Abstract
In the 1960s and 1970s, Hilary Putnam articulated a notion of relativized apriority that was motivated to address the problem of scientific change. This paper examines Putnam’s account in its historical context and in relation to contemporary views. I begin by locating Putnam’s analysis in the historical context of Quine’s rejection of apriority, presenting Putnam as a sympathetic commentator on Quine. Subsequently, I explicate Putnam’s positive account of apriority, focusing on his analysis of the history of physics and geometry. In the remainder of the paper, I explore connections between Putnam’s account of relativized a priori principles and contemporary views. In particular, I situate Putnam’s account in relation to analyses advanced by Michael Friedman, David Stump, and William Wimsatt. From this comparison, I address issues concerning whether a priori scientific principles are appropriately characterized as “constitutive” or “entrenched”. I argue that these two features need to be clearly distinguished, and that only the constitutive function is essential to apriority. By way of conclusion, I explore the relationship between the constitutive function a priori principles and entrenchment.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
DiSalle R. (2002) Reconsidering Kant, Friedman, logical positivism, and the exact sciences. Philosophy of Science 69: 191–211. doi:10.1086/341049
Ebbs G. (1997) Rule-following and realism. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Friedman M. (1997) Philosophical naturalism. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 71: 7–21. doi:10.2307/3130938
Friedman M. (1999) Reconsidering logical positivism. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Friedman M. (2001) Dynamics of reason. CSLI Publications, Stanford, CA
Kuhn T.S. (1970) The structure of scientific revolutions (2nd ed). University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL
Lange M. (2004) Review essay on Dynamics of Reason by Michael Friedman. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68: 702–712. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00377.x
Lewontin R.C. (1970) The units of selection. Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 1: 1–18. doi:10.1146/annurev.es.01.110170.000245
Nye M.J. (1972) Molecular reality. Macdonald, London
Perrin, J. (1923). Atoms (D. L. Ammick, Trans.). New York: Van Nostrand. (Original work published 1913)
Putnam, H. (1962a). It ain’t necessarily so. Journal of Philosophy, 59. Reprinted in H.Putnam (1979b), pp. 237–249.
Putnam, H. (1962b). The analytic and the synthetic. In H. Feigl & G. Maxwell (Eds.), Scientific explanation, space, and time: Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science (Vol. 3). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Reprinted in H. Putnam (1975), pp. 33–69.
Putnam H. (1975) Mind, language and reality: Philosophical papers (Vol. 2). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Putnam H. (1976). ‘Two dogmas’ revisited. In: Ryle G. (Ed). Contemporary aspects of philosophy. Stocksfield: Oriel Press. Reprinted in H. Putnam (1983), pp. 87–97.
Putnam, H. (1978). There is at least one a priori truth. Erkenntnis, 13. Reprinted in H. Putnam (1983), pp. 98–114.
Putnam, H. (1979a). Analyticity and apriority: Beyond Wittgenstein and Quine. In P. A. French, T. E. Uehling, & H. K. Wettstein (Eds.), Studies in metaphysics: Midwest studies in philosophy (Vol. 4). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Reprinted in H. Putnam (1983), pp. 115–138.
Putnam H. (1979b) Mathematics, matter and method: Philosophical papers (Vol. 1, 2nd ed). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Putnam H. (1983) Realism and reason: Philosophical papers (Vol. 3). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Putnam, H. (1994a). Rethinking mathematical necessity. In H. Putnam (1994b), pp. 245–263.
Putnam H. (1994b) Words and life. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Quine, W. V. (1951). Two dogmas of empiricism. Philosophical review, 60. Reprinted with revisions in W. V. Quine (1980), From a logical point of view, 2nd ed. (pp. 20–46). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Reichenbach, H. (1965). The theory of relativity and a priori knowledge (M. Reichenbach Trans.). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. (Original work published 1920)
Richardson A.W. (2002) Narrating the history of reason itself: Friedman, Kuhn, and a constitutive a priori for the twenty-first century. Perspectives on Science 10: 253–274. doi:10.1162/106361402321899050
Salmon W.C. (1984) Scientific explanation and the causal structure of the world. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ
Stump D.J. (2003) Defending conventions as functionally a priori knowledge. Philosophy of Science 70: 1149–1160. doi:10.1086/377396
Tsou J.Y. (2003) Critical notice: A role for reason in science. Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review 42: 573–598
Wimsatt, W. C. (1987). Generative entrenchment, scientific change, and the analytic–synthetic distinction: A developmental model of scientific evolution. Invited address at the Western (now Central) Division of the APA meetings, unpublished ms., 18 pp.
Wimsatt W.C. (2001) Generative entrenchment and the developmental systems approach to evolutionary processes. In: Oyama S., Gray R., Griffiths P. (eds) Cycles of contingency: Developmental systems and evolution. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp 219–238
Wimsatt, W. C. (Ed.). (2007). Robustness and entrenchment: How the contingent becomes necessary. In Re-engineering philosophy for limited beings: Piecewise approximations to reality (pp. 133–145). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Tsou, J.Y. Putnam’s account of apriority and scientific change: its historical and contemporary interest. Synthese 176, 429–445 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9574-0
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9574-0