

PETER OF PALUDE ON DIVINE
CONCURRENCE:
AN EDITION OF HIS *IN II SENT.*, D. 1, Q. 4

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Abstract

The present text contains a critical edition of Peter of Palude's question of divine concurrence, found in his *Sentences* commentary, book II, d. 1, q. 4. The question concerns whether God is immediately active in every action of a creature, and if yes, how we should understand this divine concurrence. Peter, just as elsewhere in his commentary, considers at length the opinions of other thinkers — especially those of Giles of Rome, Durand of St.-Pourçain, and Thomas Aquinas — and develops his own answer as a response to theirs. Thus, while Giles maintained that God acts uniformly in every instance of natural causation just as the sun acts uniformly by giving the same light to everything, Peter (following Durand) argues that this is incompatible with the divine creation of multiple things. Second, while Durand maintained that God is only *mediately* active in the actions of creatures, Peter rejects this opinion because it cannot account for miracles *contra naturam* (such as the three young men in Nebuchadnezzar's fire), and because he thinks that God's immediate action follows from his immediate conservation of creatures. Third, Peter presents Aquinas's position in detail, and defends it against Durand's objections; according to this position, God immediately conserves and concurs with every creature, with an action that is numerically distinct from that of the secondary agent. Although as a result of his extensive borrowing, Peter's text might not be regarded as immensely original, it provides an interesting case study of the Dominican reaction against Durand in the early 1300's.

1. *Introduction*

The present text, question 4 of the first distinction of book II of Peter of Palude's commentary on the *Sentences*, is Peter's contribution to a larger thirteenth-century debate on divine concurrence, of which he is both a witness and a participant. The debate concerned whether God is immediately active in every action of a creature, and if yes,

what this divine concurring action amounts to. Peter was a Dominican theologian in Paris in the first half of the fourteenth century (d. 1342), possibly belonging to the circle of Durand of St.-Pourçain¹ but later also a chief participant of the investigations against the latter. As he presents the debate, it sprang from Aquinas's legacy and the various reactions to it, and thus can be regarded as mostly internal to the Dominican order (with the exception of Giles of Rome). Peter considers Aquinas's, Giles of Rome's, and Durand of St.-Pourçain's stance on the question before developing his own answer. In what follows, first I sketch some details of the debate as it was presented by Peter of Palude; second, I consider Peter's connection to Durand in some more detail; finally, I provide an edition of Peter of Palude's text. As will be seen below, Peter heavily relies on the accounts of his contemporaries; thus, what follows is not so much a groundbreaking fourteenth-century contribution to the debate but rather an interesting case study of the early Dominican reactions against Durand.

2. *The debate about divine concurrence*

It would be both impossible and unnecessary to give here a comprehensive treatment of the thirteenth-century debate on divine concurrence. Some details of it have been treated elsewhere, and overall, it will suffice to supply the necessary background to Peter's text, quickly reviewing the authors he discusses.

Aquinas's account of divine concurrence, as well as Giles's, Durand's, and Peter of Palude's reactions to it, derives from two claims to which they are committed. On the one hand, they maintain that individual natural agents efficaciously exercise causal powers; and, on the other hand, with the exception of Durand, also hold that God is causally involved, or, more precisely, is immediately active in the production of every natural effect.² The rejection of the first claim

1. J. DUNBABIN, *A Hound of God: Pierre de la Palud and the Fourteenth-Century Church*, Oxford 1991, pp. 36-42.

I am thankful to Giorgio Pini for reading earlier versions of this paper, as well as to the reviewers for their helpful comments.

2. The problem as I consider it now is restricted to efficient causation. Thus, the question might be rephrased as this: how is it that (1) created agents act as efficient causes, yet (2) God is also an efficient cause of everything?

would amount to the acceptance of what later came to be called occasionalism; the rejection of the second claim would amount to the acceptance of mere conservationism.

Occasionalism, put rather crudely, holds that God is the only causally efficacious agent while creatures either have no causal powers or cannot exercise these powers efficaciously. Thus, when a change occurs in the world, it is due to God's causal efficacy alone, while the creatures merely give occasion for God to exercise this efficacy. Varieties of the occasionalist view were known in the West as the positions of the Arabic thinkers, with whom Aquinas, Giles, Durand, and Palude were familiar through Maimonides's report of Al-Ghazali, Avicenna's *Fons Vitae*, and Avicenna (Averroes's refutation of Al-Ghazali was translated slightly later, in 1328).³ Unlike these Arabic thinkers and some early modern ones, however, most thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century authors, including Aquinas, Giles, Durand, and Peter of Palude, thought that we do experience causal interactions in the world,⁴ such as when a fire ignites a piece of cotton placed next to it. For Aquinas and Giles, occasionalism cannot account well for these everyday experiences of causal interactions, and indeed for sense experience itself (insofar as sense experience is caused by the sensed object).⁵

The history of mere conservationism is less known than that of occasionalism.⁶ Mere conservationism, according to which God is not immediately active in the causal operations of the creatures but only conserves these creatures, was certainly not unknown in the earlier Middle Ages, although it seems not to have been a widely maintained

3. For a history of Islamic and Western medieval occasionalism, see D. PERLER – U. RUDOLPH, *Occasionalismus. Theorien der Kausalität im arabisch-islamischen und im europäischen Denken*, Göttingen 2000.

4. The fourteenth century provides some counterexamples to this claim, most famously Nicolas of Autrecourt and perhaps Ockham.

5. Aquinas's fullest treatments are in *Summa contra gentiles* III, c. 69, and in *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 7. For Giles, whose treatment is somewhat more detailed, see, e.g., *Quaestiones de esse et essentia*, q. 4. Interestingly, neither Durand nor Palude deals with the occasionalist position at any length.

6. The position — starting perhaps with A. J. FREDDOSO, "God's General Concurrence with Secondary Causes: Why Conservation is not Enough," in: *Philosophical Perspectives* 5 (1991), pp. 553-585 — has usually been labeled as 'mere conservationism' to indicate that conservation alone is not sufficient to distinguish it from concurrentism, which also holds that God needs to conserve creatures during the time of their existence.

view by the time of Aquinas.⁷ Perhaps this is the reason why Aquinas does not deal with it in detail, and Giles dismisses it relatively quickly as well. It is not a mere coincidence, therefore, that Durand has been the most well known mere conservationist, and indeed the only one cited by name by both Suarez and Malebranche.⁸

The argument Durand offers for mere conservationism is twofold: first, he shows that neither Aquinas's nor Giles's account is satisfactory; second, he argues that whether concurrentists regard God's action and the secondary agent's action as numerically identical or as numerically different, one of the actions will be superfluous.⁹ Peter of Palude will take up these arguments in his own commentary in order to refute them.

I will cite Durand's arguments against Aquinas and Giles when discussing the concurrentist positions. We should note, however, that the question where Durand argues against Aquinas and Giles is missing from the second redaction of his commentary (more about this in the next section). Whether this was already a result of some Dominican resistance is difficult to determine with certainty, although we might note that when Durand's teachings were examined for the first time in order to determine their orthodoxy, the records mention both that Durand had held this "erroneous and dangerous" position, as well as that it cannot be found in his "new" version of the commentary (redaction *B*). As we can read among the 93 propositions put together by the committee:

[17] The second book, first distinction, article 4, in his old <version> maintains and shows that God does not act immediately in the action of every creature;

7. Albert the Great mentions that mere conservationism "mostly disappeared from the lecture halls, and many moderns regard it as heretical" (*In II Sent.*, d. 35, a. 7, resp.).

8. Suarez, *Disputationes metaphysicae*, disp. 22, sect. 1; Nicolas MALEBRANCHE, *The Search after Truth*, ed. P. J. OLSGAMP – T. M. LENNON, Cambridge 1997, p. 680. On Durand's view and its influence on early modern philosophy, see T. M. SCHMALTZ, *Descartes on Causation*, Oxford 2008, pp. 19-24. Another mere conservationist who received some attention recently is Peter John Olivi; see G. FROST, "Peter Olivi's Rejection of God's Concurrence with Created Causes," in: *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 22/4 (2014), pp. 655-679. On Durand's view, see K. FLASCH, *Das philosophische Denken im Mittelalter: Von Augustin zu Machiavelli*. Unter Mitarbeit von F. RETUCCI und O. PLUTA, Stuttgart 2013, pp. 510-512; and J. STUFLER, "Bemerkungen zur Konkurrenzlehre des Durandus von St. Pourçain," in: *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters*, Suppl. 3.2 (1935), pp. 1080-1090.

9. For Durand's second, positive argument, see *In II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 4, ed. F. RETUCCI, Leuven 2012, pp. 53-55, lines 148-214.

but we do not find this in his new, second <version>. Also, in the same place <i.e., the first version>, at the end of the article he says that it is doubtful whether God has to coexist immediately with every creature with regard to everything that is in a creature — which perhaps, as he says, is not true unless only with regard to those things that are immediately from God himself. And this article is only in his old <version>, not in the new one. *If he means the exclusion of <God's> immediate power, this is an error and a dangerous view.*¹⁰

As this suggests, by the time of the first list of errors concerning Durand it was clear that Durand's position was not entirely orthodox, and the same remark appears in the later list of errors as well.¹¹

Indeed, the most common position to take with regard to God's concurrence was to accept both that secondary agents are causally active and that God is immediately active in every operation of nature. How these claims are reconciled will be the main focus of Giles's, Aquinas's, and Peter's texts.

3. *God's Uniform Action: Giles of Rome*

Although Giles and Aquinas agree that God concurs with created causes in every operation of nature, how they understand this concurrence differs in important respects.¹² Since Peter of Palude (contrary to Durand) treats Giles's account first, I will also proceed in this order.

10. J. KOCH, *Kleine Schriften*, vol. 2, Rome 1973, p. 57: “[17] Secundo libro d. prima a. 4 in suo antiquo innuit et probat quod deus non agit immediate in actione omnis creature; sed hoc non invenimus in suo secundo novo. Ibidem etiam in fine articuli dicit quod dubium est an ‘oporteat deum immediate coexistere omni creature quantum ad omnia que sunt in ea quod forte’, ut dicit, ‘non est verum sed solum quoad illa que sunt immediate ab ipso’; et iste articulus est solum in suo veteri non in novo. *Si intendat exclusionem immediate* [in Koch: *immediatam*] *virtutis, error et periculosum.*” The final quotation is from *In II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 4, p. 56, lines 231-234; see also below, lines 149-152. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations from the Latin are mine.

11. §52; Koch, *ibid.*, p. 83. In fact, the Parisian condemnation of 1277 already labeled such a position as erroneous (prop. 190 [16]): “Quod prima causa est causa entium remotissima. — Error, si intelligatur cum precisione, scilicet ita: quod non propinquissima.” (See Étienne Tempier, *La condamnation Parisienne de 1277*, ed. D. PICHE — C. LAFLEUR, Paris 1999, p. 136.)

12. Although Giles was for a long time regarded as no more than a faithful and rather servant follower Aquinas, new studies show this to be not the case. On Giles's “anti-Thomism” in general, see M. PICKAVÉ, “An Early Witness of the *Reportatio* of Giles of Rome's Lectures on the Sentences: Note on the Edition of Concetta Luna,” in: *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* 71 (2005), pp. 175-185. For Giles's and Aquinas's comparative treatment of creation, see G. PINI, “Being and Creation in Giles of Rome,”

Giles's fullest treatment of the question how God interacts with secondary agents can be found in his *Quaestiones de esse et essentia* (1286–87) and in the parallel questions of his commentary on the second book of the *Sentences* — both in the revised *Ordinatio* version (finished around 1309) and in the *Reportatio* (around 1271–73).¹³ After clarifying the sense of 'immediate' — which, depending on whether we consider it from the effect or from the cause, can either mean a proximate cause, a principal cause, or both¹⁴ — he maintains that God is an immediate cause of natural effects in both of these senses.

Since Peter of Paludé's presentation of Giles's view is almost verbatim a repetition of Durand's characterization of it (more on this in the next section), it is likely that Peter's source, at least in this text, was not Giles himself but rather Durand's *Sentences* commentary. Regarding the source of Durand, a comparison of Durand's text with that of the *Reportatio* and the other works mentioned above clearly shows that Durand relied on Giles's *Reportatio* when discussing the question. (In fact, Durand's description of Giles's view is hardly more than a paraphrase of the *Reportatio* passage.) Although this might seem somewhat surprising — after all, Giles's revised, *Ordinatio* version of *Sentences* II and his *Quaestiones de esse et essentia* were much more widely circulated than his unrevised *Reportatio* — Durand could not have used the *Ordinatio* version, since Durand's first redaction (between 1304 and 1308) was finished earlier than Giles's revision. Why Durand did not use (if he knew) the *Quaestiones* is not clear at the moment, but at least from

in: J. A. AERTSEN – K. EMERY, Jr. – A. SPEER (eds.) *After the Condemnation of 1277*, Berlin 2001, pp. 390–409; or, with respect to sacramental causality, M. MCCORD ADAMS, *Some Later Medieval Theories of the Eucharist: Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Duns Scotus, and William Ockham*, Oxford 2010, especially pp. 85–110. Giles's concurrentism is explored in some detail in P. VOLLMER, "Die göttliche Mitwirkung bei Aegidius Romanus," in: *Divus Thomas* 6 (1928), pp. 452–470, who, however, did not yet have access to the *Reportatio* or to the *Quaestiones de esse et essentia*.

13. *Quaestiones de esse et essentia*, q. 4; *In II Sent.*, d. 1, pars 1, q. 2, a. 6; *Reportatio* II, q. 8. See also his commentary on the *Liber de causis* (1287–90), prop. 4. For the chronology of Giles's works, see F. DEL PUNTA – S. DONATI – C. LUNA, "Egidio Romano," in: A. M. GHISALBERTI (ed.), *Dizionario biografico degli Italiani*, vol. 42, Rome 1993, pp. 319–341.

14. Cf. *Quaestiones de esse et essentia*, q. 4, 9rb. According to Giles's example there, if we consider it from the cause, then, for instance, the king is a more immediate cause of whatever the legate does as a legate, since the legate is acting by the king's power (that is, by the mediation of the king). On the other hand, if we consider it from the effect, then the legate is a more immediate cause than the king, since it is closer to the effect than the king is.

this and from John of Paris's mention of the *Reportatio*¹⁵ it seems likely that the Dominicans in Paris around the first decade of the fourteenth century did have a copy of or at least access to this work.

The *Reportatio* passage that Durand and in turn Peter of Palude refer to is from question 8 of the second book, where regarding the mode of divine concurrence, Giles notes:

An effect that is from God alone, is <from God> immediately and totally; but an effect that is from God by the mediation of secondary causes, is from God wholly immediately but not totally, that is, not in every way, because God uniformly acts in everything as much as it depends on him, so that the diversity <of things> is only due to the diversity of recipients, which cannot receive uniformly, because they receive according to their natures; and thus the effect, insofar as it is from the influence of God, does not have any distinction, but it has distinction from the part that is from the secondary causes (acting diversely according to their diverse natures) and according to the diversity of those receiving God's influence.¹⁶

According to this account, in cases of natural causation, God is responsible for the effect wholly immediately but not totally. Giles illustrates this distinction with an example: In a living being, to exist is the same as to live, or, a human person is a human just as much as he is an animal (that is, there is no part of the human person that would not be, at the same time, also part of the animal). However, if we just look at living things insofar as they exist, this does not distinguish them from non-living things; or similarly, if we just look at human beings insofar as they are animals, this does not distinguish them from other kinds of animals.¹⁷ Now, according to Giles, God

15. Cf. Luna's introduction, in: AEGIDIUS ROMANUS, *Reportatio Lecturae Super Libros I-IV Sententiarum*, ed. C. LUNA, Florence 2003, pp. 3-4.

16. *Reportatio Monacensis*, q. 8, ed. Luna, p. 208, 19-28: "Effectus qui est a solo Deo, <est> totus immediate et totaliter; sed effectus qui est a Deo mediantibus causis secundis, est a Deo totus immediate, sed non totaliter, id est non omni modo, quia Deus uniformiter agit in omnibus quantum est ex parte sui, ita quod solum diversitas est propter diversitatem recipientium, qui non possunt recipere uniformiter, quia [non] recipiunt secundum naturas suas; et ita effectus, a parte illa qua est ex influentia Dei, non habet distinctionem, sed ex parte illa qua est ex causis secundis agentibus diversimode propter diversas naturas earum et propter diversitatem recipientis influentiae Dei, habet distinctionem." See also AEGIDIUS ROMANUS, *Quaestiones de esse et essentia, de mensura angelorum et de cognitione angelorum*, Venetiis: Per Simonem de Luere, 1513, q. 4, fol. 9rb; and *Super librum de causis*, Venetiis: Apud Iacobum Zoppinum (repr.: Minerva), 1550 (1968), q. 4, fol. 14v H.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 208, 28-35: "In effectu vivente idem est penitus vivere et esse, et ideo totum est a Deo et totum est a secundo agente, quia totum quod dicit vivere, dicit esse,

is responsible for the universal part (the *esse*) of every being, from which there is no distinction between things; and the secondary agent is responsible for what makes the thing distinct from others. In this sense, we can say that God is not totally responsible for the thing's existence (since he is not responsible for its diversity) even though he is wholly immediately responsible for it.¹⁸

Giles make the same point elsewhere relying on Pseudo-Dionysius's characterization of God's influence in the *Divine Names*.¹⁹ As Giles claims, the uniformity of God's action and the resulting diversity is similar to how the uniform action of the sun results in different colors: although the sun gives the same light to everything, the objects reflect this uniform sunlight in different ways due to their different natures (or the dispositions of the various surfaces); similarly, God gives the same *esse* to every created thing, while the diversity of effects derives from the different ways in which the secondary agents reflect it due to their different natures and different dispositions.²⁰ The result of God's action is thus the *esse* of things that is differentiated by their secondary causes; moreover, since everything is primarily an existing thing and only after that a thing of a certain kind or of a certain quality, Giles also concludes that God is a more principal cause than the secondary agent.

Giles further elaborates on this latter point with the help of the sun analogy in his commentary on the *Liber de causis*.²¹ As he notes here, just

sicut idem dicunt homo et animal: nam omni modo quod dicit illud 'homo' dicit illud 'animal'. Ita Deus agit totum, sed non totaliter."

18. Although Giles makes no reference to it in this context, this way he might still be able to maintain that *forma dat esse rei* (*Auct. Arist.* 1, 189; 1, 201; and 1, 214): God gives *esse* insofar as it is considered in its uniformity, but the secondary agent, by virtue of its substantial form, gives it insofar as it is considered in its specificity.

19. For Dionysius, see *De diuinis nominibus* (Grosseteste's transl.): "Etenim quemadmodum qui secundum nos sol, non ratiocinans aut eligens sed ipso esse, illuminat omnia participare lumen ipsius, secundum propriam potentia rationem, sic utique et per se bonum, super solem ut super obscuram imaginem segregate archetypum, ipsa existentia omnibus existentibus analogice supermittit totius bonitatis radios" (see *Dionysiaca: Recueil donnant l'ensemble des traductions latines des ouvrages attribués au Denys de l'Aréopage*, ed. Ph. CHEVALLIER, Bruges 1937-1951, p. 146, col. 4).

20. AEGIDIUS ROMANUS, *In Secundum Librum Sententiarum Quaestiones (Ordinatio)*, II, d. 1, p. 1, q. 2, a. 6, Venetiis: Apud Franciscum Zilettum, 1581, fol. 31b C.

21. Prop. 4: "Prima rerum creaturarum est esse, et non est ante ipsum creatum aliud." Aquinas's interpretation of this analogy in the same place is somewhat similar, although he thinks that unless one assumes that the first created thing is already diverse, it is impossible

as light is the first visible because it is what primarily provides the *ratio* of visibility for other things (simply: it is only by light that we see other things), in a similar way, *esse* is the first among created things because this is what provides the *ratio* for other things being created (simply: it is only because they participate in *esse* that they are produced).²² He goes on to explain how the multiplicity of created things comes about by another analogy that Durand and in turn Peter will mention, although in a slightly different context. Giles compares the process of multiplication of *esse* to the coming about of numbers from the number one; just as in the number case, in which one is multiplied to three by the mediation of two, and so on, here also all multiplication comes about by the mediation of the intelligences (which are already multiple). The intelligences themselves are multiplied because the one infinite *esse* is joined with something finite (namely, their form or essence).

Although there are more details in Giles's account than what this limited study can show, this will already suffice to make Durand's and Peter's objections intelligible. For Durand presents two arguments against Giles's account, and these arguments are almost verbatim reiterated by Peter. First he argues against the position itself, then against the argument for the position. Concerning the first one he notes:

This opinion is mistaken in itself and in its reasoning. For what it says, that God acts uniformly in everything and there is no diversity in things if not from the secondary causes, is false, because according to this it would be impossible that multiple things come into existence from God without secondary causes, and thus God could not create diverse things, which is false.²³

to give a satisfactory account of the multiplicity of created things. For Aquinas's commentary, see THOMAS AQUINAS, *Super librum de causis expositio*, ed. H. D. SAFFREY, Paris 2002.

22. Fol. 13v C: "Hoc ergo modo prima rerum creaturarum est esse, sicut prima rerum visarum est lux, quia lux est prima et principalis ratio quare aliquid videatur. Lux enim respersa[?] in rebus facit ea esse visibilia. Sic ex esse sumitur prima et principalis ratio quare aliquid creetur, quia intantum aliquid est creatum et productum inquantum participat esse." On this question, see P. PORRO, "Prima rerum creaturarum est esse: Henri de Gand, Gilles de Rome et la quatrième proposition du *De causis*," in: V. CORDONIER – T. SUAREZ-NANI (eds.), *L'aristotélisme exposé. Aspects du débat philosophique entre Henri de Gand et Gilles de Rome*, Fribourg (Suisse) 2014, pp. 55-81.

23. *In II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 4, p. 52, 114-122: "Hec autem opinio deficit in se et in sua ratione. Quod enim dicit, quod Deus uniformiter agit in omnibus nec est diuersitas in rebus nisi ex causis secundis, falsum est, quia secundum hoc impossibile esset quod plura et distincta fierent a Deo sine causis secundis, et ita Deus non posset diuersa creare, quod est falsum." For Peter of Palude, see lines 31-34 below.

Thus, according to Durand, if we assume that God acts uniformly in every operation of nature, this would imply that he cannot create multiple, numerically distinct and different things (if we take ‘creation’ to mean bringing them about without secondary causes). However, since we do know that God can (and did) create multiple numerically distinct things, as Giles would also admit, then we have to deny the antecedent.²⁴

Second, Durand notes that Giles’s argument is mistaken:

Also, the argument by which they prove their opinion is not sound. For what they assume, namely that the particular effect is reduced to the particular cause and the universal effect to the universal cause, should be understood about the particular and universal according to the mode of predication, similarly in the cause and in the effect.²⁵

According to Durand, Giles’s argument — *esse* being the most general effect, hence the effect of the most general cause, God — is mistaken, since from an effect that is most universal only according to reason it wants to derive a cause that is most universal not only according to reason but also in reality. Durand cites Aristotle’s example about *this* sculptor being the cause of *this* statue while sculptor (in general) being the cause of statues (in general), in which case *this* statue and statue (in general) differ only according to reason, and similarly in the cause. In the same way, from *esse* being the most general effect according to reason one could indeed derive the claim that God (the cause of this *esse*) is the most general cause according to reason; Giles, however, wants to maintain that God is the most general cause in reality as well, which claim thus remains unsupported.

4. *Indeterminate and determinate esse: Aquinas*

Whether Durand’s or Peter of Palude’s reading of Aquinas gives a correct interpretation of Aquinas’s final take on divine concurrence is at least dubious as their main source is his *Sentences* commentary

24. Giles addresses how one can account for creation of individuals even by this uniform action in his *De causis* commentary, prop. 24.

25. *Ibid.*, pp. 52-53, 129-133: “Ratio etiam per quam probant suum propositum non ualet. Quod enim assumunt quod effectus particularis reducitur in causam particularem et uniuersalis in uniuersalem intelligendum est de particulari et uniuersali per predicationem, consimiliter in causa et effectum.” For Peter, see lines 42-45 below.

rather than the more developed *Summae* or the *Quaestiones de potentia*.²⁶ (It is worth noting, however, that it is the same *Sentences* account as the one that also Giles criticizes in his *Reportatio* just before developing his own answer.) The account they discuss comes from book II, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, where Aquinas, after quickly dealing with occasionalism and mere conservationism, presents a third, concurrentist option. According to this third option, things fall into two categories with respect to how they come to be. First, there are things that are created by God immediately and cannot be produced by a creature (which can be for various reasons). Second, there are things that can be and are produced by other created things, and these are the relevant ones for the current discussion. About these, Aquinas notes:

The third position is that God effects everything immediately, and that particular things have proper operations by which they are the proximate causes of things [...]. Others, however, that are produced by motion and generation, can have a created cause, either so that <the created cause> has causality above the whole species, just as the sun is a cause in the generation of humans or of lions; or so that it has causality only with respect to a member of a certain species, just as man generates man, and fire generates fire. God, however, is also a cause of these, more interiorly working in them than the other moving causes: because he is giving the *esse* of things, while the other causes are determining this *esse*. For there is no such thing the whole being of which receives its principle from some creature, since matter is only from God; but *esse* is more interior to the thing than that by which it is determined (since it remains when the others are removed, as it is said in the *Liber de causis*).

26. Aquinas's account of divine concurrence has received little attention in recent scholarship. For various aspects of it, see J. A. AERTSEN, *Nature and Creature. Aquinas's Way of Thought*, Leiden 1988, pp. 127-136 and 313-324 (on how it connects to Aquinas's more general metaphysical background); P. DVOŘÁK, "The Concurrentism of Thomas Aquinas: Divine Causation and Human Freedom," in: *Philosophia* 41 (2013), pp. 617-634 (about concurrence and human agency); S. L. BROCK, "Causality and Necessity in Thomas Aquinas," in: *Quaestio* 2 (2002), pp. 217-240 (concerning the problem of causal necessitation in Aquinas); M. DODDS, "Unlocking Divine Causality: Aquinas, Contemporary Science, and Divine Action," in: *Angelicum* 86 (2009), pp. 67-86; G. T. DOOLAN, "The Causality of the Divine Ideas in Relation to Natural Agents in Thomas Aquinas," in: *International Philosophical Quarterly* 44 (2004), pp. 393-409; A. J. FREDDOSO, "God's General Concurrence with Secondary Causes: Pitfalls and Prospects," in: *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 68 (1994), pp. 131-156; M. ROTA, "Causation," in: B. DAVIES (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas*, Oxford 2012, pp. 104-114; and I. SILVA, "Thomas Aquinas Holds Fast: Objections to Aquinas within Today's Debate on Divine Action," in: *The Heythrop Journal* 54 (2013), pp. 658-667. Among these, Dvořák is the only one who gives considerable attention to Aquinas's treatment in the *Quaestiones de potentia*.

Therefore, the operation of the creator pertains to the thing more interiorly than the operation of the secondary cause, and thus that the creature is the cause of other creatures does not exclude that God immediately operates in everything.²⁷

The account proposed here consists of two claims: (1) in the case of every being, God is responsible for its *esse*, while the secondary cause somehow determines this *esse* and is thus responsible for the determinate qualities the thing has; and (2) since the former is more interior to the thing than the latter, God is a more intimate cause of the secondary effect than the secondary agent.²⁸ Aquinas here leaves the notions of indeterminate and determinate *esse* largely unexplained, but according to his argument, God is responsible for the indeterminate *esse* because he is responsible for the matter of every created thing, while the secondary agent induces the form in that matter.²⁹ As this suggests, Aquinas maintains that the division of labor between God and the secondary cause in a natural causal action reflects the metaphysical division between matter and form in the effect.³⁰

27. *In II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, ed. P. MANDONNET, Paris 1929, pp. 25-26: “Tertia positio est, quod Deus immediate omnia operatur, et quod res singulae proprias operationes habent, per quas causae proximae rerum sunt [...]. Aliorum vero quae per motum et generationem producuntur, creatura causa esse potest, vel ita quod habeat causalitatem supra totam speciem, sicut sol est causa in generatione hominis vel leonis; vel ita quod habeat causalitatem ad unum individuum speciei tantum, sicut homo generat hominem, et ignis ignem. Horum tamen causa etiam Deus est, magis intime in eis operans quam aliae causae moventes: quia ipse est dans esse rebus. Causae autem aliae sunt quasi determinantes illud esse. Nullius enim rei totum esse ab aliqua creatura principium sumit, cum materia a Deo solum sit; esse autem est magis intimum cuilibet rei quam ea per quae esse determinatur; unde et remanet, illis remotis, ut in libro de causis dicitur. Unde operatio creatoris magis pertingit ad intima rei quam operatio causarum secundarum: et ideo hoc quod creatum est causa alii creaturae, non excludit quin Deus immediate in rebus omnibus operetur.”

28. For a more detailed analysis of this passage, especially with regard to God’s action on the secondary agent and the account’s neoplatonic origins, see J. SCHMUTZ, “La doctrine médiévale des causes et la théologie de la nature pure,” in: *Revue thomiste* 101 (2001), pp. 217-264, especially 223-229.

29. It is important to emphasize that for Aquinas, the secondary agent *induces* but does not *create* the form; the latter is also a result of God’s activity.

30. Interestingly, later in his career Aquinas does not seem to regard this characterization as a sufficient one of divine concurrence. Indeed, as Durand will be ready to point it out, saying this much only seems to amount to some kind of partialism (a view that not the whole effect but only part of it is brought about by God, which Aquinas would elsewhere deny — see, e.g., *Summa contra gentiles*, III, c.70).

Peter of Palude will further elaborate on the position, maintaining both of its claims, and making Aquinas's argument relying on the matter and form distinction more explicit. According to Peter's description, matter contributes to the thing's existence, or more precisely, it gives the thing its being in general. Form, on the other hand, presupposing this matter and being, is responsible for the determination of it, which makes the thing to be the kind of thing it is (in case of a substantial form), or makes the thing to have the specific quality it has (in case of an accidental form).

As for the second claim, that God's action is more immediate or interior to the effect than that of the secondary agent, Peter, borrowing again Durand's description of the position,³¹ appeals to a specific notion of interiority, having to do with "removing": according to this notion, C_1 is more immediately inherent to E than C_2 just in case we can remove C_2 while C_1 still remains — but not vice versa.³² And, according to Peter, the secondary cause in every action is such that its effect (the determinate *esse*) can be removed from the thing while God's effect (the indeterminate *esse*) cannot. To put it otherwise, God's contribution does not get removed by removing the secondary cause's contribution, while if we remove God's contribution, the secondary cause's contribution is also removed with it.

According to Durand, however, Aquinas's account is mistaken for two reasons: first, it is irrelevant to the question; second, one claim of the account rests on a false assumption. As he notes, in this case cited by Peter verbatim:

That it is not to the point is clear because it is one thing to say that God produces immediately something that is in a creature, namely matter, which is one part of the composite substance — which is entirely true, yet not to the point; and another thing to say that God produces immediately everything that is produced by the creature. For since the action of the creature attains a form but not matter as the term of its action, as they say, we ask whether that form of the natural thing, which is attained immediately by the action of the creature, is also attained immediately by the action of God. They, however, treat the first point but not the second,

31. *In II Sent.*, p. 49, 33-44.

32. Cf. below, lines 326 and 358. Although in Palude's formulation it is C_1 itself that remains after C_2 's removal, the *De Causis* passage Palude is referring to makes the claim that it is C_1 's power and activity that remain after C_2 's power and activity are taken away. See *Liber de causis*, prop. 1, 1-2.

which is clear from the middle term of the argument they adduce, and thus it is not to the point.³³

Thus, Durand raises against Aquinas what we might call the ‘partialism objection’: if one understands Aquinas as claiming that *whatever* the creature brings about, God also immediately brings about, then he cannot say that one part of the effect is brought about by God and the other part is brought about by the creature, since in this latter action God’s immediate cooperation is not posited, despite the earlier claim to the contrary.³⁴ Aquinas seems to maintain, however, that matter is brought about by God, and form is by the secondary agent. Therefore, Durand claims, this version of the concurrentist position cannot be consistently maintained.

Durand’s second objection is directed against the argument for the claim that God’s concurring action is more immediate to the effect than that of the secondary agent. In Durand’s interpretation, the argument rests on two premises: that indeterminate *esse* is more immediate or more interior to the thing than its determinate *esse* (P_1); and that God is responsible for the former while the secondary cause is responsible for the latter (P_2). According to Durand, however, the first premise of this argument is simply false:

It also assumes something false. For what they say that *esse* is more interior to a thing than those <features> that determine it, if it is understood so that *esse* in potency is more interior to the thing than *esse* in act by which it is determined, then it is false. For just as something is more truly what it is by the form rather than by the matter [...], in the same way *esse* in act is more true and more interior to the thing than *esse* in potency. If, however, it is understood so that actual *esse*, as taken in its generality, is more interior to the thing than that by which it is determined to this or that being, which is

33. *In II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 4, pp. 49-50, 47-57: “Quod non sit ad propositum, patet, quia aliud est dicere quod Deus producat immediate aliquid quod est in creatura, scilicet materiam, que est altera pars substantie composite, quod utique uerum est nec hoc querit questio; aliud est dicere quod Deus producat immediate omne illud quod producit creatura. Cum enim actio creature attingat formam ut terminum actionis sue et non materiam, ut ipsimet dicunt, querimus utrum ipsam formam rei naturalis, ad quam immediate attingit actio creature, attingat etiam actio Dei immediate. Ipsi autem pertractant primum et non secundum, ut patet ex medio quod adducunt, et ideo non est ad propositum.” For Peter, see lines 306-313 below.

34. This is the very same argument that Giles had already leveled against Aquinas’s early position; cf. *Reportatio*, pp. 207-208.

living being or intellectual being, then they change the meaning of their claim, as it is obvious by itself.³⁵

As this passage suggests, the argument is mistaken, since

1. (P_1) can either mean (a) that *esse* in potency is more intimate to a thing than its *esse* in act; or (b) that *esse*, taken generally, is more intimate than that which determines it.
2. But (a) is false.
3. Hence (b).
4. But (b) modifies the proposition P_1 , and thus C does not follow.

The first horn of Durand's dilemma here attributes to Aquinas the claim that *esse* in potency is more immediate to a thing than its *esse* in act. However, in an Aristotelian framework, as Durand points out, this is not the case; *esse* in potentiality is determined by the substantial form, which makes the thing the thing it is (e.g., making the indeterminate *esse* of animality into that of a human being); and thus the latter is much more immediate to the thing than the former.

The second horn of the dilemma is more difficult to interpret, especially since its *reductio* is assumed to be simply "obvious by itself." It attributes to Aquinas the claim that "actual *esse*, as taken in its generality, is more interior to the thing than that by which it is determined to this or that being, which is living being or intellectual being," and argues that if this is the case, then Aquinas modifies the meaning of P_1 . From the rather brief elaboration that Durand offers here, the point seems to be similar to the one raised against Giles. The argument only works if P_1 is understood as saying that indeterminate and determinate *esse* are more and less immediate in reality (*in re*), since only in this case can we maintain that their respective causes (namely, God and the secondary agent) are more and less immediate in reality, and since God is regarded as a universal cause

35. *In II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 4, p. 50, 58-67: "Assumit etiam falsum. Quod enim dicunt quod esse est intimius rei quam ea que ipsum determinant, si intelligatur quod esse in potentia sit intimius rei quam esse in actu per quod determinatur, falsum est. Sicut enim per formam quolibet res est uerius id quod est quam per materiam [...] sic esse actu est uerius et intimius rei quam esse in potentia. Si autem intelligatur quod esse actuale in sua communitate sumptum intimius est rei quam ea per que determinatur ad hoc esse uel illud quod est esse uiuens uel esse intellectuale, tunc uariant propositum suum, ut de se patet." For Peter, see lines 314-321 below.

not merely *secundum rationem* but really. As Durand has argued, however, the reading of P_1 according to which it expresses a real distinction is not plausible; indeed, the premise can only be regarded true if it marks a distinction according to reason (*secundum rationem*), namely that *esse*, taken generally (*communitate sumptum*) is more immediate than determinate *esse*.

I cannot discuss here whether Durand's criticism of Aquinas is in fact right. In the text below Peter offers a response to Durand's objection, and argues that Aquinas's account, if we understand it properly, can be defended against this criticism.

5. *Peter of Palude's position*

Peter of Palude responds to Durand's objections against Aquinas by elaborating on what it means to be responsible for the existence of matter, and then by endorsing the first horn of Durand's dilemma. Peter emphasizes that matter needs to be maintained at every moment of its existence, which grounds the immediacy of God's concurring action. His example does not fully express this, but as he says, we can imagine that two people apply a seal so that one warms up and applies the wax, while the other presses the seal into the wax. In this case, as Peter points out, we would be likely to say that the one who applied the wax acted just as immediately to the impression of the seal as the one who pressed the seal into it. In a similar way, God, by producing the matter and appropriately disposing it to receive the form from the secondary agent, acts just as immediately towards every effect as the secondary agent does.³⁶

As for Durand's dilemma, Peter maintains that if we understand it correctly, *esse in potentia* is prior and more immediate to the thing than its actual *esse*; as was pointed out above, he argues that the former comes prior to the thing than the latter and recedes from the thing later than the latter. That is, we might say at one moment (namely when the cat has not been born yet) that the existence of a certain cat is merely possible; and can also say (after the cat died) that its existence is possible (since it did not die at that time necessarily). If this is the case, then possible being does precede actual being, and

36. Cf. lines 352-353 below.

the two are different in reality and not only *secundum rationem*: actual being can be taken away while possible being remains, just as is required by the notion of 'immediate' Peter is referring to.³⁷

After answering Durand's objections against Aquinas, Peter proposes his own answer, which he regards as an elaboration on Aquinas's account, and which does indeed agree with what Aquinas has said on the question. Similarly to Aquinas, Peter maintains that (1) God conserves everything in being; (2) God immediately acts in every action of a creature; and (3) God acts with an action that is formally but not materially distinct from the action of the creature.³⁸ He presents some arguments for each of these claims, which I will cite here without thorough examination.

In the argument for the first,³⁹ Peter refers to the distinction between ingenerable (eviternal) and generable things, and shows that the claim is true of both. Although the argument in the case of ingenerable things is not much more than a restatement of the claim (God conserves them in being since he is the cause of their existence), in the case of generable things he offers two arguments. First, since (according to the previous remark) the ingenerable heavens cannot even conserve themselves in existence, they can even less conserve something else, unless they are supported by God's immediate action. According to the second argument, it is within God's power to annihilate every content while retaining all containing things with their powers; but this could not be unless by the withdrawal of a concurring action. (The minor premise follows from the fact that a positive action must have either a terminus or a subject in which the change occurs, both of which are lacking in annihilation.)

As an elaboration on the second claim⁴⁰ — that God acts immediately in every action — Peter, just as Aquinas at least in his later account, maintains that God's action is immediate both on the secondary agent and on the secondary effect. On the secondary effect it is immediate since God has to conserve and thus create the secondary effect at every moment of its existence (including the moment of its

37. Cf. lines 353-361 below.

38. Cf. lines 379-381 below.

39. Cf. lines 382-394 below.

40. Cf. lines 395-401 below.

generation). It is likewise immediate on the secondary agent, since an agent is more capable of maintaining itself in existence than of bringing to existence something else, but as was just shown above, no secondary agent can maintain itself; therefore, no secondary agent can bring something else into existence either without God supplementing its power.⁴¹

Finally, for the third claim⁴² — that God's action is formally distinct but materially identical to the action of the secondary agent — Peter notes that the distinction between actions *ex principiis* comes from their efficient causes, while the distinction *ex terminis* from their final causes. Thus, when — in the often used example — two people are pulling a boat on a river, or two candles illuminate a room, we can speak of only one action formally, since the two agents act by the same principle of action (that is, they pull the boat by the same power, and similarly for the candles). In the case of God and the secondary creature, however, the action must be formally distinct, since they do not have the same principle of action (or, as Aquinas would say, they belong to a different order of causes), even though their termini are the same.

As can be seen already from this brief exposition, Peter of Palude's approach can hardly be called novel. Nevertheless, the main virtue of his text lies in the fact that he at least seems familiar with several of the contemporary competing positions — even if this familiarity derives primarily not from his reading of primary sources but from a close acquaintance with Durand of St.-Pourçain's commentary — and reacts to each of them from a broadly speaking Thomistic concurrentist viewpoint.

6. *Peter of Palude and Durand of St.-Pourçain*

Peter was first noticed in the twentieth century precisely because of his connection to Durand of St.-Pourçain, another Dominican theologian in Paris in the 1300s whose teachings resulted in two investigations to determine their orthodoxy. Involved in these investigations — taking place in Paris in 1314 and 1316/17 — were Peter of Palude, Hervaeus Natalis, James of Lausanne, and John of Naples.

41. Aquinas's similar argument is somewhat more detailed in *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 7.

42. Cf. below, lines 402-423.

The first investigation issued a list of 93 propositions that were suspected of error or heresy.⁴³ The second investigation took a more directly Thomistic line, examining how much Durand disagreed with Thomas, and issuing a list of 235 propositions.

Durand, during his lifetime, produced multiple redactions of his commentary on the *Sentences*, and the relationship between or in fact the number of these different redactions is not entirely clear at the moment. Koch had argued that Durand had three different versions; one was published in 1307/08 (redaction *A*), the second was composed between 1310 and 1313 (redaction *B*), and the third later, between 1317 and 1327 (redaction *C*).⁴⁴ Of book II, both early redactions are known, while for book I, only one version is extant (together with redaction *C*). Although recent work on Durand has shown that the picture is more complicated than Koch had assumed,⁴⁵ we need not take a stance on those issues for now. What is worth repeating is that, as noted above, Durand's *B* redaction does not contain the question on divine concurrence, while it reappears in redaction *C* in almost verbatim the same form as it was presented in *A*.

Durand's career and commentary is relevant in the present context due to the fact that Peter of Palude incorporated much of Durand's text into his own.⁴⁶ Which one of Durand's three redactions was

43. For the edition of this list, see KOCH, *Kleine Schriften*, pp. 53-72.

44. J. KOCH, *Durandus de S. Porciano O.P. Forschungen zum Streit um Thomas von Aquin zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts*, Münster 1927, pp. 60-63 and 72-74.

45. For instance, Fiorella Retucci has recently argued that Durand's redactions might have been the result of a continuous revising process, producing manuscripts that contain multiple redactions at the same time. See F. RETUCCI, "Selected Problems in Books I-II of Durand's *Sentences* Commentary," in: A. SPEER *et al.* (eds.), *Durand of Saint-Pourçain and His Sentences Commentary. Historical, Philosophical, and Theological Issues*, Leuven 2014, pp. 71-96. I would like to thank Thomas Jeschke and Massimo Perrone at the Cologne Institute for informing me about the current *status quaestionis*, and providing some useful background on Durand's work. The present text also confirms that there is another, no longer extant redaction of book I; Peter makes a reference to book I to a question (d. 17, q. 7) that is missing from the extant redaction although is present in *C* (which Peter could not have used due to its lateness); cf. lines 221-222 below.

46. The claim that Durand's lost version of the first book (if there was one) is virtually contained in Peter's commentary, was first defended in KOCH, *Durandus*. For the accuracy of this claim, as well as for the best recent study on Peter's connection to Durand, see R. L. FRIEDMAN – C. SCHABEL – I. BALCOYIANNPOULOU, "Peter of Palude and the Parisian Reaction to Durand of St Pourçain on Future Contingents," in: *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 71 (2001), pp. 183-300.

Peter using is generally difficult to determine (redaction *C* was almost certainly composed after Peter's text, thus the choice is rather between *A* and *B*),⁴⁷ even though until recently it was regarded as relatively well established that he could not have used the *B* version in book II.⁴⁸ Whether this is indeed the case in general — Friedman et al. have concluded that “the only safe method of proceeding when trying to make claims about which version of Durand's commentary Peter was relying on is to compare Peter's text with Durand's version *A*, *B*, or both”⁴⁹ — making the claim regarding the present text is easy as the corresponding question is missing from the *B* version, thus, Peter could have only been using version *A*.⁵⁰ Henceforth, unless otherwise noted, all Durand references will be to redaction *A*.

Peter of Palude's connection to Durand helps to give an approximate date for Peter's *Sentences* commentary.⁵¹ As has been well established,⁵² Durand's first redaction of the *Sentences* was written somewhere between 1304 and 1308. We also know that Peter probably lectured on the *Sentences* in 1310–12, after which he was regent master in theology in Paris (1314–17). His commentary — almost certainly an *Ordinatio* — was composed in this order: book I,

47. According to Koch, it was the *A* version in all cases; but now it has been established that this cannot be the case. For a comprehensive study on the question see FRIEDMAN – SCHABEL – BALCOYIANNOPOULOU, “Peter of Palude,” pp. 198–215.

48. See DURAND OF ST.-POURÇAIN, *Quaestio de natura cognitionis (II Sent. [A] d. 3 q. 5) et Disputatio cum Anonymo quodam*, ed. J. KOCH, Münster 1929; R. M. MARTIN, *La controverse sur le péché originel au début du XIVe siècle: Textes inédits*, Leuven 1930; M. G. HENNINGER, “Durand of Saint Pourçain (b. ca. 1270; d. 1334),” in: J. J. E. GRACIA (ed.), *Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation (1150–1650)*, Albany 1994, pp. 319–332; and FRIEDMAN – SCHABEL – BALCOYIANNOPOULOU, “Peter of Palude.”

49. *Ibid.*, p. 215.

50. Or, as Fiorella Retucci has concluded, a manuscript that contained both versions.

51. This relies on G. GROPPA, *La Teologia e il suo 'Subiectum' secondo il Prologo del Commento alle Sentenze di Pietro da Palude, O.P. (†1342)*, Rome 1961, and FRIEDMAN – SCHABEL – BALCOYIANNOPOULOU, “Peter of Palude,” pp. 214–215; see also P. T. STELLA, “A proposito di Pietro da Palude (In I Sent., d. 43, q. 1): La questione inedita ‘Utrum Deum esse infinitum in perfectione et vigore possit efficaci ratione probari’ di Erveo Natalis,” in: *Salesianum* 22 (1960), pp. 245–325.

52. Cf. FRIEDMAN – SCHABEL – BALCOYIANNOPOULOU, “Peter of Palude,” pp. 189–190; both the *terminus a quo* and the *terminus ad quem* relies on Hervaeus's works, for which see B. DECKER, *Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz. Untersuchungen zur Dominikanertheologie zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts*, Münster 1967, p. 88.

book III, book II, and book IV.⁵³ We do know that he finished book III by November 1312, so he probably started on book II towards the end of that year. He finished the final, fourth book by 1315 or perhaps even later.⁵⁴ Thus, we can quite safely say that he was working on book II somewhere between the end of 1312 and 1314.

Returning to Durand's influence on Peter of Palude, in the text below, 167 out of the total 425 lines come from Durand almost verbatim. Although this might seem to render Peter's work rather unoriginal, this is not entirely the case, since even where he uses Durand's text, how he does it betrays some philosophical insight.⁵⁵ His arrangement of the text largely differs from his opponent's, and so does, of course, his main argument and conclusion. The table below shows the thematic breakdown of Durand's and Peter's text. The first part is practically a table of contents to Fiorella Retucci's recent Durand edition,⁵⁶ with its line numbers, referencing also where Peter repeats the text (with the line numbers of the present edition). These repetitions do contain occasional minor differences (*ergo* for *igitur* and other synonyms), which I have not noted. The second part of the table lists the topics in the order Peter treats them, giving the line numbers of the present edition, and also the references to Durand's text (with the line numbers of Retucci's edition).

As this list shows, Peter of Palude makes extensive use of Durand's text while completely restructuring it. Peter presents four positions on the question (while Durand only dealt with three). First, he starts with Giles of Rome's position (which was the second position Durand discussed), where he basically agrees with Durand's exposition and

53. FRIEDMAN – SCHABEL – BALCOYIANNOPOULOU, "Peter of Palude," p. 214.

54. V. HEYNCK, "Zur Datierung des Sentenzenkommentars des Petrus de Palude," in: *Franziskanische Studien* 53 (1971), pp. 317-327.

55. Modern scholars greatly disagree on how much philosophical insight we should attribute to Peter. While according to Dunbabin, "modern readers [...] often find themselves baffled by the sheer quantity of opinions cited and the inconclusiveness of the conclusions. [...] In sum Pierre's attempt to expose Durand's weaknesses was like a man trying to trap a rat by throwing a duvet at it" (*The Hound of God*, pp. 33-34, 41), Cyrill Vollert claims that Peter's work "approaches the best writing of modern authors in clarity and solidity" (*The Doctrine of Hervaeus Natalis on Primitive Justice and Original Sin*, Rome 1947, pp. 259-260). As will be seen below, regarding the question of divine concurrence the truth lies somewhere in the middle.

56. DURAND OF ST.-POURÇAIN, *Scriptum super IV libros Sententiarum. Distinctiones 1-5 libri Secundi*, ed. F. RETUCCI, Leuven 2012, pp. 47-56.

criticism. Second, he presents Durand's position quite carefully, with all the arguments that can be found in Durand's text, raising and answering also the objections that Durand discussed. One of the most original pieces in Peter's work is his argument against Durand's position, where he shows that it contradicts Biblical authority and the arguments offered for it are insufficient to establish the conclusion. Third, while Durand deals with Aquinas's position first and rather quickly, Peter discusses it as the penultimate opinion with which — after certain clarifications — he will mostly agree. He repeats both Durand's exposition of and arguments against Aquinas, and responds to the latter in detail. Finally, fourth, he presents his own view on the question, relatively briefly, given that he regards it as a clarification of Aquinas's view.

As was pointed out above and can also be seen from these remarks, both Durand and Peter join into an ongoing discussion on divine concurrence, relying on Aquinas's and Giles's position, besides whom they also cite Aristotle, Avicenna (Peter), and some authors whom I have not been able to identify.

<i>Durand's In II Sent., d.1, q.4</i>		<i>Palude</i>
Objections to Durand's position	lin. 3-15	lin. 125-134
Sed contra	lin. 16-18	—
Clarification of the question	lin. 19-31	—
Aquinas's position	lin. 32-44	lin. 292-302
Against Aquinas's position	lin. 45-82	lin. 304-332
Giles of Rome's position	lin. 83-103	lin. 7-29
Against Giles's position	lin. 104-147	lin. 31-56
Durand's position	lin. 148-214	lin. 73-123
Response to the objections	lin. 215-235	lin. 136-152
 <i>Palude's In II Sent., d.1, q.4</i>		<i>Durand</i>
Objection from Biblical authority	lin. 3	—
Sed contra from Biblical authority	lin. 4	—
Giles of Rome's position	lin. 7-29	lin. 83-103
Against Giles's position	lin. 31-56	lin. 104-147
Further remarks on Giles's position	lin. 57-71	—
Durand's position	lin. 73-123	lin. 148-214
Objections to Durand's position	lin. 125-134	lin. 3-15
Durand's response to the objections	lin. 136-152	lin. 215-235

Against Durand's position	lin. 154-290	—
Aquinas's position	lin. 292-302	lin. 32-44
Durand's objections to Aquinas	lin. 304-332	lin. 45-82
Further remarks on Durand's objections	lin. 333-345	—
Response to Durand's objections	lin. 347-376	—
Palude's position	lin. 378-423	—
Response to the objection	lin. 424-425	—

7. *The edition*

The manuscripts

There are three currently known extant mss. that contain the second book of Palude's *Sentences* commentary. These are:

B = Basel, Universitätsbibliothek BII 22 (saec. XIV)

U = Vat. Lat. 1073 (saec. XV)

P = Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine 899 (a. 1472).

Basel, UB BII 22

See also Meyer and Burckhardt's description.⁵⁷ Petrus de Palude: super secundum librum Sententiarum (fols. 1r^a–262v^b; table of questions: fols. 258v^b–262v^b). Fragments: officii corporis Christi; Commentarii in psalmos poenitentiales (on flyleaf).

Incipit (fol. 1r^a): Circa primam distinctionem secundi Sententiarum queruntur quinque, primo utrum aliqua creatura potuerit esse ab eterno; secundo etc.

Explicit: fol. 258v^b: Sed ultimus est unus et idem, scilicet ipse Deus, qui est benedictus in secula. Amen. *Explicit secundus*. Fol. 262v^b: Expliciuunt tituli super secundum.

14th century.

Latin; parchment, 32.5 × 24 cm, ii + 262 + i folios. 22 quires: 1–6¹², 7¹⁰, 8–22¹². Some catchwords on last folio of quires. Foliated with modern pencil (Arabic numerals), from fol. 1.

Two columns, writing surface 23/23.5 × 16/17 cm, 50/52 lines, lightly ruled. 14th-century Gothic, possibly French, *textualis media*,

57. G. MEYER – M. BURCKHARDT, *Die mittelalterlichen Handschriften der Universitätsbibliothek Basel: Beschreibendes Verzeichnis*, vol. 1, Basel 1960, pp. 187-190.

written by the same hand. Flyleaves: 14th-century cursive and calligraphic minuscule script (end of 14th century).

Decorations: decorated initials (occupying 2–4 lines) throughout, at the beginning of every question. On fol. 1r^a, two initials (C, P), occupying 5 and 4 lines, respectively. Often decorated with ferns. Running head with the distinction number (Roman numerals, on v) and the question number (Roman numerals, on r). Occasional marginal corrections and references, possibly by the same hand.

Binding: wooden cover, bound in leather, trimmed. Seal: Fleur de lis, hippogryph.

Origin and provenance: From the Basel Dominican monastery. Former owner unknown. Missing from the Dominican library catalogue. On fol. 1r: *ex lib(ris) Acad(emiae) Bas(iliensis) 1519*. Schmidt lists it in his catalogue.⁵⁸

Vat. Lat. 1073

See also the description in *Codices Vaticani Latini*.⁵⁹ Petrus de Palude: super secundum librum Sententiarum (fols. 1r^a–189r^b; table of questions: fols. 186v^a–189r^b).

Incipit (fol. 1r^a): Circa primam distinctionem secundi Sententiarum queruntur quinque, etc.

Explicit: fol. 186r^b: Sed ultimus est unus et idem, scilicet ipse Deus qui est benedictus in secula seculorum. Amen. *Explicit* secundus. Fol. 189r^b: Expliciunt tituli super secundum. Finito libro, sit laus et gloria Christo. Amen.

15th century.

Latin; parchment, 40 × 28 cm, i + 190 + i folios. Foliated throughout (Arabic numerals), but the numbering is off starting from 58^a (following 58 and preceding 59).

Two columns, writing surface 28 × 17 cm, 67 lines, ruled throughout. Semi-Gothic, near humanistic book script, early 15th century.

Decorations: decorated initials throughout (2–3 lines), often with fern decorations, at the beginning of distinctions golden letters.

58. Ph. SCHMIDT, "Die Bibliothek des ehemaligen Dominikanerklosters in Basel," in: *Basler Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Altertumskunde* 18 (1919), § 220.

59. A. PELZER (ed.), *Codices Vaticani Latini*, vol. 2: *Codices 679–1134*, Vatican 1931, pp. 629–630.

On fol. 1r^a 6-line illuminated, inhabited initial (C) with a Dominican friar (Aquinas?), holding a book. Occasional marginal corrections and references by the same hand. Frequent paragraph marks. On fol. 1r, on the top, in cursive: ‘*Durandus.*’

Origin and provenance unknown.

Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine 899

See also the description in the *Catalogue de la Bibliothèque Mazarine*.⁶⁰ Petrus de Palude: super secundum librum Sententiarum (fols. 1r^a–288r^a; table of questions: fols. 285v^a–288r^a).

Incipit (fol. 1r^a): Circa primam distinctionem secundi Sententiarum quaeruntur quinque, etc.

Explicit: fol. 285v^a: Sed ultimus est unus et idem, scilicet ipse Deus, qui est benedictus in saecula. Amen. Fol. 288r^a: Expliciunt tituli super secundum. Scriptum per manus Arnoldi de Ligno, anno Domini 1472, in profesto beati Benedicti abbatis.

Latin; paper, 40 × 29 cm, iii + 288 + ii folios. Foliated throughout (Arabic numerals), starting on fol. 1.

Two columns, writing surface 27.5 × 18 cm, 58/60 lines, lightly ruled. According to the explicit, copied in 1472, by Arnold de Ligno; written by the same hand. 15th-century hybrid Gothic script of medium quality.

Decorations: unfinished; empty space left for initials (3–7 lines), but never filled in. Otherwise undecorated. Occasional corrections and section titles on the margin, possibly by the same hand.

Modern binding.

Origin and provenance: on the front flyleaf: “Istud volumen Petri de Palude super 2um Sententiarum pertinet conventui Gandensi, ordinis fratrum Praedicatorum,” which indicates that it belonged to the Dominican monastery of Gent. Later provenance unknown.

Besides these three mss., Kaeppli lists five additional ones and one early edition of this text,⁶¹ which, however, are either misattributions

60. A. MOLINIER, *Catalogue des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Mazarine*, vol. 1, Paris 1885, p. 422.

61. T. KAEPPLEI, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi*, 4 vols., Rome 1970–1993, § 3286.

or have not been found. The early edition (Paris, 1517) does contain Peter of Palude's commentary, but not the second book. Los Angeles Libr. of the University of Southern California 3, Bergamo Bibl. civ. Γ 7. 5, and Jena Univ. Bibl. Ms. El. Fol. 43 do not contain Peter of Palude's commentary at all but commentaries by other authors. I have not been able to find any trace of the Vienna Dominican ms., and the collection might have been destroyed. There is also no trace of the Gent, Conv. Ord. Praed. ms.; it is possible that it was also falsely attributed to Peter, or perhaps that the ms. Kaeppli refers to is what is known as Paris, Bibl. Mazarine 899.⁶²

The existing three manuscripts are generally reliable. They contain the same redaction of the work, and most differences are due to mechanical errors or occasional variance in word order. As the mechanical errors show, the manuscripts were probably copied by sight.

P omits the lines preceding the *responsio*, but apart from that, the only significant omissions are errors *per homoeoteleuton*. The list of all significant omissions:

<i>Lines</i>	<i>Omitted in</i>
3-5	<i>P</i>
236	<i>U</i>
296-297	<i>U</i>
366	<i>P</i>

The oldest manuscript is *B*, which is also arguably the best one. It is overall reliable, it contains the least number of mechanical errors, and there are no omissions compared to *U* and *P*. However, since *B* contains several obvious errors, it cannot be the original exemplar.

On the other hand, *U* contains the most mechanical errors, as well as the two longer homeoteleutic omissions. Apart from the mechanical errors, however, it has no significant variants compared to *B*.

The Paris manuscript is perhaps the most interesting one in terms of variants: on the one hand, it contains some mechanical errors that

62. I am thankful to several people who helped me establishing the misattribution or non-existence of these mss., and also for helping to acquire the mss. that actually do exist: Henrik Defoort, Russell Friedman, Peter Hartman, and Giorgio Pini.

suggest that at least at one point in the history, the scribe did not understand the text and was rather unskilled in Latin grammar (misreading “*fit*” for “*sicut*,” “*enim*” for “*est verum*,” “*verum*” for “*item*,” etc.; readings that neither syntactically nor otherwise could be assumed to be correct). On the other hand, however, in other places, P contains additions that make the text easier to follow or make the argument more explicit.

The number of common errors is insufficient to establish the stemma with certainty. The number of common errors are:

<i>BU</i> :	8
<i>PU</i> :	4
<i>BP</i> :	1
<i>BPU</i> :	1

With the exception of two, all the common errors might be due to independent mechanical errors (e.g., reading “*generatio*” instead of “*genero*,” “*qua*” instead of “*quasi*,” etc.). The exceptions are: (1) the addition shared by *B* and *U* in line 106 (adding “*producere*” to “*prius*”); and (2) *U* and *P*’s reading of “*calor*” instead of “*ignis*” (line 184). The only mistake shared by all mss. might have been due to a mechanical error (reading “*que*” instead of “*quia*” in line 195), and since neither ms. shares all its errors with any other ms., a direct dependency cannot be established between them.

Thus, either a trichotomic or a dichotomic stemma is likely, although the latter is perhaps more so, given the common errors of *B* and *U*. In that case, *B* and *U* derived from a common ancestor, which ancestor, however — likely containing already the common mistakes of *B* and *U* — is not identical to the archetype. *P* might have derived from the archetype by the mediation of a different ancestor.

Editorial principles

Since *B* is overall the most reliable manuscript as well as the oldest one, the following edition is largely based on *B*’s reading, occasionally corrected by means of *P* or *U*. Since, as noted above, a considerable part of Peter’s text is a repetition of Durand’s, for the sake of comparison I also included the current Durand critical edition in the

apparatus criticus.⁶³ I kept the editorial additions and corrections to minimal.

The orthography has been standardized according to medieval Latin spelling, which the manuscripts in generally follow although with some inconsistencies. Variants on spelling are not marked in the critical apparatus. Paragraphs and punctuation have been modified and added throughout, and the title of the question as well as the subtitles are also editorial additions. Additions are marked with angled brackets.

Abbreviations

- a. c.* ante correctionem
add. addidit (-erunt etc.)
cf. confera(n)tur
del. deleuit
exp. expunxit
lin. linea
mrg. in margine
om. omisit
sup. supra

Bibliography to the edition

- AEGIDIUS ROMANUS, *Quaestiones de esse et essentia, de mensura angelorum et de cognitione angelorum*, Venetiis, Per Simonem de Luere, 1513.
 --- *In Secundum Librum Sententiarum Quaestiones (Ordinatio)*, Venetiis, Apud Franciscum Zilettum, 1581.
 --- *Reportatio Lecturae Super Libros I–IV Sententiarum*. Edited by C. LUNA. Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia, Florence 2003.
 ANONYMUS (IOHANNES DE FONTE?). *Les Auctoritates Aristotelis: Un florilège médiéval*. Edited by J. HAMESSE, Louvain 1974.
 ANONYMUS, “Le *Liber de Causis*: Édition établie à l’aide de 90 manuscrits avec introduction et notes”. Edited by A. PATTIN, in: *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* 28 (1966), pp. 90-203.

63. It should be noted that in the collation I only relied on the text of the critical edition. In some cases where Peter’s text differs from *D*, it does follow some other ms. variant of Durand’s text (most often that of *A* and occasionally *D* and *V* of the Durand edition).

- ARISTOTELES, *Ethica Nicomachea, libri I–III, VIII.1–5 (Burgundii translationis recensio): Robertus Grosseteste reuisor translationis Aristotelis*. Edited by R. A. GAUTHIER. Aristoteles Latinus, vol. 26.1–3, Leiden 1972.
- *De anima: Guillelmus de Morbeka reuisor translationis secundum Aquinatis librum*. Aristoteles Latinus, vol. 12.2, Rome, Commissio Leonina, 1984.
- *Physica (Translatio uetus): Iacobus Veneticus translator Aristotelis*. Edited by F. BOSSIER and J. BRAMS. Aristoteles Latinus, vol. 7.1, Leiden 1990.
- AVICENNA, *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina*. Edited by S. VAN RIET. Avicenna Latinus, 1.4, Leuven 1980.
- DURANDUS DE S. PORCIANO, *In Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentariorum Libri IIII*, Venetiis, Ex Typographia Guerraea, 1571.
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- GREGORIUS MAGNUS. *Moralia in Iob*. Edited by M. ADRIAEN. CCSL 143, Turnhout 1979.
- STEPHANUS TEMPIER, *La condamnation Parisienne de 1277*. Edited by D. PICHÉ and C. LAFLEUR, Paris 1999.
- THOMAS DE AQUINO, *Pars Prima Summae theologiae: a quaestione I ad quaestionem XLIX*. Opera Omnia, Editio Leonina, vol. 4, Rome 1888.
- *Liber de veritate catholicae fidei contra errores infidelium seu Summa contra Gentiles*. Edited by P. MARC, C. PERA, and P. CARMELLO, Turin-Rome 1961.
- *S. Thomae Aquinatis Quaestiones disputatae 2: De potentia; De anima; De spiritualibus creaturis*. Edited by P. M. PESSON, Turin-Rome 1965.

Vtrum Deus immediate agat in omni actione

B 7rb,
P 8vb,
U 5va

Quarto queritur utrum Deus immediate agat in omni actione.
Et uidetur quod non, quia *quieuit ab omni opere quod patrarat*.
Contra: *operatur omnia in omnibus*.

- 5 Responsio: de ista questione sunt quattuor opiniones, que tractabuntur per ordinem.

<Prima opinio: Egidii Romani>

Prima opinio dicit quod duo sunt genera effectuum: quidam enim sunt *a solo Deo* creatura nichil cooperante, ut angelus uel celum, et tales effectus sunt a Deo *immediate et totaliter*, id est secundum omnem modum, et de istis non procedit
10 questio; alii sunt effectus causarum secundarum et non solius Dei, et de istis est questio. De quibus dicunt isti quod sunt a *Deo* toti *immediate*, non tamen *totaliter*, hoc est secundum omnem modum. Quod declarant, quia, ut dicunt, Deus *agit uniformiter in omnibus rebus quantum est de se, ita quod tota diuersitas*
15 *in effectibus est ex diuersitate recipientium* influentiam diuinam *propter diuersitatem* suarum naturarum. *Et ideo effectus, ex ea parte qua sunt a causis secundis*, habent *distinctionem* et non | ex parte *Dei*. Sic igitur res in quantum sunt, a Deo
sunt, quia in hoc non distinguuntur, in quantum autem habent esse distinctum, sunt a causis secundis per quas distinguuntur. Verbi gratia: *in re uiuente idem est penitus uiuere et esse, et ideo totum | est immediate a Deo et totum immediate*
20 *a secundo agente*, sed non eodem modo, quia *ex parte ipsius esse non est distinctio in rebus, sed per uiuere distinguitur* una res ab alia; propter quod Deus *dat esse* et uiuere, sed solum sub ratione ipsius esse in quo nichil distinguitur; *creatura uero dat totum illud sub ratione qua est uiuere ex parte* cuius est in rebus distinctio.

B 7va

U 5vb

Pro hac autem opinione uidetur esse dictum Aristotelis II^o Phisicorum, capitulo de causis, ubi dicit quod effectus particularis reducitur in causam particularem et uniuersalis in uniuersalem; sed esse est uniuersalissimus effectus; ergo
25 reduci debet in causam uniuersalissimam, que est Deus. Viuere autem, cum sit

3 Gen. 2:2 4 1 Cor. 12:6 7-23 Aegidius Romanus, *Reportatio*, 208, lin. 19-35. Cf. *Ordinatio*, II, d. 1, pars 1, q. 2, a. 6; *Quaestiones de esse et essentia*, q. 4 7-56 Durandus, *In II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 4, lin. 83-147 25-26 Arist., *Phys.*, II, 3, 195b26-30. tr. Iacobus Veneticus: "Oportet autem semper causam uniuscuiusque summam querere, sicut et in aliis, ut homo edificat quoniam edificator est, edificator autem est secundum edificativam; hec igitur prima causa est, et sic in omnibus; amplius autem alie quidem sunt genera generum, alie autem singulare singularium, ut statuam quidem faciens statue, hic autem huius; et potentias quidem potentium, operantes autem ad opera" (AL 7.1:62, lin. 7-10)

3-5 Et - Responsio] *om. P* 8 creatura] creata *U* | effectus] effectibile *U* 9 id est] est *P* 12 dicunt] *om. U* 14 ex] *om., add. mrg. B* 15 a] ex *D* 17 autem] autem *add. P* 19 est penitus] penitus est *B*; est ponitur *U* 22 ipsius esse] esse ipsius *B* 27 causam uniuersalissimam] uniuersalissimam causam *P*

effectus particularis, debet reduci in causam secundam et particularem, ut rationes effectuum respondeant rationibus causarum.

30 <Contra primam opinionem>

Hec autem opinio deficit in se et in sua ratione. Quod enim dicit, quod Deus uniformiter agit in omnibus nec est diuersitas in rebus nisi ex causis secundis, falsum est, quia secundum hoc impossibile esset quod plura et distincta fierent a Deo sine causis secundis, et ita Deus non posset diuersa creare, quod est falsum
 35 et contradicit primo dicto eorum, scilicet quod effectus qui sunt a solo Deo sunt ab eo toti et totaliter, hoc est secundum omnem modum, in quantum habent esse et in quantum habent distinctum esse.

Preterea, agere semper uniformiter et nullo modo difformiter est condicio agentis naturalis et non uoluntarii. Dicere ergo quod Deus semper quantum est
 40 ex parte eius agat uniformiter et nullo modo difformiter idem est ac si diceretur quod Deus agit ex necessitate nature et non ex libera uoluntate, quod est falsum.

Ratio etiam per quam probant suum propositum non ualet. Quod enim assumunt quod effectus particularis reducitur in causam particularem et uniuersalis in uniuersalem intelligendum est de uniuersali et particulari per predicationem,
 45 consimiliter in causa et effectu, ut patet per exempla que ponit ibidem Philosophus (*ut statue quidem statuam faciens, hic autem huius*), ita quod, sicut non | est aliud re statua et hec statua, sed ratione tantum, sic non reducuntur in causas diuersas re, sed ratione tantum, que sunt statuifica et hec statuifica. Et similiter in proposito, cum esse et uiuere in eodem differant solum ratione, reduci debent
 50 in causas solum ratione differentes, ita quod solum est una causa re que dat esse et uiuere immediate, sed sub diuersis rationibus, esse quidem in quantum ipsa est ens actu et aliud solum in potentia, uiuere uero in quantum est uiuens actu et aliud uiuens in potentia. Semper enim quod est tale in potentia fit ab eo quod est actu tale, et ita non oportet quod esse et uiuere in eodem secundum rationes
 55 eorum differentes reducantur immediate in causas realiter diuersas, puta uiuere in causam secundam, esse autem in causam primam, que est Deus.

Quidam tamen imponunt istis quod *esse est effectus communissimus* differens in omnibus ab essentia, et ipsum *est per creationem* a solo Deo, essentia uero *per*

P 9ra

46 Arist., *Phys.*, II, 3, 195b26-27, tr. Iacobus Veneticus: "statuam quidem faciens statue, hic autem huius" (AL 7.1:62, lin. 9) 8-56 Durandus, *In II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 4, lin. 83-147 57 Forte Aquinas, *Quaestiones de potentia*, q. 3, a. 1 et a. 7 (ed. Pession, 39, col. 2, lin. 42 et 58, col. 1, lin. 223)

29 respondeant] correspondeant DP 33 et] in U 34 Deus] plura add. U 38 et] nihil add. et exp. B 39 ergo] enim U | semper] om. D | quantum] in quantum U 40 eius] semper add. D | idem est] est idem D 43 reducitur] om. U 44 uniuersali et particulari] particulari et uniuersali D 48 ratione tantum] tantum ratione D 50 in - differentes] solum in causas differentes ratione D 54 tale] om. P 58 essential] esse U

60 *informationem* ut sic essentia forme sit ab agente naturali. Sed esse compositi et
suppositi in omnibus sit a Deo, et quia hoc est intimius, ideo Deus immediate
agit.

65 Alii uero dicunt probabilius quod sicut aliqui imaginantur quod species coloris
fit in medio a sole et a colore et immediate ab utroque sed immediatius a luce
inquantum in uirtute eius color se multiplicat, aut sicut a duobus coloratis fit
70 una species sensibilis in medio, uel sicut a phantasmate et intellectu agente fit
species uel intellectio in intellectu possibili, sic etiam a creatura et Deo fit unus
effectus, et quidquid creatura producere nititur, oportet nichilominus illum
effectum a Deo e-]manare.

B 7vb

70 Auicenna uero uidetur dicere quod Deus est agens dans formam, id est ipsa
intelligentia agens, agens uero corporale est agens transmutans solum, ut de omni
forma sit idem quod dicimus de anima rationali et accidentibus infusis.

<Secunda opinio: Durandi>

75 Secunda est opinio quorundam modernorum probabilis et subtilis, dicens
quod *ea que fiunt a Deo mediantibus causis secundis non fiunt ab eo immediate,*
sicut ipsemet rationes terminorum uidentur sonare.

*Quod apparet primo sic: Si Deus ageret immediate ad productionem effectus cause
secunde (ut cum ignis generat ignem), aut ageret eadem actione qua creatura aut
alia. Non eadem propter duo.*

80 *Primo, quia illam potest habere creatura sine speciali influxu Dei supposita con-*
seruatione sue nature et sue uirtutis actiue, quia actio que non excedit uirtutem
speciei agentis sufficienter elicitur a sola uirtute speciei, frustra ergo poneretur aliud
immediatum eliciens talem operationem.

85 *Secundo, quia impossibile est eandem actionem numero esse a duobus uel pluribus*
agentibus, ita quod a quolibet sit immediate et perfecte, nisi in illis sit eadem uirtus
numero; sed in Deo et creatura non potest esse eadem uirtus numero; ergo impossibile
est quod eadem actio numero sit ab utroque immediate et perfecte. Actio autem
creature immediate est a creatura et perfecte, cum non excedat uirtutem sue speciei;
ergo eadem actio non est immediate a Deo.

90 *Minor de se patet, sed maior probatur. Contingit enim quod eadem | actio numero*
sit a duobus et a quolibet perfecte, sed ab uno immediate, ab alio | uero mediate, quia
eandem actionem, quam facit causa propinqua immediate, facit causa uniuersalis et

U 6ra

P 9rb

62 Non inueni 69 Auicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima*, tract. 9, cap. 5 (*Auicenna Latinus* 1.4:488-494) 73-123 Durandus, *In II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 4, lin. 148-214

59 sic essentia] sit esse U 59 forme] sic essentia forme *add. et exp. B* 59-60 compositi et suppositi] suppositi et compositi U 60 hoc] *om. B* | intimius] intimus U 62-63 coloris] caloris U 63 fit] sicut P | colore] calore U 64 color] calor U 66 Deo] ideo P 69 ipsa] *om. P* 70 intelligentia agens] intelligentiam P 71 sit] fit U 73 modernorum] *om. U* 74 quod] quia P | que] dicunt *add. et exp. U* 78 que] quia U 90 sit] sit *add. U* | ab alio] ab alio *add. P*

remota perfecte, inquantum dat uirtutem cause proxime et datam conseruat, et hoc est mediate solum. Alio modo contingit eandem actionem numero esse duorum immediate, sed a neutro perfecte, ut cum duo trahunt nauem uel due candeles causant unum lumen, 95 quia a neutro perfecte est tractus nauis et a neutra candela per se est et perfecte illuminatio aeris. In talibus enim duo agentia imperfecta suppleunt uicem unius agentis perfecti. Si autem actio sit immediate et perfecte a quolibet, non apparet modus possibilis, nisi in utroque eorum sit idem principium uel eadem uirtus numero. Propter hoc enim dicimus quod in diuinis Pater et Filius una numero spiratione spirant Spiritum Sanctum, et quilibet perfecte, quia in eis est uis spiratiua una numero.

Vera est ergo maior propositio, scilicet quod eadem actio numero non potest esse a duobus uel pluribus, ita quod a quolibet sit perfecte et immediate, nisi in eis sit eadem uirtus secundum numerum. Minor autem de se manifesta est. Sequitur ergo conclusio, scilicet quod Deus ad effectum cause secunde non agit immediate eadem 105 actione cum creatura.

Item, nec alia actione, quia aut una illarum actionum prius attingeret productum quam alia aut non, sed utraque simul.

Non una prius quam alia, puta actio Dei prius quam actio creature, quia si Deus sua actione prius rem totam produceret, tunc creatura per suam actionem sequentem nichil 110 faceret. Et econuerso, si actio creature precederet actionem Dei, nec potest dici quod Deus producat partem et creatura partem, quia hic querimus utrum illud idem quod producit creatura immediate producat etiam Deus immediate. Prius enim fuit concessum quod in quolibet creatura materiali est aliquid quod est a Deo immediate, scilicet materia.

Item, nec utraque actio simul attingit productum, quia si hoc esset, altera superflueret, cum una sufficiat ad totum producendum. Et preterea, actiones uidentur idem esse realiter cum suis | terminis, unde et ab eis sumunt denominationem. Impossibile est ergo ad acquirendum eandem formam numero esse diuersas actiones. Patet igitur 115 quod ea que producuntur per actionem creature non producuntur a Deo immediate. Posset tamen Deus ea immediate producere si uellet, sed tunc creatura nichil ibi ageret.

Secundo patet idem sic: Ordo agentium correspondet ordini finium; sed unius rei non possunt esse duo fines immediati; ergo nec duo agentia, nisi forte supplerent uicem unius agentis modo quo dictum est de trahentibus nauem, quia consimiliter possent esse duo immediati fines.

73-123 Durandus, *In II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 4, lin. 148-214

92 perfecte] perfectione U 93 actionem] actione P 94 due] om. U 95 perfecte] est add. D 96 In] et U 98 nisi] nisi add. U 106 illarum] istarum U | prius] producere add. BU | attingeret] attingerit P 110 nec] non P 111 producat] causam add. et exp. U 112 etiam] et U 113 scilicet materia] materia scilicet U 114 esset] om. P 115-116 idem esse] esse idem D 117 acquirendum] acquirendam BP | igitur] ergo P 118 per actionem creature] a creatura P 120 Secundo] Tertio D 121 nisi] duo agentia add. P 122 unius agentis] agentis unius U

<Obiectiones>

125 Isti autem arguunt contra se dupliciter. Primo, quia *sicut se habet unitas ad constituendum numeros in ratione cause materialis, sic se habet Deus ad creaturas in ratione cause agentis; sed unitas immediate sui additione ad numeros constituit omnem numerum preter binarium, quem constituit per seipsam uel in se replicata: addita enim binario constituit ternarium et addita ternario constituit quaternarium, et sic de omnibus; ergo similiter Deus cum aliis agentibus immediate producit omnem effectum preter primum, quem producit per seipsum solum.*

130 Secundo, quia *sicut se habet esse ad esse, ita agere ad agere; sed creatura omnino non esset, nisi Deus immediate ei adesset; ergo nec creatura aliquid ageret, nisi Deus immediate ei coageret.*

135 <Responsio Durandi ad obiectiones>

Et ad ista | respondent isti sic:

Ad primum dicendum per interemptionem minoris. Non enim unitas sui additione cum aliis causat numeros, immo ipsa sola sui replicatione causat omnem numerum materialiter. Sex enim non sunt quinque et unum, sed semel sex uel sex
 140 *unitates: numerus enim non habet aliam materiam quam unitatem. Est enim numerus multitudo ex unitatibus collecta. Et eodem modo Deus omnia immediate produceret, si uirtutem producendi aliis non communicasset.*

Ad secundum dicendum quod non est simile de esse et agere, quia esse cause secunde, puta intelligentie uel corporis celestis, est immediatus effectus cause prime, que est eius causa immediata non solum in fieri, sed conseruando in esse. Et ideo causa secunda non esset, nisi ei causa prima coexisteret. Sed agere cause secunde non est immediatus effectus cause prime, et ideo non oportet quod Deus ad talem actionem immediate coagat.

150 *Supponit etiam ratio unum dubium, scilicet quod oporteat Deum immediate coexistere omni creature quantum ad omnia que sunt in ea, quod forte non est uerum, sed solum quoad illa que sunt immediate ab ipso. Hoc tamen non assero, sed primum sufficit ad soluendum rationem.*

P 9va

125-134 Durandus, *In II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 4, lin. 3-15 137-152 Durandus, *In II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 4, lin. 215-235

127 cause] esse U | additione] actione U 128 seipsam] seipsa ipsam D 133 ageret] om. U 134 immediate ei] ei immediate P 136 respondent] responderent B; responderet U 137 primum] argumentum add. D 138 sola] cum add. B 139 enim] est uerum P 140 quam] nisi D 143 cause] esse U 144 immediatus] immediate P | a cause prima] causa prima ei immediata D 146 cause] prime add. et del. P 150-151 est uerum] uerum est P 151 sed²] cum D 152 ad] ad add. P

<Contra secundam opinionem>

- 155 Quamuis autem hec opinio sit probabilis, tamen communis opinio est con-
 traria. Primo, quia in camino puerorum conseruabatur ignis in suo esse et in sua
 uirtute actiua, non tamen agebat, quia Deus | non coagebat; ergo ignis cum U 6rb
 calore non est sufficiens causa calefaciendi, quia posita non sequitur effectus
 — et idem erit post diem iudicii. Si dicatur quod ignis est sufficiens causa nisi
 impediatur, quero: quomodo impediabatur? Aut agendo aut actionem subtra-
 160 hendo. Non agendo, quia nec igni fuit aliud impressum calorem reprimens, quia
 combussit caldeos et combussit uinacula puerorum, non uestes aut capillos; nec
 eis fuit aliud impressum, puta frigiditas qua resisteret igni. Et quod dicitur quod
angelus Domini fecit medium fornacis, quasi uentum roris flantem et huiusmodi,
 methaphorice dictum est; uel si tunc fuit, saltem post | diem iudicii nichil tale B 8rb
 165 erit. Ergo Deus impediuit solum actionem subtrahendo.
- Preterea, nichil est causa conseruans immediate nisi quod est immediata causa
 in fieri eo modo quo conseruat uel effectiue uel dispositiue; cum ergo ignis
 generat ignem, quero quid conseruat formam generatam immediate in materia.
 Non potest dici quod generans, quia illud aliquando elongatur; nec aliquod
 170 corpus nisi forte continens, illud autem non conseruat semper sed aliquando
 corrumpit. Nec potest dici quod non indiget conseruante, quia si incorruptibilia
 indigent conseruante, multo magis corruptibilia, et quandoque actu alterantur
 ad corruptionem, sicut calor in aqua. Ergo Deus, qui solus est ubique *per essen-*
tiam, presentiam, et potentiam, omnia ubique immediate conseruat, ergo omnia
 175 immediate causat; quando ergo ignis generat ignem, Deus cum eo generat, qui
 sine eo genitum conseruat.

155-156 Dan 3:19-30 158 Cf., e.g. Aquinas, *Quaestiones de potentia*, q. 5, a. 8: "Nam et ignis suo calore transmutat materiam, ex virtute corporis caelestis; et corpora visibilia multiplicant suas species in medio, virtute luminis, cuius fons est in caelesti corpore. Unde si actio utraque corporis caelestis cessaret, nulla actio in istis inferioribus remaneret. Sed cessante motu caeli, cessabit prima actio, sed non secunda; et ideo cessante motu caeli, erit quidem actio in istis inferioribus illuminationis et immutationis medii a sensibilibus; non autem erit actio per quam transmutatur materia, quam sequitur generatio et corruptio" (Ed. Pession, 152, col. 1, lin. 63-68) 163 Dan. 3:49-50: "Angelus autem descendit cum Azaria et sociis eius in fornacem et excussit flammam ignis de fornace et fecit medium fornacis quasi uentum roris flantem et non tetigit eos omnino ignis" 173-174 Cf. Aquinas, *Summa theologie*, I, q. 8, a. 3, resp.: "Sic ergo est in omnibus per potentiam, inquantum omnia eius potestati subduntur. Est per presentiam in omnibus, inquantum omnia nuda sunt et aperta oculis eius. Est in omnibus per essentiam, inquantum adest omnibus ut causa essendi" (Ed. Leonina, 4:87b)

154 opinio] *om. P* 157 est sufficiens] sufficiens est *B* | quia] qua *U* 160 igni] ignis *BU* 162 aliud] aliquid *P* | qua] quasi *BU* 164 tunc] dictum *add. U* 167 quo] quod *P* 170 autem] aut *P* 172 quandoque] quando *P* 175 quando ergo] ergo quando *P* 176 eo] id *P*

Preterea, si uerum est quod omnis actio inferiorum firmatur in motu celi primo, et cessante motu celi ignis non combureret stupam, et quod dicitur II^o De Gen. quod elementa respectu celi agunt *deterius quam organa*, et si uerum est quod dicunt
 180 Augustinus et Gregorius quod omnia in nichilum tenderent nisi manu omnipotentis tenentur, qui *portat omnia uerbo uirtutis sue*, ergo nisi ipse agat, nichil ageret.

Quod ergo primo dicunt isti, quod ad eliciendum actionem speciei sufficit uirtus specifica, non est uerum nisi coagente ei illo a quo sustentatur in esse, sicut ignis | agit in uirtute forme substantialis non solum carnem sed etiam
 185 calorem, et calor separatus, nisi uirtus prima sibi conseruaretur, non ageret. Et quidquid esset respectu creature, tamen respectu primi agentis simpliciter nullum agens est sufficiens sine eo.

Ad secundum concedatur maior, sed prima probatio non ualet, quia causa uniuersalis aliquando immediate agit, sicut in intellectum possibilem immediate
 190 agunt intellectus agens tamquam causa uniuersalis et phantasma tamquam causa particularis. Et falsum est quod dicunt, quod utraque causa perfecta est, quia *homo generat ex materia hominem et sol*, nec alterum per se sufficit; ergo ambo suppleunt uicem unius perfecti agentis.

Alia probatio est bona, sed minor illius rationis est falsa, quia actio creature
 195 non egreditur perfecte ab ea sed imperfecte, quia sine creatore non potest; a Deo autem non egreditur perfecte, non quia non potest sed quia non uult — uult enim quod sit una perfecta actio egrediens a se et a creatura, cui communicat uirtutem agendi. Vel potest dici quod egreditur a Deo perfecte, sed a creatura imperfecte, sicut si sol et candela concurrant ad illuminationem aeris, quam etsi
 200 solus sol faceret eque perfectam, tamen candela concurrens facit ad eam, nec tamen intendit eam (supposito quod sol sit tantum illuminatiuus quantum aer est illuminabilis). Nec propter hoc actio creature superfluit, quia hanc nobilitatem Deus ei tribuit ut cooperetur Deo.

177-178 Cf. Tempier, *Articuli condemnati*, 156: "Quod si celum staret, ignis in stupam non ageret, quia natura deesset" (ed. Piché – Lafleur, 126-127). Etiam Durandus, *In II Sent.*, d. 15, q. 3 179 Arist., *De Gen.*, II, 9, 336a13, tr. Moerbeke: "Quocirca si quam maxime facit et movet ignis, sed quomodo movet, quoniam deterius quam organa" (AL 9.2) 180-181 Gregorius, *Moralia*, XVI, c. 37: "Cuncta quippe ex nihilo facta sunt eorumque essentia rursus ad nihilum tenderet, nisi eam auctor omnium regiminis manu retineret" (CCSL 143A, 825, lin. 15-17) 181 Heb. 1:3: "qui cum sit splendor glorie et figura substantie eius portansque omnia uerbo uirtutis sue purgationem peccatorum faciens." 182 Durandus, *In II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 4, lin. 153-158; lin. 79-82 sup. 188 secundum] Lin. 83-105 sup. 188 maior illius rationis] Lin. 83-85 sup. 188 prima probatio] Lin. 89-93 sup. 192 Arist., *Phys.*, II, 2, 194 b14 (AL 7.1:55, lin. 8); *Auct. Arist.* 2, 65 (ed. Hamesse, 145) 194 Alia probatio] Lin. 93-100 sup. 194 minor illius rationis] Lin. 86-88 sup.

177 celi] essentii U 183 sustentatur] substantatur B 184 ignis] calor PU | etiam] et PU 188 concedatur] conceditur P 191 causa] om. PU 192 materia] natura U 194 est bona] bona est U 195 quia] que BPU 196 non⁴] om. U 200 facit] faciat P 202 hanc] habent U

205 Preterea, ad principale propositum potest sic argui: potentior est forma ad
dandum esse formaliter suo subiecto quam ad multiplicandum se effectiue in
alio (unde alique forme debiles esse possunt que agere non possunt, sicut parvus
ignis); sed essentia angeli non sibi sufficit ad esse in se sine Deo agente ad illud
esse; ergo nec sufficit ad mouere uel agere nisi Deo coagente ad illud. Et sic
potest sustineri quod sit unum actio Dei et creature, non manens sed transiens.

210 Ad tertium potest dici quod essent due actiones; si enim actio in motu non
est nisi esse ab hoc, ergo esse, a diuersis maxime equiuoce agentibus, est esse
diuersas actiones. Nec tamen una attingit partem nec prius, sed utraque simul
attingit totum effectum; nec diuina superfluit, quia sine illa creatura non
sufficeret, nec creatura superfluit quoad Dei uoluntatem (licet superfluat quoad
215 necessitatem), quia sine creatura | posset si uellet, sed non uult.

B 8va

Ad quartum dicendum quod physice loquendo *actio et passio* non differunt a
motu et termino, quia non sunt sensibilia sine eo; sed metaphysice loquendo
actio et passio et motus differunt re a terminis, quia preter operationem intel-
lectus est inter ea realis diuersitas ex natura rei. Vnde cum constet intensionem
220 et remissionem eiusdem forme esse actiones et passiones et motus contrarios, et
tamen est eadem forma numero et essentialiter (ut isti dicunt primo libro
d. 17^o), patet quod ad eandem formam numero possunt terminari diuersae numero
actiones. Et si quidem actio sit in agente substantiue, cum idem accidens | non
sit in diuersis subiectis, oportet quod secundum diuersitatem agentium sit diuer-
225 sitas actionum. Si autem actio sit in passo, si sunt agentia unius rationis, erit
actio una specie et per consequens numero, ex quo subiectum est unum numero;
si autem sunt agentia diuersarum rationum, erunt actiones diuersae specie et | per
consequens numero, licet sit unus effectus specie et numero. Vnde quando sol
et ignis calefaciunt aliud, est unus calor specie et numero impressus, sed tamen
230 uidentur esse duo calefieri, quia alia specie relatio consurgit ad solem, qui cale-
facit equiuoce, et ad ignem, qui calefacit uniuoce. Si autem fundamentum esset
unius rationis, et relationes essent eiusdem rationis; multo magis igitur est hoc
respectu Dei, ad quem nunquam est relatio eiusdem rationis et ad creaturam,
quia nunquam sic se habet creatura ad creaturam aliam sicut ad creatorem.

U 6va

P 10ra

204 Lin. 73-75 sup. 210 tertium] Lin. 106-113 sup. 210 actio in motu] Cf. *Auct. Arist.*, 33, 9: "Omnis actio in motu et omnis motus in actione firmabitur" (ed. Hamesse, 306) 216 quartum] Lin. 114-119 sup. 216-217 actio – motu] *Auct. Arist.*, 2, 101: "Actio et passio sunt unus motus et in passo sicut in subiecto" (ed. Hamesse, 148) 221-222 Haec quaestio deest in priore redactione commenti Durandi super Sententias quam cognoscimus, habetur autem in tertia redactione (communiter nuncupata C, ed. Venetiis 1517). Cf. Lib. I, d. 17, q. 7: "Utrum eadem forma numero possit esse intensa et remissa," quam Durandus soluit affirmatiue

206 alio] alia U 207 essentia] esse U 210 potest] posset PU 212 Nec] non P 213 creatura] creata BU 219 realis] re alia U | intensionem] intentionem U 229 ignis] simul add. P 232 igitur] om. P

235 Ad quintum dicendum quod ordo agentium sic respondet ordini finium quod superius agens intendit supremum finem immediate, et secundum agens medium finem (ut dicitur in principio Ethicorum), non autem sic quod ad unum finem et immediate intentum non possint concurrere plura agentia — sicut plures trahentes nauem possunt intendere unum finem numero.

240 Preterea, possunt esse duo fines eque immediate uoliti, quia unico actu uoluntatis qui est de fine proximo et remoto, licet de uno propter alium, sed non eque immediate attingiti uel consecuti. Et similiter possunt esse plura agentia eque immediata sed unum propter aliud; et istud erit agens imperfectum, aliud perfectum. Nec propter hoc aliud superfluit, quia uoluntarie illud sibi adiungit, sicut etiam finis medius imperfecte desideratur, sed finis ultimus perfecte.

In solutione autem primi argumenti contra se inducti bene dicunt quod nichil aliud re quam unitas causat numerum omnem, si uerum sit quod ipsi supponunt, quod numerus non dicat rem abstractam differentem a quantitate continua. Quod tamen est dubium, quia linea diuisa etiam sine operatione intellectus aliter se habet nunc et prius, non quod sit maior aut minor, sed quia prius erat continua, nunc discontinua. Sicut continuitas est res quedam, ita et discontinuitas sibi opposita per differentias formales diuidentes quantitatem; sed discontinuitas est formaliter quantitas distincta siue ipsa distinctio quantitatis, que
255 est numerus; ergo numerus est res, et non ens rationis nec pura priuatio continuitatis, quia illa est punctus. Si dicatur quod non est unum accidens numero in diuersis subiectis, omnis autem numerus est huiusmodi, dicendum quod non idem modus essendi conuenit omnibus, sicut aliter sunt successiua et permanentia, et similiter aliter est quantitas continua que est in uno, aliter distincta que
260 est in pluribus. Vel sicut non dicitur albedo alba, sed superficies per eam, sic numerus non est unum nec multa, sed ratio qua aliud est unum uel multa — nisi forte unitate et multitudine que consequuntur ens, et sic binarius est quid unum, non tamen unitate que est principium numer(or)um, sed que conuertitur cum ente; et duo binarii sunt duo quedam dualitate ei opposita. Sed non uide-
265 tur quod unum quod conuertitur cum ente magis possit esse | simul in diuersis

B 8vb

235 quintum] Lin. 120-123 sup. 235-237 ordo – finem] Cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles*, III, c. 17, 7 236 Arist., *Eth. Nic.*, I, 1, 1094a14-15, tr. Grosseteste: “In omnibus itaque ARCHITECTONICARUM fines omnibus sunt desiderabiliores (seu eligibiliores), hiis que sub ipsis. Horum enim gracia, et illa PERSEQUUNTUR” (AL 26.2:141, lin. 18) 247 primi argumenti] Lin. 125-131 sup. 247 bene dicunt] Lin. 137-142 sup.

236 intendit - agens] *om. U* 238 intentum] intantum *P* 242 attingiti] intenti *P* | consecuti] assecuti *U* 247 autem] a *B*; de *U* | quod] quia *P* 248 omnem] sed *add. U* | sit] illud *add. B*; est *P* 248-249 ipsi supponunt] supponunt ipsi *B* 250 tamen] tam *U* 252 discontinua.] Igitur *add. U* 252 Sicut] ergo *add. P* | continuitas] discontinuitas *a. c. B* 255 priuatio] *om., add. mrg. P* 257 huiusmodi] huius *BU* | non] est *add. B* 258 conuenit] pluribus *add. et exp. B* 258-259 permanentia] permanentia *P* 259 distincta] discreta *P* 262 consequuntur] consequuntur *P*

subiectis situ distinctis quam unum quod est principium numerorum. Et hec sint solum dubitatie dicta.

Ad secundum dicendum quod sicut omnis forma que dependet in esse a corpore dependet ab eo in agere et non econuerso (unde omnis actio anime corruptibilis est coniuncti et sola operatio anime rationalis est ei propria, quia potest esse sine corpore et per consequens operari), sic omnis creatura, | que dependet a Deo secundum esse, dependet etiam in operari, sic scilicet quod sicut suum esse est a Deo et conseruatur immediate, sic sua actio est a Deo immediate et immediate conseruatur a Deo. Nemo enim potest dare alteri quod non habet; unde si celum non conseruat se in esse, non potest dare suo effectui quod conseruet se, nec iterum celum potest suum effectum conseruare, quia non potest seipsum conseruare, ergo multo minus aliud; ergo Deus utrumque conseruat. Si dicatur quod celum, licet non possit se conseruare, tamen eo ipso quod conseruatur potest aliud conseruare quamdiu conseruatur, et sic ipsum solum immediate conseruat, sicut ignis calefacit aquam et aqua immediate se balneantem in ea, non est simile, quia amoto igne adhuc ad horam manet calor in aqua, unde ignis non erat tota causa conseruans sed aliqua alia. P 10rb

Quod autem dicunt quod illis solum oportet Deum adesse que sunt immediate ab ipso et non omnibus simpliciter, non est uerum, quia Deus potest immediate omnia annihilare, et remanentibus omnibus causis extrinsecis annihilabilis effectum. Hec autem annihilatio non est per actionem positiuam, quia illa requirit uel substantiam, sicut corruptio, uel terminum ad quem realem, sicut creatio; ergo est per subtractionem realis influxus. Cum ergo omnis influxus Dei in causis remaneat, ut suppono, preter illum erat specialis influxus in creatum, cuius subtractione ipsum annihilatur.

<Tertia, uera opinio: Thome>

Tertia opinio est que uidetur esse Sancti Thome, et est uera si bene intelligatur. Est igitur opinio quod omnes effectus sunt a Deo in quantum habent esse, a creatura autem in quantum habent determinatum esse. Quod uidetur sic probari: *Nullius rei totum esse sumit principium ab aliqua creatura, cum ad esse rei*

268 secundum] Lin. 132-134 et 143-148 sup. 274 *Auct. Arist.*, 37, 23: "Nihil dat quod non habet" (ed. Hamesse, 333) 283 Lin. 149-152 sup. 292 Aquinas, *In II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4 (ed. Mandonnet, 25-26)

266 situ] sic U | unum quod] unumquodque U | numerorum] numerum BU 270 operatio] opinio U 272 etiam] et P | suum] om. U 274 alteri] alii P | quod] quid P 275 effectui] effectum U 279 quamdiu] quod B 280 et] om. P 284-285 immediate omnia] omnia immediate U 293 omnes] tales D 294 determinatum] distinctum B 294-295 probari] probare D 295 sumit principium] suum principium sumit D

faciat *materia*, que a solo Deo creatur. Ad distinctionem autem esse nichil facit materia, sed solum forma, quam creatura in | materia presupposita inducit. Ex U 6vb
hoc arguitur sic: Deus creans materiam operatur immediate ad esse rei, creatura
autem dans formam operatur ad esse distinctum; *esse autem est magis intimum*
300 *rei quam ea per que determinatur (unde remanet aliis remotis, ut dicitur prima*
propositione De causis); ergo in omni re Deus est causa intimius et immediatius
operans quam aliqua creatura.

<Obiectiones Durandi>

305 Contra istam opinionem quidam arguunt dicentes quod *hec responsio non*
uidetur esse ad propositum, et quod *assumit etiam falsum*.

Quod non sit ad propositum, patet, quia aliud est dicere quod Deus producat
immediate aliquid quod est in creatura, scilicet materiam, que est altera pars sub-
stantie compositae, quod utique uerum est nec hoc querit questio; et aliud est dicere
310 *quod Deus producat immediate omne illud quod producit creatura. Cum enim actio*
creature attingat formam ut terminum sue actionis et non materiam, ut ipsimet
dicunt, querimus utrum ipsam formam rei naturalis, ad quam immediate attingit
actio creature, attingat etiam actio Dei immediate. Ipsi autem pertractant primum
et non secundum, ut patet ex medio quod adducunt, et ideo non est ad propositum.

Assumit etiam falsum. Quod enim dicunt quod esse est intimius rei quam ea que
315 *ipsum determinat, si intelligatur quod esse in potentia sit intimius rei quam esse in*
actu per quod determinatur, falsum | est. Sicut enim per formam quelibet res est B 9ra
uerius id quod est quam per materiam, ut dicitur 1^o Phisicorum, sic esse actu est
uerius et intimius esse rei quam esse in potentia. Si autem intelligatur quod esse
320 *actuale in sua communitate sumptum | intimius est rei quam ea per que determina-* P 10va
tur ad hoc esse uel ad illud quod est esse uiuens uel esse intellectuale, tunc uariant
propositum suum, ut de se patet. Quod etiam non uidetur uerum, quia que penitus
sunt idem unum non est alio intimius rei; sed esse et determinatum esse in una et

293-302 Durandus, *In II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 4, lin. 33-44 300-301 Cf. *Liber de causis*, prop. 1, 1-2: "Cum ergo causa universalis secunda virtutem suam a re, causa universalis prima non aufert virtutem suam ab ea" (ed. Pattin, 134, lin. 3-5) 304-332 Durandus, *In II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 4, lin. 45-82 313 medio] Lin. 299-300 sup. 316-317 Cf. Arist., *Phys.*, II, 1, 193b3-8, tr. Iacobus Veneticus: "Quare alio modo natura utique erit habentium in se ipsis motus principium forma et species, que non separata est sed aut secundum rationem; quod autem est ex istis natura quidem non est, sed natura, ut homo. Et magis natura hec est quam materia" (AL 7.1:48, lin. 4)

296-297 que - materia] om. U 297 in] illi U | materia presupposita] presupposita materia D 298 arguitur] om. D 301 causa] om. D | intimius] intimus U 304 responsio] autem positio D 305 assumit] assumitur U 310 sue actionis] actionis sue D 312 attingat] attingit P | etiam] ipse add. B 314 intimius] intimus U 315 intimus] intimus U 316 res] om. U 317 uerius] id add. P 320 ad hoc] adhuc P | ad] om. B 321 suum] suis U | Quod] Et D | uidetur uerum] uerum uidetur U 322 alio intimius rei] intimius rei alio D

eadem re, sicut in planta, sunt penitus idem re (uiuere enim uiuentibus est esse); ergo unum non est rei intimius quam alterum loquendo realiter; secundum rationem tamen esse in communi intimius est rei quam perfectiones determinantes ipsum, et secundum intellectum nostrum prius aduenit et posterius recedit. Separatur enim secundum rationem ab aliis, quia communius est, ut in preallegata propositione dicitur. Sed ex hoc non potest haberi quod Deus immediatius operetur in omni re quam aliqua creatura, immo nec quod operetur immediate, quia uniuersalia non fiunt nisi factione singularium. Et ideo res non sunt ab aliquo inquantum habent esse, nisi quia sunt ab eodem inquantum habent hoc determinatum esse, cuius oppositum pro conclusione ponit hec opinio.

Quidquid autem sit de opinione et de impugnatione, uerum est quod ratio non probat Deum agere immediate in omni actione creature, immo nec in aliqua. Si enim Deus non aliter agit nisi quia materiam producit, in illa sola actione immediate agit in qua uel cum qua est creatio materie; hoc autem non est in aliqua actione creature, nisi forte quando ex speciebus in sacramento altaris aliquid generatur, si tunc Deus ibi creat materiam et natura inducit formam. Ibi enim ad productionem totius immediatius agit inquantum presupponitur materia ad hoc quod de ea forma educatur.

Preterea, esse est magis a forma quam a materia; unde si tota forma esset a creatura et sola materia a Deo, plus ageret creatura in productione rei quam Deus.

Preterea, multe actiones sunt in intellectualibus in quibus non est materia, de quibus non datur ratio immediationis.

<Responsio ad obiectiones>

Potest tamen sic sustineri opinio quod actio realis creature, que infert passionem proprie dictam, supponit materiam; inquantum ergo Deus sustentat continue materiam et continue creat in qua omnis actio creature mediate uel immediate suscipitur, intantum immediate agere dicitur, quia et materiam applicat qui eam sustentat, et eam disponit qui aptitudinem naturalem, qua est susceptibilis, in ea custodit — sicut qui ceram applicaret et mollificaret, immediate ad impressionem sigilli ageret. Videtur tamen contra id quod illi dicunt reprobando opinionem, quod esse possibile sit intimius rei quam esse actuale, quia illud est rei intimius quod est in re prius et posterius; sed hoc est esse possibile. Prius est enim res in potentia quam in actu, quia quod est, potest esse, non autem

323 Arist., *De an.*, II, 4, 415b13, tr. Moerbeke: “uiuere autem uiuentibus est esse” (AL 12.2:95, col. 2, lin. 5) 353 illi dicunt] sc. Durandus, ut sup.

323 sunt] idem *add.* P | penitus] ponitus P 325 rei] dei U 329 nec quod] quod nec B 341 est magis] magis inest B 342 rei quam] re quod U 344 actiones] rationes U 350 et] etiam U 353 id] illud U 353-354 reprobando] improbando P 354 possibile] potentiale P 355 possibile] potentiale P 356 est enim] enim est P | quam] quod U | quod] quid U

omne quod potest esse, est; item, postquam res non est, adhuc potest esse, unde esse in potentia prius aduenit et posterius recedit; ergo est intimius, et hoc secundum rem, ubi ista differunt secundum rem, sicut in compositis ex materia
 360 et forma materia etiam est prior forma (I^o Phisicorum: *subiectum est prius predicato*) et remanet post formam corruptam.

De esse uero in communi uerum dicunt quod secundum rationem, non secundum rem, est intimius et prius et posterius; sed cum hoc non uidetur stare quod sequitur, quod uniuersale non | fit nisi per hoc quod singulare fit, quia
 365 fieri terminatur ad esse (unde illud uidetur prius fieri cui prius competit esse, sicut composito, cui prius competit esse quam forme, prius competit fieri quam forme); si igitur uniuersale prius est quam singulare, ergo prius fit — sed uerum est quod uniuersale per se nunquam fit prout est distinctum ratione a singulari.

Preterea, si celum pro tanto dicitur non immediatum agens, quia determinatur a particulari coagente, ipsum indeterminatum existens, | cum Deus non solum sit agens uniuersale, immo et determinet seipsum, esse determinatum ita est a Deo sicut indeterminatum. Licet ergo uno | modo possit saluari immediatio actionis diuine in omni effectu per hoc quod ipse immediate conseruat illud in quo actio recipitur et illud a quo actio egreditur, quod in corporalibus est materia, in aliis aliud loco materie immediate a Deo creatum, ut essentia, tamen
 375 non propter hoc negantur alii modi.

<Quarta opinio: Petri de Palude>

Quarta opinio potest concludi ex omnibus predictis.

Ad cuius euidenciam tria uidenda sunt: primo quod Deus conseruat omnia
 380 immediate quoad omne esse; secundo quod ipse agit immediate in omni actione; tertio quod per actionem distinctam formaliter, licet non materialiter.

Primum patet sic, quia omne quod est aut est ingenerabile (ut euiterna) aut generabile; constat autem quod omne euiternum a solo Deo conseruatur immediate, a quo solo efficitur, quia causa in conseruari non est nisi illa que est in
 385 fieri. De generabilibus autem idem patet dupliciter: primo, quia si celum non sufficit sibi ad conseruandum seipsum nisi immediate a Deo conseruetur, multo minus sufficit ad conseruandum aliud nisi in conseruando adiuuetur immediate a Deo, quia forma plus nata est conseruare suam materiam quam alienam. Preterea, cum Deus possit annihilare omnia contenta retentis omnibus continen-
 390 tibus cum omnibus suis uirtutibus, et hoc non sit per actionem ueram, que uel

360-361 *Auct. Arist.*, 2, 19 (ed. Hamesse, 141)

357 quod] quid U | item] uerum P 358 esse] est U | potentia] potentie U | intimius] intimus U 359 ubi] nisi U 365 esse²] om. P 366 esse - competit] om. P 367 igitur] ergo P 368 est] om. B 370 ipsum] est add. B | indeterminatum] determinatum P | existens] ens U 371 et] etiam B 375 essentia] esse U 378 predictis] infra statim add. P 382 ingenerabile] generabile B 383 constat] constatant B 384 causa] huius add. P 388 forma] om. P | est] forma add. P

habet subiectum, ut corruptio, uel terminum, ut creatio, sed per subtractionem influentie et actionis, que non habet subiectum nec terminum, non est hoc per corruptionem actionis aliene, sed per subtractionem actionis proprie, id est conseruationis sue; ergo illam rem conseruabat.

395 Secundo, ex hoc quod ipse immediate agit in omni actione. Primo ex parte effectus actionis, sic: ille qui immediate conseruat omne productum, immediate egit ad eius productionem, quia conseruatio non est nisi productionis continuatio; sed Deus immediate conseruat omne productum; ergo immediate producit omne quod producit. Secundo ex parte agentis, sic: plus sufficit aliquid sibi
400 ad essendum quam ad aliud producendum; sed nulla creatura sufficit sibi ad esse nisi Deo conseruante immediate; ergo nec ad agere nisi Deo coagente.

Tertio, quod per aliam actionem. Vbi sciendum quod distinctio actionum ex principiis est per causam efficientem, ex terminis per causam finalem, et neutra per causam formalem, cum actio sit predicamentum distinctum ab omni principio et termino suo, unum autem predicamentum non distinguitur formaliter
405 | differentiis alterius, quia diuersorum generum et non subalternatim positorum diuerse sunt species et differentie. Sed dicuntur actio et passio unus motus materialiter et subiectiue, quia actio est in passo. Si ergo agentia unum effectum sunt unius rationis, erit duorum agentium unum effectum in uno subiecto una actio
410 numero, quia est una specie habens unum subiectum (ut duorum trahentium nauem unum trahere et non solum unum trahi uel unus tractus et duorum luminarium unum illuminare, quia lumen est unius rationis, non solum in termino sed in principiis). Quando autem sunt agentia inquantum huiusmodi diuersarum rationum, sicut particulare et uniuersale, uidentur esse diuerse
415 actiones propter duo. Primo, quia aliquando una est uniuoca, alia equiuoca, sicut *homo generat hominem et sol*; generatio autem uniuoca et equiuoca non sunt unius rationis in genere actionis et modo agendi. Secundo, quia diuerse relationes habent diuersa fundamenta in eodem subiecto; sed alia relatione refertur homo genitus ad generantem patrem, puta filiatione, alia ad solem, cuius non
420 est filius; hoc autem non est propter diuersitatem termini accepti, qui est unus; | ergo propter diuersitatem ipsius actionis. Multo magis ergo actio qua Deus in omni actione creata agit differt ab illa maxime. Tertio, quia a principiis diuersis specie emanant diuerse actiones.

P 11ra

B 9va

407-408 *Auct. Arist.* 2, 101; cf. lin. 216-217 sup. 416 *Auct. Arist.*, 2, 65; cf. lin. 192 sup.

391 habet] *om. P* 392 per] actionem *add. et exp. B* 404 actio] acto *U* | predicamentum] preiunctum *U* 406 generum] *om. U* 407 motus] modus *U* 412 illuminare] luminare *B* 413 huiusmodi] huius *U* 414 particulare et uniuersale] uniuersale et particulare *B* 415 alia] est *add. P* 416 generatio] genero *BU* 419 homo] *om. P* 423 emanant] emanat *U*

Ad argumentum dicendum quod loquitur de opere creationis, non propaga-
425 tionis, de quo dicit: *pater meus usque modo operatur et ego operor.*

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