considered the possibility of science without experience. He asked "whether the empirical hypothesis is correct, i.e., whether experience can be regarded as a true source and foundation (testing ground) of knowledge". Everyone can admit that this hypothesis could possibly be correct because it is not absurd or self-contradictory in the context of logic: "It must be possible to imagine a natural science without sensory elements…". (Feyerabend, 1969: 791)

In his "Science without Experience", however, Feyerabend did not explain what *knowledge* without experience is. It cannot be a material process, nor can it be reduced to materialism because "knowledge", whatever it really is, is not a material thing. He mentioned that "experience is said to enter science at three points: testing; assimilation of the results of test; understanding of theories", and that experience includes the senses and "simple and readily identifiable sensations" (Feyerabend, 1969: 791). Here, his examples indicate the direct perception of the external entities, and next he argued that experience is needed at none of the three points (Feyerabend, 1969: 791). The objection could be such that we understand our theories only if we have been told how they are connected with experience. However, says Feyerabend, one must point out that

"Experience arises *together with* theoretical assumptions, *not* before them, and that an experience without theories is just as uncomprehended as is (allegedly) a theory without experience: eliminate the part of the

theoretical knowledge of a sensing subject and you have a person who is completely disoriented, in capable of carrying out the simplest action". (Feyerabend, 1969: 792–3)

If we eliminate further knowledge, then the subject's sensory world starts disintegrating. Sensations taken by themselves, i.e., taken as they would appear to a completely disoriented person, are of no use for either understanding or action. Nor is it sufficient to just link them to the existing theories. (Feyerabend, 1969: 792–3) For Feyerabend, knowledge must be something conceptual, but it is not:

"Knowledge can enter our brain without touching our senses. And some knowledge resides in the individual brain without ever having entered it." (Feyerabend, 1969: 794)

However, I would claim that 'knowing directly the external world' is something other than the material processes occurring within a person.

Dualism concerning a human person means that a person has a mental and material essence. Monism, on the other hand, argues that only material processes exist within a human person. Feyerabend argued that the following proposition implies *dualism,* although reductive materialism, identity theory, or functionalism claim otherwise: "X is a mental process of kind A ≡ X is a central process of kind α" implies "There are mental events which have physical features and physical events which have non-physical features". Hence, inferred Feyerabend, dualism is true provided that *the identity hypothesis* is true. But if monism is correct, then the hypothesis is false. However, dualism also shows that the monist misstates his case when defending the hypothesis since he or she seems forced to acknowledge the correctness of a dualistic point of view. (Feyerabend, 1963a: 295) Therefore, this hypothesis would not result in the elimination of the "problem of perception", the problem created by the phenomena of illusion and hallucination. Feyerabend's inference seems to be valid.

Feyerabend identified mental processes with supernatural events in the same way as Paul Churchland. When seeing a person who seems to suffer from epilepsy, we do not *explain* her external behavior using a theological framework, but with a physiological theory. (Feyerabend, 1963a: 296) He continued to state that a physiological theory of epilepsy does

not become an empty tautology because it lacks the phrases "possessed by the devil" or "the devil". (Feyerabend, 1963a: 296) Perhaps Feyerabend would speak of perception in a similar way. He thought that observational results must always be formulated with respect to a certain background of theory: "There is no reason why physiology should not by itself be capable of forming such a background" (Feyerabend, 1963a: 296). He concluded "a purely physiological approach to human beings is not at all dependent on the outcome of an analysis of H [the hypothesis above]" (Feyerabend, 1963a: 296). In this tiny comment in 1963, Feyerabend said nothing of the objects of observation.

The simplest form of materialism may be that of Democritus. The only entities existing in the world are atoms, aggregates of atoms, and their properties and relations. Can such materialism include human beings? First, Feyerabend suggested *an answer in the negative* because human beings have experiences; they think; they feel pain, etc. Even if we had a complete account of the physical nature of human persons and the environment, something would be missing —our subjective phenomenal experiences. Such experiences cannot be analyzed in a materialistic fashion, assured Feyerabend. (1963b: 49–50) This extra entity, a subjective phenomenal experience, is the core of Thomas Nagel's and Frank Jackson's arguments (Nagel: 1974; Jackson: 1983). That is, experiences, thoughts, and pains cannot be material processes, and statements[56] that can be made about mental states cannot be made about material processes (Feyerabend, 1963b: 49–50, 54).

Second, however, Feyerabend objected to *the answer in the negative*. Experiences, thoughts, and pains are material processes. He tried to refute the argument based on observation of the difference between mental entities and material processes: "It is by observation that we discover the difference between the one and the other and refute materialism" (Feyerabend, 1963b: 53–54). His argument is identification. It is not a strict elimination of mental entities:

1) A sense-datum of the thing does not differ from a real thing.
2) A seen table differs from a felt table, but they both identify with a real table (from 1).

[56] Someone might wonder how there can be true propositions in a materialistic universe.

3) Appearing thought differs from the appearing image, but they both identify with material processes (from 1, 2).
4) Thought and imagination are mental entities.
5) Therefore, mental entities identify with material processes (from 3, 4).

This argument concludes that introspective results do not prove conscious thoughts, sensations, pains, and dreams and material processes to be *two distinct* things. (Feyerabend, 1963b: 53–55) Feyerabend argued that what appears to be different does not need to be different:

"Is not the seen table very different from the felt table? Is not the heard sound very different from its mechanical manifestations (Chladni's figures; Kundt's tube, etc., etc.)? And if despite this difference of appearance we are allowed to make an identification, postulating an object in the outer world (the physical table, the physical sound), then why should the observed difference between a thought and the impression of a brain process prevent us from making another identification, postulating this time an object in the inner (material) world, viz., a brain process?." (Feyerabend, 1963b: 54)

For Feyerabend, it is clear that what we directly perceive are the physical external substances (Feyerabend, 1963b: 54−60). It is important to note that if the phenomenal character of experience (the sound I experience, for example) identifies with a material process within the body, then it does not identify with a material substance outside the body (such as a bird's feature). Therefore, in Feyerabend's reasoning, the phenomenal character of experience cannot be in the external environment. (Chapter 3.4, pp. 87−89)[57] But now we clearly see that Feyerabend did not think about what statements are. The truth of statements of mental or physical entities does not imply the mentality of physicality or the true statements. However, the "problem of perception" does not exist in Feyerabend's argument of identification.

Next, we will see whether Richard Rorty's view confirms our analysis. Mental entities like sense-data are like demons and phlogiston, and we directly perceive the world despite the

[57] Compare Feyerabend's reasoning with that of Martin: Chapter 5.3, pp. 140−145.

physiological nature of observation. Because mental entities do not exist, argued Rorty, they cannot be reduced to brain states or external entities outside the perceiver, and there is no "problem of perception".

Without doubt, Rorty wanted to eliminate the whole entity of mentality as non-sense in 1965 and 1970. Even so, when I am in a state of hallucination, something occurs to me that exists. However, he gave examples in which observation objects are objects in the outside world (Rorty, 1965: 32−35, 39, 43; 1970: 117−118, 120). Whether he can give such examples without conscious experience is an open question because we happen to have conscious experience.

In his articles, Rorty attempted to work out an analogy between talking about demons and talking about sensations (pains, desires, and the like). He identified sensations with demons, or in general, he identified mental entities with theological ones. Nevertheless, he had an example about an entity that is mental or psychological rather than non-mental. Let us first suppose a person is walking down the street and seeing the red fat demon. Hence, the person has experiences of the composition of redness, fatness, and demon. Rorty tended to eliminate the red fat demon and sensations-of-pain (or of-redness), leaving two entities that do not seem similar. First, the red fat demon is nothing but a hallucination, and this is simply because there are no demons. In the same way, sensations-of-pain (or of-redness) are nothing but a brain process, and this is because there are no sensations, i.e. mental entities. However, Rorty did not seem to consider hallucination a brain processes—maybe he did, but he did not mention it—and eliminated it because there seem to be hallucinations. Rorty thought that an ontology which includes hallucinations and brain processes better explains a person's cognitive activity and behavior than an ontology including supernatural and mental entities. He argued that an analogy exists. (Rorty, 1965: 24–27, 28, 30–33, 38−39, 49; 1970: 112, 114–119)

By the *'identity'* of demons and hallucinations, or sensations and brain processes, Rorty was referring to cases in which *two terms* or more refer to *one and the same* matter of fact. For example, behavior that would now cause us to refer to someone as a "psychotic woman"

would have caused earlier people to refer to the same person as "a witch", or what used to be called "Zeus's thunderbolts" are the same thing as what is now called "discharges of static electricity". Of course, Rorty wanted to argue that we are talking about brain processes when we talk about sensations, pains, and desires. (Rorty, 1965: 26–28) However, he speculated that we will deny the existence of sensations, pains, desires, and all such mental entities: "Just as we now want to deny that there are demons, future science may want to deny that there are sensations" (Rorty, 1965: 30). Science may want to deny the existence of mental/psychological entities, but can it? Rorty did not simultaneously deny the existence of hallucinations, or maybe he denied it, and then thought them to be brain processes. Nonetheless, he identified mental entities with theological ones (Rorty, 1965: 28, 30−32, 37, 40, 41, 49).

The structure behind Rorty's analysis is:

1) A is nothing but B.
2) Cs are like As.
3) Therefore, C is nothing but D.

This structure means that there would be an analogy between A (demons) and C (mental entities, sensations, and pains): they are non-existent. The argument is not valid, however. The conclusion "C is nothing but D" is not deduced from the first two premises because D (brain processes) is unknown unless it is like B (for Rorty, hallucinations). Why is it not included as a consequence in his analysis?

1) A is nothing but B.
2) Cs are like As.
3) C is nothing but D.
4) Therefore, B is nothing but D (from 1, 2, 3).

It seems to me that Rorty did not identify that B (hallucinations) is identical to D (brain processes) even though hallucinations are mental entities. He argued that As (demons) and

Cs (mental entities, sensations, and pains) are similar entities: they do not exist. (Rorty, 1965: 38−39, 49)

If Rorty and other adherents of eliminative materialism identify all mental entities, such as phenomenal character and representational content, with brain processes, then they cannot identify them with the facts of the external environment. Brain processes are not events of the world external to the possessor of the brain. It is absurd to claim that the observer's brain processes are not in the observer, but on the wall of the building, for example. In the context of perception, one says that a yellowness that one experiences is the property of the wall and, in the context of philosophy of mind, one says that the yellowness one experiences is a property of one's brain. This claim is contradictory. If one says that one experiences yellow as the property of a wall that is the character of one's brain, the description must be false. (See Chapter 3.4, pp. 87−89)

1) [Mx and P1x → Mx and ~P2x], where 'P' is 'in a place' and 'M' is 'being a brain process'.
2) If x occurs in a place 1, then x does not occur in a place 2.
3) If mental entities, which are the brain processes, occur in a living organism, then they do not occur as external to a living organism.
4) A sensation-of-yellow occurs in the brain of a living organism.
5) Thus, a sensation-of-yellow does not occur on the wall.

This last argument implies that mental entities, such as sensations and sense-data, cannot identify with both the brain processes and the events of the external world outside the brain, and this would make eliminative materialism an incoherent theory. (Chapters 2.1, pp. 28−30, 2.2, pp. 35−39, 3.2, 65−68, 70−79, 3.3, pp. 80−82, 3.4, pp. 87−88, 4.4, p. 106, 4.5, pp. 113−118, 5.3, pp. 142−145, 5.4, pp. 152−154) Neuroscience has not denied consciousness, sensations, or the phenomenon of hallucination, but it assumes them to be products of the brain. If conscious experience and states are products of the brain, it does not refute the "problems" in perception, but rather produces these problems.

Finally, Churchland, Feyerabend, and Rorty tried to eliminate mentality. Only the brain's physiological processes exist. Conscious experience thus does not exist. Maybe I am missing something, but the problem seems to be: how can I be *directly* conscious of the external environment if my consciousness does not exist? The brain's representation does not imply direct observation. In fact, pure matter such as the brain does not represent in the way a picture represents. The brain's physiological process as a direct perception of the external environment has not been verified.

We should wonder whether perceptual experience is never about the material objects. In philosophy of perception, the focus seems to be on vision, on the faculty or state of being able to see. In the next chapter, I will examine whether tactile perception is more objective than visual perception. To touch something causes a feeling of the solid and hard object. In tactile perception, we come so close to an object and come into contact with it so directly that it would not be a non-physical sense-datum.

5. The Immediate Object of Tactile Perception: Is It Feeling the Substance?

I will present a scenario in order to demonstrate my undogmatic character concerning my assertion that *in touching* the perceiver might be in direct contact with something mind-independent. Touching is like sensing the external world through one's own body. If verified, this hypothesis would save direct realism. However, it is possible that the perceiver's access to the external environment always requires some other entities mediating tactile perception of direction. Touching the substance requires the substance before touching, and that would refute the Berkeleian claim of the object of perception as an idea.

It is obvious that *an internal sense-datum,* such as material, hard, and marble, cannot be extended. Therefore, sense-data lack the material nature. (Chapters 1.1, pp. 10−14, 3.4, pp. 87−89, 4.1, pp. 90−92) If the object of perception is sometimes hard and solid, then this refutes the general statement "Object of perception is a sense-datum". However, the hardness and solidness of the object does not imply a direct connection with the external world. One's judgment about the external things is not directly about the external things. In brief, one's judgment about a tree occurs through and on grounds of perceptual experience, and

objectivity implies the judgment about the object only. Objectivity implies immediateness. (Chapter 1.1, p. 1−2) Perceptual experience may be representation of the tree which is the represented. The subject does not directly access this tree via this representation because the representation is between the subject and the represented. The subject's experience of his or her body is more direct and immediate.

Introspection as such justifies neither the sense-datum theory of perception nor direct realism, though Martin claims that it does (Chapter 5.3, pp. 140−145). Whether the objects of experience change and have a finite duration can be tested by introspection. Based only on introspection, it really appears that the sound 'rustle' changes and does not last. Therefore, the sound 'rustle' has no existence continued and distinct from a perceiver. Furthermore, colors and shapes change all the time despite the fact that the external entities remain constant. In sum, introspection can justify that objects of experience change and have a finite duration. (Chapters 2.2, pp. 35−39, 2.6, p. 52, 4.1, pp. 90−93)

One's perception of something, e.g., of a sound or a shape, is not a theory, but a fact. One cannot doubt that one perceives something. Otherwise one must doubt everything: oneself, the external world, matter, other people, language, and the like. Nothing would exist and everything would be a theory. The sense-datum theory holds this something to be a sense-datum: an internal, non-physical, private, and mind-dependent entity. (Chapters 1.1, pp. 10−15, 2.2, pp. 35−39, 3.3, pp. 80−82, 4.1, p. 91−93)

Next, I attempt to demonstrate that the object of tactile perception can *sometimes* be an outer substance. If it is the outer physical substance, then it obviously cannot be an internal and non-physical datum of sense. (Chapter 3.4, pp. 87–89) Let us first define *hardness, impenetrability, extended,* and *material* as *a sensation of resistance*. I now notice that we cannot expect vision to provide all the answers . We feel the external world.

First, one does not perceive something to be hard, impenetrable, extended, and material. Second, one touches an object. Third, one perceives or has a sensation of something being hard, impenetrable, extended, and material. Therefore, one has the sensation of resistance after touching the object. Fourth, this object of touching or tactile perception (the sensation

of resistance) cannot be a sense-datum because this object existed *before* the sensation or the feeling of something to be hard, impenetrable, extended, and material, and before one's touching. Therefore, the object of touching must be an explanation of resistance: the object was, is, and will be hard, impenetrable, extended, and material. In sum, if touching an object causes one's sense of touch—the feeling of something as hard, impenetrable, extended, and material—then this object of touching cannot be a non-physical sense-datum because it cannot have these properties. (Chapters 2.1, pp. 28−30, 2.2, pp. 35−39, 3.4, pp. 87–89)

If we claim, for example, "We have the experience of something being hard, impenetrable, extended, and material" and "Object of perception is a mind-dependent sense-datum", we should infer from these claims that something *mind-dependent* is hard, impenetrable, extended, and material. That is, the object of sensation or the sense-datum of touch is hard, impenetrable, extended, and material. I object to this inference because I touched an object *before* the sensation of resistance and feeling. This object seems to exist independent of tactile perception on grounds of reason. To claim otherwise would be a contradiction. (Chapters 2.1, pp 28−30, 5.2, 133−137)

This could be compared with internal images. If the image of the building is in our mind, then we tend to say it is not material. If we are sense-datum theorists and if we think that visual sense-data are like mental images, then the sense-datum of the building is not material. This inference is plausible. (Chapter 3.4, pp. 87–89) Next I present a counter-example directed against the general statement "Object of perception is a non-physical entity like a sense-datum".

It seems that the object does not depend on a sensation of resistance, i.e., a feeling of touch. A sensation of resistance depends on tactile perception, and touching depends on the existence of the substance, although George Berkeley would claim otherwise. (Chapters 1.1, pp. 20–21, 2.4, p. 47) In fact, he claimed that God is the cause of ideas and a sensation of resistance. Nonetheless, I am leaving God aside in the following discussion. I claim that it is the mind-independent substance that one attempts to touch.

George Berkeley's fundamental thesis was that the object of perception is always an idea dependent upon mind. The object of perception is never mind-independent. Therefore, the statement "There is an object that is mind-independent, hard, and solid" does not logically follow from the statement, "I have a sense of touch of hardness and solidness." More formally,

(1) (∃(x)) (Sx)), where "x" is "I" and "S" means "having a sense of touch of hardness and solidness."
(2) Therefore, (∃(y)) (My ∧ Hy ∧ Sy), where "y" is "some object" and "M" means "mind-independent", "H" means "hard" and "S" means "solid".

However, an object is not dependent upon touch, but *vice versa*. Having a sense through touch that something is hard and solid does not mean that having a sense of touch is hard and solid; however, touching a mind-independent substance causes having a sense through a touch of hardness and solidness. In other words, a substance feels hard and solid. In sum, having a sense of touch depends on touching a mind-independent substance. Therefore, we have a counter-example to Berkeley's thesis: The statement "There is y such that y is a mental entity of a sense of touch, and y is hard and solid" does not logically follow from the statement "There is x and there is y such that if x is touching y, then x has sensations of hardness and solidness." More formally,

(1) (∃(x) (∃(y)) (Txy → Hx ∧ Sx).
(2) Therefore, (∃(y)) (My ∧ Hy ∧ Sy).

This is a counter-example to Berkeley's thesis because (1) does not imply (2). No non-physical entities are hard and solid, the physical qualities of mind-independent substances are.

All this does not mean that the perceiver has a direct and immediate connection with the mind-independent entities, however. Because we can at least hallucinate extended items, then non-physical entities can be extended. They look like extended substance-like wholes but they are not. There are hallucinations related to touching and, therefore, I would feel

something to be hard and solid when touching even if there is no mind-independent substance in such a case.

On the other hand, I would not claim that touching something implies directly feeling or perceiving the external substance. Even in tactile perception, perceptual experience does not *directly* reach or represent the substance. There is a transitive causal relation: a substance causes pressure in the hand which causes a signal transmitted along the nerve fiber, and that causes an activation of the brain which causes a perceptual experience. However, perceptual experience does not directly reach the first cause, i.e., the external substance. *In touching,* the perceiver would not be in direct contact with something mind-independent. The perceiver feels his or her body more directly than the substance-at-distance which may be the *represented*. (Chapter 2.1, pp. 31–34) I will return to this issue in sections six and seven.

In the next chapter, I will discuss some fallacies in direct, naive realism and eliminative materialism. After doing so, I will argue that something other than the real thing appears in perception. There are circularity and identity problems in direct, naive realism and eliminative materialism.

6. The Problems of Direct Realism and Eliminative Materialism

I will first summarize the way by which direct, naive realism argues for the external entities' immediate existence to the perceiver. Their arguments involve circularity. After summarizing, I will present why the view of eliminative materialism based on the relationship between the perceptual object and the external entity is incoherent. The "problem of perception" remains.

In general, I consider myself unable to understand my perceptual situation without having a general view of *perception*. If I have no general conception of perception, then I cannot say what a token perceptual experience is or whether someone is perceiving. In a similar sense, if I do not generally know what intelligence or thought is, I cannot say whether some-

one is intelligent or what a token thought is. I cannot say that a machine or a whale is intelligent, thinking, or perceiving if I have no general sense of intelligence, thought, or perception. The fact that there exist many different theories of perception implies that it is not easy to say what perception is. Philosophers abandon the important theories of cognitive scientists Gibson, Gregory, and Marr, for example, as well as the phenomenology of Brentano, Meinong, and Husserl. Cognitive theories of perception include causation, and on this, direct realism remains silent. (I do not examine their theories in this research because their theories do not include *sense-data.* Also, I cannot concentrate on every theorist that has something important to say about perceptual experience.)

First of all, a complex causal chain between a mind and the external world and what appears to the senses does *not* imply that a perceiver or experience *directly* reaches the external entity as a constituent. To assume such an implication is implausible and a logical and physical impossibility. (See Chapters 1.1, pp. 10, 12–13, 2.1, p. 33, 2.6, pp. 50–52, 54, 57, 5.1, p. 124–125) The perceiver's structure has an effect on how things appear, thus refuting directness and identity: as stated many times, this fact refutes the idea that the perceiver would *directly* reach the external entity, or that appearing phenomena would be identical to the external entity (See Chapter 5.1, p. 124–125). The perceiver's features do not affect the external entity, and thus the external entity is not identical to the phenomenon. I will return to this issue in sections six and seven.

Direct realism, such as the versions of Austin, Martin, and Searle, is *circular* (Latin: *circulus in probando*, "circle in proving"). Its premises provide no independent ground or evidence for the conclusion because they contain no evidence distinct from the conclusion. (See Chapters 1.1, pp.10−13, 2.4, p. 47) From perceiving *something*, I conclude with the statement that I perceive *the external entity* and then I justify this conclusion that I perceive the external entity via my perceiving something. Perceptual-based statements are derived and justified by the same act of perceiving an object. In other words, first I have the experience of something. Second, I judge that I perceive a tree. Third, I justify my judgment that I perceive the tree using my first impression: I have the experience of something. This is exactly what Austin, Martin, and Searle do in their descriptive theories of perception. This

type of reasoning is clearly circular. Moreover, it is invalid to justify a particular perception of something by means of a theory or view of experience. A theory or an ideology does not justify our claims about what we perceive. However, we may be able to do so with some facts about a particular perception (if we have facts about perceptual experience independent of our experience) and logic.

Direct realism's proof of the reliability of perceptual-based statements rests on the premise of one's perception of something. However, one's verification of perceptual-based statements recirculates to the same perception of something. I cannot give examples of all of them. Searle seems to commit this fallacy in his *Perceptual Intentionality* (2012: 13, 14, 15). For example, he claims:

"Beliefs and desires are typically representations of objects and states of affairs in the world. But when I see something I do not just have a representation; I have a direct presentation of the object. My visual experience, so to speak, reaches right up to the object." (Searle, 2012: 14)

Thus, I would say that he first derives a statement from his visual experience, and second, he justifies his statement using the same visual experience. He concludes that seeing implies a direct presentation of the *mind-independent* object. The same circularity occurs in Searle's reasoning when he claims that perceptual experience is a presentation of the present feature of the object because his visual experience, so to speak, reaches right up to the object:

"The present features of the object I am seeing are the conditions of satisfaction – what makes the visual experience "veridical" – but they are experienced immediately, and they are experienced as causing the very perceptual experience that has the object and the features as the rest of the conditions of satisfaction." (Searle, 2012: 14, 15)

His arguments are circular and invalid because the immediate object does not imply externality (Chapters 1.1, pp. 10−13, 2.1, pp. 31−34, 2.4, p. 47, 3.4, pp. 87−89).

The same circularity continues when Searle presents the technical term "the objective visual field"[58]. It "consists in all of the objects and states of affairs that are visible from your point of view and given your physical condition at any particular time" (Searle, 2012: 16). However, he assumes the presence of physical entities before concluding that the immediate presentational object of perception is the physical entity. He then states the reason why he does so: "But, in addition, we have found it necessary to postulate the subjective visual field, which consists entirely of the conscious experiences going on in my head" (Searle, 2012: 17). This clearly is "circle in proving" because it contains no evidence distinct from the conclusion. That is, if I first claim what I see and, second, I justify my perceptual-based claim using what I recently saw or what I continue to see, my proving is indeed circular because my conclusion includes my seeing of something. (Chapter 2.4, p. 47) This is Searle's fallacy, and in fact, Austin's. (Searle, 2012: 18, 19)

What Austin said in the beginning *Sense and Sensibilia* is to assume what he will conclude. The testimony of the senses is so certain that most people agree with Austin's position that the perceived things exist external to people:

"It does not normally occur to us that there is any need for us to justify our belief in the existence of material things. At the present moment, for example, I have no doubt whatsoever that I really am perceiving the familiar objects, the chairs and table, the pictures and books and flowers with which my room is furnished; and I am therefore satisfied that they exist." (Austin, 1962: 6)

So, Austin assumed that the immediate objects of perception are material things, and in fact justified his perceptual-based claims using the same perceptual experience.[59] It seems that Austin "knows" a subject before examining it. Moreover, he did not analyze what sense perception really is, but how one *uses* the term. (Austin, 1962: 15–19, 47) He also practically assumed the conclusion "The external entities are immediately perceived" when he stated:

[58] For Searle (2012: 16, 17), objectivity means "being open for many", and subjectivity means "being open for me only", such as the subjective visual field is the black area seen by closed eyes.
[59] Berkeley would agree with Austin's statements here but deny his conclusion. Material things are phenomena. The ordinary man believes what he believes: he is not a scholar. See Austin, 1962, p. 7.

“When we are hit on the head we sometimes say that we 'see stars'; but for all that, seeing stars when you are hit on the head is *not* 'qualitatively' indistinguishable from seeing stars when you look at the sky.” (Austin, 1962: 49)

Moreover, he took it for granted that we perceive water, i.e., a material entity, at least sometimes:

“In particular, how many of the circumstances of a situation, as these would ordinarily be stated, are supposed to be included in 'the perception’? For example, to take the stick in water again: it is a feature of this case that part of the stick is under water, and water, of course, is not invisible; is the water, then, part of 'the perception'? It is difficult to conceive of any grounds for denying that it is;.” (Austin, 1962: 53)

In fact, Austin (1962: 56−7) was certain that he sometimes perceives material things when he said that the statement “We never perceive sense-data” is not equivalent to and interchangeable with “We always perceive material things”. Thus, he first had the experience of something. Second, from his experience of something, he derived the statement “I perceive a material thing”. Finally, he gave evidence for his statement “I perceive a material thing”, and the evidence was the same experience of something that he had earlier. This is a clear "circle in proving" fallacy. (See Chapter 2.4, p. 47)

Martin’s main claim is not only circular, but also contradictory. First, he claims that introspection reveals represented features about the external world. When, by introspection, I try to reach the feature of sense experience, I in fact always directly perceive the feature of the external world. Second, however, Martin denies this by saying that the represented content, that is, the phenomenal character, is the feature of experience. Therefore, Martin’s theory seems to be inconsistent. The representation and representationalism imply indirectness, although the represented would be a real tree. These terms have always held this meaning in Western philosophy. Because the representation leads to indirect perception of the external world, it cannot be direct: contrary properties cannot both be true. (Chapter 3.4, pp. 87−89) Let us see more exactly what Martin claims.

According to Martin, perceptual experiences "involve taking the world to be the way that the content of experience represents them to be" (Martin, 2002: 387, 388, 393). However, he also acknowledges that

"the representational properties of the experience are properties of the experience, and hence not to be identified with the ocean or any of its properties. They must rather be the properties the experience has of representing things to be a certain way." (Martin, 2002: 387)

These claims indicate that Martin's beliefs conflict with one another. The content of experience is not *identical* to the mind-independent environment if it is the representational property of the experience. (Chapter 3.4, pp. 87−89)

In his article, Martin's main argument is that sense-datum theories cannot give an adequate account of the fact that *introspection* indicates that our sense experience is transparent to the world. For Martin, introspection indicates that our sensory experiences are directed on, or are about, the mind–independent entities in the world around us. This argument is not valid. In general, the following argument is invalid: introspection shows so; therefore, it is so. (Chapter 1.1, pp. 10−13) Moreover, cognitive scientists have considered introspection an unreliable method to obtain empirical data about perception: a participant investigates her or his own internal processes and reports them during the perception task. Ulric Neisser describes why introspection proved unsatisfactory a hundred years ago:

"Introspection is a sloppy tool, yielding results that may be biased by the act of observation itself. Different observers may give divergent introspective accounts of the ´same´ process, and there is no way to resolve their disagreements." (Neisser, 1976: 2)

Michael W. Eysenck's example of this process is as follows:

"One problem is that it isn't possible to check the accuracy of the conscious thoughts people claim to have. Külpe argued that people sometimes have ´imageless thoughts´, whereas another prominent psychologist (E. P. Titchener) claimed that all thoughts have images. This controversy couldn't be resolved by introspection." (Eysenck, 2012: 6)

Eysenck mentions other problems associated with reliance upon introspective evidence, such as 1) people are unaware of processes influencing their motivation and behavior and 2) people are consciously aware of the outcome of their cognitive processes rather than those processes themselves (Eysenck, 2012: 7). In sum, if one scholar claims that the object of experience is a private sense-datum and another scholar claims that it is a public mind-independent substance and both justify their claims with introspection, then introspection does not resolve their disagreements.

I could imagine how Austin, Searle, and Martin would defend the truth of direct realism. When perceiving, I do not perceive *the idea* of the external entity. So, how could this idea be correct? I suggest that their argument would be something like this: Because what the perceiver sees is the *public* object, it must therefore be the *external* entity. Perceptual experience is an openness to the external world because the external world is open to many perceivers. (Crane and French, 2015) Most people, including scientists and scholars, believe and justify the argument by pointing out that others can perceive the object. People can take photos or record it with cameras and video recorders. People can describe the phenomenon. Their descriptions or interpretations are based on the phenomenon or the object; they are not based on a theory or an ideology. If the phenomenon was not the public object, people would neither examine it using the scientific methods nor save it in the memory using the aforementioned means. These examples suggest that the external entity is the direct object of perception.

This type of an argument indicates an *argument ad populum*. Because millions of people, including scientists and scholars, claim to perceive the external world, then they really perceive the external world as it is. However, perception is a very complex phenomenon. To say that we perceive the external world does not help. Second, and this indicates a more severe fault in logic, the use of other perceivers to justify identifying the external entities as the immediate objects of perception is a statement of falsehood. I would absolutely know by perception that another person is next to me in the external world, and we just consider in fun if we really perceive the table in front of us. There would not be the problem of the external world because another person, or my own hand, would be the external entity whom

I perceive from my point of view, from the inside. Nothing, however, is more incorrect. From my point of view, other perceivers are as external as the entities themselves. (Chapter 1.1, 21−23)

Direct realism often seems to be certain of what we perceive. Millions of people use physical object concepts, therefore they must perceive the same physical things (this kind of argument resembles an *argumentum ad populum.* These arguments conclude that a proposition is true because most people believe it to be). However, I am certain about the following implication, and those who object to it do not understand logic. The statement "When describing what one perceives, one uses physical object concepts" does not imply the statement "perception is perception of physical objects". The denial of the implication is invalid, although direct, naive realists would object. I do not know who would even make such a claim since we must first be acquainted with the physical things in order to acquire physical object concepts.

If we describe what we perceive, a direct realist might claim that we usually do so by referring to physical entities. He may note that it is impossible to describe our experience in terms of sense-data. If we describe the colored patch above as 'tree-shaped', then we use the physical object concept of 'tree'. A direct realist reasons that our way of describing sense-data depends on concepts of physical objects. However, what this use of the concept does not show is that our perceptual experience immediately *presents* or *reaches* mind-independent external entities. Using physical object concepts does not prove one's perception is of external physical entities. Our conceptual world-view does not determine what occurs in the reality. Instead, the reality determines (or should determine) the formation of singular statements if our way of thinking of the reality is at least relatively objective. Experience presents particular contingent cases. However, an openness to many perceivers or the shareability of data of sense does not verify conclusion about the external entity. (Chapters 1.1, pp. 10−13, 2.4, p. 47, 3.4, pp. 87−89)

Here, I argue for the claim that the statement "I perceive something" does not imply the statement "Something perceived is external and material" (see Chapter 1.1, pp. 12). For

example, I perceive something to be green, square, or sweet. However, from *something* that I perceive to be green, square, or sweet, can I derive that I perceive *the external material entity* appearing green, square, or sweet, such as Austin claimed? I can claim that the entity perceived by me appears external and material but is not. I cannot derive that I perceive the entity mentioned above because such an inference is unjustified. (Chapters 1.1, pp. 10−13, 2.4, p. 47, 3.4, pp. 87−89) From greenness, squareness, or sweetness I cannot derive externality and materiality.

Analytic philosophy seems to sometimes imply intolerance, narrow-mindedness, and dogmatism. This is because it has a research paradigm that all members must admit.[60] Austin, for example, focused on perception-based judgements, not perception and its objects as phenomena. However, it has been known *for more than half a century* that the belief formation process of perceptual experience is neither objective nor value-free. The perception-based judgments may be biased due to the theory utilized. Such judgments present nothing new because the theory-laden perceptual experience has been argued for by both analytic philosophers—e.g., Quine, and Duhem, who was a philosopher of science—and critical theorists and continental philosophers like Foucault and Horkheimer[61]. Experience shows that the analytic philosophers continue as if nothing had happened.

Direct realism is a *descriptive* theory of perception. It begs the question because they who defend it consider it self-evident that the immediate objects of perception are external entities. They assume external entities to be self-evident before forming perception-based judgments. (Crane and French, 2015) A *justification* for the immediacy of the external entity in perception is the description of one's own perception. They describe directly perceiving the external world and its entities, and describe doing so without the need for inference from an experience of perceiving objects. They describe what appears to them in perception[62].

[60] In my experience, analytic philosophy is not tolerant of different ideas and thoughts. Analytic philosophers themselves have shown their paradigm to be factual, and do not question it. In Finland, for example, bare perception is sufficient justification for a claim of what one perceives. Their research paradigm *should* be accepted without criticism.
[61] See, for example, Quine (1951), Duhem (1954), Foucault (2002) and Horkheimer (1972).
[62] See, for example, Searle (2012: 22): He "knows" what the immediate object of perception by suggesting us to "watch an animal engaged in complex conscious behavior – a dog digging for a bone, for example, or

(Searle, 2012: 9, 14, 15, 16, 18, 22) Different animals would also describe what appears to them in perception if they were able to describe anything. What appears to humans and animals must differ because of their different perceptual systems (from understanding). However, the external world does not appear differently to them even though the external world affects both human and non-human animals. The *different* immediate objects of perceptual experience appear to be due to their different anatomical structure. Their essence affects how things appear, refuting directness and identity. These sorts of objects can be created by manipulating the subjects, and this contradicts direct realism. The perceiver's features do not affect the external entity, and thus the external entity is not identical to the phenomenon. (Chapter 5.1, pp. 123−125) A descriptive theory of perception is not plausible.

Next I highlight two problems in eliminative materialism. Recent discussions in philosophy of mind acknowledge the phenomenological character of experience, i.e., the representational content, which escapes physical theory. Nonetheless, the identity problems appear if the qualia is closely tied to the brain or is identical with a token of brain state and if it is linked with the perceptual situation. (Smith, 2013: 13−17; Chapter 3.4, pp. 87−89) Paul M. Churchland argued that the perceived object or a phenomenological feature of sensation is not identical with a property of the external substance, but with some other physical thing. What I immediately perceive, said Churchland, is redness that is identical with a certain wavelength triplet of electromagnetic reflectance efficiencies. (Chapter 5.4, pp. 152−154) One problem is that greenness that I experience can be identical with, or caused by, a brain state, and Churchland did not mention that here. So, the object of experience could be identical with a brain state or be caused by the brain. If this is so, then the object of experience cannot be in the external environment because the external environment is not dependent upon the perceiver. (Chapter 3.4, pp. 87−89) If the brain represents external features and these features are the represented as Churchland (1984: 146−155) claims, then its representations are not *directly* about the represented external features, but are somehow mediated.

chasing a cat – you see precisely this combination of the conscious experience of causation and the identification of intentional objects". This is not philosophy.

Feyerabend argued that experiences, thoughts, and pains are material processes. He can be said to refute Churchland's argument using observations of the difference between mental/psychological entities and material processes. Feyerabend's argument is identification that provides the conclusion that introspective results do not prove that conscious thoughts, sensations, pains, and dreams are distinct from material processes. (Feyerabend, 1963: 53–55) It is important to note that if the phenomenal character of experience (the sound I experience, for example) identifies with a material process within the body, then it does not identify with a material substance outside the body (such as a bird's feature). Therefore, in Feyerabend's reasoning, the phenomenal character of experience cannot be in the external environment. In fact, he did not even claim that experiences are material processes outside the body. (Chapter 3.4, pp. 87−89) Incoherence seems to be a problem in Rorty's studies as well.

Rorty identified sensations with demons. That is, he identified mental/psychological entities with theological ones. By the identity of demons and hallucinations (or sensations and brain processes), he was referring to cases in which two or more terms refer to one and the same matter of fact. For example, behavior that would now cause us to refer to someone as a "psychotic woman" would have caused earlier people to refer to the same person as "a witch", or what used to be called "Zeus's thunderbolts" are the same thing as what is now called "discharges of static electricity". Of course, Rorty wanted to argue that we are talking about brain processes when we talk about pains, sense-data, and sensations. (Rorty, 1970: 26–28) However, if Rorty and other adherents of eliminative materialism identify mental/psychological entities, like the phenomenal character and the representational content, with brain processes, then they cannot identify them with the facts of the external environment. Eliminative materialists, nonetheless, deny experiences and qualia as objects of experience, if we consider them mental entities. Eliminative materialism would not then imply qualia outside the body, in the external environment. Brain processes are not the events of the world external to the possessor of the brain. It is absurd to claim that the observer's brain processes are not in the observer, but on the wall of a building, for example. In the context of perception, one says that a yellow that one experiences is the property of the wall and, in the context of philosophy of mind, one says that a yellow that one experiences is the

property of one's brain. If the brain represents yellow in the wall, then eliminativists cannot claim observation brain processes to be directly of the color of the wall. This claim is contradictory. However, eliminativists do not argue for the sense-datum theory of perception: observation is of physical objects. If one says that one experiences yellow as the property of the wall that is the character of one's brain, and one's brain states represent the external environment, then the direct observation of the world seems to be inconsistent with the representation of the brain. (Chapter 3.4, pp. 87−89)

Eliminative materialism seems to be incoherent. And do eliminative materialists believe in their theory? If they believe in eliminative materialism, their belief yields a contradiction because, for them, beliefs do not exist. Furthermore, the present neuroscience does not deny consciousness, which really is inconsistent with eliminative materialism.

Someone might defend eliminative materialism by arguing that the mind/body problem and the problem of perception do not confuse the perceptual situation. There is no "problem of perception". If hallucination and illusion are possible, how can perception be what we ordinarily understand it to be (an openness to and awareness of the external world)? First, it is possible that mind is the brain and, furthermore, it is also possible that experience, thought, emotion, desire, and the like are nothing but the brain's neural processes. Second, however, it might be possible that the external environment and the perceiving organism's physiological structure do not distort perceptual experience in the way that the observer indirectly represents the facts of the external environment (Chapter 2.6, pp. 50–52, 54, 57). Furthermore, the external environment and the perceiving organism's physiological structure might *not* cause the internal phenomenon, i.e. sense-data, in the perceptual experience produced by the causal chain of the events. Thus, the observer does not perceive the internal phenomenon about the external environment, and this is what Feyerabend and Churchland accept. Despite the effects of the external environment and the perceiving organism's physiological structure, the observer would directly perceive the external environment. In sum, the "problems" in perceptual experience do not exist.

It is likely, however, that appearance and reality do exist, even though the argument scenario above is rational. We can think that appearances about the world are different for different animals because their sensory systems produce different internal phenomena. Therefore, different observers represent the world indirectly. (Chapter 5.1, pp. 129−131) Internal views look different when viewed from the inside. The fact is that eliminative materialism does not deny the impact of the brain on perceptual experience. On the other hand, if our starting point is the existence of data of consciousness, we should not assume that we already know the existence of the external entities. If we know them, then there exists neither the problem of perception nor the problem of the external world. (Chapter 1.1, pp. 1−3, 10−13)

We have reached section three. Section one dealt with the sense-datum theory and its critics. Section two denied the existence of sense-data between the perceiver and the external entities: we directly perceive the external environment. In the next two sections, I will argue that something other than the real thing appears in perception. If I can provide even one property that separates the immediate object from the external substance, then I have shown a sharp distinction between the immediate object and the external substance. They are not identical.

6. THE SIMILARITY OF THE PERCEPTUAL OBJECT AND THE IMAGE[63]

1. A Perceptual Object, an Image, and the External Entity

In section six—and section seven—I will give a justification for the conclusion that the external entity is not identical to the immediate object of perception. The justification has a form that is based on understanding. It goes as follows: As are Fs and Bs are not Fs; As are here and Bs are there; Bs are causes of As; therefore, As are not identical to Bs (Chapter 3.4, 87−88). It is against my understanding to object to the conclusion. The question is also whether evidence based on understanding is a reliable demonstration of how some matter of fact is in the reality.

[63] All of section six is published in Suojanen (2015a).

The intentional object of perception has been related to an imaginary entity, not only in the philosophies of John Locke, David Hume, Franz Brentano, and George Berkeley, but also in cognitive science. In particular, the studies of Stephen Kosslyn (2003, 2005) and Zenon Pylyshyn (2002, 2003) have been quite remarkable. However, they did not focus on the ontology of these two phenomena being in relation to the perceiver and the external world. The perceiver is an embodied scene to perceptual experience, imagination, and their objects. Many medieval and early-modern philosophers distinguished a mental object from an external entity. For example, when an architect has the image of a house in his or her mind the house exists as a potentiality, whereas the real house exists as an actualized entity in the external world. The inner idea situated in the mind has been named both 'form' and 'object', as René Descartes called them. On the other hand, the external entity located in the external world has also been called an 'object' and a 'form', and this can cause confusion. Nevertheless, the distinction between the mental picture of silver coins and the real silver coins in hand should be easily understood. As I addressed earlier (see Chapter 2.6 pp. 53−57), if the imagined x and the existing x are two essentially different entities, it is hard to decide which set the perceived x is included in. The perceived x is not included in both categories. (Chapter 3.4, pp. 87−88) In fact, there are very good reasons to claim that a mental image and the immediate object of perception are similar entities, but not identical. One hypothesis is that they can be distinguished on the basis of the supposed external entities, which are causal factors (the brain is an external entity).

When S perceives x, this x is either the external entity, like a tree, or it is not. If this x perceived is a product of complex causal events, then this x is not identical to the external entity. If the external entity y causes the object x, then y is a cause and x is the effect, and thus x is not identical to y. Identity and causality are mutually exclusive. The cause cannot simultaneously be the effect. Also, if this x in S's perceiving of x is the effect in mind, then the x cannot be an external entity, like a tree, which is a cause of the x. It is highly debatable to claim that perceptual experience *directly* reaches the external entity after the complex causal events (see Chapter 2.1). Perceptual experience via technology *does not directly present* external things like planets or molecules. Why perceptual experience would present via

the sensory system is open to question. The data about direct realism show that direct realists do not make much mention of causal factors in perceptual experience and the perceiver's physiological and anatomical nature (see Chapter 2.2, pp. 35−37). Rather, they belittle the importance of these facts even though they are realists concerned with physical things and their own bodies.

I argue that the hypothesis that a mental image and the immediate object of perception can be distinguished from the supposed external entities is true. I do so using three arguments against the claim that the immediate object of perception is the external entity. It seems to me that such arguments have not been presented in this way in earlier studies of philosophy of perception. Unlike George Berkeley, I do not infer from the consequences the non-existence of the external world and that of the external physical substrata.

2. The Immediate Object of Perception and the Image are Internal Objects

The real philosophical problem is the question of why the immediate object of perception would be the same kind of entity as an image, and not an external entity. The aim of these three arguments is to argue that what we sense is not the external entity. The first argument is based on a general thought about the different spatial location of things[64]. The starting point is an assumption that the material entity hypothesis is untrue because an immediate object x of perception, when S perceives x, arises within a perceiver. That is, what is in one base is not in another base. (Compare with Chapter 3.4, pp. 87−88.)

1) B is in A and C is in D.

2) B and C are entities external to one another, as are A and D..

3) B is not in both A and D, and C is not in bothD and A (from 1 and 2).

4) B is only in A (from 1 and 3).

[64] Nicholas F. Stang (2013) uses different spatiotemporal and modal properties against the identity of appearances and things in themselves, also called the 'One Object' view in Kant's Idealism. The distinction between the appearance and the thing in itself is a distinction between two objects, not between two ways of considering one and the same object. However, his arguments seem to stay on the logical level without being related to empirical phenomena.

5) Therefore, B is not in D (from 3 and 4).

When A is a human subject, in which a perceptual appearance B arises because of dependency on the subject, it is logically and really impossible that B would also be in the external substance D at the same time, in which for example the surface C exists. The conclusion cannot, then, be that the perceptual appearance B is identical to the external material substance D. In sum, the material entity hypothesis is untrue. (Chapters 2.1, pp. 28−30, 2.2, pp. 35−36, 37−39, 3.4, pp. 87−88)

The second argument is against the direct realism. An assumption is that an image and an immediate object of perception are the same kind of entities in essence. The conclusion means that the immediate object of perception is never a material entity of the external world.

1) An image of x is a mind-dependent entity not possessing space.

2) An image of x shares similar qualities with an object y of perception.

3) They share features based on which they are subjective, sensory, conscious, and within a person.

4) Therefore, an object y of perception is a mind-dependent entity not possessing space (from 1, 2, 3).

When having an image of the elliptical shape and when sensing the elliptical shape in mind, it is very hard to understand why one would infer from these two phenomena that one of them is the real external entity. This real external entity is not even elliptical because it is round. What one senses is the elliptical shape or the composition of properties. (From understanding, Chapter 3.4, pp. 87−88) Logically considered, the real external entity has much more properties than a mental picture about it and the object of perceptual experience. However, this does not mean that the image of the elliptical shape and the elliptical shape of sensation would not refer to the entity of the external world. In particular, this argument against direct realism is a common picture argument:

1) An image of an elliptical small shape is mind-dependent.

2) Images share common content with visual objects of experiences.

3) Therefore, an elliptical small shape of experience is mind-dependent.

It is clear that the content of mental images and visual experiences are similar (from introspection). A face-appearance is similar in both the image of the face and the face of experience. Whatever mental images and objects of experiences are, they are not material bodies of the external world. They are located somewhere other than the external world. They are within the internal world of the perceiver. (Chapter 2.1, pp. 28−30, 3.4, pp. 87−88) Experience is not a relational state between a subject and the external entity because most experiences have no object. The content is a part of the psychological act, i.e., experience.

The third argument demonstrates that the existence of the external entity (if any) is not sufficient to cause perception.

1) A human person and her or his own qualities are necessary for perceiving an object.

2) Perceiving an object is dependent upon a human person, such as upon his or her visual angle.

3) Therefore, the existence of the external entity is not sufficient to cause perception of the external entity.

If the brain and its specialized neural cells cause perceptual experience, then it is possible that a direct perception of things located in the external world does not occur. For example, a perception of noise, a perception of the color red, or a face-appearance is caused by human nature, the neural cells of the brain, and the like, implying an *indirect* connection with the thing of the external world. (Chapters 2.1, pp. 28−30, 2.2, pp. 35−39, 2.5, p. 48, 2.6, pp. 52, 55−57, 3.4, pp. 84−88, 4.4, p. 106, 4.5, pp. 112−115, 5.1, pp. 123−125) Finally, it is certain that concept analysis and thinking cannot show what a round shape of experience is or how it arises from human nature.

I will go through the premises of these arguments in the next chapter. Let us see if I find something that easily disproves them.

3. Critical Evaluation of the Premises

The first and second premises of the first argument are absolutely self-evident. In general, when B is in A and C is in D, and B is not C and A is not D, then their truths cannot be doubted as such. Consider the case of two houses A and D, where Carl is in house A and a lamp is in house D. Let there be B (Carl) and C (the lamp), from which it easily follows that B is not C. Of course, houses A and D are two different buildings. Thus, it is impossible to understand how Carl and the lamp would be in both houses at the same time. An analogue is a perception time in which A is a perceiving subject and D is the object of the external world, from which it follows that when a perceptual appearance B realizes in A, then B is not C. The location of C is in D, whatever an entity C that is dependent on the existence of D is. Therefore, the first two premises of the first argument can be acknowledged as true.

The third general premise is also true because there are no means to find reasons which refute it. B is not in A and D at the same time, nor is C in D and A. When Carl is in house A, he is not in house D because A and D are distinct houses. When the lamp is located in house D, then it is not located in house A, where Carl is staying. Possible objections may consist of the possible worlds and quantum physics which try to prove that one and the same entity can be located in two different places at the same time. However, the example does not negate a perception time: Jack's perceptual appearance is not simultaneously within Jack and Jill because the content of a conscious state does not move from one person to another. It is not possible for Jill's circulation to be located in both Jill and Jack. Nevertheless, our aim is not to try to prove imagined worlds as true or perform experiments with quantum physics. Therefore, the third premise is acknowledged to be true.

The fourth premise is problem-free. If something is in some other substance, then a statement that something is in some other substance is true. Carl is in house A. The conclusion is nothing but that Carl is not in any other houses other than house A. On the other hand, it is hard to understand why Carl's image of New York would be in some other person in addition to Carl. And it is certain that Carl's image of New York is not located in New York, even though the image would refer to that metropolis. It is impossible to find reasons why a visual figure of perception arising from the brain would not be in a subject. It cannot occur

in the streets of New York in front of a person. (Chapters 1.1, pp. 10−13, 2.1, pp. 28−30, 3.3, pp. 80−82, 3.4, pp. 87−88) The examples show that the fourth premise is true, and thus the argument is valid.

The most complicated instance is a perceptual object. Is it an appearance x within the perceiver, or an entity x in the external world? If it is an image y, then one logical inference is that a perceptual object of New York or an object of a face of Marilyn Monroe is in a subject who is directly conscious of them. A perceiver has experiences of a sense-datum and an image. They might represent external entities. The second argument shows that this is the case.

The first premise of the second argument demonstrates that visualizing x is an internal, mind-dependent object. We cannot know how a mental image of x would *not* be mind-dependent or in the mind. Maybe this judgment can be criticized: an image of x and visualizing this x are dependent on a body, especially on the brain. However, the criticism does not change the fact that the image of x is within a subject and is not an entity outside the subject, such as a book in which there is a picture of Marilyn Monroe. An artist's idea is always different from a work of art. From the ontological point of view, which mechanism causes mental images is not crucial, but what is crucial is how it exists and what the nature of a mental image is. In brief, the first premise must be true.

The second premise is a real philosophical problem and a test of these three arguments. Why would the immediate object of perception be the same kind of entity as an image, and not an external entity? Most people say that they perceive the external entity because there is some matter, “a lump”, in front of them. A material book is what they perceive. They do not say that they are perceiving the internal idea of the material book. Human nature may be such a quality that it makes us infer from it that the external world is as the senses present the world to us. As George Berkeley argued, the influences of ideas upon the senses are so strong that they make us regard them as the entities of the external material world, even in cases in which matter would not exist. The image of a book and the immediate perceptual object of the book share similar content (e.g., blue facing surfaces) and qualities (e.g., caused by the perceiver’s anatomy and being dependent upon the perceiver). Both are then

subjective entities because they do not occur outside a perceiving person. For example, an image of Marilyn Monroe is clearly similar in content to a Marilyn Monroe of perceptual experience, although the internal, mental image can come into existence without an external entity, excluding the brain of a perceiver. The Marilyn Monroe of perceptual experience is dependent on the perceiver, but a distinct external substance is not. It seems to me that there are no good reasons to reject the second premise. The second argument is valid. (Chapters 1.1, 10−13, 3.4, pp. 87−88)

The first premise of the third argument is true. It must be: a perceiver's own qualities are necessary for perception. Damages in the perceiver would explain and predict why she will not perceive in a future situation. However, of course, this argument alone does not prove that one would not directly perceive external entities. We can easily say, for example, that we see rivers, houses, and roses, and that they are causes of our perception about them. The first and second argument contend that that is not the case. Furthermore, if Wesley C. Salmon's conditions for causation "in the objects" are correct, then it is unfounded to claim that the external entity causes a conscious state of the direct perceptual experience about it (see Chapter 2.1, pp. 28−30). Visual perception means eyeing or measuring an object arising from a stimulus in the senses (Chapter 2.6, 54−57). The problem is: is the immediate object of perception identical to the external entity (Chapter 1.1, p. 5)? In his *The Transparency of Experience*, M.G.F. Martin argues that they are identical on the grounds of introspection. I do not think that introspection proves that they are. (See Chapters 4.1, pp. 90−93, 5.3, pp. 140−145)

A conscious perceptual object is not like a material entity of the external world. It is impossible to characterize and understand a perceptual object—a color patch as a three-dimensional body possessing a certain place in space where we will meet it in a future situation—because the object of sense, that is, the sense-datum, is dependent upon the perceiver. We understand the external entity as something that is independent of us and possessing a certain place where we are not located (see Chapters 2.1, p. 28 and 3.4, pp. 87−88). However, we do not continue to infer from this judgment that there is no material world. If an external, material entity *partly* causes our data of sense within us, then there must be the external,

material world. In the first chapter of section seven, I will argue for why the immediate object is not the external entity, and will do so using *understanding* of the concepts "identity" and "causality".

4. An Objection and a Reply

One might object that I have misunderstood direct, naive realists' arguments. There is one central difficulty that could be raised. Why would we really consider there to be a sense-datum between a perceiver and the external entities? In their criticism, direct, naive realists argue that we see books, not visual book sense-data. The *way* we perceive the external world may change *without* us being directly aware of an internal object in perception. In defending a thesis which holds that there is no an extra entity or veil of perception, direct, naive realists may argue as follows: perceptual experience is the presentation of the external world to us as it really is; therefore, there is no extra entity between the external entity and a perceiver. (Crane and French, 2015) Direct, naive realists may argue that the perception of a physical thing has many causes located somewhere between the perceiver and the physical thing but, in the end we perceive the physical thing.

The real, external entity and the immediate object of perceptual experience are the same, even though there are complex causal chains between the perceiver's mental states and the external entity. One does not see a replica or a tiny picture of a material thing in the eyes, but a thing as it really is, like the contour of a house. When we perceive something having some property F, then there is no *internal* something that has this property F. It is our way to directly perceive external entities as F, even if they lack this property. For example, when the table appears elliptical, there is no elliptical internal object in the mind. Moreover, we directly perceive something external as a table, even though our perceptions about it have many causes. Therefore, according to direct realism, sometimes we perceive the 'appears' properties of external entities, and sometimes we perceive the external entities and the properties they really have. (Chapter 3.3, pp. 80−82)

In the beginning of this thesis, I said that it is directly obvious I am perceiving something. I am seeing colors, shapes, and surfaces; I am hearing sounds, voices, and buzzes. (Chapter

1.1, pp. 1−3, 10−13) For direct realism, there are no internal objects that I am now directly aware of in perception. This is my way of seeing and hearing the external entities. I am seeing the external entities as colorful and hearing them as loud and noisy. Moreover, if something appears elliptical, it does not mean that an internal object appears elliptical. It is, insist direct, naive realists: the external entity *appears* elliptical and *is* round. They claim that "Appearing pink" or "Appearing buzzy" is a property the external entity has, it is not the property of a sense-datum, nor is it an internal object.

Is direct, naive realism correct? I am certain that I am aware of something in perception. Let us call this something "a color red" or "a sound buzz". Is *this something* identical to the external entity which my perception directly reaches despite the complex causal chains between my consciousness and the external entity? Direct realism claims that I perceive a red external entity or a buzzing one because perceptual experience, in its character, involves the presentation (as) of ordinary mind-independent objects to a subject (Crane and French, 2015). (In the next section, I will present as follows. If this something that I am directly aware of has different properties than the external entity, then they are distinct; if the external entity is a cause and this something is the effect due to the complex causal processes, they are not identical; if this something and the external entity must have distinct causal histories in order to exist, they are not identical.)

It is possible that the objection under discussion here suffers the same implausible belief as the claim "Perceived objects are like unperceived objects". Can we show unperceived objects? No, because we always talk about what we see, hear, touch, smell, and taste. We talk about sensible objects perceived. We say that we know these things *through* the senses, not without the senses. It is logically certain that perceptual experience or introspection does not imply the truth of our intuition, which holds that perceptual experience, in its character, involves the presentation (as) of ordinary mind-independent objects to a subject. Perceptual experience and introspection are not demonstrations that the sensible objects of perception are ordinary mind-independent entities. (Chapters 2.1, p. 33, 5.1, pp. 124–125, 5.6, pp. 167−178)

I doubt that one's perception *directly* reaches the external world. The perceiver's structure affects experienced phenomena, refuting directness and identity: as stated many times, this fact refutes the assertion that a perceiver's mental states would directly reach the external entity or that appearing phenomena would be identical to the external entity. The perceiver's features do not affect the external entity, and thus the external entity is not identical to the phenomenon (See Chapters 1.1, pp. 10, 12–13, 2.1, pp. 31–33, 5.1, p. 124–125, 5.6, pp. 168, 174–178). There are not many different ways to perceive the external world. There is only one way to perceive; therefore, that way cannot be changed. However, brain damage can prevent perception while the external environment remains constant. The visual field is not the external world. If the whole visual field is blurred, it does not prove that I am seeing the external world as blurred. I am directly aware of the visual field formed by my eyes. Therefore, because perceptual experience is dependent upon the perceiver, I do not see how my perceptual experience directly reaches what is going on in the external world or what is there. (Chapters 2.1, pp. 28−30, 2.2, pp. 35−39, 3.4, pp. 87−88) Perceptual experience may represent what there is in the external environment, and this external environment is the represented. However, perceptual experience *indirectly* represents the external state of affairs to the subject. Representation implies indirectness.

Do the terms 'via senses' and 'through senses' mean that perceiving an object does not directly occur, but is always mediated? The correct interpretation seems to be that an external entity is not directly presented to a perceiver. One can never verify that the external world is as the senses present things to be. Richard Fumerton rightly argues that to establish that sensations are signs of physical objects, one would have to observe a correlation between sensations and the existence of certain physical objects. He continues to say that to observe such a correlation in order to establish a connection, one would need independent access to physical objects. This one cannot have if all one knows directly is that certain sensations occur. (Fumerton: 1992: 339) All I directly know in perceiving an object is certain sensations. On the other hand, these terms do not necessarily mean that we see inner object-pictures or hear inner sound-experiences. We would not perceive sense-data of a tree, but the trees *via* sense-data.

Let me give an example to elucidate the notion of a ‘via sense-data’. When an astronomer observes the night sky with a telescope, she does not think that she sees images of the telescope, but of the planet Mars. However, the images are necessary in order to see Mars with the telescope. These images arise from the lens system of the telescope. In the same way, the tiny images in the retina of eyes are necessary in order to see houses, books, and friends external to us. However, we would not see the images, but we would *indirectly* see the things via images. Furthermore, reason indicates that the structure of a telescope or some other machine affects how things appear, just as the structure of a human person or some other animal affects how things appear. This fact refutes beliefs that the perceiver’s mental states directly reach the external entity or that appearing phenomena would thus be identical to the external entity. (Chapters 2.1, p. 33, 2.6, pp. 50–52, 54, 57, 5.1, pp. 124–125, 5.6, pp. 168, 174–178)

The example above clearly shows that the external entities do not identify with the appearances/sense-data of the external entities, or with telescope images. However, such identification may yield consequences that direct, naive realists would not want to hold by.

1) The external entities are mind-dependent appearances of the external entities.

2) Mind-dependent appearances of the external entities are the products of the brain’s neural cellular events.

3) Therefore, the external entities are the products of brains’ neural cellular events.

It seems clear that there are, for example, sound-phenomena and color-shape-phenomena. It is possible that the causes of these phenomena come from within a human person. Eliminative materialism asserts that mental phenomena do not exist. Only the brain’s physical events exist. It is then very hard to understand why one would identify the external entities with visual images of the external entities. The following may be a matter of fact:

1) It is possible that perception dependent on human nature, the brain, etc. prevents direct perception about the external world.

2) Therefore, it is possible that the claim ‘One directly perceives sounds and color-shapes of the external world’ is untrue.

Eliminative materialists must explain what the meaning of ‘perception’ is in order to prove that perceiving the immediate object p is about the entity of the external world.

Finally, because there are many different claims about what the immediate object of perception is, perception alone cannot show what one perceives. The implication ‘One perceives p implies one knows p’ is untrue because ‘One perceives p’ is true, but ‘One knows p’ is untrue. For example, I perceive a sound and I believe that the sound is open to many perceivers. However, I do not know what the sound is and whether or not it is in the air. One thing is certain—we will not discover what appears to us in perception and what kind of entity it is by analyzing words.

The whole of section six has argued for the similarity between the direct object of perception and the image. Their similarity in kind—they are kinds of mind—distinguish them from the external mind-independent entities. (Chapter 2.6, p. 52) This justification is based on their distinct places and different causal paths. Because the direct object of perception and the image are dependent upon the perceiver’s properties, the *mind-independent* entities cannot be what we directly perceive. Because the x perceived is *a product* of the complex causal events, what we perceive is not the external entity although the x perceived has many causes. The perceived x and the external entity have distinct causes and causal histories for their existences. (Chapters 2.1, pp. 28−30, 33, 2.2, pp. 35−39, 2.5, p. 48, 2.6, pp. 49, 55−57, 3.4, pp. 87−88, 5.1, pp. 124–125, 5.6, pp. 168, 174–178)

In the next section, I will present an argument for the claim that the immediate objects of perception are *never* identical to the external entities of the external world on grounds of different properties. I must refer to *a criterion* by which to distinguish the external entity from the inner object of perception. I must refer to a distinguishing feature.

7. THE POSSIBILITY OF THE PERCEIVING SENSE-DATA

1. The Immediate Object and the External Entity: The Relation of the Causality to the Identity

In this section, I will continue to argue for the claim that the immediate object of perception is not identical to the external substance. Hence, S perceives x, but x is not a mind-independent entity outside of S. The immediate *idea* of Ms. Jones appears to me in perception, *not* the real Ms. Jones, for instance. The mediate or indirect perception is, for example, the perceiving of the figure through the mirror or the telescope. I immediately or directly perceive the picture of the figure. I am not my mirror image (numerically).

Causality and identity are opposite ideas. If A is identical to B, then A does not cause B, and vice versa. Moreover, if A causes B and B causes C, then C is not identical to A, which is self-evident. (Chapters 1.1, p. 5, 2.1, pp. 28−30, 5.1, pp. 124–125, 6.4, pp. 187−191, 10, p. 212−215) Let us consider some examples. First, if the phenomenal character is identical to the brain's neural state, it is impossible that the brain's neural state causes the phenomenal character. The character is then the brain's neural state. Second, various events are caused by my acts. However, no events are identical to my acts when my acts cause them to occur. For example, I bump someone, and she staggers. But in this situation, to bump is not to walk or move unsteadily, as if about to fall. Third, if the phenomenal character is the property of the perceiver, it is then clear that it is not the property of the crowd. For example, I experience a murmur that is not a property of the crowd, but is my property within me. From my point of view, the experience is that of whispering. Fourth, if the phenomenal character is caused by several events, then to claim that this object of perceptual experience is identical to the external substance is inconsistent with the fact and thus incorrect. For example, a needle hits the skin, causing the movement of nerve cells. They pass through the neural pathways along the cortex and probably cause injection sensation, pain sensation, in my awareness. The injection and the pain are phenomenal characters of my experience. The introspection-based claim that the injection or the pain is identical to the property of the external substance is untrue. This example reveals as problematic a general claim according to which the phenomenal contents of experience are the features of an external substance

that causes these contents (compare this feeling of sting with that of flavor and odor perception, and see Chapter 2.1, pp. 28−30, 3.4, 87−89). To sum up the idea of the whole paragraph, I am perceiving the idea of a person rather than the person herself because causality refutes identity. How could this fact even be otherwise? Direct, naive realists may think that the mind or genuine perception constitutively reaches the external entity, even if a causal connection exists between a perceiver and the external entity. However, this view is in contradiction with identity between several things in the causal chain because, as Nicholas of Cusa judiciously said, there cannot be several things that are exactly the same, for in that case there would not be several things, but the same thing itself (De Venatione Sapientiae, Chapter 23; Chapters 2.1, p. 33, 5.1, pp. 124–125, 6.4, pp. 187−191). If the external entity is a cause and what appears to me directly in perception is the effect, then they are not identical. I do not directly perceive the external entity because a cause is not identical with an effect, i.e., with an object I directly perceive.

It is certain and absolute that *things* and *events* with different properties are not identical. To suppose two things as identical is to suppose the same thing under two names. For example, "Bertrand Russell" and "the author of 'On Denoting'" refer to the same person. In contrast, non-identical things refer to the fact that no two distinct things (such as two snowflakes) can be exactly alike or the same thing under two names. For example, a thing that has a different place and age than another thing cannot be exactly like the other thing (such as a mother and her son). Therefore, if a thing x is not identical to a thing y, a thing x is an F, and thus a thing y is not an F. If I have an experience of sweetness and greenness that are dependent upon myself, and the sum of molecules has neither properties of sweetness and greenness nor properties of tasting sweet and looking green that are dependent upon myself, then sweetness and greenness are not identical to *the sum of molecules* when I am perceiving something to be sweet and green. If the existence of the F object of perception is dependent upon the perceiver, it cannot be identical with the property of the external entity because the external entity and its properties are not dependent upon the perceiver. The existence of taste or color does not occur without the senses, consciousness, and the brain. (Chapters 2.1, pp. 28−30, 2.2, pp. 35−39, 3.4, pp. 87−89, 6.4, pp. 187−191) The question now deals

with the location of the immediately perceived object: Is the object in the external world, or is it *an idea* caused by various *events* in the perceiver?[65]

For example, the property of tasting sweet is not identical to the property of being soluble or any external properties of sugar. The "appears" property of tasting sweet is the property of *the perceiver*, not of *the external entity*, because the sensory properties perceived are dependent upon the perceiver's properties. I do not have only images and emotions, but also tastes, colors, and other data of experience that I am directly aware of. The gestalt, the organized whole, that I experience and perceive is more than the sum of its parts. The gestalt of experience is the property of a perceiver. Therefore, it is not really the property of the external substance (this inference is *not* based on introspection of the experience from the subject's point of view, but is based on reasoning). These immediate objects of my perceptual experience are not identical to the external substance or any of its properties because the external substance and its properties are not dependent upon the perceiver's properties, such as the senses. (Chapters 1.1, p. 5, 2.1, pp. 28−30, 2.2, pp. 35−39, 3.4, pp. 87−89)

With this inference in mind, I would like to ask whether the external entity has properties, or at least one property, that the immediate object of perception does not have. If I can give evidence of their different properties, then *what* I immediately perceive is never the external entity. Let us consider a rope. The rope has two ends. If I move one end, the other end starts moving. The rope ends are not identical. In a causal series, a cause is not identical to the ultimate effect, which is obvious. If the external entity is a cause of the series of events yielding an experience of perceiving something, the external entity is not identical to *something* (the effect) that is the immediate object of the experience of perceiving (self-evident). Furthermore, the causal series of events does not continue from the experience of perceiving something to the external entity in a sense that the experience of perceiving reaches the external entity (this is also self-evident). For example, sight does not touch another's face. If the data of sense that I am immediately aware of in perception are caused by different

[65] I do not mean that various events cause the perception, and this perception is directed at the external thing. How you perceive Ms. Jones has many causes. I mean a case of whether various events cause an idea of Ms. Jones, a sense-datum, and thus you perceive the internal idea of Ms. Jones. See Chapters 2.1 and 2.2.

events and things including the external entity, then it is contradictory and absurd to claim that what one sees is the external entity (If Salmon's criteria are correct, and the assertions of Nicholas of Cusa mentioned above are true, this is a physical impossibility. See Chapters 2.1, pp. 28−30, 5.1, 124–125). Data of sense are the perceiver's properties dependent upon the perceiver: this is one quality that distinguishes the immediate object of perception from the external substance. Moreover, if a whispering sound is *the phenomenal character* of experience from the subject's point of view, this sound might be caused by the complex neural states. But then the whispering sound and the complex neural states are not identical (numerically) because two distinct events cannot be identical when one event is a cause and the other the effect. The whispering sound would be an internal phenomenon that depends on the real process (see Chapter 2.1, pp. 28−29). But one thing is certain: if the whispering sound *is dependent upon* brain activity, the whispering sound *is not* identical with the external substance or with one of the substance's properties: they have distinct causes and causal histories for their existences (Chapter 3.4, pp. 87−89). I would not perceive the sound as the property of a bird or a car, for instance; that is, the sound is my property. The whispering sound would not occur without the senses, consciousness, and the brain of the perceiver. The senses, consciousness, and the brain are preconditions for the whispering sound. Direct realists might object to this conclusion. However, the fact is that direct realists are silent on causal events in perceptual experience. This is a mistake.[66]

The external entity is not identical to the immediate object of perception because they have different properties. The external entity is not anatomical, it is not caused by and dependent upon the anatomy of the perceiver (3.4, pp. 87−89). The immediate object of perception can be manipulated while the external supposed entity remains constant (see also Chapter 2.1, pp. 28−30). The immediate object of perception is psychological, and thus it can be distinguished from the external entity outside of the perceiver. The perceiver's, such as a human person's, an animal's and a smartphone's, structure affects how things appear refuting directness and identity (5.1, p. 124–125, 6.4, pp. 187–191)—I justify this claim by experience, understanding and imagination; it makes sense. That is, the perceiver's features do not affect

[66] See, for example, Crane (2000) and Martin (2002).

the external entity, and thus the external entity is not identical to the immediate object of perception.

1) If an event F causes an event G, then F is not identical to G.
2) The external event connected with the external substance causes the immediate object of perception within a perceiver.
3) Therefore, the external event is not identical to the immediate object that the perceiver immediately perceives.

A direct realist may argue for the claim that *the way* we perceive the external entities is manipulated, not the internal immediate object of perception. The external entities look and sound different after manipulation. I reply to this argument by stating that the internal content of perceptual experience changed and the external world remained constant. The whole visual field, for example, can be manipulated by us, but nobody believes that the external world has also changed. For example, everything appears different if I am drinking two bottles of red wine or using heroin. I am seeing, hearing, and feeling the whole panorama of my experience, but the whole panorama is an appearance, not the external world. In a similar way, if a person's visual field is blurred, it does not mean that the external world is blurred or appears blurred or that this is the way the person perceives the external world. The visual field is blurred, and the visual field is not identical to the aspect of the external world because the visual field is in the perceiver, in her or his eyes. Therefore, the content that we are directly aware of in perception has been manipulated, but not *the way* we perceive the external entities.

In fact, there is only one way to perceive. For example, if the green visual content of experience changes to pink, it does not imply one's way of perceiving has changed. Those who claim that it does confuse an act (PERCEPTION) with what an object (GREEN AND PINK PATCHES) is about. Therefore, the way of perceiving cannot be changed. (Chapter 2.6, pp. 54−57)

I said above that the notion of causality and the notion of identity are mutually exclusive, which is certain. It is not possible for two identical events or states to be in the cause-effect

relation. Such a possibility would mean that event F is identical to an event G, and the event F causes the event G (that is not the event F), which is absurd. The existence of two identical events in the cause and the effect relation is absurd because causality is the relation between an event (the *cause*) and a second event (the *effect*). According to direct, naive realism, S perceives the external substance x, even though there is a complex causal chain of events between the perceiver's mental states and the external substance x. However, the following statement is true and testable in principle, e.g., by doing surgery on the perceiver's senses: how things appear directly to the perceivers in perception is determined by the perceivers' essence. Therefore, direct, naive realism is not true, and what appears to the perceiver, e.g., the aspect of a tree or sweetness, sense-data for Russell, and the external substance x are not identical. (Chapters 1.1, pp. 12–13, 2.1, p. 33, 5.1, pp. 124–125, 5.6, pp. 168, 174–178, 6.4, pp. 187–191) For example, I do not believe that the two labels "being sweet" and "being a sugar's property A" refers to the same entity. Sugar's ingredients affect the perceiver's sense in order to cause an experience of sweet flavor *after* the stimulation of the perceiver's sense. In sum, if the causal theory of perception is true, and it is, then the identity theory of the object of perception is not true (Chapter 2.2, pp. 35−39, 3.4, pp. 87−89). Those who object confuse two terms in the context of perceptual experience: *identity* and *causality*. If the immediate object of perception is caused by the external entity (an event, a property, or a substance), then the external entity is not identical to the immediate object of perception, although perceptual experience represents the external entity—it does not directly reach the external entity, for perceptual experience arises from the perceiver's structure and is within the perceiver (it comes from understanding a camcorder, for instance; 1.1, pp. 10, 12–13, 2.1, p. 33, 3.4, pp. 86–89, 5.1, p. 124–125, 6.4, pp. 187–191). Moreover, the cause of the immediate object x of perception may be the brain and its activity when S perceives x. Thus, this x is not the external entity, tree for instance, because the external entity, i.e., the represented, is not dependent upon the perceiver's brain activity (This really is a sound possibility. See again Chapter 2.1, pp. 28−30).

It is not possible that the immediate object of perception is identical to the external entity if the immediate object of perception is caused by the complex causal events in which one is connected with a possible external substance, like a tree, and if they have distinct causes

and causal histories for their existences (Chapter 3.4, pp. 86−89). In this sense, such identity is not possible because causality refutes identity. The possible external substance does not have the feature "is caused by the human body", and the immediate object of perceptual experience as a phenomenal character has the property "is dependent upon the perceiver". Therefore, the immediate object of perceptual experience and the external entity have different properties, which makes them *non-identical*.

The statement "x is a cause of y" is not equivalent to the statement "x is identical to y", and vice versa. First, if the experience of perceiving something is the brain state, then the brain state is not a cause of the experience of perceiving something (I assume them to be events). Second, if the external entity (an event, a property, or a substance) is a cause of the immediate object of experience, then the external entity is not identical to the immediate object of experience. Third, if a set of factors (the external entity and the brain state) is a cause of the immediate object of experience or how things appear to the perceivers, then the set of factors is not identical to the immediate object of experience or how things appear to the perceivers. In conclusion, the causality and the identity are mutually exclusive, excluding the possibility that a property of the external entity is identical to the intentional object of which I am immediately aware in perception, such as a sweet taste. The causality of perceptual experience implying representation does *not* indicate direct contact with the external entity. Such an implication is a logical and physical impossibility: mental states and acts are not dimensional. Mind and conscious states extend nowhere. (Chapter 1.1, 12–13) Direct, naive realists should deny representational states—which they do not do—so that the direct object of perception would be the external entity, despite the complex *physical* causal chain lacking consciousness between the perceiver and the external entity. In sum, direct, naive realism is implausible, confusing, and contradictory.

When I *introspect* my current perceptual experience of sweetness, I attend to the datum of sense, not to the external substance and the way it appears. That is, this sweetness might be the phenomenal character of the experience. I experience sweet as a property of the perceptual experience. The best explanation for such a phenomenal character is the brain's neural state. Therefore, sweetness as a phenomenal character is dependent upon the brain's neural

state. Moreover, it is dependent upon the perceiver because it is the property of the perceiver (see Chapter 2.1, pp. 28−30). What follows is that to claim the property of the perceiver to be identical to the property of the external substance is contradictory and absurd. Clearly, tasting sweet is not identical to the property of the external substance because tasting sweet *is* dependent upon the perceiver, and the external substance with its properties *is not*. Jack's property cannot be the property of the tree in the same way that Jill's brain state does not occur in her dog's brain.

The argument is then:

1) If the immediate datum of sense, like blueness or the sky, is dependent upon the brain and not only upon the external substance outside of the perceiver in the causal sense, then the immediate datum is not identical to the object outside of the perceiver in the external world.
2) The immediate datum of sense, like blueness or the sky, is dependent upon the brain (because the brain causes it).
3) Therefore, the immediate datum is not identical to the object outside of the perceiver in the external world.

Blueness cannot be a property of the sky or the sky itself, for example, because one and the same entity cannot simultaneously be in the brain and outside of the same brain: one and the same entity cannot be both dependent on and independent of the brain or the physical energy light (Chapters 3.4, pp. 86−89, 6.4, pp. 187−191). To claim that *causality* and *identity* are the same is as absurd and contradictory as claiming that *dependence* and *independence* or *spatiality* and *identity* are identical. To claim based on introspection that the object of perceptual experience is the tree and the way it looks, and at the same time claim that various events tend to cause a datum of sense to the perceiver, and that the existence of the datum is dependent upon the perceiver and other physical materials (e.g., light, air) certainly leads to a contradiction. The perceiver's features do not affect the external entity, and thus the external entity is not identical to the datum of sense. The experience is not transparent.[67] When perceiving, I perceive *the idea* of a tree.

[67] See Crane (2000) p. 2.

2. Brain Processes, a Flow of Experiences, and the External Event

Here, I argue for the claim that a flow of experiences with *represented* contents cannot be simultaneously identified with the brain processes (as eliminative materialists do) *and* the external mind-independent entities (as direct realists do). It is not the multi-reduced entity. The external entity would not appear in perception, and the perceiver always describes the data of sense despite the fact that his or her perceptual experience would represent the external entity. Representation does not imply the direct object of the external world.

In Chapter 5.5, I argued that the object of perceptual experience is not always a sense-datum because the sense-datum cannot have properties possessed by the particular external entities in the sense of touch: materiality, hardness and marble, and the like. However, this fact does not imply that we have an immediate, direct connection with entities of the external world in tactile perception. Eliminative materialism is incoherent if its adherents *claim to* have a direct connection with the facts of the external world. Their claims do not *immediately* and *objectively* describe the entities of the external world, but rather represent them *via* perceptual experience.

1) If A is B, then A is not C (as B is not identical to C).
2) If a flow of sensations is the brain processes, then a flow of sensations is not an external event (brain processes are not external events because the former occurs in the subject and the latter occurs outside of the subject. That is, they have distinct places).
3) If a flow of flight of yellow butterfly-sensations is the brain processes, then a flow of a flight of a butterfly-sensations is not the external flight of a yellow butterfly (the brain process is not identical to the butterfly that flies, which is obvious).
4) Therefore, the brain process is not a flying yellow butterfly.

This chain of inferences confirms my earlier arguments, which I presented in section six, pp. 179−191. The external entity does not appear as a butterfly, yellow, and flying because the entities appear in perception. There is something-perceived: the figure that is not a substance having the “appear” properties of being butterfly, yellow, and flying, but the figure is a part of experience. It is the rich content of experience. These “appear” properties are

sense-data not being the properties of a sense-datum (Chapter 3.3, pp. 80−82). The part of experience, or the experience of being figure, is a property of the subject itself Chapter (3.4, pp. 87−88).

It is justified to claim that philosophy of mind and philosophy of perception lead to a mess. What appears in perception, for example, qualia, *cannot* be reduced to both the brain and the external environment (Chapter 3.4, pp. 87−88). It is possible that data of sense are reduced. However, it seems to me that there is at least one entity which cannot be reduced to matter: perceptual knowledge about the external world.

3. Knowledge about the External World via X

What I will argue for next is the entity that is not reduced. Perceptual knowledge cannot be reduced to matter. Knowledge based on perception does not imply an external world open to many. Mediators exist between the perceiver and the external world. The perceiver's properties play important roles in mediating perceptual knowledge of the external world.

We have tried to reduce mathematics to logic, mind to the brain, water to H2O, a table to the aggregate of atoms; scientific methods may be reduced to cognition, intellect, external perception, introspection, and memory. However, it seems to me that *knowledge* can be reduced to neither perception nor a collection of material things because it is an abstract entity. Nevertheless, we tend to claim that we have knowledge about reality, i.e., presenting true claims about an extra-mental world. Knowledge of the external world requires a medium.

To say A about B means there are two distinct entities, not one. If we say that we have knowledge about the external world, then knowledge is one entity and the external world is another. However, what do we have when we say that we have knowledge? We might have something conceptual, a true proposition, or true beliefs. If we have various propositions and we call them "knowledge", these propositions must be true. However, one can ask *how* these various propositions are true about something. It seems then to me that knowledge as true propositions requires a medium. In sum, we can say that our knowledge A about B is

based on some C. There are three distinct entities, A, B, and C. We possess knowledge about the external world because of perceptual experience.

Perceptual knowledge refers to true propositions based on perception and experience/experiment, and a priori knowledge (true propositions based on intellect and universal knowledge, they are true propositions that always hold). It seems clear to me that a consequence of the theory of eliminative materialism is that perceptual knowledge is based on the brain processes because the meaning of 'perception' in the theory is a brain process connected to sense-organs and the external stimulation. (Chapter 5.4, pp. 148−152) However, I do not believe that eliminative materialists would claim "Knowledge is nothing but brain processes", and "Knowledge must be eliminated from neuroscience and its ontology". Knowledge cannot be reduced to matter. When perception is interpreted in a materialistic framework, how does one know *what* perceives? If the best explanation for perception is the brain, and experiencing is an internal representing phenomenon, then the connection between the perceiver and the external world is not direct. In this context, it is untrue to claim to be directly perceiving the external world. (Chapters 2.1, pp. 28−30, 2.2, pp. 35−39, 2.6, pp. 52, 55−57, 3.4, pp. 87−88, 4.2, pp. 96−99, 4.5, pp. 112−118, 5.1, pp. 123−126, 6.4, pp. 187−191) Nonetheless, direct realism and materialism claim to directly perceive nothing but external entities, i.e., entities external to a perceiver and its brain.

The implication from perceptual statements to statements concerning the physical world is not valid because one can question the claim that the immediate object of perception is a physical thing. Such a claim is not perceptual knowledge, and it cannot be reduced to a perceiver's physiological states. If the immediate object of perception has different properties than a physical thing, then the object of perception and the thing are not identical. A thing A and a thing B have different temporal properties; due to Leibniz's Law, A is not B when they have different properties; Therefore, A is not B. We tend to believe that the immediate object of perception does not last as long a time as a possible external entity independent of our minds. Therefore, it is possible that the immediate object of perception and the external entity, say a tree or another person, have different temporal properties. Thus, due to Leibniz's law, the immediate object of perception is not the external entity.

Furthermore, the immediate object of perception and the external entity have different causes for their existences.

There are phenomena of experience of which I am aware. If that description is knowledge, it is not reduced to matter. Knowledge is based on some other entity to which the description is not reduced. But what is the best explanation for it? If the brain is the best explanation for my experience data, I cannot infer directly from them to external entities outside the brain. Maybe the external world, including a perceiver's body, is the best explanation for the perceiver's experiences and the contents of their experiences. However, this subject is totally different from that concerning the identity between the immediate object of perceptual experience and an external mind-independent entity. If they have different properties, then they are not identical. First, there are different causal mechanisms for their existences. Second, if many external entities are causes of "the intentional phenomenon" effect, then an external entity cannot be identical to this intentional phenomenon. Third, from the first and the second, they are not identical. This conclusion is a logical necessity based on my reasoning (see Chapters 7.1, 3.4 and 2.1).

8. THE RESULTS

1. The Main Results

The main result of this study is that the identity between the immediate object of perception and an external entity is incorrect: there is a mediate and indirect connection between *a perceiver* and *the external world*. One is in connection to the external entities *through* perceptual experience caused by one's own nature and circumstances, and this makes perceptual experience representative (the object of experience is a replica on a smaller scale). This result differs from the ideas of Austin and Searle and their objectivity-as-open-to-many argument. Moreover, one's claims are not immediately of the external world, but of the immediate objects of perception. Because of different properties and causation, the immediate object of perception is not identical to the external entity.

Direct realism is circular, a circle in proving. Its premises provide no independent ground or evidence for the conclusion because it contains no evidence that is distinct from the conclusion. From perceiving something I conclude that I perceive the external entity, and then I use my perception of something to justify the conclusion that I perceive the external entity.

The immediate object of perception cannot be considered in a singular perceptual statement as an individual substance, however. Doing so leads to the sense-datum fallacies. Nonetheless, from a singular perceptual statement, a singular statement concerning the physical world does not follow. In brief, these statements have different meanings.

One result is as follows. The logical consequence of eliminative materialism is that it is untrue because of the possibility of mind and mentality, and thus the "problem of perception". Eliminative materialism implies the falsity of the theory because mind and matter are not impossible entities or self-contradictory. In general terms, theories do not determine what exists in the reality. Theories do not justify an interpretation or a description about the phenomenon. The phenomenon must be discovered by means of something that justifies the interpretation or the description. The phenomenon should confirm the theory – otherwise the signs and symbols of a theory mask what we experience. There must first be some particular aspects of reality functioning as *evidence*, and *after evidence,* theory, hypothesis, or general statement formation must occur. Evidence is *a test* of a singular and general statement. In brief, although eliminative materialism includes only physical concepts, it does not logically imply that there are only material entities in the reality, nor does it imply direct perception of the external material entities. Language does not imply reality.

The second result of this study is that empirical knowledge requires a medium. If asking how one can discover an external entity p of the external world, this means there is some entity q by which p will be discovered. For direct realism, q is perceptual experience, and for eliminative materialism it is observation and brain processes. However, if asking how to discover the immediately perceived p, the response cannot be that it is discovered by perceptual experience (or introspection), because the answer then begs the question. Metaphysical judgments influence how idealists, dualists, and realists claim to know p, or a

sound of rustling, for instance. Idealists say that what they perceive is a mind-dependent entity; dualists know by perceiving a rustle sense-datum resembling something external to them; and direct realists are certain that they perceive a real rustle located in the external world without first having to experience a sense-datum in order to perceive the outer something. Nevertheless, their knowing is based on *cognition*. Has this study's analysis of *perception* then justified that *perception* is a meaningful concept? The analysis shows that the concept *perception* has a *referent*, and thus it is not an empty word. Contemporary philosophy of perception does not focus enough on the process of perception itself, even though the notion "philosophy of perception" assumes perception to be the most important entity in philosophy of perception. The second result is just that perception is not sufficient to show that what one perceives is external.

2. Knowledge and the External World: A Medium between Them

The results of this research have been obtained by means of logic and reasoning together with experience and facts relating to perceivers: I have used, first, the identity and the causality in an experience of perceiving something, which is a directly obvious fact, second, the spatial inference from perception and, third, the empirical introspective comparison between the immediate object of perception and the imagery. The background theory of perception is a causal one, of which one application is the interpretation-based theory of perception, i.e., *to spot and process empirical data*.

It is also a precipitate conclusion that the causal theory of perception involves skepticism: if the causal theory of perception is true, we know the sensed world, not the real world. The claim that there is causality in perception does not necessarily yield skepticism. It also eliminates solipsism, the view that only I and my mental states exist because something external to me causally affects and changes my states. Solipsism is too hasty because it is through perceptual experience that we get information that we otherwise would not get. Perceptual experience is a medium between knowledge and the external world. Direct, naive realists' judgment "Material bodies are perceived without causality" is false because of the necessity of causality (they remain silent concerning causality in their theories). Their arguments are circular because perception cannot be said to show what the nature of the perceived object

is before knowing what the nature of perception is. Direct, naive realists' theories have not clearly demonstrated what perception is. In perceiving, we are spotting, measuring, and interpreting the sensible object after the external stimulation of the sense-organs.

The following is certain: perception in itself is not sufficient to discover what the nature of the immediate object of perception is. Neither realists nor idealists have a judgment that would prove what they perceive and how they will start to perceive. Although we do not exactly know the nature of a visual image and a sense-datum, we do know *by introspection (inner perception)* that the visual sense-datum *is like* the mental image, such as, firstly, seeing the movement of experience, and secondly, after closing our eyes, visualizing the flight.

All this above means:

1) Causal factors (and possibly, specialized neural cells) are necessary for perception in a future situation.
2) There is no direct access to the world outside of the mind out there.
3) Knowledge about the external world is based on something—subjective sense-data.
4) Perception is a more reliable source of knowledge about the external world than intuition, tradition, or belief in authority, though perception is not a direct source.

The first point indicates that perception will not occur only if something external to the observer is present out there. For example, somebody walks in, and thus perception of him or her occurs because his or her being is present. It is untrue that someone's being present and perception always exist in tandem just because they exist in the situation. The being present does not cause perception. A philosophical theory in which one thing is present, another thing meets it, and then this other thing immediately perceives the thing proves nothing about the occurrences of the color-shape, sound, touch, taste, smell, depth, face, and event perception, to name but a few.

The second point means that a connection with the external things is not possible without sensing. However, subjects do not sense sensations or perceive perceptions, but rather they

sense particulars they call colors of redness and greens, shapes of roundness and squareness, sounds of speech and purring, tastes of bitterness and sweetness, smells of smokiness and roses, and touches of hardness and rubber-like. They make us direct our attention to something external when they first come into being in the senses. One rhetorical question is whether colors and shapes make a blind person measure them up with her or his eyes. Things, which we perceive or experience, are not *in the perceptions* or *in the experiences*, but *our perceptions*, and *experiences* are *of these things*, whatever their nature may be. They may be non-physical or physical, or neither non-physical nor physical, but something unknown. The percept is not the external entity, but the inner object. "An object-experience about an object" means that there are two things external to one another.

The third point means that if knowledge of the world and its entities is based on subjective phenomena or sense-data, then these phenomena must exist. The external perception is a subjective event and knowledge about the external world is based on the contents of this event. Claims about the external world are based on the immediate objects of external perception. The conclusion is then that perception and its objects must exist. It is an absurd inconsistency to first accept that knowledge requires perception and then deny that there is such a thing as perception.

On the other hand, if the meaning of perception is something other than a psychological internal phenomenon, as eliminative materialism claims, then the situation changes. Perception and knowledge are not in the relationship.

The fourth point means that perceptual experience forces us to rely on it. The intellect without the senses tells us nothing about the empirical world. Perception guides our action, not intuition or adherence to authorities. Perceptual experience awakens our curiosity and makes us want to ask what something is and investigate it, while adherence to a priori theoretical systems prevents this. Therefore, I would conclude as follows.

Pre-analytic philosophy and cognitive science offer promising chances to create new views and develop our understanding of perception and its role in knowing the external world. Contemporary direct, naive realism is speculative in nature. Critical thinking and concept

analysis are not efficient methods to discover what is going on outside of one's mind/brain. In summary, I recommend the abandonment of direct, naive realism.

9. CONCLUSION

My conclusion about the present situation of *the research problem* is that the relationship between the internal mind and the external world is supposedly known by direct, naive realists, though I claim otherwise. For so many philosophers, the reality is as one perceives it to be. Maybe they do not really understand what the problem of perception and the problem of the external world mean. They assure us that the real, external world appears in perception, for otherwise the external entity would be identical to the immediate object of perception. For direct, naive realists, the "appears" properties are the properties of the real, external world. They insist that the property of appearing green is not the property of the inner object, of the sense-datum that I have an experience of, because, for example, the lawn over there appears green to me in this perceptual situation.

I think this kind of *a synthesis* is the consequence of some fundamental differences between my results and previous studies. Why is this? Next I will present some reasons.

Philosophers, for example, Austin and Moore, close their eyes to certain philosophical problems. Subjectivity is true. One's experiences or picture of the reality do not necessarily correspond with the reality. First, there is reality, and second, the perceiver has an experience of perceiving it. However, the reality is neither identical to nor similar to one's experience of perceiving. Perceptual-based judgments can be "colorful" due to the perceiver's mental states, world-view, or prior experiences and prejudices. For example, the academic world may be public, but my perceptions and picture of it are not identical to the academic world. My objects of perception and picture of the academic world are not objective. However, I have this inner experience of my own and an interpretation about what I have been experiencing. This yields the second difference: it is *perception*.

The reason why my results differ from previous studies and direct, naive realism is because I use a different conception of *perception*. I do not believe what philosophers say about perception as a phenomenon. Nobody should believe their description if she or he is honest.

To define *perception* as 'the belief formation' or 'to be directly acquainted to' is incorrect. The fact is that philosophers do not have much to say about what perception is. They have concentrated on objects. *Perception* is when the observer organizes the information and translates/interprets it into something meaningful (selective attention) or something that can be made sense of. *Sensation*, on the other hand, is the stimulation of a sense which produces impulses that the observer interprets as a sound, visual image, odor, taste, pain, etc. My conception of *perception* distinguishes me from direct, naive realism.

The ontological conceptions are the third difference between my results and those of previous studies. I am pretty certain about the role of metaphysical principles and views in analytic philosophers' statements made based on particular cases. These principles and views "color" statements made by particulars. The collective research paradigm excludes alternative ontological conceptions. If not for this exclusion, the research problem "What are these immediately perceived things?" or "Is there an external world?" would be solved. They "know". I am *uncertain* if there is an external world, and I am *uncertain* what type of entity it is.

The fourth difference in results is due to a lack of understanding about the difference between the most general of concepts. These concepts, such as identity, causality, substance, and property, cannot be known to apply to less general concepts and particular, empirical cases. The applying occurs in the mind when one "moves" between the different ontological levels and between generality and particularity. For example, if the immediate object of perception is caused by the external entity, then it is not possible that the object is identical to the entity. Moreover, it is justified to ask where the place of sweetness is in perception: Is *sweetness* a property of a substance or part of an experience of taste? Somehow, the inner world of the mind and the external world exist. Neuroscience cannot negate this dualism.

Nevertheless, I admit many merits in the studies of Chisholm, Austin, and Churchland. Chisholm justified why the correct category of sense-datum is not that of substance, although Russell and Moore thought it to be. He also gave justified reasons for why sense-data-based judgments are not the absolutely certain, infallible, uninferred data of empirical

knowledge. However, these two findings do not imply the external, mind-independent object of perception. Austin, and later Hilton, Martin, Snowden, and McDowell, showed that the content of hallucination/illusion and the object of perceptual experience might be distinguishable after all. If Austin's arguments are valid, a number of arguments that support our perceptions as being based on inner objects of sense-data are invalid, especially the Argument of Illusion and the Argument of Hallucination. These standard arguments go back to the 17th century and Ancient Greece, and were used by a big group of philosophers, such as Plato, Sextus Empiricus, Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Leibniz, Spinoza, Kant, Mill, and Russell. The weak point in their results is their ambiguous base. The results are based on a fallacy of ambiguity because the expressions 'perception', 'identity', 'causality', and 'property' are unclear in the arguments of Austin, Churchland, and other eliminative materialists. A coworker and I wonder what we have an experience of, although my coworker is as obscure as the thing I wonder inside of me.

'Sense-data' does not necessarily mean 'inner, subjective substance', but, as I express it, sense-data is the material that I as a perceiver sense, experience, and process in attentive perception. In brief, sense-data are empirical 'exhibits', 'sources', or 'documents' that I am able to describe and point to. I have given evidence that this empirical material is not identical to the external entities of the external world because they have different properties. The merit of my research is that is brings dualism back. It must be taken seriously. There exist two things, the mind and the external world. Perception does not directly disclose the external world.

The weak point in my main result is *the non-empirical claim* for the inevitability of the ontological difference of the external entity and the immediate object of perceptual experience. The claim is understandable: the external entity includes properties that the immediate object of perceptual experience does not possess. This non-empirical claim is based on my understanding and internal inspection of an experience of perceiving something (which is directly obvious to me and which is caused by the external factors). My result may be weak in the sense that in perceiving I am just "measuring" entities that are directly present to me, like the surface of a table. What you see is what you get, said the cognitive scientist James L. Gibson. There is no need for processing (interpretation) since the information we receive

about size, shape, distance, etc. is sufficiently detailed for us to interact directly with the environment. As Searle says, perceptual experience is "presentational": no inference is needed in order to judge what exists in the public space. However, my senses still remain skeptical of direct, naive realism of perception. I am not able to verify or check that the external world is as my perceptual states present it to me, although they may represent the represented external world. I do not have God's perspective. I have been tied to my perspective.

The key argument is that a sense-datum entity is required between the observer and the external world in order to perceive the mind-independent thing. However, the sense-datum does not necessarily mean the individual thing. It can be an event-like entity. The sense-datum is then necessary in order to claim something about the extra-mental world. Claims about such a world are mediated by perceptual experience. However, perception does not occur without causes other than the external thing (if there is any).

The findings of this research are *not* consistent with contemporary analytic philosophy and phenomenology, although, of course, some of today's philosophers do not accept the naive picture of direct realism. This study shares the causal theory of perception with cognitive science. Contemporary philosophers may exclude *a perceiving subject* because they try to secure objective empirical knowledge even though such knowledge is never infallible. Nevertheless, the view that perception can exist without complex processes is incorrect. The findings do *not* concur with those of some classic philosophers, such as Kant, Descartes, and Reid, who identify the sense-datum or the internal object with the external thing. The subject perceives sensible properties, i.e., a substance-like composition of properties.

What we now understand better than earlier is that past philosophers and previous studies did not much describe and explain *perception* in itself. Perception is not sufficient to know what is perceived. In perceiving, there is no direct access to the external world without some sort of sensory information, some sort of empirical data. This content of perceptual experience, i.e., a sense-datum or an appearance, is located in the perceiving person.

Further research could consider *perception* and *experience* more closely by considering the following questions:

1) Is there a link between thoughts and experience in the context of experiencing various roles? Do thoughts and experiences affect our actions (mental causation)?
2) How does perception automatically differentiate between different objects in the environment? What is the role of memory in perception and in this differentiation?
3) What is the boundary between the internal world of the mind and the external world of the reality?
4) Is empirical knowledge influenced by other mental states or background beliefs, or is empirical knowledge *objective* in some sense, despite not being infallible and absolutely certain?

This research has left unanswered a question about theory-free perception. Theory-free perception concerns the issue of whether the conceptual framework of a perceiver influences his or her formation of perceptual statements, or if perception occurs in the conceptual framework. Paul M. Churchland's eliminative materialism, for example, claims that a person's conceptual framework does influence perception. Nevertheless, I have learned that statements concerning the physical world are presented by means of perceptual experience about sensible qualities. This research advances the understanding that the identification of a sense-datum with a mind-independent substratum is incorrect.

Finally, we must ask what this research means, i.e., what the results really mean. Simply put, it goes against logic to claim that "The immediate object of perception is the real external entity" is a true *identity* statement.

Neuroscience's prediction that people will start using material concepts is not a scientific claim. There is no evidence that people talk about parts of the brain cortex or the material processes when they want to talk about their perceptions, experiences, and feelings. This claim is materialist ideology, although neuroscience can explain and predict how people use language in general. That is, neuroscience can explain language behavior.

10. APPENDIX: METHODS AND THEIR RELIABILITY

The starting point in this work is a perceptual situation in which I immediately perceive something, a sound, for instance. The raw data are the entities of perceptual experience which are ready for analysis. For example, a perception of a red phenomenon is such an entity. Therefore, we have a particular case, for example, an experience of perceiving a sound, and theories of perception should be generalizations of this particular phenomenon. A methodological question here is that of how I find out what the nature of the immediate object of perception is. For example, how do I discover whether an object that I am experiencing is an inner object in my mind or an outer entity in the external world?

Richard Fumerton argues that to establish that sensations are signs of physical objects one would have to *observe* a correlation between sensations and the existence of certain physical objects. He continues to say that one would need independent access to physical objects in order to observe such a correlation and establish a connection. One cannot have such access if all one directly knows is that certain sensations occur. (Fumerton: 1992: 339) I think that this is correct.

The philosophical problems concerning perception have been discussed since the origin of Western philosophy, and most major philosophers have had something to say about it. Philosophers have given answers to these deep questions by *reasoning* and *thinking* rather than by using experiments, interviews, or telescopes. Although *the linguistic turn*[68] of the 20th century places focus on words and concepts instead of useless metaphysical speculation, I think that most philosophical problems are about reality. In brief, I do not believe that analyzing words can show what sort of a thing I am directly aware of. Reasoning can be more fruitful. Reasoning focuses on things rather than concepts about things. The analytic method is an unconvincing because it starts from concepts or theories and then continues to judge

[68] This *linguistic turn* seems to be a dogma, as if reality depended on language. It is not clear at all what language is and how it exists. The human sciences believe that language is somehow more real than "reality".

phenomena[69]. Phenomena or particular instances are primary; the used concepts are secondary (unless the research subject concerns language).

Using philosophy focused only on language and theories is not a reliable method to obtain information about one's mental phenomena or phenomena of the external world. The analysis of theories and propositions gives information about the theories and propositions. For me, the starting point of research is a particular instance, it is an empirical or logical *fact*. Analysis without experience is blind. By analyzing the concept 'perception', it is impossible to know what perception is and how objects of perception occurs. For example, although it seems clear that one senses colors, it is impossible to know what experience of colors is on the grounds of pure conceptual analysis. However, today's analytic philosophy does not of course assume that philosophical problems can be reduced to problems of language.

Sense experience should once again hold a central position in philosophy. Claims must be tested by experience, introspection, or intellect in order to be scientific information. Such testing methods refer to empiricism because the senses disclose the world, not words. In addition, empiricism does not exclude conceptual analysis since this research concerns perception and the source from which immediate perception can be derived. An analysis is about a phenomenon. This is not what contemporary analytic philosophers understand by the term "analysis", notices Dean Zimmerman (2007: 7−11). They do not rely on the analysis of propositions and language.

Independent of logical positivism and its extreme forms in the early 20th century, contemporary analytic philosophers do not say that "analytic" just means the view that all important philosophical problems can be dissolved by some kind of careful attention to language according to Zimmerman (2007: 7). He says that for Bertrand Russell, "logical analysis" did not mean "linguistic analysis", which is the reducing of philosophical problems to puzzles about language (Zimmerman, 2007: 8). Bertrand Russell's belief was that facts can be un-

[69] But the same happens in phenomenology, and in fact all humanities and social sciences. Using a theory, a scholar interprets an empirical thing leading to claims not supported by the thing examined. The methods of these sciences should be more exact, replicable, and objective, and thus plausible.

derstood by analyzing their constituents (Zimmerman, 2007: 8). However, analytic philosophers were intent upon turning philosophical problems into linguistic problems. Zimmerman (2007: 9−10) continues to say that today's analytic philosophers do not think all philosophical problems can be eliminated by some magic bullet of "linguistic analysis". I agree with Zimmerman, but to my mind, theories are the starting point of analysis in today's analytic philosophy. This is problematic.

Zimmerman (2007: 11) says that every philosopher still believes various philosophical theories: "the ones that seem, after careful reflection, to do the most justice to the sorts of evidence that count in favour of philosophical theories." What kind of evidence is he referring to here? He answers as follows: "The theory's ability to retain most of its firmest pretheoretical convictions about the subject matter it purports to describe; the naturalness of the theory's fit with other philosophical views they hold; the theoretical virtues it displays such as simplicity or the unification of what seemed to be disparate phenomena." (Zimmerman, 2007: 11). I must say that this "evidence" does not prove a theory to be true or untrue. In fact, it does not reveal the accuracy of the theory under consideration. We should follow different methods in philosophy.

Let me first show by the most general propositions how scientists verify or falsify theories, hypotheses, or general claims. After doing so, I shall refer to cases in which similar techniques have been used in philosophy. First, it is considered whether a general claim "X is P"—which can be a theory, hypothesis, or a judgment—is true or false. Second, a researcher does A, and by doing A, she or he tries to demonstrate that the claim "X is P" is true or that it cannot be true. Finally, this A is evidence that "X is P" is true (or false). A might be an experiment of eye movement at a lab, collecting historical documents at an archives, or recording politicians' speeches.

This kind of a philosophical study was done by Roderick M. Chisholm in his 1942 article *The Problem of the Speckled Hen*. According to sense-datum theorists, that which is directly perceived cannot be dubious. And what one directly perceives are mind-dependent sense-data, or colors, shapes, sounds, and the like. Sense-data give the infallible foundation for empirical knowledge. Chisholm questioned their thesis. Using introspective evidence,

Chisholm proved that sense-datum claims can be fallible. For example, for sense-datum theorists, I cannot doubt a claim that something appears to be a red dot to me, but I can doubt whether this appearance is the real thing, a hallucination, or a mental image. According to Chisholm, claims including numbers are highly debatable: I am aware of many words on a page of the book, but my sense-datum-based claim that it appears to me that there are 59 words can be untrue. In this way, Chisholm demonstrated how philosophy is productive researching activity.

For example, I can reason that if I am able to affect a perceptual experience that I am directly aware of or acquainted with, then causality has a role in perceiving an object, an event, or a property. Frank Jackson advises us to stick a pin into our finger if we do not understand the term 'directly acquainted'. The relation we will then painfully experience is an instance of direct acquaintance. (Jackson, 1992: 445) The realist could say that perceiving pain cannot occur without the brain and the central neural system. Likewise, if a tree causes an internal appearance (sense-datum, idea), and I am conscious of the mind-dependent entity of the tree, I reason that the information about the tree I acquired in perceiving is indirect. Following direct realism, I can also reason that I acquire the information by perceiving about the mind-independent external tree because I appear to perceive the mind-independent external tree. My perception of the tree depends on the tree: without the existence of a tree in front of me, I am not able to see it. In sum, one source of knowledge is reasoning. The reliability of reasoning is another issue.

The next point deals with the question of *why* the answers to philosophical problems are reliable. This is requesting evidence, justification, and reasons, not only for philosophical theories in general, but also for this research. It seems that simply perceiving an object is not sufficient to discover the object that is directly perceived. Research is an interactive process undertaken in order to examine *what* some phenomenon is and *how* to find out, to discover what it is. Nowadays, sciences, science, and the humanities are divided into groups according to subjects: physics studies inanimate nature, biology studies living nature, sociology studies groups, and the like. Which then are the methods of sciences? There are many methods in different sciences, but they all seem to reduce to *experience* and *reason* despite

the fact that these two phenomena are very challenging to define. If we do not certainly know what experience and reason are, how is knowledge reliable? I request reasons for knowing the phenomena. I do not believe that perceiving in-itself implies knowing the nature of colors, sounds, or events, for instance. This does not mean that having an experience of the object would not inform me of something that exists, but the information would not demonstrate its essence and origin.

In addition to reasoning, I use introspection and basic principles of propositional and predicate logics and metaphysics. I assume that the reader understands the basics of the propositional and predicate logics. These basic principles include at least the following:

1. The Law of Contradiction
2. The Law of Identity
3. The Identity of Indiscernibles
4. The Principle of Sufficient Reason
5. The Substance/attribute Distinction

Introspection is taking an internal look at what is going on in our own minds when we imagine, see, or feel something, for example. It reveals our inner states and processes. A substance-attribute metaphysic indicates that these inner mental entities inhere in a subject[70]. There is therefore no inner mental event without a substance which goes through that state: the sense experience of a sound inheres in the perceiver. I argue that introspection can show the similarity between objects of mental images and visual experiences, and this fact can be the knowledge based on taking an internal look. However, I do not think that I can discover by means of introspection whether or not the immediate object of perception *is* the outer entity of the external world. I cannot do so because it seems to me that I perceive properties that may not be mind-independent, such as colors, shapes, and sounds. Introspection also seems to indicate that the relation of cause and effect occurs between internal psychological events.

[70] In section two, I present reasons why the substance-attribute metaphysic makes sense.

Let us consider a mental image of a ball, for example. The image of a ball arises. After it arises, I make the judgment "I am aware of a ball". I argue that the image of the ball made me judge it to be "a ball image". I argue that this is a cause and effect relation. Similarly, perceiving a tree causes a perceptual judgement of the tree: "I perceive the tree". Thus, I first have the experience of a tree and, second, I judge that I see the tree, not vice versa. Introspection seems to reveal the presence of the immediate causality between experience and judgment. The experimental psychology of perception also assures that perceptual experience includes the causal connection between the existence of material objects and conscious perception. I think that there is more evidence for the causal theory of perception than against it, and thus I do not understand why some philosophers want to criticize this assumption.

I said that introspection, reasoning, and basic principles of logic and metaphysics are useful. They are useful in the study of theories and their theses and arguments. But are they reliable methods for uncovering what the nature of a particular perceptual entity is: what is *that* which I now appear to perceive? The reliability of research increases if it can be reproduced. I think that everyone can admit perceiving something and ask what the nature of this something is. A perceptual situation in which one seems to be is open to everyone: I am perceiving colors, for instance. It is then not only replicable, but also objective (in the sense that I have described objectivity in chapter 1.1, pp. 1−2. If philosophical studies are only speculation and cannot express anything objectively, it does not make sense to believe in them.[71] A philosophical study is scientific if its statements are testable, even somehow.

I think that every research process has an organized temporal structure, especially in empirical sciences[72]. They all have a beginning and an end. Perceiving and knowledge of the nature of objects of perception are an open question for me. I start with a clean sheet of paper and ask what that thing is that I directly perceive. People who want to defend some theory of perception know the results *before* research has started, *before* they have chosen

[71] I think that Peter Unger's (2014) new book is an important criticism of analytic philosophy. According to Unger, analytic philosophers study empty ideas while gaining no important findings about the substantial reality. Unger argues that the ideas philosophers study must be substantial, or objective.
[72] There are plenty of studies concerning what the research process is. See, for example, Blaxter, Hughes, and Tight: *How to Research*: 2006.

a research problem and a starting point, and *before* they have analyzed data, theories, and cases, although defending a theory of perception does not necessarily imply invalidating the given theory. As with other sciences, philosophical study must start with examination of a subject, such as concepts, a set of arguments, or philosophical theories, and the report will be written after the examination. The research process has an organized structure.

The history of philosophy shows that *perception* has been used by philosophers to prove different conclusions about the object of perception. In the context of perception, dualism means that a distinction occurs between appearance and reality, or between mind and the world. We would have the experience of appearance. According to Plato, Sextus Empiricus, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and Bertrand Russell, perception somehow deceives us into speculating that the world of perception is the real external world, although it is *the human way* to experience contingent entities that are not necessarily the real things of the physical world.

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