Current Moral Problems

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Preface

It is a commonplace that one matures slowly to serious research, by reading, writing, and above all by participation in the exchange of ideas; hence the great emphasis placed today on participation in academic conferences. The organisation of an international conference by doctoral students of the Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw is praiseworthy for the same reason. The conference took place on the thirteenth of May, 2008, and examined some of the ethical problems with which contemporary philosophy is concerned. One of its fruits is this volume.

A hugely diverse range of questions were tackled by the speakers, a diversity which can be construed as both a strength and a weakness of the event. No subject was treated in greater depth, but the participants were able to acquaint themselves with the interests of young scholars, and to present, if only in outline, something of the current state of contemporary philosophy. The papers were of quite good quality for graduate students. Some concerned the thought of well-known philosophers, others covered less familiar territory such as the ideas of Virginia Held. There were also questions of the practice of the moral life, especially those at the juncture of ethics, ecology and business, for example moral doubts raised in connection with food, or matters of the environment in which we live.

Young scholars from Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic took part in the conference. This is worth noting, as it permitted the exchange of views from within this region of Europe which is connected by a common history quite different from that of the other countries of our continent. It permits us to hope that these same scholars will in the future undertake some common research project.

Despite the great variety in its subject matter, certain common strands of thought can be found in this volume. One is that of freedom and the responsibility that rests on man and society alike not just for human

life but for that of the whole environment. Another question which interested many participants is the relationship between what we call the good of the individual and the common good. Many speakers held the conviction that contemporary ethics is, more or less clearly, based on or inspired by tradition, especially the Aristotelian tradition, as becomes clear in writers such as Alistair MacIntyre and Paul Ricoeur. The third question connecting some of the papers is whether we need a new ethics of some kind, which would take into consideration the challenges of the present day (animal rights, environmental demands, business conditions, feminist movements) or whether it would be enough if we were to define the subject of ethics in such a way that it would include not only man and his good.

The arguments presented here, whatever opposition they may provoke, are without doubt worthy of attention. The authors have demonstrated great care in their work and a good knowledge of the relevant literature.

I hope, therefore, that this volume will not only orient the reader in some ongoing ethical discussions, but also that he will find articles that broaden his philosophical knowledge and perhaps encourage him or her to undertake research in one of the directions suggested.

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Liberal Toleration, Rights and Moral Individualism

Probably most of us in the current liberal democracies tolerate things like abortion, homosexual marriage, assisted suicide, promiscuous sexual lifestyles and so on, because we tend to think that at least part of morality is a matter for the individual's conscience. Each person, we think, needs to decide the big questions of life for him or her self. It is against the dignity of human beings to compel people to decisions which are not theirs. Not to allow, say, a right to abortion would mean to show disrespect to people because each one of us is a unique creator of his or her own happiness. Because we understand people as moral persons, we believe that they have the capacity to form their own moral decisions and to act according to them. To force them to act in a certain way would mean to show them disrespect as moral subjects.

The aim of this paper is to show that the arguments for toleration just presented, though mainstream, are false. I divide my argument into two parts. First, I will sketch out the positions according to which people are different in their life-styles and therefore a unitary vision of the good for the whole of society is not possible. Due to the fact that we are different, we should tolerate life-styles which are not like ours, unless these interfere with people's rights. In the second part, I show why I think that this argument from rights for toleration tends to be inadequate. Even though there is no necessary connection between rights-based justification of toleration and moral individualism, rights-based justifications tend to presuppose an individualistic moral outlook. I will use some arguments by Joseph Raz to show that this moral outlook is false. Individual well-being is not possible if isolated from the good of society. Or, to use more technical language, it is false because not all intrinsic goods are of an individual nature.

We need on the one hand, therefore, to stop understanding individualistically arguments made for toleration on the basis of rights. On the other hand, we have to see rights as protecting not only individual freedom but also those collective goods which give individual freedom its meaning.

I.I

„A tolerant society is one which allows persons the freedom to act on their own self-chosen values"[1]. The value of equal respect is the reason for a tolerant society. „That is, persons have to respect one another as equals, this respect implying that each person recognizes others as capable and competent to form their own projects and plans of life"[2]. The opposite of a tolerant society is a paternalistic society, in which some personal choices have less weight than others, perhaps because they are considered by government as not right or not good. According however to supporters of the tolerant society, paternalism does not respect the obvious fact that people are different. „Nothing is more obvious than that people differ from one another. Some are pious, others are irreverent. Some prefer one sexual partner, others prefer a variety. Some are committed to developing their skills and talents to the maximum extent possible, and others are content to allow their lives to pass with passive intoxication of alcohol, television or other sources of gratification. Some seek active involvement in the affairs of the community; others prefer to cultivate their own gardens. And some have very strong views about the way in which their society is to be organized, whilst others are prepared to let every one go their own way"[3].

Robert Nozick, the famous philosophical opponent of the Rawlsian theory of justice, agrees: „People are different. They differ in temperament, interests, intellectual ability, aspirations, natural bent, spiritual quests,

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1   A. Weale, *Toleration, individual differences and respect for persons*, in: *Aspects of Toleration*. Ed. J. Horton, S. Mendus, London And New York, 1985, 29.
2   Ibidem, 29.
3   Ibidem, 16.

and the kind of life they wish to lead. They diverge in the values they have and have different weightings for the values they share. (They wish to live in different climates – some in mountains, plains, deserts, seashores, cities, towns.)"[4].

It seems that variety of life styles implies the individualistic conclusion that there is not one ideal of the good for everybody. As Nozick says, „There is no reason to think that there is one community which will serve as ideal for all people and much reason to think that there is not"[5]. Appiah agrees: „There is no general answer to the question how one should live one's life: not everyone should be a priest or a poet or a pipe fitter. There are lives worth living that focus on family, and others that center on work. Liberals are pluralists about human flourishing, holding that there are many ways for human beings to live good lives and many projects worth pursuing"[6].

In case those lines have left us still sceptical about the diversity of lifestyles, Nozick gives us a list of famous people who differ radically from each other over how one should lead one's life: „Wittgenstein, Elisabeth Taylor, Bertrand Russell, Thomas Merton, Yogi Berra, Allen Ginsburg, Harry Wolfson, Thoreau, Casey Stengel, the Lubavitcher Rebbe, Picasso, Moses, Einstein, Hugh Heffner, Socrates, Henry Ford..."[7].

I.II

The question is, if there is no one ideal way of conducting a human life, if we live and have to live in a pluralistic society, does this mean that there are no restrictions concerning how one may live? No. There are certain limits on how to live because people are social beings that live in societies. These limits, which we usually call rights, restrict our individual

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[4] R. Nozick, *Anarchy, state, and utopia*, Oxford 1993, 309.

[5] Ibidem, 310.

[6] A. K. Appiah, *Liberal education: the United States example*, in: *The Citizenship and Education in Liberal-Democratic Societies: Teaching for Cosmopolitan Values and Collective Identities*. Ed. K. Mcdonough, W. Feinberg, Oxford 2005, 56.

[7] Ibidem, 310.

pursuit of our interests and goals because of our common goal of minimal social cooperation and harmony. Citizens are free to make choices of any kind so long as they do not interfere with the equal rights of others. So to respect other people we need to respect their rights. Respect of others is realized by respecting their rights which we can picture as walls of individual personal freedom that cannot be crossed without consent.

Now, rights give us a reason for toleration. You or I may personally consider the decisions of other people to be plainly wrong or immoral. This kind of attitude to others is natural if people live according to different ideals of life. If their life-styles differ, their opinions as to the best life to live differ as well. The important point is, however, that so long as the decisions of a given person do not interfere with the rights of others, then to respect that person we need to tolerate him and not interfere with his decisions. I might personally think that deciding to abort is wrong or immoral. However, because women have certain rights (for example personal freedom, maybe even a right to abortion), to respect them as equal human beings I need to tolerate them and therefore overcome my inclination to interfere with their decisions.

This attitude towards others is, in a tolerant society, appropriate not only within personal relations, but also – and not less – in political ones. As Appiah says: „I as a liberal, regard it as proper for the state to allow you to do what is, in my judgment, plainly wrong, provided that in doing so, you interfere with no one's rights and have freely chosen to do it in pursuit of your aims and in the light of your own knowledge, your best understanding"[8]. Although I think that marriage is reserved only for heterosexual couples, I am not going to urge the state to interfere with your decision to marry a partner of the same sex if you are convinced that it is a good thing for you to do, but you must not interfere with my right and the rights of others to decide the question of marriage differently.

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[8]   Ibidem, 59.

II.

This paper shows that the arguments presented in part I are inadequate to justify liberal toleration. A rights-based justification of toleration influenced by an individualistic moral vision clearly presupposes the division of morality into two independent parts. One part of morality relates to each individual uniquely and is connected with the most important personal goals and interests (questions of abortion, type of marriage and so on). The second, objective, part relates to all individuals equally and defines their rights (and duties) to each other. If two separate kinds of morality really were to exist, it would imply that the value of individual goals is independent of what other people consider valuable. It would mean that individuals could realize their well-being irrespective of the well-being of others. This is, however, impossible (as will be shown later). If we do not relate the principles of individual and of inter-personal action to each other, than we will be unable to identify any of these principles. As Raz says, „The mistake is to think that one can identify, say, the rights of others, while being completely ignorant of what values make a life meaningful and satisfying and what personal goals one has in life. Conversely, it is also a mistake to think that one can understand the values which can give a meaning to life and have personal goals and ideals while remaining ignorant of one's duties to others"[9].

To see why the division of morality which right-based justifications of toleration presuppose is illusory, I need to demonstrate the falsity of moral individualism. Individualism can be described as a moral outlook according to which only individual goods can be intrinsically good. If true, it would mean that all other goods (public, collective, religious and so on) are only of instrumental value and cannot take priority over the individual. Individualism, therefore, denies that there exists any external moral standard governing individual behavior. Rights are thought to be trumps which provide for individuals the sphere of independence and personal liberty which is needed for the pursuit of personal goals and

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[9] Ibidem, 214.

values. The role of government is reduced to the protection of the rights and liberties of each individual. Toleration towards all kinds of behaviour or opinions is expected if these do not interfere with other individuals' rights.

I will argue, using the moral theory of Joseph Raz, that individualism which does not recognize the intrinsic value of any collective goods is not a sound moral conviction, simply because collective goods which are intrinsically valuable exist. And consequently, because the existence of collective goods cannot be derived from rights alone, rights cannot be the principles of objective morality. Therefore, there is no division of morality into two parts, subjective and objective.

This conclusion has strong implications for the morality of liberal toleration. According to individualistic rights-based justifications of toleration, we should tolerate behaviour which seems to us to be wrong, so long as it does not interfere with the rights of others. This claim is sound only if rights express those interests of individuals that protect the public good.

II.I

In his respected book *The Morality of Freedom*, Raz defines moral individualism as follows: „A moral theory will be said to be individualistic if it ... doesn't recognize any intrinsic value in any collective good"[10]. According to this individualistic approach to morality, „collective goods have instrumental value only"[11].

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[10] J. Raz, *The Morality of Freedom*, Oxford 1988, 198. Raz defines 'collective good' as inherent public good. Inherent public goods are general beneficial features of society. „Living in a society with these characteristics is generally of benefit to individuals... The benefits I have in mind are the more diffuse ones deriving from the general character of the society to which one belongs. Different people benefit from the good qualities of the society to different degrees. But the degree to which they benefit depends on their character, interests, and dispositions, and cannot be directly controlled by others." Ibidem, 199.

[11] Ibidem, 199.

Raz grounds justification of intrinsically valuable collective goods on the intrinsic value of autonomy. If personal autonomy is an intrinsic good, than at least some collective goods are intrinsically valuable[12]. This claim might seem to be implausible at first glance, because autonomy is an ideal of personal freedom, freedom to shape one's individual life as one wishes, irrespective of the desires of others or of society. If personal autonomy remains in opposition to any kind of paternalism, whether religious, cultural, or even moral, how it can be intrinsically related to any collective good?

To be able to make one's life autonomous, an individual must have the possibility of choosing from a variety of acceptable options. It is not possible to become an autonomous person if one lives, for example, on a desert island. We can therefore speak about autonomy in two senses: as an achievement, when a person becomes a fully autonomous person, and as a condition, in which an individual can choose from many different options. For an individual to have the possibility of achieving an autonomous life he must live in a society which allows him to choose from a 'sufficient range of significant options'[13]. So it follows that „if having an autonomous life is an ultimate value, then having a sufficient range of acceptable options is of intrinsic value, for it is constitutive of an autonomous life that it is lived in circumstances where acceptable alternatives are present"[14]. As Raz adds, „One cannot have an option to be a barrister, a surgeon, or a psychiatrist in a society where those professions, and the institutions their existence presupposes, do not exist"[15]. Social conditions which constitute such options are collective

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[12] See: ibidem, 203.

[13] See: ibidem, 204.

[14] Ibidem, 205. Raz distinguishes three categories of intrinsically valuable things: goods in themselves, constitutive goods and ultimate goods. Goods in themselves are goods which are valuable irrespective of what else exists. Constituent goods are goods which are elements of the good in itself. Ultimate goods are goods with ultimate value. That means that their value is not justified by reference to other values. Ultimate goods give us reasons, and elucidate, why a good is an intrinsic good. Ibidem, 200.

[15] Ibidem, 205.

goods. For example, *a tolerant society with many alternative options* or *a society with a legal profession* or *with an institution of marriage* are collective goods – because those benefits are not „voluntarily controlled by anyone other that the potential beneficiary"[16].

If the analysis presented succeeds in showing the intrinsic value of some collective goods, we have good reasons to deny the validity of moral individualism. If autonomy is a necessary component of human well-being and is at the same time an intrinsic good, then it is not possible for one's well-being to be independent of the well-being of others or of society, because an autonomous life cannot be lead if there are not sufficient options for an individual to choose from. These options are the goods constitutive of an autonomous life, which is the ultimate good, and their existence is connected with the existence of certain social forms and conditions. „Therefore that notion of an inherent general conflict between individual freedom and the needs of others is illusory. Though an individual's freedom, understood as personal autonomy, sometimes conflicts with the interests of others, it also depends on those interests and can be obtained only through collective goods which do not benefit anyone unless they benefit everyone"[17].

II.II

We are in a position to ask whether the existence of collective goods which are intrinsically valuable is derivable from rights. If it is not, rights cannot remain be first principles of an objective morality.

According to Raz, rights based on the interests of an individual ground the duties of others. An individual human being can claim a right if an important aspect of her well-being, her interest, is „a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under duty"[18]. It is important that not every interest, however, is a reason for holding some other person(s) under duty. There needs to be sufficient reason[19].

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[16] Ibidem, 206.
[17] Ibidem, 250.
[18] Ibidem, 166.
[19] See: ibidem, 202.

Let's consider examples of intrinsically collective goods such as *a beautiful town in a tolerant and cultured society, a society with legal and medical and similar professions, a society with the institution of marriage*, and so on. Is it possible that the intrinsic value of these collective goods could be derivable from rights?[20]. For this to be so, a person would have to have a right to the intrinsically collective goods just mentioned. Having this right presupposes having an interest in living in such societies. Is this kind of interest sufficient for holding some other person (s) under duty? It does not seem so. Even if I do have an interest in living in such a society this interest does not seem to be sufficient „to establish that I have a right to live in such society" and to impose a duty on anyone to make my society and environment such. The reason is that rights usually establish the duty of one person to another and no single person has a duty to provide collective goods for another individual. Collective goods, as general beneficial features of society, are inherently public, and so transcend the scope of single individuals. As Raz adds, „It does not follow that no one has such duties. I am inclined to say that the government has a duty to achieve all these goals or at least to try to do so. But its duty is not grounded in my interest alone. It is based on my interest and on the interests of everyone else"[21].

It is not only the existence of certain collective goods that rights cannot explain, but also the intrinsic good of autonomy, the existence of which is a condition of any collective good as well. First of all, rights reduce autonomy to the condition of autonomy protected by rights. If rights are first principles, then the virtue of autonomy, autonomous life for its own sake, cannot be derived from rights alone. Secondly, in order for autonomy to be possible many social forms must exist. If the individual had a right to autonomy, it would mean that all other individuals would have a duty to provide him with the social conditions necessary for an autonomous life. That would, however, be too burdensome for individuals, therefore, such right to autonomy does not exist[22].

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[20] See: ibidem, 194.
[21] Ibidem, 202.
[22] See: ibidem, 247.

To summarize. I opposed the claim that there are two independent parts of morality. There is only one comprehensive objective morality which includes personal goals and interests as well as interpersonal rights and duties to others. This conclusion is based on two premises. The first says that individualism, according to which the individual's well-being can be separated from the well-being of others, is false, because intrinsically valuable collective goods exist. The second premise says that the existence of collective goods is not derivable from rights, therefore rights cannot stand for first principles of objective morality.

To justify toleration we need to abandon the reduction of morality to rights that are shelters of our individual freedom from the interests of others. Rights must be understood to protect not only individual interests but, along with those same interests, also the interests of the whole society. It cannot be otherwise, because individual well-being is connected, through the existence of collective goods, with the well-being of others. In order for toleration to be compatible with morality it must not diminish collective goods, which are necessary components of each individual's well-being.

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The Communitarian Common Good and its Aristotelian Orgins

When one analyzes the condition of contemporary liberal societies, it is impossible not to notice their peculiar diversification and stratification, expressed in ever more explicit antagonisms occurring in particular social structures. Anthropological, ontological, and political issues are disputed in the fields of ethics and morals. The disparity of opinions originates in the way man is understood, and in particular in how his creative power, participation, self-creation and responsibility are understood. A very clear example of this dispute is the discussion between liberals and communitarians which has now been going strong for over thirty years. One of the key objectives of the supporters of communitarianism is to prove the weakness of the vision of the state offered by various forms of liberalism. John Rawls's *A Theory of Justice*, with its definition of justice as impartiality, is the starting point for their criticism of this doctrine[1]. Analyzing his proposal, communitarians say that it presents man as a being capable of abstracting its 'self' from its personal features. This understanding of man supposes that the self precedes the goods and goals that every individual has, meaning that there are no goods or goals constitutive of man. In liberalism, the only ability that is in any way constitutive is the arbitrary ability to choose between values,

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[1] According to Rawls, the principles of justice, which determine rights and obligations and regulate the distribution of social and economic benefits, should be defined in the form of a hypothetical agreement made by people who abstract from all aspects of their personal beliefs, being directed only by impartiality based on resignation from the achievement of individual or group benefits or successes. The two main principles coming from this project are that all citizens of a state are entitled to equal basic liberties, and that only those social and economic inequalities are acceptable which are advantageous for the most poorly situated members of the society. See: J. Rawls,. *A theory of justice*, Oxford 1999, 21-26.

goals, goods and lifestyles; this ability is at the same time the expression of the utmost liberty of the individual. A communitarian critique of liberalism has formed on the basis of the above analysis, its key claim being that there is no unconditioned self standing apart from our goals. Every individual is rooted from birth in some history, community, and tradition; the objectives pursued by the individual are therefore in some way predetermined, and constitutive of the individual. This means that the individual has certain roles laid upon him, and is obliged to achieve certain ends determined by the community in which he, or she, lives. Charles Taylor says that an individual's identity cannot be properly understood and identified without reference to other individuals. This reference is a language-determined dialogue through which people discover not only the meaning of their actions, but also the hierarchies of their goal-setting. Only through discovering this hierarchy can an individual become truly free. A person can only be free if he is able to find and achieve community-rooted goals, taking into consideration the good life of both the individual and the community[2].

The communitarian views presented are merely a narrow presentation of the postulate saying that the role of community in human life should be emphasized[3]. According to communitarians, humans can achieve fulfillment only in a community, because of the values, arising out of its tradition and history, that it incorporates. However, it is not enough to

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[2] See: Ch. Taylor, *The Ethics of Authenticity*, Cambridge 1993, 38-62, and his *Philosophical Arguments*, Cambridge 1996, 171-173.

[3] Emphasis on the role of community is a consequence of criticism of the justice concept proposed by John Rawls. According to Michael Walzer, nembers of a liberal society share no common political or religious traditions. They are able to tell only the story of themselves, which is a story of *ex nihilo* creation, beginning in the state of nature or in some primary situation. Everyone imagines himself as an absolutely free, unrestricted being, living his own life – and joins the community only to minimize risk. See M. Walzer,. The *Communitarian Critique of Liberalism*, Political Theory 18(1990)1, 81-96. The contractual nature of social relationships is based on the principle of freedom of association determined by free will, not supported by tradition or community history. This implies not only freedom to associate with any community of one's choice, but also freedom to quit it.

be born in a specific community. One should also identify oneself with it. To make this so, communitarians propose that the individual's goals should be identified with the community's goals. Does this claim have sufficient grounds to be considered? It is obvious that the currently dominant free market and the competitive principles related to it, being the achievements of liberalism and democracy, are contrary to any vision of common goals. Yet the communitarian postulate still plays a central role in political debate. One of the reasons for the continued vitality of this idea is its origin. To emphasize the role of community is nothing other than to refer to the vision of a common good, which has its roots in antiquity. Communitarians understand the common good either as acceptance of, and submission to, the historically formed values of a given community, or as the possibility of choosing the community's values through public debate in which as many society members as possible should participate[4]. Another communitarian interpretation of the common good is that people seek to belong to a community by discovering their own identities on the basis of virtues connected with the practices of defined social roles and with the traditions in which those practices are rooted. The community itself can also be interpreted as being the common good, based on deep relationships between its members who identify with their community and actively pursue its positive development. Here it is worth considering the justification of the common good conceived of in this way. What is the source of this idea, the key to understanding this postulate and the fundamental concepts which constitute it? I will try to demonstrate that this source lies in the philosophy of Aristotle, and concretely in its interpretation by communitarian philosophers.

To show the relationship between the Aristotelian and communitarian understandings of community we must first refer to the notion of human nature, as the description of the community in which man lives is determined by how he is understood. For Aristotle, every individual is a *politikon zoon* – a political animal. Man is endowed with reason, which

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4   See: A.MacIntyre, *After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory*, London 1985, 19-26.

enables him to judge what is right and what wrong, and with speech, which enables him to share his sentiments[5]. These judgments can take place only within a community whose chief goal is to pursue good, understood as the good life of its members.

Charles Taylor holds a similar view, stating that the human search for good is possible only in a society. Man cannot exist as the moral subject of his actions outside the community nor pursue his own good. According to Taylor, what an individual gains from society is not only support in realizing the good, but also the very possibility of seeking it[6]. Understanding the communitarian concept of the realization of good requires further reference to Aristotelian thought. Aristotle interpreted man as a dynamic being, constantly moving towards something. He claimed that anyone „moving towards" must have a defined something towards which to move, a definite end. The end determines the way in which it is approached – Aristotle interprets the *telos* itself as something achieved by an individual in the course of his development. Good is therefore to a certain extent determined by man's pursuit of it, it is not something permanent and invariable. Nor should it be identified with Plato's „idea", as good is closely related to the achievement of a rationally chosen end. Taylor is clearly making use of Aristotle in his discussion of self-realization through realization of one's good. Self-realization is always related to some end pursued by the individual. The end is connected with man's good because it is a point of reference for the individual through which he can relate to his rights and freedom. Each man's freedom of choice is meaningful only in the context of a worthwhile goal, which individuals can choose. Man can realize himself only through the rational choice of superior goods, which order life and make it better. Superior/ higher-order goods constitute man's identity and cause his activity while at the same time imposing on him certain obligations. These are not absolute obligations, as the order of goods depends to a great extent on people, who create it through articulation in language[7].

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[5]   See: Aristotle, *Politics*, 1253a.
[6]   See: Ch. Taylor, *The Nature and the Scope of Distributive Justice*, Cambridge 1995, 292-304.
[7]   See: Ch. Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern* Identity, Cambridge 1992, 88-101.

Referring to the human *telos* and emphasizing the significance of the function each person has to play in the community, Alasdair MacIntyre uses the notion of practice, which means „any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity"; when practical activity is conceived thus, human ability to achieve perfection and human understanding of goals and goods are systematically enhanced[8]. Striving for perfection in a specific field enhances not only the given practice, but also the community involved in the practice. Models of perfection, or virtues, exist in the practice itself. They are therefore neither arbitrary nor created by the individual[9].

According to MacIntyre, it is not enough to base understanding of virtues on the concept of practice. All goods typical of practices are always limited in some way; a goal is needed that will overcome this limitation. Such a goal would be the good of an entire life, understood as a unity[10]. MacIntyre claims that not only those qualities that are necessary for achieving the goods typical of practices are virtues, but also those that contribute to the good of life as a whole, and that are related to man's pursuit of good within the framework of an ongoing social tradition.

To illustrate other connections between communitarian theory and Aristotelian philosophy let us look more closely at the very concept of community. According to Michael Sandel, a community is not only what individuals have as citizens, but also who they are[11]. Community members do not so much choose to be involved in a relationship with others as oblige themselves to belong to a given community. In Taylor's opinion this means that the morality of a given community is not determined by the internal voice of individuals but rather is based on

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[8]   See: A. MacIntyre, ibidem, 187.
[9]   See: P. Śpiewak, *W stronę wspólnego dobra* [Towards the Common Good], Warsaw 1998, 259.
[10] See: A. MacIntyre, ibidem, 201-3.
[11] See: M. Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*, Cambridge 1982, 150.

those individuals' identification with the community. Taylor understands this identification as a strong interpersonal bond, taking the form of patriotism. This understanding of community bonds was already present in the thought of Aristotle, who referred to it as *politikos*. In antiquity *politikos* was understood as the entirety of social life; it was not limited to public activities, but also comprised personal relationships between citizens. It was for this reason that Aristotle applied the same criterion to moral evaluation of the individual and of the community. Of course, Aristotle's views[12] were directly conditioned by the size of contemporary states. The Greek city-state, occupying a small area and having by our standards a small number of citizens, furnished conditions advantageous for the growth of numerous personal bonds between all the members of the state community.

Aristotle held that the state is an educator, because the Greek understanding of the notion *politikos* equated the realm of morality and the realm of public life. Michael Sandel similarly excludes the possibility of the existence of a neutral state. He claims that politics is of particular importance for a community's life, as it is protects and promotes the values of a given community's values. A procedural state, as proposed by Rawls, is not able to secure permanence of civic goods and virtues, as it is not able to raise mature citizens, capable of managing their common goods. According to Sandel, citizens will only develop such skills with the support and involvement of a common field, namely the field of politics. The objective is to develop the power of self-government among community members through deliberate state action. Participation in community life is an expression of individual freedom properly understood. This

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[12] It seems that Aristotle dedicated 2 books of his *Nicomachean Ethics* to the idea of friendship precisely because of the important role of personal relationships between the participants of public life in politics and therefore in ethics. This is the foundation for the formation of human associations, meaning that the state owes its origins to friendship as well. Friendship and unanimity within the state reinforce the solidarity of community members. Citizens of a *polis* whoare bound by friendship need no justice, as they have the same wishes for each other, or engage in mutual exchange. See: K. Leśniak, *Arystoteles [Aristotle]*, Warsaw 1989, 86-87.

understanding of freedom is related to the implementation of a politics of the common good, the objective of the entire political community[13].

One of the principal communitarian ideas is that human identity is largely constituted by the community and by discovery of the purposes, roles and obligations of the human being. However, these obligations are not limited to individual members of the community. The community itself has also certain obligations to its members. Among the most important of these obligations is the formation of the civic character of its members and making a shared vision of the good life a reality. Education was also for Aristotle a principle purpose of the *polis*. He held that virtuous citizens must be the foundation of a state mindful of the common good, and that therefore education should be based on the perfection and development of virtues in public life[14]. Education must not be limited to teaching which virtues are appropriate in a given situation, but must lead to self-knowledge and understanding of one's actions. It must therefore incorporate the virtue of prudence[15]. MacIntyre likewise emphasizes the importance of this virtue. When engaging in a practice and pursuing virtue, people order their actions not in regard to their own needs or their own concept of good, but are guided by their own recognition and understanding of the practice in question, and organize their purposes and activities in accordance with that recognition. This recognition depends on each one's degree of familiarity with the practice, with authorities and role models, as well as on self-analysis, on the seeking of one's own identity and role in the community. The meaning of a given judgment is therefore related to a unique human experience, to the context in which it is made, and to the purposes of the practice to which the judgment refers, but it is also related to the collective experience of the entire community[16]. All these components

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[13] See: M. Sandel, *Democracy's Discontent. America in Search of a Public Philosophy*, Cambridge 1996, 4-26.

[14] See: E. Podrez, „Aksjologiczne podłoże związków etyki z polityką" [Axiological Grounds of the Connections between Politics and Ethics], *Studia Philosophiae Christianae* 40 (2004)I, 110-111.

[15] See: P. Śpiewak, ibid., 120-121.

[16] See: A. MacIntyre, ibid., 232-241.

that constitute the meaning of an opinion, are combined in the virtue called *phronesis*, prudence. It is the use of prudence, or practical wisdom, in debates setting moral standards, that enables the community to pursue the common good of its members.

For a community to enable an individual to pursue his *telos*, it must guarantee some social order, minimizing conflicts arising from individuals' pursuit of their specific goals. For Aristotle, the foundation of such a social order was justice[17]. This concept is also important for communitarians in their critique of John Rawls's principles of justice. They notice a certain tension among his principles which appears in the establishment of specific legal norms. This tension is due to the contradiction between an individual's right to liberty and the principle of realizing an individual's personal talents or preferences. An individual entitled to basic liberties and free to choose his life pattern must also resign from these liberties in favour of the poorest citizens (through serving them with his abilities, funds, or other resources). What is more, the individual who is better off must subsidize even those those who of their own choice have limited access to social goods[18].

Summing up, it is clear that it is not easy to characterize the communitarian concept of the common good because of the wide variety of views in the current of thought under this name. Turning to the work Aristotle we cannot not only show the sources of the communitarian idea

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[17] According to Aristotle, justice guaranteed correct interpretation of rights on the basis of what is just. Because law tends to be too general for particular cases, applying it rigorously can bring about consequences quite opposite to those intended. The role of justice is to supply for the generality and inflexibility of written laws in particular cases. However, for Aristotle justice in the life of the community is primarily a moral virtue, meaning human perfection in relationships with other people. This perfection is based on equating other people's good with one's own good. In this interpretation, justice is a combination of all the other qualities and virtues that refer to human co-existence because it is the only virtue that directly refers to interpersonal relations by its very nature. See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1129a 32-1130a 3.

[18] See: W. Kymlicka, *Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction*, Oxford 1990 77-81.

of the common good, but are also enabled to make structured analysis of this concept. Like Aristotle, communitarians tend to present the common good on the basis of a specific concept of man understood as a social being. Where we were born and where we live not only constitutes our identity but also influences our understanding of values and virtues, in other words, determines our morals. Any particular understanding of our values carries within it implied means of achieving certain goals, and thus also the implied essence of those goals. Choosing appropriate goods and discovering his goals, man must fulfill the roles established for him by the community. Fulfillment of a given role is related to the practice of its realization, which is rooted in the history and traditions of the given community. The concept of practice refers to models of perfection in performing an activity, and thus allows for the unique role of virtues in the realm of social life. Not only do virtues determine the proper understanding of practice, but also they also connect practices with the project of a good life and the tradition of the entire community.

The creation and practical implementation of a project of the good life can be a key purpose of the Aristotelian city-state and of the communitarian community only if political and public actions are not differentiated from moral attitude. The concept of a common good can rise on the foundation of a given social structure only if there is a strong relationship between the choice of means used for achieving specific purposes and the moral interpretation and justification of those means. If we want to discuss the very idea of the common good, we must accept the existence of anethics directed towards the project of the good life and also permanently bound to the political realm. The organization of common social structures, as well as the organization of individuals' lives, must become a coherent whole, similar to that suggested by Aristotle on the basis of the *politikos* concept. When politics is unified with morals, common good can on the one hand mean community-guaranteed education of its members on the basis of the virtues, and on the other, involve active participation of the maximum possible number of people in building the stability of and developing the community to which they belong and with which they identify themselves. A community

should therefore engage in educating its members in accordance with its values and the shared concept of the virtue-based life, so that they are afterwards capable of taking an active part in the pursuit of the common good. Education should enhance self-awareness and practical wisdom, or prudence. This virtue – *phronesis* – is indispensable in discussion of a community's shared standards. This common discussion, based on the historically developed values, practices and traditions of the community, is the fullest realization of the community's common good.

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MacIntyre's view of telos as a critical response to Hume's thesis

Introduction

The aim of the paper is to present two distinct notions of reason (thus also two distinct notions of human nature) with respect to ethics and practical conduct. The first one – the Humean notion – considerably restricts the role of reason in practical conduct while the second one – MacIntyre's neo- Aristotelian notion – allows reason a more significant role.

The paper consists of two parts. In the first I will present Hume's account of reason and its consequences for ethics and practical conduct. In the second, I will try to put forward possible arguments against Hume's thesis and the Humean notion of reason with the help of Alistair MacIntyre (and Elizabeth Anscombe) and also to offer an alternative concept of human nature by MacIntyre. At the end of the second part and in the conclusion, I will analyze whether MacIntyre's notions fall prey to Hume's thesis and whether MacIntyre, in basing his idea of man's flourishing on factual grounds, commits the naturalist fallacy.

Hume's Thesis

This statement on morality, or rather, depiction of a certain questionable relation in terms of language of morals, provoked thought and has inspired philosophers and ethicists up to the present day. The statement was made by David Hume in his *Treatise of Human Nature* and it is as striking as it is ambiguous in its consequences for any theory of morals:

„In every system of morality, I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of

reasoning, and establishes the being of God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations and propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For, as this ought, or ought not, express some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be obserev'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it"[1].

In short, what is Hume saying here is that the relation among what we now call evaluative judgements (what ought/ought not to be) and factual ones (what is/is not) is logically dubious at least or, taking into consideration the whole text of the *Treatise*, that the nature of evaluative judgements is so distinct from factual ones that there is no way to infer logically[2] the former from the latter. What is so problematic about these 'ought statements' and why such a harsh conclusion?

As I see it, the philosophical background of Hume's consists of two main arguments. Each argument is somehow related to Hume's notion of reason and its capacities. Let us begin with a brief analysis of these capacities, and then proceed to explication of the arguments.

In his *Treatise* Hume introduces two ways in which understanding is to be executed, from *demonstrative* and *probable* judgements. The former provide us with information about the abstract relations of our ideas (mathematical truths), the latter with about relations of real objects of our experience[3], more specifically, their causal relations. However, Hume

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[1]   D. Hume, *The treatise on human nature*, http://www.philosophia.cl/biblioteca/hume. htm, 243.

[2]   Let's have two factual sentences from which we infer evaluative ones: „John feels pain" „We *ought not to* cause him pain". How could that be? The inference is more comprehensive with the implementation of a second premise that „Feeling pain is *bad*". However, this is an evaluative statement already and it is unclear in what relation this premise stands to the first one. The case is similar in the inference e.g. that „Robert beats his children". „Robert *ought not to* beat his children", which stands and falls upon the complementing premise that „Beating your children is *bad*".

[3]   See: D. Hume, op. cit., 214.

claims that neither of these can provide us with *motivation* for action when we are deciding what to do. The impulse to act must always come from passion. All that the above-mentioned capacities of reason can do is to inform us and discover the causes and effects among the objects of the outside world and thus to give us information as to where a feeling of either satisfaction or uneasiness may be found. Reason's capacities are thus mostly of instrumental, bur never of motivational use. As Hume points out: „Where the objects themselves do not affect us, their connexion can never give them any influence; and 'tis plain, that as reason is nothing but the discovery of this connexion, it cannot be by its means that the objects are able to affect us"[4]. Reason alone (neither demonstrative nor probable) is incapable of causing an action and it is Hume's famous statement that: „Reason is, and ought only to be the slave to the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them"[5].

Now, this was the first part of Hume's argument: Reason's capacities are restricted to a strictly descriptive function having no motivational force and leaving this force to passions.

Let us now think of language. If I say that „X is made of wood„, I make a descriptive statement on how the things in the world *are*. Using Hume's own term, I can say that I am expressing a 'belief'. But if I say that „Y is blameable„ and that therefore „We ought not do Y„, (that is, I am prescribing an action, I am not saying anything about the world as it is), then what I am doing here (and let's bear Hume's conclusion about the nature of motivation of any action in mind) is, as Kolář comments on Hume, expressing a wish; how I *would like* the world to be. I am expressing a 'desire'[6]. The problem however is that while the former type of expression could be confuted empirically[7], this is impossible to do with

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[4] Ibidem, 215.

[5] Ibidem, 215.

[6] See: P. Kolář, V. Svoboda, *Logika a etika: Úvod do metaetiky*, Praha 1997,155.

[7] The *truth*, for Hume, is a matter of copying and forming of adequate representations. Falsity of a statement or belief thus „…consists in the disagreement of ideas, consider'd as copies, with those objects, which they represent ". D. Hume, op. cit., 215. On the other hand, a passion: „…contains no representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification ". D. Hume, op. cit., 215)

the latter. The question of whether „…desires match with the reality (are true or false) does not make any sense"[8]. Or can we quarrel about what ought to be?

This is Hume's second important conclusion: not only are we motivated by desires, denying to reason any motivating capacity, but these desires are indifferentiable in terms of true/false distinction since only statements about the relation of our ideas to each other, or about facts of existence, can be true or false, that is, statements where demonstrative or probable reasoning is applied. The difference is further stressed by Hume: „Actions may be laudable or blameable: but they cannot be reasonable: Laudable or blameable, therefore, are not the same with reasonable or unreasonable"[9].

Such conclusions however have serious consequences for ethics and the philosophy of action. If our actions are to be motivated solely by desires and if, as we have seen, no rational debate concerning desires is possible, then neither any action of ours nor any prescriptive/restrictive evaluative judgement (what ought/ought not be) is rationally justifiable. In other words, unless we do not agree with others in our passions, we lack means sufficient to persuade anybody about what ought/ought not be done. The only thing we are allowed to criticize are the means of pursuing our goals, but certainly not *what* goals we pursue (thus leaving the question of „what goals to pursue" aside).

The limits of such a discussion would probably look like this: you say that X is made of wood and I've verified empirically that you're right and I agree with you. But, you say also that Y is blamable but I've found nothing blamable in Y and I don't know what you are talking about. I think that you just want Y to be blamable and to discourage people of doing it, but you have not convinced me.

I have briefly sketched briefly sketched the Humean arguments Humean arguments for the impossibility of the is/ought inference. In the next section, I will try to provide counterarguments for these, as well as for Hume's account of reason and passion.

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8   P. Kolář, V. Svoboda, op. cit., 155.
9   D. Hume, op. cit., 273.

Possibilities of MacIntyre's response to Hume's thesis

To present the counterarguments to Hume's thesis, I will now analyse two of MacIntyre's notions important in this respect. They are the notion of a *functional term* and the notion of human *flourishing*.

MacIntyre claims that there are terms, and he calls them *functional terms*, on the basis of which it is possible to infer a valid evaluative conclusion from factual premises. One of MacIntyre's reflections in his *After Virtue* goes like this[10]: Think of the adjective *to be good*. We understand what we mean by a *good watch*, or a *good farmer*. A good watch measures time correctly; a good farmer gets the largest amount of crop together etc. We recognize these as *good* according to the function they carry out. However, the accomplishment of these functions is being carried out in the world of verifiable facts. To call someone a *good* or *bad farmer* is thus a verifiable, factual statement. Using such terms, we are defining activities, which a good farmer *ought to do*: „…the concept of a watch cannot be defined independently of the concept of a good watch nor the concept of a farmer independently of that of a good farmer; and that the criterion of something's being a watch and the criterion of something's being a good watch – and so also for 'farmer' and for all other functional concepts – are not independent of each other"[11]. The adjective *to be good* (or bad) primarily defines a function verifiable in experience. Tell me that this watch does not measure time correctly and I can immediately make an evaluative judgement, that this watch is bad. At first glance, this observation in itself says nothing revolutionary about the nature of our practical conduct in its complexity. But it does at least imply how, in certain circumstances, the is/ought inference is to be made. Moreover, it is obvious that the 'ought' of the good farmer or the good watch is not the moral 'ought'. Of course, we would be able to speak of the moral 'ought', if we were able to speak of *the good man* as a functional term, in other words, if we knew the *telos* of the term man – a

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[10] See: A. MacIntyre, *Ztráta cnosti*, translated from English by P. Sadílková and D. Hoffman,Praha 2004, 75-77.
[11] Ibidem, 76.

goal towards which man's life is aimed. But is this possible? Do we know what this function might be and is it possible to back it up with factual (descriptive) statements?

In her article *Modern Moral Philosophy*, Elizabeth Anscombe re-introduces the Aristotelian notion of *flourishing*: „It would be possible to bring out a different point by enquiring about the transition from „is" to „needs"; from the characteristics of *an organism to the environment that it needs*, for example. To say that it needs that environment is not to say, e.g., that you want it to have that environment, but that it won't *flourish* unless it has it. Certainly, it all depends whether you *want it* to flourish as Hume would say,"[12]. And, „…there is no necessary connection between what you can judge the plant „needs" and what you want. But there is some sort of *necessary connection between what you think you need, and what you want*"[13] [are my italics, not her's].

We can put it like this. Say [in the sense of „let us suppose"] that an organism, in order to flourish, needs to be directed towards a certain telos, to fulfil a certain function. It won't flourish unless this function is being carried out, and it won't be carried out unless the environment fulfils certain criteria.

The cleverness of this observation, considering Hume's notion of reason, consists in an observation that what the organism needs is independent of our wanting it to need it (or e.g., our wanting it to need something else) or, more importantly for our purposes here, if the organism is us, that there is a gap between what we *think* we need, and thus 'ought' to do, and what we want. This 'ought' however, meets certain independent factual requirements.

MacIntyre further elaborated this notion of flourishing with respect to humans. His notion of flourishing is Aristotelian, though modified to a certain degree and rather complex. I have implied already that flourishing consists in the exhibition of a certain function – telos

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[12] G. E. M., Anscombe, *Modern Moral Philosophy*, in: Philosophy 33(1958)124, http://www.philosophy.uncc.edu/mleldrid/cmt/mmp.html, my italics.

[13] Ibidem, my italics.

specific for a particular species. And as MacIntyre maintains, this or that particular species will not flourish unless it develops distinctive powers that it possesses *qua* member of that species[14]. So I will reduce the question to that of what these specific powers are that we need to develop in order to be human.

What is the obvious difference between the telos of a plant or an animal and its needs, and the telos of a man and man's needs? It is precisely that above-mentioned tension of our everyday experience, the tension between what we *want* and what we *think* we need. As MacIntyre writes: „…the question 'Why should I do this rather than that?' becomes from an early age inescapable and it is characteristic of human beings that their replies to this question can themselves always be put in question, and that, when those replies are put in question, that further question can only be answered, rather than avoided or ignored, by evaluating the practical reasoning that issued in or was presupposed by their actions"[15].

Thus, what needs to be secured for us to flourish is a *transition* from our merely having reasons for actions (having desires), to our being able to stand back and evaluate our reasons for actions (desires) as good or bad, and by so doing to change our reasons for acting and in consequence our actions[16].

MacIntyre has never underestimated the motivating force of desire in practical conduct; he stresses that: „The notion of acting without desire is itself a phantasy and a dangerous one"[17]. What is at stake here is that in order to become fully human we have to be capable of not only finding means for the satisfaction of our passions and desires but also of *transforming* these passions and desires using the capacities of reason. Thus the question of proper emotional responses is introduced. However, for me, an obtrusive problem arises here: let us say that I am a perfect independent practical reasoner. Does the possibility of me evaluating

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[14] See: A. MacIntyre, *Dependent Rational Animals*, Illinois 1999, 64.

[15] Ibidem, 67.

[16] See: ibidem, 72.

[17] Ibidem, 70.

and eventually modifying and changing my reasons for action make me morally good? Does it make me a good human being or is there something else still missing?

A positive answer to these questions would present a serious challenge to Hume's thesis since, as MacIntyre claims, what ought be done and which necessary characteristics of the environment are to be fulfiled for a man to flourish do not depend on his will and can be identified on factual grounds (for humans as well as animals)[18]. On the other hand, to put the question of the evaluative 'ought' on factual, descriptive grounds would mean to commit a naturalist fallacy[19].

MacIntyre's answer is, in my opinion, positive, though at the same time a little complicated, as it is careful not to commit the fallacy. MacIntyre holds that a man becoming an independent practical reasoner inevitably acquires *virtues* in this process. Thus, a man exerting the powers of independent practical reasoning is inevitably a *virtuous man*[20]. He possesses the „qualities of mind and character that enable

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[18] So for a man to become an independent practical reasoner many factual threats and dangers must be avoided. Some of them threaten the flourishing of mere animals, that is „diseases, injuries, predators, malnutrition and starvation", some of them threaten the child's linguistic and reason-evaluating capacities, for example „failure to provide adequate stimulus to brain activity, mental retardation, autism, anxiety-engendering insecurity, conditions that render a child unable to control its aggression, too much fear, insufficient hopefulness" etc. Ibidem, 72.

[19] The naturalist fallacy is the argument of intuitionist G. E. Moore. The naturalist fallacy is committed by those who attempt to reduce the term „good" to an empirically available natural quality.

[20] Here the notion of „the others" is of crucial importance. For, as MacIntyre stresses, in articulating ourselves adequately (avoiding ego-distortions), we are dependent upon what we learn from relevant others and whether we are able to justify our reasons for action in front of these relevant others. As he writes: „When adequate self-knowledge is achieved, it is always a shared achievement." A. MacIntyre, *Dependent Rational Animals*, op. cit., 95) Thus, in order to become independent practical reasoners, we have to exercise e.g. the virtue of honesty and truthfulness to ourselves and to others as well as be able to offer sound justification of our deliberations and actions. Furthermore, a bond of receiving and giving is beginsto take place here. For MacIntyre, the character of this bond is more that of a caring and mutual friendship than that of a selfish taking of „the other" as means for fulfilment of my personal goals, a mere help to my self-clarification, hence adequate self-clarification presupposes the development of moral as well as intellectual virtues.

someone both to recognize the relevant goods and to use the relevant skills in achieving them"[21]. Such a man executes the virtue of *phronesis* or intelligence, that part of reason which, for Aristotle, guides man in practical matters, disclosing to him the nature of the good and the bad[22] and such a man will thus make good choices. The independent practical reasoner is inevitably a good human being.

The final question is: does MacIntyre commit the naturalist fallacy? The answer is rather complicated. On one hand, we can say that the naturalist fallacy is elegantly avoided since it is not clear what the virtuous man ought to do in each particular case or moral conflict with which he has to cope. There is no stable rule of conduct; rather it is the virtue of phronesis that enables man to „recognize what goods are at stake in this or that particular situation"[23] and which rules to follow. What choices the virtuous man will make, which goods he will recognize in what situations, we are not familiar with. On the other hand, as soon as we identify the independent practical reasoner with a good man and we are aware of the descriptive background needed for his or her emergence, we have in my opinion already commited the fallacy. Thus Marián Kuna analyses Gomez-Lobo's argument against Aristotle's supposed naturalism. According to Gomez-Lobo, Aristotle is not a naturalist since his notion of man's function is neutral and descriptive and thus it does not provide us with any evaluative judgement. There is a difference between a man having a certain function and a man exercising that function *well*[24]. However, applying this on MacIntyre's reflections won't work, since while exercising the function of an independent practical reasoner, we are disposed and inclined to make good choices, and we exercise this function well.

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[21] Ibidem, 92.

[22] See: Aristoteles, *Etika Nikomachova*, translated from Ancient Greek by A. Kříž, Vimperk 1996, 1140b.

[23] A. MacIntyre, *Dependent Rational Animals*, op. cit., 92.

[24] See: M. Kuna, *Hume on the Limits of Reason in the Realm of the Practical: Some Aristotelian Observations*, Organon F14 (2007)3, 316.

Conclusion

MacIntyre first offers an argument on the level of language, showing that what Hume omits in his theory of morals is the notion of a telos, a goal which in fact defines what its bearer ought to do. Two characteristics of this telos are important. Firstly, the telos of every species, and thus the conditions under which the species will be flourish, is a matter of fact, and secondly, with the telos being a matter of fact, a distinction between good and bad desires can be made and thus reason introduced into the realm of practical conduct. Good desires (the virtues) are constitutive of man's flourishing *qua* human being, since they are helpful in carrying out man's specific function – the telos. The problem is however with the naturalist fallacy. Does the fact of carrying out a function, which is objective in the sense that we are capable of defining this function in descriptive terms, make us good human beings? As Gary Watson puts it, one of the problems with virtue ethics is that by trying to speak descriptively about human nature and its flourishing, it may reduce the judgements about good to judgements about *health*, and thus conceive of morality in terms of mere health and defect[25]. As I see it, two alternatives are possible here. Either we could understand the telos in descriptive terms, take it as morally relevant and thus commit the fallacy, or we can claim that the notion of human nature (its function and flourishing) is purely descriptive, similar e.g. to the notion of a plant or animal, but that what is morally relevant is the exercising of this function well. In both cases, and with respect to Hume's thesis, there is room for doubting that we have said anything important on the distinctive nature of evaluative judgements and the role of reason in morals. However, MacIntyre's alternative is still one difficult to pin down. It seems somehow to occupy an area between these extreme positions, standing on the contentious premise that while becoming what we are, that is, independent practical reasoners (fully developed human beings) we create bonds to others, bonds that are inevitably ethical. This premise will have to be explored in more detail.

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[25] See: *Identity, Character, Morality*, eds. O. Flangan, A. O. Rorty, Cambridge Massachusetts 1990, 462-463.

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Responsibility as Understood by Martin Buber

Introduction

In the thought of the Jewish author and representative of dialogue philosophy, Martin Buber, responsibility is a particularly important, broad and complex matter. For the author of „I and Thou" „to live means to be questioned"[1] and, it should be added, to respond with one's life[2]. The whole of man's existence, of a fully authentic personal life, is a dialogue with God, conducted through the medium of the world. Life is a continuous listening to His Word, a listening that remains a reception of this Word and a responsible answer to it.

This essay is intended to bring the structure of „responsibility" as perceived by Buber closer to the reader. I identify weaknesses as well as strengths of his approach. I also consider whether Buber's „concept of responsibility" can be used to solve some contemporary ethical dilemmas.

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[1] M. Buber, *Zwischprache,* In: Martin Buber, *Werke I. Schriften zur Philosophie*, 217: *Dialog*, in : M. Buber, *Ja i Ty. Wybór pism filozoficznych*, trans. from German J. Doktór, Warsaw 1992.

[2] For the author „I and Thou" dialogue becomes a model of responsibility. There are two elements: drawing somebody's attention and the answer. (See: J. Gorczyca, „O odpowiedzialności w dialogu z Martinem Buberem" [On Responsibility, in dialogue with Martin Buber], *Forum Philosophicum* 1(1996), 47). He derives „responsibility" (*die Verantwortung*) from „respond" (*antworten*).

Responsibility and truth

In the thought of the author of „I and Thou" the authentic attitude of man, the path to the truth of personal existence, is expressed above all in man's readiness to give a responsible response, yet also in his authentic engagement with that which is. The very answering, the entering into the relationship, becomes an experience, an embodiment of the truth[3].

Our path to the truth of our own personal existence and at the same time to God's truth is the attitude of dialogue; it realizes itself in us and for us in the encounter with God. A person genuinely seeks and addresses God when he is involved in this relation; when he responsibly answers His call, His word that is His creation, and interacts with that creation, thus establishing a bond. Nevertheless, mere encounter with a being, an object, another human or a spiritual entity, does not yet make the truth complete. The inherited truth (the truth of our humanity) is fully realized only by a genuine, fully conscious and intimate relationship with God, in other words by prayer. This is how Buber himself states it: „Every particular Thou is a glimpse through to the eternal Thou; **by means of** every particular Thou the primary word addresses the eternal Thou. Through this mediation of the *Thou* of all beings fulfilment, and non-fulfilment, of relations comes to them: the inborn *Thou* is realised in each relation and consummated in none. It is consummated only in the direct relation with the *Thou* that by its nature cannot become *It*[4].

Responsibility and faith

Faith is perceived by Buber in a similar way. He views faith as neither the acknowledgement as true of some doctrines, nor as conversion,

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[3] On truth in Buber's philosophy see: M. K. Kraszewski, *Dwie koncepcje prawdy a dwoistość odniesienia człowieka do rzeczywistości. Buberowska krytyka grecko – łacińskiego rozumienia prawdy* [Two concepts of truth and the twofold relation of man to reality. The Buberian critique of the Graeco-Latin understanding of truth]: master's thesis, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University, 2002; see also, M. K. Kraszewski, *'Emet', Presentations* 2(2005)10, 20-23.

[4] See: M. Buber, *I and Thou*, trans. R.G. Smith, 2nd ed., London, Continuum 2004, 61.

the turning of an individual or groups of individuals towards the same object of worship and their accepting it. According to Buber, faith is the expression of man's authentic loyalty towards being or God, but also his willingness to remain in this living bond with reality and God[5].

Outlining his perception of faith, Buber states that every human being that is born into the world appears as God's creation, as a son of the living God, as one who is predestined to remain in a special bond with the Being of all beings, as one who is destined to realize that bond by means of God's grace given to him and by personal involvement of his will and reason. Man as a person realizes that as it were innate relation, he realizes that to which he has been called. He becomes what he is supposed to become, a person, when he becomes in reality the brother of his own brother, when he follows faithfully the guidance of his Creator, when he truly „responds" with his life to the him whom he has met on the path of life.

The structure of responsibility

Delving, however, into the issue of responsibility itself and outlining its structure, some things cannot be passed over. According to Buber, in *I and* Thou, God, addresses (whom?) every individual person (how?) without any initial conditions, without asking whether we will even accept (what?) responsibility (for what?) for that which He entrusts to us. So He does this as though His trust towards us was enough to make responsibility an unconditional duty or even a demand, binding us absoutely. What is more, the manner in which He does this makes our indifference or refusal mean, on our part, disregard for His trust, unfaithfulness, falsehood, a fall into guilt, or moral evil[6].

As a first note to the above paragraph, it should be said that man's 'turning' towards God has a metaphysical dimension. In this sense morality supposes an ontic foundation. As a second note: God's trust

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[5] Further description of faith in the context truth, as perceived by the author of "Ja i Ty" can be found in: M. K. Kraszewski, op. cit., 64-75 and 115-124.

[6] See. J. Gorczyca, op. cit., 45.

is ultimately trust in His own creation. God saw and found that His Creation was good, as Genesis says, and creation can, which He saw and found good, as the Book of Genesis says. Therefore Creation can, having potential, reveal itself as good.

The Almighty addresses man with complete trust and, as a consequence, with a demand for responsibility. He demands that (who?) we should be ready to answer (to Whom?) Him in reply (to what?) to His word, i.e. whatever meets us in each particular moment. Each moment, each situation, appears then to each one as the complete trust of God in him and as God's expectation of his response, proportionate to the gift he has received, in that situation. In short, man cannot simply remain indifferent to these situations but must rather respond to what he meets. (How?); with either a specific, decisive and fully conscious action or with fully conscious inaction. „We make a response to the moment" as Buber puts it, „but at the same time we react to it and take responsibility for it. We have been entrusted with a newly-conceived particularity of the world and we are responsible for it. A dog glanced at you – you are responsible for that glance; a child grabbed your hand – you are responsible for that touch; a crowd is swarming around you – you are responsible for its troubles"[7].

„Responsibility that does not respond to the word is a metaphor of morality. Genuine responsibility occurs only when there exists an authority to which we are answerable for our actions, whereas 'self-responsibility' becomes real only when our 'self' or ego, to which we must answer, is something unconditional. However one who is exercisi real dialogue responsibility does not need to name the author of the word to which he responds. He knows him in the substance of the word, which, insisting and forcing its way in, in the key of some internal depth, reaches the core of the heart. One can defend oneself with all one's strength from „God's" presence and still taste Him in the intimate sacrament of dialogue"[8].

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[7] M. Buber, *Dialog*, op. cit., 224.

[8] Ibid., 224-225. According to Buber, even a person claiming to be an atheist, may „unconsciously but correctly utter You" to the creation, thus providing an answer to the Ancient

Responding then to that word/call coming from the depths of particularity, we are simultaneously responsible for (for what or whom?) that very particularity to (Whom?) the One (God) who entrusted that particularity to us in giving it being.

We already know „who" is obliged by „Whom", „how" and „to do what". We also know „Who" is the one asking, „who" is being asked, and that „who" is accountable before „Whom", and „for what" this „who" is responsible. Moreover, we know that giving an answer „to" we are also accountable simulataneously „for something" and „before Somebody". Are there are any criteria or gauges („according to what"?) of responsibility? According to what norms, rules and principles are we answerable for something or answer it? It is noteworthy that in Buber's case there is a certain certain problem with this. As he himself admits, Buber distances himself decidedly from „iron" rules or codes of behavior. He is strongly in favour of the responsibility of the moment, to which none of the universal, common and as it were pre-established codes of behavior or ethical standards can be applied. In his view, each and every moment of our lives is unique and irreplicable, and that is exactly how it should be perceived by us. Responsibility, says Buber, like faith,

„… is not a catalogue of rules, in which one can always find an indication of how concretely to act in a given moment. For it is only in the given moment, and not before, that I learn as far as my abilities permit what it is that God is now demanding of me. And even then I cannot find this out except by taking this moment as my own, answering to God for it, with full answerability to Him accepted, and on Him founded"[9].

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of Days (See *I and Thou*). However, yet another passage from the author of „Dialog" reads: „The earth and the heavens are connected with each other. Whoever strives to communicate with people disregarding God will not see their word being fulfilled" (Id., *Dialog*, op. cit., 222).

[9] M. Buber, *Die Frage an den Einzelen,* In: *Das dialogische Prinzisp,* Heidelberg 1965, 240--248, 7, cited after his, *Odpowiedzialność jednostkowa*, trans. from German I. Kownacka, W Drodze 1(1976); See also M. Buber, *Between man and man,* 1963, Fontana Library 923.

Some weak points of Buber's approach

Considering the excerpt of Buber's article quoted above, we cannot fail to notice that in his understanding of „responsibility" there can be no talk of any certainty of the rightness of a personal decision at the point at which it is made.„God places me in a situation to which I must find the answer and I cannot expect that he should tell me the answer, even in the most general terms"[10]. He does refer here, it is true, to a peculiar „impetuous sense of grace", a kind of „impulse of the conscience" or „a revelation" present in each authentic and calm decision. But this feeling cannot, however, give us any certainty about the correctness of our choices, as the author himself observes. Our certainty must remain an uncertain and very personal certainty. Buber realized that his „concept of responsibility" had some limitations, as he once admitted:

„Both friends and opponents accuse me of neither recognising the traditional system of values nor offering any ethical system of my own. It is true, there is a certain lack here, but is so inseparably linked with my whole way of perceiving things that making it good is unthinkable. If I were to try to make it good, I would shift the very core of my ideas"[11].

It is difficult not to agree with this statement. Not only does this lack of „iron" rules in his teaching harmonise with his ideas as a whole, but it may also strike us as reasonable and justified by everyday life. „Purely formal" adherence even to the Decalogue does not guarantee people participation in real life. The literal and scrupulous carrying out of the prescription of divine or human law does not automatically guarantee that a man's actions are as they should be, it does not give him (or us) certainty that that which he does is the best thing for him and for others. The present moment is unruly and cannot be limited by a set of rules, a fact that renders those rules rather abstract, applicable only to an imaginary person or to no one[12]. Moreover strict observance of the

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[10] M. Buber, *Die Frage an den Einzelnen,* cited after Polish trans. *Odpowiedzialność jednostkowa*, 9.

[11] M. Buber, *Autobiographische Fragmente,* in: *Philosophy of Martin Buber*, Evaston 1963, 615.

[12] See: M. Buber, *Kształtowanie charakteru* [Formation of Character], op. cit., 924.

Law without „good intentions", without knowledge of its spirit or the principles behind it, often does more harm than good. Morality (or, to be precise, moralism) can distort the „face" of another human and weigh heavily on interpersonal relations. Religion, therefore, (orthodoxy) can also distort the face of God[13].

Do the above arguments really necessitate a radical break with „rules" and "dogma" such as that which Buber made? Would this really make our approach to God easier? Would it make our path „clearer", simpler and more comprehensible? We need not agree with the author of „I and Thou" in this question. However his extreme restraint in moving towards equating the contents of faith and morality is thought-provoking.

Some strong points of Buber's „concept of responsibility"

The above discussion shows that Buber's „concept of responsibility" connects inseparably the anthropological, ontological, religious and ethical planes. All these planes complement each other in Buber's concept of responsibility, creating an integrated and harmonious whole. Consequently, Buberian man does not need to divide his existence into separate spheres of religious, moral, political, private and social life. This also, in my opinion, deserves to be acknowledged in view of the increasingly widespread division, in the literal sense, of human existence into such spheres. The sad result of these radical divisions is always a gradual process of marginalisation of one area in favour of another. The end result is a distortion of that area that has overshadowed or replaced the others.

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[13] See: M. Buber, *Dialog*, op. cit., 225.

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The experience of self in the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur

Contemporary philosophy has rejected the moderns' concept of the subject. It puts differently the question of how the person experiences himself, and bases it on different premises.

What does it mean to experience oneself? To answer this question we must first determine whether „experience of self" is knowledge or experience. We need to consider whether it is an epistemological, ontological or ethical category. The aim of the following analyses will be to draw out the sense of „experience of self" in Paul Ricoeur's philosophy and to highlight the originality of his thought.

Ricoeur does not use the term experience in his deliberations on being oneself. He writes about recognizing oneself, returning to oneself, or the certainty of being oneself. What does he mean by these? The author explains that he is talking about „discovering that which is the subject in us, that which says I, me, that which can form relationships not only with him, with it, but also with you; that is, that which can before it another person and which constitutes itself in the first person among things"[1]. In trying to understand the expression experience of self it is worth asking what that self is. Ricoeur, in his search for a fitting term, rejects the notion of consciousness, because of the illusion of pure consciousness and because it excludes corporality. The notion of the I also raises doubts in his mind. In Ricoeur's opinion it is difficult to ponder personal identity without taking into account the other[2]. What the philosopher seeks,

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[1] P. Ricoeur, „Interrogation et l'engagement", in *Pourquoi la philosophie*?, Quebec, 1970, cited from Ricoeur, *Podług nadziei. Odczyty, studia, szkice* [Conformed to Hope. Lectures, studies, sketches] selected and translated from the French by S. Cichowicz, Warsaw 1991, 25.
[2] See: M. Drwięga, *Paul Ricoeur daje do myślenia* [Paul Ricoeur gives food for thought], Bydgoszcz 1998, 105.

namely selfhood, „concerns the best part of oneself, which has often been called thought or intellect or even soul, namely that in oneself that is the most lasting, the most constant, the least changeable with mood and desire or twist of fate"[3]. Writing about recognizing the self, Ricoeur talks about the experience of personal integrity, of the endurance of one's own person in time. But before we can interpret experience of self on the basis of Ricoeur's concept some basic terms and principles, and their relationships, need to be explained.

Ricoeur's concept of subjectivity is an attempt to reconstruct the modern philosophy of the subject, which was based on direct reflection. The modern, autonomous I, the foundation of cognition, asserted its right to absolute knowledge. Pure consciousness, perfectly sure of itself, has however been proven unsustainable. Today the existence of a consciousness sure of its reflection is considered debatable[4]. Three discoveries can be identified as having contributed to the loss of the self-confidence that was characteristic of the modern cogito. The first was the discovery of the sphere of the unconscious. Sigmund Freud proved that the idea of pure and lucid consciousness is a delusion. Not only the ego but also the id and superego make up the I. Secondly, philosophy observed that the subject does not exist as a monad. The subject is only a part of its society, which means that the other, another person, enters its consciousness and co-determines its way of thinking. The discovery of intersubjectivity has effectively undermined the modern idea of the autonomous I. The third reason for the cogito's loss of certainty was Gadamer's discovery of the totality of determinants in which we are enmeshed. Conditioning by tradition, culture and history precludes any rational idea of an absolute beginning of knowing. Thinking and understanding are deeply rooted in language, in a defined conceptual framework in which the consciousness is shaped[5].

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[3]   P. Ricoeur *Soi-même comme un autre,* cited from *O sobie samym jako innym*, trans. from French B. Chełstowski, Warszawa 2003, 305-306.

[4]   „The crisis of cogito is connected with crisis of ego. The I – a rule of internal unity, and individuality of cognition and all human experience at the same time – becomes extremely debatable. Is the psyche not … rather an arena of many different powers, events or

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Although the premises of the modern concept of the subject, as described above, must be rejected, we can still ask about subjectivity. Contemporary philosophy asks this question, though it formulates the question on a different basis.

In contemporary philosophy the subject does not constitute the first foundation and basis of cognition, direct reflection and of a substantial identity. Ricoeur calls it the humiliated cogito. This metaphor indicates that this cogito is devoid of certain knowledge about itself; it grasps itself in an unclear and indirect way[6]. The conviction that the knowledge of the subject is always an interpretation, always indirect cognition, leads Ricoeur to replace the I with „selfhood", „the self" (le soi). The return to the self is always as it were an external comprehension[7]. The originality of Ricoeur's thought lies in this, that, in contrast to the modern I, selfhood is not a primary fact. In order to return to itself the subject must go by a roundabout road of analysis and interpretation. The subject is not given to itself directly, but in the ways in which it manifests itself in the world. The unity of being oneself cannot be experienced as certain. The sense of being oneself is always hazy, indefinite, is a matter of faith and attestation and not of knowledge. „Attestation is neither a kind of mental experience, nor does it concern something that can be directly seen, checked, observed; it has nothing in common with the verification of objective knowledge nor with any theoretical cognition in general"[8]. Ricoeur associates attestation with the Aristotelian category of being-true, saying that „the being-true it expresses has to do with the self; it does this through the objectifying mediations of language, action, narrative,

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even acts …, which we define as a unity only in a symbolic way, indicating some central, stable and internally consistent keystone?" M. Kowalska, *Wstęp. Dialektyka bycia sobą*, [Introduction. The dialectic of being oneself] in: Ricoeur, *O sobie samym jako innym*, op. cit., viii.

[5] See: G. Lubowicka, *Sumienie jako poświadczenie. Idea podmiotowości w filozofii Paula Ricoeura* [Conscience as attestation. The idea of subjectivity in the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur], Wrocław 2000, 9-26.

[6] See: K. Blamey, *Oneself as Another* , P. Ricoeur, trans., Chicago 1994, 4.

[7] See: G. Lubowicka, op. cit., 32.

[8] Ibidem, 38.

and the ethical and moral predicates of action"[9]. The object of attestation is the being-true of our selves. Attestation has an epistemological and ontological dimension because trueness refers to our way of being. On the plane of action, attestation takes the form of confidence in the possibility of speaking, acting, speaking of oneself and of good conduct. It can be described as the certainty of being oneself in acting and in suffering, the certainty that each of us has of existing as an identical being. Experience of oneself is not a form of cognition but rather an experience of certainty. In the modern tradition cogito was presented as able to know itself, to acquire knowledge of itself, whereas in Ricoeur's thought experience of self is an experience of certainty as to the unity of one's being.

In the author's opinion the „experience of self" in Ricoeur means the experience of one's own identity and subjectivity. Identity is constituted by stability and permanence in time, whereas subjectivity is tied up with the problem of the potential to act. The categories of identity and subjectivity write themselves into the dialectic of permanence and the moment, life and act. The subject of the following pages will be the experience of identity.

Who is the subject? This question is essentially about definition of the subject's identity. „Identity, i.e. the way in which the subject preserves continuity in time, simultaneously determines the subject's way of being, and the way in which this subject can understand, assimilate itself. The formation of an identity is (…) also a way of answering the question who? Self is a way of being ourselves. Self is an ontological category"[10].
Up to the present day, identity was understood as sameness, and it was considered to be substantial. Ricoeur however speaks of two kinds of identity, and so of two different ways of the subject enduring in time – idem identity and ipse identity. Idem identity is defined as sameness, it concerns numerical identity, recognition of a thing as the same as itself. Identity in this sense corresponds to the operation of identifying. Idem identity also has the sense of quality identity, so it means an extreme

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[9] P. Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, op. cit., 302.
[10] G. Lubowicka, op. cit., 34.

similarity. However, change will always endanger identity if the basis of similarity is not an immutable structure. In the case of humans or animals this basis would be the stability of the genetic code. Ricoeur, though, is searching for a basis-of-identity characterizing personal, and not biological, identity. He wants a form of endurance in time that will not be a substance-category schema: a form that will be a reply to the question who am I? Ricoeur gives two patterns of the endurance of persons in time: character, and the keeping of a promise. Endurance of character expresses both idem and ipse identity, whereas keeping a promise confirms endurance of the self. By 'character' Ricoeur understands „the set of lasting dispositions by which a person is recognized"[11]. The notion of disposition is associated with another term describing character, habit. These concepts (disposition and habit) give character a temporal dimension, endow it with history. Each habit becomes a permanent disposition and constitutes a character trait, that is, a distinguishable sign, by which a person is recognized. The concept of disposition is connected to with identification with values, norms, ideals, patterns, and heroes. Thus that which is other forms the character. At the same time identifying with, for example, a particular value, induces us to faithfulness, and thus to preservation of the self. By the same token, the two kinds of identity (idem and ipse) so coincide that it is impossible to think idem identity without thinking ipse. Character has an ethical and evaluative aspect. A person is recognized by his preferences, judgements and appraisals. Nonetheless, despite the coincidence of these two kinds of identity, it is necessary to distinguish between them[12].

Idem identity, which has a substantial dimension, is replaced by ipse identity in the sense that the constancy and unchangingness of the subject have their origin in ethicality. Ipse identity is being oneself, it is something to be done, it is not given. It should be conceived of as the keeping of a promise. Promise-form is a pattern of stability over time, but entirely different from character-form; it is rooted in faithfulness to the given word.

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[11] P. Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, op. cit., 121.
[12] See: Ibidem, 115-123.

„Keeping one's word epxresses a self-constancy which cannot be inscribed, as character was, within the dimension of something in general but solely in the dimension of who"[13]. He remains himself who remains faithful to committments made, regardless of physical and psychological changes.

Personal identity combines in itself two kinds of identity: being the same and permanence of self. It consists of two models of endurance in time: the character model and the promise model. The relation between sameness and selfhood has the character of a complementary dialectic. Being oneself, that is, being conscious and subjective, maintains itself in time as the ipse identity does. Constancy of self is the only testimony to personal being. Being oneself is a specific way of being, endurance in time, the pattern for which is the promise, faithfulness to commitments. Faithfulness to one's word illustrates this model of identity which, because it becomes a reply to question who?, is possible only for the person. The promise is a symbol of endurance in time, because it connects three temporal dimensions, the past, the present, and the future. So identity acquires an ethical character, because constancy and unchangingness over time are understood as moral constancy, faithfulness to self.

The person is a being with its own history and is conscious of this. History is directly connected with issues of time, and that which connects the category of time with that of person is the concept of identity. In Ricoeur's opinion time, and more precisely, the consitution of human time, can be shown only in narrative form. Human action creates a story. But only a plot joins unconnected events into a train of events. Because characters and action are woven into the plot simultaneously, the narrative identity of each character is derived from the shape of the story[14]. Thanks to the plot a set of heterogenous causes and events becomes a logical chain of events, connected by unity of sense[15]. Literary narrative is the first source of patterns of self-understanding. A reader can recognize himself in one of the character from the story. Moreover, thanks to literature we can learn how to „tell" ourselves. Our experiences in fiction, with their

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[13] Ibidem, 123.

[14] See: P. Ricoeur, *Filozofia osoby* [Philosophy of the Person], translation from French by M. Frankiewicz, Kraków 1992, 40 (the author has been unable to identify the original).

ethical dimension, dispose us to ponder ourselves. The world of text and reader are interlaced. The connection between literature and life is realized on the plane of identification with a character. Identification is an element of character, so „[t]hrough the aspect of identifying with the hero, the the literary narrative contributes to the narrativization of character"[16].

After describing the two kinds of identity singled out by Ricoeur, it is worth considering how the person experiences his continuity and lastingness in time. How does a person maintain his own identity throughout his whole life, combining experiences from the past, present and undetermined future far distant from each other? A constitutive element of identity is narrative identity. Literature is a treasure trove of mental experiments, showing connections between sameness and being oneself. Narrative reasoning finds an application initially in stories, in which intriguing situations point the reader to the question of identity. A characteristic feature of every narrative composition is the synthesis of consistency, the rule of order that directs the course of events, and inconsistency, understood as random incidents or changes of fortune;[17] narrative is a continuous search for identity. Story permits the joining of variability and instability to endurance in time. Narrative structure creates a dynamic identity, combining opposing categories of identity and variety[18].

Human life is likewise a story. „Life is the story of this life, trying to find a way to tell of it"[19]. The person searches for his own identity in a story about his life, because „to understand oneself means to be able to tell stories about oneself that are comprehensible and that can be accepted by others"[20]. Narrative structure combines action with a person, in the sense that the answers to the questions who? what? why? where? when? with whom? form a whole coherent story[21].

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[15] See: David Pellauer, *The Course of Recognition,* P. Ricoeur, trans., Cambridge, Mass. 2004, ch. II.
[16] P. Ricoeur, *Oneself as another*, op. cit., 159n.
[17] See: Drwięga, op. cit., 141.
[18] See: P. Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, op. cit., 140, 143.
[19] P. Ricoeur, *Filozofia osoby*, op. cit., 58.
[20] Ibidem.
[21] See: M. Drwięga, op. cit., 143.

The relation between narration and the recognition of self springs from the concept of the narrative unity of life with which Alistair MacIntyre's work deals. The person, in the history of his life, preserves his identity, correlated with the identity of the history itself. „A person understood as a person from a story cannot be separated from his own experiences; he is involved in the dynamic identity of the story told. This story creates a personal identity, the person's narrative identity, building it from the story told"[22]. The coherence of the history is shaped by the identity of the character, which manifests itself in his predictability. „It is indeed in the story recounted, with its qualities of unity, internal structure and completeness ..., that the character preserves throughout the story an identity correlative to that of the story itself"[23]. The concept and internal unity of life have the character of a narrative programme. The narrative unity of life presents human existence in its entirety. Man is continually searching for consistency between that which seems best for his life as a whole with his individual choices. „First, because our aim of a „good life" and our particular choices a sort of hermeneutical circle is traced by virtue of the back-and-forth motion between the idea of the „good life" and the most important decisions of our existence. ... This can be likened to a text in which the whole and the part are to be understood in terms of the other"[24]. The person, making particular choices, interprets and judges them in reference to the overall project of his own existence.

Narrative unity gets its importance from the function played by story in establishing the connection between the judgements applied to actions and the valuing made of characters. The narrative story about a life constitutes a basis for aspiration to the good life. „How, indeed, could a subject of action give an ethical character to his or her own life taken as a whole, if this life were not gathered together in some way, and how could this occur if not, precisely, in the form of a narrative?"[25] Man judging his conduct becomes a person from the story of life. Searching for consistency between ideals and particular resolutions, man is continually exerting

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[22] Ibidem.
[23] P. Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, op. cit., 143.
[24] Ibidem, 179.
[25] Ibidem, 158.

himself in interpretation of his actions and himself. Self-interpretation becomes a source of self-esteem when a person is convinced that there is consistency between his life ideal and his particular decisions.

The narrative function therefore has ethical implications. It is not about life, but about the good life. The narrative component of self-understanding requires ethical terms. Every story carries with it differing ways of judging actions and characters. Every story is set in a land of good and evil, is a form of making use of practical wisdom which consists of judgements in the categories of good and duty.

The categories of identity and story are closely connected to each other because they both have a temporal character. Identity is a continuity and unchangingness over time, whereas the story combines three temporal dimensions in one whole. The story is not only a retrospective reflection on life. Among the facts recounted there are projects, expectations, attitudes towards the future. „Narrative also treats of care, therefore if we take into account the beginning, care and projects, and the end, we can speak of narrative unity of life"[26].

The person experiences himself as a whole, in fullness, which, for man, is his life. For life to become such an entirety, human history needs to be told, it needs narration. The story about one's life causes consciousness of one's own existence. Thanks to conscious participation in his own life the person experiences himself, senses his own presence. If our life is revealed as ours, we realize that we are responsible for it. Freedom gives rise to obligation, a duty to act excellently. „…Apart from particular duties man has a duty towards himself, which is to lead a perfect life. … The origin (of good) is in ourselves, in our action"[27]. Man participating authentically in his own life is conscious of obligations to himself. „I" becomes identical with my life. I cannot separate myself from my history.

The experience of oneself understood as an experience of the preservation of self in time combines retrospection and prospection. Recognition of self is made in time, it reaches into the past and the future. The person experiences himself as being the same through memory and

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[26]   M. Drwięga, op. cit., 146.
[27]   Ibidem, 70-71.

promise. The first concerns the past, the second the future. Through memory, that is, the ability to remember and recall, man is able to experience himself as the same in the dimension of character, of habits, values, and ideals. Promise, in turn, concerns the future. To promise means to commit oneself to action in the future. To keep one's word is to do tomorrow what is promised today. The promise enables the continuation of human action, and consequently the endurance and continuity of the self. Both categories define the temporal character of the experience of self. The present is always at the same time the present of the past, that is , memory, and likewise the present of the future, namely expectation[28].

The experience of self as preservation of identity includes temporal dimension. The person experiences himself as the same in different moments of his life. The ability to gather particular actions around the pole called self is precisely the experience of self in time. The discovery of self becomes a process, developing in time; as long as the person exists it is never final. It is identity continually formulated. „Narrative identity constitutes an expression of our selves if we analyze our deeds and decisions critically, analyze our life with regard to the realization of our self in it, with regard to the coming to be of ipse identity or to aspiration to it"[29]. The originality of Ricoeur's thought consists in the fact that identity is presented in moral categories. Identity is moral stability. Formulating identity consists in the aspiration to unity of self through the ordering of one's life. The innovation over modern concepts is the inclusion of the category of life in the field of experience of self. Man achieves harmony with himself by understanding his life as a coherent whole of defined significance.

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[28]   See: P. Ricoeur, *The Course of Recognition*, ch II.
[29]   G. Lubowicka, op. cit., 226.

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The role of the other (*l'autre*) in the constitution of subjectivity and identity in the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur[1]

The problem of the other, of its role in the process of the constitution of subjectivity is the central issue in the dispute over the subject that is prominent in contemporary philosophy. Many quite different concepts are related to the way in which the subject is understood. To bring the problem into focus we can think of it as having two opposing sides. On one side we have the modern tradition of the absolutization of *cogito* that has its source in the philosophy of Descartes and was continued by Kant, Fichte and Husserl, and on the other, the demystificational critique that was provided by three 'masters of suspicion' (Marx, Nietzsche, Freud). This critique was presaged in Hume's work, though he began with different ontological and epistemological premises. Hume considered the idea of personal identity critically and came to desubstantialize the subject. This desubstantialization returns with the appearance of the postmodernists (J. Derrida, J-F. Lyotard, G. Deleuze and M. Foucault). Of course, putting the matter like this involves a sweeping generalization because every concept of the subject contains an ambiguity[2]. Being aware

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[1] Ricoeur treats the concept of the other, *l'autre,* or of otherness, *l'altérité,* as a metacategory which comprises three meanings of otherness. He identifies otherness as, first, the otherness of another person; otherness in this sense is inherent in the relation of intersubjectivity. Next, otherness represented by the experience of one's own body, *le corps propre,* or better, of the flesh, *la chair*, as the mediator between the self, *le soi* and the world. Finally, the otherness that attests to itself in the relation of the self, *le soi*, to itself, *soi-même*, which is conscience.
The term „other" used in the title of this article refers only to the first sense of otherness, to the otherness of another person; this is due to the necessarily limited scope of the article.

[2] On ambiguity in philosophies of the subject one might consult the work of Agata Bielik-Robson and Małgorzata Kowalska. A. Bielik-Robson, *Na drugim brzegu nihili-*

of the plurality of philosophies of the subject, we have to ask what way we should go in order to be able to speak about the subject[3].

Ricoeur is one of the contemporary thinkers to have thought carefully about how to develop a new formulation of subjectivity. He asks how one can define the subject with its ambivalence; a subject which is not taken as a foundation and an immediate identity, but is regarded as being identical and nonidentical at once. For the purpose of finding a new formula that would allow the expression of the subject with its ambiguity, Ricoeur employs dialectic and elaborates an appropriate meaning of it by critical reference to Hegelian dialectic. The dialectic that is proposed by the French philosopher is contained in the expression „oneself as another", *soi-même comme un autre*. This formula refers on the one hand to the Hegelian dialectic of the Same and the Other, and on the other hand introduces new philosophical content to these two notions.

Ricoeur's interest in the issue of the subject first appears in the two-volume work *Philosophie de la volonté*[4]. Considerations of the problem of the self are continued in *De l'interprétation. Essai sur Freud* and *Le conflit des interprétations. Essais d'herméneutique I*[5]. In these two books Ricoeur enters into discussion with the psychoanalytical and structuralist critique of the concept of „subject". In his early works he had not yet arrived at formulating *expressis verbis* the concept of the

zmu. Filozofia współczesna w poszukiwaniu nowego podmiotu, [On the Other Bank of Nihilism. Contemporary Philosophy in Search of the New Subject] Warszawa 1997 and M. Kowalska, *Dialektyka podmiotu*, [The Dialectic of the Subject] in *Podmiotowość i tożsamość* [Subjectivity and Identity], ed. by J. Migasiński, Warszawa 2001, 32-40.

[3] See: M. Kowalska, op. cit., 33.

[4] P. Ricoeur, *Philosophie de la volonté. Le volontaire et l'involontaire*, Paris 1950; English translation: *Philosophy of the will. Part I: Freedom and Nature. The Voluntary and the Involuntary*, transl. from the French by E.V. Kohák, Evanston 1966. P. Ricoeur, *Philosophie de la volonté. Finitude et culpabilité*, Paris 1960; English translation: *Philosophy of the Will. Part II: Finitude and Guilt, Book I. Fallible Man*, transl. from the French by Ch. Kelbley, Chicago 1965, *Book II. The Symbolism of Evil*, trans. from the French by E. Buchanan, Boston 1969.

[5] P. Ricoeur, *De l'interprétation. Essai sur Freud*, Paris 1965. P. Ricoeur, *Le conflit des interprétations. Essais d'herméneutique I*, Paris 1969; English translation: *Freud and Philosophy: an Essay on Interpretation*, trans. from the French by D. Savage, New Haven 1977.

dialectical subject. The polemic with Freudian psychoanalysis leads the author of *De l'interprétation* to the conclusion that the subject ought to be considered within the dialectical relationship between the conscious and the unconscious. The framework of the dialectical manner of thinking the subject, which is particularly present in the work devoted to Freud, finds thorough explication in Ricoeur's last works: *Soi-même comme un autre* and *Parcours de la reconnaissance. Trois études*[6]. Ricoeur's proposed dialectical subject cannot be regarded as being ultimately nothing more than a facile eclecticism. It is important to see that he takes the existing philosophical critique into account and, deriving inspiration from and reinterpreting established notions, problematizes the thought of others in order to follow it to its conclusion, and then go beyond it.

Ricoeur's investigation of the comprehension of otherness is conducted as a polemical discussion with four thinkers: Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger and Lévinas. The theoretical framework within which Ricoeur elaborates his approach to subjectivity is delimited by the Hegelian philosophy of dialectical movement, the Husserlian concept of the constitution of the other self (being nothing more than an analogue of *ego*: in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation), the Heideggerian distinction of two manners of being, *Dasein* i *Vorhandenheit,* and passivity which surpasses the intentionality of consciousness, as presented in Lévinas's thought.

Proposing the formulation of a new concept of the subject, the author of *Soi-même comme un autre* begins by breaking with the established language of ontology. Ricoeur points to the Platonic opposition of the notions „the Same", *du Même* and „the Other", *de l'Autre*[7] as that which determined the sense of identity and otherness. As the opposite of identity understood in the sense of being the same, *du Même*, he propounds a dialectic of two different meanings of identity. This dialectic reflects the

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[6] P. Ricoeur, *Soi-même comme un autre*, Paris 1990; English translation: *Oneself as Another*, trans. from the French by K. Blamey, Chicago 1992. P. Ricoeur, *Parcours de la reconnaissance. Trois études*, Paris 2004; English translation: *The Course of Recognition. Three Studies*, trans. from the French by D. Pellauer, Cambridge 2005.

[7] See: P. Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, 317.

scholastic distinction between two irreducible senses of identity. Thus there is identity as *sameness*[8] which is expressed in Latin as *idem*, French *mêmeté*, German *Gleichheit*, and on the other side, identity as *selfhood*, which is expressed in Latin as *ipse*, French *ipséité*, German *Selbstheit*. The term *idem* concerns unchanging structure. Identity in the sense of *ipse* makes no assertion about an unchanging core of the personality.

Otherness can take one of two different meanings, depending on which modality of identity it refers to. If it relates to identity understood as sameness, *la mêmeté*, the otherness of the other-than-self remains only as an antonym of „same"[9]. The otherness which is paired with selfhood, *l'ipséité*, which is the one suggested in the title *Oneself as Another*, *Soi-même comme un autre*, is not (or not merely) the result of comparison. The otherness that is postulated by Ricoeur constitutes the very selfhood of oneself, *l'ipséité du soi-même*.

„*Oneself as Another* suggests from the outset that the selfhood of oneself implies otherness to such an intimate degree that one cannot be thought of without the other, that instead one passes into the other, as we might say in Hegelian terms"[10].

In the paper *Identité narrative*[11] Ricoeur states that the difference between *idem* and *ipse* cannot be reduced to a merely grammatical, epistemological or logical difference, but that it is above all an ontological difference. The question of selfhood, *l'ipséité*, belongs exclusively, as one can read in Heidegger's *Being and Time*[12], to the area of problems

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[8] This expression is used by David Hume in *A Treatise of Human Nature*. The critique of personal identity that his work contains pertains to identity in the sense of *idem*.

[9] See: P. Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, op. cit., 3.

[10] Ibidem.

[11] Ricoeur's paper „Identité narrative" appeared in *Esprit* in 1988, three years after the publication of the third volume of his *Temps et récit* and two years before that of *Soi-même comme un autre*. English translation: *Narrative Identity*, in *On Paul Ricoeur. Narrative and Interpretation*, ed. and trans. from the French by D. Wood, London–New York 1991. The conclusions in the paper from 1988 are close to those on which Ricoeur settles in the latest work *Soi-même comme un autre*.

[12] Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. from the German by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, Oxford 1962, 15-17.

connected with *Dasein*, which is a being that is capable of asking itself about its own being. The notion of *ipse*, *l'ipséité*, as Ricoeur states, has the same status as the Heideggerian notions Being-in-the-world, Care and *Dasein*-with. It is understood as one of the existentials that are inherent in the very Being of *Dasein*, just as categories in the Kantian sense belong to the Being of *das Seiende* that is described by Heidegger as present-at-hand and ready-to-hand. The rupture between selfhood, *ipse*, *l'ipséité* and sameness, *idem*, *la mêmeté* reflects a more fundamental rupture which separates *Dasein* from beings that are present-at-hand and ready-to-hand. It is only *Dasein* of which one can predicate being itself, *ipse, le soi*. Hence of beings that are present-at-hand and ready-to-hand one can predicate merely identity understood as sameness, *idem*[13].

In *Soi-même comme un autre* Ricoeur states that the modality of identity understood as *idem* is not equivalent to there being an unchanging base of qualities. To indicate some invariable element one does not need to postulate the presence of *hypokeimenon*. Referring to Locke's thought, that is to the statement concerning the occurrence of the primary qualities of an object, which do not change, and its secondary qualities, which are changeable, one can posit identity on the basis of the presence of unalterable qualities.

The distinction between two senses of identity is introduced by Ricoeur for the first time in the final fragment of the third volume of his *Temps et récit*, which is entitled *Conclusions. La première aporie de la temporalité: l'identité narrative*. By establishing this distinction he attempts to solve the aporia created by the need to take one of two stances. The first stance posits a subject identical with itself, *un sujet identique à lui-même*, through the diversity of its different states. The second stance, which is present in Hume's and Nietzsche's critiques, concerns the elimination of the identical subject, *un sujet identique* that is nothing more than a substantialist illusion, whose demystification brings to light a manifold of cognitions, emotions and volitions[14]. Ricoeur's

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13 See: P. Ricoeur, *Narrative Identity*, op. cit., 191-192.

14 See: P. Ricoeur, *Temps et récit. Le temps raconté*, vol. III, Paris 1985, 443 ; English translation : P. Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative. Narrated Time*, vol. III, trans. from the French by K. Blamey and D. Pellauer, Chicago 1988, 246.

intention is to situate the discussion concerning identity within the area delimited by subjectivity understood as selfhood, *l'ipséité*[15]. Grounding the investigation of subjectivity on this plane of consideration leads of itself neither to an assertion about a substratum (an unchanging base of qualities – *hypokeimenon*) that would justify the act of predicating the identity of the subject, nor an elimination of the identical subject.

The liberalisation of the understanding of identity in the sense of *idem* is connected with the concept of selfhood, *le soi*, which is the dialectic of *idem* and *ipse* that Ricoeur introduces in *Soi-même comme un autre*. In Ricoeur's intention, identity in the modality of *idem*, which is an element of the dialectic, cannot be understood as a substratum. It indicates some immutable element in the selfhood, *le soi*, whose presence allows one to maintain the self, *ce maintien de soi*, in time. That is why Ricoeur uses the expression *le soi-même*. Although it appeared in the third volume of his *Temps et récit*, it is in *Soi-même comme un autre* that it acquires its justification, which is based on two dialectics: the dialectic of *idem*, *la mêmeté*, and *ipse*, *l'ipséité*, and the dialectic of selfhood, *l'ipséité*, and otherness, *l'altérité*.

In the Fifth and Sixth Studies of *Soi-même comme un autre* Ricoeur claims that within selfhood, *l'ipséité*, one does not deal with absolute variability or otherness. When we speak of ourselves we can point to both change in some of our features and the presence of some invariant that guarantees the permanence of the self in time. Ricoeur attemps to find an invariant which allows one to justifiably predicate the identity of a person but which does not lead to a substantialist understanding of the subject. Subjectivity understood as selfhood, *l'ipséité*, avoids making a dichotomy of self-sameness, *le même*, and the other, *l'autre*, in that its identity rests on a temporal structure that conforms to the model of dynamic identity

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[15] Ibidem, 443. « La dilemme disparaît si, à l'identité comprise au sens d'un même, *idem*, on substitue l'identité comprise au sens d'un soi-même, *ipse* ». English translation : « This dilemma disappears if we substitute for identity understood in the sense of being the same, *idem*, identity understood in the sense of oneself as self-name, *ipse* ». P. Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, 246.

arising from the poetic composition of a narrative text[16]. Subjectivity comprehended as selfhood, *l'ipséité*, contains an invariant whose presence both refers to identity in the sense of being the same, *idem*, and undergoes the process of variation. Hence it avoids any attempt to reduce personal identity to the identity in the sense of being the same, *idem*. That is why Ricoeur uses the expression „oneself as self-same", *soi-même*, which is connected with selfhood, *l'ipséité*.

The self, *le soi*, which is present in every Study of *Soi-même comme un autre* and which is a nominalized form of the reciprocal pronoun *soi*, is used by Ricoeur in order to maintain a distance from the use of the personal pronoun „I", „Je", which is present in philosophies of the subject. „The I" is posited absolutely. The expression „self-same", *soi-même* that links „self", *soi*, and „same", *même*, demonstrates that it is the relation between the dimension of stability and that of instability that constitutes identity. The essence of the relation of self-same, *soi-même*, lies in the fact that one cannot think the self of the person without considering the 'same'. Identity in the sense of *idem,* which finds its conceptual articulation in numerical identity, qualitative identity and uninterrupted continuity between the first and last development stages of a person[17],

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[16] See: P. Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative. Narrated Time*, op. cit., 246. See also P. Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, Fifth and Sixth Study, 113-168. The postulate of deriving dynamic identity from narrative composition is related to the notion of narrative identity. The narrative theory to which Ricoeur devoted three volumes of *Temps et récit* is a good tool with which to account for the problem of change and discontinuity inherent in personal identity. Narrative constitutes the absolute correlation between character, *un personnage,* and action. The dynamic identity that derives from narrative configuration: the art of composition mediating between concordance (the principle of order, that presides over a plurality of events (what Aristotle calls 'the arrangement of facts') and disconcordance that is the reversals of fortune: synthesises the categories of identity and diversity. In the sequence of a story the identity of the character is comprehensible through the operation of emplotment. The identity of the character remains correlated with the identity of the very story for emplotment originates in the common development of the character and that of the story. Ricoeur adopts Frank Kermode's axiom which says 'Developing a character is recounting more'. In the investigation of the constitution of the subject, the notion of narrative identity serves to mediate between sameness, *idem,* and selfhood, *ipse*. The dialectic of sameness, *idem*, and selfhood, *ipse*, that is implicitly contained in the very notion of narrative identity, makes a significant contribution to the constitution

does not suffice to account for personal identity. This is because it does not explain the very manner in which one can predicate the permanence in time of the self, taking into account its psychophysical change and avoiding reference to the notion of substratum.

If we intend to speak about subjectivity understood as maintaining the self we must have recourse to the dialectic of same, *idem – la mêmeté*, and self, *ipse – l'ipséité*. To demonstrate this dialectic, which incorporates the ambiguity of identity, Ricoeur introduces the expression „identity of the self", *l'identité du soi*, which is connected with the phrase „the self-same", *soi-même*. The ambiguity of identity, *l'identité*, pertains to the title *Oneself as another*, *Soi-même comme un autre*, in terms of the partial synonymy between „same", *même*, and „identical", *identique*[18]. This partial synonymy between „same", *même* ,and „identical", *identique*, refers to the extents of these two notions, which do not overlap. Every use of adjective „same", *même*, functions as a comparison[19]. Its contraries are „other", „contrary", „distinct", „diverse", „unequal", „inverse". In the Introduction *The Question of Selfhood* Ricoeur writes:

„The weight of this comparative use of the term „same" seems so great to me that I shall henceforth take sameness as synonymous with *idem*-identity and shall oppose to it selfhood, *l'ipséité*, understood as *ipse*-identity. To what extent is the equivocalness of the term „same" reflected in the title *Oneself as Another*, *Soi-même comme un autre*? Only indirectly, inasmuch as „oneself", *soi-même* is only an emphatic form of „self", the expression *même* serving to indicate that it is precisely a matter

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of the self, *le soi*. This is because it incorporates diversity, variability, discontinuity and instability (which may seem to be contrary to the narrative in the domain of sameness-identity) into permanence in time.

[17] See: P. Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, op. cit., 111-139.

[18] See: Ibidem, 2-3.

[19] Ricoeur refers to the *Robert* dictionary which at the head of entries under the adjective „same", *même*, places absolute identity, *l'identité absolue* (the same person, one and the same thing). „Same", *même*, understood as sameness signifies numerical identity. Other applications of the adjective „same", *même*, pertain to simultaneity, *la simultanéité* (in the same time), similarity, *la similitude* (analogical, similar) and equality (the same quantity). See: P. Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, op. cit.,3.

of the being or the thing in question. (There is thus hardly any difference between *le souci de soi* [care of the self] and *le souci de soi-même* [care of oneself] aside from the effect of emphasis I have just mentioned.) Nevertheless, the tenuous thread that connects *même*, placed after *soi*, to the adjective *même*, in the sense of identical or similar, has not been broken. Reinforcing is still marking an identity"[20].

In this sense *idem*-identity, *la mêmeté,* is indirectly reflected in oneself, *soi-même.* There is no analogical ambiguity of the term *même*, „same", in English or German, where „same" cannot be confused with „self", nor *der, die, dasselbe*, *gleich* with *Selbst*[21].

If one wants to follow Ricoeur's contribution to the discussion on subjectivity one must not overlook the ambiguity of the term *même*. What is most significant here is the application of *même*, „same", in the sense of identical, *identique*, which in the expression *soi-même*, „oneself", marks the second element of the dialectic of *l'ipséité*, „selfhood", and *la mêmeté*, „sameness". In other words, the phrase „same", *même,* understood as identical, *identique,* indicates a certain connection between the past and present of a person that enables one to recognize him or her as being on the one hand identical, *même*, and on the other as being not merely the same, as is implied by the first element of expression *soi-même.* The negation of the possibility of approaching personal identity as *idem*-identity, *la mêmeté,* is inherent in the very *soi.* This is because, as Ricoeur states, *le soi*, the self, is constituted by two dialectics, namely the dialectic of selfhood and sameness, *l'ipséité* and *la mêmeté,* and that of selfhood and otherness, *l'ipséité* and *l'altérité.*

The connection between the past and the present that is signified in the expression „oneself", *soi-même,* cannot be apprehended as an identity in the sense in which Hume and Parfit use it. In Ricoeur's eyes their criticism of the relation of identity is based on two premises. First, they reduce the notion of identity to just one of its two modalities, that of *idem*, and secondly, they believe that identity implies the assertion of some unchanging core of the personality. The criticism made by Locke,

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[20] P. Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, op. cit., 3.
[21] See: ibidem.

Hume and Parfit is aimed at the substantialist view of identity. The relation of identity that Ricoeur proposes using the phrase „oneself", *soi-même*, holds up not because Ricoeur asserts a substratum but because of other models of permanence in time which can be summed up in two expressions: character and keeping one's word[22].

The difficulty of Ricoeur's concept of subject and identity that is expressed in the phrase „oneself as another", *soi-même comme un autre,* lies in the very shift from the initial distinction between *idem*-identity, *la mêmeté* and *ipse*-identity, *l'ipséité,* to the formula „the identity of the self", *l'identité du soi*. Ricoeur intends to go beyond the traditional understanding of identity, that is, beyond *idem*-identity, *la mêmeté*. The term „identity", *l'identité,* which is used in the formula „the identity of the self", *l'identité du soi,* belongs to the language of *idem*-identity which the French philosopher tries to avoid, whereas *le soi,* which is translated as „the self", contains the dialectic of *idem* and *ipse* postulated by Ricoeur. The whole formula „the identity of the self" *l'identité du soi,* can be predicated of a person, that is, of one whose way of being pertains to *ipse*-identity, *l'ipséité*.

The very purpose of introducing two modalities of identity is to affirm from the outset that one must not reduce selfhood, *l'ipséité*, to sameness, *la mêmeté*[23]. The critical investigation that we find in the philosophy of Hume, Locke or in contemporary analytical philosophy concerns the validity of applying the notion of identity understood as sameness, *idem*. Ricoeur aims not merely at establishing the distinction between the two senses of identity but, crucially, at going further, at conducting an investigation of subjectivity in the domain of identity understood as *ipse*. In the final fragment of the third volume of *Temps et récit* the *idem*-identity is described as a substantial identity[24].

Ricoeur modifies his standpoint in his work, *Soi-même comme un autre,* and he upholds it in *Parcours de la reconnaissance*, where the modality of

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[22] An analysis of two models of permanence in time, character and keeping one's word, is carried out by P. Ricoeur in Fifth and Sixth Study of *Oneself as Another*, op. cit., 113-168.

[23] See: P. Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, op. cit., 116. See also P. Ricoeur, *Narrative Identity*, op. cit., 189.

[24] See: P. Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative. Narrated Time*, op. cit., 246.

identity in the sense of sameness, *idem,* is no longer defined as substantial identity. «Attestation can be identified with the assurance that each person has of existing as the same in the sense of selfhood, *comme un même au sens de l'ipséité*"[25]. *Idem*-sameness, which is an element of the dialectic, signifies the presence of some invariant in the selfhood, *le soi,* and, as the author of *Soi-même comme un autre* asserts, this does not necessarily mean that one holds a substantialist view of subjectivity.

The formula *soi-même comme un autre* itself, introduced by Ricoeur for describing the subject, is difficult, perhaps impossible, to translate without some of its full meaning being lost. Kathleen Blamey, who translated *Soi-même comme un autre,* proposes the phrase „oneself as another". But this formula fails to reflect the very gist of the concept of dialectical subject which says that a person is oneself, *soi-même* and simultaneously also another.

Ricoeur explores the problem of the presence of otherness within the structure of selfhood, *l'ipséité,* on phenomenological and ontological planes of consideration. On the first plane, otherness expresses itself through the various experiences of passivity that are intertwined in multiple ways in human action. Passivity is the counterpart to otherness and it becomes the very attestation of otherness, *la passivité devient l'attestation même de l'altérité*[26]. The term „otherness", *l'altérité,* is reserved for the ontological, speculative plane of consideration. Ricoeur intends to move from exploring passivity-otherness on the phenomenological plane, where it manifests itself on various levels of experience (on linguistic level, on the level of *praxis*, on the narrative and ethical levels), to defining otherness as a metacategory on the speculative plane. In other words, Ricoeur attempts to elicit the degree of lived passivity proper to these various levels of experiences and thence to identify the kind of otherness that corresponds to each on the speculative plane.[27] In this paper we will take „otherness" to refer to the „otherness" that belongs to the meaning of selfhood.

The dialectic of selfhood, *l'ipséité,* and otherness, *l'altérité*, consisting in the fact that otherness, *l'altérité,* belongs to the tenor and ontological

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[25] P. Ricoeur, *Oneself as* Another, op. cit., 298; *Soi-même comme un autre*, op. cit., 346.
[26] See P. Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, op. cit., 318; *Soi-même comme un autre*, op. cit., 368.

constitution of selfhood, *l'ipséité*[28], offers an alternative to the opinion in which the self, *le soi,* is treated as a final foundation. For Ricoeur, this dialectic is the ultimate structure of the self, *la structure ultime d'un soi*. It both keeps a distance from the over-valuation of the subject found in the *cogito* philosophies and defends the subject from the undervaluation found in the *anti-cogito* philosophies, where *cogito* suffers ontological disintegration and fracture.

Subjectivity understood as „oneself as another", *soi-même comme un autre*, an effect of two dialectics, opens up a new path for philosophical investigation. Ricoeur's concept of a dialectical subject brings new understanding of *cogito*, that is, *cogito* which holds itself at an equal distance from self-apology and negation, and to which the shortest path leads through otherness. One may say that this is a *cogito* stricken with otherness, that is therefore far from the autonomic and self-positing *ego*[29].

The difficulty of comprehending Ricoeur's concept of the dialectical subject has its source in the formula *soi-même comme un autre,* which is quite problematic. The very phrase *le soi*, „the self", gives a great deal of trouble to anyone attempting to give an account of it, to give, for example, a synonym. Ricoeur claims that *le soi*, „the self", contains the two dialectics which provide the full explication of the human being. That is why the phrase *le soi*, „the self", is present in every Study of *Soi-même comme un autre*. It cannot be reduced to the „I", *je*. Furthermore it does not mean the same as the expression *l'ipséité*. The expression *l'ipséité* pertains to the formula *l'identité du soi* which is also troublesome, for its first part, *l'identité,* turns to the language of *idem*-identity, hence to the modality of identity that for Ricoeur cannot be predicated of any person.

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[27] See P. Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, op. cit., 319.
[28] See: Ibidem, 317.
[29] See: Ibidem, 11-16.

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The category of care and the role of felings in Virginia Held's ethics

In ethics, there are two basic moral categories, goodness and value. The former is the oldest and most elementary moral concept. The later, relatively young, is distinct from the economic concept in which value is understood as a price or equivalent of labour or commodities expressed in the form of currency. However, in the last decade the Anglo-American feminist movement began a dynamic development of ethical theory concentrating on the concept of care. One of the representatives of this movement is Virginia Held, who developed a theory of the moral interpretation of care. She does not include in her theory the notion of goodness, and the idea of value is not significant. In the following deliberations I discuss the ethics of the feminist movement as well as the concept of care understood as an ethical category and the role of feelings in the concept, and finish with an assessment of these matters.

What is the ethics of care?

In the last twenty-five years the idea of care in ethical reflection appears more and more often. The growing popularity of the concept is to a large extent due to Carol Gilligan's book *In a Different Voice*[1]. The book polemicizes with Lawrence Kohlberg's psychological research into moral development. Kohlberg's unfavorable assessment of the moral development of women became the inspiration for Gilligan's own studies. The research that she conducted led her to the assumption that women, led by various cultural reasons, follow an ethics of care that emphasizes relationship and responsibility. As stated by Gilligan, Kohlberg's

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[1]   See: C. Gilligan, *In a Different Voice*, Cambridge 1982.

systematization uses criteria which are closely connected with the way men experience morality. These criteria are directed at justice and they give emphasis to rules and rights. It can be safely asserted that it was Gilligan's book that initiated systematic academic research into the ethics of care. These studies have been conducted primarily in the United States. It was Gilligan who brought the very term into scientific circulation.

Within the ethics of care the so-called maternal movement was developed. The main representatives of the movement are Virginia Held and Sara Ruddick. They stress the inequality that exists in social relationships, for example between the young and the elderly, customers and professionals, students and teachers. Into these relationships they introduce the attitude that exists in a good relation between a mother and a child, or more broadly speaking between a parent and a child. This is done to balance the moral qualities in the relationships. The purpose of the operation is to do away with relationships based on a contract, relationships that can be reduced to the inequality between a person who is dependent on others, subject to power and a person who is autonomous, independent, who has power over another[2]. The author intends to demonstrate a moral reality in which the first thing that we experience is relationship with others. These relations are not based on equality. On the contrary, they reveal dependency among people. The first relationship of dependency that anyone experiences is that of care: if one did not experience this relation one would not survive on one's own as a child.

According to Held, the most precise definition of care was presented by Diemut Bubeck. Care is the experience of another person's needs. The key element of comprehensive action is face-to-face interaction between carer and cared-for. The very nature of the experience of need makes it impossible for the person in need to be aware of the need itself[3]. This distinguishes care for or care about someone form care supplied as a form

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[2] See: R. Tong, *Ethics: Feminist*, in: *Routledge International Encyclopedia of Women*, t.2, ed. Ch. Kramarae, D. Spender, New York, London 2000, 618.

[3] See: Diemut Bubeck, *Care, Gander, and Justice*, Oxford 1995, 129.

of service. In this context, preparing a meal for a child is a form of care for someone, whereas preparing a meal for a husband, who is a very good cook, is a form of service. A characteristic feature of care is the fact that care is always accompanied by the relation of dependence. This feature is extremely important and should be strongly emphasized.

Care is undoubtedly a form of labour but at the same time it is something more. The labour of care is a relation and it cannot be replaced by machines the way other forms of labour are. Care is a practice that includes the work of care-giving and forming standards by which the practice of care can be evaluated. Care must also be concerned with itself. It involves not only the effectiveness of its efforts to meet the needs but also the motives with which it is delivered. This description aims to show how a good care relationship should be sought. If a relationship between two people is based on domination, exploitation, distrust or hostility the relationship becomes a bad one. A good care relation can be noticed by a person who provides it, in relation to themselves and to the person who needs care. It is greatly significant that the horizons of moral behavior include the ideal of care, which is the relation between parent and child. It is essential in contacts with close relatives as well as in social life. So in fact, a good relation of care is connected with balancing or in other words harmonizing care for one's needs and the needs of others.

What is the moral criterion of a balanced care relation? According to Sara Ruddick, an author often referred to by Held, there are two sources of normativity. The first one is described by Nel Noddings. She draws attention to the fact that memories connected with taking care of somebody and memories of being taken care of stimulate a feeling of commitment. Memories of our best moments, when we were taken care of and when we took care of others evokes a feeling of compulsion or obligation (I have to). It is similar in the relation to negative memories, when I oppose certain attitudes. This is connected to memories of pain caused by loss of something or fear of something, and to positive memories connected with something enjoyable or pleasant. The second source of normativity is the acceptance of „practical identity", as it is termed by Christine Korsgaard or „ideal self", a term introduced by Nel

Noddings. Korsgaard argues that the person who tries to understand himself becomes a person capable of care for others and at the same time person who can be cared for. In Nodding's concept, normativity is connected with a certain concept of nature concerning self-reflection. In Korsgaard's approach self-reflection is replaced by reflection of choice to be. We must be clear that this theory has nothing to do with action and rationality, as in Kant. The concept of a person who morally evaluate actions is identified with an understanding of self as a person who enters the relationship of care, values it, and exercises himself in the ability of caring.

According to Sara Ruddick[4], memories are deep feelings which form the basis of identity. Ruddick stresses that comprehension of these memories is neither permanent nor evident. She claims that the psychological record of recalled memories can become a point of reference in the form of „improved morality". The change in thinking and the creation of the development of „practical identity" or the „ideal caring self" should lead to the reduction of self-deception and self-degradement. Thoughts should be aimed at forgiving and self-forgiving. All this should lead to the creation of new perspective for memories. These recurrent memories related to the ideal relation of care create a new identity. „Ethics" understood as the consciousness of experiencing enters into the reciprocal play of memory and identity. According to Sara Ruddick, ethics of care places all our memories in a new perspective, changing our identity and our behavior. The author gives the example of a person who tries to imagine himself as a citizen of a kingdom of care, a person who treats himself and others as people whose basic moral duty is to care and be cared for. She says however that it is a metaphor which awaits development and implementation by everyone engaged in this project.

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4   See: S. Ruddick, *Care as Labor and Relationship*, in: *Norms and Values. Essays on The Work of Virginia Held*, ed. J.G. Haber, M. S. Halfon, New York/Oxford 1998, 21.

There are two significant objections to be made to the proposals of the ethics of care. The first objection concerns the foundations of this ethics. It was developed on the basis of psychological research and thus the terminology it requires differs from the language used in philosophy, and especially in reference with to the categories of care and need or, as suggested by Ruddick, in reference to memories. One might ask if this is a philosophical ethics or a psychology of morality. The doubt is reinforced by the strong accent placed on emotional experience and engagement in the relationship of care as a necessary condition of a good relationship. However, it seems that Held understands the problem at least in part. For example, in her early works she uses „self" in speaking of the person; in her most recently published work this has been replaced with the word „person". Importantly, she consciously speaks about the need for normative indications for our behavior, which we can obtain through the ethics of care. This seems to me an essential element that allows the ethics of care to be accounted part of a philosophical movement rather than a psychological one. In the latter, analyses concentrate on experience and its descriptions, and not on answering the question of how we ought to act, as in the ethical concept proposed by Held.

The second objection is to the relativism into which Held falls, and the consequent abandonment of two basic ethical rules: generalization and lack of contradiction. This is due to the fact that evaluation of each individual care relation is not conducted in connection with general norms, but in the context of the needs and experiences of the two elements of the relation, the care-giver and the one cared for. This conviction may confirm the emphasis on the practical dimension of care or the practice of care. It suggests that the ethics of care affects particular relations and people. It seems to me that from the methodological perspective the findings of Dieter Brinbacher[5] in his ethics of responsibility for future generations are similar to the findings of the representatives of Held's ethics. He discusses the relation between ideal norms, which affect

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[5] See: D. Birnbacher, *Odpowiedzialność za przyszłe pokolenia*, trans. B. Andrzejewski, P. Jackowski, Warszawa 1999, 10-17.

ideal subjects and practical norms, which affect non-ideal subjects. This relation would appear to correspond to an ideal model of parents' care for children, as suggested by Held. It also corresponds to the practice of care that verifies our actions in relation to the ideal model mentioned above. In a similar manner Birnbacher accuses abstract principles of being too general, indeterminate in content and rigid. However, he stresses that „practical norms without ideal norms would be arbitrary whereas ideal norms without practical ones would be isolated from reality"[6]. Thus the ethics of care proposed by Held seems not to be relativist. This does not mean that the objection would not be valid in the case of other authors belonging to this school of thought.

In conclusion, the ethics of care suggested by Virginia Held appears interesting, but it requires further development. Objections to the connections of the ethics with psychology are not well-founded enough to disqualify it, nonetheless terms such as care and need require further philosophical working out. The methodology used, though it has certain faults, does not seem incorrect. As I have attempted to show using Birnbacher's work, similar solutions are used by other ethicists. The form of ethics developed by Virginia Held, with its category of care and the important role of feelings, is an interesting proposal, especially for cultures in which rationality and the autonomy of the individual are excessively esteemed.

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6   Ibidem, 10.

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Reverence for life vs. responsibility for life: the ethics of Albert Schweitzer and Hans Jonas

The degradation of natural environment is one of the most pressing problems in today's world. Due to humankind's intensive technical activity, in many places on the globe irreparable damage has been incurred and many species of animals and plants have become extinct. Other negative changes include a distinct rise in the average temperature and the occurrence of phenomena such as the smog or the hole in the ozone layer, the increase in the level of noise and significant – sometimes irreparable – pollution of certain areas. The development of science and technology has brought the desired progress, but only along with certain side effects, harmful for humans themselves and for the environment. The situation requires decisive action – not only targeted at minimising and preventing the dangerous and harmful effects of human activity, but also targeted at drawing new norms and standards that will help us avoid repeating the same mistakes – and bringing about the same threats – in the future. These norms should not be limited to the spheres of economy or law, they should also have ethical foundations. The environmental ethics stems from the realisation of dangers threatening the natural environment. The discipline addresses the problems of humans' relation to environment and specifies the norms dealing with this relation.

Even though environmental ethics is actually quite a young discipline, it has already offered interesting solutions to many problems connected to humans' relations to natural environment. Different solutions are proposed in line with the guiding ethical principles and with the stipulated methods of protection of these principles. Good examples of this tendency are the ethical systems of Hans Jonas and Albert Schweitzer.

For both philosophers life is the most precious value. They both attempt to define norms that would protect life in all its diversity. But even though they both choose the same value as the chief protected one, they still opt for different solutions. How significant are the differences between their approaches? Are they significant enough to view the two systems as mutually opposing? Or can these differences be regarded as nothing more than colouring that does not change the inherent similarity of the two concepts? The article aims to present the chosen differences and similarities between the two ethics of life protection – Schweitzer's ethics of reverence for life and Jonas's ethics of responsibility for life.

Both thinkers regarded life as the fundamental and absolute value, the value that demands the utmost protection and care and that continues to be the most precious regardless of the external circumstances. But Schweitzer and Jonas differ as to the methods of protection of life. Whereas Schweitzer puts stress primarily on reverence for life, Jonas attaches key importance to responsibility for life. Still, Schweitzer also stresses the role of responsibility for life and Jonas likewise talks about reverence for life. For both of them reverence and responsibility are not the appropriate methods of life protection as they in turn propose different methods of life protection as more appropriate.

Both thinkers come from the broadly defined biocentric school of thought within environmental ethics. They both notice the special value of life and the need to protect all its manifestations. Regardless of the level of complexity of the given life form, every organism is worth to be protected and no being should be annihilated or threatened with injury. Every biocentric ethical system, as a system that goes beyond the limits of the world of human relations, needs to address the question of the human beings position in the ethics. The biocentric ethical systems often fall into the pitfalls of anthropocentrism. This also happens in the ethical systems of Schweitzer and Jonas: they both err in the direction of anthropocentrism. What makes them different them however is their attitude to humans.

When Schweitzer demonstrates enormous reverence for the human being, and recognises the human beings' privileged position in the chain

of being, he also recognises the role of the human being as the subject who realises the ethics of reverence and at the same time he views the human being as an entity that deserves the reverence.

Jonas on the other hand, while he still recognises the human being's position in the chain of being, endeavours to appreciate other forms of being, sometimes at a cost of under-appreciating the human being. Jonas is being anthropocentric, but he tries to hide his attitude by presenting at the same time a vigorous critique of anthropocentrism. Declaratively speaking, his system is anti-anthropocentric, but in reality it is distinctly anthropocentric.

Furthermore, in the case of Schweitzer the ethics of reverence for live is also the ethics of particular cases. Schweitzer never offers readymade solutions, especially in the cases of conflict of interests, when attempts to preserve the life of one being can threaten another being. In such circumstances, it is necessary to carefully analyse every particular case in point, because Schweitzer does not offer a readymade solution. Every being and every specific situation give us an opportunity to implement the ethics of reverence, and the reverence is due to particular beings.

And for Jonas in turn it is not the responsibility for a single being, but for the nature as a whole, for all living beings and for all humankind that becomes the fundamental principle. In his case, the ontologisation of life, nature and humankind had led to the loss of care towards individual human beings. There is no notion of responsibility for individual human beings, only for humankind as a whole. Jonas's ethics places people at large before individuals. Jonas clearly spells out that it is permissible to sacrifice the life of an individual in order to save humankind, and not the other way round. The loss of value of an individual in order to save humankind and obey its laws creates the grounds for accusing Jonas of anti-humanism[1] that counters the achievements of modern humanism. The ontologisation of organic life and humankind, that legitimises the predominance of the object of responsibility over the subject, forms the foundations of Jonas's anti-humanism.

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[1]   Such accusations are voiced by L. Ferry czy Ch. Boissinot among others.

Both thinkers recognise the insufficiency of the extant ethics. Jonas presents his concept as an entirely new proposal that goes significantly beyond the extant ethical paradigms. Jonas creates his theory with conviction that it constitutes a totally new ethical paradigm. According to him, the extant ethics erred in the direction of anthropocentrism. It could not go beyond the scope of inter-human relations. Furthermore, in his critique of the extant ethics he stresses that it does not link up with ontology and is based on utopian principles. He is critical of humankind's blind trust in technology, of humankind's unawareness of its negative effects and of its lack of ability to cope with the enormous development of technology. Jonas condemns the extant ethics while at the same time he stresses that his own ethical system offers a new paradigm that was not – and could not – be present in the extant ethical concepts.

Schweitzer on the other hand is much more cautious in his critique. He condemns the civilisation strongly, perceiving its weaknesses and the threats posed by unlimited progress of technology and inappropriate use of the benefits that the technology has to offer. But the main butt of his criticism is the scope of ethics, which he deems too narrow and too anthropocentric. His ethics of reverence for life encompasses all forms of being. According to Schweitzer „slowly in European thought comes to the notion that ethics has not only to do with mankind but with the animal creation as well"[2]. In fact, he claims that ethics should encompass all living organisms and life in all its forms. Schweitzer does not announce the creation of a new ethical paradigm, but he draws the attention to the narrow scope of the extant ethical systems and opts for their broadening by moving from the reflection limited to the sphere of human-to-human relations to the inclusion of all manifestations of life. His approach is not limited to the critique of the extant ethical systems: he also proposes a new approach, the ethics of reverence. He thus formulates the main message of his philosophy: „I am life which wills to live, in the mids of life which wills to live. Therefore I am obliged to respect life"[3].

[2]   J. Charles (ed.), *Albert Schweitzer: An Anthology*, Boston 1960, 269.
[3]   H. Gaertner, *Albert Schweitzer*, Cracow 1978, 31.

Both these ethical systems are absolute in that they do not recognise any compromises or departures from the principle of life protection. Albert Schweitzer's ethics of reverence is directed at everyone. Everyone should discover the reverence for life inside them and demonstrate it in their actions. Jonas's ethics is also directed at everyone, but it is the politicians who are especially predestined to realise it[4]. It is linked to the observation that responsibility stems from power and hence, the greater the power, the greater the responsibility.

An important element of the concept of politicians' responsibility is the time horizon of responsibility. Namely, in Jonas's system the responsibility is directed towards the future, it becomes the responsibility for the future generations, for something that does not yet exist, but that demands to be put under appropriate care and protection[5]. And Schweitzer in turn opts for reverence for life in the present. His ethics is fully realised in the present, and its subject is life that exists in the present.

In the above section of the paper I have pointed out several differences between the theories of Jonas and Schweitzer. Their differences in the approach to the ethics of life, as indicated above, are mostly linked to the methods of life protection. They are not related to the fundamental principle, which is the protection of life in all its manifestations. Consequently, I would like to argue that the two ethical systems are similar in essentials, and the differences between them are only of secondary importance.

Both the ethical systems are directed at all humankind and both thinkers with for their concepts to be universal – they want them to become the creed of every man and woman on the planet. Even though both systems are the ethics of life protection, they both take into account respect, responsibility and the methods of life protection, they differ widely in the proposed methods of spreading the message. The abovementioned differences refer more to the qualities of the

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4   The concept of politicians' special responsibility was inspired by Max Weber's concept of the responsible politician.
5   Similarly to the concept of Max Weber.

philosophical system than to its essence. What makes the two systems different is mostly methodology.

Schweitzer points out to ethical intellectualism as a way towards reverence for life. According to him, the ethics of reverence can only come from inside of the human being. It is born inside, as a result of reflection about the world and about life. „World- and life-affirmation must be the products of thought about the world and life"[6]. The reflection leads the human being from a naïve affirmation of life towards a deeper affirmation that spurs him/her towards ethical actions and is the foundation of reason-based ethics. And the reason-based ethics in turn contributes to the ethical progress of humanity and can play an important role in the civilisation that is threatened by chaos.

The reflection leads to an affirmative attitude towards life, that is inherently linked with reverence for life. Only the affirmative attitude can lead to reverence for life, it is also the sole attitude in which the reverence can be expressed. Philosophical and religious traditions that opted for the negation of the world could not relate to the world in a way that would permit the implementation of „love thy neighbour" principle in the ethical system. The affirmative attitude allows for the discovery and realisation of the wide range of new approaches, proposed within the paradigm of reverence for life. The new ethics has many aspects. „Just like the white beam of light consists of multi-coloured rays, so reverence for life includes all the components of ethics of love, kindness, sympathy in suffering and in joy, peace-seeking attitude and the capacity to forgive"[7]. These specific elements of the ethics of reverence for life can only be realised when an affirmative attitude towards life is maintained.

When Schweitzer stressed that ethics of reverence for life stems from reflection, he proposed a link between the intellectual sphere and the sphere of morals, thus demonstrating a *sui generis* ethical intellectualism. But still, the foundation of actions is not scientific reflection but rather elementary reflection. This reflection „starts from a fundamental

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[6] A. Schweitzer, *The Decay and the Restoration of Civilisation,* translated by C.T. Campion, London 1961, 8.

[7] A. Schweitzer, *Życie*, Warsaw 1964, 52.

questions about the relations of man to the universe, about the meaning of life and about the nature of goodness"[8]. This reflection is deeper than a reflection that is limited to the explanation of phenomena perceived by the senses. It aims at answering the most fundamental questions and as such it is a sapiential reflection. This type of reflection can lead to mystique, which can prove useful in the endeavours to discovery the reverence for life and the will to live. Mystique can deepen the findings of reason, it can also help to fully understand and experience the reverence for life, empathy, will to live, affirmative attitude and the love for all living beings. If reflection is the starting point for Schweitzer, it is a reflection open to mystique, or a reflection that is complemented by mystique. The re-valuation of mystique does not mean a departure from rationalism, but Schweitzer claims that the weakness of rationalism lies in its lack of depth (and it is the mystical experiences that can add depth to our perception). Schweitzer's „reflection" is similar to the contemplation of a theory which was a characteristic feature of ancient philosophy.

According to Schweitzer, every thinking human being can discover the overwhelming importance of reverence for life. Schweitzer believed that thanks to the use of elementary reflection for thinking about human beings and their situation in the world, every person will discover his main message. In his theory, it is the reflection that becomes the key to the discovery of reverence for life. Therefore, the reverence for life is born inside. It is also inherently connected with the affirmative attitude towards the world, and the affirmative attitude is both the source and the expression of reverence.

Conversely, for Jonas it is fear, anxiety and awe that are the starting points. In his theory, Schweitzer's systematic doubt is supplanted with the systematic fear. Jonas opts for heuristics of fear, for a tool of inspiring fear. And it is fear that would enable the presentation of possible results of technology in such a way as to inspire further anxiety about to the future possibilities of the existence of life on earth. Consequently, fear would become the stimulus for taking up responsibility and for initiating

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[8]   J. Charles (Ed.) *Albert Schweizer*, op. cit., 4.

actions targeted at life protection. Why fear? Because the experience of evil is more potent than the experience of good, and because the notion of good is more prone to be taste-specific. The discreet presence of good can pass unnoticed, but the presence of evil cannot be ignored. A good example of this situation is the fact that we usually only appreciate our health when we lose it. Consequently, also in the matters of future life the experience of fear can be a motivating feeling.

Careful „dosing" of fear becomes an important issue, for, according to Jonas, we should aim more at a motivating fear than at a paralysing anxiety. Naturally, a paralysing anxiety can fail to elicit the desired response; it can completely incapacitate a human being and disable his/her capacity for making decisions. This is why a new academic discipline, the so-called comparative futurology, is expected to deliver data that would help us estimate possible results of our actions. The possible results would in turn be communicated to people in a way that would engender justified fear, but not pathological anxiety. The estimates generated by comparative futurologists would become the tools of *éducation sentimentale*, which would be instrumental in transmitting the fear to larger groups of people.

Fear would spur people into action. The choice of fear as a tool is an important element of Jonas's ethical system. He maintains that in order for ethics to be realised, it is necessary to commit the will. This can only be accomplished by the introduction of emotions into ethics. This does not mean that ethics should not be based on intellectual justification (suffice to say that the principle of responsibility itself is based on rational foundations). But still, these rational foundations are not a sufficient argument for the implementation of the theory. A well-constructed theoretical part connected with a psychological factor targeted at stirring the will is also essential. It is the commitment of the will that influences the implementation of ethics. There is no theoretical justification that would be equally effective as will. When it comes to the principle of responsibility, the psychological component is the feeling of responsibility, born out of fear of annihilating the future generations.

Whereas Schweitzer demonstrates ethical intellectualism as a way of arriving at the ethics, Jonas opts for heuristics of fear. The methodologies

of Schweitzer and Jonas are fundamentally different. The two viewpoints differ at least with respect to three important qualities.

The first difference is the provenance of the components. While ethical intellectualism comes from the inside and is a result of reflection and of an inner thinking process, the feeling of fear is external. The fear is caused by specific tools, and consequently, even though fear is experienced internally, it has to be attributed to external factors.

The second important difference is the factor that justifies the ethics. Schweitzer designates reason as the tool for discovering reverence for life and describes a connection between the moral and the intellectual sphere by indicating that it is reason that gives the final justification and validity of ethics. Schweitzer demonstrates ethical intellectualism based on the belief that the arguments for protecting life come from reason. Jonas on the other hand points to the volitional factor as an argument for taking up the ethics of responsibility. Jonas's ethics however is not based solely on feeling, it also makes use of rational foundations, but it is only the emotional „colouring" of the rational foundations that causes his ethics to be implemented. Reason alone and reflection alone are not sufficient for the implementation of the ethics, it is emotions that are instrumental for triggering action. Emotions complement the rational foundations of this ethical system, just as in Schweitzer's theory mystique complemented the ethics of reverence. Both thinkers allow both rational and non-rational factors into their systems, but there is one difference. Whereas in Schweitzer's view the reason alone is sufficient, in Jonas's view it is emotions that turn out to be the most important. In Schweitzer's view mystique is a supplementary tool that helps to deepen the revelations of reason, but it Jonas's view it is the reason that is supplementary, preparing the ground for the essential element of ethics – for emotions.

The third important difference is the effect of the diverse methodologies utilised by both thinkers. According to Schweitzer, the reflection on the human beings' place in the world leads to the affirmative attitude. This attitude is on one hand a way of developing the ethics of reverence for life, and on the other it is a method of manifestation of that same ethics, it is its effect. Jonas, through his use of heuristics of fear leads humans towards the experience of fear and anxiety. The experience

of fear is the effect of using Jonas's methodology and it is also the source of feeling of responsibility.

In spite of all the differences discussed above, both the ethical systems are largely similar. First of all, both theories assume the same goal – the protection of life in all its diversity. They also both choose the way of reverence and responsibility (while of course they differ as to the relative importance of these two values: Schweitzer stressed the fundamental role of reverence and Jonas puts emphasis on the role of responsibility). They differ with respect to the specific solutions that would ensure the protection of life. Both thinkers are the representatives of broadly defined biocentric ethics. They both fall in the pitfalls of anthropocentrism, but they differ in their attitude to the human being. While Schweitzer makes the human beings the subject of reverence, Jonas makes them the subject of critique. Schweitzer's ethics focuses on individual beings and Jonas's ethics focuses on life/humankind as a whole rather than on individual beings. Both thinkers see the inadequacy of the extant ethics and they particularly criticise the limiting of ethical reflection to anthropocentric matters (while only Jonas presents his thinking as a wholly new ethical paradigm). Both systems are absolute and targeted at everyone, while Jonas stresses the special role of politicians in the realisation of the imperative of responsibility. Jonas's ethics is directed towards the future, because it advocated responsibility for future generations, and the ethics of reverence only relates to the present. The above discussion presents some differences in the methods of life protection envisaged by both thinkers. Nonetheless, both ethical systems are essentially similar and they rely on the same principle. The main difference lies in methodology as both systems, in spite of their fundamental similarity, assume completely different tools for spreading their message.

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„All animals are equal": do we need the new ethics?

One of the problems arising with the development of civilization is that of defining the ethical subject, a role traditionally limited to human beings. Advancements in fields such as medicine are one of the factors which contribute to the large-scale extermination of animals, not only for the purpose of human survival, as in the use of animals in medical experiments, but also for the purpose of entertainment and pleasure. On the other hand, thanks to the development of science we now have greater knowledge of animal organisms than we did in the past; we know their psychological and physical features (e.g. feeling pain). With an increasing „awareness" of animals comes a demand from many for a more human treatment of animals.

For some of these people, it is not enough to demand the elimination of animal suffering; they demand that animals no longer be treated as objects, and they propose changing the human – animal relationship from one of subject – object (of proprietary character) to one of subject – subject. Some scholars advocate treating animals as one would a person (this usually applies to animals which are most similar to the human species)[1] or at least treating them as ethical subjects without comparing them to humans. For some people it is not enough to expand the concept of a person since such expansion is precisely a sign of species discrimination. „In searching for an honest and consistent ethic, if one believes that humans have rights, we find that there are no legitimate grounds for

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[1] e.g. Great Ape Projects, an international organization foundend in 1993 by Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer (who also edited a book of the same name). They advocate for the subjecthood of great apes, and an United Nation Declaration of the Rights of Great Apes that would confer basic legal rights on non-human great apes. Singer holds that this does not contradict the equality of all animals.

rejecting rights for all other animals" write Matthew Ball and Jack Norris in their manifesto[2].

One of the most active philosophers in this field is Peter Singer, a creator of theory as well as an activist of the animal liberation movement. Singer is not the first scholar to apply the concept of moral standing to animals but his book is widely considered, within the animal liberation movement, to be the founding philosophical statement of its ideas. According to Singer we need an entirely new ethics. This new system would apply not only to human beings but also to animals, and would thus raise some new important questions. Who, would be the subject of this new ethics? What would be its main principle? Is the aim of this ethics, full equality between animals and people, achievable? Do we really need a new ethics? Would it be the best way of protecting animals?

In 1975 Singer published a book entitled Animal Liberation[3], the book which manz call the bible of the liberation movement. Singer himself became very important for any organization fighting for animals' rights. What is interesting is the fact that Singer himself does not explicitly say anything about equal rights in the legal sense. Singer's ambition is to create a brand new ethical system, which would include not only human beings but also animals, and within which animals would be treated as rightful ethical subjects (not mere objects, or even subjects, of our relation).

As he himself states, Singer does this not from any particular feeling of sympathy for animals. As he says, many people who declare „love for animals" are at the same time tyrants in their relation to animals because they impose their own view of life on them. Morever, they do not mind taking part in imposing suffering on animals, perhaps not directly but by eating meat or wearing leather shoes.

Today, at least in theory, we may say that the principle „men are born equal and remain equal" is respected since discrimination is prohibited

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[2]   See: M. Ball, J.Norris, *Beyond Might Makes Right*, www.veganoutreach.org/advocacy/beyond.html.

[3]   P. Singer *Animal Liberation* , Harper Perennial, 2001, first edition 1975.

by law. At the same time we can ask what the grounds of human equality are. The most straightforward answer is similiarity. How, then, shall we treat this principle in the context of animals? (Should someone consider the problem of animal equality to be misconceived, comic, or unjustified, let him recall cases such as the history of women's struggle for equal rights, a matter which was also controversial, and equally so, not long ago.) The acceptance of animal equality is, in Singer's opinion, the logical consequence of demanding equality for women, or African Americans in the US, or for any another minority social group. No reasonable man denies that there are a lot of differences between people and animals. Neither does Singer. But in his opinion, if we start to analyze the problem of equality we have to admit that racism and sexism are simply evil.

When we talk about equality we do not mean equality in an empirical sense. Human beings do obviously differ when it comes to their sensibility, intelligence, sex and race but this difference is not sufficient reason for granting them different rights. Equality is an ethical idea, not a factual statement. The consequence of the application of the equality principle is an admission that we respect everyone's interests without regard for their abilities. „The basic principle of equality does not require equal or identical treatment, it requires equal consideration. Equal consideration for different beings may lead to different treatment and different rights"[4]. We should therefore demand different treatment for pigs and for babies, or for handicapped people. We do not demand voting right for animals; likewise, children do not have this right, for the simple reason that they are incapable of understanding the significance of voting.

There is one very important point here. Singer does not use the category of rights in regard to animals. In his opinion it is a very convenient shortcut used by the opponents of animal equality who say that only a conscious, autonomous creature can be a subject of rights. Animals do not have these properties. If we talk about rights, we face the problem of responsibility. It sounds quite nonsensical when applied to animals. There is a common belief that the subject of rights (and also of responsi-

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[4]   Ibidem, 2.

bility) has to be rational. Only the human being is recognized as rational, and on this premise, only the human being has a special position in the world of nature and the right to govern another species. This attitude, define as moral anthropocentrism or speciesism, is very often attributed to Immanuel Kant[5]. Some philosophers defend Kant and argue that Kant's attitude toward animals is in fact very similar to that of the defenders of animals[6].

Utilitarianism is the most commonly favoured philosophy among those animal status theorists who are not Kantians. It is not uniform, and not every version serves the contemporary postulates of animal equality.

For many utilitarians Jeremy Bentham is the „godfather" of the animal liberation movement. Bentham gives strong arguments not only against injustice to animals and against indifference to their suffering, but also against man being accorded a special status on the grounds of being rational. According to Bentham the basis of our relationship with animals is not the ability to reason or speak, but the ability to suffer. In this way Bentham broadens the idea of the moral and ethical subject.

Bentham writes:

„The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may one day come to be recognized that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, of the termination of os sacrum are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is is the faculty of reason, or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more

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[5]   Singer's interpretation of Kant is much too simplistic. Kant is not the only philosopher „guilty" of speciesism.

[6]   See: P. Łuków Kantowskie obowiązki wobec przyrody –człowiek a pozostałe zwierzęta, in: Świadomość środowiska, ed. Włodzimierz Galewicz, Kraków 2004, 64.

rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant or a day or a week or even a month, old. But suppose they were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk?, but Can they suffer?"[7.]

Singer builds his conception mainly on Bentham's views, but we can not pass over the standpoint of another very important utilitarian philosopher, J.S. Mill, and his concept of qualitative *differences between pleasures, which undermines Betham's arguments. Mill distinguishes higher and lower pleasures and in his opinion there is a fundamental moral difference between animals and human beings. Mill stated this difference bluntly: „It is better to be an unhappy human being than a happy pig". Mill disagrees that ability to suffer should be singled out as an important moral feature. The character and quality of experience are indeed important, as is the posession of a capacity to feel in some way that other species do not.*

Thus not every kind of utilitarianism is helpful in defending animal equality. We can even state that some utilitarian theories can in fact lead to speciesism. Only by rejecting differentiation of the quality of pleasures and narrowing utilitarianism to Bentham's views are we able to include animals as the subjects of our moral sensibility.

„The capacity for suffering and enjoyment is a prerequisite for having an interest at all, a condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of interests in a meaningful way.(...) The capacity for suffering and enjoyment is, however, not only necessary, but also sufficient for us to say that a being has interests -an absolute minimum, an interest not suffering"[8].

Singer follows Bentham's criterion of the capacity to suffer, and makes it a necessary and sufficient condition of inclusion in an ethical system, which allows his ethical system to consider all creatures sharing with this characteristic to be equal subjects. Only the being who can suffer has an interest in it and no differences can be identified in the extent of suffering

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[7]   J. Bentham, *Introduction to Priciples of Morals and Legislation*, cit. P. Singer *Animal Liberation*, op. cit. 39.
[8]   Ibidem, 7-8.

– every suffering counts equally. This criterion excludes inanimate nature from ethical protection. A stone or a tree does not suffer so they have no interest in becoming an ethical subject, but, it should be noted, neither would every representative of the animal world be granted this status.

Science seems to be the only instrument by which the boundary between who or what can and cannot become an ethical subject is established. Singer is imprecise and somewhat arbitrary in regard to what (or who) is able to feel pain. The problem lies not just in the practical use of the rule, but also in its theoretical justification. The ethical principle of minimizing suffering brings many dilemmas and many controversial consequences for both animals and human beings. Let us take a look at some of them.

If the criterion of respecting somebody's interest is suffering, then what about animals which, as the result of medical experiments (for instance genetic engineering) do not have the ability to feel pain? Do we have a right to kill them? Following this train of thought, human beings whose brain is damaged in such a way that they can feel no pain could also be killed and it would not be considered a negative action in the ethical sense. More importantly, we have to ask if they would still be ethical subjects. The answer is 'no'. Thus Singer's ethical sphere would be extended to some animals, but at the same time it would exclude some human beings.

Yet another side of this problem is that science is imperfect, or incomplete. Our knowledge of the living organism and its ability to feel pain may change. So in fact man judges the ability to suffer by using his own instrument, science. This could be considered anthropocentrism.

This brings us to the most important objection to Singer's standpoint, namely that it leads to speciesism in the same way as the traditional ethics based on the understanding of the moral subject as rational does. Admittance to the moral community is by being judged to be sufficiently similar to human beings in some way, in this case the ability to feel pain. It is a human point of view to refer to matters important exclusively to human beings. Singer writes: „To avoid speciesism we must allow that beings who are similar in all relevant respects have a similar right to life

– and mere membership in our own biological species can not be a morally relevant criterion for this right"[9].

Does Singer not trap himself? Doesn't his rule lead, not to equality, but to equalization of animals and human beings in accordance with human standards? By looking for human features among other species we do manifest a kind of anthropocentrism. Gary Francione criticizes Singer's proposed new ethics for this reason. He writes:

„Unfortunately for the present time, the welfarist position of Peter Singer is informing the movement. This position claims that advocates should support any measure that „reduces suffering." This theory has had disastrous practical results. Nearly any proposed change, such as giving an extra inch of space to a battery hen, or eating only non-crate veal, can be portrayed as reducing suffering. Singer's theory allows large, multi--million-dollar animal welfare organizations to come up with moderate campaigns and then to demand that we all jump on the bandwagon because this will „reduce suffering." Under Singer's theory, it would make sense for animal exploiters to make things as horrible as they can for animals in order to be able to „reduce suffering" and thereby make small concessions to activists. That is precisely what the exploiters are doing, with McDonalds' so-called „improvements" being a perfect example of the problem. And the „movement" is buying into this because Singer has declared that these insignificant changes will „reduce suffering"[10].

Francione accuses Singer of being speciesist himself because the rule of suffering is one drawn up in a human perspective. „How „like us" do these animals have to be before they get „promoted" in this hierarchy?[11] He proposes instead just one right suitable for animals: the right not to be property. An ethical system of this kind should be based simply on the ability to feel, without any specifications.

Some people believe that the life of every being is sacred. Many of them are opponents of abortion and euthanasia. In Singer's opinion, it

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[9] Ibidem, 19.
[10] An Interview with Professor Gary L. Francione on the State of the U.S. Animal Rights Movement, www.friendsofanimals.org, summer 2002.
[11] Ibidem.

would be more accurate to describe this view as „the sanctity of human life", because the followers of this principle do not usually oppose the killing of nonhuman animals[12]. For Singer this is a sign of hypocrisy and speciesism.

Where does this criticism of Singer's lead us? For Singer killing a mouse or causing one to suffer for a higher human interest (for instance, in medical experimentation, for the purpose of rescuing human life) is reprehensible, but killing an infant with serious brain damage, in the name of minimizing suffering, is not. Singer writes „It is not arbitrary to hold that the life of a self-aware being, capable of abstract thought, of planning for the future, of complex acts of communication, and so on, is more valuable then the life of a being without these capacities"[13]. The life of animals, which have these capacities developed more than an intellectually disabled human being, is more valuable than that of that human being. It is one of the most radical consequences of opposition to speciesism and to the defenders of human life. The question is wheher Singer really accepts this view or is trying rather to show his opponents its consequences.

In both Animal Liberation and Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse of Our Traditional Ethics Singer announces with satisfaction the collapse of western ethics based on Christian values, ethics with a strong belief in the special position of the human being in the world of nature and the doctrine of the sacredness of life from conception until natural death. Singer regards the rules of the old ethics as incoherent and out of date due to medical development, and he postulates the creation of more flexible moral rules which would be adaptable to progressive technology and knowledge.

Singer does not accept any of the current ethical systems, except Bentham's. The creators of these ethics were not interested in the treatment of animals, or worse, under pretended concern were in fact speciesist. So, as Singer states, we need to accept new principles of ethics,

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[12] See: P. Singer, *Animal Liberation,* op. cit., 17-18.
[13] Ibidem, 20.

principles of the moral equality of human beings and animals. Only in this way we will be able to end the tyranny of human beings. This view is debatable.

One of the problems is the legitimacy, justification and fairness of the main ethical principle. Another problem is understanding the ideas and using them in practice. These problems make it harder to treat Singer's system as sound one. Some of the consequences of using the principle in practice are disturbing, especially when it comes to the human species.

However, the most important question is whether this system does in fact better protect the rights of animals. It would seem that we can take care of animals and of the whole of nature without any new ethical system, especially without one with such a controversial principle of the moral equality of human beings and animals. It also seems that we do not have to give up the idea of reason and culture.

It is undoubtedly important that Singer pays attention to the question of the treatment of animals. Our relation with animals is a measure of our humanity. Singer's view is a voice in a broader discussion, but it is not the crucial one.

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Double effect reasoning and the question of surgical separation of conjoined twins

Introduction

The aim of the paper is to outline the moral debate over the surgical separation of conjoined twins, specifically looking at the case of Jodie and Mary, whose destiny was determined not only by their body's structure, but also by medical intervention[1]. I will analyse the cardinal issue of this case, the question of whether the doctors' intervention, which sacrificed Mary's life to save Jody's, can be justified. As a possible solution to this Solomonic dilemma I analyse the principle of double effect reasoning which I think can, when properly applied, lead us to a justification of the act of surgical separation of Mary and Jody. To this end, I first explain the case of the named conjoined twins, then I briefly define categories like body, identity and separateness in relation to the body shape of the conjoined twins. I then introduce the principle of double effect reasoning (DER) and going into its details use it in determining the question of the moral permissibility of the separation.

Jodie and Mary

Jodie and Mary were born as conjoined twins to Maltese parents in Great Britain, in 2000. The predictions for their future were bleak. The girls were captives in a very tragic form of the human body; medicine stated from the beginning that they could not survive in their sad condition.

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[1] I say „their body's structure" on purpose, because as will become clear I argue against the view that conjoined twins are „just two entangled singletons".

„…Mary was incapable of respiration, with a heart too underdeveloped to pump blood through her body. In addition, she suffered serious anomalies of the brain. Had she been born a singleton, she would have died at birth. While Mary's heart and lungs were virtually useless, Jodie's were strong and healthy, and because of their conjoined circulatory system, Jodie's organs kept both girls alive"[2].

Now, the question was: is it legal, moral, permissible, to bring Mary's life to an end and so to save Jodie's? The parents refused the separation and decided to give their children's lives into the hands of God[3]. Surgeons however were strongly recommending an operation to separate the girls, and that is why the case appeared before the Court of Appeal. The decision of the three law lords was a justification of the separation of the twins, despite it being a lethal act which resulted in Mary's death[4].

Before I proceed to my attempt to answer this question, I need to have a closer look at the category of „human body", since it is very important when discussing the problem of conjoined twins. We must see how we understand the human body and, consequently, the human form of conjoined twins, as different understandings can obviously lead to different reasoning in making decisions concerning their separation.

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[2] A.K. Suziedelis, *Conjoined twins: The ambiguity of double effect reasoning*, Medical Ethics & Bioethics, 8(2001)3-4, 3.

[3] David B. Waisel stands up for the decision of the parents. He understands the doctors and their motivation, but the last word in the case of separation should belong to the parents. „And although the argument that separation is Jodie's sole chance is emotionally powerful, that argument does not permit overruling parents. Indeed, parents are permitted to forgo chances for their children in the absence of convincing risks and benefits." D.B. Waisel, *Moral Permissibility as a Guide for Decision Making About Conjoined Twins*, http://www.anesthesia-analgesia.org/cgi/reprint/101/1/41.pfd, 42. Annas also points out the neglect of parental consent. He says, „I would like to have had the parents agree to the separation (since giving Jodie a chance to live at the cost of cutting Mary's life short does seem the lesser of two evils), but I do not believe the case for separation is so strong that it demands that the authority to make the decision about the medical case of their children be taken away from the parents." G.J. Annas, *Conjoined Twins – The Limits of Law at the Limits of Life*, The New England Journal of Medicine, 334(2001)14, 1108.

[4] „The trial-court judge concluded that separation was in the best interests of both children and that separation was not a case of killing Mary but one of passive euthanasia in

Body

A. Physical separateness of a body is not a necessary attribute

At the beginning of the debate over what the human body is, there is a general assumption that the „normal" form of the human body includes being physically separated from other bodies. If we understand body only according to this rigid model of physical separateness our chauvinistic view may mean we fail to recognize other human forms, and our chance of understanding them could be low. Can we name precisely the necessary attributes of a normal human body?[5]. I fear we cannot draw a line between the features that are necessary characteristics of the human body and those which would lead one to say that a body possessing them is to be treated as defective. „The fact that being conjoined is statistically of low probability is not enough to make it a defect"[6]. If we cannot make this distinction, it is difficult to say what is still normal, and what no longer is, what is out with normality, in regard to the human body. Bratton and Chetwynd (influenced by Foot, Millikan) argue:

„The evolution of a species is, however, related to an environment. Our point is that the human environment, within which we evolve, has, through medical science and public health, changed characteristics

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which her food and hydration would be withdrawn (by clamping off her blood supply from Jodie)". G.J. Annas, op. cit, 1104. The judges reached this decision, but the arguments they provided were very different. While Lord Justice Alan Ward accused Mary of killing Jodie and thus making a decision to kill Mary justifiable homicide, a case of „quasi self -defense", Lord Justice Robert Brooke argued that Mary was self-designated to a very early death and he argued for the doctrine of necessity, which he believed justifies the necessary defense of the lesser evil, and Lord Justice Robert Walker supported and developed this argument using the doctrine of double effect reasoning and stressing that although Mary's death was necessary it was not intentional but was an inevitable consequence. See: M.Q. Bratton, S.B. Chetwynd, *One into two will not go: Conceptualizing conjoined twins*, Journal of Medical Ethics, (2004)30, 279-285; http://www.hartpub.co.uk/updates/pdfs/cl-med.pdf.

[5] I believe that the „one brain – one body" model cannot be the answer, because then we would be not able to explain such cases as split brain, multiple personalities, schizophrenia etc.

[6] M.Q. Bratton, S.B. Chetwynd, op. cit., 282.

which would have been so disadvantageous as to preclude the survival of an individual long enough to reproduce. Such characteristics may still be disadvantageous, but they do not rule out survival and reproduction. Thus the standards for humans are determined in part by developments in human societies and sciences"[7].

To talk about conjoined twins, we need first to be aware of the fact that body shape is not something which must strictly fit the only model expected by a society influenced by cultural assumptions. Bratton and Chetwynd write that Alice Dreger „argues that the body is a flexible concept that cannot be pigeonholed into a discrete category"[8]. They develop her idea and point out that „we singletons cannot conceive of conjoined life and so also have a distorted view of it. We do not see things as they are, but as we are"[9].

I must also stress that if we want to talk about conjoined twins, we have first of all to liberate ourselves from our prejudices and stereotypes. We should not take as a starting point the idea that conjoined twins are deformed human beings. After coming to this awareness we can begin to discuss their identity, dignity and best interests.

B. Conjoined twins as two persons in one body

„Persons who bear names as Jodie or Mary, are separate individuals both in nature and in ordinary perception"[10]. Are these twins two singletons in one continuum of skin? Is only Jodie a person and Mary merely her parasitic part? Are they both persons sharing one body? The relation between Mary and Jody is the source of the difficulty in understanding their status and their rights and duties. Different decisions about their separation were proposed because of the lack of the „standard definition" of the relation.

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[7]   Ibidem, 282.
[8]   Ibidem, 283.
[9]   Ibidem, 283.
[10]   M. Y. Barilan, *One or two: An Examination of the Recent Case of the Conjoined Twins from Malta*. Journal of Medicine&Philosophy, 28(2003)1, 28.

To treat Mary as a parasitic twin of Jody is not possible, as although her brain was badly damaged she was born with all the features of human kind, so we do not need to take this possibility into consideration[11]. In this paper I argue that conjoined twins[12] are two people in one body (and not two people with their own bodies). When I say human body, what I have in my mind is the concept of some complex, which possesses all the features typical of the human species and which exists in one spatio-temporal reality. So by this definition, I understand conjoined twins as one complex body, which must be treated as one complex, and not merely as two bodies tied together by skin. As Barilan writes in his article, „The Maltese was individuated from its mother and from all other people, but Jody had not been individuated from Mary prior to the operation"[13]. I also support the understanding of the conjoined twins as two persons in one body. If they were to be considered as two bodies, they would have to have been separated, as two bodies usually are. Knowing they were not distinct from each other, we cannot say that they were two bodies „just" tied together. There is a general tendency to argue that in spite of the occupation of one body by two persons, the doctors can identify precisely which organ belongs to whom, and that for this reason we should see conjoined twins and their personalities as two singletons. Nevertheless, I lean towards the opinions that say conjoined twins cannot be seen as two singletons each occupying and having a right over „its own" part of

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[11] If we considered Mary to be parasitic, then we would be forced to make this conclusion also about people with brain death or in a vegetative state, and about people with very low levels of intelligence, and this I assume we do not want to do.

[12] The understanding of the body shape of the conjoined girls is also about the way we use language, how we understand the reality. To designate twins like Mary and Jody as „conjoined twins" can be misleading. There are some calls for reconsidering the use of this term (referring to the politically incorrect analogical term „siamese twins"), because the word „conjoined" naturally evokes the idea that something separate was subsequently con-joined, but this is not true about these twins, as they were joined from a very early stage of their prenatal development and were born in one body.

[13] Although Barilan indicates their common body in this idea, realizing there are two persons occupying it, he uses the pronoun „was", when talking about the girls. I would prefer to say „their body was", and „the girls (Maltese) were„ (still talking about the pre-operation state). M. Y. Barilan, op.cit., 30.

the body. „Being conjoined twins is a unique experience indeed. It is not adding one person to another, but an altogether different form of human existence"[14]. Bratton and Chetwynd, under the influence of Dreger, state that.

„This view seems to make a case for considering conjoined twins as two individuals, psychologically separate, part of whose individuality is constituted by being conjoined. That is to see them as essentially, rather than accidentally joined. This may encourage viewing their situation not as one in which each twin is a problem for the other, to be solved by contractual style negotiation, but where they both face a common problem and in which they have joint interests"[15].

We can proceed to the question of the relation between the conjoined twins themselves, between them as personalities, only if we are aware of their relation to the body and try to understand it. The judges of the Court of Appeal based their decisions on the common assumption that the relation between the girls is one of competition over a body and they strongly favoured the stronger (Jody) „competitor"[16]. This opinion follows from their assumption that Mary and Jodie are two bodies mixed together by an anomalous development and predestined to a tragic end. I am not going to analyze here the judges' decisions about the surgical separation of Mary and Jodie and their statements, I want only to show that the basis of their judgments is very weak and of doubtful validity, if we (in contrast to the judges) treat the twins as two persons in one body, which they are not supposed to compete over, but to share. As Annas says, „The problem is that once the twins are separated verbally, it is only a matter of time before they will be separated surgically"[17]. I do not want

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[14] Ibidem, 33.

[15] M.Q. Bratton, S.B. Chetwynd, op. cit., 283.

[16] Especially Lord Justice Alan Ward, who accuses Mary of sucking Jodie's life-blood treats Mary as being parasitic and killing her sister. He goes even further in his argumentation and he also „knows" what Jodie would have said to Mary, if she had had the ability to speak: „Stop it, Mary, you are killing me". G.J. Annas, op. cit., 1007. This claim seems to me terribly audacious, and I cannot see any good grounds for making it.

[17] G.J. Annas, op. cit., 1107.

to seem to argue for not separating the conjoined twins, I merely hold that their separation should be required not for reasons such as a chauvinistic model of the „normal” human body, the „repair” of abnormality, or the separation of two individual bodies, but in the best interests of both the persons involved, and to solve the situation of *one body over which neither has a privileged right.*

C. Identity

Thinking about the conjoined twins, I cannot bypass the question of their identity. This problem is a broad one, but I will briefly outline my view on the continuity of the individuation of the twins, before the operation and after it. As I defined the body of the twins and their relation to it, I argued for the opinion that until they are separated, their physical identity is common and not that of „one body + one body”. The „after-operation” identity may be a controversial issue. Are the doctors creating new people? Or are the separated twins a continuation of their „pre-operation” state?

„Conjoined twins are not separate and never have been. If we separate them, we should at the very least recognize that we are creating two new separate entities from two who were one, and that in doing so we are removing from each of them part of themselves”[18].

The other extreme opinion would be the idea that the separation could be understood as an act of restoration of the Maltese, but this is not very plausible, as the life conditions of the conjoined twins were so poor that they would have died without the operation.

We could look at this (physical) identity issue also from the point of view which proposes that the only one of the twins to be a candidate for continuity of identity is Jodie, as it was only she who had the potential to develop after the operation.

I espouse the view that both girls were the *continuations* of their pre-operation state and I see them neither as totally new creatures, nor as merely restored ones. I believe that a part of their biological history is

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[18]   M.Q. Bratton, S.B. Chetwynd, op. cit., 284.

deeply tied to the identity of the one body they shared, and that they are both equal candidates for continuing on their own the process of identity development identification they used to follow together. In this case, I would see a manifestation of Parfit's theory, which says that identity does not have to be a one-to-one relationship or an all-or-nothing one[19]. I believe that human beings living in one body in a conjoined condition can survive as two persons after separation. If we admit that survival and consequently identity can be a matter of degrees, as Parfit argues, we may have an answer to the question of the identity of conjoined twins.

Back to the question of separation

Now I return to the issue I outlined at the beginning. Analyzing and defining the core category of the conjoined twins, their body, let us try to answer the question of whether the separation of Mary and Jodie, which ended Mary's life, was justifiable. I am not going to go into the details of judges and their arguments, as they had only a little in common, but I will proceed to the doctrine of double-effect reasoning (hereafter as DER), which Lord Justice Walker partly applied, and I will attempt to show that the reasoning behind DER in this case depends on the way the body of the conjoined twins and the relation between them are understood. If an action leads to and causes serious harm as an unintended side effect, and it also achieves a good end, the whole action may be justified because of principle of double effect. There are some conditions that must be fulfilled when applying this principle.

I have drawn on the summary of these effects from the *New Catholic Encyclopedia*:

1. The act itself must be morally good or at least indifferent.
2. The agent may not positively will the bad effect but may permit it. If he can attain the good effect without the bad effect he should do so. The bad effect is sometimes said to be indirectly voluntary.

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[19] See: D. Parfit, *Personal Identity*, in: *Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology*, ed. T. Crane, K. Farkas, New York 2004, 560-577.

3. The good effect must flow from the action at least as immediately (in the order of causality, though not necessarily in the order of time) as the bad effect. In other words the good effect must be produced directly by the action, not by the bad effect. Otherwise the agent would be using a bad means to a good end, which is never allowed.
4. The good effect must be sufficiently desirable to compensate for the allowing of the bad effect[20].

There are some voices which say that DER cannot be applied to the case of conjoined twins, because not one person but two are involved. I suppose this argument is answered if we treat conjoined twins (those which are, like Mary and Jodie, strongly biologically joined)[21] as a complex, as one body, as I have described above.

If we look more carefully at the reasoning behind the separation of Jodie and Mary, we see the following; two innocent lives would have been lost if the doctors had not intervened. The doctors did all they could, and so they saved Jodie. As a result of the same operation which saved Jodie, Mary died. If we want to justify the separation, we have to analyze the intention of the doctors and the results achieved. Following DER and its criteria, we can conclude that

a.) the act of saving the innocent life of Jodie is morally good
b.) the bad effect, Mary's death, is neither wanted nor intended. Nobody wishes to kill Mary for the sake of saving Jodie. If there had been a different solution in this heartbreaking case, competent doctors would have certainly chosen it.
c.) Jodie was saved by separation from, not by the death of, Mary. Although Mary's death was foreseeable, it could not have been prevented, as it was a necessary side effect (not intended).
d.) the good effect is sufficiently desirable to compensate for the bad effect, as the innocent life of Jodie was saved, which had every chance of developing.

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[20] See: *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, 4(1967), http://www.trosch.org/phi/dbl-efft.htm.
[21] By strong biological fusion doctors understand cases of conjoined twins which share vital organs (heart, brain, lungs) and the separation of them is rarely possible if both are to be saved.

Conclusion

The case which I have tried to present is so complicated that it cannot be wholly presented in such a limited paper. Many other problems, responses, views and opinions emerge from all the particular issues I have analyzed, but it was not my aim to present them even in summary form. My intention was to outline the discussion over the moral dispute of the separation of the conjoined twins Mary and Jodie that lead to Mary's death. First I needed to define the „body" category, and subsequently that of physical identity, in order to present a view within which justification of the separation is actually possible. With no concept of „body", especially of the body of conjoined twins, we could not comprehend the problem of their separation, as it is strongly dependent on the notion of the body. I presented the position that holds that conjoined twins should be treated as two persons in one body and that the relation between them should be seen as one of unity and solidarity, and not one of rivalry and competition (over the body). On this basis, I attempted to provide a possible explanation of the justifiability of the separation of Mary and Jodie, which I built up on the doctrine of double effect. This brings me to conclude that the act of separation can be justified, since the moral good was achieved without recourse to immoral means, although it had an unavoidable side effect, Mary's death, which was not intended, although foreseen. And was the separation, justified in this way, still the best solution in their case and in the best interest of both of them? I do not suppose there could have been a better decision than to operate. What I try to underline is the source of the reasoning behind this act. I realize that there are thousands of questions and that a decision like this is never easy, but in my (vitalistic?) opinion, I cannot imagine doing nothing when an innocent life might be saved, though it require a grave sacrifice.

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Responsible Business

Economics vs. Ethics

The entrepreneurs dealing with the way the companies function and the economists responsible for the system regulating macroeconomic processes often face moral dilemmas related to the company's management. Adequate recognition of the conflicting values is necessary in order to solve these dilemmas. The conflict between moral and economic values seems to be the most interesting one[1].

The assumptions, the methods and the goals of ethics do not agree with the assumptions, the methods and the goals of economics. Philosophers of morality try to present a variety of ethical values and hope that such values will point to the direction of moral improvement of man. They try to show what we should not do, which ways of behaviour are better and which are more ethical. We may therefore describe ethics as a theory of moral values and moral behaviour. It tries to analyse the conditions of ethical behaviour and of being subject to moral judgement and norms, of moral responsibility. It deals with the assessment and norms for human behaviour and looks for the final justification of morality and its principal norms[2]. On the other hand the economy focuses mainly on production and exchange and is therefore mainly interested in their maximisation. It is an empirical science, which means that it analyses and experiments with the questions related to the production of goods and with the services which fulfil human needs. It analyses how the society

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[1] See: K. Sosenko, *Kwestia zastosowania etyki w ekonomii,* in: *Etyka biznesu,* ed. by J. Dietl, W. Gasparski, PWN, Warsaw 1997, 273.

[2] See: A. B. Stępień, *Wstęp do filozofii,* KUL, Lublin 1989, 97.

takes economic decisions on what, how and for whom to produce[3]. Being a social and empirical science it is interested in actions and behaviour of people who are connected with management.

Many economists believe that because of the fundamental differences, the economic activity of man should not be and is not subject to moral norms. At this point, we may use M. Friedman's frequently quoted phrase: "the business of business is business"[4], which means that whenever we consider the economic activity of man there is no place for ethics. The only exception is the situation in which „ethics" improve productivity and profits of a company[5]. Here we are not able to conduct a thorough analyses of the arguments of those who criticise such view, but let us only say according to Cz. Porębski, that there is no internal conflict between ethics and economics, on the contrary they are connected by a relationship of strong conditioning[6]. Furthermore, we wish to emphasise that where there is economic activity there is a need to refer to the notion of responsibility.

Philosophical idea of responsibility

Under the influence of World War One the idea of responsibility started to replace the idea of duty which was frequently used before that period. It tuned out that the second term does not correspond to the spirit of democracy and spreading idea of freedom. J. Jackson writes that the notion of duty, „points to some necessity — to something that we *have* to do or that we *have* to avoid doing"[7]. It is associated with an image of some dictate that limits the free will of man. Furthermore, the philosophy of the 20th century discovers a two-way relationship between freedom and responsibility. It is described in the following way: there is no freedom

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[3] See: D. Begg, S. Fischer, R. Dornbusch, *Ekonomia,* PWN, Warsaw 1993, 28.
[4] M. Friedman, *The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits*, The New York Times Magazine (1970)13 September.
[5] See: Cz. Porębski, *Czy etyka się opłaca? Zagadnienia etyki biznesu*, Cracow 2000, 24-25.
[6] See: Cz. Porębski, *Co nam po wartościach?*, Cracow 2001, 192.
[7] J. Jackson, *Biznes i moralność*, translated from English R. Pucek, Warsaw 1999, 134.

without responsibility and there is no responsibility without freedom. According to J. Filek, if there is no responsibility without freedom and at the same time there is no freedom without responsibility, then we see that this relation is not only mutual but probably much more deeper[8].

The term „responsibility" is also better at emphasising mutual relations. „Duty" suggests one-way obligation. After H. Jonas, the philosophers point to the change in the relationship between the man and the nature[9]. Until recently the nature was the refuge for the man, now it needs man's protection. The man, including *homo oeconomicus,* is responsible for its survival.

The generality of the notion of responsibility also works to its advantage. It means that it may be analysed both in personal and general terms. Responsibility in the personal sense emphasises direct attitude of man towards another man or of man towards things. General responsibility stresses man's responsibility for the world he lives in. At this point we do not aim at more general analyses of the related problems (especially those associated with the general responsibility), we only point to the fact that in the light of general responsibility we may perceive a company as a special kind of moral subject responsible for the world.

The idea of Corporate Social Responsibility, which is the subject of the following parts of this paper, is an attempt at appealing for the responsibility in the economy. Its supporters stress that it takes into account both praxeological (effective and economical) and axiological (ethical) issues[10]. Realising the complexity of the subject we limited our considerations to presenting definitions of the discussed concept, hoping that together with the example presented in the following parts it will lead its better understanding.

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[8] See: J. Filek, *Pytania do odpowiedzialności*, Znak (1995)10, 27.
[9] See: Cz. Porębski, *Co nam po wartościach?*, op. cit., 192
[10] See: W. Gasparski, *Społeczna odpowiedzialność biznesu: argumenty przeciw i za*, in: Annales 7(2004)1, 40.

What is CSR?

It is impossible to find one definition which would say what CSR is and what CSR is not. In the literature dealing with the subject we may find some attempts at conveying the essence of this concept. For example, *The Green Paper* defined CSR as „a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis"[11]. This definition presents CSR as an important strategic issue. While preparing its strategy a company places social interests and environmental protection among its goals. Moreover, being „socially responsible means not only fulfilling legal expectations, but also going beyond compliance and investing „more" into human capital, the environment and the relations with stakeholders"[12]. It is not enough for a company to limit its actions to fulfilling formal and legal requirements. First of all, it has focus more on investing in human resources, environmental protection and keeping good relations with its stakeholders. According to J. Filek, it means a voluntary engagement into shaping of the internal and external environment of the company[13].

Going beyond legal duties is also stressed in another definition, which states that CSR „refers to management's obligation to set policies, make decisions and follow courses of action beyond the requirements of the law that are desirable in terms of the values and objectives of society"[14]. In the papers of World Bank we may find a definition which according to J. Filek is taken much further in the direction of company's social duties[15]. This definition presents CSR as „a commitment of business to contribute

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[11] *Green Paper. Promoting a European framework for Corporate Social Responsibility*, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels 2001, 4.

[12] Ibidem, 6.

[13] See: J. Filek, *Społeczna Odpowiedzialność Biznesu. Tylko moda czy nowy model prowadzenia działalności gospodarczej?*, Cracow 2006, 4.

[14] D. Mosley, P.H. Pietri, L.C. Megginson, *Management: Leadership in Action,* New York 1996, 166.

[15] See: J. Filek, *Społeczna Odpowiedzialność Biznesu. Tylko moda czy nowy model prowadzenia działalności gospodarczej?*, op. cit., 5.

to sustainable development working with employees, their families, local communities, and society at large to improve their quality of life that are both good for business and good for development"[16].

A definition by A. B. Carroll is one of the broadest and at the same time one of the most frequently quoted definitions of CSR. It consists of four parts and includes four types of responsibility. „The social responsibility of business encompasses the economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary expectations that society has of organizations at a given point in time"[17] – writes Caroll.

Such attempts at defining the essence of CSR are based on the concept of a company focusing on the interests of stakeholders. The first of the „principles for business"[18] (Principle 1. The Responsibilities Of Businesses: Beyond Shareholders toward Stakeholders) accepted during the round-table conference in Caux in 1994, mentions the need for broader perspective on business activities of companies, so that companies do not focus only on the interests of their shareholders but also on the interests of all stakeholders. „Businesses have a role – we read in Principles for Business – to play in improving the lives of all their customers, employees, and shareholders by sharing with them the wealth they have created. Suppliers and competitors as well should expect businesses to honour their obligations in a spirit of honesty and fairness. As responsible citizens of the local, national, regional and global communities in which they operate, businesses share a part in shaping the future of those communities"[19].

Discussing CSR as an everyday business practice we may say that it is fulfilled on two levels: internal and external. The internal level includes human resources management. We may point to the question of equal rights for the employees, improvement of the communication between

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[16] *What Does Business Think about Corporate Social Responsibility? Part I*, World Bank, 2005, 11.

[17] A. B. Carroll, *A Three-Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate Performance*, Academy of Management Review 4(1979)4, 500.

[18] *Principles for Business*, Caux Round Table, 1994.

[19] Ibidem.

the employees and the managers, employee participation, perspectives for further development and improving qualifications, fair payment, supporting the employees in their attempts to combine family duties with work and staff training. Furthermore, the internal level encompasses ethical programs for the employees, safety and hygiene of work, adapting to changes, environmental protection and corporate governance[20].

On the external level a company should focus on the issues which concern local communities, which, among others, means the broader cooperation with non-governmental organizations and other local partners, engagement in philanthropic activities, social effects of business activity, creation of new jobs for the disabled, civic engagement in social investments[21]. The company should also respect human rights and deal with the global aspects of the environmental issues.

Implementation and development of the CSR Strategy – Case study[22]

Further on, our aim is to outline keystones and the way of implementation of a good Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Strategy based on sound long run win-win partnership with the company stakeholders.

At the beginning, we would like to define the basic concept of CSR used in this paper. Under CSR Strategy we understand a mean through which a company is endorsing sustainable development consistently. Sustainable development is based on the approach of acceptance the triple-bottom line strategy of economical, environmental and social values. „In its definition, sustainable development integrates equal shares of the economic, social and environmental dimensions"[23] Coline

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[20] See: B. Rok, *Odpowiedzialny biznes w nieodpowiedzialnym świecie*, Warsaw 2004, 20.

[21] See: ibidem.

[22] The study was prepared in the Framework of the Research Program No.: MSM 6138439909 „Governance in the Context of the Globalized Economy and Society".

[23] E. Zaccai, *Sustainable Consumption, Ecology and Fair Trade*, Routledge, New York 2007, 157.

Ruwet in Zaccai. By the term stakeholders we would quote the definition mentioned by McWilliams and Siegel[24] and adopted from Freeman who „asserts that firms have relationships with many constituent groups and that these stakeholders[25] both affect and are affected by the actions of the firm".

In our paper, we are examining the way of implementation and subsequently CSR Strategy already in operation within the company. We are also comparing the concept with the academic point of view of several academics and thereafter deducing our results.

Our thesis is then as follows. Main key stones of the CSR Strategy implementation are:
§   to implement the CSR Strategy into the whole company and within daily operations;
§   to find mutual triple-bottom values between the company and its stakeholders;
§   to let the company's stakeholders know about the values;
§   to act transparent and responsible; not only for one year but continuously.

Company, we are focused on, has adopted the general accepted triple-bottom line strategy of social responsibility and is still managed by one of the founder's descendant[26]. The CSR organization is showed in the chart bellow.

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[24]   A. McWilliams, D. Siegel, *Corporate Social Responsibility: A Theory of the Firm Perspective*, The Academy of Management Review, 26(2001)1, 117-127.

[25]   In our concrete case stakeholders are: Employees, Customers, Communities, Shareholders, Suppliers and Factory Workers, Non-governmental Organizations, Media, Government Entities, Business Colleagues.

[26]   The name of the descendant is Jeffrey Schwartz. He is president and CEO of the case company.

Chart 1: Company's CSR organization.

Company CSR Organization

The CEO has a CSR Board Committee above him with which he consults the CSR vision. The vision flows through Corporate Culture Officer in order to spread the ideas among all employees and so start fulfilling the vision from inside the company. It is the role of Corporate Culture Officer that the corporate values, including values referring to CSR, are incorporated within all company levels. Then, Vice President of CSR has in his responsibility relations which are more connected to the stakeholders (surrounding of the company). Company considered three – with stakeholders mutual – core areas as essential values. They are defined as follows: environmental stewardship, global human rights and community involvement. All these are pursued in transparency and accountability for couple of years and they are presented to the public by the company.

On the operational level, there are Key Performance Indicators = KPI used in the company in order to see how the firm is doing in above mentioned three key areas. The Key Performance Indicators are all of quantitative nature (hence objective) and they are specific for each key

area e.g. total metric tons of carbon emissions within the environmental area, or hours employees spent serving in the community within the Community Involvement key area[27].

Motto ´*Make it better*´ is roofing effort of all operations within the key areas. The emphasis is given on long-term lasting CSR concept incorporation in every decision and within the Organizational Culture together with monitoring and keeping up with the changing landscape. Although the company started the CSR Strategy concept in late nineties[28], it started couple of activities concerning all three key areas much earlier, e.g. partnership with the City Year organization[29] started in 1989, Path of Service Programme launched in 1992[30].

However, company declared social issue awareness long time ago; its drivers to continue behaving in responsible manner are customers who are concerned about social responsibility. It derives the fact from the increasing media interest in social responsibility matters. Company have the vision of future dialog with their customers based on *shared values and a mutual interest in the well-being of the world around*[31] them. According to its experiences our case company believes that thanks to its long-term transparent acting and lasting tendency towards sustainable development it is gaining appreciation and trust from its customers.

Global Human Rights

Our case company is dealing with over 100, 000 workers in more than 30 countries of the world. Although it has not a direct influence on workers everywhere, it developed a concept of monitoring human rights

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[27] Key Performance Indicators, their objectivity and to which rate they are useful by CSR assessment might be a good idea for further research.

[28] The first CSR Report is dated to the year 2000, www.timberland.com.

[29] It will be depicted further.

[30] The Path of Service™ programme based on the idea that „employees are offered 16 hours of paid leave to perform service in their communities every year". Quoted from: http://www.timberlandonline.co.uk/.

[31] Timberland's 2005 CSR Report, 13.

standards. First of all the company is choosing their suppliers according to what extend the supplier shares the same values as the company and is willing to operate under the standards of the company's Code of Conduct. Values and standards embodied in the Code of Conduct are based on the employment which:

§ „Is voluntary and free of harassment and abuse

§ Prohibits child labour, and

§ Meets standards for free association, labour hours, compensation, health and safety, and environmental compliance"[32].

One thing is to agree on some standards, another one to maintain the desired level of state. Hence, the company developed its own way of assessment instead of doing only external audit. Where is the difference? While auditing, auditor plays a role of controller, whereas pursuing assessment means collaboration between the case company and its suppliers. They based their assessment concept on consulting and partnering with their suppliers and left the policing style of assessment. At the operational level this evolved into participatory approach to the employees and to informal conversations.

The implementation consisted of three steps: firstly to train assessors and assessed, secondly a time to adjustment was needed and finally to continue to train, to educate and improve. The assessment was prolonged from half a day to two to five days and the rest of the year was constituted for the remedy of possible failures[33].

As stated in the CSR Report from 2006 and as we described above, the company continues to shift the focus from reactive to proactive; from policing to collaboration and partnership; and from management to worker. This approach is not as revolutionary as it could seem. Carroll[34] has already compiled several writers who provided conceptual schemes describing the ´social responsiveness continuum´. This term stands for the strategy behind business (managerial) response to social responsibility and social issues[35].

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[32] Timberland's 2005 CSR Report, Our Code of Conduct, 15.

[33] See: Timberland's 2005 CSR Report, 18.

[34] See: A. B. Carroll, op. cit.

[35] See: ibidem.

Chart 2: Stages of Social Responsiveness

Resource: Carroll[36]

The chart above shows one of the responsiveness concepts. Ian Wilson's concept (1974) declares four possible business strategies – reaction, defence, accommodation and pro-action. The reciprocal arrow underneath the four strategies represents the continuum from doing nothing to doing much within social issues. We can see our case company is shifting from the left-hand side to the right-hand side of the chart by shifting from audit based reacting style to active assessment style of the responsiveness.

Environmental Stewardship

Environmental Stewardship is based on innovations and employees´ stimulation to better environmental awareness. The stimulation is pursued in two forms. First one, in form of awards for employees with good ideas in accordance of sustainable development; the second one is of financial nature, in form of bonuses for driving a hybrid vehicle. There are innovations developed in terms of energy reduction (e.g. diminishing of green house gas emissions), balanced natural resource consumption (e.g. renewable energy from solar panels) and in terms of extending usage of nature friendly chemicals – related to products produced e.g. usage of water-based adhesives are continuously replacing solvent-based adhesives. Behind all innovation there is the target ´*how to make sure that what's being innovated isn't harmful*´.

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[36] See: ibidem.

Community Involvement

Company perceives herself as a part of the community. Hence, there were established activities which fulfil needs of the company closest surroundings. Just for a quick view we mention few examples like: forty hours for community per year paid by the company, Earth Day, Partnership with Community based organisations[37] or charitable contributions.

All these three key areas could not function if there were no transparency in all actions and good public relation management. Therefore, transparency and PR belong to principal activities in the company CSR Strategy, as it is shown in the Chart No.: 1 on previous pages.

Implementation of CSR may be a popular mean of differentiation strategy by allowing managers to simultaneously satisfy personal interests and to achieve product differentiation[38]. And as the authors further present, the differentiation may be used as comparative advantage only if it is effectively communicated to costumers, so the customer may evaluate the different product formed by effective CSR Strategy. Hence the product gains so called CSR feature which represents the differentiation mark from other products.

Conclusions

We can conclude following outcomes from the company documentation examination and relevant articles we gone through. The company realized a long-term consistent and transparent acting[39] in order

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[37] Already above mentioned City Year Organization [www.cityyear.org]. It „is an international organization whose mission is to build democracy through citizen service, civic leadership and social entrepreneurship. A critical element of the mission of City Year is to train youths to become citizen leaders, with a lifelong commitment to leading active, thoughtful and effective civic lives". Quoted from: Timberlands' 2005 CSR Report, 55.

[38] See: A. McWilliams, D. Siegel, op. cit.. 117-127.

[39] It started by examples mentioned above e.g.: since 1989 lasting partnership with City Year organization, The Path of Service program launched in 1992.

to handle in trustful and social responsible manners. Furthermore Jones' observations are telling „firms that contract (through their managers) with their stakeholders on the basis of mutual trust and cooperation will have a competitive advantage over firms that do not"[40].

In the case company, there is the social responsible strategy present in the whole company. As Townsend reasons the strategy should be within all operations and departments, not only in the CSR department (Townsend, 2007). Therefore, we would suggest placing the CSR board committee also over the general manager within the organizational structure as shown above on Chart 1 and follow the case study concept. Furthermore, the competitive advantage is also gained by adding a unique „CSR characteristics" to the product. That means a feature which is in accordance to the CSR-strategy endorsing the sustainable development. This might have no impact on the company turnover when there is no appropriate communication and advertisement provided to the customer[41]. There are various ways of communication. Company can either communicate their opinion and position through all types of advertisements (surely CSR Reports or CSR rankings count too), related newspaper and magazine articles or joining the networks like CSR and Sustainable Forums or Associations[42].

We understand the above mentioned suggestions are relevant to rather big market players who take advantage of economy of scale and hence can invest to implementation of CSR Strategies. Also, the CSR concept is rather interesting for retailers than production and B2B companies because retailers are pushed not only by the state but also encouraged by their responsible and aware end consumers. However, we consider the responsible behaviour within the business reality as a great challenge for all types of companies.

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[40] T. M. Jones, *Instrumental Stakeholder Theory: A Synthesis of Ethics and Economics*, The Academy of Management Review, 20(1995)2, 422.

[41] See: A. McWilliams, D. Siegel, op. cit., 120.

[42] E.g. „World Business Council for Sustainable Development, the UN Global Compact, the International Business Leaders Forum and similar local bodies. Investment rankings and monitors: the Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes, Corporate Responsibility Index." In: www.biggerthinking.com

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Wydawnictwo Wszechnicy Mazurskiej
Acta Universitatis Masuriensis
Seria: *EPISTEME*

Tomy wydane

EPISTEME 1(1999)
Solidarni z nauczaniem
Jana Pawła II

1. *Solidarni z nauczaniem Jana Pawła II*, pod red. J. M. Dołęgi, Episteme 1(1999) AUM, Olecko 1999, s. 259.

2. *Z dziejów chrześcijaństwa w Augustowie*, pod red. J. W. Czartoszewskiego, Episteme 2(1999) AUM, Olecko 1999, s. 208,

3. *Kazimierz Kloskowski (1953-1999)*, pod red. J. M. Dołęgi i J. Mellera, Episteme 3(2000) AUM, Olecko 2000, s. 314.

EPISTEME 4(2000)
Jerzy Sikora
Londyńska grupa literacka
"Merkuriusza" i "Kontynentów"

EPISTEME 2(1999)
Z dziejów chrześcijaństwa
w Augustowie

4. Jerzy Sikora, *Londyńska grupa literacka „Merkuriusza" i „Kontynentów"*, Episteme 4(2000) AUM, Olecko 2000, s. 310.

5. Ks. Jarosław Sokołowski, *Parafia Osowiec w środowisku społecznym i przyrodniczym*, Episteme 5(2000) AUM, Olecko 2000, s. 212.

EPISTEME 5(2000)
Ks. Jarosław Sokołowski
Parafia Osowiec w środowisku
społecznym i przyrodniczym

EPISTEME 3(2000)
Kazimierz Kloskowski
(1953-1999)

6. *Komunikacja wiary w trzecim tysiącleciu*, pod red. S. Dziekońskiego, Episteme 6(2000) AUM, Olecko 2000, s. 214.

7. *Ekologia rodziny ludzkiej*, pod red. J. M. Dołęgi i J. W. Czartoszewskiego, Episteme 7(2000) AUM, Olecko 2000, s. 334.

EPISTEME 6(2000)
Komunikacja wiary
w trzecim tysiącleciu

EPISTEME 7(2000)
Ekologia rodziny ludzkiej

EPISTEME 8(2000)
Rodzina w nauce i kulturze

EPISTEME 9(2000)
Edukacja ekologiczna w rodzinie

EPISTEME 10(2000)
Ks. Jerzy Szorc
Wolność i posłuszeństwo

8. *Rodzina w nauce i kulturze*, pod red. J. M. Dołęgi i J. W. Czartoszewskiego, Episteme 8(2000) AUM, Olecko 2000, s. 343.

9. *Edukacja ekologiczna w rodzinie*, pod red. J. M. Dołęgi i J. W. Czartoszewskiego, Episteme 9(2000), AUM, Olecko 2000, s. 336.

10. Ks. Jerzy Szorc, *Wolność i posłuszeństwo*, Episteme 10(2000) AUM, Olecko 2000, s. 263.

11. *Kazimierz Kloskowski Zasady – edukacja – testament*, pod red. J. Krajewskiego i J. Sokołowskiego, Episteme 11(2001) AUM, Olecko 2001, s. 228.

12. *Wielki Jubileusz Chrześcijaństwa 2000*, cz. I, pod red. J. M. Dołęgi, J. Sokołowskiego, S. Śledziewskiego, Episteme 12(2001) AUM, Olecko 2001, s. 314.

13. *Wielki Jubileusz Chrześcijaństwa 2000*, cz. II, pod red. J. M. Dołęgi, J. Sokołowskiego, S. Śledziewskiego, Episteme 13(2001) AUM, Olecko 2001, s. 314.

14. Marian Piotr Krysiak, *Średnie szkoły ogólnokształcące w Kolnie (1918-2000)*, Episteme 14(2001) AUM, Olecko 2001, s. 362.

15. *Prymas Tysiąclecia Kardynał Stefan Wyszyński*, cz. I: *Prymas Tysiąclecia a rodzina polska*, pod. red. J. M. Dołęgi i J. W. Czartoszewskiego, Episteme 15(2001) AUM, Olecko 2001, s. 304.

EPISTEME 11(2001)
Kazimierz Kloskowski Zasady – edukacja – testament

EPISTEME 12(2001)
Wielki Jubileusz Chrześcijaństwa 2000

EPISTEME 13(2001)
Wielki Jubileusz Chrześcijaństwa 2000

EPISTEME 14(2001)
Marian Piotr Krysiak
Średnie szkoły ogólnokształcące w Kolnie (1918-2000)

EPISTEME 15(2001)

Prymas Tysiąclecia a rodzina w Polsce

Kardynał Stefan Wyszyński
w pamięci Polski Północno-Wschodniej

EPISTEME 16(2001)

Troska o człowieka w rodzinie i szkole

W roku
Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego

EPISTEME 17(2001)

Meandry etyki

EPISTEME 18(2001)

Dziesięć lat Wszechnicy Mazurskiej w Olecku

1992-2002

16. *Prymas Tysiąclecia Kardynał Stefan Wyszyński*, cz. II: *Prymas Tysiąclecia w pamięci regionu*, pod red. J. M. Dołęgi i J. W. Czartoszewskiego, Episteme 16(2001) AUM, Olecko 2001, s. 288.

17. *Meandry etyki*, pod red. Z. Sareły, Episteme 17(2001) AUM, Olecko 2001, s. 272.

18. *Dziesięć lat Wszechnicy Mazurskiej w Olecku*, pod red.: J. Krajewskiego i J. Sokołowskiego, Episteme 18(2001) AUM, Olecko 2001, s. 232.

19. *Ks. Antoni Boszko (1942-2001)*, pod red. J. M. Dołęgi, J. Harasima, S. Łupińskiego i J. Sokołowskiego, Episteme 19(2002) AUM, Olecko 2002, s. 302.

20. *Teologia duchowości*, pod red. J. M. Dołęgi, Episteme 20(2002) AUM, Olecko 2002, s. 260.

21. *Ziemia kolneńska na przełomie XX i XXI wieku*, pod red. ks. J. L. Grajewskiego, ks. J. Sokołowskiego, Episteme 21(2002) AUM, Olecko 2002, s. 348.

22. *Od kosmologii do ekofilozofii,* pod red. J. M. Dołęgi, Episteme 22(2002) AUM, Olecko 2002, s. 332.

23. Ks. Józef Łupiński, *Dzieje grekokatolików w Królestwie Polskim po powstaniu styczniowym*, Episteme 23(2002) AUM, Olecko 2002, s. 258.

24. Jarosław Poteraj, *Polskie instytucje finansowe. Kreacja rynków i procesy*

EPISTEME 19(2002)

Ks. Antoni Boszko (1942-2001)

EPISTEME 20(2002)

Teologia duchowości

XX-lecie pracy naukowo-badawczej
ks. prof. zw. hab. Stanisława Urbańskiego

EPISTEME 21(2002)

Ziemia kolneńska na przełomie XX i XXI wieku

EPISTEME 22(2002)

Od kosmologii do ekofilozofii

konsolidacyjne, Episteme 24(2002) AUM, Olecko 2002, s. 288.

25. *Unia Europejska. Geneza – rozwój – perspektywy*, pod red. J. M. Dołęgi, Episteme 25(2002) AUM, Olecko 2002, s. 496.

26. *Współczesne dylematy diagnostyczne i metodyczne w opiece i wychowaniu*, pod red. J. Nikitorowicza, K. Sawickiego, T. Bajkowskiego, Episteme 26(2003) AUM, Olecko 2003, s. 278.

27. *Biskup Edward Eugeniusz Samsel (1940-2003)*, pod red. J. M. Dołęgi i A. Skowrońskiego, Episteme 27(2003) AUM, Olecko 2003, s. 384.

28. Kardynał Marian Jaworski, *Wybór pism filozoficznych*, Episteme 28(2003) AUM, Olecko 2003, s. 333.

29. *Konteksty podmiotowej świadomości*, pod red. E. Podrez i R. Monia, Episteme 29(2003) AUM, Olecko 2003, s. 230.

30. *Ochrona œrodowiska i edukacja ekologiczna w Unii Europejskiej i Polsce,* pod red. Z. Ciećki i J. M. Dołęgi, Episteme 30(2003) AUM, Olecko 2003, s. 244.

31. *Pedagogika – wczoraj, dziś i jutro*, pod red. J. Plachy i J. K. Zabłockiego, Episteme 31(2003) AUM, Olecko 2003, s. 210.

EPISTEME 31(2003)
Pedagogika – wczoraj, dziś i jutro

EPISTEME 32(2003)
Mieczysław Markowski
Pierwowzory uniwersytetów

EPISTEME 33(2003)
Biskup Ełcki Edward Eugeniusz Samsel

EPISTEME 34(2004)
Ks. Janusz Aptacy
Antropologia Oliviera Clément

EPISTEME 35(2004)
25 lat Pontyfikatu Jana Pawła II

EPISTEME 36(2004)
Ziemia olecka na początku XXI wieku

EPISTEME 37(2004)
Jarosław Poteraj
Procesy konsolidacyjne. *Raiders & Targets* **w polskich instytucjach finansowych**

EPISTEME 38(2004)
Kultura religijna Kurpiowszczyzny

32. Mieczysław Markowski, *Pierwowzory uniwersytetów*, Episteme 32(2003) AUM, Olecko 2003, s. 406.

33. *Biskup Ełcki Edward Eugeniusz Samsel*, pod red. J. M. Dołęgi, A. Skowrońskiego i J. Sokołowskiego, Episteme 33(2003) AUM, Olecko 2003, s. 402.

34. Ks. Janusz Aptacy, *Antropologia Oliviera Clémenta*, 34(2004) AUM, Olecko 2004, s. 245.

35. *25 lat Pontyfikatu Jana Pawła II*, pod. red. ks. Jerzego Sikory, Episteme 35(2004) AUM, Olecko 2004, s. 432.

36. *Ziemia olecka na początku XXI wieku*, pod. red. Józefa Krajewskiego i Wojciecha Guzewicza, Episteme 36(2004) AUM, Olecko 2004, s. 364.

37. Jarosław Poteraj, *Procesy konsolidacyjne. Raiders & Targets w polskich instytucjach finansowych*, Episteme 37(2004) AUM, Olecko 2004, s. 800.

38. *Kultura religijna Kurpiowszczyzny*, pod. red. ks. Mieczysława Ozorowskiego, Episteme 38(2004) AUM, Olecko 2004, s. 212.

39. Ks. Krzysztof Stępniak, *W poszukiwaniu Kościoła idealnego. Życie i dzieło Tadeusza Żychiewicza (1922-1994)*, Episteme 39(2004) AUM, Olecko 2004, s. 280.

EPISTEME 39(2004)
Ks. Krzysztof Stępniak
W poszukiwaniu Kościoła idealnego
Życie i dzieło Tadeusza Żychiewicza
(1922-1994)

40. Mieczysław Markowski, *Uniwersytet Krakowski w kontekście środkowoeuropejskim późnego średniowiecza i wczesnej nowożytności,* Episteme 40(2005) AUM, Olecko 2005.

41. *W słubie Bogu i ludziom. Ks. Czesław Jakub Domel (1932-2004)*, pod. red. ks. Wojciecha Guzewicza, Episteme 41(2005) AUM, Olecko 2005, s. 192.

EPISTEME 41(2005)
W służbie Bogu i ludziom
Ks. Czesław Jakub Domel (1932-2004)

42. *Ochrona środowiska i edukacja ekologiczna w regionie: Gmina Turośl i Wigierski Park Narodowy*, pod. red. Józefa M. Dołgi, Edwarda Grotta i Mariana P. Krysiaka, Episteme 42(2005) AUM, Olecko 2005, s. 254.

43. Waldemar Świątkowski, *Das Beziehungsgefüge von Sünde und Schuld auf dem Hintergrund der Konzilsaussagen des Vaticanum II*, Episteme 43(2005) AUM, Olecko 2005, s. 276.

EPISTEME 42(2005)
Ochrona środowiska i edukacja ekologiczna w regionie:
Gmina Turośl i Wigierski Park Narodowy

44. *Przestępca i skazany nie tracą godności osoby*, pod. red. W. Woźniaka, Episteme 44(2005) AUM, Olecko 2005, s. 212.

45. *Ks. Jan Lucjan Grajewski (1949--2004)*, pod red. ks. J. Sokołowskiego, Episteme 45(2005) AUM, Olecko 2005, s. 212.


EPISTEME 43(2005)
Waldemar Świątkowski
Das Beziehungsgefüge von Sünde und Schuld
auf dem Hintergrund der Konzilsaussagen des Vaticanum II

46. M. P. Krysiak, *Z dziejów parafii Turośl*, Episteme 46(2005) AUM, Olecko 2005, s. 202.

EPISTEME 44(2005)
Przestępca i skazany
nie tracą godności osoby

EPISTEME 45(2005)
Ks. Jan Lucjan Grajewski
(1949-2004)

EPISTEME 46(2005)
Marian Piotr Krysiak
Z dziejów parafii Turośl

EPISTEME 47(2005)
Profesor i przyjaciel
Ks. Edmund Przekop (1937-1999)

EPISTEME 48(2005)

**Brat Zenon Żebrowski
– kurpiowski Apostoł Japonii**

EPISTEME 49(2002)

Ks. Józef Łupiński

Dzieje grekokatolików w Królestwie Polskim
po powstaniu styczniowym

EPISTEME 50(2005)

Jan Paweł II Wielki

18 V 1920 – 16 X 1978 – 2 IV 2005

EPISTEME 51(2006)

**Indeksy pięćdziesięciu tomów
Episteme**

Redakcja: Wojciech Kalinowski

47. *Profesor i przyjaciel. Ks. Edmund Przekop (1937-1999)*, pod red. ks. W. Guzewicza, Episteme 47(2005) AUM, Olecko 2005, s. 176.

48. *Brat Zenon Żebrowski – kurpiowski Apostoł Japonii*, pod red. ks. J. Aptacego, Episteme 48(2005) AUM, Olecko 2005, s. 256.

49. Ks. Józef Łupiński, *Dzieje grekokatolików w Królestwie Polskim po powstaniu styczniowym*, pod red. ks. W. Guzewicza, Episteme 47(2005) AUM, Olecko 2005, s. 269.

50. *Jan Paweł II Wielki*, praca zbiorowa, Episteme 50(2005) AUM, Olecko 2005, s. 605.

51. *Indeksy pięćdziesięciu tomów Episteme*, pod red. W. Kalinowskiego, Episteme 51(2006) AUM, Olecko 2006, s. 182.

52. Wojciech Kalinowski, *Seelsorger in Polen. Polnische Priester auf dem Prüfstein des II. Vatikanischen Konzils,* Episteme 52(2006) AUM, Olecko 2005, s. 376.

53. *Zielone Płuca Polski i Europy. Ścieżki współpracy Polski, Białorusi i Litwy*, pod red. J.M. Dołęgi i J. Siedleckiej-Siwudy, Episteme 53(2006) AUM, Olecko 2006, s. 284.

54. *Henryk Luft (1877-1934). Działalność architektoniczna i budowlana*, pod red. J. Sokołowskiego, Episteme 54(2006) AUM, Olecko 2006, s. 174.

EPISTEME 52(2006)

Wojciech Kalinowski

Seelsorger in Polen

Polnische Priester auf dem Prüfstein
des II. Vatikanischen Konzils

EPISTEME 53(2006)

Zielone Płuca Polski i Europy
Ścieżki współpracy Polski, Białorusi i Litwy

EPISTEME 54(2006)

Henryk Luft (1877-1934)
Działalność architektoniczna i budowlana

EPISTEME 55(2006)

Ks. Stanisław Biały

Wybrane zagadnienia z bioetyki

EPISTEME 56(2006)

Tożsamość i odrębność w Zjednoczonej Europie

Obrazy krajów i stereotypy narodowe w literaturze anglo- i niemieckojęzycznej

EPISTEME 57(2006)

Rozmaitości ekofilozofii

Redakcja: Antoni Skowroński

EPISTEME 58(2007)

Dariusz Śleszyński

Interakcja źródłem osobowego rozwoju
Ujęcie fenomenologiczno-egzystencjalne

EPISTEME 59(2006)

Mieczysław Gogacz

Życie społeczne w duchu Ewangelii

55. Ks. Stanisław Biały, *Wybrane zagadnienia bioetyki*, Episteme 55(2006) AUM, Olecko 2006, s. 398.

56. *Tożsamość i odrębność w Zjednoczonej Europie.* Obrazy krajów i stereotypy narodowe w literaturze anglo- i niemieckojęzycznej, pod red. G. Moroza, M. Ossowskiego, J. Sztachelskiej, Episteme 56(2006), AUM, Olecko 2006, s. 265.

57. *Rozmaitości ekofilozofii*, pod red. A. Skowrońskiego, Episteme 57(2006), AUM, Olecko 2006, s. 413.

58. Dariusz Śleszyński, *Interakcja źródłem osobowego rozwoju. Ujęcie fenomenologiczno-egzystencjalne*, Episteme 58(2007), AUM, Olecko 2007, s. 430.

59. Mieczysław Gogacz, *Życie społeczne w duchu Ewangelii*, Episteme 59(2006), AUM, Olecko 2006, s. 235.

60. *Ks. Jerzy Popiełuszko – męczennik 19 październik 1984*, pod red. J. Aptacego, Episteme 60(2006), AUM, Olecko 2006, s. 376.

61. Ks. Wojciech Guzewicz, *Parafia Mikaszówka 1907-2007*, Episteme 61(2007), AUM, Olecko 2007, s. 221.

62. *Diagnostyka wytrenowania zawodników różnych dyscyplin sportowych*, pod red. Zbigniewa Jastrzębskiego, Episteme 62(2007), AUM, Olecko 2007, s. 209.

EPISTEME 60(2006)

Ks. Jerzy Popiełuszko
– męczennik 19 października 1984
Redakcja: Janusz Aptacy

EPISTEME 61 (2007)

Ks. Wojciech Guzewicz

Parafia Mikaszówka
1907 - 2007

Red. Zbigniew Jastrzębski   EPISTEME 62 (2007)

Diagnostyka wytrenowania zawodników różnych dyscyplin sportowych

Teoria i praktyka

EPISTEME 63(2007)

Adam Mariusz Filipowicz

Koncepcja duszy w pismach Tertuliana

EPISTEME 64(2007)
Wartości i styl życia Polaków
Redakcja: Wojciech Klimski

63. Adam Mariusz Filipowicz, *Koncepcja duszy w pismach Tertuliana*, Episteme 63(2007), AUM, Olecko 2007, s. 272.

64. *Wartości i styl życia Polaków*, pod red. W. Klimskiego, Episteme 64(2007), AUM, Olecko 2007, s. 418.

65. *50 lat kapłańskiej służby*, pod red. J. Sokołowskiego, Episteme 65(2007), AUM, Olecko 2007, s. 540.

EPISTEME 65(2007)
50 lat kapłańskiej służby
Redakcja: Jarosław Sokołowski

67. *Oblicza miłości. Wokół encykliki Benedykta XVI Deus caritas est*, pod red. ks. J. Kotowskiego i ks. W. Nowackiego, Episteme 67(2007), AUM, Olecko 2007, s. 196.

68. M. P. Krysiak, *Stygmatyk z Wykrotu orędownikiem Matki Bożej*, Episteme 68(2007), AUM, Olecko 2007, s. 210.

EPISTEME 67(2007)
Oblicza miłości
Wokół encykliki Benedykta XVI *Deus caritas est*
Redakcja: ks. Jarosław Kotowski i ks. Wojciech Nowacki

69. H. Czajewski, *W cieniu mojego Anioła Stróża*, Episteme 69(2007), AUM, Olecko 2007, s. 314.

70. *Badania naukowe Wszechnicy Mazurskiej w Olecku (1)*, pod red. I. Chrząścika, Episteme 70(2007), AUM, Olecko 2007, s. 176.

71. *Teoria i praktyka wychowania fizycznego i sportu na różnych etapach przygotowań*, pod red. Z. Jastrzębskiego Episteme 71(2007), AUM, Olecko 2007, s. 180.

72. *Ks. Marian Szczęsny (1942-2006)*, pod red. ks. W. Guzewicza, Episteme 72(2007), AUM, Olecko 2007, s. 250.

EPISTEME 68(2007)
Stygmatyk z Wykrotu orędownikiem Matki Bożej
Marian Piotr Krysiak

EPISTEME 69(2007)
Henryk Czajewski
W cieniu mojego Anioła Stróża
Red. ks. Jarosław Sokołowski

Red. Ireneusz Chrząścik   EPISTEME 70 (2007)
Badania naukowe Wszechnicy Mazurskiej w Olecku (1)
(wybrane zagadnienia z lat 2005-2007)

Badania naukowe Wszechnicy Mazurskiej w Olecku (2)   EPISTEME 71 (2007)
Teoria i praktyka wychowania fizycznego i sportu na różnych etapach przygotowań
Red. Zbigniew Jastrzębski

EPISTEME 72(2007)
Ks. Marian Szczęsny (1942-2006)
Redakcja: ks. Wojciech Guzewicz

73. Andrzej Szwarc, *Piłka nożna. Gra jeden przeciwko jednemu*, Episteme 73(2008) AUM, Olecko 2008, s. 92.

74. Jørgen Veisland, *The Outcast. Twisting the Plot in Six English Novels*, Episteme 74(2008) AUM, Olecko 2008, s. 128.

75. Ks. Wojciech Turowski, *Przepowiadanie o Maryi w tajemnicach Chrystusa...*, Episteme 75(2008) AUM, Olecko 2008, s. 452.

76. Ks. Robert Śliwowski, *Królowa Młodzieży. Sanktuarium Matki Bożej Płonkowskiej jako miejsce kultu maryjnego w diecezji łomżyńskiej*, Episteme 76(2008) AUM, Olecko 2008, s. 230.

77. *Miejsca magiczne w literaturze anglo- i niemieckojęzycznej*, pod. red. G. Moroza i M. Ossowskiego, Episteme 77(2008) AUM, Olecko 2008, s. 420.

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81. *Główne problemy współczesnej etyki*, pod red.: K. Dominik, D. Dzwonkowskiej i A. Waleszczyńskiego, Episteme 81(2008) AUM, Olecko 2008, s. 228.

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
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