Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Infinitism, finitude and normativity

  • Published:
Philosophical Studies Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

I evaluate two new objections to an infinitist account of epistemic justification, and conclude that they fail to raise any new problems for infinitism. The new objections are a refined version of the finite-mind objection, which says infinitism demands more than finite minds can muster, and the normativity objection, which says infinitism entails that we are epistemically blameless in holding all our beliefs. I show how resources deployed in response to the most popular objection to infinitism, the original finite-mind objection, can be redeployed to address the two new objections.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Says Klein (2007a, 10): “The infinitist will take the belief that p to be doxastically justified for S just in case S has engaged in providing ‘enough’ reasons along an endless path of reasons.” Notice that Klein says providing the reasons is both necessary and sufficient for doxastic justification. In response to Bergmann (2007), Klein (2007b, 26) indicates he might be willing to add that doxastic justification requires S’s belief to be “based on” the justifying reasons. But he also suggests that basing is tantamount to there being “an available reason” that you “cite… as a reason” for your belief, so it remains unclear how this potential revision affects his theory. Some features of Podlaskowski and Smith’s discussion do depend on attributing to Klein a specific theory of the epistemic basing relation, but those features are irrelevant to the points I wish to make here, so I’ll leave them aside.

  2. Podlaskowski and Smith (2009). References to the “online early” version of this article are included parenthetically in the main text. For very different objections to infinitism, see Turri 2009a, b, 2010. Fantl 2003 offers an argument for infinitism, which differs interestingly from Klein’s.

  3. As Podlaskowski and Smith put it, “Though one might not presently possess the (first-order) disposition to believe that which may be cited as a reason, one nevertheless [might possess] the second-order disposition to form that belief” (p. 6).

  4. And, Podlaskowski and Smith would surely add, because supertasking is not an option for us humans.

  5. An objection suggested by Stewart Cohen.

  6. For helpful conversation and feedback, I thank Stewart Cohen, Peter Klein, Adam Podlaskowski, Joshua Smith, and Angelo Turri. This research was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

References

  • Alston, W. (1989). Epistemic justification. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Audi, R. (1993). The structure of epistemic justification. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bergmann, M. (2007). Is Klein an infinitist about doxastic justification? Philos Stud, 134(1), 19–24.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cohen, S. (1999). Contextualism, skepticism, and the structure of reasons. Philos Perspect, 13, 57–89.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cohen, S. (2005). Knowledge, speaker and subject. Philos Q, 55(219), 199–212.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • DeRose, K. (2009). The case for contextualism: knowledge, skepticism, and context, vol 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Fantl, J. (2003). Modest infinitism. Can J Philos, 33(4), 537–562.

    Google Scholar 

  • Klein, P. (2005a). Infinitism is the solution to the regress problem. In M. Steup & E. Sosa (Eds.), Contemporary debates in epistemology. Malden: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Klein, P. (2005b). Infinitism’s take on justification, knowledge, certainty, and skepticism. Veritas, 50(4), 153–172.

    Google Scholar 

  • Klein, P. (2007a). Human knowledge and the infinite progress of reasoning. Philos Stud, 134(1), 1–17.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Klein, P. (2007b). How to be an infinitist about doxastic justification. Philos Stud, 134(1), 25–29.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Leite, A. (2004). On justifying and being justified. Philos Issues, 14, 219–253.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Podlaskowski, A. C., and Smith, J. A. (2009) Infinitism and epistemic normativity. Synthese. doi:10.1007/x11229-009-9654-1.

  • Sosa, E. (1991). Knowledge in perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Turri, J. (2009a). On the regress argument for infinitism. Synthese, 166(1), 157–163.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Turri, J. (2009b). An infinitist account of doxastic justification. Dialectica, 63(2), 209–218.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Turri, J. (2010). Foundationalism for modest infinitists. Can J Philos, 40(2), 275–283.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Philosophy Department, University of Waterloo, 200 University Avenue West, Waterloo, ON, Candada

    John Turri

Authors
  1. John Turri
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to John Turri.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Turri, J. Infinitism, finitude and normativity. Philos Stud 163, 791–795 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9846-7

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9846-7

Keywords

Search

Navigation