

# Probably the Charterhouse of Parma Does Not Exist, Possibly Not Even *That* Parma

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## ABSTRACT

In this paper, I will claim that fictional works apparently about utterly *immigrant* objects, i.e., real individuals imported in fiction from reality, are instead about fictional individuals that intentionally resemble those real individuals in a significant manner: *fictional surrogates* of such individuals. Since I also share the realists' conviction that the remaining fictional works concern *native* characters, i.e., full-fledged fictional individuals that originate in fiction itself, I will here defend a *hyperrealist* position according to which fictional works only concern fictional individuals.

## 1. Native and Utterly Immigrant Characters?

As everyone well knows, *The Charterhouse of Parma* (*TCP* from now onwards) is one of the most famous novels by Stendhal. One of its characters is the Charterhouse of Parma itself.<sup>1</sup> One of the last sentences of the novel indeed so recites:

[Fabrizio del Dongo] retired to the Charterhouse of Parma, situated in the woods adjoining the Po, two leagues from Sacca (*TCP*, Vol. II, Chap. XXVIII, transl. by C. K. Scott-Moncrieff).

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<sup>1</sup> «Fictional characters belong to the class of entities variously known as *fictional entities* or *fictional objects* or *facta*, a class that includes not just animate objects of fiction (fictional persons, animals, monsters, and so on) but also inanimate objects of fiction such as fictional places (Anthony Trollope's cathedral town of Barchester and Tolkien's home of the elves, Rivendell, for example)» (Kroon & Voltolini, 2011, p. 1).

Yet despite the geographical location which seems to be given to the Charterhouse in the above text, there is no chance for anyone to ever pick it out. Granted, if one travels towards Italy, after having crossed the border with Switzerland one finds the Charterhouse of Pavia in Southern Lombardy. Yet even if one travels a bit more southwards and gets to the region of Emilia, one does not find the Charterhouse of Parma, nor could one find it. For unlike the first charterhouse, the second charterhouse does not exist! Put alternatively, while the first charterhouse is a concrete artefact well located in a certain portion of the real universe, the second charterhouse is completely made up, it is one of Stendhal's most famous inventions.

At first blush, one may suppose that this failure of identification of Stendhal's Charterhouse with a certain real concrete artefact depends on want of sufficient similarity. For in point of fact there are two real concrete artefacts that may be identified with Stendhal's Charterhouse: the Abbey of Paradigna, lying in between the city of Parma and the river Po, and the Charterhouse of St. Jerome, very close to the city itself, a.k.a. the Charterhouse of Parma. The first charterhouse approximately shares the location with Stendhal's Charterhouse, while the second charterhouse shares the name itself with it. Since one cannot tell which of these charterhouses is more similar to Stendhal's Charterhouse, neither is identical with the latter.

Yet this supposition is incorrect. For even if it turned out that one of the two real charterhouses were more similar than the other to Stendhal's Charterhouse – in point of fact, it is quite unlikely that the Charterhouse of St. Jerome inspired Stendhal, for at his times it was no longer a Carthusian monastery – that charterhouse could not be the same as Stendhal's Charterhouse. For their resemblance would be merely coincidental, since, as Saul Kripke put it, there is no «historical connection» (Kripke, 1980, p. 157) between Stendhal's speaking of the Charterhouse of Parma and that charterhouse. As Kripke comments, in want of such a historical connection one cannot fill the gap between fiction and reality:

The mere discovery that there was indeed a detective with exploits like those of Sherlock Holmes would not show that Conan Doyle was writing *about* this man; it is theoretically possible, though in practice fantastically unlikely, that Doyle was writing pure fiction with only a coincidental resemblance to the actual man. (1980, p. 157).

As is well known, there is a debate between antirealists and realists about fictional entities as to how to interpret the fact that a certain made up item, the

Charterhouse of Parma in this case, does not exist. For antirealists, the fact that the Charterhouse of Parma does not exist has a mere *ontological* negative import. For it means that, in the overall domain of what there is, *there is no* such a thing as the Charterhouse of Parma. For realists,<sup>2</sup> the very same fact has both an opposite ontological import and a *metaphysical* import. For it means that *there is* such a thing as the Charterhouse of Parma yet that very thing does not exist in another metaphysically relevant sense, that is, it does not figure within the subdomain of the spatiotemporal entities insofar as it is a *fictional* entity, an entity whose metaphysical nature is that of *being fictional*. Put alternatively, realism about fictional entities is an onto-metaphysical thesis about the overall domain of what there is. For realists, such a domain contains both real individuals and fictional individuals, i.e., individuals that are not real in another, metaphysically contrastive sense of the term: real individuals are simply individuals that are not fictional, namely, whose being is utterly independent of fictional or imaginative practices. If one saves the term “actual” for whatever belongs to the overall domain, for realists about *ficta* fictional individuals are simply actual individuals that are not real: they are not real concrete entities like you and me, but they are not even real abstract individuals like the number Two and the Platonic Beauty.<sup>3</sup> Elsewhere I have tried to show that realists are right: there are fictional individuals, even though they do not spatiotemporally exist.<sup>4</sup>

Yet over and above the Charterhouse of Parma, Stendhal’s novel is also about at least another entity: Parma, of course. But *which* Parma, exactly? What a question – one will typically reply – the real concrete Parma, the Italian city renowned all over the world for its excellent food! In point of fact, while antirealists and realists divide themselves as to whether fictional works involve fictional entities – for, as we have seen, unlike the latter the former believe that there are no such things – both typically share the idea that such stories often involve real entities. Let me give another formulation of the same predicament. On the one hand, as some realists put it, while fictional entities like Stendhal’s Charterhouse are *native characters*, i.e., full-fledged fictional characters that

<sup>2</sup> Kripke himself among others (Kripke, 2013).

<sup>3</sup> According to many realists, fictional individuals are abstract individuals (admittedly of different kinds: e.g. (Zalta, 1983); (Thomasson, 1999)). In the light of what I have just said in the text, one would then have to say that *abstracta* divide themselves into real and fictional items.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. (Voltolini, 2006), where I basically focus on ontological arguments in favor of fictional entities. In (Voltolini, 2012a), I have tried to put forward further semantic arguments as to why we have to read the claim “there are (fictional) individuals that do not exist” in the realist way.

originate in a certain fiction, entities like Parma are immigrant characters that originate in no fiction at all,<sup>5</sup> let me call them *utterly immigrant characters*: i.e., they are real individuals imported in fiction from reality.<sup>6</sup> On the other hand, antirealists will deny that fictional works involves native characters. Yet they will peacefully admit that they involve utterly immigrant characters. As allegedly is the case with Parma as to Stendhal's novel.

To be sure, some realists wonder whether fictional works do not effectively involve also fictional correlates of the real entities they allegedly involve. In point of fact, we sometimes speak of *the* Parma of Stendhal's novel, as well as of *the* Napoleon of *War and Peace*, *the* London of the Conan Doyle stories etc., by somehow distinguishing these entities from their real corresponding entities – our Parma, Napoleon, and London. So, such realists maintain that fictional works also involve what they call *fictional surrogates* of real entities: although properly speaking such works only contain real entities, they also mobilize fictional counterparts of those entities, the individuals terms of the kind “the N of story S” designate. By “fictional surrogates” they mean fictional entities that, owing to the storytellers' choices, correspond to real entities by somehow sharing a significant number of properties with them.<sup>7</sup>

In what follows, I will try to be even more radical than that. For I will claim that the relevant fictional works *only* involve such surrogates, fictional entities like any other such entity. Put alternatively, my thesis is that there are *no* immigrant characters imported in fiction from reality. All characters are native characters, i.e., fictional entities. Some of them involve no correlation with real entities, while some others involve such a correlation – in this sense, they are fictional surrogates of real entities – yet the real entities the latter are correlated with do not figure at all in the relevant works. If there is a gap between fiction and reality, this is a *total* gap. Thus, over and above *mere realists* on fictional entities, i.e., people believing that there are fictional individuals, as mobilized by the relevant fictional works, there are *hyperrealists*, i.e., people believing that fictional works only involve fictional individuals, some of which are fictional surrogates of real individuals. So, I

<sup>5</sup> For this terminology, Parsons (1980, pp. 51–2, 182–5); Zalta (1983, p. 93).

<sup>6</sup> Zalta (1983, p. 93) also allows for non-utterly immigrant characters: fictional individuals that a piece of fiction inherits from another fiction. I also believe that there are no non-utterly immigrant characters either (Voltolini, 2012b), but I will not deal with this issue here.

<sup>7</sup> For the thesis that fiction involves both utterly immigrant characters and their fictional surrogates (Parsons 1980, pp. 57–9). For this account of a fictional surrogate, cf. (Bononi, 2008).

agree with mere realists about *ficta* that the Charterhouse of Parma does not exist for it is a fictional entity. But I go further than them in claiming that also Stendhal's Parma does not exist for it is another fictional entity, which intentionally – i.e., because of Stendhal's authorial choices in writing *TCP* – shares many features with the real Parma.<sup>8</sup>

## 2. Why Fictional Works Contain Fictional Surrogates but Not Their Real Correlates

In order to show this, let me start from the idea that, as many people say,<sup>9</sup> fictional entities are *incomplete*, in the sense that, of some pair of properties *P* and its complement *non-P*, a fictional entity lacks both. Thus, fictional entities significantly differ from real entities. For an object's completeness, in the objectual sense – for any property *P*, the object has either it or its complement – is the hallmark of its reality.<sup>10</sup> As some have underlined,<sup>11</sup> this *objectual* way of characterizing *ficta*'s incompleteness is better than the *propositional* one. Propositional incompleteness with respect to *ficta* can be described in two modes, the formal and the material mode. According to the former mode, sometimes at least, neither a sentence apparently involving a fictional entity and predicating of it a property *P* nor its negation are true. According to the material mode, sometimes at least, neither a positive state of affairs to the effect that a certain fictional entity has *P* nor its negative counterpart to the effect that it is not the case that such an entity has *P* hold. Either way, propositional incompleteness amounts to the thesis that *ficta* involve the failure of Excluded Middle, a thesis that Russell originally found very problematic with respect to nonexistents in general: a good logical reason to rule out nonexistents in general, and fictional entities in particular, from the overall domain.<sup>12</sup> Yet no such failure is involved by characterizing incompleteness in the objectual way, as I just did; objectual incompleteness does not entail propositional

<sup>8</sup> Quite a minority of philosophers defends this hyperrealist approach: e.g. (Bonomi, 1994) (in 2008, Bonomi still defends this approach, though partially), (Landini, 1990). In some respects, also (Lamarque & Olsen, 1994, pp. 126, 293) share this idea. I have defended it in (Voltoini, 2006, chap. 4; 2009).

<sup>9</sup> Cf. (Castañeda, 1989, p. 179), Parsons (1980, pp. 56, 183–4). The thesis is also implicit in (Zalta, 1983): cf. (Thomasson, 1999, p. 102).

<sup>10</sup> On this, cf. (Santambrogio, 1990, p. 662).

<sup>11</sup> On this point, cf. (Simons, 1990, pp. 182, 184).

<sup>12</sup> Cf. (Russell, 1905, pp. 485, 490).

incompleteness. To stick to *TCP* once again, consider the property of *being spotted on one's left shoulder* and Fabrizio del Dongo, the main character of the novel, as well as:

(1) Fabrizio is spotted on his left shoulder.

(1) is utterly false, hence false already with respect to the actual world. By uttering it, we say a sheer falsehood (not a fictional falsehood, a falsehood in the worlds of the story, etc., but a falsehood *tout court*). For among what Stendhal says or implies in his novel, there is no such thing as Fabrizio's being so spotted. So, it is straightforwardly not the case that Fabrizio has a spot on his left shoulder. Yet also:

(2) Fabrizio is non-spotted on his left shoulder

that involves the property complementary to the above one, is utterly false as well, for Stendhal is completely silent on that matter. So, it is not even the case that Fabrizio is non-spotted on his left shoulder. So, Excluded Middle is respected: both (1)'s negation and (2)'s negation are true. Hence, there is no logical reason to rule out Fabrizio of the overall domain. Yet Fabrizio is an incomplete object, for he neither has the property of *being spotted on one's left shoulder* nor its complementary property of *being non-spotted on one's left shoulder*.

Now, appearances notwithstanding, this incompleteness is shared by allegedly utterly immigrant characters, like Stendhal's Parma. To be sure, by itself, such an incompleteness may just signal a striking analogy between allegedly utterly immigrant characters and fictional entities. Yet it can be exploited in the framework of an argument that shows that such characters indeed are fictional entities. Here it is:

- i) if an entity is a real individual, it is a complete entity;
- ii) yet allegedly utterly immigrant characters, like Stendhal's Parma, are incomplete entities;
- iii) hence, they are not real individuals.
- iv) Allegedly utterly immigrant characters occur in fictional works, like *TCP*;
- v) no entity other than real individuals and fictional individuals may occur in fictional works;

- vi) hence, incomplete allegedly utterly immigrant characters are fictional entities.<sup>13</sup>

From this argument, a further interesting corollary follows. Since the characters in question are fictional entities, they are *merely* allegedly utterly immigrant characters; in other terms, they are native characters as any other fictional entity. Simply, unlike many other such entities, authorial choices as to how the relevant story has to be made up make it the case that merely allegedly utterly immigrant characters significantly resemble real individuals. As a further result, therefore, merely allegedly utterly immigrant characters are fictional surrogates of real individuals. For example, Stendhal's Parma so surrogates the real Parma.

Clearly enough, in the above argument premise iv) is something both hyperrealists and anti-hyperrealists – a class that includes both antirealists on fictional entities and mere realists on such entities, which as we saw are people believing that fictional works at least sometimes include fictional characters – might independently share. Hyperrealists have no problems in accepting that allegedly utterly immigrant objects occur in fictional works: there is no reason for them to question iv) as it stands. Yet anti-hyperrealists would have no problems in accepting it either, for they think that allegedly utterly immigrant objects are real, not fictional, entities. Also premise v) raises no particular problem, for it sounds rather trivial. On the one hand, anti-hyperrealists accept it, although some of them, the antirealists *tout court*, would further claim that, since there are no fictional entities, in point of fact real entities are the only entities that occur in fictional works. On the other hand, a hyperrealist accepts the very same premise for its triviality, even if she defends the thesis opposite

<sup>13</sup> A similar argument may directly involve incompleteness as follows:

- I) If an entity is a real individual, it is a complete entity;
- II) Yet allegedly utterly immigrant characters, like Stendhal's Parma, are incomplete entities;
- III) Hence, they are not real individuals;
- IV) Allegedly utterly immigrant characters occur in fictional works, like *TCP*;
- V) Fictional entities occur in fictional works;
- VI) Fictional entities are incomplete;
- VII) Hence, incomplete allegedly utterly immigrant characters are fictional entities.

However, not only this argument includes a premise such as V) that antirealists reject, but its conclusion would not be guaranteed if fictional works mobilized other incomplete entities that are not fictional entities. Whereas the argument I have presented in the text skips these problems by replacing premise V) with premise v), which makes premise VI) superfluous and thereby warrants the argument's conclusion.

to that of the antirealist, namely that in point of fact fictional works mobilize fictional entities only. Premise i) is also hardly contestable. As I said before, an object's completeness, in the objectual sense, is the hallmark of its reality. So, the only really questionable premise is the one that plays the substantial job in the argument, namely premise ii). Why should anti-hyperrealists accept that allegedly utterly immigrant objects are incomplete?

Here's a way to justify ii). To begin with, note that, very often, allegedly utterly immigrant objects are such that fictional works involving them make utterly true sentences that are sheer falsehoods, when evaluated with respect to the actual world by assessing the deeds of the real entities such allegedly utterly immigrant objects (to put it neutrally) correspond to. In this respect, *TCP* is paradigmatic. For definitely, many things that Stendhal says in the novel about e.g. his Parma, which the work thereby makes utterly true, are utterly false of the real city. Consider e.g.:

(3) At Fabrizio Del Dongo's times, Parma was the capital of a principality.

On the one hand, *TCP* makes (3) utterly true: that Parma was at that time the capital of a principality is what Stendhal explicitly writes in the novel. Yet on the other hand, when evaluated with respect to the actual world and the real Parma, (3) results utterly false – at the time in which the plot of *TCP* is located, that is, just after the famous 1814–15 Vienna Congress that fixed the political destiny of Europe for many decades, Parma was the capital of a duchy, not of a principality.

So what, will the anti-hyperrealist reply. Since, she will go on saying, the allegedly utterly immigrant object in question is *nothing but* the corresponding real object, this is just a case in which fiction makes true what reality falsifies. *Of one and the same object*, i.e., the real Parma, *TCP* makes true what that object itself makes utterly false, namely that immediately after 1815 Parma was the capital of a principality.

Yet this is not the end of the matter. For such a predicament – fiction makes utterly true what reality makes utterly false – makes it rather the case that, for many other pairs of propositions that differ only because they respectively contain a property and its complement, a fictional work makes utterly false both propositions of the relevant pair. But if this is the case, then the allegedly utterly immigrant object those propositions are about is incomplete. Hence, since as premise i) states if something is real it is complete, such an object cannot be a real individual.



Consider *TCP* again. If *TCP* makes (3) true, then it also makes the case that:

- (4) Parma was turned into a duchy after the times of Fabrizio's monastic retirement

is utterly false. The story says that immediately after 1815 Parma was the capital of a principality, but it neither says nor entails that *many years later*, once Fabrizio's famous deeds have come to a completion by his retiring in the monastery, an institutional change from being a principality to being a duchy took place in Parma. Yet by parity of reasoning, *TCP* also makes the case that:

- (5) Parma was non-turned into a duchy after the times of Fabrizio's monastic retirement

is utterly false as well. The story not even says or entails that *in those later years*, Parma remained a principality or underwent a different institutional change (say, it became a republic). But if the city *TCP* is about has neither become a duchy nor has failed to become a duchy in those later years, this means that it is incomplete: it neither possesses the property of *being turned into a duchy after the times of Fabrizio's retirement* nor it possesses its complement. In other terms, Parma – *that* Parma, i.e., Stendhal's Parma – is incomplete. So, it cannot be the same as our real Parma.<sup>14</sup>

To be sure, there is a way for the anti-hyperrealist to block this conclusion. If we evaluate both (4) and (5) with respect to the actual world and the real Parma, we get that the first sentence is utterly false while the second sentence is utterly true. It is not the case that our Parma *has turned* into a duchy around the half of the XIX century, for it *already* was a duchy from 1815 (as we saw, this was one of the upshots of the Vienna Congress). So, (4) is utterly false. Moreover, insofar as our Parma has failed to undergo such a change, it possesses the complementary property of *being non-turned into a duchy after the times of Fabrizio's retirement*, so (5) is utterly true. Now, the anti-hyperrealist goes on saying, if we want to stick to the intuition that *both* (4) and (5) are utterly false, we rather have to paraphrase them a bit along the following lines:

- (4') In *TCP*, Parma was turned into a duchy after the times of Fabrizio's monastic retirement

<sup>14</sup> A similar line of reflection is sketched in (Wittgenstein, 1978<sup>2</sup>, IV§9).

(5') In *TCP*, it was not the case that Parma was turned into a duchy after the times of Fabrizio's monastic retirement.

In general, says the anti-hyperrealist, we have to so paraphrase fiction-involving sentences like (4)–(5)<sup>15</sup> in terms of *internal metafictional sentences* – sentences of the form “in the story *S*, *p*” –<sup>16</sup> if we want to stick to the intuition we have shared all along, namely that such sentences have *real* truth-values that can differ from the other real truth-values we give to them with respect to both the actual world and real entities. For, as we saw, the first truth-values require as their truth-makers not external actual circumstances, but rather the works themselves – or, the anti-hyperrealist would add, the external nonactual circumstances that realize such works. Once we so paraphrase those sentences, however, we can well keep the relevant names, “Parma” in this case, as referring to their ordinary real referents, our Parma in this case.<sup>17</sup> For then there is no problem in having a sentence like (5) as being both utterly false – when *TCP* is its truth-maker, so that it is read as (5') – and utterly true – when the external actual circumstances are its truth-makers, so that it is not so paraphrased, says the anti-hyperrealist. *Mutatis mutandis*, the case of (4) considered as both not paraphrased and as paraphrased as (4') becomes strictly analogous to that of:

(6) Parma is the paradise of ham

(7) Possibly, it is not the case that Parma is the paradise of ham

which are both utterly true and about *our* Parma insofar as (6) is made true by the external actual circumstances – if you want to eat the best *culatello*, you have to get to Parma – while (7) is made true by external *possible* circumstances – alas, there definitely is a possible world in which whoever gets to Parma is just served junk food. So, we need no incomplete object to account for the falsehood both of (4) and of (5).

<sup>15</sup> But also sentences like (1)–(3). I will get back on sentences (1)–(2) quite soon.

<sup>16</sup> In (Voltolini, 2006), I tell these sentences from *external metafictional sentences*, i.e., sentences that presuppose that there are stories yet make no reference to them. Cf. e.g. “Fabrizio is a fictional character”.

<sup>17</sup> The antirealist would say that by so doing we stick to the *de re* reading of such sentences. The mere realist would agree on that, yet unlike the antirealist she would add that also sentences like (1)–(3) are to be given such a reading when the relevant genuine singular term involved refers to a fictional individual. See immediately later in the text.

Yet this anti-hyperrealist reply is not exciting. For it implies that a real object involves a violation of Excluded Middle in a nonactual world. Since, as I said before, alleged violation of Excluded Middle has been put forward as of the main reasons to reject fictional entities, this definitely is an unwelcome result for the anti-hyperrealist.

In order to see the problem, let us go back to (1)–(2). Anti-hyperrealists typically provide for the purported incompleteness of a native character, like Fabrizio, the same treatment they give to the purported incompleteness of an allegedly utterly immigrant character, like Parma. That is, they will re-read (1)–(2) as the following false sentences:

- (1') In *TCP*, Fabrizio is spotted on his left shoulder
- (2') In *TCP*, it is not the case that Fabrizio is spotted on his left shoulder.

Moreover, mere realists about *ficta* will take (1') and (2') as having a *de re* reading along the lines both kinds of anti-hyperrealists give to (4')–(5'),<sup>18</sup> while antirealists will obviously take them as having only a *de dicto* reading. Yet there is a reason as to why it is better to read such sentences in an antirealist rather than in a mere realist way. For the falsity of both (1') and (2') entails that the sentences embedded in them are false with respect to the world of *TCP*. Put in the material rather than in the formal mode, a world realizing *TCP* is not maximal; if we take a certain positive state of affairs and its negative complement, namely that Fabrizio is spotted on his left shoulder and that it is not the case that Fabrizio is so spotted, neither state subsists in that world. Indeed, it is a natural principle to hold that in a story *S* a fictional entity *FE* is *P* iff at a world in which *FE* exists, *FE* is *P*. Then, if it is not the case that in a story *S* *FE* is *P*, nor it is the case that in a story *S* it is not the case that *FE* is *P*, at a world in which *FE* exists it is neither the case that *FE* is *P*, nor it is the case that it is not *P*. But this further means that in a world realizing *TCP*, Fabrizio, if there is such a fictional thing, involves violation of Excluded Middle. As we saw before, violation of Excluded Middle was taken by Russell as a good reason to reject such entities.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Cf. (Thomasson, 1999, pp. 107–8)

<sup>19</sup> For the principle and a very similar problem it raises, cf. (Sainsbury, 2010, pp. 83–4). Lewis would try to avoid the problem by denying that principle. For him, since at some worlds in which *FE* exists *FE* is *P* while at some other such worlds it is not the case that *FE* is *P*, a sentence of the form “in *S*, *FE* is *P*” (nor a sentence of the form “in *S*, it is not the case that *FE* is *P*”) is neither true nor false. Cf. (Lewis, 1978, pp. 42–3). Yet it is obviously debatable whether to actually violate Bivalence is better than to possibly violate Excluded Middle. Moreover, it is debatable that in cases of incompleteness the

Yet by parity of reasoning, the same problem affects our Parma, if *it* is the protagonist of *TCP*. True enough, the falsity of (4') and (5') does not force Parma to involve a violation of Excluded Middle in the actual world. For since in (5') negation has narrow scope, (5') is not the negation of (4'). So both (4') and (5') can well be utterly false.<sup>20</sup> Yet that falsity forces their respective embedded sentences to be false with respect to a world realizing *TCP* as well. In such a world, it is neither the case that our Parma has turned into a duchy after the times of Fabrizio's retirement, nor it is the case that our Parma has not so turned. Since all anti-hyperrealists accept to read such sentences *de re*, as being about the real Parma, *Parma itself* involves a violation of Excluded Middle in a world realizing *TCP*. If this is a reason to reject a fictional entity, it is also a reason to reject a real entity insofar as fictional works involve it.

Beforehands, we saw that in order to rule out the unwelcome idea that fictional entities involve a violation of Excluded Middle, it is enough to read their incompleteness as an objectual rather than as a propositional incompleteness. This implies that it is wrong to paraphrase (1) and (2) as (1') and (2') respectively, insofar as that way of paraphrasing them reintroduces propositional incompleteness from the rear door.<sup>21</sup> *Mutatis mutandis*, this also shows that it is wrong to paraphrase (4) and (5) as (4') and (5') respectively. But if we no longer so paraphrase (4) and (5), we are no longer tempted to say that they involve real entities rather than fictional ones. So, we can stick to the

relevant internal metafictional sentences must be neither true nor false. As (Sainsbury, 2010, p. 89) says, the following argument is invalid insofar as its premises are true yet its conclusion is intuitively false:

- i) (in the Doyle stories) Holmes lives at 221b Baker Street
- ii) 221b Baker Street is a bank
- iii) (in the Doyle stories) Holmes lives at a bank.

Yet in Lewis' account, the argument's conclusion should be neither true nor false, for there are Doyle worlds at which the sentence embedded in that conclusion is true (in such worlds 221b Baker Street is a bank) and other such worlds at which that sentence is false (in such worlds 221b Baker Street is not a bank). (Incidentally, *pace* Sainsbury hyperrealists have no trouble in accounting for the argument's invalidity – true premises, false conclusion – for according to the them it suffers from a fallacy of equivocation: in i) “221b Baker Street” refers to the fictional surrogate, in ii) it refers to the real location).

<sup>20</sup> (Thomasson, 1999, pp. 107–8).

<sup>21</sup> This does not *co ipso* mean that paraphrasing fiction-involving sentences as internal metafictional sentences is incorrect; the point is simply that the “in the story”-phrase must not be read as an intensional operator. Cf. on this (Voltolini, 2006, chap.6).

above result: the sheer falsity of the non-paraphrased (4) and (5) shows that they concern incomplete entities, hence that they do not concern real entities – but, as my original argument purports to show, fictional ones.

To be sure, the above ontological argument is not the only reason to run hyperrealistically. For the hyperrealist may appeal to straightforwardly semantic reasons. Yet such reasons ultimately trace back again to the above onto-logical considerations against appealing to real entities when allegedly utterly immigrant characters are at stake: if allegedly utterly immigrant objects were real entities, such entities would involve a violation of Excluded Middle in the nonactual worlds of the stories. Take e.g.:

(8) For a while, Fabrizio inhabited Parma

which again *TCP* makes utterly true. A standard example of sentential meaning equivalence is given by the active/passive conversion: if one turns a sentence from the active to the passive form its meaning is preserved, hence it cannot be the case that a sentence in one form is true while a sentence in the other form is false. So, let us convert (8) into its passive form:

(8P) For a while, Parma was inhabited by Fabrizio.

Given their meaning equivalence, if (8) is utterly true, so is (8P). Yet suppose now that (8P) concerned our Parma. Then it would be utterly false: no real city has ever hosted a fictional individual. This strongly suggests that both (8) and (8P) are utterly true for they concern a certain relation holding between two fictional entities, Fabrizio del Dongo and Stendhal's Parma.<sup>22</sup>

To be sure, the anti-hyperrealist might again appeal to the idea that, in order for (8), whether taken as such or taken in the passive as (8P), to be utterly true, it must be read as an internal metafictional sentence about a real entity, our Parma:

<sup>22</sup> This problem was originally raised by (Woods, 1974, pp. 41–2). Yet the example I have given in the text is harder to deal with than the one Woods points out, which involves in the two relevant sentences a symmetrical relation, hence different relational properties of the kind *being R-ed to a* and *being R-ed to b*. As such, the 'mere realist'-solution (Berto, 2012, p. 186) provides to Woods' problem, which involves differences in focus between the two relevant sentences, does not apply to this example. Nor could even work Sainsbury's solution, which appeals to a presence versus an absence of fictional presuppositions in those sentences (cf. Sainsbury, 2010, p. 28). Moreover, the problem is reinforced if, as I have maintained in (Voltolini, 2006, p. 122), (8) is analytically true. For if this holds of (8), it must also hold of (8P), which is just its conversion into the passive.

(8') In *TCP*, for a while Fabrizio inhabits Parma/Parma is inhabited by Fabrizio.

So, one might accept both that (8), whether in its active or passive form, is utterly false, while (8') is utterly true. Yet this way out would simply take us back to the aforementioned onto-logical problem: if fiction-involving sentences, read as internal metafictional sentences, concerned real entities, such entities would implausibly involve a violation of Excluded Middle in nonactual worlds of the stories.

### 3. Objections and Replies

In this Section, I will consider some objections to hyperrealism along with some hyperrealist replies. If these replies are correct, hyperrealism will be corroborated.

(a) To begin with, anti-hyperrealists will wonder why I have chosen such a controversial example such as Stendhal's Parma. It is a commonplace among literary critics to maintain that Stendhal's Parma is an invention, for it is so different in many respects from our Parma. For instance, as I pointed out before, the political frame in which Stendhal's Parma is set is completely different from that of the real Parma at those times: in the years in which *TCP* is located, the real Parma was the capital of a duchy, not of a principality, ruled by Marie-Louise of Austria, not by Prince Ranuccio Ernesto IV Farnese. So, even if it were be taken for granted that Stendhal's Parma is a fictional character, there would be a host of more plausible examples of fictional works that involve real entities: to stick to the most famous and already quoted ones, *War and Peace* (as to Napoleon), the Doyle stories (as to London), etc.

Yet as we know from the beginning of this paper, it is not want of similarity with real things that makes a character a fictional rather than a real entity. Rather, it is want of historical connection. In this respect, what anti-hyperrealists should put forward is a precisely opposite objection based on the existence of a given historical connection between Stendhal and Parma. See immediately below.

(b) Here it is. What anti-hyperrealists should say is that, hyperrealists' convictions notwithstanding, Stendhal's Parma *is* the real Parma. For there well is a historical connection between Stendhal's talking of Parma in *TCP* and the real Parma. In the 1839 dedication letter prefacing *TCP*, Stendhal himself

clarifies that his intention in writing *TCP* is that of publishing a tale he wrote some years before, in 1830, as a result of having heard in the Italian city of Padua a certain chap, the nephew of a dead Canon, telling a story about some intrigues happened at the court of *Parma* in the immediately previous years. In quoting the Canon's nephew himself, Stendhal writes:

“In that case,” said the nephew, “let me give you my uncle's journal, which, under the heading ‘Parma’, mentions several of the intrigues of that court, in the days when the Duchessa [Sanseverina]’s word was law there; but, have a care! this story is anything but moral, and now that you pride yourselves in France on your gospel purity, it may win you the reputation of an ‘assassin’”.  
(*TCP*, “To the Reader”)

To sum up, if the above is correct, then anti-hyperrealists should face hyperrealists with the objection opposite to (a): since there is a historical connection between Stendhal's talking of Parma in telling *TCP* and the real Parma, what *TCP* is about is the real Parma, not a fictional surrogate of its.<sup>23</sup>

Yet to begin with, note that authorial intentions are not sufficient in order for a historical connection between a certain discourse and a real individual to hold. Many allegedly historical tales start with the presumption of their authors to talk about real events and individuals, but such presumptions are often wrong. In one of the most famous examples, Geoffrey of Monmouth's *Historia regum Britanniae* starts by talking of King Arthur as if he were a real individual having ruled Britain immediately after the Romans' domination. Yet nowadays most people are convinced that there is no real individual the name “King Arthur” refers to in Geoffrey's tale, Arthur's being a merely fictional king. This may well be the case with Stendhal's talking of Parma.

Suppose however that there really were a historical connection between an author's way of talking and a real individual, whether grounded in correct authorial intentions or in some other referential mechanism.<sup>24</sup> Yet that connection would not guarantee that a *fictional work* contains that individual. So, even if there were such a connection between Stendhal's talking of Parma and our Parma, *TCP* would not involve it yet. One has indeed to tell a fictional work, which in the end is a semantic entity made by the propositions that characterize the relevant story, from the content of utterances of fiction-

<sup>23</sup> As (Friend, 2011, p. 192) underlines, this intention may manifest itself even within the tale itself, as is the case with London in Orwell's *1984*.

<sup>24</sup> For instance, in a certain real individual being the dominant source of certain referential uses. For a survey of the relevant possibilities cf. (Friend, 2011, p. 198).

involving sentences occurring in a game of make-believe that is made (possibly *inter alia*) with those utterances, *fictional utterances*. Let me expand on this point.

As Kendall Walton remarked,<sup>25</sup> fiction starts from games of make-believe in which one makes fictionally true things that can well be not really such. As Evans originally maintained, such games of make-believe come in two varieties: existentially *creative* and existentially *conservative*.<sup>26</sup> On the one hand, the former games involve (typically concrete) *nonactual* individuals, i.e., individuals that do not figure in the overall domain of what there is, the actual domain – they only figure in the domain of the world of the game, which is a way of saying that there really are no such things. In these games, one makes believe *that* there is a (typically concrete) individual that does certain things.<sup>27</sup> For instance, in telling the story of *Oedipus Rex*, Sophocles makes believe that there is a concrete man named Oedipus who becomes blind after having married his mother. On the other hand, the latter games involve (typically concrete) actual individuals, i.e., individuals that figure not only in the domain of the world of the game but also in the actual domain.<sup>28</sup> In these games, *of* a (typically concrete) actual individual, one makes believe that such an individual does certain things. Historical tales mobilize games of this latter kind. Following Stendhal's intentions, one may well take his telling *TCP* as presenting (also) a conservative game: of our real Parma, Stendhal makes believe that in the post-1815 times, many intrigues happened there.

Yet this is not the end of the story. In both games, there are fictional utterances of certain fiction-involving sentences that have a certain truth-conditional content, a *fictional content*, and also a certain truth-value, a *fictional truth-value*; typically, such utterances with that content are true in the world of the relevant make-believe game. Yet in neither game such a content mobilizes a fictional individual. A fictional individual, if there is any – as realists of any kind believe – figures in the actual domain. So, it is different both from the (typically concrete) nonactual individuals creative games mobilize and from the (typically concrete) actual individuals conservative games mobilize. In the

<sup>25</sup> Cf. (Walton, 1990).

<sup>26</sup> Cf. (Evans, 1982, p. 358).

<sup>27</sup> I say “typically concrete” for there may be cases of creative games in which one makes believe that there is an abstract entity (for instance, the greatest natural number).

<sup>28</sup> I say “typically concrete” for there may be cases of conservative games in which one makes believe of an abstract entities (e.g., the number One) that it is such and such. Cf. (Voltolini, 2006; 2009).



former case, for a fictional individual and a (typically concrete) nonactual individual are members of different domains, or better, the fictional individual is a member of the overall domain of what there is, while the nonactual individual is in the end just a *façon de parler*. In the latter case, for although a fictional individual and a (typically concrete) actual individual are members of the same actual domain, they are individuals of different kind: fictional and real individuals.<sup>29</sup> As a result, even if there is a historical connection between someone talking in a conservative game about something and a certain real individual, that connection does not manage to pick up the different individual mobilized in the content of the corresponding fictional work, a fictional surrogate of that real individual.

In point of fact, for realists of any kind fictional individuals contribute to constitute the content of fictional works stemming out of creative make-believe games, which is different from the fictional content of the fictional utterances mobilized in such games. The former content rather is the content of other, *real*, utterances of the same fiction-involving sentences, those that are utterly verified or falsified by the relevant fictional works. Consider the following fiction-involving sentence, still related to *TCP*:

(9) The Duchess Sanseverina is fallen in love with his nephew Fabrizio.

Take a fictional utterance of (9), the one (9) has when uttered in the context of a creative game involving the tale of *TCP*. In such a case, (9) has a fictional content – one makes believe *that* a certain concrete woman loves a certain concrete man – and is evaluated as true with respect to the world of the game, it is fictionally true, for in that world that nonactual woman effectively loves that nonactual man. Yet (9) may also be uttered outside that game as a real utterance and be evaluated as utterly, not fictionally, true, insofar as the work of *TCP* is its real truth-maker, or alternatively put, since the story of *TCP* so unfolds that the Duchess loves Fabrizio.<sup>30</sup> But in the latter case (9)'s content is completely different from the fictional content of the corresponding fictional utterance of (9). For it involves two fictional individuals, the native character of

<sup>29</sup> One may sometimes even have a conservative game about a fictional individual; yet the fictional individual stemming out of that game will not coincide with that individual. Cf. (Voltoini, 2009).

<sup>30</sup> This is the utterances anti-hyperrealists would paraphrase as “In *TCP*, The Duchess Sanseverina is fallen in love with his nephew Fabrizio”. Realists of all kinds may accept such a paraphrase if they do not construe a phrase like “in *TCP*” as an intensional operator. Or so I hold: cf. fn. 21.

the Duchess and the native character of Fabrizio, respectively different from their nonactual counterparts. Or so realists would say.

As realists of all kinds believe, therefore, fictional individuals populate those fictional works that stem out of creative games yet whose content, as we have just seen, does not coincide with the fictional content of sentential fictional utterances those games mobilize. Yet as just hyperrealists believe, fictional individuals also populate those fictional works that stem out of conservative make-believe games. These fictional individuals are mere fictional surrogates of the real individuals such conservative games mobilize. Hence, not even the content of such works coincides with the fictional content of the utterances of the relevant fiction-involving sentences those games mobilize. For while the content of these fictional utterances involve real individuals, the content of those works is the content of other, real, utterances of the same sentences that involves not real individuals, but fictional surrogates of such individuals. Again, these other utterances are made utterly true by the relevant fictional works. Take e.g.:

(10) Parma's citadel is ten minutes from Parma southeastwards.

When uttered in the context of a *TCP*-inspired conservative game, (10) has a certain fictional content involving the real Parma and is also fictionally true, for in the world of the game the military citadel of the real Parma is so located. Yet when uttered out of that game, (10) is also utterly true for *TCP* makes it true insofar as Stendhal's Parma, Parma's fictional surrogate, in the novel also has a citadel – a fictional citadel as well, of course – so located.

To sum up, even if we accept that a conservative make-believe game is about a real individual, so that there is a historical connection between someone's speaking in that game and that very individual, such an individual is not what the corresponding fictional work is about, a given fictional surrogate. So, even if we accept that Stendhal's storytelling involves a conservative make-believe game about our Parma, *TCP* is not about it but about its fictional surrogate: Stendhal's Parma.

(c) Yet the anti-hyperrealist may further object: at least in the case of a historical tale can't we say that such a tale also mobilizes *other* real utterances of the very same fiction-involving sentences, namely, utterances that have a *real* truth-conditional content, hence a real truth-value, involving a real individual pretty much as the fictional utterances of the same sentences? And why that real content involving that real individual cannot also contribute to constitute

the content of the corresponding fictional work, the content of the different real utterances of fiction-involving sentences that are made utterly true by such works? For our purposes, the anti-hyperrealist may well go on saying, let us go back once again to *TCP*. This is how it starts:

On the 15th of May, 1796, General Bonaparte made his entry into Milan at the head of that young army which had shortly before crossed the Bridge of Lodi and taught the world that after all these centuries Caesar and Alexander had a successor (*TCP*, Vol. I, Chap. I)

Let us well suppose that Stendhal's utterance of the above sentence occurs within a certain conservative make-believe game about our flesh-and-blood Napoleon that mobilizes a certain fictional content and a certain fictional truth-value: it is true in the world of that game. Yet the very same sentence may be uttered also not in a fictional, but in a real context, as a piece of a historical narration about Napoleon. This real utterance is definitely paired with a real content and it also has a real truth-value – it is actually true, for Napoleon made his entry into Milan that very date. Now, the anti-hyperrealist may observe, why does not *this* real, *Napoleon-involving*, content, also belong to the content of the fictional work of *TCP*? In other terms, why this real content is not also the content of a *further real* utterance of the above sentence, the utterance that has not history, but the work, in focus, for it is the work, not the external actual circumstances, that makes this latter utterance utterly true? Obviously, one can repeat the question many other times. One may well see the aforementioned (10) as another case in point, with "Parma" referring to our real Parma both in a real historical utterance of (10) and in a real utterance of (10) made utterly true by *TCP*. Incidentally, this should also be the case with our aforementioned sentences (3)–(5). All of them have both real historical utterances whose truth-makers are external actual circumstances (so that the utterances of (3) and (4) are false, while the utterance of (5) is true) and other real utterances whose truth-maker is *TCP* itself (so that the relevant utterance of (3) is true, while the relevant utterances of (4)–(5) are false) that however share the same real content about our Parma. Of course, the point may even be more generalized. For, over and above historical novels, there are many other bits of fiction apparently involved with reality: e.g. parodies or lyrical poems (or autobiographies in general).

Now, the hyperrealist can well accept that a fictional utterance occurring in a conservative game and having there a fictional content is paired by a real

utterance of the same sentence occurring outside the game in a piece of historical narration and having a real content: this is the utterance that is made true by the external actual circumstances. Moreover, since the contents of both utterances involve the same real individual, the hyperrealist can also accept that such contents are just one and the same.

Yet consider now fictional utterances of fiction-involving sentences occurring in a creative game, such as (9). If they were paired by real utterances of the same sentences occurring in a piece of a historical narration, one would have to say either that these real utterances have no real content or that if they have one they are utterly false.<sup>31</sup> For genuine singular terms occurring in the former utterances – the names “the Duchess Sanseverina”,<sup>32</sup> “Fabrizio” – fictionally refer to something, but if they occurred in such real utterances, they would refer to nothing at all – pretty much as “King Arthur” in Monmouth’s *Historia regum Britanniae*.

Moreover, take a fictional utterance of a fiction-involving sentence that mobilizes both a genuine singular term that mere fictionally refers and another genuine singular term that really refers to something. That is, take a fictional utterance that involves a game that is both creative as to the first term and conservative as to the second term. Our (8) before yields a case in point. Now, a fictional utterance of (8) has a fictional content that makes it true in the world of that game. Yet if there were also a real utterance of it taken as a piece of historical narration, it would definitely have no real content or if it had one it would be utterly false, since in it “Fabrizio” refers to nothing while “Parma” refers to the real city. Yet even if it had a real content, that content would not be the same as the content that contributes to constitute the fictional work of *TCP*, the content (8) has when it is further really uttered as an utterance that has *TCP* as its truth-maker. For this further real utterance is *utterly true*.

As a result, there is no guarantee that when a fiction-involving sentence mobilizes a real utterance in a real historical context having a real content, this content is the same as the content *another* real utterance of that sentence has when a fictional work is its truth-maker. In the case of (8), mere realists would say that this difference depends on the fact that, while in the first real utterance “Fabrizio” refers to nothing, in the second real utterance it refers to a fictional

<sup>31</sup> This obviously depends on the semantic theory of empty genuine singular terms one adopts. I cannot enter here into details.

<sup>32</sup> As the text has clearly shown, I consider expressions such as “the Charterhouse of Parma”, “the Duchess Sanseverina” and the like as genuine singular terms.

individual. Yet it may also well depend on the fact that, while in the first real utterance “Parma” refers to our real Parma, in the second real utterance it refers to a fictional surrogate of its, as hyperrealists would say. As no such content identity is guaranteed across different real utterances of the same fiction-involving sentence, moreover, the same may well happen in the case of the relevant different real utterances of the afore-mentioned sentence that constitutes *TCPs incipit* and involves no genuine singular term that merely fictionally refers. Or it may well happen in the analogous case of the relevant different real utterances of (10) that merely involves the really referring name “Parma”.

But why one has to stick to this hyperrealist reply, would the anti-hyperrealist retort? Isn't it more economical to acknowledge that the aforementioned real utterances of (8), the one that has external actual circumstances as its truth-maker and the one that has a fictional work as its truth-maker, have a different content and yet in both “Parma” refers to the real city? Moreover, it would not be extremely economical to say that when a real historical utterance of a fiction-involving sentence is only about real individuals, as is the case both with *TCPs* sentential *incipit* and with (10), it has the same real content as a real utterance of the same sentence made utterly true by a fictional work, so that its relevant genuine singular terms refer to real individuals in both cases?

Well, if the latter were the case how could one justify the fact that even if such real utterances share their real truth-value, they differ in their *possible* truth-value? Suppose to evaluate a real historical utterance of (10) and a real utterance of it that is made true by *TCP* in a possible world that still contains *TCP* yet in which no citadel has been built around Parma. Clearly enough, with respect to that world the first utterance of (10) would be false and yet the second utterance would be true. So they cannot share the same content. It is easy to suppose that, while in the first utterance “Parma” refers to the real city, this is not the case of that name in the second utterance, for it there refers to a fictional surrogate of that city.<sup>33</sup>

As a further result, also in the case of historical novels, parodies, and lyric poems, a real utterance of a certain fiction-involving sentence that is made true by the relevant fictional work may well have a content, the one contributing to

<sup>33</sup> Incidentally, this result is further corroborated if one takes the real utterances of fiction-involving sentences that are made true by fictional works as being analytically true, as I held in (Voltolini, 2006).

constitute that fictional work, that differs from the content another real, historical, utterance of that sentence possesses. True enough, we would not fully understand e.g. a parody if it were not somehow related to a real individual. But this does not depend on the fact that the fictional work constituting the parody mobilizes that real individual. Rather, the point is that the parody mobilizes a fictional surrogate of that individual. Thus, its author wants to be understood as if, when her work says something about that fictional surrogate, she implicated something about that real individual. In this respect, Aristophanes' *The Clouds* mobilizes not a real, but a fictional Socrates. Yet, insofar as that fictional Socrates is a surrogate of the real Socrates, when *The Clouds* says that the fictional Socrates is absent-minded, Aristophanes wanted to be understood as implicating that the real Socrates was a buffoon. Moreover, if (as some critics say) *TCP* is an ironical narrative, probably this is how Stendhal wanted to be understood about the real Parma, i.e., as ironizing upon it (as well as upon the real Italy) when *TCP* says something about a fictional Parma that surrogates it (as well as something about a fictional Italy that surrogates the real Italy). In this respect, consider the sentence following in *TCP* the sentence just quoted:

The miracles of gallantry and genius of which Italy was a witness in the space of a few months aroused a slumbering people; only a week before the arrival of the French, the Milanese still regarded them as a mere rabble of brigands, accustomed invariably to flee before the troops of His Imperial and Royal Majesty; so much at least was reported to them three times weekly by a little news-sheet no bigger than one's hand, and printed on soiled paper. (*TCP, ibid.*)<sup>34</sup>

(d) Armed with the above reflections, the hyperrealist can discard another objection focalized on parodies or similar funny texts. Parodies have to concern real individuals, not their fictional surrogates, says the objection. For they emotionally move us towards real individuals, not fictional ones. The point of

<sup>34</sup> To argue against the idea that historical novels and the like are about fictional surrogates of real individuals, Kroon says that the fact that a certain individual intentionally resembles another one is not enough in order for the latter rather than the former to occur in a fictional work. For example, the fact that *Anna Karenina's* Levin intentionally resembles Tolstoy does not make the case that Tolstoy figures in *Anna Karenina*. Cf. (Kroon, 1994, p. 215). This is correct, but it precisely proves that the fictional Levin is a fictional surrogate of the real Tolstoy, so that the former but not the latter occurs in that fictional work. Which is also what the famous Flaubert's motto "Madame Bovary c'est moi" is intended to show.

the parody (as well as of many other novels) would be lost, if they concerned fictional individuals: we want to make fun of real individuals, not of their fictional surrogates.<sup>35</sup> In point of fact, one may note, when at the end of a narration a warning appears to the effect that the narration's protagonists are merely fictional, such a warning is intended to discard a presumption that the narration concerns real individuals, as it would instead be the case if the narration were parodic, ironic, or even simply historical.

Yet once again, we have to tell the fictional content mobilized by fictional utterances of fiction-involving sentences in make-believe games and the content mobilized by real utterances of those sentences made utterly true by fictional works. One may well have parodic conservative make-believe games in which the relevant sentential utterances are about real individuals. While attending such games, one may well be emotionally moved by such individuals; this is to say, it may well be the case that, *in the context of such games*, one is emotionally moved by real individuals.<sup>36</sup> Yet this does not force the corresponding parodic fictional works to be about such individuals rather than their fictional surrogates. To be sure, when reading such works we may recognize a further authorial intention to convey something about such real individuals, and thereby be again moved by them. But, as I said before, this does not make the content of such works be about such individuals.

This hyperrealist account, moreover, does not make the above warning trivial. If the warning still belongs to the make-believe game, it simply reminds the audience that the game is creative and not conservative, hence that its protagonists are (typically concrete) nonactual individuals rather than (typically concrete) actual ones. If the warning does not belong to the game but it applies to the content of the fictional work itself that stems out of the game, it simply reminds one that it is the content of a *fictional* work, not what I have called the real content that further real yet historical utterances of fiction-involving sentences may well have. Thus, it also reminds one that such a content is about a fictional individual, not a (typically concrete) real individual.

(e) Yet the anti-hyperrealist may rejoinder, the above reply shows that emotions in fiction only concern (typically concrete) real individuals, not

<sup>35</sup> Cf. (Friend, 2000, p. 191; 2011, p. 193).

<sup>36</sup> In this respect, there definitely is no problem, as (Friend, 2000, pp. 189–95, 201–2) points out, in imagining something of a real individual one would never think of such an individual out of that imagination, or even in being make-believely moved by such an individual in a way one would not really be moved.

fictional surrogates of them. As emotion-inducing is one of the points, maybe the most relevant one, of having fictional works in our ontology, why should fictional works be ever about fictional surrogates rather than (typically concrete) real individuals, since only the latter may induce us emotions?<sup>37</sup>

Yet once again, if by “emotions in fiction” one means emotions had in the context of a make-believe game,<sup>38</sup> the hyperrealist will definitely hold that they do not concern fictional individuals, let alone fictional surrogates, but either (typically concrete) nonactual individuals – in creative games – or (typically concrete) actual individuals – in conservative games. As I said before, games of either sort do not concern the fictional individuals that stem *out* of those games.<sup>39</sup>

In this respect, one may even engage oneself in a quite complicated self-cathartical make-believe game about oneself. As Friend herself points out,<sup>40</sup> a real subject *S* can well imagine that she is pitying herself while attending a *pièce* that presents her as despising herself. The hyperrealist may well agree with Friend on this respect, insofar as such a case presents a *nesting* of conservative make-believe games.<sup>41</sup> In the *nesting* conservative game involving her as a spectator, *S* pities herself, for in the *nested* still conservative game involving her again as a protagonist the former game nests, she dislikes herself.<sup>42</sup> The fact that a self-cathartical conservative game nests another

<sup>37</sup> Cf. (Friend, 2000).

<sup>38</sup> In order to discard some puzzles raised by (Kroon, 1994) on this concern, Friend herself (cf. Friend, 2000) maintains that what we have towards real individuals are make-believe emotions. I take this to mean that we have emotions towards such individuals in the context of conservative make-believe games.

<sup>39</sup> *Pace* (Friend, 2000, pp. 202–3).

<sup>40</sup> Cf. (Friend, 2000, pp. 195–200).

<sup>41</sup> In (Kroon, 1994, pp. 209–10), Kroon considers such a solution yet just in order to discard it. For according to him, the cases in question are not cases of games within games. Yet when originally describing “unofficial” make-believe games, such as the ones in which real subjects have make-believe attitudes with respect to fiction, Walton himself says that these games are extended games that include narrower “authorized” games (standard games having fictional tales as their props) as their parts: cf. (Walton, 1990, p. 403). Indeed, it seems to me that there is no principled distinction between the case of an extended make-believe game in which a spectator has emotions towards protagonists of an authorized game and the case of an authorized nesting game whose protagonists have emotions towards themselves as protagonists of another authorized yet nested game (we may e.g. understand Cervantes’ tale of *Don Quijote II* as involving Don Quijote despising himself for how he praises himself in the apocryphal tale by Fernandez de Avellaneda).

<sup>42</sup> What complicates the case is the fact that the real subject and the real object of the make-believe attitudes coincide. But, as Friend herself points out (cf. Friend, 2000, p. 190), nothing would change



conservative game is the only relevant difference from a typical cathartical game, in which a conservative game nests a creative game. For instance, while attending a performance of *Oedipus Rex* ending with Oedipus disliking himself – a creative game involving a concrete nonactual individual named Oedipus – a subject *S* may well pity that individual for such a disliking – in a conservative game nesting the previous creative game yet involving *S* herself. Now, insofar as in the previous example the nesting game is a conservative self-cathartical game embedding another conservative game, both are about the same concrete real individual, *S* herself.

But if by “emotions in fiction” one meant emotions concerning a fictional work, once it has been proven that fictional works neither concern (typically concrete) nonactual individuals nor (typically concrete) actual individuals, but just fictional individuals, one may claim that such emotions cannot concern fictional surrogates only if one has an argument to the effect that such emotions cannot concern fictional individuals in general. Yet in the anti-hyperrealist camp at least mere realists doubt that any such argument may work: one may well admire fictional individuals pretty much as one can think of them. Definitely, one may model one’s own behavior on the deeds of the fictional individual one takes inspiration from, as Alexander the Great did with Homer’s heroes.<sup>43</sup> So, there is no preclusion for fictional surrogates to be objects of emotions as well. It is my disliking not the real London, but Orwell’s *1984* London, that reinforces my antitotalitarian habits. In point of fact, this may well have been another point of *TCP*: not only that of inducing dislike towards its pretty ridicule fictional protagonist, Fabrizio del Dongo, but also that of inducing such a dislike towards the pretty narrow-minded fictional city he inhabited for a while, Stendhal’s Parma (perhaps with an eye by Stendhal to also induce dislike towards the real Italy and the real Italians in general, as some critics maintain).<sup>44</sup>

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if the real object of such attitudes (in the nesting and in the nested conservative game) differed from the real subject of them (in both games).

<sup>43</sup> As (Zalta, 1988, pp. 4, 127–8) suggested. *Pace* (Friend, 2000, p. 203), Thomasson herself is committed to this idea when she defends a creative theory of intentionality according to which our intentional states, hence emotions as well, can generate the nonexistent objects they are about. Cf. (Thomasson, 1999, pp. 88–92).

<sup>44</sup> I thank Carola Barbero and Elisabetta Sacchi for their useful comments.

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