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Articulate forgiveness and normative constraints

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Brandon Warmke
Brandon Warmke*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN, USA
*
*Email: bwarmke@nd.edu
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Abstract

Philosophers writing on forgiveness typically defend the Resentment Theory of Forgiveness, the view that forgiveness is (or crucially implicates) the overcoming of resentment. Rarely is much more said about the nature of resentment or how it is overcome when one forgives. Pamela Hieronymi, however, has advanced detailed accounts both of the nature of resentment and how one overcomes resentment when one forgives. In this paper, I argue that Hieronymi’s account of the nature of forgiveness is committed to two implausible claims about the norms bearing on forgiveness. Her account is highly instructive, however, for it brings into relief how certain intuitive views about the norms of forgiveness should be used to constrain our theories about its nature. I conclude by defending this methodological proposal.

Keywords

Forgivenessresentmentblameapologyobligationcontrol
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 45 , Issue 4 , August 2015 , pp. 490 - 514
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2015

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