Abstract
Natural properties are those that carve reality at the joints. The notion of carving reality at the joints, however, is somewhat obscure, and is often understood in terms of making for similarity, conferring causal powers, or figuring in the laws of nature. I develop and assess an account of the third sort according to which carving reality at the joints is understood as having the right level of determinacy relative to nomic roles. The account has the attraction of involving very weak metaphysical presuppositions, but fails to capture several features that natural properties are presumed to have.
Similar content being viewed by others
REFERENCES
Achinstein, P.: 1974, 'The Identity of Properties', American Philosophical Quarterly 11, 257–75.
Armstrong, D.: 1978, A Theory of Universals, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Armstrong, D.: 1983, What is a Law of Nature, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Armstrong, D.: 1989, Universals: An Opinionated Introduction, Westview Press, Boulder, CO.
Bacon, J.: 1986, 'Armstrong's Theory of Properties', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64, 47–53.
Bacon, J.: 1995, Universals and Property Instances: The Alphabet of Being, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
Bealer, G.: 1982, Quality and Concept, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Bigelow, R. and R. Pargetter: 1990, Science and Necessity, Cambridge University Press, New York.
Dretske, F.: 1977, 'Laws of Nature', Philosophy of Science 44, 248–68.
Dupre, J.: 1993, The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of The Disunity of Science, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Elder, C. L.: 1992, 'An Epistemological Defense of Realism About Necessity', The Philosophical Quarterly 42, 317–36.
Elder, C. L.: 1994, 'Realism and Determinable Properties', unpublished.
Elgin, C. Z.: 1995, 'Unnatural Science', Journal of Philosophy 92, 289–302.
Fales, E.: 1990, Causation and Universals, Routledge & Keegan Paul, New York.
Fales, E.: 1993, 'Are Causal Laws Contingent?', in J. Bacon, K. Campbell and L. Reinhardt (eds.), Ontology, Causality, and the Mind: Essays in Honour of D. M. Armstrong, Cambridge University Press, New York, pp. 121–44.
Fodor, J.: 1991, 'A Modal Argument for Narrow Content', Journal of Philosophy 86, 5–26.
Forrest, P.: 1993, 'Just Like Quarks? The Status of Repeatables', in J. Bacon, K. Campbell and L. Reinhardt (eds.), Ontology, Causality, and the Mind: Essays in Honour of D. M. Armstrong, Cambridge University Press, New York, pp. 45–65.
Hirsch, E.: 1993, Dividing Reality, Oxford University Press, New York.
Lewis, D.: 1983, 'New Work for a Theory of Universals', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61, 343–77.
Lewis, D.: 1986a, On the Plurality of Worlds, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
Lewis, D.: 1986b, 'Against Structural Universals', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64, 25–46.
Madden, E. H. and R. Harré: 1975, Causal Powers: A Theory of Natural Necessity, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
McCall, S.: 1994, A Model of the Universe, Oxford University Press, New York.
Mellor, D. H.: 1980, 'Necessities and Universals in Natural Laws', in D. H. Mellor (ed.), Matters of Metaphysics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 136–53.
Mellor, D. H.: 1991, 'Properties and Predicates', in D. H. Mellor (ed.), Matters of Metaphysics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 170–82.
Mellor, D. M.: 1993, 'Reply', in J. Bacon, K. Campbell and L. Reinhardt (eds.), Ontology, Causality, and Mind: Essays in Honour of D. M. Armstrong, Cambridge University Press, New York.
Mellor, D. M.: 1995, The Facts of Causation, Cambridge University, Cambridge.
Mellor, D. H. and A. Oliver (eds.): 1997, Properties, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Mortensen, C.: 1987, 'Arguing for Universals', Revue Internationale de Philosophie 41, 97–111.
Mundy, B.: 1987, 'The Metaphysics of Quantity', Philosophical Studies 51, 29–54.
Oddie, G.: 1991, 'Supervenience and Higher-Order Universals', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69, 20–47.
Oliver, A.: 1996, 'The Metaphysics of Properties', Mind 105, 1–80.
Owens, D.: 1989, 'Disjunctive Laws?', Analysis 49, 197–202.
Putnam, H.: 1970, 'On Properties', in H. Putnam (ed.), Mathematics, Matter, and Method, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 305–22.
Robinson, D.: 1993, 'Epiphenomenalism, Laws, and Properties', Philosophical Studies 69, 1–34.
Seager, W.: 1991, 'Disjunctive Laws and Supervenience', Analysis 51, 93–98.
Shoemaker, S.: 1980a, 'Properties and Inductive Projectibility', in L. J. Cohen and Mary Hesse (eds.), Applications of Inductive Logic, Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 293–332.
Shoemaker, S.: 1980b, 'Causality and Properties', in P. van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 109–35.
Shoemaker, S.: 1988, 'On What There Are', Philosophical Topics 16, 201–23.
Sider, T.: 1994, 'Two Conceptions of Primitive Naturalness', unpublished.
Sider, T.: 1996, 'Intrinsic Properties', Philosophical Studies 83, 1–27.
Sider, T.: 1995, 'Sparseness, Immanence, and Naturalness', Nous 29, 360–377.
Sober, E.: 1982, 'Why Logically Equivalent Predicates May Pick Out Different Properties', Philosophical Quarterly 19, 183–9.
Swoyer, C.: 1982, 'The Nature of Natural Laws', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 60, 203–23.
Swoyer, C.: 1987, 'The Metaphysics of Measurement', in J. Forge (ed.), Measurement, Realism, and Objectivity, D. Reidel, Dordrecht.
Swoyer, C.: 1993, 'Logic and the Empirical Conception of Properties', Philosophical Topics 21, 199–231.
Swoyer, C.: 1996, 'Theories of Properties: From Plenitude to Paucity', Philosophical Perspectives 10, 243–64.
Taylor, B.: 1993, 'On Natural Properties in Metaphysics', Mind 102, 81–100.
Tooley, M.: 1977, 'The Nature of Laws', Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7, 667–98.
Vallentyne, P.: 1988, 'Explicating Lawhood', Philosophy of Science 55, 598–613.
Vallentyne, P.: 1997, 'Intrinsic Properties Defined', Philosophical Studies 88, 209–19.
Wilson, M.: 1982, 'Predicate Meets Property', The Philosophical Review 91, 549–89.
Wilson, M.: 1985, 'What is This Thing Called '“Pain”?', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66, 227–67.
Wilson, R.: 1992, 'Individualism, Causal Powers, and Explanation', Philosophical Studies 68, 103–39.
Wilson, R.: 1993, 'Against A Priori Arguments for Individualism', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74, 60–79.
Yablo, S.: 1992a, 'Mental Causation', The Philosophical Review 101, 245–80.
Yablo, S.: 1992b, 'Cause and Essence', Synthese 93, 403–49.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Vallentyne, P. The Nomic Role Account of Carving Reality At the Joints. Synthese 115, 171–198 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005024818347
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005024818347