

KANT AND THE
CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY

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KANT ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AUTONOMY AND COMMUNITY

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The central idea behind this paper is the claim that Kant's moral idea of a realm of ends is modeled on the category of community examined in his theoretical works, and that understanding Kant's account of the category of community helps us understand certain features of the idea of a realm of ends, and in particular the fact that a member of a realm of ends must be an autonomous agent. For Kant the idea of a community is essentially the idea of a multitude of individuals in interaction and in this paper I will attempt to show why Kant believes that only autonomous individuals can interact.

Central to Kant's mature ethics is his belief that it is impossible to refute the solipsist theoretically, for from the theoretical perspective (the perspective of the *Critique of Pure Reason*), we can have no knowledge of the existence of other individuals.¹ According to Kant, if I believe that other human bodies are merely lumps of unconscious flesh to be used and abused for my own pleasure, I am not making a theoretical mistake but rather a moral choice. At the heart of Kant's ethics, then, is the belief that each individual faces a fundamental moral choice: one can either choose to be a solipsist, thinking of oneself as a solitary individual alone in the world and facing no external constraints, or one can choose to think of oneself as a finite individual in interaction with other such individuals. Choosing the second alternative involves recognizing and respecting others, who must simultaneously be thought of as radically *distinct from* but also, nevertheless, somehow *connected to* and *interacting with* oneself. To be moral, then, is to choose to be a member of a community and to *really* interact with others.²

Kant often distinguishes between what he calls ideal interaction (of which Leibnizian preestablished harmony is an example) and real interaction,³ and the central thesis of this paper is that for Kant, *we can only think of a community of individual substances in real interaction if we think of each individual member of the community as autonomous*. Therefore, to reject solipsism and to choose to interact with others is to choose to be autonomous. For Kant, this is not primarily an ethical claim but rather a theoretical, conceptual

claim, rooted in his metaphysics. If my reading of Kant's metaphysics is correct, then, in stark contrast to the standard reading of his ethics, Kant does not value autonomy primarily because he values self-mastery, but because he values the idea of being a member of a community and really interacting with others.⁴

Before examining the details of Kant's position and its development, let me briefly point to some textual evidence for my interpretation from the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. Here Kant explains that "by a realm I understand a systematic union of various rational beings through common laws . . . what these laws have as their purpose is just the relation of these beings to one another as ends and means" (4:434). Kant makes it clear that the purpose of laws in a realm of ends is to provide the "glue" that gives a community of individuals some sort of unity. And he continues by explaining that the only way to be a member of such a community is through being autonomous, that is by being (individually) the source of the laws that provide the community with its unity. Thus he explains that "a rational being belongs as a *member* to the realm of ends when he gives universal laws in it but is also himself subject to these laws" (4:434). Here Kant seems to be quite explicit about the fact that being autonomous is the membership condition for belonging to a realm of ends. And the best way of making sense of this claim is in the argument that a world of intelligible beings can only have real unity if the individuals that are members of the world are the source of the laws that provide the laws with its unity. Kant seems to be quite clear about this a few pages later, where he argues that "in this way a world of rational beings (*mundus intelligibilis*) as a realm of ends is possible, through the giving of their own laws by all persons as members" (4:438). Kant makes it quite clear that it is the giving of laws by the members of a world that makes the world possible.⁵

It should be clear by now that I am advocating a particular conception of autonomy. To be autonomous, on this interpretation, is not merely to "give laws to oneself" but also to give a particular type of law to oneself. To be autonomous is to give laws for a possible ideal community, laws that bind both oneself and others. One could, however, imagine a solipsistic egoist who wants to give some unity to his life and so chooses to act only on certain principles or laws. Such an egoist attempts to give laws to himself, but the only law he attempts to submit himself to is an intrapersonal law. Kant suggests that Wolff (1679–1754) can be thought of as advocating such an ethical principle, for the principle of perfection demands that we unify our desires and inclinations, but not necessarily in a way that makes them compatible with the desires and inclinations of others.⁶

Such an individual, who attempts to give unity to his inclinations by subjecting them to some intrapersonal law, might be thought of as taking Leibniz's (1646–1716) conception of a monad as his moral ideal. The Leibnizian

believes that the only type of finite individual we can conceive of is a solitary individual.⁷ Such an individual is essentially active and its activity is that of having representations. A Leibnizian monad, then, can be thought of as a series or stream of representations. This stream, however, is essentially unified. What unifies the representations of an individual is that they are subject to a law, and Leibniz calls this law, which provides the representations of an individual their unity, the "law of the individual" or the "law of the series." The law of the series can be thought of as the source of the series of representations and, Leibniz believes, accounts for the unity of the individual. Such a law, however, should be regarded purely as an internal law.

An egoist, then, who takes such a conception of an individual as his ideal would try to unify his representations (or desires) but would think that it could be done purely by reference to some law internal to himself, perhaps the "law of his genius." The rational solipsist (or a rational hedonist), then, can be thought of as attempting to subject himself to purely *intrapersonal* laws that make no reference to other individuals. Such an individual may claim that it is striving to be autonomous, claiming that it subjects itself to its own laws, or perhaps that it subjects itself to the law of its own genius. An autonomous agent in Kant's sense, however, legislates and subjects itself to *interpersonal* laws, that is, to laws of a possible (ideal) community. To be autonomous in the Kantian sense, then, is not merely to legislate for oneself but for a (potential) community.⁸

The paper is divided into five sections. In section one I examine Kant's account of the category of community in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In section two I explain his account of community in his metaphysics lectures. In section three I sketch the historical background to Kant's views, and in particular the debate between proponents of preestablished harmony and physical influence. In section four I explain how Kant attempted to conceptualize the possibility of real interaction. Finally, in section five, I show how his account of interaction implies that only autonomous beings can really interact.

The Concept of Community in the *Critique of Pure Reason*

In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant introduces the category of community as the third category of relation. The structure of the table of categories is derived from the table of judgments, and this table is divided into four classes, into judgments of quantity, of quality, of relation, and of modality. The categories of the third class, then, are derived from the judgments of relation. According to Kant there are three types of relational judgment: categorical judgments (*A is B*), hypothetical judgments (*if p then q*), and disjunctive judgments (*p or q or r*). The categories of substance and accident are derived from the categorical form of judgment, the categories of cause and

effect are derived from the hypothetical form of judgment, and the category of community, which either is or involves the idea of reciprocal influence, is derived from the disjunctive form of judgment.⁹

Kant believes that the category of community (and as a result the notion of interaction) is to be sharply distinguished from that of cause and effect, for they are derived from different forms of judgment. We understand the importance of this claim by considering an alternative way of conceptualizing interaction. Defenders of such an alternative conception of interaction would argue that we can fully capture what is involved in interaction in the following terms: when two entities, say *x* and *y*, interact, *x* has a causal relation to *y* and *y* has a causal relation to *x*. Kant does not deny that this partially captures what is involved in the relation of interaction,¹⁰ but he does not believe that it is the full story,¹¹ for he believes that when a number of entities interact they (a) constitute a *whole* and (b) mutually *exclude* one another. These two factors are essential to the relation of interaction and cannot be captured by appealing to the ideas of ground and consequence or to the hypothetical form of judgment. Thus, in his commentary to the table of categories in the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant compares the causal relation to the relation of interaction/community and points out that in the case of simple causation the relation is one of *subordination*, whereas in the case of interaction the relation is one of *coordination* (B112).

What he means is that in a causal relation the consequence is subordinated to the ground. For this reason the ground-consequence relation is the principle of the series, for the relation of ground and consequence can provide us with a well-ordered chain of causes and effects. The relation of community, on the other hand, cannot be understood in terms of the idea of subordination, for when a number of entities are members of a community they are not subordinated to one another but are coordinated with one another and the concept of coordination cannot be understood in terms of mutual subordination. When entities are coordinated with one another they are parts of a whole and mutually exclude one another. Thus Kant explains that the relation of community/interaction

is an entirely different kind of connection from that which is to be found in the mere relation of cause to effect (of ground to consequence), in which the consequence does not reciprocally determine the ground and therefore does not constitute a whole with the latter (as the world-creator with the world). The understanding follows the same procedure when it represents the divided sphere of a concept as when it thinks of a thing as divisible, and just as in the first case the members of the division exclude each other and yet are connected in one sphere, so in the later case the parts are represented as ones to which existence (as substances) pertains to each exclusively of the others, and which are yet connected in one whole. (B113)

In the first sentence of this passage Kant distinguishes the concept of causation from that of interaction, and focuses on the fact that in the case of interaction the entities "constitute a whole."¹² To understand the second sentence it is necessary to have a closer look at Kant's account of the disjunctive form of judgment. A disjunctive judgment has the form: "x is A or B or C."¹³ Kant explains this form of judgment in the *Critique of Pure Reason* in the following terms: "In all disjunctive judgments the sphere (the multitude of everything that is contained under it) is represented as a whole divided into parts (the subordinate concepts)" (B112). He makes his point a little more clearly in his logic lectures. In *Jäsche Logic*, for example, he explains that "disjunctive judgments represent various judgments as in the community of a sphere and produce each judgment only through the restriction of the others in regard to the whole sphere" (9:107).

A disjunctive judgment, then, is a judgment in which a number of judgments somehow restrict one another and fill up a (logical) sphere. In *Jäsche Logic* Kant gives the following example of a disjunctive judgment: "A learned man is learned either historically or in matters of reason" (9:108).¹⁴ Here the concept "learnedness" is divided into "parts." The concept "learnedness" is in this case the logical "sphere" that is to be divided into parts. The parts of this sphere are "learned historically" and "learned in matters of reason." These parts mutually exclude one another in the sense that insofar as one is "learned historically" one is not "learned in matters of reason," and, Kant believes, taken together they completely "fill the sphere" of the concept of learnedness in the sense that they exhaust the concept. In other words, Kant maintains that the "or" in a disjunctive judgment is an exclusive "or," and that in such a judgment the members of the disjunction exhaust the concept. In the disjunctive judgment, then, we find a number of judgments mutually excluding one another and completely filling a logical space. The conception of a logical space allows us to think of a space that has parts but that is not, unlike the space of intuition, infinitely divisible. We may thus think of a whole, the parts of which are simple. This will be important when we turn to the idea of community.

It is, then, from the disjunctive form of judgment that we get the concept of "exclusion." Kant makes this clear in his commentary to the table of categories. In this section he compares the disjunctive form of judgment with the hypothetical (if . . . then) form of judgment, and asks us to

note that in all disjunctive judgments the sphere (the multitude of everything that is contained under it) is represented as a whole divided into parts (the subordinate concepts), and since none of these can be contained under any other, they are thought of as *coordinated* with one another, not subordinated, so that they do not determine each other *unilaterally*, as in a *series*, but *reciprocally*, as in an *aggregate* (if one member of the division is posited, all the rest are excluded, and *vice versa*. (B112)

Earlier in his commentary on the table of categories, Kant explains that the categories he has listed do not provide a complete list of the *a priori* concepts of the understanding, for there are also derivative concepts, which Kant calls “predicables,” that can be derived from the categories. Thus, Kant explains that

for the sake of the primary concepts it is therefore still necessary to remark that the categories, as the true *ancestral concepts* of pure understanding, also have their equally pure *derivative concepts*, which could by no means be passed over in a complete system of transcendental philosophy, but with the mere mention of which I can be satisfied in a merely critical essay. (A81–82/B107)

Under the category of community Kant lists two “derivative concepts” or predicables: presence and resistance (A82/B108). The reason why resistance is a predicable of the category of community is because our (pure, unschematized) concept of resistance is to be understood in terms of exclusion, and we understand the notion of exclusion *a priori* through our grasp of the disjunctive form of judgment. What we mean if we claim that one thing resists another is that if (or, insofar as) the thing is posited all the rest are excluded. As we shall see, the fact that resistance is a predicable of the category of community has important implications for Kant’s account of interaction, for he conceives of interaction in terms of the withdrawal of resistance, which, given his analysis of community, implies that only members of a community can interact.

The category of community, then, allows us to understand the notion of a number of impenetrable individuals (concepts) filling a conceptual space (another concept) and excluding other individuals (concepts) from their part of the conceptual space, without any appeal to the space of intuition.

The Concept of Community in the Metaphysics Lectures

Before examining Kant’s account of interaction and community in his metaphysics lectures it would be helpful to understand something about how metaphysics as a discipline was structured in eighteenth-century Germany. At that time German metaphysics textbooks divided metaphysics into general metaphysics (ontology) and special metaphysics. Special metaphysics was divided into three special sciences corresponding to the three objects of rational cognition, namely, rational psychology, rational cosmology, and rational theology. Rational psychology was concerned with rational cognition of the *soul*, rational cosmology dealt with rational cognition of the *world*, and rational theology dealt with rational cognition of *God*. Although Kant rejected the possibility of rational cognition—that is, cognition of objects through pure reason—the structures of the *Critique of Pure Reason*

and the metaphysics lectures follow this traditional plan. Thus, although Kant rejects the possibility of ontology in the traditional sense, the first half of the *Critique of Pure Reason* can be understood as corresponding to the traditional role of general metaphysics, although ontology, in the strict sense of the "science of being," has been replaced by a "transcendental analytic." Kant believes that a science of being is not possible, for the intellect can give us no access to things in themselves.¹⁵ As Kant explains in his lectures on metaphysics, "Ontology is a pure doctrine of all our *a priori* cognitions; or it contains the summation of all our pure concepts that we can have *a priori* of things" (*Metaphysik L2*, 28:541).¹⁶

Thus, in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the metaphysics lectures Kant identifies three ideas of pure reason: the thinking subject, which is the object of *psychology*, the world, which is the object of *cosmology*, and God, which is the object of *theology*.¹⁷ Kant's discussion of interaction and community is found principally in his cosmology lectures, which focus on the idea of a world.

As I will show, Kant, like Leibniz, believes that the idea of a world must be the idea of a multitude of essentially active individual substances, or monads. Unlike Leibniz, however, Kant believes that the idea of a *world*, as opposed to a mere multitude of individuals, is the idea of a *community* of such individuals in interaction. For Kant the idea of a world is, by definition, the idea of a community, and the distinguishing feature of a community for Kant is the *real* interaction of its members.

Questions about interaction were central to Kant's development. Much of his published work in the 1750s and 1760s was an attempt to explain how it is possible to conceive of real interaction between windowless monads. One of his earliest published works, the *Physical Monadology* of 1756, is an attempt to develop a monadology in which there is real interaction. And in his *Inaugural Dissertation* of 1770 he argues that

the hinge . . . upon which the question about the principle of the form of the intelligible world turns is this: to explain how it is possible that a plurality of substances should be in mutual interaction with each other, and in this way belong to the same whole, which is called a world (2:407).¹⁸

Lying behind this question is Kant's recognition that Leibniz himself had huge, and I believe insoluble, problems with the idea of a world of monads. On the one hand, Leibniz's philosophy requires the idea that a world of monads makes sense, as the idea of possible worlds is central to his philosophy; on the other hand, like many commentators, I can see no way he can make any sense of the notion of a *world* of monads while he denies that monads can interact.¹⁹ Kant had the same worries and realized that the idea of a world of monads requires some sort of real interaction between them.

Kant's commitment to this position can be traced back to his precritical period. Thus, in his metaphysics lectures from the mid-1770s he claims that

the aggregation of the substances in which there is no community still does not constitute a world. Reciprocal determination, the form of the world as a composite (*compositi*), rests upon interaction (*commercio*). If we thought substances without real connection (*absque nexu reali*) and without interaction (*commercium*), where every substance would be in and for itself and they would have no community with one another, then that would indeed be a multitude (*multitudo*), but still not a world. . . . Thus the connection (*nexus*) of substances that stand in interaction (*commercio*) is the essential condition of the world. (*Metaphysik* L2, 28:196)

Central to Kant's thoughts here is the belief that our idea of a world is, by definition, the idea of a whole. Kant states this explicitly and frequently in his metaphysics lectures. For example, in his metaphysics lectures from 1792 to 1793, a series of lectures given more than ten years after the publication of the first *Critique*, he argues that "a multitude of substances without connection makes no world. One must thus not define world: the universe of substances, but rather the whole of them" (28:657). He makes it clear that he believes we can think of a whole of substances only if we think of the substances as connected and interacting, for he continues by introducing the distinction between the form and matter of a world and arguing that while the "material of the world are substances," the formal element "is the real connection (*nexus realis*) of these substances. Real connection is reciprocal influence (acting and suffering) . . . a multitude of substances without connection makes no world" (*Metaphysik Dohna*, 28:657).

The idea of a world, then, is the idea of a whole of (individual) substances, and we can only think of a whole consisting of individuals if we think of the whole as a community and the individuals that constitute the whole as really interacting. As a consequence of this definition of a world, the idea of a member of a world is the idea of "an individual in real interaction with other individuals."²⁰

Kant, then, makes it quite clear that the distinction between a world and a mere multitude is that for a set of individuals to constitute a world there must be some "real connection" between them, that they must interact and constitute a community. The idea of an intelligible world, then, is the pure idea of a community of individual substances (or monads) in interaction. The problem with this definition of a world is that, given Kant's Leibnizian conception of individuals as essentially active, there are good reasons to think that the idea of a community of such individuals in interaction is incoherent; indeed, this is precisely the conclusion that Leibniz had drawn. Kant, however, does not draw the conclusion that windowless monads cannot interact, but to understand his

account of what is involved in interaction it is necessary to understand in a little more detail why there is a *prima facie* problem with interaction for someone who is attracted to an essentially Leibnizian conception of individual substances. It is to this topic I will now turn.

Occasionalism, Preestablished Harmony, and Physical Influx

When Kant was a young man, German metaphysics was dominated by debates about the nature and possibility of interaction and the development of Kant's account of interaction has to be placed in its historical context. In eighteenth-century German metaphysics textbooks, and in particular in Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten's *Metaphysics* of 1739 (the textbook Kant used for his metaphysics lectures), the question of interaction was dealt with under two headings: Psychology and Cosmology. The psychological question is about a particular type of interaction, namely, that between mind and body, and is more familiar to contemporary philosophers. It developed in response to Cartesian dualism. For Descartes the mind and body are two radically different types of substances, and the *psychological question* has to do with understanding how two such radically different substances can interact with each other. The cosmological question, in contrast, is more general, and asks how substances in general, even substances of the same type, can interact with one another. The cosmological question, although not as prominent today, was a major topic of debate in the eighteenth century and remained of central importance to Kant throughout his career. This debate was not about ethics, but about metaphysics and the status of scientific laws.

By the time Kant began his philosophical career, there were three standard answers to the cosmological question of interaction: preestablished harmony, occasionalism, and physical influx or influence. This tripartite division can be traced back to Leibniz. In a letter of 1696 to Henri Basnage de Beauval, Leibniz, in the context of a discussion about the psychological question of mind/body interaction, famously elucidates the three possible accounts of interaction by drawing an analogy with a pair of clocks.²¹ Leibniz writes,

Consider two clocks or watches in perfect agreement. Now this can happen in *three ways*: the *first* is that of a natural influence. . . . *The second way* to make two faulty clocks always agree would be to have them watched over by a competent workman, who would adjust them and get them to agree at every moment. *The third way* is to construct these two clocks from the start with so much skill and accuracy that one can be certain of their subsequent agreement. . . . *The way of influence* is that of the common philosophy; . . . *The way of assistance* is that of the system of occasional causes. But, I hold, that is to appeal to a *Deus ex machina* in a natural and ordinary matter, where, according to reason, God should intervene only in the sense that he concurs with all

other natural things. Thus there remains only my hypothesis, that is, *the way of pre-established harmony*.²²

Pierre Bayle in his *Historical and Critical Dictionary* (1697) popularized this tripartite taxonomy of theories of interaction. There are various ways of characterizing the difference between these three positions. The simplest is to explain it in terms of a finite substance's responsibility for (internal and external) change.²³ Thus, the theory of (*physical*) *influence* (or real interaction) asserts that individuals can cause changes both in themselves and in others—that is, they can cause both internal and external change. The theory of *occasionalism* denies that finite substances are the cause of change either in themselves or in others.²⁴ The theory of *preestablished harmony* asserts that finite substances are the cause of changes in themselves, but not in others.

In the early eighteenth century the dominant account of “physical influx” involved (as the name suggests) the idea of the accidents of one substance “flowing into” another substance. Following Kant I will refer to this position as the theory of *crude physical influence*. Although Kant is a defender of physical influence broadly understood, he firmly rejects the theory of crude physical influx. Some commentators have doubted whether any philosopher actually advocated the idea of crude physical influence. Leibniz seems to trace the theory of crude physical influence back to the Spanish Jesuit philosopher Francisco Suárez (1548–1617), but it is clear that this attribution does not stand up to close scrutiny.²⁵ It seems that many Cartesians misread the Aristotelian account of perception as a crude influcionist account of body-mind causation, and it seems to me that this is what Kant has in mind when he talks of crude physical influence. According to this misreading, perception involves *sensible species* flowing from the perceived object and into the mind of the perceiver. However, as Dennis Des Chene has pointed out, “despite the language of giving and receiving, [for Aristotle] nothing is literally transmitted from agent to patient.”²⁶ Instead, despite what “Aristotle’s own occasional analogy of wax and stamp, or statue and mould, might lead one to think. . . . The formal cause of change is always intrinsic to the patient; the role of the efficient cause is not to impose a form of the patient from outside . . . but to determine just how a certain mode of being in the patient, as yet potential and indeterminate, will become actual.”²⁷ Thus, although it is common to trace back the crude influcionist position to the Peripatetics, it is clear that the Aristotelians were not proponents of the view.

Aquinas traces the influcionist position back to the Atomists, arguing that “Democritus claimed that every operation [*actionem*] is by way of an influx [*influxionem*] of atoms.”²⁸ And Eileen O’Neill has convincingly shown that we can find an influcionist model of causation among Atomists and

Corpuscularians, which can be traced back to Roger Bacon, and which was influenced by Neoplatonic ideas of emanation.²⁹ As examples of advocates of such a position she points to Kenelm Digby, Walter Charlton, John Sergeant, and, perhaps best known to us today, Pierre Gassendi. For example, according to Digby's account of perception "there is a perpetuall fluxe of little partes or atomes out of all sensible bodies that . . . can not choose but gett in at the dores of our bodies, and mingle themselves with the spirits that are in our neves."³⁰ The idea of little particles flowing into our bodies through "doors" is clearly the type of view Leibniz is rejecting when he claims that monads are windowless.³¹

Whatever the provenance of the crude doctrine of physical influence, it is clear that in our everyday language we do often use influctionist metaphors, which involve the notion of something being transferred from the agent to the patient. For example, we talk of motion being *transferred* from one object to another, and of the *transference* of property rights from one individual to another.³² Many people also see successful communication as the transference of ideas. A similar story can be told about popular views on education; knowledge is transferred from the teacher to the pupil. If the influctionist account of causation turns out to be incoherent, then there is a good reason to try to avoid all of these metaphors. Such examples should help convince a skeptical reader that our metaphysical views do have practical consequences, and so ethics, as a discipline, should not exist in a bubble as an autonomous discipline divorced from the rest of philosophy.

By the mid-eighteenth century, at least in the German-speaking world, the exhaustive tripartite taxonomy of theories of interaction was pretty much taken for granted. Thus, as Eric Watkins notes, by 1723 Georg Bernhard Bilfinger could claim that occasionalism, preestablished harmony, and physical influence were the *only* three possible theories of interaction.³³ And it seems fair to say that in the German milieu in which Kant developed philosophically, only two of these answers were regarded as serious contenders: preestablished harmony and physical influence. Following Leibniz, Wolff and his school tended to be defenders of preestablished harmony. On the other hand, a number of important philosophers such as Johann Christoph Gottsched (1700–1766), Christian August Crusius (1715–75), and Martin Knutzen (1713–51) (who was one of Kant's teachers in Königsberg) had written tracts advocating physical influx. Occasionalism was no longer taken seriously; following Leibniz, most German metaphysicians of the period conceived of substances, even finite substances, as essentially active.

Leibniz rejects occasionalism because he is committed to the position that substances (which for Leibniz are, by definition, individuals) are essentially active. Thus, for example, he argues in his *New Essays on Human Understanding* that "activity is the essence of substance in general,"³⁴ and in a letter

to Bayle in 1702 he claims that “without an internal force of action a thing could not be a substance.”³⁵ As a result of his belief that substances are necessarily active centers of force or activity, he concludes that the occasionalist position amounts to a denial of the existence of finite substance. In effect, then, Leibniz believes that the occasionalist position collapses into Spinozism. Thus, in a letter to Jacques Lelong in 1712 Leibniz argues that

without force there will be no substance; and one will fall despite oneself, into the opinion of Spinoza, according to whom creatures are only passing modifications. It is necessary, therefore, to say that God gives the force, and that he does not replace it, in order to preserve the substances outside of him.³⁶

Kant himself rejects occasionalism without much discussion and I suggest that this dismissal was motivated by the fact that, like Leibniz, he regarded individual substances as essentially active (or by the critical period as agents), which led him to see occasionalism (understood as a doctrine that denies the real agency of finite individuals) as essentially a denial of the possibility of finite individuality and hence as akin to Spinozism.

Leibniz has a number of problems with physical influence, and his rejection of crude physical influx lies behind his famous claim that monads are “windowless.” Individual substances have no windows through which anything can “flow in,” nor, as Digby suggests, do they have doors. One obvious problem with the theory of crude physical influence is that it suggests that determinations (or, in the traditional vocabulary, “accidents”) are the sort of things that can “float around” and exist independently of individual substances. Both Leibniz and Kant have a problem with this notion. A defender of crude physical influence, however, might just bite the bullet and accept the coherency of the idea of accidents existing independently of substances.

A more serious problem, however, with the doctrine of crude physical influx is that it is unclear in what sense a determination can really be thought of as being a determination of either the agent or the patient. For if accidents or determinations are the sort of things that can detach themselves from individuals and float from one individual into another, then we need some account of the way in which an accident can really “stick to” or really “belong to”³⁷ a particular individual in a way strong enough to make the accident an accident of that individual. If accidents are the sort of things that can be detached from an individual, we need to give some account of the real unity of accident and individual. As I hope to show in the following section, both Kant and Leibniz agree that the proponent of crude physical influx has no way of accounting for inherence. Kant, following Leibniz, rejects the theory of crude physical influence, for he believes that the only way an accident can truly belong to (or be unified with) a substance is if the substance is the (active) ground of the accident. That is to say, Kant agrees

with Leibniz that individual substances must be windowless. However, he does not believe that this implies that individual substances cannot really interact with one another. Thus although Kant consistently rejected the theory of crude physical influx, Kant began and ended his philosophical career as a defender of real interaction.³⁸

How Can Essentially Active Substances Interact and, in So Doing, Constitute a World? Kant's Solution to Leibniz's Problem

The problem with conceptualizing interaction is fairly simple. Following Leibniz, Kant thinks that the idea of an individual (substance) is the idea of something essentially active. There is, however, a problem in explaining how two essentially active beings can act upon one another, for we must be able to give an account of how an essentially active substance can suffer or be passive. Any account of interaction, then, must be able to explain how an agent can be a patient. Kant himself explicitly addresses this problem in his lectures on metaphysics. He explains, "That substance suffers (passive) whose accidents inhere through another power." He then asks, "How is this passion possible, since it was said earlier that it [i.e., the passive/suffering substance] is active insofar as its accidents inhere" (*Metaphysik Mrongovius*, 29:823).

The problem, then, is not merely that Kant conceives of individual substances as essentially active, but that, following Leibniz, he is committed to a particular conception of inherence. Namely, he is committed to the view that an accident (or, more generally, what Kant refers to as a "determination") can only truly inhere in or belong to a substance if the substance is the active cause or ground of the accident. I name this doctrine the *principle of active inherence*.³⁹ It is Leibniz's acceptance of this principle that lies behind his claim that monads are windowless and lies behind Kant's rejection of physical influence. If we accept the principle of active inherence, though, it is not clear how one individual can ever be the cause of any change in another individual. If a determination can only be a determination of individual *b* if *b* is the active ground or cause of the determination, how can another substance ever be the cause of a change in *b*? Leibniz's solution was to admit defeat and conclude that one substance cannot be the cause of a change in another.

Kant's solution to this problem will be to claim that we can understand the idea of an individual being acted upon without appealing to the untenable notion of accidents flowing into the individual in terms of the agent "determining the active power of the substance being acted upon" (29:823). This account of action does not violate the principle of active inherence,

because the patient's determination inheres in the patient (since it is a result of the patient's power). This power, however, has been determined by the agent. It is not clear, however, what we should make of this notion of the agent "determining the power" of the patient.

The model Kant introduces to clarify the notion of one individual determining the power of another is that of the withdrawal of resistance. One individual substance (the agent) is the cause of a change in another individual substance (the patient) if the change in the patient is the result of the agent withdrawing its resistance. The patient remains, however, essentially active, for the determination is the result of its power. Thus each individual is essentially active in that everything that happens to a particular individual (everything a particular individual does or suffers) is the result of its own power or potentiality. But much of what we do occurs only when other individuals remove impediments.⁴⁰ On this model, if individuals are to interact they must already resist one another. In section one of this paper I explained the dependence of the concept of resistance on the concept of community; why, for Kant, individuals can only resist one another if they constitute a community. In the next section of this paper I will explain how Kant believes such resistance is possible. Kant argues that resistance must be the result of law and that the only possible source of *real* resistance between individuals is a law that has been "given" by each and every member of the community. I will, however, first present some textual evidence for my reading and will also examine some of the details of Kant's position.

Kant explains in his lectures on metaphysics from 1782–82:

We can never be merely passive, but rather every passion is at the same time action. . . . Every substance is self-active, otherwise it could not be substance; . . . The substance being acted upon (*substantia patiens*) is acting in itself (*eo ipso agens*), for the accident would not inhere if the substance had no power through which it inhered in it, hence it also acts; influence (*influxus*) is therefore an unfitting expression, as it implies that the accident migrated out of a substance. What then is genuine passivity? The acting substance (*substantia agens*) determines the power of the substance being acted upon (*substantiae patientis*) in order to produce this accident, therefore all passivity (*passio*) is nothing more than the determination of the power of the suffering substance by an outer power. (*Metaphysik Mrongovius*, 29:823)

Here Kant spells out his commitment to the principle of active inherence: "an accident would not inhere if the substance had no power through which it inhered in it." And he believes that commitment to this principle rules out the possibility of crude physical influence. However, he does not believe that it necessarily rules out any commitment to real interaction, for it still allows for some account of passivity. An individual can be a patient, that is, can be

acted upon, if another individual “determines the power of the substance being acted upon in order to produce the accident.”

In a later passage he explains that one individual “determines the power” of another when it removes an impediment that allows what he calls a “dead” power to become a living power. Thus he argues that

with a faculty we imagine only the possibility of power. Between faculty and power lies the concept of endeavor (*conatus*; *Bestrebung*). When the determining ground for an effect is internally sufficient, then it is a dead power. But when it is internally and externally sufficient, then it is a living power. Power which is merely internally sufficient, without being able to produce the effect, is always opposed to an opposing power which hinders its effect, an impediment (*impedimentum*). Thus as soon as the impediment (*impedimentum*) is removed, the dead power becomes living. (*Metaphysik L2*, 28:565)

Here Kant distinguishes between the idea of a faculty and the idea of a power. A faculty is a mere capacity, whereas a power is already a striving or endeavor. *Conatus* is a term that Kant has borrowed from calculus. Imagine a ball at rest. It has the faculty or capacity to move in a straight line. Now, imagine a ball attached to a rope being swung around a fixed point (or better, imagine the moon attracted to the earth by the force of gravity and circling it). At each particular moment the ball “wants” to move in a straight line, at a tangent to the circle it is describing. This is what Leibniz termed *conatus* and what Kant refers to in German as “endeavor” (*Bestrebung*). Thus, although the ball is actually moving in a circle, at any particular moment it is “endeavoring” to move in a straight line along the tangent. At any particular moment it would move along the tangent if all external forces were removed. Kant calls this “endeavor” to move along the tangent a “power”; it is more than what Kant calls a capacity or faculty, for even an object at rest has the capacity to move along a straight line. We can, however, distinguish between a “dead” power and a “living” power. The power of the ball (to move along the tangent) will remain a “dead power” unless the rope is cut. If the rope is cut, the impediment is removed, and the ball will move off along the tangent. Upon the cutting of the rope the dead power becomes a living power. The cutting of the rope “causes” the ball to fly off in a straight line—but this cutting merely allows for the actualization of the ball’s dead power. So the motion of the ball along the tangent really is the ball’s motion.

Thus, a static (physical) point has the *capacity* or *faculty* to move along a straight line. If it is moving in a circle around a center of gravity at every moment it is “striving” to move along the tangent. In such situations, at each moment it has a *dead power* to move along the tangent. If the force of gravity is removed it will move along the tangent along a straight line. In moving along a straight line it is exercising a *living power*. Although the

movement along the straight line is due to its own power, the removal of the force of gravity is the *cause* of its motion in a straight line. Kant suggests that all interaction between substances can be understood in an analogous way.

Why Only Autonomous Individuals Can Interact

In the previous section I argued that Kant believes that if individuals are to interact they must resist one another. I will now explain how this resistance between individuals is possible. I will make two claims. First, Kant believes that the source of resistance between individuals are laws. Second, Kant distinguishes between real interaction and ideal interaction. If the individuals are to *really* interact the resistance must be “real” and this is only possible if the individuals themselves are the source of the laws that create the resistance. That is, if individuals are to really interact, they must be autonomous.

The example of the ball was an essentially spatiotemporal example. Kant however, believes that the idea of a community of individuals in interaction is intelligible,⁴¹ and hence must be conceivable in essentially nonspatiotemporal terms. So, in order to conceive of real interaction between intelligible individuals we must be able to strip the analogy of its spatiotemporal elements. Kant believes that this can be done because (as we saw in section one of this paper) he believes that the concept of resistance is not a phenomenal concept, but is instead an *a priori* concept of the understanding derived from the table of categories of the first *Critique*. In Kant’s terminology the concept of resistance is a “predicable” of the category of community. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant explains that the category of community is derived from the disjunctive (“*x* is *a*” or “*x* is *b*” or “*x* is *c*”) form of judgment. The notion of resistance is a predicable of the category of community because our (pure, unschematized) concept of resistance is to be understood in terms of exclusion, and, Kant believes, we understand the notion of exclusion *a priori* through our grasp of the disjunctive form of judgment. One individual resists another individual by excluding it from a “space.” Kant believes that we *understand* the notion of one individual excluding another from a “space” without any appeal to intuitive space, in terms of the way in which, given a disjunctive judgment, the assertion of one of the disjuncts excludes the assertion of the other disjuncts. Given *p* or not-*p*, the assertion of *p* excludes the assertion of not-*p*. The category of community, then, allows us to understand the notion of a number of impenetrable individuals (concepts) filling a conceptual space (another concept) and excluding other individuals (concepts) from their bit of the conceptual space, without any appeal to the space of intuition, and he believes that this notion of logical exclusion is the basis of our concept of resistance. Given *p* or not-*p*, the withdrawal of the assertion of *p* removes the resistance to the assertion of not-*p*. This, Kant

believes, is the basis for our capacity to think of intelligible individuals as resisting one another and hence as capable of interaction, without being subject to spatiotemporal conditions.

Kant, then, believes that interaction between active individuals is conceivable only in terms of the withdrawal of resistance; hence interaction is only possible between individuals that (already) constitute a community. The idea of a community, however, is the idea of a totality or whole, so individuals can only interact if they somehow constitute a totality or whole. If we accept this claim then we need to make only one more step to arrive at Kant's conclusion that only autonomous agents can really interact: namely, the claim that *only autonomous agents can constitute the right kind of whole*. Kant's final step, then, is to argue that if individuals are to really interact, the whole or totality they constitute must be "real" as opposed to "ideal" and that only autonomous individuals can constitute such a whole.

The mature Kant, then, reached the conclusion that what distinguished the idea of real interaction from that of ideal interaction is that in the case of real interaction the individuals constitute a *real*, as opposed to an *ideal*, whole. Thus, Kant explains in his lectures of 1790–91 on metaphysics that "substances are the matter of the world, the formal aspect of the world consists in their connection (*nexu*) and indeed in a real connection (*nexu reali*). The world is thus a real whole (*totum reale*), not ideal" (*Metaphysik L2*, 28:581). Our idea of a world is the idea of a *real* as opposed to an *ideal* whole. Elsewhere in the same lectures, Kant is more explicit about this distinction. He explains that

the connection (*nexus*) is ideal if I merely think the substances together, and real if the substances actually stand in interaction (*commercio*). . . . The form of the world is a real connection (*nexus realis*) because it is a real whole (*totum reale*). For if we have a multitude of substances, then these must also stand together in a connection, otherwise they would be isolated. Isolated substances, however, never constitute a whole (*totum*), then they must also be a real whole (*totum reale*). For were they ideal, then surely they could be represented in thought as a whole (*totum*), or the representations of them would constitute a whole (*totum*); but things in themselves would still not constitute a whole on this account. (*Metaphysik Mrongovius*, 29:851)

An ideal whole is a whole that can be merely "represented in thought" as a whole. In such a whole the unity exists only in the mind of the observer. As a consequence, the resistance between the individuals really exists only in the mind of the observer. In a real whole, in contrast, the unity must be intrinsic to the whole, and hence the resistance between the individuals would also be real. And, although Kant himself does not explicitly make this claim, I suggest that the best way of making sense of what Kant means is

that the individuals that constitute a real whole must somehow be responsible for the unity of the whole. Now, in the case of a community or world, what unifies the whole, and in so doing creates resistance between the individual members of the whole, are *laws* (or practical principles), and so the individuals must be thought of as the source of those laws that provide the community with its unity. Kant is explicit about the role of laws (or principles) in providing a world with its unity. Thus, he explains in an unpublished note from the 1780s that “the unity of the intelligible world [is] in accordance with practical principles, like that of the world of sense [is] in accordance with physical laws” (19:297, #7260). I am suggesting, then, that Kant believes that there can only be an intelligible world (or realm of ends) if each individual member of the world is the source of the unity of the world. Now, as laws (or principles) are what provide the world with its unity, each individual must be thought of as (concurrently) the source of these laws.

I have suggested, then, that the proponents of preestablished harmony and real interaction can be thought of as disagreeing about the nature of the unity of any possible community of individuals. Defenders of preestablished harmony can be thought of as claiming that the unity of the world is ideal in the sense that it exists merely in the mind of the ideal observer, God, whereas the defender of real interaction believes that its unity is real, that it constitutes some fact about the world itself. A “real” community is to be distinguished from an “ideal” community in that the unity of a real community is *intrinsic* to the community. The members of a real community must, by definition, themselves be the source of the relations (or laws) that provide the community with its unity. In other words, the members of a real community in which real interaction is possible must be autonomous.

Kant believes that it is possible to conceive of a community of individuals in interaction only if we think of the members of the community as governed by laws, and we can think of the members of a community as *governed* by laws only if we think of each individual member of the community as the *source* or *giver* of these laws. Kant believes that a world is essentially unified, for it is this unity that distinguishes the idea of a world from that of a mere multitude. In addition, he believes that a multitude of individual substances can only be unified or “held together” by laws. So the idea of a world is the idea of a multitude of individuals unified by laws. Now, if the unity of a world is to be “intrinsic” to the world, rather than merely existing in the mind of some ideal observer observing the world; that is, if there is to be *real interaction* between the members of the world rather than a mere *constant conjunction* between the state of one substance and that of another (à la Hume),⁴² then the members of the world must be responsible for the unity of the world, and Kant believes that this is possible only if each individual member of the world is the source of, or “the giver of,” the laws that provide the world with

its unity. In other words, each member of a world must be autonomous. That is, in the language of his mature ethics, *we can think of a community of individuals in interaction only if we think of each individual member of the community as autonomous*. And to be autonomous is not merely, or even primarily, to rule oneself, but rather to be the source of the laws of a possible community.⁴³

Notes

1. Indeed, Kant believes that from the theoretical, phenomenal perspective the solipsist is right, insofar as he rejects the existence of a plurality of independent substances. One indication of this is his belief that if the phenomenal world were all there is, Spinoza would be right. Thus, for example, in one set of metaphysics lectures he argues that "if we assume space as real we assume Spinoza's system" (*Metaphysik Dohna* 28:666). And in another set Kant argues that "those who assume space as a matter in itself or as a constitution of things in themselves, are required to be Spinozists, i.e., they assume the world to be a summation of the determinations of a united necessary substance, and thus only one substance" (*Metaphysik Vigilantius* 29:1008–9). He makes a similar claim in the *Critique of Practical Reason* (5:102). Elsewhere he makes a clear connection between Spinozism and egoism, arguing that "dogmatic egoism is a hidden Spinozism" (*Metaphysik L2*, 28:207). Kant's belief that immorality is to be thought of as a type of solipsism can be traced back at least to the 1760s; Kant writes in an early unpublished fragment that "action from the singular will is *moral solipsism*. Action from the communal will is moral justice" (2:246; my emphasis). References to Kant's writings, lectures, and correspondence are given by abbreviated title, volume, and page number of *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 29 vols. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1900–). The *Critique of Pure Reason* is cited by the standard A and B pagination of the first (1781) and second (1787) editions. Unless otherwise stated, translations are from *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant*, 13 vols., ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992–). Since the Cambridge edition includes the Academy edition pagination in its margins, separate page numbers for the translations will not be given.

2. One indication that this is Kant's position is the fact that he often identifies the opposite of being moral and doing one's duty with what he calls "moral egoism" or "solipsism." He makes this clear in *Anthropology*, where he argues that "the moral egoist limits all purposes to himself; as a eudaemonist, he concentrates the highest motives of his will merely on profit and his own profit and his own happiness, but not on the concept of duty. . . . All eudaemonists are consequently egoists. Egoism can only be contrasted with pluralism, which is a frame of mind in which the self, instead of being enwrapped in itself as if it were the whole world, understands and behaves itself as a mere citizen of the world" (7:130). In his ethics lectures Kant identifies moral egoism with solipsism and argues that "the rule: *Be not selfish*, or the *duty in regard to solipsism*, is twofold" (my emphasis) and he explains that the second rule is: "Act unselfishly, i.e., act not from the principle of utility, merely, but also from that of duty" (27:620–21). See also 27:604.

3. He explains this distinction in his metaphysics lectures in the following terms: "The connection (*nexus*) is ideal if I merely think the substances together, and real if the substances actually stand in interaction (*commercio*)" (*Metaphysik Mrongovius*, 29:851). What this distinction actually amounts to will be an important topic of this paper.

4. Sam Kerstein has raised the objection that Kant merely draws an *analogy* between egoism (a moral concept) and solipsism (a metaphysical concept) rather than identifying the two. The main justification for my interpretation is that it provides a way of understanding puzzling aspects of Kant's ethics. Kant himself does at times, however, seem to explicitly identify solipsism and egoism. For example, in his lectures on metaphysics he defines the "egoist" as "one who assumes here that he is the only existing being" (*Metaphysik Dohna*, 28:657).

5. I believe that Kant tries to make a similar point in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, although there he is not so clear. For example, he argues that "supersensible nature . . . is nothing other than a nature under the autonomy of pure practical reason. The law of this autonomy, however, is the moral law, which is therefore the fundamental law of a supersensible nature and of a pure world of the understanding" (5:43). And he seems to repeat, or at least allude to the idea, that autonomy is a condition for the possibility of an intelligible world. So, for example, he argues that "the moral law is, in fact, a law of the causality through freedom and hence a law of the possibility of a supersensible nature" (5:43), and that "freedom considered positively" can be defined as "the causality of a being insofar as it belongs to the intelligible world" (5:132).

6. Nietzsche also at times seems to advocate a sort of egoistic, solipsistic autonomy. For example, in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, in the section *Of the Way of the Creator*, Zarathustra asks: "Do you call yourself free? I want to hear your ruling idea, and not that you have escaped from a yoke. . . . Free from what? Zarathustra does not care about that! But your eye should clearly tell me: free for what? Can you furnish yourself with your own good and evil and hang up your own will above yourself as a law? Can you be judge of yourself and avenger of your law?" Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. and with an introduction by R. J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin, 1961), 89. Nietzsche seems to suggest that we must be creative in the sense of creating our own individual intrapersonal law.

7. Leibniz famously argues in the *Discourse on Metaphysics* that "each substance is like a world apart, independent of all other things, except for God." G. W. Leibniz *Philosophical Essays*, ed. and trans. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), 47.

8. In claiming this I am disagreeing with Martin Schönfeld, who argues that "Leibniz's pre-established harmony permits the autonomy of souls." Martin Schönfeld, *The Philosophy of the Young Kant* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 141.

9. Kant's account of the disjunctive form of judgment has received a rather bad press in the contemporary literature. Thus Paul Guyer, for example, writes that "as is often pointed out, Kant's connection of the real relation of reciprocal influence with the logical notion of exclusive disjunction is the most tenuous piece of his metaphysical deduction of the categories." Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 452.

10. "The third category always arises from the combination of the first two in its class" (B110). In the case of the category of relation, which is the third category of relation, the first and second categories are substance and causation. So community involves substances in causal relations, but cannot be reduced to the notion of mutual causation.

11. "But one should not think that the third category is therefore a merely derivative one and not an ancestral concept of pure understanding. For the combination of the first and second in order to bring forth the third concept requires a special act of the understanding, which is not identical with that act performed in the first and second" (B111).

12. This is not the case in the ground-consequence relation. He appeals to the example of God, the "world creator." God is the ground or cause of the world, but God and the world do not constitute a whole. If God was thought of as interacting with the world, however, God and the world would constitute a whole. Here I disagree with Jerome Schneewind, who argues that Kant advocates the "astonishing claim . . . that God and we share membership in a single moral community only if we all equally legislate the law we are to obey." Jerome B. Schneewind, *The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 513; see also 554.

13. Or, perhaps more accurately: "x is A or x is B or x is C."

14. This is, perhaps, not a particularly good example, as Kant makes it clear that disjunction is to be understood exclusively; that is, Kant is making the assumption that a learned man could not be learned *both* historically and in matters of reason. I suspect that Kant chose this particular example in an attempt to introduce a light-hearted moment into his lecture. A sympathetic reader of Kant could imagine his students having a quiet chuckle at this point.

15. Having rejected the rationalist claim that noncontradiction is a sufficient criterion for real possibility, Kant believes that pure theoretical speculation can tell us nothing positive about the nature of being (or beings).

16. According to the critical Kant, then, ontology cannot tell us anything about being or about things in themselves. Instead, it only provides us with information about our own cognitive capacities and faculties, and the contents of these faculties. In addition, although reason in its pure use cannot provide us with knowledge of objects, it can tell us something about its own limits. The *Transcendental Dialectic*, on the other hand, corresponds to the traditional disciplines of special metaphysics and is structured according to the traditional division of special metaphysics into three special sciences. Whereas traditional German metaphysicians understood these three special sciences to be concerned with three distinct types of objects, which could be cognized by the human intellect, in Kant's *Transcendental Dialectic* these three "objects" are merely objects of thought and can be examined purely as ideas. These ideas are possible as objects of our thought, but we have no way of knowing if there are, or even if there possibly could be, "real" objects corresponding to them.

17. And, as we have seen, these ideas are "pure" in the sense that they have no sensible content. It is not merely that they have no empirical content (which would make them merely *a priori*); they are also ideas of pure reason, and as such, by definition, have no content provided by the faculty of intuition. As Kant explains, "A

pure concept is one that is not abstracted from experience but arises rather from the understanding even as to content" (9:92). In addition, these ideas of pure reason, although they are possible objects of thought, are not possible objects of experience (or intuition), and as a consequence they are not possible objects of cognition.

18. Although by his critical period Kant had come to see that answering questions about the form of the intelligible world would leave us no less the wiser about the nature of the world we experience, answering such questions does have a function in that it helps us understand the moral law, for, as he explains in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, the moral law "is to furnish the sensible world (*Sinnenswelt*) . . . with the form of a world of the understanding (*Verstandeswelt*)" (5:43). Therefore to understand the moral law we must understand the form of the *Verstandeswelt*, and Kant continues to conceive of the form of such a world in terms of a plurality of substances in mutual interaction with one another.

19. Leibniz himself believes that we can understand the notion of a world of monads through the purely logical notion of *compossibility*. Monads are members of the same world if they are compossible. However, it is unclear to me how we can understand the notion of *compossibility* (or more precisely the notion of *incompossibility*) if we reject any real connection between monads. If monads are not connected, how can any two monads be impossible? For more on this, see G. H. R. Parkinson, *Logic and Reality in Leibniz's Metaphysics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965); Hidé Ishiguro, *Leibniz's Philosophy of Logic and Language* (London: Duckworth, 1972; 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Margaret Dauber Wilson, *Leibniz' Doctrine of Necessary Truth* (New York: Garland, 1990).

20. Similarly, in his lectures from the early 1780s Kant once again distinguishes between the idea of a world and that of a mere multitude and argues that "a great multitude of isolated substances would not constitute a world (isolated substances are only the stuff for a world), because they would not constitute a whole, but rather each of them would be entirely alone and without any *community* with the others" (*Metaphysik Mrongovius*, 29:853; my emphasis). Once again, Kant makes it quite clear that substances can only constitute a world if they are in community with one another. Similar passages are not hard to find. See, for example: 28:581–82, 28:45, 29:851–52, 29:868, 29:1006–7.

21. Kant himself seems to have been aware of this passage and refers to this analogy while explaining Leibniz's position in his lectures on metaphysics. See *Metaphysik Mrongovius*, 29:866–67.

22. Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays*, 147–48. It should be noted that in this letter Leibniz is discussing the psychological question of mind-body interaction and not the cosmological question of interaction in general. In his lectures, however, Kant appeals to this analogy during his discussion of the cosmological question. And Leibniz himself ultimately regards the psychological question as a special instance of the cosmological question.

23. In explaining the distinction in this way I am following Eric Watkins; see "The Development of Physical Influx in Early Eighteenth-Century Germany: Gottsched, Knutzen, and Crusius," in *The Review of Metaphysics* 49 (1995): 295–339.

24. It is not clear if this reading is fair to the French Cartesian Nicolas Malebranche. In Germany in the eighteenth century it seems that the standard reading of

Malebranche was that he denied all activity to finite substances. Malebranche himself seems to have believed that finite individuals do have wills in that they possess the capacity to assert or deny. I think most of his readers in the post-Leibnizian tradition took this to mean that Malebranche denied that finite substances were active in any meaningful sense.

25. Suárez does explain action in terms of influence rather than dependence; however, for Suárez *influere* is a transitive verb the direct object of which is *esse* (being); the patient being acted upon is taken as the indirect object of this verb. Suárez does not, then, suggest that in interaction something (say an accident) is transferred from the agent to the patient; instead the agent “flows being into” the patient. What Suárez actually meant by the notion of the agent “flowing being into” the patient is unclear. See Disputation 12 on causality, *De causis entis in communi*, of his *Disputationes Metaphysicae* (*Metaphysical Disputations*, 1597), trans. and annotated by Shane Duarte (unpublished). Leibniz himself seems to have attributed the notion of influence to Suárez, and to have recognized that for Suárez *influere* was a transitive verb with a direct and an indirect object, for he writes that “on the invention of this last word [*influere*] Suárez prides himself not a little. . . . Introducing the phrase ‘flow in’ (‘influx’), he defined a cause as what flows being into something else—a quite barbarous and obscure expression. Even the construction is inept, since *influere* is transformed from an intransitive into a transitive verb; and this *influx* is metaphorical and more obscure than what it defines. I should think it an easier task to define the term ‘cause’ than this term *influx*, used in such an unnatural sense.” From “Preface to an Edition of Nizolius” (1670) in G. W. Leibniz, *Philosophical Papers and Letters*, 2nd ed., ed. and trans. Leroy E. Loemker (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1969), 126.

26. Dennis Des Chene, *Physiologia: Natural Philosophy in Late Aristotelian and Cartesian Thought* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 62.

27. *Ibid.*, 62–63. Here Des Chene is talking about Zabarella; however, a similar story could be told about most of the other Aristotelians, including Aquinas. Aquinas makes it quite clear that he rejects an influtionist model of causation, pointing out that “a natural agent does not hand over its own form to another subject, but it reduces the passive subject from potency to act.” Saint Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, vol. 1, book 3, trans. Pegis et al. (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1975), 28. Hereafter cited as SCG. The late scholastics advocated a position based upon Aquinas’s position that the agent somehow triggers something in the patient that allows a potentiality in the patient to be actualized. As we shall see, this is, interestingly, very close to the view of the mature Kant.

28. Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger, 1974), part 1, q. 84, art. 6.

29. See Eileen O’Neill, “*Influxus Physicus*,” in *Causation in Early Modern Philosophy: Cartesianism, Occasionalism, and Preestablished Harmony*, ed. Steven Nadler (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993). O’Neill argues that “the most important difference between the [Neoplatonist and Corpuscularian model] concerns the ontological status of what is transmitted in the flow. On the Neoplatonic model, what inflows is distinct from the substance of the agent; on the corpuscular model, the efflux is continuous with this substance” (45). The Corpuscularians believe that the agent is diminished by the efflux, as tiny particles are actually

shed by the agent, whereas the Neoplatonists deny that the agent is diminished in any way by the efflux. Another difference seems to be that Neoplatonists believe that the effect lasts only as long as the agent continues with its activity, whereas at least some Corpuscularians seem to think that the effect can remain in the patient even after the agent has stopped acting.

30. Kenelm Digby, *Two Treatises: In the One of Which, the Nature of Bodies, in the Other, the Nature of Man's Mind, is Looked Into* (Paris: Gilles Blaizot, 1644; facsimile reprint by Garland, 1978), 278.

31. The Corpuscularians clearly do not restrict this influxionist account to explanations of perception; a good example is Gassendi's explanation of magnetism in *De Motu* (1642).

32. I believe that much of Kant's account of property rights in the *Metaphysics of Morals* is an attempt to develop an ontology of property that does not involve an influxionist account of interaction. For Kant, property rights cannot, literally, be transferred.

33. Eric Watkins, "Kant's Theory of Physical Influx," in *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 77 (1995): 285.

34. G. W. Leibniz, *New Essays on Human Understanding*, ed. and trans. P. Remnant and J. Bennett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 65.

35. G. W. Leibniz, *Die Philosophischen Schriften von G. W. Leibniz*, vol. 3, ed. C. I. Gerhardt (Berlin: Weidmann, 1875–90), 3:58.

36. A. Robinet, ed., *Malebranche et Leibniz: Relations Personelles* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1955), 421. Quoted in Donald P. Rutherford, "Natures, Laws, and the Roots of Leibniz's Critique of Occasionalism," in *Causation in Early Modern Philosophy*, 139.

37. This idiom may help the reader understand why Kant's engagement with this question had an important impact on his ontology of property.

38. That is, he was and remained a defender of "physical influence" broadly understood.

39. Kant's commitment to this principle can be traced back at least to the *New Elucidation* of 1755. Here Kant argues that "the inner determinations, which already belong to the substance, are posited in virtue of inner grounds which exclude the opposite. Accordingly, if you want another determination to follow, you must also posit another ground. But since the opposite of this ground is internal to the substance, and since, in virtue of what we have presupposed, no external ground is added to it, it is patently obvious that [4] the new determination cannot be introduced into the being" (1:140). In the *New Elucidation*, in advocating the principle of active inherence, Kant agrees with the Leibnizians that individual substances must be thought of as windowless; he agrees that the determinations of a substance must be due to inner grounds. His position, however, diverges from Leibniz's in that he believes that this does not imply that a *change* of determinations must also be due to grounds internal to an individual substance. This allows him to claim that although monads must be windowless, real interaction between them is possible, for one monad may be the cause of *change* in another monad. Here I disagree with Rae Langton, who argues that in the *Physical Monadology* Kant claims that "monads are not windowless, but open to the influence of others." Rae Langton, *Kantian Humility: Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 105.

40. As we shall see, however, there is at least one thing that we can do that is not the result of another agent withdrawing resistance; namely, "giving laws." It is the giving of laws that creates the resistance between individuals in the first place.

41. At this point I should remind the reader that I believe that for Kant the "idea of a community of individuals in interaction" is what he elsewhere calls the "intelligible world" and "the realm of ends."

42. Who, of course, was strongly influenced by Malabranche's occasionalism.

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