

THE NEW SCHELLING

Edited by
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INTRODUCTION: THE NEW SCHELLING

Judith Norman and Alistair Welchman

A PHILOSOPHER'S PHILOSOPHER

Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling (1775–1854) is often thought of as a 'philosopher's philosopher', with a specialist rather than generalist appeal. One reason for Schelling's lack of popularity is that he is something of a problem case for traditional narratives about the history of philosophy. Although he is often slotted in as a stepping stone on the intellectual journey from Kant to Hegel, any attention to his ideas will show that he does not fit this role very well. His later philosophy suggests a materialism and empiricism that puts him outside of idealism proper; his connection with the romantic movement suggests an aestheticism that challenges traditional philosophy as such; and his mysticism allies him with medieval, pre-critical philosophies considered antiquated by the nineteenth century. And if Schelling was not entirely at home with his contemporaries, he seems, on the face of it, to have fared little better with his future: there has been no Schelling school, he has had no followers. No historical trajectory announces Schelling as its point of departure.

And yet Schelling's influence has been an extraordinary one. He has inspired physicists, physicians, theologians, historians and poets. A wildly diverse set of philosophers have claimed that their ideas have resonance with his. Perhaps the question of Schelling's influence can be approached by looking at what Kant says about works of genius – that they should give rise to inspiration, not imitation. Paradoxically, to imitate genius is not to produce an imitation but a new creative work. Whether or not Schelling should be strictly viewed as a genius, Kant's notion suggests a sense in which Schelling should be understood as a 'philosopher's philosopher': he inspired creativity, not repetition. In this perspective, the lack of a 'Schelling school' is a sign of strength; Schelling is continually being rediscovered, and his works have retained a fresh and untimely character. If Schelling does not have any obvious historical successors, it is because his influence cannot be charted by the usual methods. New philosophical tools are needed in order to understand his philosophical significance, his impact on contemporary thought and relevance for contemporary concerns.

Perhaps Schelling's thought presents these challenges because it is 'unsystematic' (although, of course, this does not preclude a certain unity of problematic). This 'unsystem' arises, on the one hand, from Schelling's attempts to produce a philosophical encounter with the irrational and, on the

other hand, from the fact that the sheer number of 'systems' he created undermines the notion of unitary system in the sense intended by Kant or Hegel. It is not much of an exaggeration to say that twentieth-century European thought is motivated by a struggle to escape from this notion of a unitary philosophical system imposed largely by German thought in the previous century; consequently, it comes as no surprise that Schelling's thought allies itself with so many different – and mutually incompatible – strands in the contemporary. We see traces of Schelling in both twentieth-century idealism and materialism, in existentialism, Marxism, psychoanalysis and even deconstruction. But it also follows from this notion of 'unsystem' that these alliances or affinities often cannot be expressed in terms of the standard conception of influence, with its institutional presuppositions of schools and expositors that form the concrete correlates of the philosophical conception of system. Rather, we need some other conceptualization of Schelling's reach into the present. Karl Jaspers wrote:

To study Schelling, to look with new eyes at who Schelling is and where he leads, to follow him from his great beginnings, to see through his magic and to let him speak to us from his prevailing modes and ways of thinking – this largely means: to grasp the possibilities and dangers of contemporary philosophy. Schelling's reality, his rich mental life, the way he presents himself is not an example [*Vorbild*] to be copied, but rather a prototype [*Urbild*] of modern possibilities.¹

The pieces in this collection will view Schelling as *Urbild* rather than *Vorbild*, and explore the possibilities he opened up for modern thought.

DIE SCHELLINGALTER

The periodization of Schelling's works is a subject of heated debate, because a frequent complaint against Schelling is his extreme philosophical volatility. Schelling is described unkindly as a protean thinker, never sticking with a view long enough to develop it. There are two aspects to this charge: fickleness and lack of rigour. Accordingly, Schelling's defenders often argue for his continuity of vision. Heidegger famously claimed: 'there was seldom a thinker who fought so passionately ever since his earliest periods for his one and unique standpoint.'² And Emil Fackenheim turns the complaint against Schelling right around, saying: 'The modern student who fails to perceive a connection does well to suspect that the fault lies, not with Schelling, but with himself.'³

Even proponents of the continuity thesis tend to divide Schelling's works into roughly four periods: transcendental philosophy and philosophy of nature; the system of identity; the system of freedom; and the positive philosophy. This classification is certainly an oversimplification, concealing

the gradual development and tensions in each of these periods, but it is basically accurate, generally accepted, and taxonomically useful.

Schelling studied at the Protestant seminary in Tübingen from 1790 to 1795; Hegel and Hölderlin were among his close friends and fellow students. Schelling began reading Fichte, and was drawn to the manner in which Fichte was attempting to provide a more fundamental ground for the transcendental structures Kant believed to condition the possibility of experience. Fichte transformed the Kantian system into an idealism by referring all objects of experience entirely to the freely self-positing acts of the absolute subject of consciousness. In early essays such as *Of the I as Principle of Philosophy or on the Unconditional in Human Knowledge* (1795) and *Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism* (1795), Schelling pursues this Fichtean line of inquiry. But Schelling quickly became critical of Fichte, and came to believe that a reduction of experience to consciousness illegitimately privileges the subjective pole of consciousness over the objective pole of nature. Schelling began to develop a broader conception of the absolute as a ground of nature and consciousness, being and thought. Schelling hoped that this approach would preserve the autonomy of nature with respect to consciousness while safeguarding human (and divine) freedom.

This line of inquiry led Schelling to split philosophy into two, corresponding parts. A transcendental idealism focuses on the subject of consciousness, tracing the development of the thinking subject from nature. Schelling articulates this project in the *System of Transcendental Idealism* (1800). The complementary project of a philosophy of nature, which Schelling developed in his *Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature* (1797, 1803), focuses on the objective world constructing a speculative system of the laws and forces of nature.

Schelling elaborated this philosophical project at the University of Jena, where Goethe's influence enabled him to secure a position in 1798. In 1801, Schelling turned to arguing (in a Spinozistic – and decidedly un-Fichtean – vein) that the real and ideal aspects of his system stood in a relation of identity or indifference, although they seem separate from a finite, human perspective. This is his second period, his system of identity, articulated in texts such as *Presentation of My System of Philosophy* (1801), *Bruno, or On the Natural and the Divine Principle of Things* (1802), and *System of the Whole of Philosophy and of Philosophy of Nature in Particular* (1804). The question that dogs his philosophy at this point is how conditioned, finite objects (and minds) arise out of this unconditioned, primal identity.

In 1803, Schelling moved first to Würzburg and then, in 1806, to Munich. This is the period of his third philosophical phase, when he began turning his attention to problems involving God and human freedom. If there was a real break in Schelling's philosophy it was here, when he started theorizing a dark, material basis of existence. Schelling no longer thought that the relationship between real and ideal was symmetrical but instead started to theorize that it had the structure of ground and consequent. The

material ground has a blunt actuality that does not lend itself to rational exposition, according to Schelling; it is 'unprethinkable' in that we cannot ask about the conditions of its possibility. Our grounding in this material force gives us our individuality and personality, while providing the condition for the permanent possibility of evil, disease, and madness and finally explaining how finite objects are able to arise out of the unconditioned. Schelling developed this notion in the context of philosophies of God, time, and human freedom in a series of texts including *Of Human Freedom* (1809), the *Stuttgart Seminars* (1810), and *Ages of the World* (*Die Weltalter*) (1811, 1813, and 1815).

Schelling spent the last four decades of his life lecturing in Munich, Erlangen, and Berlin. Kierkegaard, Engels, Bakunin, and Burckhardt were among those who attended his famous lectures. Schelling's later (fourth phase) thought was characterized by a distinction between 'positive' and 'negative' philosophy. Negative philosophy is supposed to be a purely *a priori* rational determination of the metaphysical grounds of reality. It treats the essence of things or their abstract possibility (the 'what') as opposed to their existence or concrete actuality (the 'that'), which is the subject of positive philosophy. Existence cannot, in the end, be rationally grounded and philosophy needs an experiential component to describe actuality and complement the speculative inquiries of the negative philosophy. Schelling describes the positive philosophy that integrates this component as a metaphysical empiricism, and worked out positive philosophies of mythology and revelation in a series of lectures delivered in Berlin between 1842 and 1846. His *Philosophy of Mythology* and *Philosophy of Revelation* were not published until after his death in 1854.

Schelling did undoubtedly change his philosophical perspective throughout his long period of intellectual activity, whether or not we agree with Heidegger about how fundamental these changes actually were. The essays in this book will not address the question of the ultimate continuity of Schelling's thought, but rather argue for the rich philosophical potential of the various stages. In other words, this collection does not offer much of a response to the charge that Schelling was a fickle thinker; but it does offer ample evidence that Schelling's thought is both fruitful and rigorous in the extreme.

THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS

Schelling's reputation has had mixed fortunes. Not only has he been dismissed with the complaint of volatility but for a long time he has been slotted into a facile historical narrative of the triumphal progression of philosophy from Fichte to Hegel in which he was consigned to the role of intermediary, correcting Fichte's shortcomings while cultivating a new set to pass on to Hegel for correction. Accordingly, the task of reviving Schelling has had a lot to do with insisting on his importance outside of this historical

position. This entails arguing that Hegel's interpretation is not definitive, and that Schelling's career did not end when Hegel began publishing.

After his death in 1854, Schelling's reputation quickly waned, along with the fortunes of philosophical idealism. He had been subject to a virulent denunciation at the hands of the Young Hegelians who thought that Hegel's brand of idealism lent itself more readily to a permutation into the sort of materialism then in vogue (see Alberto Toscano's paper in this volume). Continental Europe has subsequently seen two revivals of Schelling's thought. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, Schelling enjoyed a first, short-lived renaissance at the hands of such writers as Kuno Fischer, Eduard von Hartmann and Benedetto Croce. After this, his work descended again into relative obscurity – despite Heidegger's important and well-received study of Schelling's *On Human Freedom* – until a second revival on the centennial of his death in 1954. This was the year of an important conference on Schelling in Bad Ragaz, Switzerland (where Schelling had died) which drew renewed attention in Europe to Schelling's works; philosophers such as Jürgen Habermas, Karl Jaspers, Horst Fuhrmans and Walter Schulz contributed important studies arguing for Schelling's historical and philosophical significance. The Jubilee edition of Schelling's works was completed in the same year.

In the English-speaking world, however, neither of these revivals had much effect. This is a fact for which Hegel may be doubly responsible, because the first revival coincided with the rising arc of the Oxford Hegelians, who would naturally have regarded Schelling's significance as very limited. By the mid-1950s, in contrast, both British and American philosophy were dominated by an abrasive variant of the Vienna School philosophy that was so deeply anti-Hegelian that anything even vaguely connected with him – Schelling included – would have been regarded as, at best, nonsense.

The inattention of the English-speaking world is, at last, starting to change. In 1997, Terry Eagleton wrote that 'over the past few years [Schelling] has been shot from Teutonic obscurity to something like philosophical stardom.'⁴ There are several reasons for this. Recent resurgence of interest in Heidegger has led scholars to finally attend to a philosopher who was certainly a key influence on the development of Heidegger's thought. David Farrell-Krell is perhaps the most notable writer in this tradition. Moreover, recent books by Andrew Bowie, Dale Snow and Edward Allen Beach have helped introduce Schelling to a wider public. Finally Slovenian psychoanalytical theorist, philosophy and film critic Slavoj Žižek has brought Schelling to an audience wider than anyone would have thought possible, not least by insisting on the importance of reading Schelling for viewing Hitchcock (see Žižek's chapter in this volume).

This collection aims to contribute to this on-going discovery of Schelling by showing some of the directions Schelling's thought is leading, and pro-

viding translations of classic German studies of Schelling's influence and significance.

THE NEW SCHELLING

Schelling's impact on and relevance for twentieth-century thought can be seen most strongly in four different areas: materialism, existentialism, psychoanalysis and religion.

1. Psychoanalysis

Schelling's connections to psychoanalysis are conceptually clear. He developed a theory of the unconscious as a set of pre-personal drives that matches the contours of Freud's account. Canonical works like Hartmann's groundbreaking *Philosophy of the Unconscious* acknowledge the centrality of Schelling's contribution here.

In his article, 'Several Connections between Aesthetics and Therapeutics in Nineteenth-century Philosophy' (which has been translated into English for the first time for this collection),⁵ Odo Marquard argues for a different and more novel 'functional' continuity between Schelling's earlier philosophies of art and nature and Freudian psychoanalysis: 'Freudian psychoanalysis is to a significant degree the disenchanting form of Schelling's philosophy of nature.'⁶ Although also interested in the question of the historical influence of Schelling on Freud, Marquard is more deeply concerned with the structural – in fact *functional* – convergence between Schelling's aesthetic and Freud's therapeutic project. He argues that they are formally distinct responses to the same problem, namely the threat posed by the irrational and destructive powers of nature. For Schellingian aesthetics it is the artistic genius that represents an acceptable – sublimated or domesticated – form under which nature can appear. For Freud the therapeutic process performs the same function of providing a forum in which nature can appear but without being a direct threat, albeit in a very different way. This affinity between Freud and Schelling is therefore quite distinct from any questions of historical influence or terminological continuity: they constructed different tools to solve the same problem.

The Slovenian philosopher and film critic Slavoj Žižek has been key in reawakening contemporary interest in Schelling. In his 1996 book, *The Indivisible Remainder: An Essay on Schelling and Related Matters*, Žižek applies a distinctive blend of Lacanian psychoanalysis and pop culture to the task of interpreting Schelling's middle period works. Žižek stresses the Lacanian theme that rational structures of ordinary thought are predicated on some Real, a dejected, obscene surplus of materiality or indivisible remainder that cannot be thought through or thought away. Žižek finds considerable resonance between this and Schelling's theory of a chaotic ground of existence, and spells out the relevance of Schelling for Lacan (and vice versa) in

terms of theories of language, time, even physics. Žižek adds to this a dizzying assortment of references to various cultural phenomena, in particular film.

In Žižek's piece for the collection, 'Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Schelling (But Were Afraid to Ask Hitchcock)', he explores the relationship between Lacan, Schelling and Hitchcock. Žižek focuses on Schelling's idea of the unfathomable Real, which he describes as ontologically incomplete, a 'spectral plurality of virtual realities'. Žižek describes three ways of construing this spectral Real in Schelling's *Ages of the World*; and then he generalizes Schelling's point, finding these three versions of the Real played out in a wide variety of Hitchcock's filmic motifs. Schelling becomes a matrix through which to read Hitchcock – a more significant matrix even than Lacanian psychoanalysis. Of course Hitchcock was no reader of Schelling. But Žižek argues that artistic conventions often anticipate the technological means of realizing them, and both Hitchcock and Schelling were aiming at a vision only first realized in the hypertext, which offers a way of presenting reality as virtual, inconclusive, haunted by an abject abyss of traces of possibilities it does not actualize. Hitchcock – and by extension Schelling – prefigure the thought of a fictionalized, virtual reality, in which the virtual is not a qualification on reality, but rather its essence and kernel.

2. Materialism

Schelling has had a stormy relationship with dialectical materialism. Although inspired by his critique of Hegelian idealism, the Young Hegelians repudiated Schelling's theology, and Lukas branded him an irrationalist, largely because of his early theory of a quasi-mystical intellectual intuition.⁷ On the other hand, Schelling casts considerable and elaborate doubts on the efficacy of the pure concept as vector of development or ground of material reality. Schelling develops the thought of an 'unprethinkable' material ground prior to reason, and philosophers such as Jürgen Habermas and Ernst Bloch have been very receptive to this idea, agreeing that a purely rational philosophy does not have the resources to account for actually existing material nature. In fact, Marxists have seen Schelling's distinction between negative and positive philosophy as a prototype for a distinction between theory and practice. Habermas goes so far as to describe Ernst Bloch as a 'Marxist Schelling', citing Schellingian inspirations for Bloch's views on nature and history.⁸

In his own treatment of Schelling, Habermas focuses on the works from the time of the *Freedom* essay and the positive philosophy, and the notions of a material ground and pre-personal will. He is interested in the extent to which Schelling succeeded in integrating a sense of historical or empirical contingency into an otherwise transcendental rationalism. In his 1954 dissertation Habermas lays particular stress on the first draft of Schelling's

fragmentary, *Ages of the World*; Habermas sees this as the locus for a theory of historical freedom, in which freedom loses its absolute, transcendental character; even God becomes genuinely historical, and individuals are empowered to intervene meaningfully in determining their historical fate. Habermas thinks that Schelling's experiment in historical freedom was ultimately at odds with the rationalist tendency of his metaphysics, leading him eventually to abandon it; Schelling was not able to realize the revolutionary potential of his insight.

Habermas continues these themes in his 1971 article, 'Dialectical Idealism in Transition to Materialism: Schelling's Idea of a Contraction of God and its Consequences for the Philosophy of History,'⁹ which appears in English for the first time in this collection. Habermas emphasizes Schelling's theory of a contraction in God, a force that draws things inward and resists expansiveness, acting as a material ground for the actual development of God through history. Habermas focuses on how this force serves to ground not only God but a finite being who has broken from God (but is bound to him by love) and fallen into corruption. This finite creature is social, historical humanity as an *'alter deus'* or other (of the) Absolute. God puts his own fate in jeopardy by relinquishing power to this other, which destroys its connection to nature and inaugurates a period of corruption. Habermas is interested in the extent to which Schelling succeeds in theorizing an actual historical beginning to this *alter deus*, as an actual (as opposed to transcendental) beginning of corruption makes possible the practical demand for an actual end to corruption. This would permit the restoration of an authentic relationship with nature, and the abolition of the political state as a coercive institution that uses domination to establish order.

Judith Norman's article on Schelling and Nietzsche discusses the various affinities and points of contact between these two philosophers of the will. Unlike Schopenhauer, Schelling and Nietzsche were concerned to bring the idea of a material will into relationship with temporality. Specifically, Norman argues that both Nietzsche and Schelling constructed the notion of a will capable of creating the past as a way of affirming the present. For both of them, the will not only intervenes creatively in time – it is involved in a sort of backwards causality that constitutes temporality in the first place. And in both cases, this backwards willing functions within a project of affirmation, as a way of embracing and valorizing the present. Norman argues against seeing this reverse causality as a sort of return of the repressed for either Schelling or Nietzsche; Schelling's notion of reverse causality does not entail the thought of return, while Nietzsche's thought of eternal return is predicated on a decisive overcoming of repression.

Gilles Deleuze refers to Schelling sparingly but approvingly, and the articles by Toscano and Hamilton Grant both explore the Deleuzian side of Schelling. Toscano suggests that materialism can be seen as a type of philosophical *practice* common to both Schelling and Deleuze (-Guattari), specifically the practice of construction. Schelling transformed the Kantian

theme of construction in a manner vital to the development of materialism, Toscano argues, giving speculative philosophy a privileged position as a recapitulation of the transcendental production of the Absolute. Schelling's great merit was to bring production into the concept and see philosophy as creative practice; but Toscano thinks that Schelling ultimately fails to make good the promise of this advance. By linking the task of philosophy to construction within the Absolute, and construing the Absolute as a starting point that is given in advance and develops in a necessary manner, Schelling fails to grasp the *specificity* and artifice of philosophical construction. Philosophy remains safely locked within the Absolute and never comes into contact with anything like a non-philosophical exterior. It is the thought of such an exterior, of philosophical construction as heterogenesis, that characterizes Deleuze's more radical materialism, a line of thinking that Schelling inaugurated, according to Toscano, but never fulfilled.

Iain Hamilton Grant's paper, "Philosophy become Genetic": The Physics of the World Soul' shares not just a common Deleuzian contemporary intellectual coordination for Schelling with Toscano, but also a Kantian matrix. That is, Schelling exacerbates the productive, constructive or genetic impetus of the critical philosophy, pushing it beyond its representational and therefore idealist frame. At the limit, this requires, as Toscano agrees, an immersion of philosophy itself, the process of thought, in the productive nexus of matter, as well as a strictly correlate intensification of the empirical process of production. The former radicalizes the alleged vitalism of the nineteenth-century *Naturphilosophen*; the latter is, Grant argues, a continual and active un-conditioning of things, almost an *Entdingen*. Along the way Grant recasts the standard debates around Plato and Aristotle in a highly original way ('the *Timaeus* is not a two-worlds metaphysics . . . because it has a one-world physics') and performs a *tour de force* by rehabilitating the 'recapitulation' hypothesis of the *Naturphilosophen* – that phylogeny recapitulates ontogeny – in a way analogous to Deleuze's treatment of return in Nietzsche. In both cases, a thought that apparently presupposes a whole idealist identity theory is reconfigured through an account of repetition as a generator of difference. Grant mobilizes recapitulation in the service of a catastrophism that ruins the possibility of the same, arguing that even identity must be constructed, and thereby building an unusual bridge between Schelling's philosophy of nature and philosophy of identity phases.

3. Existentialism

Paul Tillich saw Schelling as the father of existentialism, because his later philosophy explicitly took its point of departure from the notion that concrete existence precedes essence. (Interestingly, this is one of the principle reasons why philosophical materialism has taken such an interest in Schelling.) Indeed, Tillich went so far as to say: "There are hardly any concepts in the whole of twentieth-century existentialist literature that did not come

from the [Berlin] lectures.¹⁰ In the case of Kierkegaard this lineage is particularly direct, since he actually attended the lecture series in 1841–2. But the works of Jaspers and Heidegger, especially Heidegger's famous lectures on Schelling from 1936 and 1941, also attest not only to Schelling's impact on their own thought, but also to his wider and continued effects on existentialist thought in general.

Manfred Frank is one of the most significant Schelling commentators in recent years, and has done groundbreaking work in demonstrating the roots of Marxism as well as existentialism in the thought of Schelling. His contribution to this collection, 'Schelling and Sartre on Being and Nothingness', is the first English translation of his important study of Schelling's relevance for an understanding of Sartrean existentialism.¹¹ Frank carefully lays out Sartre's discussion of the nature of consciousness and its relation to the facticity of being-in-itself in the opening sections of *Being and Nothingness*. He explains that Sartre has to bend grammar in order to express the manner in which consciousness *is*, given the fact that its mode of being is to be nothing; so, for instance Sartre coins passive and transitive forms of the verb 'to be'. Frank argues that Schelling had been driven by the same desire to distinguish between forms and states of nothingness, and had developed a sophisticated set of conceptual distinctions that would be useful for an understanding of Sartre. Both, moreover, were motivated by the same desire to develop an ontology of freedom. The ontology of the late Schelling, Frank argues, has 'stupendous similarities' to that of the early Sartre, and Frank gives us a taste of the productive cross-fertilizations that can occur by reading the two together.

4. Religion

Philosophers of religion have found considerable inspiration in Schelling, with Paul Tillich being perhaps the most noteworthy example. Tillich's central distinction between mysticism and guilt consciousness or philosophy and religion, and his attempt to overcome this dichotomy through a metaphysical conception of the will, were inspired by Schelling's late, religious philosophy.

The chapters by Joseph Lawrence and Michael Vater contribute to ongoing religious appropriations of Schelling's thought in new ways. Lawrence explores Schelling's conception of radical evil. Given the scope of the atrocities apparent in the twentieth century and now unfolding in the twenty-first, Lawrence turns to Schelling not only to understand how and why evil takes the forms it now does, but also to grasp the possibility of forgiveness. In his middle period works, Schelling distinguishes between, on the one hand, the overt evil of incipient irrationality, the chaotic material ground run amok, and, on the other hand, the subtler (but, Lawrence argues, ultimately more destructive) evil of a dominating rationalism that conducts silent genocides in the name of self-interest. These are the twin evils of

suicide bombers and capitalism, or 'Jihad' and 'McWorld', in Lawrence's analysis. Schelling cleared the way for understanding such terrors by seeing hell not as a punishment for evil, but as its condition. Our vibrant, living world necessarily entails the existence of suffering, and the two types of evil are ultimately responses to the crisis caused by ineradicable human suffering. By recognizing this, Lawrence believes, we can not only begin to understand evil – we can finally begin to forgive it.

Finally, Michael Vater's contribution looks at Schelling's system of identity as well as the later system of freedom in light of the tradition of Mahayana Buddhist, anti-metaphysical thought. Vater focuses in particular on the Madhyamika theory of knowledge and reality, and the manner in which it describes the relationship between 'absolute' and 'relative' truths as two ways of speaking about the very same thing(s). Vater uses Buddhist thought as a model of clarity, and therefore a standard by means of which to measure how effectively Schelling's metaphysics is able to avoid a reification of the Absolute. Vater's conclusion is that Schelling cannot avoid this; but it is only by renouncing a philosophical enterprise that the Buddhist tradition succeeds.

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The heterogeneity of the articles collected in this volume is testimony to the diversity and fruitfulness of Schelling's thought, evidence that Schelling articulated a wide range of ideas that other and later traditions would follow through to their limit. Most of all, these articles show that, after 200 years, Schelling is still *new*.

Notes

- 1 *Schelling: Größe und Verhängnis* (Munich: Piper, 1955), 332.
- 2 *Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Athens OH: Ohio University Press, 1985), 6.
- 3 'Schelling's Conception of Positive Philosophy', in *Review of Metaphysics*, vol. VII, 4 (1954), 565.
- 4 'Enjoy!' *London Review of Books*, 27 November 1997.
- 5 The piece originally appeared as 'Über einige Beziehungen zwischen Ästhetik und therapeutik in der Philosophie des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts', in *Schwierigkeiten mit der Geschichtsphilosophie* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1973) and was republished in *Materialien zu Schellings philosophischen Anfängen*, ed. Manfred Frank and Gerhard Kurz (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1975), 341–77.
- 6 'Schelling – Zeitgenosse inkognito' in Baumgartner, H. M. (ed.), *Schelling: Einführung in seine Philosophie* (Munich: Karl Alber, 1975), 22.
- 7 See Karl Löwith, *From Hegel to Nietzsche*, trans. David E. Green (New York: Anchor, 1967), 114–19.
- 8 Jürgen Habermas, 'Ernst Bloch: A Marxist Schelling (1960)' in *Philosophical-Political Profiles*, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1983), 61–77.
- 9 The piece originally appeared as 'Dialektischer Idealismus im Übergang zum

- Materialismus. Geschichtsphilosophische folgerungen aus Schellings Idee einer Kontraction Gottes' in *Theorie und Praxis* (Berlin: Luchterhand, 1969), 108–61.
- 10 *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte des christlichen Denkens. Teil II: Aspekte des Protestantismus im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Ingeborg C. Henel (Stuttgart: Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1972), 123. Quoted in 'Schellings Wirkung im Überblick' by Annemarie Pieper in Baumgartner, *Einführung*, 149.
- 11 Frank's piece in this collection is a translation of an edited excerpt from part III of the introduction to his seminal book, *Der unendliche Mangel an Sein. Schellings Hegelkritik und die Anfänge der Marxschen Dialektik*, 2nd edition, expanded edn (Munich: W. Fink, 1992), 50–84.

1

SEVERAL CONNECTIONS
BETWEEN AESTHETICS AND
THERAPEUTICS IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY
PHILOSOPHY

Odo Marquard
Translated by Judith Norman

I

This investigation takes its point of departure from two books. One appeared in the first year of the nineteenth century; the other appeared in the last. The one is Schelling's *System of Transcendental Idealism*; the other is Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams*.

Schelling's *System of Transcendental Idealism* appears in 1800, three years after his *Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature*, two years after his work on the World Soul, one year after his *First Attempt at a System of the Philosophy of Nature*. Its concluding and decisive 'Part Six' contains the 'Deduction of a Universal Organ of Philosophy, Or: Essentials of the Philosophy of Art according to the Principles of Transcendental Idealism.'¹ 'Art' – Schelling wrote – 'is . . . paramount to the philosopher' (III, 628; STI, 231): 'It is not, however, the first principle of philosophy, merely, and the first intuition that philosophy proceeds from, which initially become objective through aesthetic production; the same is true of the entire mechanism which philosophy deduces, and on which in turn it rests' (III, 625–6; STI, 230) 'The proper sense' – Schelling therefore says – 'by which this type of philosophy must be apprehended is thus the aesthetic sense, and that is why the philosophy of art is the true organon of philosophy' (III, 351; STI, 14). Thus, Schelling clearly understands human reality to be exemplified by art and the artist, and this is reflected in the central position he gives to the philosophy of art.² Schelling's *System of Transcendental Idealism* takes an aesthetic perspective on existence; it determines philosophy primarily as aesthetics.

Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams* appears in the final year of the nineteenth century; in point of fact, Jones tells us³ it appears on 4 November 1899; the